The Launch Point: Why a Combined Arms Operation with Maritime Autonomous Systems?

02/29/2024

By Robbin Laird

In my last article, I highlighted a third way one can discuss autonomous systems working with manned air systems. This third way would focus upon crafting combat clusters which work in a combined arms operation involving a manned air system with autonomous maritime systems especially working as a wolf pack.

Prior to discussing a notional case of doing so, I would like to focus on why one would want to be able to do so.

For me, the answer to this lies in my assessments of the Marines and their focus on enhanced force mobility to deal with the threats from peer adversaries.

The focus has been upon an ability to distribute a force, to reduce the signature of that distributed force and to move more rapidly across the combat chessboard in order to be able to target the adversary more effectively from the points of interest where those dynamic distributed forces operate.

During my visits to MAWTS-1 in Yuma Arizona since 2018, there is a clearly evident focus on finding ways to be able to do what I have just described. During my November 2023 visit, such a focus was evident throughout the interviews with the officers at the command.

For example, I noted after the visit:

When I was last at MAWTS-1 in 2020, they were starting to work on how to enhance the deployability and mobility of the Marine Corps and to do so in formations smaller than the traditional MAGTF.  During this visit, my discussions with the department heads underscored how much work they have done in terms of doing expeditionary basing, innovations in Forward Refueling and Re-Arming points and ways to reduce the signature of the deployed force.”

In that visit, my discussion with the Aviation Ground Support (AGS) Department Head, Maj Justin Atkins, a USMC combat engineer, focused on the signature management challenge.

Atkins noted that in his deployments to date, they had not really focused on signature management. When fighting the land wars, signature management was not a key issue. But when dealing with more advanced adversaries, obviously operations in the electro-magnetic spectrum had a key effect on the movement and operation of forces.

With regard to Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), the question of how to manage forces across the combat chessboard is clearly affected by signature management and the need to organize force in ways to reduce it or to mask it. He noted that most of AGS activities are focused on FARP operations as the means to do EABOs.

They have worked multiple configurations of FARPs to do so but have not found an optimal solution. We are building small tactical teams and exploring ways to sense, communicate, and to operate in the battlespace with mobility. But how to ensure that such teams have the desired effects?

He noted that they work with the spectrum warfare department to do two things. First, they work with them to reduce their spectrum signature footprint. Second, they are working as well to copy that footprint to provide means to mask operations as well.

Maj Atkins noted: Before coming to MAWTS, I never looked at the question of electromagnetic spectrum whatsoever. Now it is a central consideration of my focus and effort.

In short, the Marines at MAWTS have been working new ways to do FARPS as a way to do EABOs, but there are key limitations to what one can do in the real world. And ultimately, the key combat question can be put simply: What combat effect can you create with an EABO? How does the joint force use an EABO in creating a joint effect? And what is the relationship of the creation of EABOs to what the Marines do when the National Command Authority calls on them to deploy?

My discussions with LtGen Heckl, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, expanded on this challenge and highlighted the importance of introducing autonomous systems in the force to provide for the kind of force mobility and support the Marine Corps was looking for.

LtGen Heckl argued in one of our interviews:

It is about survivability and a key to being able to do that is signature management. We are keenly focused on reduced electronic magnetic signature management in how we think about deployment of the force and doing so with an eye to how the deployed force can integrate sensors with strike.

“It really is about a kill web in which the real value proposition is reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance reducing your vulnerabilities and exposing those of the adversary and enabling effective strike.”

It is in this context that Heckl discussed autonomous systems. “We are focusing on a broad range of autonomous systems capabilities. They aid significantly in signature management. If they are unmanned, you don’t have the weight or equipment necessary for a man onboard whether it be a ship or an airborne system. It means as well you can get better value out of your manned aviation assets or your ships.

“With regard to our lift assets – C-130s, CH-53s, or Ospreys – they can carry the most essential elements to an EABO but can be supplemented by a variety of autonomous systems which reduces the overall signature of the force and allows for enhanced flexibility of the force.”

Logistics in LtGen Heckl’s view is the pacing function for a distributed force. How to sustain a distributed force? This will be a combination of the air and sea manned assets as well various autonomous systems. He highlighted work being done for the USMC to build unmanned surface vessels to carry logistics to the point of need.

 In another of our interviews, he added this core point:

The real value proposition we are putting forward as the Stand in Force  for the joint force is our sensing capability. The insertion of Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) of a sensing capability that can link with other assets, such as the F-35, allows us to sense, connect, and operate even in the face of the denial of space-based assets.

When we’re in an integrated environment, everything we’re doing, we’re approaching from that perspective so that we will still be active even when an adversary takes action to degrade our ability to connect, we will still be connected.

