As the war in Ukraine enters the fall of 2025, what began as a regional European conflict has transformed into a global struggle with profound implications for the Indo-Pacific.
Far from remaining spectators to events thousands of miles away, major Asian powers, China, North Korea, Japan, South Korea, and India, have become deeply enmeshed in the conflict, each pursuing distinct strategic objectives that reflect their broader geopolitical calculations.
The involvement of these nations has fundamentally altered the nature of the war, turning it into a proxy conflict where Asian powers compete for their interests on European soil.
The interconnection between European and Asian security, once a theoretical concern of strategists, has become manifest reality. North Korean soldiers fight alongside Russian forces in Kursk, Chinese nationals appear on Ukrainian battlefields, Japanese and South Korean aid flows to Kyiv, and India conducts delicate diplomatic shuttles between Moscow and Ukraine. This unprecedented Asian engagement in a European war represents a historic shift in global geopolitics.
China: The “No-Limits” Partnership in Practice
China’s role in the Ukraine conflict exemplifies the complexities of modern major power politics. Beijing has maintained what it characterizes as a “no-limits” strategic partnership with Russia while simultaneously claiming neutrality and advocating for peaceful resolution.
This apparent contradiction reflects China’s careful calibration of its interests: supporting Russia as a fellow opponent of Western hegemony while avoiding direct involvement that could compromise China’s global economic interests.1
The substance of Chinese support for Russia has been primarily economic rather than military. Since the onset of the full-scale invasion in February 2022, China has become the key buyer of Russian energy exports, helping Moscow compensate for the loss of European markets and thereby providing crucial revenue that sustains Russia’s war effort. This economic lifeline has proven essential for Russia’s resilience in the face of comprehensive Western sanctions.2
China’s position on the Russia-Ukraine war in 2025 has indeed evolved, with senior Chinese officials offering rare public candor about Beijing’s strategic interests. In July 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told EU High Representative Kaja Kallas during a high-level meeting in Brussels that China “cannot afford for Russia to lose the war in Ukraine”. Wang reportedly explained that Beijing views a Russian defeat as a threat, believing it would allow the United States to turn its full strategic attention toward China, thus intensifying pressure on Beijing in the Indo-Pacific region.3
This explicit statement was a departure from China’s usual diplomatic rhetoric of neutrality regarding the conflict. European diplomats and Asian media noted that China’s private comments contradicted its public stance, revealing that “pro-Russian neutrality” is a guiding principle beneath Chinese declarations of objectivity. The remarks sparked considerable discussion among EU officials, indicating that China’s strategic interest is for the conflict to persist, preventing the U.S. from refocusing on Asia and Taiwan.
Yet China has also sought to position itself as a potential mediator. In August 2025, during discussions preceding peace negotiations, Chinese President Xi Jinping expressed support for renewed contact between the United States and Russia while describing the war as presenting complex issues with no easy solutions.4
A particularly sensitive development emerged in April 2025 when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy claimed that 155 Chinese nationals were fighting for Russian forces in Ukraine. According to Ukrainian intelligence, these individuals had been recruited through targeted advertisements on Chinese social media platforms like Douyin (China’s version of TikTok), which emphasized monetary incentives and called upon Chinese men to be “tough.”5
Zelenskyy stressed that Ukraine had found no evidence of state sponsorship or direct orders from the Chinese government for these fighters to join Russian forces. Nevertheless, he argued that China must have been aware of its citizens’ participation in the conflict, their use of weapons against Ukrainians, and their receipt of payment from Russia for military services.6 This situation placed Beijing in an uncomfortable position, complicating its efforts to maintain a neutral image while its citizens appeared on the battlefield supporting Russian aggression.
Nonetheless, in September 2025, China held a large military parade in Beijing to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II and Japan’s surrender. President Xi Jinping presided over the event, and Russian President Vladimir Putin was given a position of honor directly beside Xi during the official ceremonies. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was also present.
This public and choreographed display of Putin’s and Xi’s alignment, in front of a global audience and at a celebration steeped in nationalist symbolism, was widely interpreted as a demonstration of Sino-Russian solidarity in contrast to China’s prior claims of strict neutrality regarding global conflicts, particularly the war in Ukraine.
