By Robbin Laird

After learning about the International Flight Training School during my visit to Rome in November 2024, I was eager to understand more about Italy’s innovative approach to shaping air power training. The opportunity came in October 2025, when I returned to Italy to meet with Italian Air Force officers in Rome before visiting the IFTS facility at Decimomannu airbase in Sardinia. What I discovered was far more sophisticated than I had anticipated. It provides a comprehensive training ecosystem that represents the future of military aviation education.

A Vision Realized

The progressive collaboration between the Italian Air Force (Aeronautica Militare) and Leonardo to establish IFTS began with an ambitious goal: creating a world-leading military pilot training center. The journey from concept to reality unfolded systematically over six years, demonstrating the commitment required to build something truly exceptional.

The partnership launched in July 2018 with an Italian Air Force-Leonardo Letter of Intent, signaling the initial commitment to this transformative project. By March 2020, the collaboration expanded with the Leonardo-CAE Final Industrial Collaboration Agreement, bringing CAE’s simulation expertise into the consortium. Four months later, in July 2020, the formal Italian Air Force-Leonardo Decimomannu Collaboration Agreement solidified the operational framework that would guide the school’s development.

December 2020 marked a ceremonial milestone with the Decimomannu Groundbreaking Ceremony, officially launching construction of what would become a state-of-the-art training facility. In March 2021, Leonardo CAE Advanced Jet Training was incorporated as the operating entity responsible for running the school. The first students began training with IFTS courses at Galatina in June 2021, followed by courses at Decimomannu in July 2022. The final milestone arrived in the first quarter of 2024 when the school achieved full operational capability after completing the relocation from Galatina, consolidating all operations at Decimomannu.

This six-year transformation turned a strategic vision into a fully operational training center designed to set new global standards for military pilot excellence.

Military Led, Industry Powered

The partnership structure embodies a philosophy of “Military Led, Industry Powered,” creating a unique balance between operational expertise and technological innovation.

The Italian Air Force provides military leadership, drawing on over 70 years of aviation experience to guide the school’s direction. The Aeronautica Militare leads syllabus development, standardization, tests and exams, while overseeing both flight and ground training programs. Critically, the Air Force handles instructor pilot selection for both military and civilian roles, ensuring that training standards remain uncompromised.

Industry support comes from two key partners. Leonardo contributes as the leading integrated training systems and services provider, supplying the T-346 aircraft and logistics support, ground-based simulation systems and support, plus campus construction and services. CAE brings its specialized expertise in simulation systems and services to complement Leonardo’s capabilities.

This joint vision aims to create a worldwide training excellence center that combines military operational knowledge with cutting-edge industry technology and infrastructure. The Italian Air Force sets the training standards and requirements, while Leonardo and CAE provide the technological platforms, facilities, and support services to execute the training mission.

My visit underscored how comprehensive IFTS’s effort is in terms of Level IV training or the training of pilots who already have their wings and are being prepared for their final training step in the operational squadron they would join. This advanced phase represents a critical transition point where pilots move from basic flying skills to combat-ready operational capabilities.

The Ready Room Effect

During my time at IFTS, I visited the flight line, lived on campus, and talked in detail with instructors, officers, and contractors regarding their activities. I noted the appearance on campus of many student pilots from the 12 nations currently training at the facility, creating a truly international learning environment.

It was an immersive experience that underscored a key point my colleague, former USMC squadron commander Ed Timperlake, has often made about pilot knowledge gained in the ready room. According to Timperlake, the ready room serves as a crucial informal learning center for air combat pilots in several essential ways.

First, it enables peer learning and knowledge transfer. The ready room is where pilots at different experience levels discuss flying, share experiences, and learn from squadron mates who have been exposed to different career paths and operational situations. This cross-pollination of experience accelerates learning in ways that formal instruction cannot replicate.

Second, it facilitates cultural and professional development. Beyond technical skills, the ready room is where pilots develop camaraderie and understand what it means to be part of the aviation community. It’s where they “talk airplane stuff” and build the team cohesion essential for combat operations.

Third, it serves as a venue for tactical innovation and standardization. The ready room hosts interesting and often heated discussions about training methods and operational procedures that aren’t yet defined in manuals. These debates drive innovation and help establish best practices that eventually become standardized.

Finally, it enables evolution beyond individual skills. The ready room is where pilots transition from focusing solely on their own performance to understanding the bigger picture and how they fit within the larger combat force. It’s where the realization occurs that success isn’t just about individual capability, but about functioning as part of a coordinated team.

These informal ready room exchanges are foundational to shaping combat training approaches and capabilities for the entire air combat force.

Creating a Living Training Ecosystem

IFTS enables such discussions among students from various nations and between students and instructors. But the innovation goes deeper. Twice a year, instructors from the M-346 program, the various operational conversion units for Eurofighter, Tornado, and F-35, and operational squadron pilots come together at Decimomannu. They fly together, review procedures, and adjust curricula based on real-world operational experience.

This creates a continuous feedback loop where operational lessons flow backward through the training system. Squadrons deployed on NATO missions identify tactical or procedural changes based on evolving threats and operational realities. These insights are brought back to IFTS, where they inform curriculum adjustments and training emphasis. The result is a dynamic system that remains constantly aligned with operational requirements rather than becoming static or obsolete.

The Digital Foundation

Most tellingly, I had the opportunity to visit and be briefed on the four simulation rooms in the ground-based training center. I was able to see what each accomplished and how they were built to interact, creating an entire interactive digital enterprise that informs the live flying operations within IFTS.

It was an eye-opening experience, much more profound than simply reading about the operation. The simulation systems don’t exist in isolation for they’re networked to create scenarios that can involve multiple aircraft, different threat environments, and complex tactical situations. Students can train on missions that would be too dangerous, expensive, or logistically challenging to execute in actual flight, yet gain realistic experience that transfers directly to the cockpit.

The integration between the ground-based training systems and live flight operations creates a seamless learning progression. Skills developed in simulation are refined in the air, while lessons learned from flight are captured and fed back into simulation scenarios. This bidirectional flow of training data and operational experience ensures maximum efficiency and effectiveness.

A System, Not Just a School

It was during this visit that I learned something fundamental: the “S” in IFTS actually stands for dynamic system, not simply “school.” This distinction is more than semantic for it reflects a philosophical understanding that effective combat aviation training requires more than just instruction. It requires a comprehensive, adaptive ecosystem that integrates technology, human expertise, international collaboration, and continuous operational feedback.

