Indian-UK Konkan Shakti 2021 Exercise: October 2021

10/27/2021

By Indian Strategic

New Delhi. The sea phase of maiden Tri-Service exercise ‘Konkan Shakti 2021’ between the Armed Forces of India and United Kingdom is being held off the Konkan coast in the Arabian Sea.

On completion of harbour planning phase, the sea phase of the exercise commenced on October 24 and will continue till October 27.

All participating units were split into two opposing forces with the aim of achieving sea control to land Army ground-troops at a pre-designated site.

One force was led by the Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet and comprised the flag ship INS Chennai, other warships of the Indian Navy and HMS Richmond, the Royal Navy’s Type 23 frigate.

The other force operated under the UK Carrier Strike Group comprising aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, other UK and Netherland naval ships and Indian warships.

The two forces integrated within their groups with exercises such as replenishment at sea approaches, air direction and strike operations by fighter aircraft (MiG 29Ks and F35Bs), cross control of helicopters (Sea King, Chetak and Wildcat), transiting through war-at-sea scenarios and gun shoots on expendable air targets.

Simulated induction of Army troops was also undertaken, followed by setting up of a joint command operations centre.

Thereafter, the two forces effected a rendezvous at sea with advanced air and sub-surface exercises.

The air operations included strikes on the combined formation by Indian maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) Dornier, fighters of the Indian Navy (MiG 29Ks), Royal Navy (F35Bs) and Indian Air Force (SU-30 and Jaguars) as well as a composite fly past over the formation.

Sub-surface exercises with an Indian Scorpene class submarine and underwater remote controlled vehicle EMATT, operated by the Royal Navy, were undertaken through the night. Indian MPA, P8I also participated in the exercise.

This article was published by India Strategic in October 2021.

 

Exercise Talisman Sabre 21: Amphbious Assault

U.S. Marines with 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, British Royal Marine Commandos with 40 Commando, Japan Ground Self Defense Force soldiers and Australian Army soldiers with 3rd Royal Australian Regiment conduct an amphibious landing during Exercise Talisman Sabre 21 in Ingham, Queensland, Australia, July 29, 2021.

Amphibious operations provide a Combined-Joint Force Commander the capability to rapidly project power ashore in support of crisis response at the desired time and location.

INGHAM, QLD, AUSTRALIA

07.29.2021

Video by Staff Sgt. Laiqa Hitt

U.S. Army Pacific Public Affairs Office

Australia and Indonesia Work Maritime Security

10/26/2021

According to an Australian Department of Defence article published on October 24, 2021, Australia and Indonesia are conducted combined maritime patrols.

The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) have completed a coordinated maritime patrol to enhance security along our shared maritime border as part of AUSINDO CORPAT 2021.

The five-day patrol conducted by Armidale Class Patrol Boat HMAS Ararat and TNI-AL vessels KRI Kerapu and KRI Sura was the eleventh iteration of AUSINDO CORPAT and reflected the enduring defence partnership between Australia and Indonesia.

AUSINDO CORPAT took place in the waters between Australia and Indonesia, with a specific focus on the deterrence of illegal fishing.

Commander of the Australian Fleet, Rear Admiral Mark Hammond, said the coordinated patrol demonstrated Australia’s enduring commitment to the Indo-Pacific region.

“Indonesia is an essential partner for Australia. We share security challenges and a firm commitment to a rules-based maritime order, underpinned by adherence to international law,” Rear Admiral Hammond said.

“AUSINDO CORPAT tested and proved our shared mariner skills, techniques and procedures and refined our ability to work together in cooperative maritime surveillance, security and interdiction.”

“By working together, we improve regional maritime security and promote a stable, inclusive and resilient region based on international law.”

The coordinated patrol was conducted in a contactless manner to help prevent the spread of COVID-19.

Featured photo: Armidale Class Patrol Boat HMAS Ararat (centre) sails with Indonesian Navy vessels KRI Sura (top) and KRI Kerapu (bottom) during AUSINDO CORPAT 2021

The Australian Submarine Decision: Challenges and Next Steps

By Robbin Laird

The decision by the Morrison Administration to shift from a conventional submarine to a nuclear submarine is part of the strategic reset underway in Australia since 2018. With the Chinese threat ramping up, the Australians have been looking to refocus their defence efforts on the Indo-Pacific region and to find ways to expand the reach of their forces in the region. That re-focus started with an emphasis on building longer range strike weapons and to shape capability within Australia to build out their own capabilities to build guided weapons, including over time, longer range strike weapons.

