Speed, Sensors, and Strategic Presence: The Evolution of 2nd Marine Air Wing

11/11/2025

In 2007, an MV-22 Osprey touched down on the deck of HMS Illustrious, marking the first time this distinctive tiltrotor aircraft had landed on a non-American vessel.

The moment was more than a technical milestone.

It was a preview of a transformation that would reshape Marine Corps aviation over the next two decades.

This landing on a British carrier signaled an emerging vision of allied interoperability that would come to define the Second Marine Aircraft Wing’s evolution into what it is today: the Marine Corps’ designated “fight tonight” force, ready to respond to crises anywhere on the globe.

The story of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing from 2007 to 2025 represents one of the most significant institutional transformations in modern American military history.

It’s a story driven by three revolutionary aircraft platforms, a fundamental strategic reorientation, and an organizational culture that learned to embrace digital innovation from the bottom up.

But perhaps most importantly, it’s a story that raises profound questions about how military forces prove their value in an era where deterrence and presence matter as much as kinetic effects.

From the Middle East to the High North

Perhaps the most dramatic shift documented in this transformation is strategic rather than technological.

For two decades, Marine aviation focused heavily on counterterrorism operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The mission set emphasized close air support, troop transport in desert conditions, and sustained operations from relatively secure bases with robust logistics chains.

Today’s mission couldn’t be more different. The Second MAW has pivoted toward strategic competition with peer adversaries, which means preparing for conflict in environments that would have seemed almost unimaginable during the height of Middle East operations. The North Atlantic, the Arctic, and other cold-weather regions now figure prominently in training exercises and operational planning.

Exercise Nordic Response 24 exemplifies this shift. During this major exercise, the Second MAW operated their F-35s in Sweden, immediately integrating with the newest NATO members, Sweden and Finland. The demonstration showed that Marine aviation could operate complex fifth-generation jets in challenging climates far from established American bases—exactly the capability profile needed for strategic competition in the 21st century.

This strategic reorientation places extraordinary demands on equipment, training, and logistics. Cold-weather operations require different maintenance procedures, specialized survival training, and coordination with allies whose systems and protocols may differ significantly from American standards.

The transformation from Middle East counterterrorism to high-latitude strategic competition represents as much a cultural and intellectual shift as a technological one.

The Osprey: Collapsing Time and Distance

The MV-22 Osprey sits at the heart of the Second MAW’s transformation, and for good reason. While it was described at the outset of its deployment as simply as a replacement for the aging CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter, this characterization dramatically understates its impact. The Osprey doesn’t just do the same job faster. It has fundamentally changed the concept of operational reach and what’s possible in crisis response.

The numbers tell part of the story: the Osprey flies at roughly twice the speed and twice the range of conventional rotorcraft.

But the real impact becomes clear in specific operations. During Operation Odyssey Dawn off Libya in 2011, an Osprey achieved a 45-minute transit time each way while “shooting the gap” between several surface-to-air missile sites. A traditional helicopter simply wouldn’t have had the speed or range for that kind of mission in such a contested threat environment.

Perhaps the most striking evidence of the Osprey’s psychological impact comes from Iraq, where troops flying in the aircraft for the first time reportedly refused to disembark initially because they genuinely thought the flight had been too short. Marines who had mentally prepared for a 90-minute helicopter flight found themselves on the ground in 40 minutes. This anecdote illustrates how profoundly the Osprey changed not just logistics and planning factors, but even the troops’ embodied expectations of what military aviation could do.

The Osprey’s vertical takeoff and landing capability combined with its speed enables remarkably flexible operations. In one notable example, an Osprey delivered an entire Harrier jet engine from a supply ship at sea to a big-deck amphibious assault ship. This ability to move critical parts or personnel over long distances quickly proves indispensable for how modern Marine Expeditionary Units need to operate.

The pairing of the Osprey with the KC-130J Super Hercules extends its reach even further. This aerial refueling capability transforms the Osprey into a true long-range force insertion platform, whether for combat operations or humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions like the Philippine typhoon relief efforts.

The Osprey-KC-130J combination represents a force multiplier that gives the Second MAW global reach from its East Coast bases.

The CH-53K: Digital Precision in Heavy Lift

If the Osprey revolutionized speed and range, the CH-53K King Stallion represents the digitalization of heavy lift. The jump from the older CH-53E Super Stallion to the K model isn’t merely about lifting more cargo, though it does that exceptionally well.

The key word is “digital,” and the implications ripple throughout operations and maintenance.

The King Stallion is a fly-by-wire aircraft, meaning pilot control inputs go to computers that then command the flight control actuators digitally rather than through mechanical linkages. This architecture provides vastly improved stability and dramatically reduces aircrew workload. The computers handle the constant fine adjustments needed to keep the massive aircraft stable, especially in challenging conditions.

The precision this enables is genuinely astonishing.

In degraded visual environments — dust storms, heavy snow, night landings — the King Stallion can maintain its hover position within one foot of its intended point. Imagine trying to hold a large, powerful helicopter that steady manually during a brownout condition. This digital stabilization removes immense stress from pilots and significantly boosts safety margins for tricky operations like sling-loading heavy cargo or landing troops precisely.

The digital-first approach extends into maintenance through the Integrated Vehicle Health Monitoring System. This system constantly monitors the aircraft’s health through sensor data, vibrations, temperatures, system performance, and provides predictive maintenance information. The philosophy is straightforward: reliability is horsepower. If the aircraft is available, it can do the work.

At New River, a log demo program focused on transitioning from unscheduled, reactive maintenance to scheduled, predictive maintenance. Instead of fixing components after they break, the goal was to use data to predict failures and replace parts before they fail. This approach dramatically enhances aircraft availability, which proves critical for a force that needs to maintain high readiness for crisis response.

The F-35: A Flying Sensor Network

The F-35 Lightning II represents the third pillar of the Second MAW’s transformation. The aircraft is consistently described as an exponential leap comparable to the shift from the CH-46 helicopter to the Osprey. But understanding why requires looking beyond traditional fighter jet capabilities.

The F-35 is fundamentally a superb sensor platform designed to hunt as a pack. Its advanced radar, electronic surveillance systems, and data links from other aircraft and ground units all feed into a fusion process that creates a single, integrated picture of the battlespace. This fused picture then gets shared across the entire Marine Air-Ground Task Force, turning battlefield complexity into a common digital map that enhances situational awareness for pilots, troops on the ground, and commanders simultaneously.

Critically, the F-35 fills a long-standing capability gap by providing organic airborne electronic warfare capabilities right there with deploying forces. Previously, Marine units had to rely on larger, dedicated electronic warfare aircraft like the EA-6B Prowler. Now, self-protection and jamming capability are baked into the F-35 fleet, protecting entire strike packages much more effectively.

The pilots truly unlocking this potential are what MajGen Davis called the “iPad generation” or digital natives coming straight out of flight school who haven’t spent years flying older jets with analog cockpits. These pilots grew up with networked systems, intuitive interfaces, and data fusion. They’ve trained extensively in simulators that mirror the integrated environment from day one, so they think differently about how to use information. They expect to be able to share data seamlessly and leverage sensors from multiple platforms simultaneously.

At Beaufort, older fourth-generation jets like F/A-18s fly alongside F-35s to develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures for how different generations cooperate. This connectivity push extends even further down the aviation food chain, even attack helicopters like the H-1Z Viper are receiving Link 16 data links.

The goal is ensuring every air asset across the Marine Air-Ground Task Force can seamlessly share data with the F-35 and contribute to the common operational picture.

EABO: The Doctrine That Demands Everything

All three platform revolutions, the Osprey’s speed, the King Stallion’s digital lift, and the F-35’s sensors, serve a larger operational concept called Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, or EABO. This doctrine puts enormous demands on the force and fundamentally changes how Marine aviation operates.

EABO requires forces to disaggregate, to spread out to avoid presenting one large, vulnerable target to sophisticated enemy systems.

But forces still need to fight together, which means rapidly aggregating combat power when and where it’s needed.

It’s a constant dance between dispersal for survival and concentration for effect.

This completely upends traditional logistics and aviation ground support. The old model of building large, relatively static forward operating bases, what one Marine memorably compared to “setting up Walmart supercenters”, doesn’t work in EABO.

The new model is about rapidly creating smaller, distributed, temporary sites, more like agile pop-up stores. These require minimal footprint, highly mobile teams for refueling, rearming, light maintenance, and local security. Teams must be ready to set up, operate, and then pack up and move quickly from austere locations.

