Guided-missile destroyer USS John Finn (DDG 113) launches a missile during U.S. Pacific Fleet’s Unmanned Systems Integrated Battle Problem (UxS IBP) 21, April 25.
UxS IBP 21 integrates manned and unmanned capabilities into challenging operational scenarios to generate warfighting advantages.
(U.S. Navy video by Boatswain’s Mate Seaman Clark Lappert)
By Pierre Tran Paris – France last year won arms export contracts worth €4.9 billion ($5.6 billion), down from €8.3 billion in 2019, reflecting lock down and governments freezing military budgets in response to the pandemic crisis, Hervé Grandjean, spokesman for the defense ministry, said June 2.
“This retreat is no surprise for the armed forces ministry,” Grandjean told a news conference on the government report to parliament on French sales of weapons to foreign clients.
For arms companies, executives were unable to fly overseas to pitch products and trade shows were cancelled, he said, while prospective client nations postponed military projects due to budgetary uncertainty and a focus on health spending.
That meant there were no major arms deals last year for France, with most of the foreign sales consisting of small and medium contracts of less than €200 million, covering spares, service, and training, he said.
The outlook, however, for 2021, was a rebound in orders, with total sales worth “at least €10 billion,” he said. Some €7.5 billion was forecast from three deals for the Dassault Aviation Rafale fighter jet, with “other good news” expected.
The increase stemmed from Rafale orders worth €2.5 billion from Greece, €4 billion from Egypt, and €1 billion from Croatia. In the case of the latter, France expects to sign a contract later this year, he said.
Those fighter jet orders would go on top of the forecast €3 billion-€4 billion from small and medium deals, the cornerstone of foreign sales.
A greater parliamentary oversight of arms exports was one of the reforms called for by a June 2 report from Fondation Jean Jaures, a think tank, which also cited the update on the multiyear defense budget law and Franco-German military industrial cooperation as showing the need for political reform on defense.
“The reasons for this imbalance are to be found in institutions, but also in the political treatment of defense,” said the report drafted by Axel Nicholas. “As the elections of 2022 approach, changes can be considered to re-establish the democratic functioning of our institutions.”
On the German arms embargo on Saudi Arabia, Berlin has allowed delivery of equipment for programs based on European cooperation, German news agency DPA reported Dec. 10. That exception was granted as part of Germany’s extension of its embargo to the end of 2021.
That effective lightening of Berlin’s clampdown of arms deals with Saudi Arabia implied European missile maker MBDA could deliver weapons to the Saudi air force, an implication which was altogether logical, said a source who has followed closely the deal. The Berlin embargo had previously prevented the MBDA German unit from shipping equipment to the Middle East client nation.
Germany had imposed that embargo in response to the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Turkey in November 2018, a blockade of arms sales which France had publicly called to be lifted.
On the French league table, Saudi Arabia ranked first for foreign sales, buying €703 million of arms last year, Grandjean said, with the US second with €433 million, followed by Morocco with €425 million, the UK with €290 million, India with €285 million, Greece with €282 million, and Senegal with €217 million. The African nation ordered last year Piriou offshore patrol vessels.
The sales to Saudi Arabia were composed largely of Thales air defense radar and communications and control, and ECA maritime anti-mine robots, while the US orders were mostly composed of sonars. The UK sales were mostly munitions.
France came third in the world rankings for foreign arms sales, after the US and Russia, the SIPRI think tank reported, Grandjean said, followed by Germany and China as fourth and fifth.
Based on 2016-2020 sales, the US held 37 percent of arms exports, Russia with 20 percent, France 8.2 percent, Germany 5.5 percent, China 5.2 percent, and the UK 3.3 percent, the report from the Swedish think tank said.
Europe accounted 25 percent of French arms sales, with 15 percent from European Union members and 10 percent from other European nations, Grandjean said. The UK and Greece were in the top six client nations.
The Middle East accounted for 24 percent, 22 percent from Asia, and 16 percent from Africa.
That leading position for Europe showed the priority Paris has set on sales into the European market, he said, with last year marking the second time the continent had accounted for 25 percent of sales.
The report shows Australian orders accounted for €199 million last year. The 12-strong Australian submarine project, led by French shipbuilder Naval Group, is expected to bring in a total €34 billion.
Vietnam ordered €4.5 million of French kit.
The Greek order and Croatian selection of Rafale signalled the importance of France selling second hand fighters, as the jets may be used, but new missiles have been ordered, including Safran AASM powered smart bombs for the Greek air force.
Companies must apply for French licenses to make a sales pitch to a prospective foreign client, and in general five to 10 percent of licenses lead to contracts, Grandjean said. These licenses detail the various options offered, including the maximum size of the potential deal.
There were some 4,000 licenses approved last year, indicating future sales efforts to win contracts.
France rejected 19 license applications last year after interministerial review of the prospective pitches to foreign states.