IFTS represents a new model for military aviation training, one that recognizes the complexity of modern air combat and the need for training systems that can evolve as rapidly as the operational environment they prepare pilots to enter. By combining Italian Air Force operational expertise, industry technological capability, international student participation, and integrated digital and live training, IFTS has created something genuinely innovative.

The facility at Decimomannu isn’t just training pilots; it’s advancing the science of how pilots are trained, creating a model that other nations are studying carefully. In an era where air superiority remains crucial to military success and where the technology and tactics of air combat continue to evolve rapidly, IFTS demonstrates that the most effective approach to pilot training is one that views it as a dynamic, integrated system rather than a static program.

As I departed Sardinia, I carried with me a deeper appreciation for what Italy has accomplished. IFTS stands as a testament to what’s possible when military vision, industry capability, and international cooperation align around a common goal: preparing the next generation of combat pilots for the challenges they will face.

By Robbin Laird

The Sir Richard Williams Foundation’s September 18, 2025 seminar posed a fundamental question that cuts to the heart of modern defense planning: How does a nation achieve “readiness at the speed of relevance” when the luxury of time may no longer exist?

The presentations provided sobering but actionable answers that collectively paint a picture of how 21st-century militaries must fundamentally restructure their approach to combat readiness.

The answers that emerged reveal a paradigm shift away from the comfortable assumptions of the post-Cold War era toward a new reality where conflicts may be decided before the first shot is fired, where industrial mobilization cannot wait for crisis to justify investment, and where readiness is no longer a destination but a continuous, dynamic condition requiring constant maintenance across multiple domains.

Answer One: Deterrence Through Demonstrated Capability, Not Future Promises

Air Marshal Stephen Chappell, Chief of Air Force, provided perhaps the most fundamental reframe of how military forces contribute to deterrence in the modern era. His insight challenges decades of defense planning focused on future capability acquisition, arguing instead that deterrence emerges from the continuous demonstration of existing capabilities.

“We contribute to deterrence directly through force generation, through raise, train, sustain, sustaining a tier one force and demonstrating that every day,” Chappell explained. This philosophy centers on what he calls the “D words” or the ability to “degrade, disrupt, destroy, defeat” showcased through regular, visible exercises that communicate credible hard power to potential adversaries.

This approach recognizes that potential adversaries make cost-benefit calculations based on demonstrated capabilities rather than promised future systems. The repeated demonstration of complex, integrated operations or what Chappell describes as having “capability and credibility that aligned minds will comprehend, communicated collectively with innovative force structures including allies and partners, delivered cumulatively over time” creates deterrent effects that pure acquisition programs cannot match.

The strategic implications are significant: military forces must be structured not just to fight when called upon, but to continuously demonstrate their readiness to fight. This requires maintaining higher peacetime operational tempos, conducting more complex training exercises, and accepting the costs of regular capability demonstrations as essential investments in deterrence.

Answer Two: Industrial Mobilization as Immediate Capability, Not Crisis Response

The seminar’s most uncomfortable truth emerged from industry leaders who shattered traditional assumptions about wartime mobilization. Air Vice Marshal (Retired) Robert Denney of Northrop Grumman delivered the starkest assessment: “Mobilization is not a switch you can flip when conflict begins. It’s a capability you build in advance.”

This insight fundamentally challenges defense planning that assumes industrial surge capacity can be activated when needed. The reality, as demonstrated by Ukraine’s experience and historical analysis, is that effective mobilization requires years of preparation, established supply chains, and experienced workforces that cannot be created during crisis.

Matt Jones from BAE Systems Australia reinforced this reality through historical comparison, contrasting Bill Knudsen’s successful coordination of America’s “Arsenal of Democracy” with Essington Lewis’s frustrated attempts to mobilize Australia’s industrial base before World War II. The key difference was timing: Knudsen had government backing and urgency before conflict began, while Lewis faced bureaucratic obstacles that prevented adequate preparation.

Ukraine’s transformation following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea provides the most relevant contemporary example. By beginning industrial modernization eight years before Russia’s 2022 invasion, Ukraine had developed the capacity to sustain artillery fire, manufacture unmanned systems, and innovate at wartime speed. Crucially, Ukrainian industry had cultivated “a culture of innovating at wartime speed” where battlefield problems were prototyped in days and fielded in weeks.

The implications for Australia are stark: waiting for crisis to justify industrial investment leaves money but no time. Defense industry leaders emphasized that successful mobilization requires early government investment in industrial capabilities, acceptance of higher peacetime costs to maintain surge capacity, and systematic development of the skills and infrastructure necessary for rapid scaling.

Mike Prior from Boeing Defence Australia highlighted the practical challenges through the “reservist dilemma”. Boeing Australia employs approximately 900 active reservists representing over 30% of their workforce, concentrated in critical maintenance, modifications, and training roles. Activating these personnel for military service would immediately collapse Australia’s Wedgetail training system, creating impossible choices between civilian defense support and military mobilization.

Answer Three: The Tyranny of Compressed Timelines

Professor Justin Bronk of the Royal United Service Institute delivered perhaps the seminar’s most urgent warning: Australia faces a 2-5 year window for preparation, not the 5-10 year timeline commonly assumed in defense planning. This compressed timeline stems from converging factors that create windows of opportunity for potential adversaries.

American military capabilities will improve significantly by 2030 with new platforms like the B-21 bomber and advanced missiles coming online. Chinese leaders likely recognize this window of temporary advantage and may feel pressure to act before American capabilities mature. Similarly, current American political dysfunction hampers intelligence synthesis and decision-making, providing additional incentive for adversaries to act sooner rather than later.

The implications cascade through every aspect of defense planning. Traditional acquisition timelines measured in decades become irrelevant when potential conflicts may emerge within years. The comfortable assumption that warning time will allow for mobilization and preparation dissolves when adversaries can achieve fait accompli before effective responses can be mounted.

This reality demands fundamental changes in how military forces approach readiness. Air Commodore Peter Robinson, Commander Air Combat Group, emphasized that rather than planning for future capabilities or waiting for ideal conditions, forces must achieve readiness “with current assets against existing threats.” The “fight tonight” philosophy acknowledges that adversaries operate on their own timelines, not those preferred by defense planners.