This challenge has led the aviation ground support community to argue that their capability should be formally recognized as the seventh function of Marine Corps aviation, alongside traditional functions like anti-air warfare and assault support. That’s how critical expeditionary basing flexibility has become to the entire Marine aviation mission.

Managing dispersed operations requires innovative command and control solutions. One fascinating example is the use of an MV-22 Osprey as an airborne command post. The Second MAW developed a roll-on, roll-off C2 suite called the NOTM-A kit, essentially communications gear and workstations that can quickly turn a transport aircraft into a sophisticated flying command node that links dispersed ground and air forces.

At the individual Marine level, ruggedized digital tablets called “MAGTABs” allow ground forces and aviators to share real-time situational awareness, targeting data, maps, and messages.

This digital backbone prevents dispersion from becoming confusion, keeping everyone synchronized when spread thin.

The Value of Presence

The ongoing transformation, driven by new platforms, emerging doctrine, and an evolving culture, raises a fundamental question that may define the future of military strategy and analysis. Kinetic effects can be recorded and quantified: targets destroyed, sorties flown, ordnance expended. Yet the effect of presence remains far more elusive, difficult to measure, and equally significant.

As the Marine Corps adapts to deter complex, often ambiguous hybrid threats, it increasingly depends on the flexible, distributed presence such as the Second Marine Aircraft Wing provides. Simply being there, reassuring allies, demonstrating capability, complicating adversary planning, produces strategic effects that are both real and consequential, even if they resist conventional metrics.

The critical challenge lies in demonstrating the necessity of this intangible presence to political leaders who emphasize measurable outcomes. The tension between what can be quantified and what truly counts may well define the next frontier in military thought.

The transformation of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing suggests a compelling answer: to cultivate forces so capable, adaptable, and ready that their very existence shapes the calculations of potential adversaries. In an era of enduring strategic competition, where deterrence is as vital as destruction, it may be the unmeasurable that warrants the most deliberate and disciplined assessment of all.

Note: If you want a compelling, inside account of how U.S. Marine aviation reinvented itself for the demands of the modern battlefield from technology to training, from strategy to culture. our new book on 2nd MAW delivers an authoritative and insightful guide.

A must-read for professionals, policymakers, and anyone fascinated by the nexus of leadership, innovation, and defense in a world defined by uncertainty and rapid change.

2nd Marine Air Wing: Transitioning the Fight Tonight Force

USS Oak Hill Departs in Atlantic Alliance 2025

11/10/2025

The Harpers Ferry-class dock landing ship USS Oak Hill (LSD 51) departs Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, June 20, in support of Atlantic Alliance 2025 (AA25). U.S. 2nd Fleet and II Marine Expeditionary Force, alongside Allies from the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, will conduct AA25, the premier East Coast naval integration exercise designed to rehearse, train, and refine U.S. Navy and Marine Corps amphibious capabilities while improving interoperability with our Allies in the littoral environment.

06.20.2025

Video by Seaman Recruit Nathan Sears 

USS OAK HILL

Edward Timperlake: A Distinguished Career in Military, Public Service, and Strategic Analysis

11/09/2025

By Robbin Laird

This is the second in our series about our 16-year path associated with our defense websites, Second Line of Defense and Defense Information.

Recognition of the contribution of the many talented individuals who have contributed to the path forward is central to highlighting the path forward as well.

Going forward, the series highlights the contributions of key participants in the journety, and there is no more central figure than Edward Timperlake.

His professional journey stands as a powerful example of multidimensional commitment to national defense, government leadership, and investigative analysis.

With a career spanning high-stakes operational roles, senior government appointments, and insightful contributions to defense literature, Timperlake’s story demonstrates a rare blend of practical experience and strategic thought leadership.

Timperlake began his career with a strong academic foundation, graduating from the United States Naval Academy in 1969. He pursued further education by earning an MBA from Cornell University, preparing himself for both operational leadership and complex organizational roles.

Entering the U.S. Marine Corps, Timperlake trained as a fighter pilot and quickly distinguished himself. His service included a combat tour during the Vietnam War, where he was awarded the Vietnam Service Medal (2 stars). Rising through the ranks, he commanded VMFA-321, a Marine Corps reserve fighter squadron, highlighting his leadership of operational aviation units and engagement in advanced tactical training programs.

After his active military service, Timperlake transitioned to several senior government positions:

  • As Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (1989–1992), he played pivotal roles in Congressional, public, and intergovernmental affairs, including leading medical mobilization during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and acting as a key spokesperson on Gulf War Illnesses.
  • Serving as Principal Director of Mobilization Planning and Requirements in the Office of the Secretary of Defense under President Reagan, he contributed to both DOD mobilization planning and continuity of government initiatives.
  • On Capitol Hill, Timperlake worked with the House Committee on Rules, focusing on national security issues including the investigation of illegal foreign contributions to political campaigns and participating in NATO’s North Atlantic Assembly affairs.

Transitioning into the private sector, he directed classified studies on military modernization as a Program Manager at The Analytic Sciences Corporation (TASC). Notably, he developed the TASCFORM methodology, a significant innovation for assessing global military air power modernization, of lasting value to sponsors such as the Department of Defense and the CIA.

Timperlake’s expertise reached a wider audience through his editorial leadership and authorship:

  1. As key part of the leadership team for Second Line of Defense and Defense.info, he contributed in-depth reporting and analysis on defense technology and policy issues.
  2. His books have garnered national attention, including the New York Times best-selling Year of the RatRed Dragon Rising, Showdown, and Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st Century Strategy, co-authored with Robbin Laird and Richard Weitz.

Demonstrating a commitment to public service beyond government, he has served on the board of the Vietnam Children’s Fund, facilitating the construction of elementary schools in Vietnam—a testament to his long-term vision for reconciliation and community-building.

Edward Timperlake’s varied career highlights a unique fusion of combat experience, strategic planning, policy innovation, and a passion for informing public understanding.

His influence continues to resonate in U.S. security circles, military modernization debates, and humanitarian efforts making him a respected voice in every sphere he has engaged.

And below are two books which we have written together which were driven by our work on the websites.

MAWTS 1: An Incubator for Military Transformation

Breaking Through the Echo Chamber: Sixteen Years of Comprehensive Defense Analysis

 

The Return of History: Why Australia’s New Centre for Public Ideas Matters

11/08/2025

By Robbin Laird

Research Fellow, Sir Richard Williams Foundation, Canberra, Australia

In an age of instant reactions, social media pile-ons, and policy-by-press-release, the University of Canberra has launched an audacious experiment: a center dedicated to the radical proposition that historical perspective and civil disagreement might actually improve public policy.

The Centre for Public Ideas, which opened its doors this week under the leadership of historian Professor Frank Bongiorno, represents more than just another academic initiative. It signals a growing recognition that something fundamental has broken in how democracies debate, decide, and govern.

The center’s genesis is itself noteworthy. Its architect is Bill Shorten, the university’s vice-chancellor and one of Australia’s most experienced political operators, a former union leader, opposition leader, and cabinet minister who knows intimately the pressures that produce short-term thinking in government. That someone who spent decades in the furnace of political combat now champions an institution devoted to long-term perspective and informed disagreement suggests this isn’t merely an academic exercise. It’s an intervention born of hard-won recognition that current approaches aren’t working.

The Crisis of Contemporary Debate

Professor Bongiorno’s diagnosis of what ails public discourse is both sweeping and specific. “There is a lack of civility in contemporary debate, an incapacity to agree, or to disagree well,” he argues. This isn’t simply about people being rude to each other on Twitter, though that’s certainly part of it. It’s about the erosion of the fundamental democratic skill of productive disagreement or the ability to engage with ideas you find objectionable without seeking to eliminate either the ideas or their proponents from the public square.

The professor traces the roots of current polarization not to recent technological disruptions but to deeper cultural shifts dating back decades. “The conflicts and tension and differences that came out of the 1960s have really become worse over the decades,” he notes. While social media often takes the blame for our fractured discourse, Bongiorno sees it as amplifying rather than creating these divisions. The platforms have given us new tools for conflict, but the underlying inability to engage across difference predates the digital age.

This matters because democracies require disagreement to function. The question isn’t whether we’ll have conflicts over values, priorities, and policies, of course we will. The question is whether we can maintain institutions and norms that allow these conflicts to be productive rather than purely destructive. “In democracies, we have to be able to disagree,” Bongiorno emphasizes, identifying this capacity as essential democratic infrastructure, as important as voting systems or independent courts.