Under the European Union Coarm working party on foreign arms sales, if a member state receives an application for a license for which another member state has previously refused, the latter is expected to share information and explain why it rejected the previous application.
The government is studying steps to take in the light of a Nov. 18 2020 parliamentary report on the control of arms exports, Grandjean said.
That report, drafted by parliamentarians Jacques Maire and Michèle Tabarot, called for a detailed and active scrutiny of the authorization of arms sales by a joint committee of the senate and national assembly, rather than the government simply reporting to parliament deals done in the previous year.
By Robbin Laird
WGCDR Keirin Joyce noted: “All of the services see robotic autonomous systems as a significant part of the road ahead. It’s just that the services are getting after them differently.” At the Williams Foundation seminar held on April 8, 2021, each of the service chiefs provided their perspective on the way ahead for their service with regard to such systems.
Even though the strategic way ahead is shaping a force able to work across service platforms to deliver the desired combat or crisis management effects, each domain has a physical quality to it different from the other domains. And autonomous platforms like any platforms have to respect the domain within which they operate. And so doing, they might well be able to contribute to platforms operating in other domains, but they must first of all work effectively within a ground, air or naval combat force.
With regard to the Army, the ability to experiment is significantly greater than with the other two services. The cost to do so and the fratricide which such systems can introduce into the operational force is much less to do so. There is little doubt that introducing such systems into near term operations, such as logistical support for HADR operations make a great deal of sense and can provide the force with near term learning from which to generate a broader capability to use such systems.
In an August 9, 2020 video, the Army put its case succinctly in highlighting an optionally crewed autonomous casualty evacuation vehicle (OCCV):
“The Australian Army will increase its experimentation, prototyping and exploration of autonomous vehicles and emerging technologies through Defence industry contracts valued at $12 million, allowing Army to learn, prototype and develop future concepts. Technology such as Robotics, Autonomous Systems, and Artificial Intelligence act as a force multiplier, and the mastery of the technology will make us more effective on the future battlefield and help to keep our personnel safe.”
Lieutenant General Rick Burr, Chief of the Australian Army, underscored the work Army is doing to introduce autonomous systems and to integrate them into the force. The Army’s overall approach is described as accelerated warfare within which autonomous systems are developed and assessed as contributors to enhanced capabilities, like all platforms and systems are as well.
They are part of being what he calls having a force which is “future ready.” The inclusion of intelligence learning machines will contribute to what the Chief refers to as his approach to shaping the Army as a “force in motion.” He argued that Robotic Autonomous Systems (RAS) can maximize solider performance, improve decision-making, generate mass and scalable effects, protect the force and enhance efficiency.
Today, Army is the largest user of uncrewed air systems. The Chief argued that uncrewed ground systems in the future will proliferate in a similar way. “Greater use of autonomous systems will be a feature of future ground forces.”
An important point which he highlighted was that in making capability investment decisions are being done with regard to their ability to incorporate or work with RAS. For example, with regard to the future infantry fighting vehicle, the Army is focused on that vehicle able to operate with RAS, including controlling several smaller autonomous vehicles as well. “The vehicle will have the power and computing potential to operate numerous, smaller uncrewed and autonomous systems.”
In the Army Chief’s approach, autonomous systems are part of the future force, but part of force being driven by a number of technological developments. “Greater platform collaboration, new power sources, new forms of active and passive protection, more lethal strike weapons, and directed energy weapons, are examples of this way ahead.”
He underscored that in the future “Army’s teams will be more connected, protected and lethal so they can achieve their missions against current and emerging threats at the lowest possible risk to Australian soldiers.”
He argued that the force as it modernizes is examining throughout this effort new opportunities for the use of RAS in the force. For example, “our aviation crews are examining the opportunities for manned-unmanned teaming, notably as we look forward to the delivery of the new attack helicopter.”
The Army chief highlighted the nature of the globally competitive environment where maintaining an edge is both more necessary and more difficult. He argued that such a competitive edge could accrue to the ADF to the extent to which the force can be better integrated, and coordinated than its adversaries. This requires superior training and decision-making capabilities. This is why, he argued, why people is at the “center of our efforts. It is people that get the technology working effectively in the dangerous and contested environments.”
The Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Noonan, discussed the Navy’s RAS-AI 2040 strategy which he had introduced last year. As he described that strategy: “The way that we’ve sought to visualize this vision is through five very fundamental effects. Force protection, obviously all about keeping our people safe and out of harm’s way so that they can get on and do their job. Force projection is about how we can achieve mass. Force potential using human machine teaming, ultimately to achieve better and more effective decision-making in the war fighting effort. Partnered force concept around how we will operate as an integrated and joint force by design.”
Vice Admiral Noonan then discussed the six principles which underly the RAS-AI Strategy 2040.
“The six fundamental principles were built around a user centered design. The system design is user centered. In terms of decision support, we are looking to have systems that significantly reduce the cognitive load on our commanders and operators alike, allowing for them to achieve greater shared situational awareness to deliver effective, efficient, and ethical decision-making.