The Japanese when launching the war in the Pacific understood from the outset that Australia was the outlier continent which could influence the outcome significantly. The key was to isolate the continent and deny use of that continent to the United States. The Chinese Communist regime certainly understood this and approached the Australian problem by economic, cultural, and political means to reshape the Australian perspective and to isolate the United States from Australian defence.

President Xi has dramatically failed.

Now the Australians are working through how best to shape a way ahead to craft an integrated force capable of longer-range reach and providing more credible deterrent capabilities going forward. I have chronicled the ADF journey with regard to building out a joint force over the past few years through the perspective of the Williams Foundation seminars held from 2014 until the 2020 pandemic shutdown in my book Joint by Design published earlier this year.

With the new strategy announced in 2020, there is a re-set underway within which the nuclear submarine decision is a key part. But a re-set is not built in a day, and as my former boss, Secretary Michael Wynne, often commented, “you have 80% of your force 20 years from now, right now.” So rebuilding is about re-shifting, it is about leveraging new capabilities that get you where you want to go; but it is not about working from a blank slate.

To discuss the transition and its challenges, I recently spoke with Marcus Hellyer of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute about his take on the decision.

From Marcus’s perspective, this decision “is the most important one in his lifetime.”  It is about putting a stake in the ground, and rescoping the reach of the ADF and how it will operate in the Indo-Pacific region.

We both agreed that the head of the Nuclear-Powered submarine task force, Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead, had his work cut out for him, but an essential point is for the government and the Navy to ensure that the effort, although crucial, would not dominate the efforts to re-orient the overall ADF effort itself.

As Hellyer put it: “ It is important to let Jonathan Mead, do his work, and everybody else needs to focus on what we can be doing right now. I don’t have an issue with going with SSNs, but we can’t afford to sit back and say the SSNs are coming to save us.  There are many, many things we can be doing to make the ADF a much more robust force. The SSNs effort could suck all the oxygen out of the room and taking all the decision makers’ time and energy and headspace. But the focus, while Mead gets on with his job, needs to be on how to get a much faster return on a much more modest investment if we pursue the right things now and figure out the right ways to use them.”

A key problem facing the government is the challenge of shaping the defence narrative in a credible and effective manner.

Certainly, when looking at the effort surrounding the future submarine program designed to deliver a new conventional submarine, that narrative was largely missing in action. That cannot be repeated if Australia is to make an effective strategic transition.

According to Hellyer: “When the defence update came out last year, there was broad agreement that the observations about the strategic environment and the kinds of actions needed to shape new capabilities to deal with that environment were spot on. Notably, the need not to simply sit back and respond to Russia and China, but to shape new capabilities like long-range strike to create problems for them.

“But what is missing is a clear relationship between that narrative and force design narrative. When look at the force structure that was attached to new defence narrative, it’s essentially the same force structure that we’ve been working on in an absolutely glacial fashion since the 2009 white paper. There is a major disconnect between the timelines, the threat environment, and the actual capabilities that to date we are acquiring to deal with it.

“The government is acquiring new or additional capabilities for sure, but the narrative is not there with regard to how these capabilities are woven together and shaping the strategic relaunch. Tomahawks are being acquired for the fleet. A new squadron of Romeo ASW helicopters are being acquired. A co-operative program with the U.S. on hypersonic systems has been announced as well as one working with the U.S. Army on its ground launched long-range strike missiles. We are acquiring the longer-range JASSM.

“There are a number of announcements of new defence efforts, but there is a need for the narrative reflecting and guiding the ADF build out.”

It should also be noted that U.S. and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific are themselves in the throes of fundamental change, and one way ahead for Australia clearly is to be a key driver in that reshaping effort. And given its collaborative efforts in the region, those efforts can be key drivers in the transformation process as well.

I have identified in my own work, especially with Ed Timperlake, a number of such points involving the United States, namely, the reshaping of the U.S. Navy around a distributed force operating in kill webs. The USAF working how to deliver agile combat employment. The USMC working its flexible basing approach and leveraging its Osprey and F-35 transitions going forward.

Clearly, the United States military is a key element in the strategic re-shift but other allies are increasingly important as well, notably Japan.

One innovation which Hellyer noted that could be driven by the acquisition of a new squadron of Romeos is the need to find other ship or land-based solutions to hosting the new aircraft, as the inventory will exceed the number of Royal Australian Navy ships which can currently operate the aircraft. He suggested that the two Australian amphibious ships – the HMAS Canberra and Adelaide – might include this among their roles.

But the U.S. Navy has been experimenting with such an approach, as evidenced by the Black Widow exercise last Fall. During that exercise, the Navy used the USS Wasp as an ASW or USW platform.