During Putin’s visit, the two leaders held extensive meetings, with Xi hailing his Kremlin counterpart as an “old friend.” This warm reception came despite Western efforts to isolate Putin over the invasion, and it sent a clear message about China’s willingness to stand with Russia regardless of international condemnation.9 North Korean leader Kim Jong Un also joined Xi and Putin for the parade, creating a powerful visual representation of an emerging authoritarian axis united in opposition to the Western-led international order.7
North Korea: From Arms Supplier to Combat Participant
North Korea’s involvement in the Ukraine war represents perhaps the most dramatic manifestation of Asian engagement in the European conflict. By the summer of 2025, Pyongyang had become an indispensable military partner for Moscow, supplying up to 40 percent of the ammunition used by Russian forces in Ukraine. This support included over 12 million rounds of artillery, more than 100 ballistic missiles, rocket launchers, self-propelled guns, vehicles, and other heavy weapons.8
The deployment of North Korean personnel to Russia’s war against Ukraine marks a significant escalation not seen since the Vietnam War. Approximately 15,000 North Korean soldiers were deployed by late 2024 and early 2025, with some estimates indicating initial deployments of 11,000-12,000 troops and further reinforcements that could push the numbers as high as 30,000 by mid-2025.
Unlike in previous overseas engagements, these North Korean troops have not served merely as advisors or trainers but have taken active combat roles, particularly during major operations around the Kursk region. North Korean soldiers directly engaged Ukrainian forces and sustained heavy casualties, with South Korean intelligence estimating about 600 killed and 4,700 wounded or injured by spring 2025, numbers that later rose to roughly 2,000 killed and thousands more wounded by late summer 2025. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un publicly acknowledged the deployment and combat deaths for the first time in August 2025.9
These deployments represent the North Korean military’s first large-scale overseas direct combat participation since the Vietnam War, rather than a small advisory or technical mission, further underlining the unprecedented nature of the move in recent decades
The presence of these forces on European battlefields represented a remarkable development in several respects. It demonstrated the depth of the Moscow-Pyongyang partnership, with North Korea willing to commit its soldiers to a conflict far from its borders. It also provided North Korean forces with invaluable combat experience, something that Chinese commentators noted with concern, fearing it could embolden Kim Jong Un and destabilize the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula.10
North Korea’s motivations for such extensive involvement extend beyond mere ideological alignment with Russia. In exchange for its military support, North Korea has reportedly received food aid, military technology, energy assistance, and crucial economic cooperation from Moscow.11 The resumption of joint energy projects and agreements on defense and technology sharing have provided North Korea with benefits it struggled to obtain from China alone.
The accelerating security partnership between Russia and North Korea has emerged as one of 2025’s most troubling developments for Western intelligence agencies and policymakers. Driven by mutual interests, Russia’s need for munitions in its ongoing war against Ukraine and North Korea’s quest for advanced military technologies, the alliance is now altering the calculus for nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia and beyond. The alarming possibility that Russia could supply North Korea with technology for nuclear weapons delivery systems, including missile reentry vehicles and submarine propulsion, has sent shockwaves through intelligence communities across the West.12
Beginning in 2023, Russia turned to North Korea to secure a reliable source of ammunition, rockets, and even military personnel for its forces battling in Ukraine. In exchange, Moscow has offered a range of support, from oil and food aid to much more worrying forms of military assistance. According to the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, a coalition formed after Moscow withdrew backing from UN’s North Korea sanctions panel, Russia’s help has transcended conventional munitions, and now comprises technology transfers that could fundamentally advance the North’s strategic capabilities.13
North Korea’s interest in nuclear-powered submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) has been clear for years, but until recently, its capacity to realize these goals was severely limited by technological bottlenecks. Intelligence received by South Korean and US officials suggests that Moscow has crossed a “red line” by transferring modules, including nuclear reactors and propulsion systems, removed from decommissioned Russian submarines and destined for Pyongyang’s new construction projects.14
Pyongyang’s inability to build small nuclear reactors suitable for submarines was one of the last significant hurdles to fielding a credible nuclear-powered strategic force. Russian technical support, reportedly secured in return for North Korean personnel and materiel in Ukraine, may enable the North to reverse-engineer these modules, giving its scientists practical knowledge and capabilities they have lacked for decades. If confirmed, this transfer would not only violate the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty but could also trigger another round of severe international sanctions.15
Just as concerning is Russia’s recent assistance with satellite launches in North Korea. Western analysts point out that launch vehicle and missile technologies share significant overlap. Moscow’s expertise in reentry vehicle design and submarine missile systems is the “missing link” in Pyongyang’s ongoing modernization effort. United States and NATO officials have publicly voiced fears that Russia may soon provide North Korea with sensitive know-how, bringing its capabilities closer to strategic parity with regional adversaries.16
The Russian-North Korean partnership is not a simple transactional exchange, but a strategic compact that could reshape deterrence relationships throughout the Indo-Pacific. North Korea, recently designated a “permanent partner” by Moscow under a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership treaty, now enjoys access to Russian financial channels, including direct clearing in Russian banks and occupied territories, that help bypass longstanding international sanctions. This enables Pyongyang to obtain hard currency, technology, and commodities in ways previously denied by the global nonproliferation regime.
