By Robbin Laird

In the April 8, 2021, Williams Foundation seminar on Next Generation Autonomous Systems, an important consideration was how the ADF could leverage a broader ecosystem of change in the commercial sector where robotics and artificial intelligence were playing key roles. An important presentation at the seminar was by Professor Jason Scholz, CEO of the Trusted Autonomous Systems Defence Cooperation Centre. Scholz is this year’s winner of the McNeil prize, awarded to ‘an individual from Australian industry who has made an outstanding contribution to the capabilities of the Royal Australian Navy’, he is also a tenured Innovation Professor at RMIT University in Melbourne.

The broader Australian effort with regard to autonomous systems provides an opportunity for the ADF to shape sovereign defense capabilities in this area as well as working more effectively with relevant global partners in this area. And it is not simply a question of kit; it is about working ADF concepts of operations interactively with core allies.

As the ADF works its way ahead with regard to building out its fifth generation force to enable integrated distributed operations, selective autonomous systems will enable the force to become more effective, more lethal and more survivable.

The Centre provides a catalyst for change. This is how the TAS website describes the organization:

Trusted Autonomous Systems is Australia’s first Defence Cooperative Research Centre, and is uniquely equipped to deliver world-leading autonomous and robotic technologies to enable trusted and effective cooperation between humans and machines. Our aim is to improve the competitiveness, productivity and sustainability of Australian industry.

 Supporting Australia’s defence capability

Trusted Autonomous Systems, together with its participants and the Department of Defence, is developing the capacity of Australia’s defence industry to acquire, deploy and sustain the most advanced autonomous and robotic technology through:

• delivering world-leading autonomous and robotic Defence technologies
• building innovative IP through targeted research and technology programs
• assisting Australian industry to develop new, improved and competitive autonomy technologies
• evaluating the utility of autonomous systems through capability demonstrations.
• Specifically, Trusted Autonomous Systems aims to:
• develop highly self-sufficient and survivable systems *
• develop highly self-determining and self-aware systems *
• develop human-autonomy systems that are human and context aware
• increase the speed to reach a deployable state for trusted autonomous systems
• increase the scalability and reduce the cost of autonomous systems technology solutions
• educate in the ethics and legal aspects of autonomous systems
• advocate and form national policy and regulations.

 Supporting acceptance, regulation and certification of autonomy

In addition to specific industry-led Projects, TASDCRC is undertaking two common-good activities that have broader, non-defence applications, in addition to their defence benefit. These activities are the Ethics & Law of Autonomous Systems and Assurance of Autonomy.

 Through these activities TASDCRC will:

• foster ethical and legal research including value-sensitive design
• develop policy pathways for projects and participants
• support development of Queensland air, land and marine ranges for trusted trials, test and evaluation
• establish independent, world-class certification pathways for global industry.

 How we work

Trusted Autonomous Systems fosters collaboration between Australia’s defence industry and research organisations and aims to increase small and medium enterprise participation in its collaborative research to improve the research capabilities of the Australian defence industry.

Established under the Next Generation Technologies Fund, with $50 million invested over seven years, and supplemented by other governmental funding, the Defence CRC aims to deliver trustworthy smart-machine technologies for new defence capabilities based on advanced human-machine teaming.

 * May be human piloted but never needs to be. If in trouble seeks human assistance. If assistance not forthcoming goes into a safe mode of operation.

This is how Scholz described the challenge and the way ahead for the ADF in the autonomous systems area:

“Autonomous systems for air, land, sea, space, cyber, electromagnetic, and information environments offers huge potential to enhance Australia’s critical and scarce manned platforms and soldiers, and realizing this now and into the future requires leadership in defence, in industry, in science and technology and academia with an ambition and an appetite for risk in effecting high-impact and disruptive change.”

He underscored the crucial importance of leveraging the broader commercial developments and uses already underway.

“We need a diversity of means to make this work. And it happened into the future. This is an initiative of defence and DST group. It leverages strong commercial technology drivers to solve these long-term challenges experienced by the department.”

The Centre takes an approach which is “defence needs-driven,” with every project clearly having to show how it can be a “game-changer for the ADF to fight and win.”