“The joint integration piece is critical. I cannot stress that highly enough in terms of we must ensure that these systems are integrated. Not just integrated into the platforms or their parent platforms but integrated into the force.
“And they are capable of being evergreen. This is the new term for spiral development. It’s about ensuring that we have systems that remain contemporary, and I am challenged on a daily basis about capability gaps and about deficiencies in the long lead times that require us in the shipbuilding space. It takes about 10 years to build a submarine, or five years to build a frigate.
“And are we incorporating old technologies? Bottom answer is no, in that we are designing future and evergreen in growth into our platforms. And I think that’s a very important concept that we have not always fully grasped.
“Finally, is the importance of made in Australia. Our systems must be designed for the very unique circumstances that we operate in, particularly in the maritime environment.”
Vice Admiral Noonan then highlighted really the key aspect of using any new sensor networks, whether they be autonomous or not, namely, their integration into a C2 system.
“Operating all these systems would simply be too complex, too time consuming and ultimately unmanageable without a common control framework. Therefore, as part of the way that we seek to get after that, the building blocks of that framework, as we see them in Navy, it needs to be a legal and ethical module that allows us to have embedded and encoded regulatory and legal protocols. Clearly a common control protocol that unifies the means of machine control.
“We need common control bridges that provide an interface between the proprietary control systems and the combat management systems of the platforms from which they’re housed. We need a common control language that can express C2 in a way that both human operators and RAS-AI machines can understand. And ultimately, we need a common spectrum management protocol, levering and integrating programmed projects to harden and ensure the spectrum in which we operate.”
The RAAF has already acquired two flying platforms which are designed to work together in a manned-unmanned teaming effort, namely, the P-8 and Triton. These platforms for the U.S. Navy working with other platforms, such as the Romeo Helicopter are providing important real world operational lessons with regard to shaping a foundation for the future.
In addition, with the loyal wingman program underway, the RAAF as one of the most advanced air forces in the world, we introduce the loyal wingman into a force already being reworked with the introduction of the F-35. The challenges to introduce Loyal Wingman and then to use it effectively will be an important part of shaping a way ahead for autonomous systems in the airspace.
At the seminar, Air Marshal Mel Hupfeld provided the RAAF perspective on the way ahead in this area of development and operations. At the outset of his remarks, he noted: “Defense can gain significant advantage through leveraging autonomous systems, that’s to make better decisions faster, to more effectively allocate resources, and to discover new ways of delivering military effects. Artificial intelligence and human-machine teaming will play a pivotal role in air and space power into the future.”
The RAAF is working a way ahead with regard to integrate manned new and existing aircraft with remotely piloted and autonomous systems. A key case in point is Loyal Wingman.
According to Hupfeld: “The true value is indeed hidden inside the airframe of Loyal Wingman. And that is the development of the code and the algorithms which form the artificial intelligence behaviors that will optimize its combat capability. The Loyal Wingman project is a pathfinder for the integration of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence to create smart human-machine teams.
“The aim is to provide capability advantage, working alongside existing platforms to complement and extend our air combat platforms and our other systems. And we’re exploring totally new concepts of operations, whereby multiple systems will pair with crude capabilities, such as the F-35, the Growler, the E-7 Wedgetail, with an aim to bolster our relatively small but potent Air Force.
“And it’s clear how this changes things for us. Such an asset will change the way we calculate risk. The Loyal Wingman is the giant uncrewed gorilla in the room, but we’ve got many other programs that don’t immediately catch the eye. And these programs, though less visible, will no less revolutionize the way we do business.”
He underscored that the Plan Jericho program through the Jericho Disruptive Innovation effort is looking at ways of automation and artificial intelligence that can step in to help pull the weight. There are still jobs in Air Force that we have people performing which are predictable, repetitive, and they don’t require creativity.
“But this is not about replacing people with machines. We’ve got a shortage of people and they’re a scarce resource. And our work in this space is really about freeing up those people so that we can employ them in those areas that humans do best.
“In my view, one of the best examples of this theory at work is some work we’re doing, once again, through the Jericho program, on quarriable sensors program. Now, while we would probably work on a catchier name, and hopefully one that’s easier to pronounce, what this project is seeking to achieve has the capacity to force-multiply our intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance capability by a factor of two or three….
“I believe that our sensors are currently employed very inefficiently. So for example, most of what our sensors stream is meaningless noise, and even when we do capture important information, it’s not necessarily available to the people that need it. The quarriable sensor program takes care of all this by using artificial intelligence and machine learning to automatically detect when an event of significance occurs. It will then report that directly to commanders and decision-makers in real time, enabling the customer to determine whether the automated response and the intelligence is valid.”
Air Marshal Hupfeld provided a good summary to the day and to the presentations of the Service Chiefs.