Despite these advantages, the relationship remains one-sided. Recent analyses reveal Moscow has gained nearly $9.8 billion worth of arms and personnel from North Korea while Pyongyang’s immediate tangible gains are closer to $1 billion. Nevertheless, the strategic payoff for the North, especially access to Russian submarine and missile technology, could be transformational and profoundly destabilizing.17
With its deepening ties to Moscow, North Korea now stands on the threshold of a new era in its military modernization. The potential acquisition of Russian nuclear reactor technology and advanced missile know-how could turn Pyongyang’s ambitions for a second-strike nuclear capability into a reality.
Russia’s embrace of North Korea as a “partner in proliferation” upends decades of international efforts to contain nuclear threats in Asia and injects new urgency into debates about deterrence, sanctions, and great-power strategy.
China’s reaction to the North Korea-Russia military partnership has been notably muted yet tinged with concern. Officially, Beijing has maintained its standard position of non-involvement, with Foreign Ministry spokespersons repeatedly stating that China lacks information about North Korean troop deployments and calling for de-escalation.18
In short, North Korea’s participation in Russia’s war against Ukraine has marked a dramatic and unprecedented evolution in both international conflict dynamics and the security landscape of Northeast Asia. For Pyongyang, the benefits have been twofold. North Korea is receiving Russian military technology and technical expertise, enabling significant upgrades to its missile guidance systems, air defense platforms, electronic warfare tactics, and crucially its burgeoning drone warfare capabilities.19
North Korean forces have adapted swiftly to modern battlefield conditions, learning from direct experience under Russian command and incorporating cutting-edge concepts such as drone reconnaissance and rapid counter-UAV tactics. This operational exposure is widely viewed as a windfall for Kim Jong Un’s regime, which until recently had exercised its forces almost exclusively within the peninsula’s unique, static environment.20
The risk for the wider region is clear. Chinese and South Korean analysts have raised concerns that North Korea’s acquisition of up-to-date combat experience and Russian military technology could catalyze a profound shift in the peninsula’s security balance. Beijing has adopted a cautious tone in official messaging, but Chinese academic commentators have warned about Pyongyang’s growing independence and the possibility of a “fundamental shift” in regional security if North Korea leverages these lessons and systems in future conflicts.
Inside North Korea, state propaganda has exalted the sacrifice and “heroism” of soldiers killed in action, weaving a powerful domestic narrative centered on revolutionary sacrifice and loyalty to Kim’s regime. Photographs of mourning ceremonies and awards for “martyrs” underscore the regime’s investment in validating its overseas intervention for the North Korean public. Nevertheless, some observers in China and South Korea openly deride the strategic utility of these deployments labeling the soldiers “cannon fodder” and citing immense casualties as evidence of their expendability from the Kremlin’s perspective.21
For Moscow and Pyongyang, the partnership is transactional. Russia receives troops and ammunition to prolong its war in Ukraine; North Korea gains valuable battlefield experience, cash infusions, and advanced military hardware.
North Korea’s intervention in Ukraine on Russia’s behalf has exceeded all prior expectations regarding the scope of its international military footprint. The long-term impact remains uncertain, but there is growing recognition that Pyongyang’s forces, bloodied in Ukraine, and technologically upgraded by the Kremlin, represent a qualitatively new military challenge for regional and global security planners.
Japanese Support for Ukraine
For Japan, support for Ukraine represents more than humanitarian concern or alliance solidarity with the United States and Europe.
Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s warning that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow” is a well-documented statement he has made in several major venues since 2022. One of the most prominent and frequently cited instances is his keynote address to the Shangri-La Dialogue security summit in Singapore in June 2022, where he said, “I myself have a strong sense of urgency that Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow” in the context of rising tensions over Taiwan and broader regional security concerns. Kishida has repeated similar language in other official settings including G7 events and a speech to the U.S. Congress, reinforcing the warning as a pillar of Japan’s diplomatic messaging on the risks of unilateral changes to the status quo in East Asia.22
This perspective reflects a clear-eyed assessment of the implications of Russia’s invasion. If the international community accepts or tolerates the conquest of territory through military force in Ukraine, it sets a precedent that could embolden China regarding Taiwan or encourage North Korean aggression against South Korea. The principle at stake that borders cannot be changed by force is fundamental to the post-World War II international order that has provided the framework for Asian security.
Japan and South Korea have therefore positioned their support for Ukraine as defense of the rules-based international order rather than merely a European matter. This framing has allowed both nations to deepen their engagement with NATO and European security structures in ways that would have been unthinkable a decade ago.
Japan’s support for Ukraine has been exceptionally substantial and wide-ranging. By mid-2025, Japan’s overall assistance to Ukraine, including financial, humanitarian, and recovery aid, totaled between $10 and $15 billion, with additional funding already announced for the coming year. Japan is now consistently ranked among the top five global donors to Ukraine, most current trackers list it as either the third- or fifth-largest donor after the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France.23
When measured as a percentage of gross domestic product, however, Japan’s aid amounts to about 0.20% of its GDP, placing it substantially below the extraordinary shares contributed by several Baltic and Northern European nations, such as Denmark, Estonia, and Lithuania. Nonetheless, even by this metric, Japan’s support represents a significant and sustained commitment, especially for a non-NATO, non-European state, and it has played a crucial diplomatic and convening role within the G7 and broader international community in support of Ukraine.24
Japan played a pivotal diplomatic role during the May 2023 G7 Hiroshima Summit by inviting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to attend, which marked Zelenskyy’s first visit to East Asia since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This opportunity allowed Zelenskyy to make direct appeals to the G7 leaders and engage with key Indo-Pacific nations, including South Korea, Australia, and India. Notably, Japan facilitated Zelenskyy’s first in-person meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi since the outbreak of the war, an encounter considered especially significant in encouraging India to adopt a more engaged, proactive posture toward addressing the crisis in Ukraine.25
In January 2025, Japan took the symbolic but significant step of opening a dedicated diplomatic mission to NATO, with Ambassador Osamu Izawa formally received by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. This institutionalized Japan’s growing security relationship with the Atlantic alliance.26
While Japan does not supply lethal weaponry, its military cooperation with Ukraine has been significant in funding, logistics, technology, security sector capacity-building, and international coordination making it a pivotal non-Western partner in Ukraine’s defense and resilience.
As discussed in an earlier chapter, Japan has also provided Ukraine with synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite data, marking a historic first for Japanese military intelligence sharing with a foreign country during an ongoing conflict. The arrangement involves Ukraine’s military intelligence (HUR) gaining direct access to geospatial data, including high-definition radar imagery from Japan’s iQPS (Institute for Q-shu Pioneers of Space) satellites.
This SAR data is critical for military operations because it allows Ukrainian forces to see through clouds, darkness, smoke, and camouflage, providing real-time battlefield imagery regardless of weather or concealment. Such capabilities are vital for tracking Russian troop movements, supply convoys, vehicle concentrations, newly built fortifications, and conducting bomb damage assessments with much greater accuracy than optical imagery alone.
Japan’s SAR data integration has allowed Ukrainian military analysts and drone/artillery operators to quickly identify and strike Russian positions, infrastructure, and logistics nodes even in conditions where other Western or commercial imagery sources are unavailable or disrupted. This technological support is considered a game-changer for Ukraine’s intelligence autonomy, reducing its vulnerability to temporary suspensions of U.S. or European intelligence while representing a major step in Japan’s willingness to contribute advanced dual-use technology to a partner in war.
South Korean Support for Ukraine
South Korea’s contributions, while initially more cautious due to concerns about antagonizing Russia and North Korea, increased markedly as Pyongyang deepened its military support for Moscow. In April 2025, South Korea pledged $100 million in assistance to Ukraine, explicitly citing North Korea-Russia military cooperation as a regional threat that justified Seoul’s enhanced support for Kyiv.27 South Korean officials made clear that Russia had chosen its partner on the Korean Peninsula, and it was not South Korea.27
Both Japan and South Korea have engaged with Ukraine and NATO through structured partnership programs. The individually tailored partnership programs (ITPP) developed at NATO’s Washington Summit established four flagship projects for cooperation between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea): support to Ukraine focusing on military healthcare, cyber defense, countering disinformation, and artificial intelligence.28
These programs represent a practical manifestation of the increasingly interconnected nature of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security. By working together on these initiatives, Asian and European democracies are building operational relationships and sharing expertise that may prove valuable in addressing future security challenges in either region.
