By LtGen Steve Rudder (Retired)

The Ukraine employment of Unmanned Surface Vessels (USV) in attacks on the Russian Black Sea Fleet represents a window into the lethality of swarming and autonomous unmanned surface vessels. Because of their small radar cross-section, high speed, and agile maneuverability, USVs are likely going to change the face of Naval Warfare.

Dr. Robbin Laird has been leading the reporting on Unmanned Systems and Kill Webs for many years and has been producing forward thinking pieces on the evolution of autonomy.

At each achievement, whether it be Ukraine, TF-59 in the Arabian Gulf, or the Australian Defense Force, his articles and books have provided a window into the future dominance of autonomous maritime systems and the journey into the Kill Web.

The combination of air and surface unmanned capabilities is ripe for the maritime environment where nations do not have large Navies or Air Forces to secure their heavily trafficked Economic Exclusion Zones.

For the United States there are similar requirements where wargaming between the PLA and U.S. Navy exemplifies attrition warfare at its best. Compounding the U.S. problem is that weapons and shipbuilding timelines are not keeping pace with the growth of the PLA Navy and their shore based anti-ship capabilities.

However, this competitive premise is only based on capitol ship production of surface combatants, aircraft carriers, and submarines. Robbin points out that the asymmetric advantage of swarming USVs and loitering munitions are becoming well documented in the Ukrainian conflict and could provide an asymmetric advantage for U.S. maritime forces.

Autonomous USVs offer a number of advantages over regular manned vessels which make them attractive to many countries that have been developing or experimenting with them in recent years.

In the Asia pacific, allies and partners are looking at USVs and UAVs to solve the maritime domain awareness gaps.

For Japan, the Miyako Strait and Bashi Channel are positioned along what military strategists refer to as the “first island chain” stretching from the Japanese archipelago through Taiwan to the Philippines.  The Senkaku Islands are a group of uninhabited islands in the East China Sea administered by Japan. From Gray zone activities, PLA Coast Guard, and PLA Navy incursions these areas present a significant concern to the Japanese.

This expanse of islands also represents just one of the many contested areas the U.S. Navy will have to fight its way into should conflict occur. Notably, the distance between Taiwan and Japan’s Yonaguni Island is only 70 miles. Unmanned craft operating in and around the Japanese island chain could be employed to provide early warning, local security, and contested logistics.

Robbin’s book lets us imagine what a “wolfpack” of autonomous USVs might look like in and around these maritime choke points.

To date, the U.S. has limited experience in this rapidly evolving area. The Navy has invested heavily with a strategic plan to acquire medium, large and extra-large “unmanned vehicles” to operate both on the surface and underwater, but relatively little effort on small and very small USVs.

The Navy and Marine Corps also face a major problem of coming to terms with how to use a kill web of USV and UAVs. As speed and response time provide the physical attributes of unmanned maneuver and fire, USV lethality options come in many different categories from providing targeting solutions for joint weapons to being a weapon itself as in Ukraine.

The book highlights the ability for unmanned craft to operate as a lethal system integrated with the fleets. USVs operating at speeds of 100 knots would have great affect with the Switchblade loitering munition, Naval Strike Missiles and/or torpedoes. Large numbers of networked maritime USVs would be very difficult to detect and equally as difficult to fire upon with today’s defense systems

Although the potential for lethal operations for USVs is impressive, it is also about the full spectrum of operations from ISR, Personnel Recovery, and Logistics. For each maritime problem around the world, there are simply not enough ships or aircraft for persistent domain awareness. We will not in the foreseeable future have the capacity to put capital assets continually forward to fill that gap. UAVs and USVs, notably working together, can fill such a gap cost effectively.

Another key attribute Robbin brings up is that USVs can operate from multiple port location ranging from large commercial ports to distributed remote shore locations.

He also introduces the reader to the “Mothership.” Rather than large capitol ships fighting each other, a mother ship could deploy multiple high speed unmanned craft able to swiftly attack large, slow, vulnerable surface ships. The obvious choice for the mothership concept would the LCS, ESB, or LPD. Already the launching platform for aviation and amphibious capabilities, Robbin’s research highlights these as untapped resources for the inclusion of large numbers of maritime USV and UAVs.

The evolution of UAVs and USVs operating within a mesh network would give naval forces new capabilities to execute their maritime mission. Solving the question of how to best use such capabilities should not hinder or delay necessary innovation and implementation.

As TF59 and Naval Unmanned Exercise Forces around the world demonstrate through experimentation, USV technology is available today. Capabilities already exist to build such a network which suggests the ability to rapidly field UAV-USV teams to the fleet.

The reader of Robbin’s book should walk away with a sense of how autonomous maritime systems are changing how we think about Naval Warfare.

LtGen Rudder (ret) serves as the President of Stick Rudder Enterprises specializing in aerospace and defense consulting for domestic and international markets.

He also serves as a Senior Defense Fellow for the Atlantic Council and supports the U.S. Taiwan Business Council with industry visits to Taiwan focused on defense partnerships.