The Cancel Culture Question

The center explicitly positions itself as addressing what Bongiorno calls “cancel culture” though his understanding of the term goes beyond simplistic political caricatures. He’s concerned about environments where people feel they cannot voice dissenting opinions without facing severe social or professional consequences. “I see universities as having a deep responsibility to provide spaces where safe disagreement is possible, where people can discuss quite difficult and controversial topics in an environment where they feel they’re not going to be cancelled.”

The use of “safe disagreement” is telling. It reclaims the concept of “safe spaces” from its association with protecting people from challenging ideas, instead reimagining it as protecting the space for challenging ideas themselves. The safety isn’t from discomfort or disagreement, but from the kind of personal destruction that makes people self-censor rather than risk engagement.

Bongiorno identifies identity politics as a particular driver of intolerance, though he’s careful not to dismiss the legitimate concerns that often animate identity-based movements. The problem arises when political discourse becomes primarily about asserting and defending identities rather than engaging with ideas when the most important question about any argument becomes “who said it” rather than “is it true” or “does it work.”

His criticism of statue removal illustrates this point. Rather than simply erasing controversial historical figures like Captain James Cook, Bongiorno advocates for adding context through plaques and interpretation. “I think there is a danger, if you simply get rid of particular monuments or statues, that it can actually induce a kind of forgetting about the past and indeed a kind of historical ignorance,” he argues. The goal should be “encouraging conversation and better understanding, rather than elimination.”

This approach, adding complexity rather than subtracting difficulty, runs counter to the simplifying instincts of contemporary discourse. It’s harder to maintain a monument with explanatory context than to tear it down. It’s harder to teach a complex, contradictory history than a simple narrative of heroes and villains. But difficulty, Bongiorno suggests, might be the point. Democracy isn’t supposed to be easy.

The Amnesia of Policy-Making

Perhaps the center’s most important mission is addressing what Bongiorno sees as a dangerous historical amnesia in policy development. “Too much debate about public policy lacks historical context, as if every problem is being contemplated for the first time,” he observes. This ahistorical approach means repeatedly rediscovering insights that previous generations already learned, often the hard way.

“It’s very rare that a particular problem is cropping up without some kind of precedence,” Bongiorno notes. Whether the issue is housing affordability, immigration policy, healthcare reform, or managing great power competition, contemporary Australia isn’t the first society to grapple with these challenges. Yet policy debates often proceed as if they are, reinventing wheels and repeating mistakes because institutional memory has been lost.

The causes of this amnesia are multiple. Bongiorno points to “the busyness of professional life, of politics and the bureaucracy” that encourages “situation management”, dealing with immediate crises using whatever tools are at hand, without time to consult experience or consider long-term implications. The modern political cycle, measured in news cycles and polling periods, creates intense pressure toward the urgent at the expense of the important.

But there’s also been a more deliberate turn against historical thinking. Bongiorno identifies “a longer-term trend against institutional memory and historical perspective, and sometimes perhaps an assumption that the past is a poor guide to the present.” This assumption is particularly strong in technological and economic domains, where genuine innovation can create an illusion that everything is new and past experience is irrelevant.

The irony is that this presentism makes policy-making worse, not better. “In fact, a lot of the problems we are dealing with are echoing problems of the past: history can provide a useful guidance to dealing with the present,” Bongiorno argues. Understanding how previous governments addressed housing shortages, managed immigration waves, or reformed taxation helps contemporary decision-makers avoid pitfalls and adapt successful approaches to current conditions.

Rebuilding Institutional Memory

The Centre for Public Ideas aims to address this memory loss through multiple mechanisms. It will host seminars and debates where public servants and politicians can engage with historical perspectives on current policy challenges. It will offer “microcredential” courses. short, focused educational programs designed for busy decision-makers who need historical context without committing to lengthy academic programs.

The center’s approach recognizes that policy professionals often know their immediate domains well but lack broader context. A housing bureaucrat might understand current market conditions and regulatory frameworks intimately while knowing little about how previous generations addressed similar challenges. A defense planner might be expert in contemporary capabilities while unaware of historical debates about strategy and force structure that could illuminate current choices.

By bringing this historical depth to bear, the center hopes to shift policy conversations from “what should we do?” to “what have others done when facing similar challenges, what worked, what failed, and what can we learn?” This doesn’t mean history provides simple answers: past contexts differ from present ones in important ways. But it does mean not starting from scratch every time.

The loss of institutional memory isn’t just about forgetting successes worth replicating. It’s also about forgetting failures worth avoiding. “We’ve often forgotten experiments of the past – both successes and failures,” Bongiorno notes. Understanding why certain approaches didn’t work can be as valuable as understanding what succeeded, but only if that knowledge is preserved and transmitted.

The Donald Horne Legacy

The center’s leadership position is named the Donald Horne Professorship, honoring the late writer, editor, and public intellectual who served as University of Canberra chancellor. Horne was perhaps best known for coining the phrase “the lucky country” though often misunderstood as celebration rather than criticism. Horne’s point was that Australia had relied on luck rather than planning, coasting on natural advantages without developing the political and intellectual institutions needed for sustained success.

That critique resonates with the center’s mission. Bongiorno and Shorten are essentially arguing that Australia can no longer afford to be lucky, that effective governance in an increasingly complex and challenging world requires exactly the kind of historically-informed, civilly-contested policy development that Horne advocated. The center represents an attempt to build the intellectual infrastructure that Horne believed Australia lacked.

Horne was also notable for moving freely between journalism, academia, and public service, exactly the kind of boundary-crossing the center hopes to facilitate. The goal isn’t to keep historical expertise locked in universities but to make it available to policy practitioners. The micro-credential courses and seminars aim to create opportunities for the kind of cross-pollination between academic knowledge and practical experience that Horne exemplified.

The International Context

Australia isn’t alone in grappling with these challenges. Across the democratic world, similar concerns about polarization, short-term thinking, and the loss of institutional memory have prompted various responses. Some universities have established centers focused on civil discourse. Some think tanks have emphasized historical analysis of policy challenges. Some governments have created dedicated units focused on long-term strategic planning.

What distinguishes the University of Canberra initiative is its explicit integration of these elements, bringing together the free speech/civil discourse mission with the historical memory mission with the practical policy application mission. Rather than treating these as separate concerns, the center recognizes them as interconnected aspects of a broader challenge to democratic governance.

The international dimension is also important because Australia’s policy challenges increasingly have global dimensions. Whether managing relations with China, addressing climate change, or responding to technological disruption, Australian policymakers are grappling with issues that require international cooperation and can benefit from international experience. A historically-informed approach should look not just at Australia’s past but at how other democracies have addressed similar challenges.

The Path Forward

The Centre for Public Ideas faces significant challenges. Academic institutions attempting to influence practical policy often struggle to bridge the gap between scholarly analysis and operational decision-making. Centers promoting civil discourse must navigate intense politicization of these very concepts. Initiatives requiring busy professionals to engage with historical material must overcome the time pressures and presentist biases that created the problem in the first place.

Yet the center’s launch reflects a growing recognition that business-as-usual isn’t working. The policy failures, democratic dysfunctions, and cultural polarization plaguing Australia and other democracies have created demand for alternatives. If the center can demonstrate that historically-informed, civilly-contested policy development produces better outcomes than reflexive partisanship and institutional amnesia, it may find an audience hungry for what it offers.

The ultimate measure of success won’t be academic publications or attendance at seminars, though those matter. It will be whether policy conversations actually become more historically informed, whether contentious issues get debated more productively, whether long-term thinking gains ground against short-term crisis management. These are difficult outcomes to measure and even more difficult to achieve.

But the ambition itself is worth celebrating. In an era when so much of our public discourse seems designed to generate heat rather than light, when policy development too often means responding to whatever crisis dominates the current news cycle, the idea of an institution dedicated to historical perspective and civil disagreement represents something genuinely countercultural. Whether it succeeds may say much about whether democracies can summon the discipline to address their most serious challenges.

As Professor Bongiorno observes, history can provide useful guidance to dealing with the present, but only if we’re willing to learn from it. The Centre for Public Ideas is a bet that Australia is ready to try.

This article was triggered by Natasha Bira, “University of Canberra launches new Centre of Public Ideas to champion free speech,” The Australian, November 7, 2023 and all quotes are taken from this article and credited to her.