Hellyer underscored that this sort of experimentation was what he would like to see the ADF engaged in during the period ahead as it reworks its approach going forward. And he noted that the experimentation which the USMC is doing in the Pacific, is perhaps a good model for how to do so.

Of course, there are a number of decisions to be made associated with the ability to operate nuclear submarines by the Royal Australian Navy or to operate them from an Australian support structure. Hellyer highlighted on key one, which is simply ramping up the number of submariners required to operate a nuclear submarine fleet. He cited the recent appearance by Chief of Navy before a Senate Committee where he needed at least 2,300 submariners, which would require an increase by two and half times over the current force. As Hellyer noted: “I think the issue is going to be how do we actually develop the crew for the SSNs and make them effective before the Collins class submarines essentially time out.”

He underscored that the challenge already being faced by the ADF, namely, the sunsetting of the Collins class submarine, has not been solved, but actually is worse because the delivery schedule for the SSNs is later than the now-cancelled Attack-class conventional submarine project.

So how will the RAN and the ADF deal with this?

The answer probably lies not simply in the question of when Australian built nuclear submarines hit the water, or nuclear submarines built for Australia are operational, but with other solution sets as well.  But here we are entering the domain of how Australia crafts its working relationships with the United States and UK navies going forward.

And that is a final point. Hellyer found the fixation in the press with regard to whether the Australians would pursue a U.S. or UK nuclear submarine, Virginia or Astute, misplaced. If you are going down this route, obviously you are working with the dominant allied submarine force in the Indo-Pacific, the United States Navy.

Global Britain may be a nice marketing point, but not one on which to build the future of Australian defence.

As Hellyer put it: “The U.S. Navy is grappling every day with the same problems that we’re facing, which is how do you deal with an increasingly capable and aggressive Chinese military. And whatever the benefits or advantages of the Royal Navy, those are not the issues that the Royal Navy is grappling with every day. You want to be able to leverage what the U.S. military and the U.S. Navy in particular is doing going forward.”

Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Collins Class submarines have been captured in impressive imagery, whilst exercising off the West Australian coast. Credit: Australian Department of Defence. 

Also, see the following:

Battalion Landing Team 1/1, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit

10/25/2021

Battalion Landing Team 1/1, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, serves as the Ground Combat Element for the 11th MEU’s Marine Air-Ground Task Force.

The reinforced infantry battalion is responsible for missions such as heliborne raids, amphibious assaults, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel and embassy reinforcement.

PACIFIC OCEAN

07.30.2021

Video by Cpl. Ian Simmons

11th Marine Expeditionary Unit

Task Force 59: Creating Maritime Capabilities for the 5th Fleet Area of Operations

10/24/2021

In early September 2021, the U.S. Navy set up a new task force to deliver usable unmanned systems for enhanced maritime capabilities in the 5th Fleet Area of Operations.

In a story written by MC1 Roland Franklin and published on September 9, 2021 by the U.S. Navy:

U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) established a new task force, Sept. 9, to rapidly integrate unmanned systems and artificial intelligence with maritime operations in the 5th Fleet area of operations.

Task Force 59 is the first U.S. Navy task force of its kind.

The U.S. 5th Fleet region’s unique geography, climate, and strategic importance offer an ideal environment for innovation.

“The bottom line on why we’re doing this is so that we can develop and integrate unmanned systems and AI as a means to do two things,” said Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of NAVCENT, U.S. 5th Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces. “One, enhance our maritime domain awareness, and two, increase deterrence.”

Cooper also stated the task force would rely heavily on regional and coalition partnerships.

“The launch of Task Force 59 really invigorates our partnerships around this region as we expand our common operating picture.”  

Cooper appointed Capt. Michael D. Brasseur, an expert in maritime robotics, as Task Force 59’s first commodore during a commissioning ceremony onboard Naval Support Activity Bahrain, Thursday. Brasseur served as a founding member of the NATO Maritime Unmanned Systems Initiative prior to arriving in Bahrain.

“It’s an honor to be named commander of this historic and innovative task force,” said Brasseur. “As we continue to adapt and implement cutting edge technology, I fully expect our talented team will enrich and enhance the 5th Fleet mission.”

Brasseur’s staff includes experienced operators with region-specific expertise, including directors for unmanned systems; unmanned exercises; task force integration; cyber, AI and space; and partnership opportunities.

In the coming weeks, the task force aims to build trust and confidence in human-machine teaming through a series of operations at sea. International Maritime Exercise (IMX) 22, slated for next year, will provide NAVCENT a real-world opportunity to demonstrate the resiliency and scalability of human-machine teaming technologies.