Projects are “industry led” often with smaller firms, to ensure new technologies get through the “valley of death.”

All projects are “research supported” which includes subcontracting government researchers and academics to industry – a novel approach.

I had a chance to discuss with Jason, to understand the nature of the way ahead in practical terms during a phone interview on May 27, 2021.

The focus of that conversation was very much on how to get these innovations into the hands of the ADF as operational capabilities as the ADF was working force transformation referred to as building a fifth generation force.

Although autonomous systems can be labelled as disruptive technology, in actual fact, the disruption is already underway.

What the ADF refers to as building a fifth generation force can also be labelled as building a distributed and human-machine-team integrated force.

This is clearly underway with the platforms and systems which the ADF is already acquiring, but what next generation autonomous systems can do is accelerate the transition and build out greater mass for a distributed force.

And as autonomous systems are leveraged, the way new capabilities will be added, and supported will change, including in terms of the industrial model supporting the force as well. For example, the ADF is operating a number of software upgradeable systems already, with the Wedgetail being the first platform introduced into the force which is built around software upgradeability.

With a manned system, obviously there is concern for the safety and security of the manned elements crewing the platform, so that software redesign needs to be done in regard to these key considerations.

But as Scholz put it in our interview, with the Centre’s focus on the “smart, the small and the many”, compared with traditional “complex, large and few” manned systems, code rewriting can be much faster.

It is also the case that digital engineering and digital twins is changing how all platforms are designed and supported. But in the case of next generation autonomous systems, the entire life cycle of these “smart, small and many” systems is very different.

“They will be attritable; there will be no need to develop and maintain 30 years of systems engineering documentation – some of these might be used only once or a few times before disposal. When you need to adapt to the threat, digital engineering supports fast redesign and T&E in the virtual, and to add a new capability you just download it as software.” Scholz says.

And the question of how to handle the requirements process is very different.

This already true for software upgradable platforms like Triton, but it has been VERY difficult for acquisition systems to recognize how software upgradeability simply blows up the traditional requirements setting process.  Next generation autonomous systems are built around software and digital life cycles; this means that how they are validated and introduced requires a clearly modified acquisition approach.

I remember how difficult it was to introduce the Osprey into the USMC and then into the force. I interviewed a Marine in the early days of introduction and he referred to the challenge of transitioning from being a “bar act” to becoming a core combat capability which significantly transformed the force.

Autonomous systems face the problem of moving from being a “bar act.”

So where might these systems be introduced in the near term, gain operator’s confidence, and contribute in the short to mid-term to a more effective ADF?

The shortest path to escaping the “bar act” phase is in infrastructure defense.

Maritime autonomous systems certainly could provide a significant contribution in the relatively short-term to something as crucial as extended port security and defense.

Indeed, Scholz worked with CMDR Paul Hornsby in the 2018 Autonomous Warrior exercise.

According to Scholz: “This was the biggest trial of autonomous systems which the Royal Australian Navy has done to date. We had 45 companies actively participating with live demonstrations, as well hosting the final demonstration of the Five Eyes nations Autonomy Strategic Challenge which was an initiative of The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP). We were able during the exercise to control 13 separate semi-autonomous vehicles, in the air, on the surface, underwater and on land simultaneously from a single operator at a workstation. One of the vignettes was littoral base defense.”

He argued that for the ADF, a “human-centered, AI-enabled, internet of things” approach is a way to think of it. From our work with Second Fleet, VADM Lewis and his team are rebuilding their approach around mission command for a distributed force.

This is the strategic direction already underway.

Scholz sees autonomous systems as providing mass to the distributed force. “Humans express mission command goals to machines, machines express to the operator what actions they can take to achieve that, and a contract agreement is formed. Within the commander’s intent, machines then subcontract to other machines and so on, dynamically adapting as the battle evolves to build that Mosaic.”

In both his presentation and our discussion, he highlighted a capability which they are working now which can provide for sensors and communications capabilities to support the force which complements manned assets to provide for Information, Reconnaissance and Intelligence. In other words, autonomous systems can provide for sensor networks which can be part of the effort to leverage information systems to deliver more timely and effective decisions.