And below is the official announcement from the university about the new Centre:

UC launches newly established Vice-Chancellor’s Centre of Public Ideas and appointment of inaugural director

The University of Canberra (UC) today announced the establishment of the Vice-Chancellor’s Centre of Public Ideas (COPI), and the appointment of Professor Frank Bongiorno AM, who will take up the Donald Horne Professorship as the inaugural director of the Centre.

The Centre is an extension of UC’s focus on politics and democracy and will leverage the experience and expertise of the Vice-Chancellor and President, The Honourable Bill Shorten. COPI will deliver high-quality education, research and community outreach in the field of Public Ideas, with a focus on history and politics in an Australian setting. The name of the professorship honours the late Professor Donald Horne AO, a former UC Chancellor and leading Australian journalist, editor, academic, historian and public intellectual.

“The future will be shaped by what we learn from the past, by seeking new opportunities and equipping future generations to think differently and act with urgency,” said Mr Shorten

“COPI has the potential to position UC as a leading authority on Australian politics and society, with a view to influencing policymaking and debate through Public Ideas informed by history. UC’s location in the seat of Federal and Territory governments uniquely positions us to lead the way in advancing political debate, decision making and policy development.”

The Centre will build on UC’s research and teaching capabilities across its Faculties of Business, Government and Law and Arts and Design, explore how historical analysis can strengthen the understanding and practice of contemporary politics and restore long-term thinking to policymaking. It will facilitate collaborations across the University and complement the work of UC’s Centres of Deliberative Democracy and Creative and Cultural Research.

The Centre will be home to the University’s Pathways to Politics for Women and the work of Professorial Fellow Ms Michelle Grattan AO, a prominent figure in Australian political journalism at The Conversation. More programs and projects will be added moving forward.

“Professor Bongiorno was a logical choice to lead COPI,” said Mr Shorten. “His vision, aspirations and understanding of the times past and present and how they influence the future will support UC’s strategic objectives to lean into the next era of learning, teaching and research.”

Expanding on his vision for COPI, Professor Bongiorno said the Canberra setting is critical and will provide the necessary perspective to advance the Centre’s mandate.

“I am a historian, and much of my work has been in Australian political history. I notice that a great deal of public debate and policymaking in Australia happens without much sense of what I call “historical hinterland” – a rich sense of context that helps us see the present in perspective,” said Professor Bongiorno.

“We want to establish connections and partnerships with individuals and institutions – government, NGO, cultural and business – that will allow the Centre to play a creative role in generating fresh ideas and perspectives at a time when our city, nation and world desperately need them.”

The Centre’s activities will include undergraduate education, short courses and microcredentials designed for current decision-makers.

“We will also have a public program that will encourage the exchange of ideas through lectures, podcasts, publications and seminars. And we will have a group of distinguished adjuncts who will help to support the Centre’s activities. This is an exciting and timely initiative – and unique to UC,” said Professor Bongiorno.

“We live in a very different time now to then I first entered academia, initially as a tutor at UC in 1992. Students learn differently, academics teach and research differently, and universities, by and large, do much of their business differently. But many things have not changed all that much.”

“We have a responsibility to the communities we serve, especially in Canberra, and academics have the responsibility of equipping students to enter the world of work with confidence and capacity, and to be active and thoughtful democratic citizens. Then there are the opportunities to contribute to new research and fresh ideas about issues that matter to the ACT, national and international debates.”

The Centre of Public Ideas will officially launch in February 2026, when Professor Bongiorno commences at UC.

Organizing the Chaos: Understanding Global Change Without Coherent Outcomes

11/07/2025

By Robbin Laird

We stand at a peculiar moment in history where multiple powerful forces are reshaping the global order, yet these variables of change do not converge toward any clear, coherent outcome. This paradox defines our era: dramatic transformation without discernible destination.

In a recent conversation I had with Dr. Paul Bracken, this dynamic emerged as in our conversation as the central challenge facing policymakers, strategists, and nations attempting to navigate an increasingly turbulent international environment.

The traditional framework of “great power competition” proves inadequate for understanding contemporary geopolitics. The real story unfolding across multiple theaters, from Ukraine to the Indo-Pacific, from the Caribbean to the Arctic, involves middle powers asserting sovereignty, authoritarian systems facing succession crises, technological competition accelerating beyond strategic planning horizons, and gray zone conflicts proliferating beneath the threshold of conventional war. Meanwhile, the nuclear shadow lengthens as China pursues capabilities that may transcend parity with the United States, raising questions about Western capacity for sustained strategic competition.

This chapter explores these intersecting variables of change, based on the proposition that predicting specific outcomes matters less than organizing our understanding of the chaos itself. And is my first “case study” highlighting why chaos management has become a central requirement of steering our way ahead.

The Global War in Ukraine: A Catalyst for Transformation

The war in Ukraine represents far more than a regional conflict between Russia and its neighbor. It has evolved into the global war in Ukraine, a conflict with participants, implications, and consequences spanning continents. This characterization challenges conventional analysis that treats the war as a localized European crisis, revealing instead a conflict that has fundamentally altered global alignments and exposed vulnerabilities in the post-Cold War order.

South Korea and Japan have become deeply involved in supporting Ukraine, providing everything from ammunition to sophisticated military technology. This involvement is rarely discussed in mainstream analysis, yet it represents a profound shift. When American presidents visit Tokyo or Seoul, they now represent not just the leader of the Pacific alliance system, but a co-belligerent in the conflict against Russia. This creates new bonds and shared interests that transcend traditional geographic boundaries.

The war has also inadvertently accomplished what decades of Western policy could not: the dismantling of the Russian Empire. Putin’s strategic overreach has resulted in Russia effectively ceding the Far East to Chinese influence, isolating Kaliningrad from the motherland, and losing influence over former Soviet republics. Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and other Central Asian states have used the war to assert independence from Moscow in ways that would have constituted acts of war a decade ago.

Poland’s newfound assertiveness exemplifies this shift. When China approached Poland about maintaining Belt and Road Initiative access through Polish territory to Belarus, the Poles bluntly refused, a remarkable assertion of sovereignty that would have been unthinkable in previous decades.

The war’s impact on globalization may prove its most lasting consequence. Nations across the globe are reassessing dependencies on potential adversaries and recognizing that sovereignty requires maintaining certain capabilities domestically or within trusted alliance networks. The Belt and Road Initiative, once celebrated as Chinese strategic genius, increasingly appears fragile and counterproductive, generating debt traps and resentment rather than influence.

The Middle Power Moment

Traditional international relations theory focuses on great powers, the United States, China, Russia, as the primary actors shaping global order. But this framework misses the most dynamic element of contemporary geopolitics: the emergence of middle powers as decisive actors with agency, capability, and willingness to shape their own destinies.

Middle powers like Australia, Japan, South Korea, Brazil, and India, face a fundamental choice: develop sufficient sovereignty and military capability to navigate between major powers, or risk becoming client states absorbed into spheres of influence. This choice cannot be deferred or avoided through clever diplomacy alone. It requires concrete investments in defense capabilities, supply chain security, and economic resilience.

Japan’s transformation illustrates the pattern. For decades content to shelter under American protection while maintaining minimal military capabilities, Japan now invests heavily in defense, develops indigenous military technologies, and assumes regional security leadership. South Korea follows a similar trajectory, becoming a major arms exporter to Europe while negotiating nuclear submarine construction deals with the United States, agreements that fundamentally reshape both regional dynamics and the global defense market.

Australia presents a more complicated case study. Despite facing the most direct Chinese pressure of any middle power, Australia’s current government has failed to make necessary investments in the Australian Defence Force (ADF). Instead, Canberra appears to try to maintain its American connection through the AUKUS submarine deal while maintaining resource exports to China that fund the very military capabilities threatening Australian sovereignty. The disconnect between Australia’s strategic situation and its policy response represents precisely the kind of cross-cutting approaches that middle powers cannot afford.

Brazil under Lula has made the opposite choice, aligning more closely with China and distancing itself from Western democratic allies. This decision will have profound consequences not just for Brazil but for the entire South American continent, potentially creating a Chinese sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere.

The middle power moment matters because these nations collectively shape whether the 21st century fragments into competing blocs or maintains some level of integrated global commerce and cooperation. Their choices about sovereignty, alliance partnerships, and economic dependencies will prove more consequential than the grand strategies emanating from Washington, Beijing, or Moscow.