The compressed timeline also affects international cooperation and alliance coordination. Traditional consultation processes that unfold over weeks or months become irrelevant when adversaries can achieve decisive results in days. This doesn’t mean abandoning democratic principles, but rather pre-positioning decision-making frameworks that can respond rapidly while maintaining legitimacy and coordination.

Answer Four: Beyond Platform Acquisition to Whole-of-Nation Capability

The seminar’s presentations consistently emphasized that combat readiness extends far beyond military platforms to encompass what officials termed “whole-of-nation capability.” This recognition challenges traditional boundaries between military and civilian sectors, demanding integration across government, industry, and civil society.

Lieutenant General Susan Coyle, Chief of Joint Capabilities, put this in stark terms: “the use of non-kinetic effects and our ability to defend against those effects prior to and during conflict will likely be the deciding factor in who prevails.” This reality requires capabilities that span space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains – areas where civilian infrastructure and expertise prove as critical as military systems.

Air Marshal Chappell outlined preliminary concepts for a National Aerospace Enterprise that recognizes Australia as “an aviation nation” with “an incredible amount of capacity and capability out there, but we are no way stitched up.” Even within the defense establishment, integration remains incomplete, making broader civilian integration even more challenging.

The challenge involves practical questions that become critical during crisis:

• Which civilian reserve personnel should be recalled to active duty versus remaining in industry roles where they contribute more effectively?

• Where should civilian aircraft land during emergencies, and which airfields should remain clear for military operations?

These decisions require coordination mechanisms that don’t currently exist.

Colonel Dave Beaumont from Defence’s National Support Division identified four pillars of Australia’s national support base: industry, workforce, social cohesion, and institutional decision-making capacity. Each pillar faces distinct challenges, but success requires integration across all four. The vast majority of Australia’s economy operates without daily consideration of defense requirements, yet these civilian industries would prove critical during extended conflict.

This whole-of-nation approach requires fundamental changes in how Australia thinks about national security. It demands civilian industries understand potential defense requirements, government agencies coordinate across traditional boundaries, and society as a whole maintains commitment to sustained defense efforts.

Answer Five: Geographic Realities Demand Forward Defense

Australia’s unique geography emerged as both advantage and constraint throughout the seminar discussions. Air Commodore Robinson’s presentation included a striking comparison: the 2,000-mile span from Perth to Cairns equals the distance from northern Finland to Greece or essentially the entire NATO front line. Yet where Europe offers dense populations, extensive infrastructure, and multiple allied nations, Australia faces vast oceanic distances with scattered island chains and limited friendly bases.

This “tyranny of distance” creates what Robinson termed the imperative for forward defense: it’s preferable to “kill the ship before it launches missiles” than to intercept those missiles after launch. This forward defense concept demands not only advanced capabilities but extensive regional partnerships and basing arrangements.

The RAAF maintains an extensive exercise program across the Indo-Pacific, from Thailand and Indonesia to Japan and the Philippines. These engagements serve multiple purposes beyond simple training: building operational familiarity with regional air forces, demonstrating Australian commitment to regional security while providing deterrent effects, and offering practical experience in operating from austere or unfamiliar bases.

Recent developments, such as taking weapons into Southeast Asia for the first time in decades during Exercise Cope West in the Philippines, represent significant policy and operational milestones. Such exercises test not only tactical procedures but also the diplomatic and logistical frameworks necessary for forward operations.

The geographic imperative also shapes capability requirements. Unlike European theaters where reinforcements might arrive within hours, the Indo-Pacific demands self-reliance and forward positioning. Australian forces must be capable of sustained operations at extended ranges with limited support infrastructure.

Answer Six: The Human Dimension as the Ultimate Constraint

Across multiple presentations, the human dimension emerged as both the greatest strength and most critical constraint in achieving combat readiness. Air Marshal Chappell noted a concerning disconnect: “Too many folks in the Air Force and too many folks in the air domain team don’t see that. They just think they’re doing their job, their bit, and aircrew and a few others are doing the air power thing.”

This observation led to his focus on building shared purpose or transforming individual jobs into a collective calling. The framework extends beyond immediate tactical readiness to encompass what Chappell describes as “healthy tension” between maintaining readiness for immediate threats while avoiding unnecessary attrition that could compromise long-term capability.

The human challenge manifests across multiple dimensions. Lieutenant General Coyle acknowledged the education gap: “There are still people out there that say to me, ‘What do you do in space and cyber? I’ve got no idea,’ and they’ve been in the defense force for decades.” This knowledge gap isn’t merely about technical details: it’s about fundamental operational concepts necessary for integrated operations across domains.

Industry faces parallel challenges. Mike Prior from Boeing noted that 30-35% of most defense industry workers have less than 18 months of experience, with over 50% of sustainment program personnel expected to have less than three years of experience by next year. This inexperience creates dangerous knowledge gaps during normal operations and could prove catastrophic during crisis mobilization.

The retention challenge proves equally critical. Lieutenant General Coyle noted that the Australian Defence Force has implemented specialized pay scales for cyber warfare officers using aviation officer pay scales to compete with civilian opportunities. However, compensation alone isn’t sufficient because these fields require development times of three to five years before personnel become fully proficient.

Air Commodore Robinson concluded by emphasizing the exceptional quality and dedication of current service members, noting “a really clear sense of purpose for the environment that we’re in, more so than I think I’ve ever seen in my career.” However, preserving this human capital through appropriate pacing of operations and training remains essential for maintaining readiness.

Answer Seven: Technology Integration at Operational Speed

The seminar revealed that technological advancement alone cannot deliver combat readiness. The critical factor is integrating technology at the speed of operational relevance. This emerged most clearly in discussions of non-kinetic effects across space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains.

Wing Commander (Retired) Steven Thornton, commanding No. 6 Squadron RAAF, described the electromagnetic spectrum as fundamental to ensuring “survivability and lethality of the joint coalition force.” However, Professor Bronk noted that cyber operations represent “one of the slowest forms of warfare” for counter-military network cyber payloads require “between 18 months and three years, often to develop and embed a capability in an adversary Air Defense Network.”

This temporal disconnect between cyber capabilities and operational needs creates significant planning challenges. Unlike kinetic weapons that can be employed rapidly once available, cyber effects require extensive preparation, reconnaissance, and often pre-positioning of capabilities years in advance.