“We’re disappointed in reporting that we see from some of our commentators who still choose to discuss Air Force capabilities in isolation. Qhether or not Super Hornet can breed another capability one on one is really, to me, not a useful conversation. The force of tomorrow will be characterized by those invisible connections across air, land, maritime space and cyber, with masses of data from sensor inputs being fused, using artificial intelligence and machine learning, to rapidly convert data to information, to knowledge, to insight, all at unfathomable speeds.
“The entire Defence Force will be one integrated system of systems. My vision for automation is that the joint force will be AI-enabled using robotics to augment roles, and humans working with machines, so they get the best out of both. The days of boring menial tasks will be gone. Our most scarce resource, our people, will focus on higher value and the creative tasks that we need.
“And with this vision, we’ll march in lockstep with our colleagues in Navy and Army and across Defense to ensure that we deliver an autonomous future, and the responsiveness and precision of air and space power that we need, into our future joint force.”
War, by nature, remains an intense human activity and the use of armed force to compel change remains at its heart. The character of war is changing with the adoption of emerging and disruptive technologies. As these technologies become more available and affordable, the gap between well-equipped militaries and the motivated individual or group with a cause is closing. Therefore, sustaining and maintaining a technological edge over potential adversaries is becoming more challenging. An area where we can maintain an edge is in the large scale integration, synchronisation and coordinated employment of these technologies, coupled with superior training and decision-making.
This can be achieved through robotics and manipulation of data through advanced networks (or system of networks) that can improve the speed and accuracy of information sharing. These networks can connect soldiers to other combatants (both human and machine), the broader Army, the Joint Force and partner nations; improving situational awareness, survivability and lethality. However, adoption of emerging technologies should be considered objectively prior to acquisition to confirm the capability offered by the technology is justified and cost effective. Risk, informed through future casting, modelling, simulation and experimentation, should also be considered to ensure the right technology is adopted at the right time.
In this context RAS can be viewed as the application of software, artificial intelligence and advanced robotics to perform tasks as directed by humans. Simply “autonomy is the ability of a machine to perform a task without human input. Thus, an autonomous system is a machine, whether hardware or software, once activated performs some task or function on its own”. The term autonomy can be a barrier to understanding as it is, generally, specific to a system or sub-system. Therefore, it can be misleading to refer to an autonomous platform if the entire system of systems is not autonomous. It can be helpful to consider the level of human input, how much discretion the machine has with regard to the task and what aspect of the system has been automated.
Within this strategy, RAS will span the full spectrum of human input from remote control through to full autonomy – the level of autonomy required will be determined by the role and also the maturity of the underpinning technologies such as AI.
Therefore RAS is a lens through which to describe a system, hardware and software, which has varying elements of autonomy and/or robotics and commonly both.
The forward to the strategy by Vice Admiral Noonan:
On 1 July 2020, the Prime Minister launched the Defence Strategic Update 2020. This highlighted that we are experiencing the most consequential strategic realignment since the Second World War. Consequently, our Navy must be able to meet the emerging challenges of regional military modernisation, the risk of state-on-state conflict and technological disruption, to maintain our ability to Shape the Maritime Environment, Deter actions against our national interests in the Maritime Domain, and Respond with credible Naval Power to defend our Nation, and our National Interests.
Robotics, Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence (RAS-AI) are transforming every aspect of our lives. As a Fighting and Thinking Navy, we must leverage these advances to also transform, and improve, our ability to Fight and Win at Sea.
I am therefore pleased to release Navy’s RAS-AI Strategy 2040, which nests within Navy’s capstone strategic documents – Plans MERCATOR and PELORUS, and supports the achievement of each of the five Navy Outcomes.
RAS-AI Strategy 2040 sets out the challenges and opportunities that these technologies present and explains to Navy, our Joint Force colleagues, the broader Defence Organisation, our allies and industry the benefits e seek from RAS-AI, and how we aim to realise them. To fulfil our potential we need to engage in constant experimentation, and encourage collaboration and innovation at all levels. This will enable us to leverage RAS-AI to enhance Navy’s capability by strengthening our Force Protection, increasing our Force Projection in the maritime approaches of our near region, improving our Joint Integration through Partnership, maximising our Force Potential, and ensuring Australian Control.
Just as our people and machines must operate in teams to enhance their strengths and overcome weaknesses, we must team with Defence as a whole, industry, academia and our international partners, to achieve the potential of these technologies. My vision is for Navy, industry and academia to build upon our established transformational partnerships, allowing us to address the challenges outlined in this strategy, together.
Make no mistake; the pace of change is increasing and will challenge us all at some point. To meet that challenge, all that
I ask, is that each of us focus on being a little better – every day.
In embracing technology, we must remember that warfare is, and will remain, a fundamentally human activity. Our people will be at the core of our technological advances, and we must design systems with them at the centre. RAS-AI will make our people better warfighte s, and will enable us to achieve expanded reach across the region, however it is our people who remain our competitive edge.
The race in autonomous warfare has already begun.