The Nuclear Question: China’s Trajectory and Western Capacity

Dr. Bracken poses a question that should trouble anyone thinking seriously about long-term strategic competition: Why would China stop at nuclear parity with the United States? Once the infrastructure for producing nuclear warheads exists, the marginal cost of additional weapons becomes relatively modest. If China decides to pursue nuclear superiority rather than mere parity, what does this mean for Western strategy?

The question becomes more acute when considering the economic dimension of sustained competition. Cold War-era arms races saw the United States devote 10-12% of GNP to defense spending. Today, the U.S. spends approximately 3.5% with loud political debates about even modest increases. Can Western democracies sustain the kind of long-term mobilization necessary to compete with an authoritarian state facing fewer domestic political constraints?

The answer remains uncertain, but the question itself reveals a dangerous gap in strategic thinking. Much nuclear policy debate focuses on operational questions, launch authority, second-strike capability, tactical versus strategic weapons, while ignoring the fundamental economic and political requirements for sustained competition. These requirements extend far beyond weapons procurement to encompass the industrial base, STEM education, research infrastructure, and public willingness to prioritize security over consumption.

China’s nuclear expansion serves multiple strategic purposes. Most obviously, it deters attacks on Chinese territory during conventional conflict. China’s modernization strategy concentrated economic development on coastal regions, reversing Maoist-era policies that emphasized strategic depth. This creates vulnerability: China’s cities, infrastructure, and industrial capacity lie exposed to potential attack. A robust nuclear deterrent protects these assets by raising the stakes of any conflict to unacceptable levels.

The nuclear shadow extends over all considerations of conventional military balance. Discussions of Taiwan contingencies, for instance, often focus on naval capabilities, air superiority, and amphibious operations while underestimating how nuclear weapons constrain Western military options. Would the United States risk Los Angeles for Taipei? This Cold War-era question applies with renewed force to contemporary scenarios.

Yet the nuclear dimension receives inadequate attention in policy debates, perhaps because it raises uncomfortable questions without easy answers. Strategic culture has shifted away from serious engagement with nuclear strategy, treating it as a solved problem consigned to history rather than a central element of contemporary competition. This represents a dangerous form of willful blindness.

Gray Zone Warfare and the Limits of Traditional Strategy

The proliferation of conflicts below the threshold of significant armed combat, commonly termed “gray zone warfare”, presents another variable reshaping international competition. This encompasses cyber attacks, drone warfare, proxy conflicts, disinformation campaigns, economic coercion, and activities by non-state actors operating with state sponsorship.

Traditional crisis management frameworks prove inadequate for these situations. Classic crisis management assumes discrete events with clear beginnings and endings, the Cuban Missile Crisis lasting thirteen days, for instance. But gray zone conflicts persist indefinitely, blurring the distinction between war and peace, combatant and civilian, military and law enforcement.

The Trump administration’s approach to the Caribbean drug trade illustrates one possible response paradigm. Rather than treating drug cartels as law enforcement problems, the administration increasingly frames them as terrorist organizations engaged in gray zone warfare against the United States. This reframing justifies military responses and treats cartel logistics networks as legitimate military targets.

Whether this approach succeeds or fails, it represents a serious attempt to grapple with a problem that previous administrations treated as intractable. The question it raises transcends partisan politics: If adversary nations use gray zone tactics, flooding Western societies with fentanyl, conducting cyber attacks on infrastructure, manipulating social media to exacerbate political divisions, what constitutes an appropriate and effective response? Traditional deterrence theory offers limited guidance, and international law provides few clear boundaries.

Gray zone conflicts also challenge democratic governance. Publics conditioned to think of war as discrete events with declarations and peace treaties struggle to understand indefinite, low-intensity conflicts that nevertheless impose real costs. Politicians find it difficult to sustain public support for responses to threats that remain ambiguous and persistent rather than acute and temporary.

Defense Transformation and the Collapse of Force Structure Planning

The accelerating pace of technological change has rendered traditional defense planning obsolete. For decades, militaries developed force structure plans projecting capabilities twenty to thirty years into the future. These plans assumed relatively stable technology, known threat profiles, and predictable industrial processes. None of these assumptions hold.

Software-upgradable weapons systems, autonomous platforms, artificial intelligence, and networked warfare have fundamentally altered what constitutes military capability. A platform delivered today may have dramatically different capabilities within five years through software updates, sensor improvements, and integration with new systems. This reality makes traditional force structure planning, imagining what military you need in 2045, essentially meaningless.

The implications extend beyond procurement to training, doctrine, and operational concepts. This transformation requires rethinking not just what to buy but how to build adaptive organizations capable of rapid evolution. The acquisition community, optimized for stability and predictability, becomes a hindrance rather than an asset.

The war in Ukraine validates many of these observations. Drone warfare, electronic warfare, and distributed operations have surprised many observers with their effectiveness. Conversely, platforms that looked formidable in peacetime, tanks, aircraft, ships, prove vulnerable in ways that force rapid doctrinal and tactical adaptation. The war serves as the world’s most expensive live-fire demonstration of which military concepts work and which fail against peer competitors.

The Succession Problem: Authoritarian Fragility

An under appreciated variable in long-term strategic competition involves succession crises in authoritarian systems. Putin, Xi Jinping, and other authoritarian leaders have consolidated power to degrees that make orderly transitions difficult if not impossible. When these leaders eventually exit power, whether through death, incapacity, or internal coup, the resulting instability could dwarf the changes produced by their policies while in office.

Russia presents the most acute case. Putin has systematically eliminated potential successors and centralized all significant decisions in his own office. When he departs, Russia faces questions it hasn’t seriously confronted since the early 1990s: What is Russia’s relationship with the West? How should Russia relate to its former Soviet neighbors? What role do nuclear weapons play in Russian strategy? How should Russia manage its Far Eastern territories increasingly under Chinese economic and demographic influence?

These questions have no institutional mechanisms for resolution. The succession struggle could easily produce internal conflict, with nuclear weapons providing the ultimate prize for whichever faction gains control. The West has barely begun thinking about how to manage this transition, despite it likely occurring within the next decade.

China faces a different but equally serious problem. Xi Jinping has reversed the collective leadership model that provided stability after Mao’s death, concentrating authority and eliminating term limits. When Xi eventually leaves power, no obvious successor or succession mechanism exists. Moreover, Xi’s hyper-centralization makes China’s system poorly adapted for managing the distributed, innovative processes required for technological leadership in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and other frontier technologies.

The economic dimension compounds the problem. China’s economy shows signs of serious structural problems, demographic decline, debt overhangs, real estate speculation, youth unemployment, that its political system seems unable to address. Whether these problems produce crisis before or after Xi’s departure remains uncertain, but the combination of succession uncertainty and economic fragility creates volatility that Western strategy must account for.

Trump as Transformational Disruptor

The Trump presidency serves as both symptom and accelerant of the transformations described above. Trump instinctively grasps that the post-Cold War order has collapsed, even if he lacks a coherent vision for what should replace it. His role can be understood as creative destruction, dismantling legacy structures and assumptions without necessarily constructing alternatives.

This approach has produced concrete results. The pressure on European NATO members to increase defense spending has succeeded beyond what decades of diplomatic entreaties accomplished. The message to South Korea and Japan that they must assume greater responsibility for regional security has accelerated their military development and regional leadership. The transactional approach to alliance relationships, while controversial, forces serious conversations about what these relationships actually provide and at what cost.

Trump’s willingness to challenge the fundamental assumptions of American foreign policy, that Europe’s defense matters as much as America’s, that the international order serves American interests, that globalization benefits ordinary Americans, resonates with publics precisely because these assumptions have become questionable.

Yet Trump’s approach lacks a theory of reconstruction. Creative destruction only produces progress if something better emerges from the rubble. So far, the evidence suggests that Trump excels at identifying what doesn’t work but struggles to articulate what should replace it. The gap between destruction and reconstruction creates significant uncertainty, particularly for allies trying to navigate American policy.

The broader point transcends any individual president: the structures that organized international relations for seventy-five years no longer serve their intended purposes. Whether Trump’s disruption produces creative regeneration or simply accelerates decay depends on choices that extend far beyond any single administration.

Capitalism’s Asian Future?

A provocative thesis emerged during out discussion: Asian nations may prove better at capitalism than the West in the years ahead. The underlying logic combines work ethic, cultural values, and demographic factors. Asian societies maintain stronger norms around work, education, and collective advancement compared to increasingly sclerotic Western welfare states.