“For example, high-altitude balloons can operate at 50,000 to 70,000 feet, above manned aircraft – largely solving the detect and avoid airspace problem. The endurance of these are a few days to weeks with the potential to station-keep or track surface targets with edge intelligence. The cost of these are a few thousand dollars each.

“They are reusable maybe six times, and can carry comms and ISR. Launch them in hours not like the months for cube sats. They are attritable, so you can put them in places you wouldn’t put other assets. They can assist first responders or support to war fighters.”

In short, the ADF is already undergoing a transition to shaping a distributed integrated force.

Next Generation Autonomous Systems can provide a further set of capabilities for a more effective, dense, survivable and capable ADF as it builds out for operations in the Indo-Pacific region and enhances its defense of the Australian continent.

See below to view Professor Scholz’s presentation to the seminar:

04_NGAS_Scholz

 

 

By Marcus Hellyer

The government’s 2020 defence strategic update provided refreshing clarity about Australia’s deteriorating strategic environment and the need for new military capabilities to address it.

These include long-range strike capabilities to impose greater cost on potential great-power adversaries at greater range from Australia. The government also included a shopping list of those capabilities giving a broad outline of schedule and the scale of investment.

But there’s a big gap between where we are today and where we need to be, and the shopping list crosses that gap achingly slowly. In the vast reaches of the Indo-Pacific, range is crucial and the Australian Defence Force’s long-range strike cupboard is bare.

The F-35A has an effective combat radius of about 1,000 kilometres. That can be boosted to about 1,500 kilometres with the use of expensive and vulnerable tanker aircraft. But even that doesn’t cover much of our neighbourhood. It’s also easily out-ranged by Chinese missiles—it doesn’t matter how good the F-35A is if it’s taken out on the ground or its bases are destroyed.

The navy doesn’t have much to offer either. Its six submarines provide only two for operations, which doesn’t guarantee one on station to our north. They can only carry a few strike missiles and once they’re fired, it’s a one-month turnaround back to Australia to reload. And on the current Attack-class submarine schedule, it could be close to 2040 before the number of boats in our submarine fleet grows.

With the government providing Defence with $575 billion over the coming decade, the department has to do better at getting effective strike capability into service sooner.

One option that could deliver formidable long-range strike power well before the future submarines arrive are bombers. It’s strange that bombers don’t get much attention as a military option for Australia, considering we have a long history operating them. We flew bombers out of northern Australia during World War II against the Japanese to telling effect, and it was only a decade ago that the F-111, long a mainstay of Australia’s deterrent capability, was retired.

The only real candidate for a crewed long-range bomber is the B-21 stealth bomber, currently under development in the US and planned to enter service late this decade. Remarkably for a developmental project, the B-21 seems to be roughly on schedule and on budget by leveraging the technologies used in earlier stealth aircraft projects. It’s using two F-35 engines, for example, but it will have three or four times the range of the F-35. That will allow it to reach far out into the Indo-Pacific, greatly complicating the planning of any adversary operating against us or our friends. It also means it can be based deep inside Australia, far from threats, and still not need to rely on tanker support.

If Australia had a squadron of 12 B-21s, it could dispatch a flight of three aircraft carrying around 30 long-range anti-ship missiles in the morning and follow it up with another in the afternoon. Unlike submarines, bombers can do it all again the next day. If the mission was to strike ground targets, they could each carry 50 guided bombs.

Granted, bombers can’t do everything that submarines can do (and the reverse is also the case). But they can potentially deliver similar results differently, for example by destroying enemy submarines in port, rather than hunting them down at sea. Or by dropping sophisticated sea mines off an enemy’s naval bases.

Certainly, that kind of capability doesn’t come cheap. The US is aiming for a unit price under $1 billion. A squadron of 12 aircraft will likely total around $20–25 billion once we add in bases, support systems such as simulators and maintenance facilities, and so on. That’s a lot, but compared to the $45 billion to be spent on future frigates, the $89 billion on submarines or indeed the $30 billion on armoured vehicles, it’s a price worth considering. Deploying a B-21 would also mean sending a crew of two into danger, as opposed to more than 60 on an Attack-class submarine or 180 on a future frigate.