For me, the discussions at MAWTS-1 and with LtGen Heckl provide the launch point for considering why a combined arms operation of manned air systems with a maritime autonomous system wolfpack can be a significant innovation in rethinking how to leverage the force you have now to have the future capability you want now.

I will turn in the next article to a notional case of how one could do so.

Featured Photo: ARABIAN GULF (Oct. 23, 2023) A Lethal Miniature Aerial Missile System launches munitions from a MARTAC T-38 Devil Ray unmanned surface vehicle, attached to U.S. Naval Forces Central Command’s Task Force 59, during Exercise Digital Talon in the Arabian Gulf, Oct. 23. U.S. Naval Forces Central Command recently completed Exercise Digital Talon, demonstrating the ability of unmanned platforms to pair with traditionally crewed ships in “manned-unmanned teaming” to identify and target hostile forces at sea. Then, using munitions launched from another unmanned platform, engaged and destroyed those targets. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Justin Stumberg)

Autonomous Systems and Manned Platforms: From Teaming to Combined Ops

 

 

 

 

 

 

Naval Air Station Sigonell Mass Casualty Drill

02/28/2024

Sailors, assigned to U.S. Naval Hospital Sigonella, and airmen, assigned to 446th Airlift Wing, joined their Italian counterparts to execute a mass casualty drill on Naval Air Station Sigonella, May 12.

NAS Sigonella’s strategic location enables U.S., allied, and partner nation forces to deploy and respond as required to ensure security and stability in Europe, Africa, and Central Command.

SIGONELLA, ITALY
05.12.2023
Video by Petty Officer 2nd Class William Berksteiner
AFN Sigonella

Marines with 3rd LAR

02/26/2024

U.S. Marines with 3rd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st Marine Division, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, unload tactical vehicles onto a U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III assigned to the 14th Airlift Squadron, 437th Airlift Wing, during a strategic mobility exercise, as part of Service Level Training Exercise 2-24 at Camp Wilson, Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California, Jan. 26, 2024.

Joint interoperability between the Air Force and the U.S. Marine Corps enables Marine units to rapidly embark on C-17’s, allowing the Marine Corps to provide support for expeditionary operations.

TWENTYNINE PALMS, CA,
01.26.2024
Video by Lance Cpl. Iris Gantt
Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center

Autonomous Systems and Manned Platforms: From Teaming to Combined Ops

By Robbin Laird

Generally, when autonomous systems are discussed in relation to manned systems, the focus is upon teaming. Images of the Australian Loyal Wingman come to mind whereby the autonomous system is seen as a slaved system to a manned aircraft, hence the term teaming.

A key capability of the manned air system is the ability to communicate with and digitally manage the autonomous system.

In my own discussions with NAVAIR concerning the coming of the CH-53K, I focused on such a future for the manned aircraft working with an autonomous system.

In my visit to NAVAIR in January 2020, I discussed this approach with Col Jack Perrin, then the Program Manager, PMA-261 H53 Heavy Lift Helicopters, U.S. Naval Air Systems Command at Pax River Naval Air Station.

As Col Perrin noted in our conversation: “The USMC has done many studies of distributed operations and throughout the analyses it is clear that heavy lift is an essential piece of the ability to do such operations.” And not just any heavy lift – but heavy lift built around a digital architecture. Clearly, the CH-53E being more than 30 years old is not built in such a manner; but the CH-53K is.

What this means. according to Colonel Perrin, is that the CH-53K “can operate and fight on the digital battlefield.”

And because the flight crew are enabled by the digital systems onboard, they can focus on the mission rather than focusing primarily on the mechanics of flying the aircraft.

This will be crucial as the Marines shift to using unmanned systems more broadly than they do now. For example, it is clearly a conceivable future that CH-53Ks would be flying a heavy lift operation with unmanned “mules” accompanying them. The CH-53K in a FARP or Forward Arming and Refueling Point Mission could bring weapons on-board and the unmanned “mules” could bring the fuel bladders along with the main hook, or in the future the three hook system. Such manned-unmanned teaming requires a lot of digital capability and bandwidth to manage, a capability built into the CH-53K.

If one envisages the operational environment in distributed terms, this means that various types of sea bases, ranging from large deck carriers to various types of Maritime Sealift Command ships, along with expeditionary bases, or Formed Arming and Refueling Points (FARPs) or Forward Operating Base (FOBS), will need to be connected into a combined combat force.

To establish expeditionary bases, it is crucial to be able to set them up, operate and to leave such a base rapidly or in an expeditionary manner (sorry for the pun). This will be virtually impossible to do without heavy lift, and vertical heavy lift, specifically.