IMX-22 will include more than 60 nations and international organizations and features the extensive use of unmanned systems in various operational scenarios designed to challenge the technology in a dynamic environment and ultimately enhance partner capabilities through manned and unmanned teaming.

The U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations encompasses nearly 2.5 million square miles of water area and includes the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea and parts of the Indian Ocean. The region is comprised of 21 countries and includes three critical choke points at the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Bab-al-Mandeb at the southern tip of Yemen.

And in in a story written by John. W. Miller and Ari Cicurel published on October 6, 2021, this is how the Task Force’s role was explained:

“By increasing the Fifth Fleet’s unmanned operations in the Middle East, TF-59 will realize more persistent and capable intelligence coverage and more capacity to deter, detect, prevent, and respond to Iranian maritime aggression than conventional manned platforms currently produce.

“Incorporating surveillance and attack unmanned platforms above, on, and under the sea into a sensor network will provide earlier warning of Iranian intentions and attacks, further enabling a secure maritime environment throughout the region. The persistence of unmanned vehicles serves as a force multiplier at a time when America needs to repurpose manned ships and aircraft in support of emerging national.”

The authors noted: “TF- 59 will have unmanned platforms, such as the unmanned surface vehicles Sea Hunter and Seahawk, the MQ-9B Sea Guardian, and the MQ-8B Fire Scout autonomous helicopter.”

But notably,. the Task Force featured in a recent video the “little engine that could” as a key capability they were exercising now, the MANTAS T-12 which is part of a family of USVs avaialbe right now for the U.S. and allied Navies.

According to the Command:

“MANTAS T-12 unmanned surface vessels operating in the Arabian Gulf alongside U.S. Navy crewed assets.

“This was the first unmanned/manned teaming activity underway for U.S. 5th Fleet’s new Task Force 59. The task force was established Sept. 9 to accelerate the development and integration of new unmanned systems across the fleet.”

10.20.2021

Video by Sgt. Thiem Huynh

U.S. Naval Forces Central Command / U.S. 5th Fleet

The featured photo: Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, left, commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, U.S. 5th Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces, shakes hands with Capt. Michael D. Brasseur, the first commodore of Task Force (TF 59) during a commissioning ceremony for TF 59 onboard Naval Support Activity Bahrain, Sept. 9. TF 59 is the first U.S. Navy task force of its kind, designed to rapidly integrate unmanned systems and artificial intelligence with maritime operations in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations. (Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Dawson Roth).

Also, see the following:

https://defense.info/system-type/martac-maritime-autonomous-systems/

British Army’s Poacher Troop

10/22/2021

Battle Group Poland’s British Army contingent, Poacher Troop, practiced reconnaissance firing and maneuvering during a live-fire exercise at Bemowo Piskie Training Area, Poland, September 1, 2021.

Poacher Troop is Battle Group Poland’s primary intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance asset.

BEMOWO PISKIE TRAINING AREA, POLAND

09.01.2021

Video by Sgt. 1st Class Adrian Patoka

Enhanced Forward Presence Battlegroup Poland

President Macron and Defense: The Perspective of General (Retired) Didier Castres

10/20/2021

By Robbin Laird and Pierre Tran

On September 22, 2021, we had a chance to meet Army General (retired) Didier Castres and discuss the evolution of military operations and strategy under president Macron.

Castres is a highly experienced staff officer who has been engaged in activities associated with crisis management and the French forces.

He is a graduate of Saint Cyr military college and spent most of his operational career in the Infanterie de marine. He became deputy to the chief of staff of the president of the Republic from 2005-2009 with presidents Chirac and Sarkozy, and then commanded for five years from 2009-2011 the Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations (CPCO), the planning cell for operations attached to the Etat Major des Armées (EMA), or general staff. He then was appointed deputy chief of staff for operations from 2011 to 2016 with the general staff.

While at the EMA, Castres participated in a number of operations either led by France or with France working within EU, NATO or UN coalitions, in Afghanistan, the Ivory Coast, Libya, Mali, the Central African Republic, Iraq, and Syria. He worked on the planning and command of the Serval and Barkhane operations. Then in 2016, he was appointed Inspecteur général des armées. He retired in 2020 from the French army and created a consulting firm focused on defense, notably with regard to African issues.

We had a wide-ranging discussion with Castres, looking at many aspects of the challenges facing crisis management for French forces and for those of French allies.

His deep knowledge of both national and coalition operations informed his discussion of the significant challenges which the Western states face in defending their interests in the context of strategic change.

Towards the end of our discussion, we focused on president Macron and how he has approached crises, after discussing the evolving strategic context for military operations. But we will start our article by starting with the Macron element of the discussion.