Of course, if we buy B-21s from the US, not a lot of money will be spent here on local industry in their acquisition. But the Defence budget shouldn’t be seen primarily as an industry program. At any rate, the bulk of spending over the life of a military aircraft is in its sustainment, and much of that will be spent here.

There’s one other potential option; a Goldilocks solution with greater range than the F-35 but less capability and cost than the B-21. It would involve developing a bigger, multi-engined version of the loyal wingman uncrewed combat aircraft recently test flown by Boeing Australia. That would take a commitment from the government and Defence to invest in its development, as well as trust that autonomous systems can deliver lethal effects at long range.

But we could pursue both approaches as an insurance policy to hedge against the risks we are facing.

Marcus Hellyer is ASPI’s senior analyst for defence economics and capability.

A version of this article was published in The Australian.

This was published by ASPI on May 24, 2021.

Featured Image: US Air Force.

By Robbin Laird

The Navy and the Marines are reworking ways to enhance their warfighting and deterrence capabilities in the North Atlantic. This effort has been referred to as preparing for the “Fourth Battle of the Atlantic” by Adm. James Foggo III, when he was commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe/Africa.

As CNO Admiral Richardson established 2nd Fleet, he highlighted a new role of the High North as a key area of interest in dealing with the Russian challenge, one which for the direct interest of the United States is focused around what Admiral Gortney highlighted as the 10:00 O’clock threat to CONUS.

In an interview we did with the then head of Northcom and NORAD, Admiral Gortney, this is how he put the challenge:

“With the emergence of the new Russia, they are developing a qualitatively better military than the quantitative military that they had in the Soviet Union. They have a doctrine to support that wholly government doctrine. And you’re seeing that doctrine in military capability being employed in the Ukraine and in Syria.

“For example, the Russians are evolving their long-range aviation and at sea capabilities. They are fielding and employing precision-guided cruise missiles from the air, from ships and from submarines. Their new cruise missiles can be launched from Bears and Blackjacks and they went from development to testing by use in Syria.

“It achieved initial operating capability based on a shot from a deployed force. The Kh-101 and 102 were in development, not testing, so they used combat shots as “tests,” which means that their capability for technological “surprise” is significant as well, as their force evolves. The air and sea-launched cruise missiles can carry conventional or nuclear warheads, and what this means is that a “tactical” weapon can have strategic effect with regard to North America.

“Today, they can launch from their air bases over Russia and reach into North American territory.

“The challenge is that, when launched, we are catching arrows, but we are not going after the archers.

“The archers do not have to leave Russia in order to range our homeland. And with the augmentation of the firepower of their submarine force, the question of the state of our anti-submarine warfare capabilities is clearly raised by in the North Atlantic and the Northern Pacific waters.

“We need to shape a more integrated air and maritime force that can operate to defend the maritime and air approaches to North America as well as North America itself. We can look at the evolving threat as a ten o’clock and a two o’clock fight, because they originate from the ten and two. And the ten o’clock fight is primarily right now an aviation fight.”

But how does meeting this challenge look from the standpoint of North Carolina based Marines?

And with the enhanced focus on integration with naval forces, how will the Marines reshape their forces and approach to operate in the 10:00 O’clock area of operations?

During my visit to Camp Lejeune in April 2021, I had a chance to discuss the challenge of shaping an effective way ahead with three members of the II MEF team who have taken the longer-term perspective on meeting these challenges.

My meeting with Dr. Nick Woods, the Center for Naval Analyses II MEF Field Representative, with Dan Kelly, a retired Marine Colonel who works within the G-5, and Major Ronald Bess who works Plans as well at the command.

The three together provided a very helpful perspective in understanding how enhancing integration with the Navy looks like from a II MEF lens.

There are a number of takeaways from that conversation which I would like to highlight.

And as I have written with regard to earlier articles, I am not holding these individuals responsible for what I concluded from our conversation, but thank them for their insights.

There are four key takeaways.

The first is that this a work in the early phases of navigating the way ahead.

As one participant highlighted that it is extremely important that both the Navy and Marine Corps both work through what each side brings to the key warfighting functions in the North Atlantic.

Each side needs to better understand what each force can bring to the key warfighting functions, both in terms of contributions and limitations.