Put in other terms, the new strategic environment requires new operating concepts; and in those operating concepts, the CH-53K provides significant requisite capabilities, especially when one builds in its ability to direct the operations with autonomous “mules” working with it.

A second way they have been discussed has been in terms of mission threads tasked to an autonomous system or swarm or wolfpack which then is directed to do a mission which then the manned force can exploit in terms of associated operations.

We have seen in the Ukraine war many examples of drones being sent to do a single one-way mission, but this is not only way to think the single-mission focused unmanned system. These one-way drones are conceived of more terms of how missiles are used than in terms of providing a robust partner for ongoing manned platforms.

The notion of mission-thread and the use of maritime autonomous systems is here now and I discussed this approach with the then Director General Warfare Innovation, Royal Australian Navy, Commodore Darron Kavanagh of the Royal Australian Navy in a visit to his office in Canberra in May 2023.

As CDRE Kavanagh underscored:  “One of the issues about how we’ve been looking at these systems is that we think in terms of  using traditional approaches of capability realization with them.

“We are not creating a defense capability from scratch. These things exist, already, to a degree out in the commercial world, regardless of what defense does. AI built into robotic and autonomous systems are in the real world regardless of what the defence entities think or do.

“And we have shown through various autonomous warrior exercises, that we can already make important contributions to mission threads which combat commanders need to build out now and even more so going forward.”

And that is really the key point in discussing these systems. The use of maritime autonomous systems is driven by evolving concepts of operations and the mission threads within those evolving CONOPS rather than by a platform-centric traditional model of acquisition.

CDRE Kavanagh pointed out that traditional acquisition is primarily focused on platform replacement and has difficulty in supporting evolving concepts of operations.

This is how he put it:  “We’re good at replacing platforms. That doesn’t actually require a detailed CONOPS when we are just replacing something. But we now need to examine on a regular basis what other options do we have? How could we do a mission in a different way which would require a different profile completely?”

Autonomous or unmanned systems seen in this way will reach another level when they can swarm to deliver the capability needed for a mission thread. Although this capability can be foreseen it is not here yet, but learning how to use unmanned and autonomous systems to perform a core mission thread is the necessary step towards a swarming future. If you don’t use them, you will not build them into your force anticipating the swarming future.

As Keirin Joyce, an Australian Air Force Officer who also served in the Australian Army, a leading expert on unmanned and autonomous systems put it in a 2020 article:

 What does true swarming look like? Imagine UAVs are operating across the sky, providing aerial observation, targeting, data networks, delivery of even smaller UAV and precision navigation and timing services, with ground robots that can be tasked to take action in a wide spectrum from logistics to combat and casualty evacuation.

 That robotic swarm is a heterogeneous cross-domain team, consisting of dynamic configurations, sensing capabilities, spatial footprints and behavioural strategies, independent of centralised control, synchronised to work with, and cued by, their human teammates.

 Imagining a more expansive vignette of robotic swarming is not too difficult:

It is 2030, and an Australian joint task force (JTF) is deployed on stabilisation operations in the near region against a force of insurgents who have been equipped and trained by a technologically sophisticated, militarised nation-state seeking to gain power at a regional pivot point.

The Australian JTF includes swarming machines in support of an Army brigade. Multiple unmanned assets come and go with trusted permission from the networked combat teams, and they operate in all five domains: on and underwater, on land, in the air, in space, and interacting with the cyber/electromagnetic spectrum.

These assets started their capability life cycle in the 2010s as small tactical unmanned aerial systems (UAS), ground robots, teleoperated armoured vehicles, and armed medium altitude long endurance (MALE) remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS). They are now semi- and fully autonomous.

Their configurations are dynamic, changing which assets are leading or following and adapting routes to account for unpredictable weather, changes which are frequent and difficult to predict in the Pacific.

The systems take evasive action from insurgent threats in the kinetic, electromagnetic, and cyber spectrum. The insurgents are well equipped with mobile, radar-cued surface-to-air missiles and counter-UAS systems. At higher altitudes, a Loyal Wingman swarm protects the crewed Wedgetail by changing flight altitudes and /profiles to account for radar threats. Down at ground level, machines in the team sense themselves and their surroundings to adapt to conceal their signatures, and or to exploit the signatures of threat forces.

This adaptation occurs across a wide spectrum of sound, vibration, colour, light, electromagnetic, radar, and particulate sensing.

The machine sensing can algorithmically adjust its behaviour depending on the tactical and operational scenario and mission guidance: passive, reactive, overt, covert, offensive, defensive, or population interactive.