Doing nothing, or waiting for allies to solve our requirements, is not an option. I commend the RAS-AI Strategy to you all and challenge each of you to think about how you can contribute to it.
The featured photo: Chief of the Australian Army addresses the Williams Foundation Conference on April 8, 2021.
By Robbin Laird
As II MEF transforms, a key challenge is force cohesion and force aggregation. For example, with the current Marine Expeditionary Unit, the MEU has a well-defined organic capability which allows it to operate effectively and to scale up with force integration with other force units. But going forward, how will the MEF forces be organized? What will the force packages look like? How much organic ISR and fire power? How much reliance on externally supplied ISR and fire power? And how to build a viable distributed but integratable force?
The only way such questions will be answered effectively is with the evolution of C2 capabilities, and systems which can shape integratable modular task forces, which can either be the supported or supporting building block for a scalable force.
But working C2 to achieve the kind of force flexibility which could lead to significant reworking of the mosaic of a joint or coalition force is a major challenge.
During my visit to II MEF in April 2021, I had a chance to discuss these issues across the command, but with an opportunity as well to focus specifically on the C2 piece with II MEF’s G-6 command, which is the communications element. I had a chance to discuss C2 issues with the Assistant Chief of Staff of G-6, Colonel Hyla and Master Gunnery Sergeant Stephens, II MEF Defense Information Network Chief.
We discussed a number of aspects of the C2 challenges and transition. I will not hold them responsible for my takeaways from our conversation, but there were four key takeaways from my point of view.
The first is that the goal of greater Navy and Marine Corps integration faces a major challenge of ensuring that the two forces can work over compatible ISR and C2 systems. This simply is not the case currently. If there is an end goal of empowering Marines to be able to provide ISR to the fleet to enable fire solutions, or ashore Marines to leverage Navy ISR and provide for firing solutions either from afloat or ashore assets, the C2 needs to be adequate and effective to do so.
Data from various Navy systems must be usable by afloat or ashore Marines. USMC aviation assets afloat or ashore can provide for firing solutions organically or in terms of current USMC C2, but if third party targeting in support of the fleet is desired then C2 needs to be integratable across the fleet into the Marine Corps force.
The second is that meeting the challenge of what the Aussies refer to as transient software advantage is a major challenge. An ability to rewrite software code ahead of adversary capability to disrupt ISR/C2 systems is crucial. During a visit to Jax Navy last year, I saw the P-8 team working such an approach with regard to rewriting code. In an interview with Lt. Sean Lavelle, he described the approach as follows:
They are focusing on ways to execute in-house software development under PMA-290, the Program Office for the P-8. Within PMA-290 is an office called the Software Support Activity, which Lt. Lavelle and his team works with. There they are focused on building a system on the P-8 where mission system data, including data links, and information generated by the sensor networks goes to the “sandbox” which is a secure computing environment that can take data, process it, and generate decision-making recommendations for the operator or alert them to tactical problems. It does not directly push data to the aircraft, so it is divorced from safety of flight software considerations.
According to Lt. Lavelle: “This allows us to push updates to the sandbox on timescales measured in days or weeks, rather than years. The Weapons School is building the software for the sandbox based on operators’ experiences, while the traditional acquisitions enterprise builds the infrastructure to allow that development. The process is that we observe the fleet’s problems, we write code to solve those problems, we send the finished application to PMA-290, they do a security analysis, and then they push it back to be integrated onto the aircraft. We are funding this process operationally rather than on a project basis. We have four to six people at the weapons school at any one time who are trained to write software for the sandbox.”[1]
The Marines are focused on a similar effort. As Col. Hyle put it: “The Marine Corps has recognized the need to code ourselves, and we have our first cohort of what is now 0673s is the new Military Occupational Specialty (MOS).”
The third is working new ways to integrate with core allies in terms of C2 capabilities This rests not simply on sorting through ways to work more traditional security arrangements, but new innovative ways of leveraging commercial networks in secure manners as well. II MEF has been hard at work in this area, notably in working with Canadians, Norwegians, the British and French forces in Europe to be able to shape shared C2 capabilities in new and innovative ways.
The fourth is the force aggregation and disaggregation issue noted at the beginning of this article. As Colonel Hyla put it: “How do we fit into the transformation of Composite Warfare? For example, I may be working under potentially the MEF today, but we may for a couple days move over to work for the carrier strike commander, or we may transfer a couple aircraft to work for the anti-sub warfare commander for a couple days, depending on the availability of assets in the battlespace. But we’re not used to cutting away a platoon or a battery from a battalion or a company from a battalion to work for the Navy for a day or two and then come back to us. We’ve got to make sure, once they decide how we do that, that all our C4 systems align and work with them and we can talk with them, whoever our direct combat boss is in the battlespace.”