The classification requirements surrounding cyber operations further complicate integration. As Professor Bronk observed, “Does the person who’s putting together the campaign plan have the clearances to know that and the compartments to know that that capability exists, let alone the authorities to release it?” Even when cyber capabilities exist, they may not be usable due to legal, operational, or security constraints.

Electronic warfare offers more immediate effects but faces its own challenges. The effectiveness of jamming depends on signal processing capabilities improving rapidly on both sides. This evolution is driving military forces toward “stand-in” electronic warfare platforms – systems that can penetrate closer to enemy territory to deliver jamming effects at shorter ranges where they remain effective.

Air Marshal Chappell’s enthusiasm for the MQ-28 Ghost Bat program exemplifies what is the goal of technology integration. Having observed live demonstrations where two aircraft operated “just like a fighter formation” with control systems simple enough to operate while inverted in an aircraft, he described the potential for transforming Australia from “a tier one small air force into a tier one medium-sized air force” without burning out human capability and capacity.

Answer Eight: Cost-Effective Solutions to Mass Threats

The emergence of low-cost drone threats has prompted significant rethinking of defense economics throughout the allied community. Professor Bronk highlighted the unsustainable mathematics: NATO forces intercepting $20,000 drones with $1.2-1.8 million missiles creates cost-exchange ratios that favor adversaries employing mass drone tactics.

Russia’s mass production of Shahed-136 drones illustrates how adversaries exploit these economic vulnerabilities. Initially costing $150,000-200,000 per unit, Russian manufacturers have driven costs down to approximately $7,000 through simplified production methods. While crude, these systems work effectively as saturation weapons designed to overwhelm defensive systems.

Ukraine’s experience provides crucial insights into cost-effective responses. Ukrainian forces have found helicopters equipped with machine guns and forward-looking infrared sensors represent one of their most cost-effective counter-drone platforms. Crews in light aircraft like Yak-52s armed with assault rifles shoot down hundreds of drones monthly, a decidedly low-tech solution to a high-tech problem.

The Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) emerged as perhaps the most promising development in cost-effective air defense. At $20,000-35,000 per interceptor, APKWS breaks the unsustainable cost curve while providing genuine tactical capability. A single fighter aircraft can carry 28-49 APKWS rounds in standard rocket pods, providing sustained engagement capability against drone swarms.

For Australia, APKWS represents an opportunity to leverage existing platforms effectively. Super Hornets could serve as interceptor aircraft while F-35s provide sensor coverage, creating a layered defense network capable of engaging threats far from Australian shores. The system’s relative simplicity also makes it a candidate for domestic production.

Answer Nine: Resilience Through Distributed Operations

The concept of resilience emerged as fundamental to combat readiness, but not in traditional terms of hardening individual assets. Instead, presentations emphasized resilience through distribution, adaptability, and multiple redundant capabilities across all operational domains.

Air Marshal Chappell highlighted lessons from Ukraine and Israel, both of which have demonstrated continued air power generation despite sustained attacks on their infrastructure. Australia has been developing these capabilities through exercises like Coral Sea, where forces practiced rapid relocation, refueling, rearming, and replanning using agile basing concepts with C-17 transport aircraft supporting fast jet operations.

Lieutenant General Coyle emphasized building resilience through PACE planning or Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency options for every critical capability. “We expect to lose everything at that point in time. The reality of that is unlikely, because it’s not like you can barrage jam the entire Australian Defense Force and expect it to sustain, but we are prepared to have alternates to everything.”

This resilience requires more than technical redundancy: it demands operational flexibility. Military personnel must be trained not just on primary systems but on backup methods, including potentially reverting to older technologies that may be less vulnerable to sophisticated attacks. This might mean training on celestial navigation as backup to GPS, or understanding how to operate with paper maps when digital systems are compromised.

The distributed approach extends to force structure decisions. Rather than concentrating capabilities in large, vulnerable platforms, military forces are moving toward networks of smaller, more survivable systems. This trend has implications across all domains, suggesting that future conflicts will require capabilities that can operate effectively against distributed, adaptive adversaries.

Answer Ten: The Strategic Depth of Time

Air Marshal (Retired) Mark Binskin focused on  “strategic depth” as a key challenge which he characterized as not just in geography or resources, but in time itself. By accelerating the development of critical capabilities now, strengthening industrial partnerships today, and synchronizing efforts across all domains, democracies can compress the decision-making cycle that adversaries seek to exploit.

This temporal strategic depth requires departure from traditional procurement timelines and bureaucratic processes designed for a more stable world. Consider the implications for defense industrial capacity: in previous conflicts, nations could rely on their ability to mobilize and scale production during wartime. Modern warfare may not provide that luxury for the industrial base must be prepared to surge immediately.

The human dimension proves equally critical to temporal strategic depth. Military personnel cannot simply be trained for yesterday’s conflicts; they must be prepared for scenarios that may unfold with unprecedented speed and complexity. This demands not just technical proficiency, but cognitive agility – the ability to adapt rapidly to changing circumstances and make effective decisions under extreme time pressure.

Alliance structures, too, must evolve to match the speed of modern threats. Traditional consultation processes that unfold over weeks or months become irrelevant when adversaries can achieve fait accompli in days. This doesn’t mean abandoning democratic principles or alliance consultation, but rather pre-positioning decision-making frameworks that can respond rapidly to emerging crises while maintaining legitimacy and coordination.

Conclusion: A New Paradigm for an Uncertain Era

The Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar underscored that “readiness at the speed of relevance” demands nothing less than a fundamental transformation in how democratic societies approach defense. The comfortable certainties of the post-Cold War era, extended warning times, predictable adversaries, and the luxury of perfect preparation, have dissolved in the face of new strategic realities.

The major answers that emerged from the seminar point toward a new paradigm: deterrence through demonstrated capability rather than future promises; industrial mobilization as immediate capability rather than crisis response; compressed timelines that demand immediate action rather than gradual preparation; whole-of-nation approaches that transcend traditional military boundaries; geographic realities that require forward defense; human dimensions that represent both greatest strength and critical constraint; technology integration at operational speed; cost-effective solutions to mass threats; resilience through distributed operations; and strategic depth measured in time rather than just geography.