Humans issue the orders and the mission commands, and, as the team rolls through the area of operations, the machines are cued and prioritised by the humans and their robot teammates.

Robots are sacrificed, they use automated/autonomous kinetic engagement to shield their machine and human teammates, and they undertake the dull, dirty, and dangerous roles to enable the humans in the team to do what they do best.

This is science fiction becoming science fact. The advent of true machine swarming behaviour is coming: an armada of machines, evolved algorithms, distributed intelligence, and complex autonomous behaviours – just as in a colony of bees.

However, true swarming is not here yet. In the meantime, we need to dial down the use of the term ‘swarm’ when discussing multiple unmanned aircraft.

But there is a third way in which one can discuss autonomous systems working with manned air systems. One can build combat clusters which work in a combined arms operation. This would particularly refer to manned systems working with a package of autonomous systems to deliver them to a point of operation where they then could do a mission thread, as discussed in what I am referring to as the second modality for autonomous systems operations.

I will discuss this combined arms operation approach in my next article in this series on the way autonomous systems can be used today, and not wait until the ghost fleet arrives or 2040 or whichever comes first.

Featured Graphic credit: Photo 147541472 | Autonomous Systems © Fairoesh N. | Dreamstime.com

 

 

2nd Bn. 4th Marines in Military Exercise

02/23/2024

U.S. Marines with 2nd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, conduct a live-fire day and night deliberate ground attack on Range 410A as part of Service Level Training Exercise 2-24 at Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, California, Jan. 25, 2024.

Range 410A challenges platoons to perform a complex fire and maneuver attack requiring communication and coordination between multiple support-by-fire positions and a maneuver element.

TWENTYNINE PALMS, CA

01.25.2024

Video by Lance Cpl. Anita Ramos

1st Marine Division

Crafting and Shaping the Nacelle Improvement Program for the Osprey: The Role of Industry

02/22/2024

By Robbin Laird

Improving sustainment has been an ongoing major effort throughout the evolution of the tiltrotor enterprise.

The Nacelle Improvement program (NI) is a major milestone in this effort.

When discussing sustainment, an important metric is the mission-capable rate (MC). That rate – expressed as a percentage of total time an aircraft can fly and perform at least one mission – is used to measure of the health and readiness of an aircraft fleet.

The key objectives of the NI program were to improve maintainability and reliability, so as to improve the V-22’s mission-capable rate. A reduction in maintenance man-hours to troubleshoot and repair, coupled with reduced failure rate of components results in less downtime and increased mission-capable status.

I wanted to learn more about industry’s role in the Nacelle Improvement program, so I turned to David Albin, the Nacelle Readiness Program Manager at Bell.

For 20 years, David Albin served on active duty in the Air Force and in the New Mexico Air National Guard as a helicopter and tiltrotor instructor pilot, completing more than 200 combat sorties in the V-22 and rotorcraft.

From my experience with the U.S. Marine Corps in terms of the evolution of maintenance and sustainability, the first years were focused on getting the aircraft deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan and learning how to support it. The focus was on providing parts to ensure mission availability.

As a digital aircraft, the Osprey generated data on parts performance that allowed the Marines to understand better the maintenance profile of the aircraft. By the time it was anchoring the new Special Purpose-MAGTF or SP-MAGTF, Marines could make a reasoned judgment about what parts needed to be onboard the KC-130Js, which were flying with the Osprey on crisis management missions.

By 2015, enough data had been accumulated to focus on how to shape a sustainment enterprise. This enabled the Marines to achieve better mission-capable rates and lower cost per flight hour for the Osprey.

This is where nacelle improvement entered the narrative, as described by Albin:

“When we started the nacelle improvement effort in 2014, we had access to data that allows industry to generate solutions using the fleet’s data. We worked with government on the input from maintainers about the aircraft and looked for solutions to enhance the MC rate and lower cost for flight hour.”

Albin continued, “There are fixed costs and variable costs in working sustainment for an aircraft. We focused on the variable costs and how to reduce them. How do we reduce the demand for components? How many times are parts being ordered based on false positives from the diagnostic system? How do we reduce false positives or get more accurate reporting from the diagnostic system? How do we improve the choke points in maintenance which reduce MC rate, and drive-up cost?”

The focus of the redesign effort was on engineering efforts to improve the operational characteristics of the nacelle.

Albin underscored: “The redesign focused both on service components to reduce the need for in-service repairs, like cracked frame stations, cracked baffles, the hinges and latches were all improved, so that maintainers would have to spend less time dealing with these components and their follow-on effects on the aircraft such as vibration in flight which caused the doors to open and potentially depart the aircraft, for example.”