He retired after 38 years as the Commanding General, Marine Forces Pacific. He Commanded 1st Marine Air Wing in Japan and was Director of Policy and Plans for INDOPACOM.

Before assuming command of Marine Forces Pacific, he served as the Deputy Commandant for Aviation where he managed all Marine Aviation aircraft procurement and sustainment programs.

With over 5000 hours in multiple aircraft and recipient of the Distinguished Flying Cross in combat, he uses his operational and program experience to serve U.S. Defense Companies and International Partners.

By Robbin Laird

The Marines in focusing on EABOs have two key lift assets which can deliver autonomous systems payloads to an EABO and to do so with the reduced signature goal which has been highlighted by LtGen Heckl.

Maritime autonomous systems can be delivered to an EABO via an Osprey/CH-53K combination. The payloads for the maritime autonomous systems could be delivered to an EABO by a single Osprey which would land and offload the Marines, the payloads for the maritime autonomous systems and the support which the Marines would need for a short duration mission. The Osprey could deliver the payloads and land the Marines and leave rapidly.

An incoming CH-53K – both the Osprey and the CH-53K are air refillable and could land at the remote location operating as a transient EABO in a wide variety of locations determined operationally significant by the Navy/Marine Corps command element.

The CH-53K as Col Fleeger, the head of NAVAIR’s PMA-261 which manages the cradle to grave procurement, development, support, fielding, and disposal of the entire family of H-53 heavy lift helicopters,  has noted can be thought of in these terms: “I would argue we should be putting the new age into the back of our helicopter. I’m talking about new technology and new capabilities in roll-on/roll-off packages and inserting them into the back of our helicopter which should be the next logical conceptual leap. We carry cargo in the back, we just we just need to think differently about the type of cargo we’re carrying and the capabilities of the cargo itself.”

The Osprey could carry C2, ISR, Counter-ISR or weapons payloads to the transient location for the EABO. The CH-53K could bring maritime autonomous systems such as those provided by the family of systems built and operated today by MARTAC and the Marines could use one of the boats provided to leave the EABO if rapid turn around and maximum reduction of the signature is a key requirement, or the Marines could simply depart onboard the CH-53K after having launched the MARTAC wolfpack of autonomous systems.

I asked the CEO of MARTAC, Bruce Hanson, after carefully examining the cargo capability of the CH-53K, what could be carried by the aircraft to an EABO. The answer: On the hook, carried beneath the aircraft could be one of the larger boats, the T-38, or a T-50 or T-60 with the number suggesting the length of the boat. Inside the aircraft could comfortably carry three T-18s and 6 T-12s. This means that if the Marines departed by the CH-53K a wolfpack of the larger boat with an additional nine boats could be launched with a decent range to set up a C2 mesh network, and ISR mesh network or a counter-ISR deception network or if desired weaponized with either torpedoes or UAVs such as longer-range loitering munitions on the boats. In addition, most of these vessels can hide undetected for long periods of time in “Gator Mode” awaiting instructions.

The Marines could choose to reduce signature by leaving some of the boats.  The quantity of boats would be correlated to how many Marines are necessary to marry the payloads to the boats.

I have provided extensive detail in my book on The Coming of Maritime Systems to be published later this month of the payloads in relationship to the wolfpack boat operations.

But C2, ISR, Counter-ISR payloads have all been tested on these boats, and the wolfpack operating capabilities of the boats working together with various sizes have been clearly demonstrated. Weapons have also been demonstrated but I think for the near term, the focus is on mesh networks of C2, ISR or counter-ISR payloads.

The importance of counter-ISR is especially significant. As LtGen Heckl put it about his desired EABOs: The real value proposition we are putting forward as the Stand in Force  for the joint force is our sensing capability. The insertion of Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) of a sensing capability that can link with other assets, such as the F-35, allows us to sense, connect, and operate even in the face of the denial of space-based assets.

This is an additional way to do this which reduces the time on station for the Marines to do so, thereby enhancing signature management.

The central importance of counter-ISR was underscored in a meeting I had last year with a senior Admiral involved in Pacific operations. This is what he told me:

“Counter-ISR is the number one priority for me, to deny the adversary with to high confidence in his targeting capabilities. I need to deceive them and to make a needle look like a needle in a haystack of needles. It is important to have the capability to look like a black hole in the middle of nothing.”

Dropping in numbers of MARTAC wolfpacks makes for a lot of cost-effective haystacks.

A combined arms operations of Marine air with maritime autonomous systems is one way to do that now and provide a key building block for shaping future operations.

For a report drawing the four articles in the series together, see the following:

Featured Photo: A U.S. Marine Corps CH-53K King Stallion helicopter, assigned to Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461, conducts an external lift at Auxiliary Airfield II near Yuma, Arizona, March 28, 2023. The CH-53K King Stallion performed the heaviest lift by a U.S. military helicopter outside of developmental testing with a total load weight of 36,000 pounds. HMH-461 is a subordinate unit of 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, the aviation combat element of II Marine Expeditionary Force. (U.S. Marine Corps still image extracted from video by Cpl. Jaye Townsend),