And with the clear focus of Second Fleet working with the only operational NATO command on U.S. territory, how best to work with Allied Joint Forces Command?

For example, if there is a shift from engaging the Marines built around the large deck amphibious ship, what then is the role of frigates or destroyers in supporting Marine Corps operations?

The second is to understand what warfighting gaps exists as such integration unfolds, and how best to fill those gaps?

And this needs to be realistic.

What capabilities do we have now?

What would we like to have?

And what is a realistic acquisition strategy to fill those gaps? As one participant put it: “The joint force as well as those of our allies and partners all are going through change and we need to crosswalk this so we identify Marine Corps contributions and do we have any gaps.”

The third is the impact of potential disconnect between what the Combatant Commands want from Marine Corps forces and potential new paths for future Marine Corps development.

The demand side clearly needs to change to provide for room for transformations that might well attenuate Marine Corps capability in the near to middle term but provide for prospects for new capabilities down the road.

The fourth is the general challenge of reworking how the fourth battle of the Atlantic would be fought.

How will the joint and maritime forces work together most effectively with allies to deliver the desired combat and crisis management effects?

This ties back to the first point, namely, ensuring that the Navy and the Marine Corps work through most effectively how to deliver with regard to the key warfighting functions in a correlated and where possible integrated manner?

As one participant put it: “We need to go to the White Board and work through each of the key functions to ensure that we can deliver an integrated capability before we let go of any current capabilities which we have.”

And as another participant concluded: “there is a strong argument to be made for divesting of legacy capabilities now in favor of future capabilities that would provide a greater contribution to European defense in the future.”

For an example of a change being worked, see the following:

In an article by Capt. Kelton Cochran, 24th MEU published on May 24, 2021, the deployment of HIMARS with the 24th MEU was highlighted.

The 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit’s 2021 deployment cycle brings with it a capability not yet employed by an East Coast MEU. In addition to the more traditional assets allocated to the MEU as it composited ground, logistics, and aviation combat elements in September 2020, the crisis response force was also assigned a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System detachment.

The 24th MEU is exploring a different approach towards employing HIMARS as a theater-level expeditionary asset—keeping the asset forward in the task force’s area of operations as opposed to embarked on naval vessels.

“MEUs operate globally, year around as the Nation’s Force-in-Readiness,” said U.S. Marine Corps Col. Eric D. Cloutier, commanding officer, 24th MEU. “As we lean into the future fight, expanding our reach and flexibility by utilizing platforms like HIMARS gives us the ability to facilitate maneuver and freedom-of-movement for friendly forces, and our Allies and partners, while denying our adversaries the ability to do the same.”

HIMARS is designed as an affordable and adaptable theater force protection asset. The system has been in service with the Department of Defense since 2005 and was fielded by the U.S. Marine Corps in 2008 in support of operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

As the Corps looks to the future and refocuses on its naval roots, commanders are exploring the numerous options for employing the vehicle-mounted precision rocket system in more dynamic operations in the maritime and littoral environment. Embarking HIMARS platoons aboard Amphibious Ready Group ships and deploying them via surface connectors, such as landing craft utility vessels, is a concept of employment that West Coast MEUs have rehearsed, and developed to a high level of proficiency.

Maintaining a forward deployed land-based element of HIMARS that is attached to the MEU allows it to capitalize on strategic lift capabilities provided by USMC and Joint platforms in support of ARG / MEU missions. A HIMARS platoon, with strategic lift, can quickly infiltrate contested environments, prosecute targets, and depart before adversaries are able to detect or engage them. This technique is known as HIMARS Rapid Infiltration. The 24th MEU conducted HIRAIN in both live-fire and rehearsal events since early 2021 during pre-deployment training. Since deploying, the 24th MEU has engaged in multiple opportunities for sustainment through rehearsals with Joint units in theater, like the 352d Special Operations Wing, based in the United Kingdom.

The Iwo Jima ARG consists of the amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7), transport dock ship USS San Antonio (LPD 17), and dock landing ship USS Carter Hall (LSD 50). Embarked detachments for the Iwo Jima ARG include Amphibious Squadron Four, Fleet Surgical Team Six, Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 26, Tactical Air Control Squadron 21, Naval Beach Group Two, Beach Master Unit Two, Assault Craft Unit Two and Four, and Sailors from Amphibious Construction Battalion Two.