India: Strategic Neutrality in Practice
India’s position on the Ukraine war exemplifies the concept of strategic autonomy in contemporary international relations. New Delhi has carefully maintained equidistance between the warring parties, pursuing what it characterizes as a policy of dialogue and peaceful resolution while scrupulously avoiding any public condemnation of Russia’s actions.29
This neutrality is not mere fence-sitting but reflects deep strategic calculations rooted in India’s historical relationship with Russia, its ongoing security needs, and its broader geopolitical objectives. India has consistently abstained from United Nations resolutions condemning Russia’s invasion, including votes at the UN Security Council, UN Human Rights Council, and UN General Assembly calling for Russia’s withdrawal and demanding investigations into Russian war crimes and human rights violations.
India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar has described the India-Russia relationship as “the one constant in world politics,” underscoring the enduring nature of ties that date back to the Soviet era.30
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union consistently backed India on critical issues, most notably using its UN Security Council veto to support India’s position on Kashmir and acting as a mediator between India and Pakistan. This historical legacy continues to shape Indian policy.
India’s policy on the Ukraine conflict has been shaped by pressing economic concerns, especially its energy needs. The country responded to Western sanctions on Russia by massively increasing oil imports from Russia, capitalizing on significant discounts available due to the sanctions regime.
In 2021, Russia supplied just 0.2–2 percent of India’s crude oil imports, making it a minor supplier compared to countries like Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Following the imposition of sanctions in 2022, however, Russia’s market share in India grew rapidly so that by May 2023, Russian oil accounted for around 45 percent of India’s imports, and Russia had overtaken all other suppliers to become India’s largest source of crude oil.31
Official data shows that between April 2022 and January 2023, India’s imports from Russia driven mostly by oil rose by nearly 384 percent. Overall, this dramatic shift turned Russia from the seventeenth largest supplier of oil to India into its top trading partner for crude within less than two years 32
Ukrainian officials have openly criticized this trade. Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated bluntly in December 2022: “There can be no ‘neutrality’ in the face of such mass war crimes. Pretending to be ‘neutral’ equals taking Russia’s side.”33
Nevertheless, India maintained that its energy purchases were legitimate commercial transactions and that New Delhi’s policy served India’s national interests while not precluding humanitarian assistance to Ukraine.
In a remarkable twist, India emerged as Ukraine’s leading supplier of diesel fuel by July 2025, accounting for 15.5% of Ukraine’s diesel imports—an extraordinary rise from only 1.9% in the previous year. Indian exports to Ukraine averaged 2,700 tonnes per day during this period, typically transported via Romania and Turkey. Although these fuel shipments bolstered Ukraine’s wartime logistics, multiple analysts observed that significant volumes of Indian diesel were likely refined from Russian-sourced crude oil. This phenomenon resulted in a notably circular trade dynamic: Russia sold crude oil to India, which processed it and subsequently exported refined diesel to Ukraine, indirectly supporting Ukraine’s resistance against Russia’s ongoing military campaign.34
India’s reluctance to criticize Russia also stems from military considerations. Over 85 percent of India’s military arsenal consists of Russian or Soviet-made weaponry, creating a dependency that cannot be quickly overcome.35
Although India has been diversifying its arms purchases, buying more systems from the United States, France, and Israel, Russia remains India’s top arms supplier. The need for spare parts, maintenance, upgrades, and continued access to Russian military technology constrains India’s freedom of action regarding Ukraine.
This military dependency is compounded by India’s strategic concerns about China. As tensions between New Delhi and Beijing persist along their disputed Himalayan border, India views Russia as a potential counterweight to Chinese power and a source of leverage in managing the complex triangular relationship between the three nations. A Russia entirely dependent on and aligned with China would be disadvantageous for Indian interests; maintaining independent channels to Moscow serves India’s broader strategic objectives.36
Despite its unwillingness to condemn Russia, India has sought to position itself as a potential facilitator of peace. Prime Minister Modi has engaged in shuttle diplomacy, visiting Moscow in July 2024, his first trip to Russia in five years, and then making a historic visit to Kyiv in August 2024, the first by an Indian Prime Minister since Ukraine’s independence.