It has been often noted that when Macron became president, he was 39 years old and the youngest president in French history and the youngest French head of state since Napoleon. But Castres added some key points from a military officer’s point of view.

Macron is of the new generation which did not serve in national conscription, which also applies to the younger generation in parliament. This is in stark contrast to the then president Chirac who served in the Algerian war, and based on his own experience, warned then President George W. Bush of what would happen if the United States led an invasion of Iraq.

Macron is the first French president born in the age of globalization. Globalization of the economy was a given for Macron and his generation. His predecessors saw it arrive; he was born into it and it is a baseline assumption.Macron inherited crises and participated in coalition actions, but he engaged in modifying or reshaping engagements, rather than initiating ones of his own.

Macron has been engaged in crisis management from the beginning of his mandate and has taken an approach which the British and Americans call a “whole of government” approach. His national security council sessions, or conseil de défense et sécurité nationale, have not been limited to the military or foreign policy or intelligence apparatus. They have included ministers of justice,  education, and others dependent on the particular crisis. From Macron’s perspective, crisis management was not primarily a military only or military led operation.

But that raises the broader question of how to engage in crisis management of the world as it is and not the world that we might wish.

Here Castres had many insights to share, as well as highlighting how he saw the specific French advantages in crisis management.

The strategic environment is significantly changing in which authoritarian competitors or adversaries are working to use information war, cyber conflict, gray zone operations, and other means to gain their tactical and strategic objectives.  How will we respond? How will we use military and other means to counter such operations?

One way to look at the challenge is to focus on the adversary using lethal force up to the level necessary to achieve their objectives, but stopping short of generating significant conventional military conflict. How to counter lethal operations and successfully master escalation management?

A key challenge for Western states is there is a heavy reliance on coalitions to shape engagements. The problem was seen in Afghanistan, said Castres, where the Americans focused on the cohesion of a coalition of 30 or 40 nations. As he noted: “There may be cohesion but there is no longer a common objective for the operation.”

Coalitions are built around interoperability.

On the one hand, there is the question of military interoperability, for the forces of the various nations being able to work together.

On the other hand, there is the more difficult challenge of cultural interoperability.

With regard to cultural interoperability, Castres underscored the different nations have different traditions, different histories, different expectations with regard to the use of military force. What this means is that the nature of the coalition which is put together will define what military objectives can really be obtained.

He noted that for the military it was important to have clarity and objectives for the use of force. The military understands that it is not engaged to simply eliminate an enemy, but “to create conditions for a political resolution of a crisis.”

“This means that there needs to be a blunt and honest discussion between politicians and military leaders about what is realistic in terms of what the military can achieve.

“We do not want military leaders to engage in vagueness and duplicity with regard to what the military can and cannot do.

:The objectives set in Afghanistan were completely unrealistic in terms of transforming the country; a realistic objective lies in reducing the capability of terrorists to operate outside Afghanistan, and there are military means to do so. But transforming a country is not a military operation per se.”

Castres argued that the battle space is being transformed with information war, cyber engagements, and other means about winning the war without fighting.

This means that the French engagement in Africa, for example, is as much about engaging and winning an information war as it is about controlling territory and eliminating terrorist strongholds.

He argued that with regard to France’s African operations, Macron’s goal has been to support African nations to create the conditions whereby their territories do not function as international safe havens for jihadism, and to do so without a strong permanent presence of Western forces.

This goal is difficult, but this has been pursued through three missions.

The first is along the lines of the U.S. SOCOM in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, namely, to hunt down terrorist leaders.

The second is to build and support operational partnerships with French and EU troops going into combat with African troops. This has been seen in both the French Barkhane and EU Takuba operations.

The third is to provide a French guarantee of support to African nations with quick reaction troops and support from drones, fighters and helicopters.

The French are able to conduct such intervention because of the DNA of expeditionary operations inherent within the French forces. Castres quoted a famous British statement that captures the expeditionary spirit: “move now, orders to follow.” The French forces are capable of doing so and this means that the French forces are able to move more rapidly than other European nations after a presidential decision to go to an area of interest.

He also noted the ability of the French forces to adapt to local populations and situations in Africa as an advantage which the French have.

In short, President Macron has been president as globalization has faltered, conflict with ISIS and other terrorist organizations has been persistent, and coalition dynamics have been defined by Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa.

The  challenge lies with shaping a way ahead for France within its coalition-based alliances with the EU and NATO.

What is clear is that ensuring that military and coalition logic is crucial to shaping a way ahead for France to meet its national interests.

The featured photo is taken from the following source:

https://www.voltairenet.org/article190403.html