These answers collectively paint a picture of military forces that must be continuously ready, constantly adapting, and perpetually demonstrating their capabilities. The alternative, waiting for perfect conditions or crisis justification, risks ceding the initiative to adversaries who have already embraced the speed of modern conflict.

The transformation is not optional. As the seminar made clear, in an era where the luxury of time may no longer exist, nations must choose between preparation now or improvisation later. The consequences of choosing poorly could prove as tragic as those witnessed in previous conflicts where inadequate preparation led to avoidable losses.

The question is not whether this transformation is necessary for the strategic environment has already made that choice. The question is whether Australia can implement these changes quickly enough to remain secure in an increasingly dangerous world.

By Robbin Laird

In a discussion at the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar on September 18, 2025, Air Marshal Stephen Chappell, Chief of Air Force, provided comprehensive insights into the Royal Australian Air Force’s strategic direction and operational philosophy.

Speaking to Air Marshal (Retired) Brown and an audience of defence professionals, Chappell outlined a vision that balances immediate readiness with long-term capability development, drawing critical lessons from contemporary conflicts while positioning the RAAF for future challenges.

The Strategic Framework: People, Purpose, and Preparedness

Fourteen months into his tenure as Chief of Air Force, Chappell has crystallized his leadership approach around three fundamental pillars. His first 100 days involved extensive consultations across all Australian air bases, including remote locations like Curtin and Scherger, engaging with what he terms the “air domain team” or aviators, soldiers, sailors, public servants, and industry colleagues who collectively generate and deliver air power.

“Every member of the Royal Australian Air Force and every member of the broader air domain team directly contributes every day to the generation of delivery of air power,” Chappell emphasized. However, he noted a concerning disconnect: “Too many folks in the Air Force and too many folks in the air domain team don’t see that. They just think they’re doing their job, their bit, and aircrew and a few others are doing the air power thing.”

This observation led to his focus on building shared purpose which is transforming individual jobs into a collective calling. The framework extends to medium-term objectives, including influencing the 2026 National Defence Strategy update, and long-term vision development for air power in the 2040s and beyond.

Central to this approach is a single key directive: “preserve the force.” This concept creates what Chappell describes as “healthy tension” between maintaining readiness for immediate threats while avoiding unnecessary attrition that could compromise long-term capability.

Redefining Deterrence Through Demonstrated Capability

Chappell’s approach to deterrence represents a departure from traditional acquisition-focused strategies. While acknowledging that acquiring future capabilities with future funding contributes to deterrence, he argues it’s insufficient on its own. Similarly, being “really, really good at current operations” which Australia demonstrably is remains important but incomplete.

The key, according to Chappell, lies in how air forces contribute to deterrence through continuous force generation and demonstration. “We contribute to deterrence directly through force generation, through raise, train, sustain, sustaining a tier one force and demonstrating that every day,” he explained. This involves showcasing the ability to “degrade, disrupt, destroy, defeat” or the “D words” that demonstrate hard power capabilities.

This philosophy extends to what he calls the “six Cs” or having capability and credibility that aligned minds will comprehend, communicated collectively with innovative force structures including allies and partners, delivered cumulatively over time. The repetition of these demonstrations, Chappell argues, is what truly deters malign actors by showcasing consistent, credible hard power.

Operational Excellence in Practice

The RAAF’s current operational tempo provides compelling evidence of this deterrence-through-demonstration approach. Chappell detailed several recent examples that showcase the force’s ability to respond rapidly and effectively to emerging challenges.

In June 2025, a C-130J crew deployed at extremely short notice to assist in evacuating Australians and other approved nationals from Tel Aviv. The mission exemplified operational excellence under pressure: called on a Saturday, the crew launched by Monday with minimal preparation, conducting a 19-hour mission with multiple takeoffs and landings while receiving real-time intelligence from the Air Operations Center. The captain timed landings between ballistic missile barrages, loading 119 people in just 10 minutes before departing ahead of the next attack wave.

During Tropical Cyclone Alfred’s impact on Southeast Queensland, the RAAF demonstrated its ability to rapidly relocate and regenerate air power. After flushing assets from affected bases, the force quickly reorganized to conduct a marathon strike mission covering over 2,400 nautical miles into the northern South China Sea – all without preparation or rehearsal.

The deployment of EA-18G Growlers and F/A-18F Super Hornets to Clark Air Base in the Philippines provided another validation point. Operating in the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea, these assets verified their capabilities against real-world competitor systems , something impossible to replicate on any training range globally.

Lessons from Contemporary Conflicts

Chappell’s analysis of current conflicts provides sobering insights for air power practitioners. Regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict, he argues that Russia “took the wrong lessons from the Spanish Civil War,” maintaining air power as a subservient component of continental land forces rather than developing genuine air domain mastery.

“They never developed the culture, doctrine, capabilities, the capacity to actually genuinely fight in the air domain and try to master that domain,” Chappell observed. Had they achieved air superiority early in 2022, the conflict might have proceeded very differently.

Conversely, Ukraine has demonstrated remarkable resilience in air base operations, continuing to generate air power despite sustained attacks. This resilience, Chappell noted, exceeds what most analysts predicted and suggests that air bases possess more inherent survivability than commonly credited.

The proliferation of drones in the Ukraine conflict, while significant, represents what Chappell sees as a second-order effect of Russia’s failure to achieve air superiority. “Drones are just adding additional lethality in an attempt to get lethality and mobility and maneuver into the conflict,” he explained, while the fundamental nature remains an attritional ground fight.

The contrast with Israeli operations in the Middle East is stark. Over 12 days in June, Israeli air operations demonstrated “what a tier one Air Force can do utilizing multi-domain effects.” While acknowledging that tier one air forces represent significant investment, Chappell emphasized they’re “vastly less expensive than the alternative, which is a tier two air force.”

The rapid degradation of Iranian air defence systems surprised many observers, but Chappell attributes this to the layered, multi-domain approach characteristic of tier one air operations. Fifth-generation capabilities, electromagnetic warfare assets, and multi-domain integration created synergistic effects that quickly overwhelmed defensive systems.

Integrated Air and Missile Defence: The Priority Program

When discussing Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD), Chappell’s urgency was evident. “It is the thing that I would look to pull forward as quickly as possible,” he stated, emphasizing the program’s strategic importance for Australian defence.