Much easier to do with briefing slides than with operational forces. And being able to fight tonight remains an imperative as II MEF serves many masters, including, EUCOM, Second and Sixth Fleet
[1] Robbin Laird, Training for the High-End Fight, Chapter Three, 2021, https://www.amazon.com/Training-High-End-Fight-Strategic-Shift/dp/1098350758/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=training+for+the+high+end+fight&qid=1620576406&sr=8-1
Featured Photo: Tents, communication networks and vehicles are set up for Marines to operate during MEFEX 16 at Camp Lejeune, N.C., May 16, 2016. MEFEX 16 is a command and control exercise conducted in a simulated deployed environment designed to synchronize and bring to bear the full spectrum of II Marine Expeditionary Force’s C2 capabilities in support of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force. Conducting exercises of this nature ensures II MEF remains ready to provide the Marine Corps with an experienced staff capable of integrating with international allies and partner nations in a combined joint task force, charged with accomplishing a wide range of military operations. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Kirstin Merrimarahajara/released)
Trojan Footprint is the premier Special Operations Forces exercise in Europe.
While the exercise is focused on improving the ability to SOF to counter myriad threats, it also increases integration with conventional forces and enhances interoperability with our NATO allies and European partners.
Most importantly, however, Trojan Footprint builds upon already strong relationships, grows trust and develops lasting friendships that promote European peace and stability.
Special Forces soldiers from North Macedonia and the U.S. honed their Close-Quarters Battle (CBQ) skills during Exercise Trojan Footprint 21.
Trojan Footprint 21 is Special Operations Command Europe’s annual exercise to demonstrate proficiencies, assess the readiness and lethality of our respective forces, and to continue improving interoperability with allies and partners. In North Macedonia, soldiers from the U.S. Army’s 10th Special Force Group and North Macedonia’s Special Forces Battalion, nicknamed “The Wolves,” are focusing on CQB and special reconnaissance skills, both of which they’ll put to the test during at two-day field exercise in North Macedonia’s Krivolak Training Area.
SKOPJE, NORTH MACEDONIA
05.09.2021
Video by 1st Lt. Robert Kunzig
U.S. Special Operations Command Europe
U.S. Marines conduct immediate action drills during exercise Dynamic Cape (DC 21.1) on April 20, 2021 at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
DC 21.1 is a command and control exercise simulating a contested environment to enhance operational readiness between II Marine Expeditionary Force partner nations and other Department of Defense entities.
04.20.2021
Video by Cpl. Seaira Moore
2nd Marine Logistics Group
By Robbin Laird
In the April 8, 2021, Williams Foundation seminar on Next Generation Autonomous Systems, an important consideration was how the ADF could leverage a broader ecosystem of change in the commercial sector where robotics and artificial intelligence were playing key roles. An important presentation at the seminar was by Professor Jason Scholz, CEO of the Trusted Autonomous Systems Defence Cooperation Centre. Scholz is this year’s winner of the McNeil prize, awarded to ‘an individual from Australian industry who has made an outstanding contribution to the capabilities of the Royal Australian Navy’, he is also a tenured Innovation Professor at RMIT University in Melbourne.
The broader Australian effort with regard to autonomous systems provides an opportunity for the ADF to shape sovereign defense capabilities in this area as well as working more effectively with relevant global partners in this area. And it is not simply a question of kit; it is about working ADF concepts of operations interactively with core allies.
As the ADF works its way ahead with regard to building out its fifth generation force to enable integrated distributed operations, selective autonomous systems will enable the force to become more effective, more lethal and more survivable.
The Centre provides a catalyst for change. This is how the TAS website describes the organization:
Trusted Autonomous Systems is Australia’s first Defence Cooperative Research Centre, and is uniquely equipped to deliver world-leading autonomous and robotic technologies to enable trusted and effective cooperation between humans and machines. Our aim is to improve the competitiveness, productivity and sustainability of Australian industry.
Supporting Australia’s defence capability
Trusted Autonomous Systems, together with its participants and the Department of Defence, is developing the capacity of Australia’s defence industry to acquire, deploy and sustain the most advanced autonomous and robotic technology through:
Supporting acceptance, regulation and certification of autonomy
In addition to specific industry-led Projects, TASDCRC is undertaking two common-good activities that have broader, non-defence applications, in addition to their defence benefit. These activities are the Ethics & Law of Autonomous Systems and Assurance of Autonomy.
Through these activities TASDCRC will:
How we work
Trusted Autonomous Systems fosters collaboration between Australia’s defence industry and research organisations and aims to increase small and medium enterprise participation in its collaborative research to improve the research capabilities of the Australian defence industry.
Established under the Next Generation Technologies Fund, with $50 million invested over seven years, and supplemented by other governmental funding, the Defence CRC aims to deliver trustworthy smart-machine technologies for new defence capabilities based on advanced human-machine teaming.
* May be human piloted but never needs to be. If in trouble seeks human assistance. If assistance not forthcoming goes into a safe mode of operation.