The evidence supports this thesis unevenly. Europe clearly struggles with demographic decline, welfare state dependencies, and integration failures. The United States presents a more complex picture. American society combines Asian and European immigrant populations with native-born Americans of all backgrounds, creating a dynamic mix that defies simple categorization. American universities, corporations, and research institutions continue attracting global talent, though political dysfunction and infrastructure decay threaten these advantages.

South Korea’s emergence as a major defense exporter illustrates Asian capitalism’s potential. Korean firms produce tanks, artillery, combat aircraft, and other systems at quality levels comparable to Western manufacturers but at significantly lower cost. They build to NATO standards, enabling rapid integration with allied forces. This combination of quality, cost, and interoperability makes Korean defense exports increasingly attractive to nations seeking to build or modernize military capabilities.

The capitalism question intersects with strategic competition in crucial ways. Can Western democracies maintain the economic dynamism necessary for technological leadership? Can they sustain the industrial base required for extended strategic competition? These questions admit no certain answers, but they frame the challenge facing Western policymakers: winning long-term competition requires not just military strength but economic vitality, technological innovation, and social cohesion.

Navigating Chaos: A Framework for Understanding

The central insight emerging from this analysis is that we should abandon attempts to predict where these variables of change will lead. The interaction effects are too complex, the uncertainties too profound, the possibilities too numerous. Instead, the task involves organizing our understanding of the chaos itself, identifying the key variables, understanding their interactions, and maintaining strategic flexibility to respond as events unfold.

This approach requires several shifts in strategic thinking:

• First, embrace uncertainty. Long-range strategic planning that claims to know what the world will look like in 2045 is not just unreliable but counterproductive, breeding false confidence and inflexibility. Better to understand the major forces at work and maintain adaptive capacity.

• Second, focus on building resilient capabilities rather than optimizing for specific scenarios. In a world of radical uncertainty, resilience and adaptability matter more than efficiency and optimization. This applies to everything from military force structure to supply chains to alliance relationships.

• Third, take middle powers seriously as independent actors. Grand strategies developed in Washington, Beijing, and Moscow matter less than whether Japan, South Korea, Australia, Indonesia, Brazil, and others develop the sovereignty and capability to shape their own futures. Their choices will prove decisive.

• Fourth, recognize that gray zone conflicts constitute the new normal rather than anomalies. Traditional crisis management frameworks assuming discrete events with clear beginnings and endings no longer apply. Strategy must adapt to persistent, ambiguous conflicts that never quite become wars but never quite produce peace.

• Fifth, confront the nuclear dimension honestly. The expansion of Chinese nuclear capabilities fundamentally alters strategic calculations in ways that most policy debates ignore. Without serious engagement with these questions, Western strategy amounts to wishful thinking.

• Sixth, understand that technology is transforming warfare faster than institutions can adapt. The acquisition bureaucracies, force structure planning processes, and doctrinal development systems optimized for industrial-age warfare cannot keep pace with software-defined capabilities, autonomous systems, and AI integration.

Conclusion: The Photograph, Not the Prediction

Our conversation between concluded with an apt metaphor: they were taking a photograph of the world rather than predicting its future. This distinction matters. The photograph captures the multiple variables driving change, the global war in Ukraine, middle power emergence, nuclear competition, gray zone proliferation, defense transformation, authoritarian succession crises, and shifting economic dynamics.

These variables interact in ways that preclude confident prediction. We cannot know whether China will pursue nuclear superiority or stop at parity. We cannot know whether authoritarian succession crises will produce instability or surprisingly smooth transitions. We cannot know whether middle powers will choose sovereignty or vassalage. We cannot know whether Western democracies will find the political will for sustained strategic competition.

What we can know is that these questions will be answered through actions taken or not taken over the next five to fifteen years. The world will settle into certain structures eventually, but we remain at the beginning of this transformation rather than its conclusion. The task for strategists, policymakers, and citizens is not to pretend certainty about outcomes but to understand the forces at work, maintain strategic flexibility, and make choices that preserve options rather than foreclosing them.

This is the age of transformation without clear direction. Rather than lamenting this uncertainty, we should embrace it as the price of living through genuinely consequential times. The photograph captures a moment of maximum possibility, dangerous, yes, but also pregnant with opportunities for those wise enough to recognize and seize them. The challenge lies not in predicting the future but in organizing the chaos well enough to navigate it successfully, preserving what matters while remaining open to transformation.

In the end, that may be the most important insight: in times of radical uncertainty, organizing the chaos matters more than predicting outcomes. The nations, institutions, and leaders who understand this will shape the future, while those clinging to outdated certainties will be swept aside by forces they neither understand nor control.

The featured image was created by an AI program.

Transitioning the Flight Tonight Force: The Story of 2nd Marine Air Wing

11/06/2025

This video discusses our new book in the USMC transformation series.

Discover the dramatic transformation at the heart of 21st-century military aviation in “2nd Marine Air Wing: Transitioning the Fight Tonight Force.” This compelling and deeply researched volume unlocks the story of how America’s Second Marine Aircraft Wing (2nd MAW) underwent a remarkable evolution between 2007 and 2025, becoming a digitally driven, combat-ready force able to respond to crises the world over, at a moment’s notice.

From the very first landing of the MV-22 Osprey on a British warship, the 2nd MAW showcased its vision for seamless allied interoperability, a vision that would come to define its mission. The Osprey’s revolutionary tiltrotor design shattered old ideas of time and distance, enabling fast, far-reaching deployments, whether rescuing personnel under fire or providing hurricane relief across the Pacific. Paired with the KC-130J Super Hercules aerial tanker and lifter, the Osprey’s range extended global reach as never before.

But the Osprey was just the beginning. The introduction of the CH-53K King Stallion brought a digital-first heavy-lift helicopter, delivering unmatched stability, reduced pilot workload, and sophisticated predictive maintenance. Its fly-by-wire system and integrated vehicle health monitoring were game changers for reliability, translating data into action, and hours into combat power. Pilots gained new confidence flying in degraded environments, from blinding dust storms to Arctic darkness.

At the center of the 2nd MAW’s revolution stands the F-35 Lightning II. This fifth-generation marvel isn’t just faster and stealthier; it’s a networked sensor-fusion platform that reshapes the entire battlefield. The F-35 fuses massive streams of information from radar and electronic surveillance, distributes a unified tactical picture to every level of command, and provides integral electronic warfare support that once depended on aging dedicated aircraft. This shift allows Marines to strike harder, survive longer, and share intelligence at the speed of relevance.

Driving these advancements is a new generation of “digital native” pilots, the iPad generation, trained from day one to think in terms of networked, integrated, data-powered warfighting. At Beaufort, South Carolina, the pipeline of F-35 pilots grows, ready to exploit the full potential of fifth-generation technology and develop tactics that will define conflict for decades to come.

Transformation isn’t only about platforms and sensors; it’s about culture. The book sheds light on how forward-thinking leaders, empowered junior Marines, and a bottom-up innovation culture have propelled readiness.

Command and control are reimagined through the creative fielding of mobile C2 solutions, such as retrofitting MV-22s as airborne “nerve centers” with digital communication suites, and the widespread adoption of ruggedized MAGTAB tablets for real-time secure sharing across every echelon.

If you want a compelling, inside account of how U.S. Marine aviation reinvented itself for the demands of the modern battlefield from technology to training, from strategy to culture. this book delivers an authoritative and insightful guide.

A must-read for professionals

2nd Marine Air Wing: Transitioning the Fight Tonight Force

 

From Jakarta to Amsterdam: French Weapons in International Demand

11/05/2025

By Pierre Tran

Paris – France achieved near record breaking arms export orders in 2024. France won in 2024 export arms orders worth €21.6 billion ($25.1 billion), up from €8.2 billion in 2023, the annual report of the armed forces ministry to parliament said, marking the second-highest value of foreign deals for French weapons and services in a year.

France hit its record high in weapon exports in 2022 with contracts worth €26.9 billion, buoyed by the United Arab Emirates’s €16.9 billion order for 80 Rafale and related weapons.

Indonesia and Serbia ordered the Rafale fighter jet, while the Netherlands signed for a conventional version of the Barracuda submarine, boosting the value of French exports.

The fighter deal with Jakarta was worth €3.6 billion, Belgrade’s contract was worth €2.7 billion, and Amsterdam will pay €5.9 billion for its four-strong fleet of diesel-electric boats, dubbed the Orka class of submarines based on the Blacksword Barracuda.

Besides the big ticket items, there was a growing portion of foreign sales for deals worth less than €200 million, the 139 page report said.