His conceptual framework for IAMD encompasses multiple layers: passive defence, active defence, counter-force operations, and counter-proliferation measures. While acknowledging that counter-proliferation may be less relevant given Australia’s primary strategic competitor, he noted its continued importance as regional proliferation dynamics evolve over decades.

The passive defence layer draws heavily on lessons from Ukraine and Israel, both of which have demonstrated continued air power generation despite significant attacks on their infrastructure. Australia has been developing these capabilities through exercises like Coral Sea, where forces practiced rapid relocation, refueling, rearming, and replanning using agile basing concepts with C-17 transport aircraft supporting fast jet operations.

Counter-force capabilities received significant attention, with Chappell highlighting recent maritime strike demonstrations that effectively reached “the primary area of military interest for Australia.” These exercises validated the ability to engage tier-one targets at maximum range, providing crucial deterrent signaling while building operational confidence.

The active defence component will see prototype testing next year in collaboration with U.S. forces to demonstrate integrated air and missile defence concepts. Integration with broader ADF sensor networks and countermeasures will be crucial to the system’s effectiveness.

Addressing the Drone Threat: Cost-Effective Solutions

The emergence of low-cost drone threats has prompted significant rethinking of air defence economics. The unfavorable cost-to-kill ratios of using expensive interceptors against cheap drones has led to renewed interest in kinetic solutions, including the return of cannon-based systems for point defence.

“There’s lots of ways of countering UAS,” Chappell noted, emphasizing that threats won’t necessarily originate from overseas but could include internal threats. The RAAF has established a panel of providers to advise on counter-UAS capabilities and is implementing both active and passive defence measures.

Current efforts focus on protecting air bases and key infrastructure during the latter half of 2025, though Chappell acknowledged that “we are not ahead of the track” in this area. Learning from Israeli, European, and US experiences, the RAAF is exploring lower-cost effectors that can be deployed even on high-end platforms like fast jets.

The Ghost Bat Revolution: Collaborative Combat Aircraft

Chappell’s enthusiasm for the MQ-28 Ghost Bat program was unmistakable. Having recently observed live demonstrations, he described watching two aircraft launch and operate in trail formation “just like a fighter formation,” with control systems simple enough to operate while inverted in an aircraft.

The program’s collaboration with the United States has yielded impressive results, including demonstrations where a single operator controlled multiple Ghost Bats simultaneously while performing “find, fix, track, and transmit” missions with operationally relevant data. The system has been deployed to operational bases and tested in realistic environments.

“I’m really confident when I talk to my fellow air chiefs that we have a world-leading collaborative combat aircraft in the MQ-28,” Chappell stated. The strategic implications are significant: the ability to position uncrewed assets across Australian air bases during crisis periods could transform Australia from a “tier one small air force into a tier one medium-sized air force” without burning out human capability and capacity.

The Ghost Bat’s potential for defensive counter-air operations is particularly compelling. Positioned to intercept threats before they reach Australia, these systems could engage hostile aircraft over key terrain while preserving human crews. Even if subjected to preemptive strikes, losses wouldn’t include irreplaceable aircrew.

National Aerospace Enterprise: Integrating Civilian Capabilities

Looking beyond pure military capabilities, Chappell outlined preliminary concepts for a National Aerospace Enterprise through an aerospace council. This initiative recognizes Australia’s vibrant aviation sector and seeks to integrate civilian capabilities more effectively with defence needs.

“We are an aviation nation,” Chappell observed. “We’ve got an incredible amount of capacity and capability out there, but we are no way stitched up.” Even within the defence establishment, integration remains incomplete, making broader civilian integration even more challenging.

The concept addresses practical questions that become critical during crisis:

• Which civilian reserve personnel should be recalled to active duty versus remaining in industry roles where they contribute more effectively?

• Where should civilian aircraft land during emergencies, and which airfields should remain clear for military operations?

These decisions require coordination mechanisms that don’t currently exist.

The aerospace council would provide a framework for addressing cultural and mindset challenges while developing practical solutions with available resources. As the 2026 National Defence Strategy provides opportunities for increased funding, this groundwork will prove essential for maximizing return on investment.

Looking Forward: The 2040s Vision

While maintaining operational focus on current threats, Chappell emphasized the importance of imagining air power’s evolution into the 2040s. His interactions with international counterparts at the Global Aerospace Chiefs Conference reinforced his confidence in the RAAF’s tier-one status, built through a century of investment in human capability and decades of platform acquisition by his predecessors.

This legacy creates an obligation to future air forces. The decisions made today regarding capability development, force structure, and operational concepts will determine whether Australia maintains its tier-one status through the next generation of air power evolution.

Conclusion: Balancing Present Readiness with Future Vision

Air Marshal Chappell’s strategic vision for the RAAF represents a sophisticated balance between immediate operational requirements and long-term capability development. His emphasis on deterrence through demonstrated capability, rather than mere acquisition, provides a framework for maximizing current investments while building toward future needs.

The integration of human capability development, technological advancement, and operational excellence creates a comprehensive approach to air power that extends well beyond traditional service boundaries. By engaging the broader aerospace community and learning from contemporary conflicts, the RAAF is positioning itself to meet the challenges of an increasingly complex strategic environment.

As Australia faces an uncertain security future, the RAAF’s commitment to maintaining tier-one status while innovating for tomorrow’s challenges provides a model for how middle powers can maintain strategic relevance in an era of great power competition.

The success of this approach will depend on sustained commitment to excellence, continued investment in both human and technological capabilities, and the wisdom to learn from current conflicts while preparing for future challenges that may be fundamentally different from today’s threats.

Featured image: Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown and Air Marshal Stephen Chappell, Chief of Air Force addressing the audience at the seminar.

In August 2025, Admiral Daryl Caudle assumed the role of the 34th Chief of Naval Operations, inheriting a U.S. Navy facing extraordinary pressures. From shipyard backlogs and workforce challenges to evolving threats in the Indo-Pacific, the service confronts demands that will test every aspect of its institutional capacity.

To mark this transition, the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) convened its “Notes to the New CNO“ series which is a collection of recommendations from naval officers, defense analysts, and maritime experts worldwide. The resulting contributions paint a comprehensive picture of the challenges ahead and offer concrete pathways toward solutions.

This article synthesizes the major themes and recommendations from this series, organizing them around five critical areas: institutional culture and reform, force structure and capabilities, warfighting development and readiness, strategic positioning and alliances, and the human dimension of naval power.