Modi’s embrace of Putin in Moscow, which occurred on the same day Russian missiles struck a children’s hospital in Kyiv, drew sharp criticism from Zelenskyy and Western observers. Yet Modi followed this visit with his trip to Ukraine, where he told Zelenskyy that he came “as a friend” and pledged India’s support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity while offering to play any role “toward peace.”37
This positioning reflects India’s aspiration to serve as a bridge between the warring parties, a role that few other nations can credibly claim given the polarization of the international community over Ukraine. India’s warm relations with both Russia and the West, combined with its rising global stature, theoretically position it well for mediation. However, the substantive question remains whether India would be willing to use its leverage with Russia in ways that might genuinely advance peace rather than merely preserve its own balanced position.38
Strategic Implications of the Proxy War
The involvement of these diverse Asian powers in the Ukraine conflict represents a fundamental realignment of global geopolitics. What began as a European regional war has evolved into a genuine proxy conflict in which Asian nations compete for their strategic interests on European soil. As analysts at the RAND Corporation argued, the motivations of China, North Korea, Japan, South Korea, and even India all bear “the hallmarks of their being involved in a proxy war.”39
Beijing and Pyongyang share Russia’s vision of a post-Western world order in which U.S. hegemony is broken and multipolarity prevails or more accurately, in which their own authoritarian models gain legitimacy and space to operate.
The war is part of playing out of the next phase of the rise or curtailment of the multi-polar authoritarian world which is the focus of the authoritarian powers. Supporting Putin’s war in Ukraine by the fellow authoritarian powers serves this strategic imperative, making Russia’s success or at least its avoidance of decisive defeat a matter of importance to both China and North Korea.
Conversely, Japan and South Korea view Ukraine as a test case for whether the international community will tolerate territorial conquest. Their support for Ukraine reflects a conviction that allowing Russia to succeed would embolden potential aggressors in Asia primarily China regarding Taiwan, but also North Korea on the peninsula. The principle that borders cannot be changed by force must be defended globally, or it will erode everywhere.
China’s position looms large across all these relationships. For Japan and South Korea, containing Chinese power and defending against Chinese revisionism provides the ultimate rationale for supporting Ukraine. For North Korea, the deepening partnership with Russia provides an alternative patron that reduces Pyongyang’s dependence on Beijing. For India, maintaining ties with Russia serves partly as a hedge against excessive Chinese influence over Moscow and as a source of leverage in India’s own rivalry with China.
The Asian dimension of the Ukraine war marks a watershed in international security. The artificial separation between European and Indo-Pacific security concerns, long maintained for analytical and policy convenience, has definitively collapsed. What happens in Ukraine reverberates across Asia, and Asian powers’ choices shape outcomes in Europe.
This interconnection creates both dangers and opportunities. The danger lies in escalation dynamics: more actors with diverse interests complicate conflict management and increase the risk of miscalculation. North Korean troops gaining combat experience in Ukraine may become more confident in challenging South Korea; Chinese support for Russia may embolden Beijing’s own territorial ambitions; and the precedents set in Ukraine will influence calculations about Taiwan for years to come.
The opportunity lies in collective action by democracies across regions. Japan, South Korea, and European nations working together on Ukraine support creates habits of cooperation and shared understanding that could prove valuable in addressing future challenges. If this cooperation can be sustained and deepened, it could form the basis for a truly global coalition of democracies capable of defending their interests against the continued progress of the multi-polar authoritarian world.
As the war continues into its fourth year, the Asian dimension will only grow more important. The actions of major Asian powers whether supporting Ukraine’s defense, enabling Russia’s aggression, or attempting to mediate peace will significantly influence the war’s trajectory and ultimate outcome.
The Ukraine war has become a truly global conflict, one in which Asian powers pursue their interests on European battlefields and European powers contemplate their roles in Asian security. This new reality demands new thinking from policymakers and analysts alike. The era of regional security in isolation has ended; we now inhabit a world of global security interdependence, for better or worse.