Moscow’s military needs in Ukraine, Western sanctions, and concern over Russia’s perceived ambitions may have underpinned the switch by Croatia, Indonesia, and Serbia away from Russian MiG and Sukhoi fighters, and their pick of a French war plane for the first time.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute ranks France as the second arms exporter in 2020-24, with 9.6 pct of the world market, while the U.S. leads with 43 pct. Russia fell to third position, with 7.8 pct market share, down 64 percent from its 21 pct in 2015-19, SIPRI said.

There have also been almost arms deals, one which were pursued but never sealed.

Interest could be seen in the French offer of the Barracuda boat to Australia with the Sept. 5 publication of Atomisé (Editions La Route de la Soie), which carried a subtitle which said “How the United States Sank Australian Sovereignty…and a Strategic Contract for France.”

The book was the French edition of Nuked, a book by Australian journalist Andrew Fowler,  published last year by Melbourne University Press.

Australia ordered French military kit worth €56 million last year compared to €17.19 million in 2023, the 2025 official report said.

France Lives In Interesting Times

It remains to be seen whether domestic turmoil and fiscal distress will hurt French exports, which the official report says helps sustain the arms industry and jobs around the country.

A political choice of ally may be a factor for client nations, alongside financial, industrial, and operational terms.

Embassy staff here may have been reporting to their ministries at home how President Emmanuel Macron has rejected opposition calls to resign, and hold early elections. He has insisted on holding on to his post as head of state and commander in chief while a center-right administration led by prime minister Sebastien Lecornu seeks support from a severely split parliament. Lecornu was previously armed forces minister.

Macron appointed Sept. 9 Lecornu as prime minister, and the latter resigned after just 27 days at Matignon, unable to gain backing from the conservative party, Les Républicains.

Lecornu’s resignation pointed up an internal party dispute, sparked by the appointment of Bruno Le Maire as armed forces minister.

Le Maire was seen as having driven up the national debt when he was finance minister. He served one day at Brienne House, the office of armed forces minister, before resigning, such was the resistance to his appointment.

Lecornu agreed Oct. 10 to take up the Matignon mantle again at Macron’s request, and the prime minister survived two parliamentary motions aimed at forcing his resignation.

Lecornu appointed two days later Catherine Vautrin as armed forces minister, with Alice Rufo as the junior minister. Vautrin was labor minister in the administration led by the previous prime minister, François Bayrou.

French media have reported Rufo as a safe pair of hands. She was head of the Direction Générale des Relations Internationales et de la Stratégie, a high-level government think tank, and previously worked as diplomatic adviser at the Elysée president’s office.

In the troubled times, Lecornu said Oct. 13 in his farewell letter to the services Macron had said in his July 13 speech there was a fresh effort to relaunch a French rearmament.

“This is indispensable,” Lecornu said, adding he would ensure the pledge was respected.

Macron had said €3.5 billion would be added to 2026 military spending, on top of a planned rise of €3.2 billion. Those increases would boost the 2026 defense budget to €57.2 billion, up 13.2 pct from the 2025 budget of €50.5 billion.

Meanwhile, Lecornu seeks to cut the 2026 national deficit to 4.7 pct from 5.4 pct of gross domestic product this year, to bring the gap down to less than three pct, as set by the European Union.

But there is little political agreement on how to slash public spending and raise income to meet that fiscal imperative.

Deals In The Pipeline

India ordered this year a naval version of the Rafale for its two-strong carrier fleet for the first time. That order for 26 French fighters was worth some 630 billion rupees (€6.2 billion, $7.2 billion), the Indian government said in an April 29 statement.

New Delhi is looking to order a further 114 fighters to update its air force fleet, and DW, the German news agency, has reported that deal might be split between French and Russian jets.

Boeing, Dassault Aviation, Eurofighter, Lockheed Martin, Saab, and United Aircraft Corporation – the Russian builder of the Sukhoi – are in close pursuit of that order, Reuters  reported. President Donald Trump has said the U.S. would one day offer the F-35 stealth fighter to New Delhi.

Washington’s 50 pct tariff on Indian goods have strained relations with New Delhi, with half that tax linked to India’s import of Russian oil, which helps sustain the Russian economy.

India has long flown a split fleet of Russian and French fighters, along with the aging Anglo-French Jaguar fighter, reflecting its history as a non-aligned nation in the Cold War.

Canada, Poland Seek Submarines

Canada said Aug. 26 it had placed a German company, ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems, and a South Korean shipbuilder, Hanwha Ocean, on a short list in its competition for 12 conventional submarines.

Ottawa’s patrol submarine project aims to replace a four-strong fleet of Victoria class boats, and secure the Arctic waters of the High North, and the Pacific, where Russian and Chinese fleets are seen as growing threats.

Germany and Norway, which have ordered the same TKMS submarine in a joint order, teamed up to make a pooled pitch to Canada.

Canada’s selection of TKMS and Hanwha was seen as a blow for the French company Naval Group, which had offered its diesel-electric Blacksword Barracuda boat.

Saab pitched its C71 Expeditionary submarine, which was also left by the wayside.

Canada said it received 25 responses for its request for information on the submarine tender.

Meanwhile, Poland is holding a tender for three conventional submarines for its Orka project, and Warsaw has reportedly sent out requests for information to submarine builders in France, Germany, Italy, South Korea, Spain, and Sweden.

Naval Group said Sept. 3 it had signed an industrial cooperation agreement with the Polish defense group PGZ, with a focus on building submarines and other “highly specialized vessels.” That agreement marked a “significant milestone in the strategic relationship” between the two companies, the French shipbuilder said in a statement.

Fincantieri and Saab separately signed a memorandum of understanding with PGZ, also in September, seeking to win an award of the Orka project.

Warsaw is expected to place an order for the Orka boats by the end of the year.

India might drop a plan to order three more French Scorpene conventional submarines, switching to build six boats designed by German shipbuilder TKMS, Indian media reported. That project for six submarines, dubbed project-75 India, was reported to be worth $5 billion.

The three French-designed boats would add to the six-strong Scorpene fleet operated by the Indian navy, if that deal with Naval Group went ahead.

Weapons for Ukraine

France sold weapons worth a total €5.9 billion to Ukraine as “military support” between Feb. 24, 2022 to Dec. 31, 2024, the 2025 report said. Paris provided funding which should rise to €2.3 billion, or 18 pct, of the European Peace Facility, an E.U. fund to supply military kit.

Orders for aircraft, effectively the Rafale contracts, made up some 43 pct of exports last year, followed by naval deals with 33 pct, and land weapons with 15 pct, the report said. Radar and communications systems accounted for five pct, while missiles were four pct.

Sales to E.U. member states rose to some 41 pct in 2024, almost double the 21 pct in 2022, the report said. That reflected the rise in the average annual value of deals with E.U. states to 23 pct in 2015-2024, up from 10 pct in 2012-2021.

Asia accounted for some 23 pct of orders last year, compared to 42 pct in 2023, the report said, while orders from the Middle East remained stable at some 11 pct.

A Two Report Mystery

There appear to be two electronic versions of the report to parliament, with one version carrying the traditional introduction from the armed forces minister of the day. That version carries a bold notation ARMM2522716X on its cover, above pictures of a submarine, Rafale, and Caesar truck-mounted cannon.

The other electronic version has a blank page in place of the minister’s introduction.

“Since 1988, the armed forces ministry gives an account each year of French arms exports with a public report,” Lecornu, the then minister, said in his introduction.

Orders from European allies accounted for almost 60 pct of the 2024 foreign arms deals, he said in his note, which appears on page three, which bears his formal portrait.

The armed forces ministry website carries the version of the report without the ministerial comment. That version carries an unsigned summary, with the European 60 percent share tucked away in brackets – almost an afterthought – at the end of the last paragraph.

Mediapart, a website, said Sept 4 it had obtained the report, and reported the contents, highlighting an increase in sales to Israel. French arms deals to Jerusalem have stirred controversy, with non-governmental organizations calling for suspension of deliveries.

That media reporting stands in contrast to the press conferences previously held by senior press officers of the defense and foreign ministries presenting the report, with copies of the document made available to reporters.

The Disclose website has reported shipment of French equipment used by Israeli forces in Gaza, with an Oct. 17 report of a French company, Sermat, expected to send three days later electric alternators for the Hermes 900 drone, widely used by Israeli services in Gaza.

Disclose published the 2022 export report on its website, placing it in the public domain before the French authorities.