This is how Scholz described the challenge and the way ahead for the ADF in the autonomous systems area:
“Autonomous systems for air, land, sea, space, cyber, electromagnetic, and information environments offers huge potential to enhance Australia’s critical and scarce manned platforms and soldiers, and realizing this now and into the future requires leadership in defence, in industry, in science and technology and academia with an ambition and an appetite for risk in effecting high-impact and disruptive change.”
He underscored the crucial importance of leveraging the broader commercial developments and uses already underway.
“We need a diversity of means to make this work. And it happened into the future. This is an initiative of defence and DST group. It leverages strong commercial technology drivers to solve these long-term challenges experienced by the department.”
The Centre takes an approach which is “defence needs-driven,” with every project clearly having to show how it can be a “game-changer for the ADF to fight and win.”
Projects are “industry led” often with smaller firms, to ensure new technologies get through the “valley of death.”
All projects are “research supported” which includes subcontracting government researchers and academics to industry – a novel approach.
I had a chance to discuss with Jason, to understand the nature of the way ahead in practical terms during a phone interview on May 27, 2021.
The focus of that conversation was very much on how to get these innovations into the hands of the ADF as operational capabilities as the ADF was working force transformation referred to as building a fifth generation force.
Although autonomous systems can be labelled as disruptive technology, in actual fact, the disruption is already underway.
What the ADF refers to as building a fifth generation force can also be labelled as building a distributed and human-machine-team integrated force.
This is clearly underway with the platforms and systems which the ADF is already acquiring, but what next generation autonomous systems can do is accelerate the transition and build out greater mass for a distributed force.
And as autonomous systems are leveraged, the way new capabilities will be added, and supported will change, including in terms of the industrial model supporting the force as well. For example, the ADF is operating a number of software upgradeable systems already, with the Wedgetail being the first platform introduced into the force which is built around software upgradeability.
With a manned system, obviously there is concern for the safety and security of the manned elements crewing the platform, so that software redesign needs to be done in regard to these key considerations.
But as Scholz put it in our interview, with the Centre’s focus on the “smart, the small and the many”, compared with traditional “complex, large and few” manned systems, code rewriting can be much faster.
It is also the case that digital engineering and digital twins is changing how all platforms are designed and supported. But in the case of next generation autonomous systems, the entire life cycle of these “smart, small and many” systems is very different.
“They will be attritable; there will be no need to develop and maintain 30 years of systems engineering documentation – some of these might be used only once or a few times before disposal. When you need to adapt to the threat, digital engineering supports fast redesign and T&E in the virtual, and to add a new capability you just download it as software.” Scholz says.
And the question of how to handle the requirements process is very different.
This already true for software upgradable platforms like Triton, but it has been VERY difficult for acquisition systems to recognize how software upgradeability simply blows up the traditional requirements setting process. Next generation autonomous systems are built around software and digital life cycles; this means that how they are validated and introduced requires a clearly modified acquisition approach.
I remember how difficult it was to introduce the Osprey into the USMC and then into the force. I interviewed a Marine in the early days of introduction and he referred to the challenge of transitioning from being a “bar act” to becoming a core combat capability which significantly transformed the force.
Autonomous systems face the problem of moving from being a “bar act.”
So where might these systems be introduced in the near term, gain operator’s confidence, and contribute in the short to mid-term to a more effective ADF?
The shortest path to escaping the “bar act” phase is in infrastructure defense.
Maritime autonomous systems certainly could provide a significant contribution in the relatively short-term to something as crucial as extended port security and defense.
Indeed, Scholz worked with CMDR Paul Hornsby in the 2018 Autonomous Warrior exercise.
According to Scholz: “This was the biggest trial of autonomous systems which the Royal Australian Navy has done to date. We had 45 companies actively participating with live demonstrations, as well hosting the final demonstration of the Five Eyes nations Autonomy Strategic Challenge which was an initiative of The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP). We were able during the exercise to control 13 separate semi-autonomous vehicles, in the air, on the surface, underwater and on land simultaneously from a single operator at a workstation. One of the vignettes was littoral base defense.”
He argued that for the ADF, a “human-centered, AI-enabled, internet of things” approach is a way to think of it. From our work with Second Fleet, VADM Lewis and his team are rebuilding their approach around mission command for a distributed force.
This is the strategic direction already underway.
Scholz sees autonomous systems as providing mass to the distributed force. “Humans express mission command goals to machines, machines express to the operator what actions they can take to achieve that, and a contract agreement is formed. Within the commander’s intent, machines then subcontract to other machines and so on, dynamically adapting as the battle evolves to build that Mosaic.”
In both his presentation and our discussion, he highlighted a capability which they are working now which can provide for sensors and communications capabilities to support the force which complements manned assets to provide for Information, Reconnaissance and Intelligence. In other words, autonomous systems can provide for sensor networks which can be part of the effort to leverage information systems to deliver more timely and effective decisions.