The Call for Radical Institutional Change

Perhaps the most urgent theme throughout the series is the need for fundamental cultural and institutional transformation. Lieutenant Chris Rielage’s contribution, “Sir, Be Radical,” sets this tone forcefully. Rielage argues that junior officers, those closest to tactics, closest to sailors, and least enculturated into Navy bureaucracy, overwhelmingly believe the current approach is insufficient for major power competition.

Rielage identifies a broken social contract: junior officers were encouraged to think innovatively about naval warfare, yet their ideas have rarely translated into meaningful institutional change. The result is a generation of officers who know promotion milestones but lack clarity on how the Navy will defeat China. This administrative obsession, Rielage argues, has created battlefield risk by prioritizing bureaucratic compliance over warfighting readiness.

Commander Paul Viscovich reinforces this critique in “The Foundry, Fleet, and Fighting Triad? Warfighting Focus,” comparing the Navy unfavorably to Naval Special Warfare communities. SEALs maintain laser focus on their mission by ruthlessly eliminating anything that doesn’t directly contribute to combat readiness. The conventional Navy, by contrast, has allowed eight decades without peer conflict to erode its warrior ethos, replacing it with an administratively-obsessed culture that conflates inspection performance with warfighting capability.

Viscovich’s prescription is direct: the CNO must cultivate a critical mass of reformers of independent-thinking junior admirals and captains willing to challenge calcified orthodoxy. He recommends establishing a blue-ribbon panel of retired officers, including SEALs expert in eliminating institutional bloat, to systematically cut non-essential programs. This approach recognizes that personnel policy drives organizational culture, and that sustained reform requires champions at multiple levels who can outlast any single CNO’s tenure.

Captain John Cordle’s “We Are At Risk of Forgetting the Lessons of the 2017 Collisions” provides sobering context for why institutional reform matters. The 2017 collisions that killed 17 sailors prompted the Comprehensive Review, which generated 112 corrective actions addressing fatigue, human-centered design, and the “can-do” attitude that had normalized dangerous practices.

Yet recent Class A mishaps suggest these reforms may not have taken root. Human Factors positions in the Surface Force remain vacant due to hiring freezes, essentially “unchecking the block” on key recommendations. Cordle warns that organizational drift toward failure remains constant, and that only sustained critical self-assessment prevents tragedy. His message to the CNO is clear: read complete mishap reports, not just summaries, and conduct holistic examination of whether reforms actually worked.

Reimagining Force Structure and Capabilities

The series features extensive debate about the platforms and capabilities the Navy needs for future conflict. Dmitry Filipoff’s “Fix the Navy’s Flawed System of Warfighting Development” provides essential context by arguing that 30 years of post-Cold War experience created fundamental atrophy in high-end warfighting skills. The Navy’s combat training program trained one warfare area at a time against opposition deliberately made to lose, producing certified forces whose actual readiness for great power war remained distorted by institutional pressure to meet deployment schedules.

This tactical literacy deficit undermines nearly everything else, Filipoff argues, because “almost everything the Navy does boils down to its tactical warfighting implications.” Without understanding the logic of how fleets are destroyed in combat, sound decisions about force structure, operational concepts, or personnel policy become nearly impossible.

Against this backdrop, several contributors address specific capability gaps. Dr. Shelley Gallup and Ben DiDonato make the case for small, lightly-manned warships in “Start Building Small Warships.” They argue that while submarines and naval aviation remain world-class, the surface fleet faces serious challenges.

The solution is not more large, expensive platforms but smaller, well-armed vessels that can provide persistent presence, reduce logistics burdens through greater endurance, and bring smaller shipyards into the industrial base. Their Lightly Manned Automated Combat Capability (LMACC) design envisions a crew of approximately 25 operating alongside unmanned systems, with commanding opportunities for O-3s that develop leadership earlier in officers’ careers. At under $200 million per platform, such vessels could be built in meaningful numbers to address China’s maritime militia while freeing destroyers for higher-end missions.

Dr. Craig Koerner takes a different approach in “A Navy for War in the Age of Intelligent Missiles,” arguing that the era of smart platforms delivering short-range weapons is ending. Modern missiles with capable seekers can penetrate defenses more effectively than aircraft, and at lower cost.

This shift demands moving from platform-centric to missile-centric operations, with long-range weapons launched from low-signature vehicles that never see their targets. Koerner emphasizes that survivable reconnaissance becomes paramount, satellites with improved resilience through large constellations, expendable drones, and specialized reconnaissance forces hidden in clutter. Unable to hide, conventional air and sea-surface platforms face grim prospects against competent opponents equipped with modern ISR and long-range fires.

Nicholas Weising’s “Anchor Acquisition and Force Development on Targeting China’s C4ISR” bridges platform debates by arguing that neutralizing Chinese command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance should serve as the organizing principle for Navy development. China’s anti-access/area denial strategy depends fundamentally on its C4ISR architecture or its ability to find and target U.S. forces.

The CNO should therefore prioritize layered approaches that target hostile sensing while reinforcing friendly networks, scaling up electronic warfare and cyber teams, investing in resilient communication architectures, and developing deception methods to complicate enemy targeting. This focus ensures that force structure debates remain grounded in the operational problem: defeating China’s kill chains before they can be executed.

Warfighting Development and Readiness

The series dedicates substantial attention to how the Navy trains, educates, and prepares its forces. Captain Paul Nickell’s “To Win the Fight, We Must First Win the Mind: Create NDP-1.1 Naval Warfighting” identifies a critical gap. The Navy possesses abundant technical manuals but lacks unifying warfighting philosophy that helps sailors think through friction, fluidity, and ambiguity inherent in combat.

Modeled on the Marine Corps’ transformative MCDP-1 Warfighting, Nickell proposes NDP-1.1 as a companion to existing doctrine. This publication should articulate clear philosophy valuing initiative and adaptation, provide strong conceptual foundations about the nature of naval warfare, and elevate leadership and decision-making as core competencies. Critically, publication alone is insufficient for the document must be integrated into curriculum, training, and fleet culture from accession to flag rank.

Commander Michael Posey’s “Accelerate Human-Machine Teaming in the Maritime Operations Center” addresses the technological dimension of readiness. Maritime Operations Centers serve as decision hubs for numbered fleets, integrating intelligence, operations, and logistics at scale. With the Navy fighting from seabed to space and through the electromagnetic spectrum, the volume of data demands AI-enhanced tools that augment rather than replace human judgment.