The 2025 report made the point that France exercised a specific audit of deals with Israel to ensure weapons were not shipped, but components for equipment for defensive use or re-exported to another client nation were permitted.

The Future of Maritime Navigation: Remote Piloting Transforms Ship Operations

The maritime industry stands at the threshold of a technological revolution that promises to fundamentally change how ships navigate the world’s waterways.

Remote piloting technology, which allows marine pilots to guide vessels from shore-based control centers rather than boarding ships in dangerous conditions, represents a pivotal shift toward safer, more efficient maritime operations.

For centuries, maritime pilots have risked life and limb climbing rope ladders in rolling seas to board vessels and guide them through treacherous waters. This dangerous tradition, while steeped in maritime history, has remained largely unchanged despite advances in every other aspect of shipping technology. Recent developments in Denmark and other maritime nations are finally offering an alternative.

The Danish pilot service DanPilot has pioneered a groundbreaking remote pilotage system that enables pilots to virtually board vessels and guide them from shore-based control centers1. Using technology from navigation-data firm Danelec, pilots can access real-time data directly from ships’ voyage data recorders, essentially maritime black boxes, to monitor speed, route, radar displays, and nearby obstacles from dozens of miles away.

Remote pilotage systems represent a convergence of several advanced technologies. Shore-based control centers feature multiple high-resolution monitors displaying comprehensive navigational information, while sophisticated communication systems maintain constant contact with ship crews. The technology integrates data from GPS systems, radar, automated navigation equipment, and various sensors to create a complete operational picture.

Unlike traditional pilotage where pilots rely solely on visual observation and local knowledge, remote systems provide enhanced situational awareness through multiple data streams. Advanced sensor fusion technologies combine information from radar, LIDAR, cameras, and other equipment to create accurate environmental representations that can surpass what human pilots might observe in poor weather conditions.

Artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms increasingly support these systems, analyzing navigation patterns, predicting potential hazards, and optimizing routes in real-time. These technologies enable more precise decision-making and can help identify risks that might escape human attention during critical navigation phases.

The commercial shipping industry has embraced remote pilotage technology for several compelling reasons. Cost reduction represents a primary driver, as traditional pilotage often involves significant expenses for pilot boats, crew transfers, and weather delays. Remote operations can eliminate many of these costs while improving operational efficiency.

Major shipping companies report that remote pilotage can reduce fuel consumption by allowing vessels to maintain optimal speeds without slowing for pilot transfers. This benefit becomes particularly significant for large container ships and bulk carriers where speed adjustments represent substantial fuel costs. Environmental benefits follow naturally, as reduced fuel consumption translates to lower emissions and smaller environmental footprints.

The technology also addresses the growing shortage of qualified maritime pilots in many regions1. As fewer seafarers enter and remain in the industry, remote pilotage allows experienced pilots to guide multiple vessels without physical boarding, effectively multiplying their operational capacity.

Safety considerations drive much of the interest in remote pilotage technology. Traditional pilot transfers present inherent risks, with pilots regularly injured during boarding operations in rough weather. Recent incidents, including a Belgian pilot who fell 20 feet from a ladder in the Netherlands, highlight the ongoing dangers of conventional pilotage methods.

Remote operations eliminate these transfer risks entirely while potentially improving navigation safety through enhanced technological capabilities. Shore-based pilots have access to multiple data sources, weather information, and collision avoidance systems that may not be available or as comprehensive on vessel bridges4. The ability to monitor multiple aspects of navigation simultaneously, supported by automated systems, can lead to more informed decision-making.

However, remote pilotage also introduces new safety considerations. Cybersecurity becomes paramount when critical navigation functions depend on digital communications and remote systems5. The maritime industry needs to develop robust protocols to prevent system exploitation while ensuring reliable connectivity between shore stations and vessels.

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is developing comprehensive regulations for Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS), including remote pilotage operations. The organization plans to introduce a non-mandatory code in 2025, followed by mandatory regulations in 2028. This regulatory framework will establish safety standards, operational requirements, and certification processes for remote maritime operations.

Different countries are taking varied approaches to accommodate remote pilotage technology. Norway, Denmark, and other maritime nations have established test corridors and pilot programs to evaluate the technology under controlled conditions7. Canada is conducting extensive studies with the International Maritime Pilots’ Association to assess the feasibility and impacts of remote pilotage on navigation safety.

The European Union has particularly emphasized the development of MASS regulations, working closely with the IMO and member states to ensure comprehensive safety standards9. These regulatory efforts reflect the recognition that remote maritime operations require careful oversight to maintain the high safety standards expected in international shipping.

The autonomous shipping market, which includes remote pilotage systems, is experiencing rapid growth. Market analysts project the sector will expand from approximately $8.5 billion in 2024 to over $17 billion by 2034, representing a compound annual growth rate of 7.5%. This growth reflects increasing investment in maritime automation technologies and growing acceptance of remote operations.

Commercial shipping companies account for the majority of current investment, driven by operational cost savings and efficiency improvements. However, government and military applications are growing rapidly, with defense spending on maritime automation increasing at rates exceeding 15% annually. This dual-use nature of remote pilotage technology accelerates development and reduces costs for civilian applications.

Major maritime technology companies, including Kongsberg, Wärtsilä, and others, have made substantial investments in remote operation capabilities. Strategic acquisitions, such as Kongsberg’s $660 million purchase of Rolls-Royce Commercial Marine, demonstrate the industry’s commitment to autonomous maritime technologies.

Despite technological advances and commercial benefits, remote pilotage faces significant challenges. Some maritime pilots express skepticism about the technology, viewing it as a threat to traditional employment rather than an enhancement of their capabilities. Labor unions in the maritime sector have organized conferences focused on resisting automation, reflecting broader concerns about technology displacement in the industry.

Technical challenges remain substantial. Reliable communication systems are essential for safe remote operations, but maintaining constant connectivity across vast ocean distances presents ongoing difficulties. Latency in communication systems can create dangerous delays in critical situations, requiring robust backup systems and failsafe protocols.

Public acceptance represents another challenge, particularly for passenger vessels and operations in environmentally sensitive areas. Maritime authorities must balance the benefits of remote technology with public expectations for human oversight of critical navigation decisions.

Successful implementation of remote pilotage requires careful planning and gradual deployment. Many operators are beginning with specific routes and vessel types where the technology offers clear advantages and risks are well-understood. Short-distance coastal routes, regular ferry services, and dedicated shipping lanes provide ideal testing environments for remote pilotage systems.

Training and certification programs for remote pilots are essential components of implementation strategies. Pilots must develop new skills for operating sophisticated control systems while maintaining their traditional navigation expertise. Simulation technologies play crucial roles in training programs, allowing pilots to practice remote operations in safe, controlled environments.

Shore infrastructure development represents a significant investment requirement. Remote pilotage centers require sophisticated equipment, redundant communication systems, and highly trained personnel. The costs of establishing these facilities must be weighed against the long-term operational benefits of remote operations.

The future of remote pilotage extends beyond current capabilities to include emerging technologies such as drone integration and enhanced artificial intelligence systems1. Some companies are testing drones that can be deployed from shore to provide additional visual information to remote pilots, offering capabilities that exceed traditional human observation.

Advanced simulation and digital twin technologies may enable more sophisticated remote operations, allowing pilots to practice complex maneuvers in virtual environments before executing them with real vessels. These technologies could significantly enhance training effectiveness and operational safety.

The integration of 5G and satellite communication systems promises to address current connectivity limitations, enabling more reliable and responsive remote pilotage operations across greater distances. These improvements could expand the applicability of remote pilotage to longer routes and more challenging operational environments.

Remote pilotage represents a fundamental shift in maritime operations, offering significant benefits in safety, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness. While challenges remain in technology implementation, regulatory development, and industry acceptance, the trajectory toward increased automation in maritime operations appears irreversible.

The successful deployment of remote pilotage systems in Denmark, Norway, and other maritime nations demonstrates the technology’s viability for specific applications. As regulatory frameworks mature and technology continues to improve, remote pilotage is likely to become a standard component of modern maritime operations.

The transformation from traditional rope ladder boarding to sophisticated shore-based control represents more than a technological upgrade.

It symbolizes the maritime industry’s evolution toward safer, more efficient, and environmentally sustainable operations.

For an industry built on centuries of tradition, this change marks a significant step toward a more technologically advanced future while maintaining the essential human expertise that ensures safe navigation in the world’s increasingly busy waterways.

A Paradigm Shift in Maritime Operations: Autonomous Systems and Their Impact