“For example, high-altitude balloons can operate at 50,000 to 70,000 feet, above manned aircraft – largely solving the detect and avoid airspace problem. The endurance of these are a few days to weeks with the potential to station-keep or track surface targets with edge intelligence. The cost of these are a few thousand dollars each.
“They are reusable maybe six times, and can carry comms and ISR. Launch them in hours not like the months for cube sats. They are attritable, so you can put them in places you wouldn’t put other assets. They can assist first responders or support to war fighters.”
In short, the ADF is already undergoing a transition to shaping a distributed integrated force.
Next Generation Autonomous Systems can provide a further set of capabilities for a more effective, dense, survivable and capable ADF as it builds out for operations in the Indo-Pacific region and enhances its defense of the Australian continent.
See below to view Professor Scholz’s presentation to the seminar:
04_NGAS_Scholz
By Marcus Hellyer
The government’s 2020 defence strategic update provided refreshing clarity about Australia’s deteriorating strategic environment and the need for new military capabilities to address it.
These include long-range strike capabilities to impose greater cost on potential great-power adversaries at greater range from Australia. The government also included a shopping list of those capabilities giving a broad outline of schedule and the scale of investment.
But there’s a big gap between where we are today and where we need to be, and the shopping list crosses that gap achingly slowly. In the vast reaches of the Indo-Pacific, range is crucial and the Australian Defence Force’s long-range strike cupboard is bare.
The F-35A has an effective combat radius of about 1,000 kilometres. That can be boosted to about 1,500 kilometres with the use of expensive and vulnerable tanker aircraft. But even that doesn’t cover much of our neighbourhood. It’s also easily out-ranged by Chinese missiles—it doesn’t matter how good the F-35A is if it’s taken out on the ground or its bases are destroyed.
The navy doesn’t have much to offer either. Its six submarines provide only two for operations, which doesn’t guarantee one on station to our north. They can only carry a few strike missiles and once they’re fired, it’s a one-month turnaround back to Australia to reload. And on the current Attack-class submarine schedule, it could be close to 2040 before the number of boats in our submarine fleet grows.
With the government providing Defence with $575 billion over the coming decade, the department has to do better at getting effective strike capability into service sooner.
One option that could deliver formidable long-range strike power well before the future submarines arrive are bombers. It’s strange that bombers don’t get much attention as a military option for Australia, considering we have a long history operating them. We flew bombers out of northern Australia during World War II against the Japanese to telling effect, and it was only a decade ago that the F-111, long a mainstay of Australia’s deterrent capability, was retired.
The only real candidate for a crewed long-range bomber is the B-21 stealth bomber, currently under development in the US and planned to enter service late this decade. Remarkably for a developmental project, the B-21 seems to be roughly on schedule and on budget by leveraging the technologies used in earlier stealth aircraft projects. It’s using two F-35 engines, for example, but it will have three or four times the range of the F-35. That will allow it to reach far out into the Indo-Pacific, greatly complicating the planning of any adversary operating against us or our friends. It also means it can be based deep inside Australia, far from threats, and still not need to rely on tanker support.
If Australia had a squadron of 12 B-21s, it could dispatch a flight of three aircraft carrying around 30 long-range anti-ship missiles in the morning and follow it up with another in the afternoon. Unlike submarines, bombers can do it all again the next day. If the mission was to strike ground targets, they could each carry 50 guided bombs.
Granted, bombers can’t do everything that submarines can do (and the reverse is also the case). But they can potentially deliver similar results differently, for example by destroying enemy submarines in port, rather than hunting them down at sea. Or by dropping sophisticated sea mines off an enemy’s naval bases.
Certainly, that kind of capability doesn’t come cheap. The US is aiming for a unit price under $1 billion. A squadron of 12 aircraft will likely total around $20–25 billion once we add in bases, support systems such as simulators and maintenance facilities, and so on. That’s a lot, but compared to the $45 billion to be spent on future frigates, the $89 billion on submarines or indeed the $30 billion on armoured vehicles, it’s a price worth considering. Deploying a B-21 would also mean sending a crew of two into danger, as opposed to more than 60 on an Attack-class submarine or 180 on a future frigate.
Of course, if we buy B-21s from the US, not a lot of money will be spent here on local industry in their acquisition. But the Defence budget shouldn’t be seen primarily as an industry program. At any rate, the bulk of spending over the life of a military aircraft is in its sustainment, and much of that will be spent here.
There’s one other potential option; a Goldilocks solution with greater range than the F-35 but less capability and cost than the B-21. It would involve developing a bigger, multi-engined version of the loyal wingman uncrewed combat aircraft recently test flown by Boeing Australia. That would take a commitment from the government and Defence to invest in its development, as well as trust that autonomous systems can deliver lethal effects at long range.
But we could pursue both approaches as an insurance policy to hedge against the risks we are facing.
Marcus Hellyer is ASPI’s senior analyst for defence economics and capability.
A version of this article was published in The Australian.
This was published by ASPI on May 24, 2021.
Featured Image: US Air Force.