The 24th MEU consists of a ground combat element, Battalion Landing Team 1/8, a logistics combat element, Combat Logistics Battalion 24, and an aviation combat element, Medium Tilt-Rotor Squadron 162 Reinforced. The unit is a self-sustained amphibious fighting force comprised of a command element, ground combat element, aviation combat element, and logistics combat element. Embarked with the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group, this Marine air-ground task force is forward deployed in the U.S. Sixth Fleet area of operations in support of U.S. national security interests in Europe and Africa.

Iwo Jima ARG-MEU team is manned, trained and equipped to fulfill amphibious requirements in support of maritime security and stability. Amphibious ready groups and larger amphibious task forces provide military commanders a wide range of flexible capabilities including maritime security operations, expeditionary power projection, strike operations, forward naval presence, crisis response, sea control, deterrence, counter-terrorism, information operations, security cooperation and counter proliferation, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

U.S. Sixth Fleet, headquartered in Naples, Italy, conducts the full spectrum of joint and naval operations, often in concert with allied and interagency partners, in order to advance U.S. national interests and security and stability in Europe and Africa.

The featured photo: Marines from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit conduct firing training on a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) at RAF Fairford on March 30, 2021. Special operation’s capabilities enhance the execution of HIMARS Rapid Aerial Insertion missions, extend the reach of long-range, precision strike capabilities and enable the joint force. (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Roidan Carlson)

 

 

By Robbin Laird

Our focus over the past few years has been upon the shift from the Middle Eastern Land Wars to the refocus on peer competitors. The preparation for the high-end fight is a key part of this refocus, but not as the sole focus of attention; rather it is upon an ability to shape effective crisis management capabilities to be able to deliver escalation control.

The peers we are talking about are nuclear powers. Any high-end fight will be shaped by the presence of nuclear weapons in such an engagement.

Clearly, there is a desire on the United States to protect its interests short of nuclear engagement, but the United States is not the only player in such calculations.

This means that building out conventional warfighting capabilities entails thinking through from the outset how packages of conventional forces can be clustered for crisis management events in ways that provide for effective escalation management.

This requires civilians to prepare for escalation management, rather than when facing an event which can spin out of control, either ignoring or capitulating to the peer competitor. It is about doing more than verbal admonishment, or being reduced to invoking economic sanctions, or otherwise limited use tasks, which often have little real effect on deterring an authoritarian peer competitor.

The mindset of the peer competitor is a key part of preparing for crisis management as well. This means understanding what might allow for successful crisis management when dealing with such different cultural manifestations of global authoritarians such as Russia or China. This has a clear effect on the forces which might be tasked to perform crisis management tasks.

A key example is how the Russians deal with the evolving threat of Nordic integration to the classic intimidation strategies they follow in Europe. During my travels to the region, there is a clear concern on how Nordic integration can be strengthened and in so doing finding ways to shape more effective collaboration for crisis management.

How to avoid the seams that the Russians exploit in normal times, and will accentuate through various means of coercion in a crisis?

In our discussions with both Second Fleet, and with Allied Joint Force Command Norfolk, it is clear Vice Admiral Lewis and his team have focused from the outset of the 2018 standup of the new C2F upon how to shape a fleet which is optimized for crisis management and to operate in such a way that the Russians can exploit the operational seams in the North Atlantic.

The emphasis of the Nordics on a significant strengthening of their collaborative capabilities and the NATO reset in the region have provided a key context within which the U.S. and allied fleets are working new ways to distribute the force to the point of effect but to do so in a way that the force is integratable across the region.

What this means is the key role of the “relevant nations” in North Atlantic defense need to understand events in their region from the standpoint of crisis management.

And to be able to correlate that understanding with clear and decisive military and whole of government actions to convey to the Russian leadership what deterrence means in that specific case.

Deterrence is not universal state; it is delivered in times of key events shaping pre-crisis or crisis challenges.