He continued: “The Reliability & Maintainability Team used the data which had been accumulated from the operational fleet to determine what components or areas on the aircraft needed redesign. Based on this work, the engineers went and did the redesign and the NI program – then delivered reduced maintenance man hour rates and enhanced reliability.”

These combined effects of reduced maintenance man hours & improved reliability are what have holistically resulted in modified aircraft demonstrating higher MC rates compared to aircraft with the prior variant of nacelle.

This approach which yielded the NI program was rooted in two things: (1) a demand side shaped by the maintainers, and (2) the data generated by the aircraft from the operational fleet.

This information then flowed into industry, which then could parse the data and convert the maintainer input into engineering requirements. The engineers then focused on specific, realistic solutions in a re-design precisely focused on a more sustainable aircraft.

The resulting program had four key lines of effort:

  • New build of the nacelles;
  • Enhanced reuse of repairable components;
  • A new wiring design which improved maintainability, reliability and reduced part count;
  • New structure, consisting of targeted improvements to address fleet needs.

What has been the result?

According to data through the end of 2023 from the first users of the NI effort, namely the Air Force CV-22 community, the results have been significant. Twenty-one NI modified aircraft have flown 4,065 hours to date. During those flight hours, the maintainability improvements of NI have saved over 10,000 maintenance man hours or over 400 days of maintainer time on the modified aircraft compared to the time that would have spent on the legacy nacelle design.

Based on the NI program objective to improve reliability by four times, the prediction for NI after over 4K flight hours was 140 component failures. The actual failure rate of NI components to date has been zero, which is a truly significant result.

With regard to the NI maintainability rate, the results have also been notable. The objective was to reduce maintenance man hours by 75%, which after 4K flight hours should have accrued 2,195 hours.  The actual accrued maintenance man hours on NI components are at 12-man hours to date, which is a remarkable outcome.

As for the MC rate benefit from NI, in October 2023 AFSOC observed a 10.8% MC rate improvement in their NI modified aircraft compared to the legacy nacelle aircraft in their fleet.

Industry predictions are for an overall MC rate improvement of 7% or higher for the CV-22 fleet once all 50 aircraft in the Air Force fleet are modified.

To data leads to one conclusion: The NI program is a significant step forward in shaping a more sustainable tiltrotor enterprise. The benefits to the fleet from improved maintainability, reliability and overall MC rate are certain to provide great benefit in the austere and distributed operations employment of the aircraft in the future.

The featured photo shows Albin in his military role as a CV-22 pilot.

See also the following:

Osprey Major Redesign Effort: Modified CV-22s Arrive at Cannon Air Force Base

V-22 Major Nacelle Redesign Effort

 

 

 

Australia Works Maritime Autonomous Systems

02/20/2024

Recently, the Hudson Institute hosted a session looking at how the Australian Navy is approaching the opportunity to incorporate maritime autonomous systems in the fleet.

In an article by John Grady published by USNI News on February 1, 2024, the session was highlighted.

Numerous forward deployed, unmanned, underwater systems “might be the poor man’s version of the nuclear deterrent,” the director general of warfare innovation for the Royal Australian Navy said Thursday.

Capt. Adam Allicia, speaking at a Hudson Institute online event, said these systems “help us get over those long distances” that figure into any Indo-Pacific operation. The idea, he added, “is to rotate them in and out” to maintain at least a persistent presence for deterrence.

The underwater systems “look like a submarine,” but, because they’re not manned, “you can probably take more risks” in how they are employed. “We can take losses without the loss of human life.”

In assessing their immediate use, Allicia said, “they’re probably small, [so] how do we fight with these systems” as well as manned air and surface platforms and submarines? The immediate answer likely harkens “back to the ’50s, ’60s and ’70s – talking to one another.”

Allicia said the RAN has established a central integrating office for surface, subsurface and air experimentation and exercises to understand the risks and limits. “How we’re going to use these robots together is a challenge.”

“We’re obviously an island nation,” he said. Forward-deployed unmanned systems capable of delivering mass effects in addition to providing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance data can close “the ocean gap between us and a potential adversary.”

“Reach and persistence [over such] a maritime empire is becoming harder and harder,” Air Commodore Ross Bender, who heads Australia’s air combat capabilities efforts, added. Unmanned systems can make a difference in Canberra’s ability to defend itself and project power in the Indo-Pacific.

Army Brig. Gen. James Davis, who heads Canberra’s joint autonomy efforts, said “autonomy is the only way to bridge the gap in vast geography and population” for Australia to defend itself, particularly on its northern borders. Australia is roughly the size of the lower 48 states and has a population of about 28 million compared to the United States’ 330 million.