1. https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/china-russia-relations-start-war-ukraine
2. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/china-india-and-north-korea-back-russia-as-changing-global-order-takes-shape/
3. https://www.cnn.com/2025/07/04/europe/china-ukraine-eu-war-intl; https://kyivindependent.com/chinas-foreign-minister-tells-eu-that-beijing-cannot-afford-russian-loss-in-ukraine-media-reports-6-2025/
4. https://www.cfr.org/article/china-russia-and-ukraine-august-2025
5. https://www.cfr.org/article/russia-china-ukraine-april-2025
6. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/08/world/europe/zelensky-russia-chinese-belgorod.html
7. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cp8z83np4xjo
8. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/china-india-and-north-korea-back-russia-as-changing-global-order-takes-shape/
9. https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-updates-seoul-says-2000-north-korean-troops-killed/live-73844989; https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-second-north-korean-wave-in-ukraine-what-next-as-pyongyangs-troops-arrive-on-russias-front-lines/
10. https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/11/chinas-dilemmas-deepen-north-korea-enters-ukraine-war
11. https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/china-russia-north-korea-nexus-implications-regional-security-and-war-ukraine
12. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russia-now-actively-funding-north-koreas-nuclear-programme; https://beyondparallel.csis.org/north-korea-russia-cooperation/
13. https://beyondparallel.csis.org/north-korea-russia-cooperation/
14. https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-09-17/national/northKorea/Russia-may-have-supplied-North-with-nuclear-reactor-Souths-military-says/2400938
15. https://thediplomat.com/2025/04/what-russias-support-means-for-north-koreas-nuclear-modernization/
16. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/06/13/nuclear-cooperation-among-the-axis-of-aggressors-an-emerging-threat/
17. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/9/18/north-korea-getting-a-raw-deal-on-support-for-russias-war-report
18. https://www.rfa.org/english/korea/2024/10/25/north-korea-china-ukraine-troops/
19. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/north-korea-is-playing-a-key-role-in-russias-war-against-ukraine/
20. https://thediplomat.com/2025/08/the-russia-ukraine-war-has-made-north-korea-more-dangerous/
21. https://www.voanews.com/a/n-koreans-high-casualties-in-ukraine-blamed-on-inexperience/7983971.html; https://ukrainian-studies.ca/2025/01/24/north-korean-troops-become-cannon-fodder-for-russia/
22. https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/russia-ukraine-war-fumio-kishida-ukraine-today-could-be-east-asia-tomorrow-japan-prime-minister-3056754; https://nypost.com/2024/04/11/us-news/japan-pm-urges-ukraine-support-calls-china-greatest-strategic-challenge-in-address-to-congress/
23. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2025-09-11/help-far-east-japans-support-ukraine; https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/d01042/
24. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/4266915/japan-the-war-in-ukraine-and-japaneurope-relations-a-g7nato-alignment-perspecti/
25. https://www.npr.org/2023/05/19/1177024349/zelenskyy-to-japan-attend-g-7-summit
26. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_232471.htm
27. https://www.nknews.org/2025/04/seoul-pledges-100m-to-ukraine-cites-north-korea-russia-ties-as-regional-threat/
28. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_232471.htm#:~:text=NATO%20is%20developing%20its%20cooperation,at%20NATO’s%20Summit%20in%20Washington.
29. https://www.usip.org/publications/2025/01/can-india-advance-peace-ukraine
30. https://www.eurasiareview.com/11062025-indias-strategic-autonomy-in-the-russia-ukraine-war-analysing-challenges-and-opportunities/
31. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/oil-gas/russia-redraws-indias-oil-map-but-middle-east-holds-ground/articleshow/123416474.cms
32. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/from-0-2-to-35-40-indias-imports-of-russian-oil-under-spotlight-after-trump-tariffs/articleshow/123003228.cms; https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/12/06/can-russia-serve-as-a-stable-oil-supplier-to-india-reducing-its-overdependence-on-instable-middle-east/
33. https://kyivindependent.com/kuleba-there-can-be-no-neutrality-toward-russias-mass-war-crimes/
34. https://swarajyamag.com/world/india-emerges-as-ukraines-top-diesel-supplier-in-july-claims-oil-analytics-firm; https://www.rjassociatesmedia.com/amid-us-tariffs-on-russian-crude-india-emerges-as-ukraines-leading-supplier-of-diesel/
35. https://www.eurasian-research.org/publication/indias-stance-on-russia-ukraine-crisis/
36. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/05/why-india-staying-neutral-over-ukraine-invasion
37. https://www.bushcenter.org/publications/is-indias-balancing-act-on-the-ukraine-war-sustainable
38. https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/03/05/india-diplomacy-ukraine-russia-trump-zelensky-putin/
39. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/11/ukraine-is-now-a-proxy-war-for-asian-powers.html