The flexibility which VADM Lewis’s commands are demonstrating in exercises and operations is an element of providing the infrastructure for effective crisis management. The USAF and its engagement earlier this year with the exercising of bombers with Nordic fighter and ground force support is another.

But a key part of this effort is what the Marines can bring to the crisis management engagement. The Marines have provided a rotational force to Norway which has been a key element for providing initial crisis management support and doing so will remain crucial in the years ahead, and in the next piece in this series, I will make the case that indeed expanding this role might be one way to shape a more effective crisis management force.

A key objective of the North Carolina based Marines is the reinforcement of the Nordic area and operating with all four Nordic states — the Marines are a unique air land sea or already multi domain force and that is where they are best.

As the head of DIA recently warned that the Russians pose a significant direct military threat to the United States and he was not talking about hybrid war. From a US national security perspective that means the Kola Peninsula and Russia’s lateral moves to try to avoid being choked by a significant allied and Nordic defense effort is the core focus of direct defense in Europe.

As he put it in his April 29, 2021 statement:

“The Russian military is an existential threat to the United States and a potent tool designed to maintain influence over the states along its periphery, compete with U.S. global primacy, and compel adversaries who challenge Russia’s vital national interests.

“Moscow continues to invest in its strategic nuclear forces, in new capabilities to enhance its strategic deterrent and that place the U.S. homeland at risk, and in capabilities that improve its conventional warfighting.

“The Kremlin’s military strength is built on its survivable strategic nuclear forces and a conventional force largely postured for defensive and regional operations.

“Russia has a growing ability to project power with long-range precision cruise missiles and limited expeditionary capabilities.

“Military leaders are incorporating lessons from Russia’s involvement in Syria into their training and exercises as they seek to develop a better-coordinated, joint force.

As we wrote in our European book there are three very different European defense problems today but this is the on which most significantly affects directly the United States and that is why Lewis’s focus on HOW to reshape these capabilities makes his efforts so important.

The renewed focus on USMC-U.S .Navy integration embraces the important role which Marines play both in terms of re-imaging the role of the amphibious force in North Atlantic defense (e.g. the engagement of the USS Wasp in the Black Widow Exercise last year) or in terms of refocusing its capabilities to reinforce Nordic integration, of the sort that the Russians have to take seriously in terms of the ultimate choke point – namely, operations out of the Kola Peninsula.

Indeed, the Russians are expanding their Arctic reach in part to try to outflank such a challenge.

In short, to deal with the challenge of peer competitor nuclear powers and their global engagement, full spectrum crisis management capabilities are crucial up to and inclusive of the high-end fight.

But this means having insertion force packages at the point of critical impact in events which can grow up the escalation ladder.

As Paul Bracken put it in a 2018 piece:  “The key point for today is that there are many levels of intensity above counterinsurgency and counter terrorism, yet well short of total war. In terms of escalation intensity, this is about one-third up the escalation ladder.

“Here, there are issues of war termination, disengagement, maneuvering for advantage, signaling, — and yes, further escalation — in a war that is quite limited compared to World War II, but far above the intensity of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan…..

“A particular area of focus should be exemplary attacks. Examples include select attack of U.S. ships, Chinese or Russian bases, and command and control.

“These are above crisis management as it is usually conceived in the West. But they are well below total war. Each side had better think through the dynamics of scenarios in this space.

Deep strike for exemplary attacks, precise targeting, option packages for limited war, and command and control in a degraded environment need to be thought through beforehand.

“The Russians have done this, with their escalate to deescalate strategy. I recently played a war game where Russian exemplary attacks were a turning point, and they were used quite effectively to terminate a conflict on favorable terms. In East Asia, exemplary attacks are also important as the ability to track US ships increases.

“Great power rivalry has returned. A wider range of possibilities has opened up. But binary thinking — that strategy is either low intensity or all-out war – has not.”

One-Third Up the Escalation Ladder

Or see the 2018 report on Nordic defense and the strategic shift:

And see the recent report on Second Fleet and Allied Joint Force Command Norfolk:

2nd Fleet and Joint Force Command Norfolk: A May 2021 Update

For the first two articles in the series, see the following:

https://defense.info/featured-story/2021/05/events-policy-making-and-strategic-imagination/

Warning Time, Events and Crisis Management