Posey emphasizes that AI literacy must be built in the Foundry, through education at Naval Postgraduate School, Maritime Warfighting Courses, and Fleet Tactical Training Groups. Watchstanders must arrive prepared to operate in vast, volatile, contested maritime domains that demand machine teaming, understanding both AI’s force-multiplying potential and its limitations in bias, contextual failures, and misinterpretation.

Captain Alan Brechbill takes a more specific focus in “Sink the Kill Chain: A Navy Space Guide to Protecting Ships and Sailors,” arguing that the next war at sea will be decided first in space. Ships operating inside lethal weapons engagement zones cannot survive China’s massed precision fires unless the Navy treats space operations and Counter-C5ISRT as foundational rather than auxiliary.

Brechbill outlines five lines of effort: treating space as a warfighting domain owned by trained sailors rather than outsourced to the Space Force; making Counter-C5ISRT the Navy’s first layer of defense; building platforms designed to operate when space enablers are degraded; training the fleet to disappear through emissions control and deception; and investing in dedicated Navy Space operators with the same rigor given aviators and submariners. His central argument is stark: a fleet that cannot hide cannot fight, and breaking the enemy’s kill chain is the Navy’s main line of defense.

Lieutenant Andrew Pfau and Bridger Smith address training gaps for submarine forces in “The Submarine Force Needs More Flexible Training Tools.” Shore-based attack centers provide high-fidelity training but are limited in number, leaving shipyard crews, often weeks between opportunities, struggling to maintain readiness. Their solution involves “attack center in a box” trainers: lower-fidelity, modular systems running on basic laptops that link tactical watchstanders in shared training environments. These would not replace shore trainers but provide higher training density and frequency. Combined with tabletop wargames for tactical decision-making, such approaches offer cost-effective ways to maintain perishable skills during extended shipyard availabilities while preparing crews to transition quickly to combat-ready status.

Strategic Positioning and Alliance Management

Several contributors address how the Navy should position itself strategically and leverage partnerships.

Dr. Peter Dombrowski’s “Change the Navy’s Narrative: The Future Fight and the Hybrid Fleet” argues that Admiral Caudle has an opportunity to realign strategic narrative with emerging operational reality. After years of distributed maritime operations experimentation and unmanned systems integration, the Navy must overcome headlines about past scandals to restore faith with the President, Congress, and the American people.

This requires emphasizing two pillars: how the Navy has adapted to shifts in maritime warfare based on Black Sea and Red Sea lessons, and how the American industrial base, in collaboration with partners and new entrants, will provide advanced systems enabling new operational concepts. By articulating a powerful vision through testimony, documents, and sustained communication, the CNO can help unify effort and provide insight to other services about naval operations for the next three years and beyond.

Lieutenant Vince Vanterpool focuses on a specific operational challenge in “Train to Win Below the Threshold of War.” The PRC and PLAN operate comfortably under their “Three Warfares” doctrine in gray-zone competition, growing bolder in day-to-day operations. While Integrated Deterrence has increased partnerships and exercises, these initiatives fall short of providing tactical-level personnel with training necessary to win in situations remaining just below hostile acts of war.

Vanterpool argues for robust tactics and techniques development through discussions and wargames guided by JAGs, warfare commanders, and personnel familiar with PRC coercion tactics. The Navy Deterrence Concept needs tactical-level operational guidance for units operating in this ambiguous space where China excels at exploiting policy seams.

Commander Jason Lancaster offers an unconventional approach in “Rugby and Rivalry: Use Sports Diplomacy to Counter China in the South Pacific.” Despite U.S. and allied development aid dwarfing PRC contributions in the South Pacific, China has made significant regional influence gains. The region’s 14 countries may be small, but their economic exclusion zones cover 20 percent of Earth’s surface in strategically vital locations.

Lancaster proposes systematic sports diplomacy through regular rugby matches, building on successful Naval Academy tours and learning from Australia’s $600 million agreement for an NRL expansion team in Papua New Guinea. This provides high-profile opportunities for key leader engagement, allows sailors of Pacific Island descent to connect with their heritage communities, and leverages competitive rugby teams, a capability the PRC cannot match, to demonstrate presence and benefit U.S. regional interests.

Captain Renato Scarfi and Captain Gian Carlo Poddighe address the broader alliance challenge in “The Indian Ocean: An Opportunity to Strengthen Alliances and Deter China.” They argue that Western presence in the Indo-Pacific, particularly the Indian Ocean, is essential for commercial and energy survival, especially for southern European countries vital to Euro-Mediterranean balance.

A permanent European naval presence in the Indian Ocean should interest the U.S. Navy greatly, potentially freeing American forces to focus on the Pacific in conjunction with Japan, South Korea, and Australia. The Italian Navy’s longstanding presence and Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Centre experience collecting maritime domain awareness data across half the Atlantic, the Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean positions it well for expanded roles. The U.S. Navy can catalyze this cooperation, manifesting strengthened friendship and representing a key deterrence factor while improving burden-sharing.

The Human Dimension of Naval Power

Throughout the series, contributors emphasize that platforms and concepts mean nothing without properly trained, educated, and cared-for personnel.

Lieutenant Colonel Steven Bancroft and Major Benjamin Van Horrick’s “The Imperative for Integrated Maritime Operations” discusses how the ARG/MEU team, while remaining vital, proves insufficient against modern threats. Twenty-first-century naval integration requires maritime networks accessing various platforms, sensors, and weapons systems enabling distributed forces to operate in concert. The Task Force 76/3 experiment merging Expeditionary Strike Group capabilities with Marine Expeditionary Brigade expertise demonstrates how integrated command structures enhance responsiveness and lethality. This integration, exemplified by formations like TF-76/3, TF-61/2, and TF-51/5, ensures maritime power projection remains ready for modern demands while maintaining the agility and expeditionary mindset that makes naval forces distinctive.

Jacob Wiencek’s “Three Focus Areas for the New CNO” addresses foundational personnel issues often overshadowed by platform debates.

1. First, physical health: with nearly 70 percent of servicemembers classified as obese or overweight and the Navy exhibiting 20 percent obesity rates, improved food quality and daily physical training must become command priorities at all levels.
2. Second, unifying naval education and training: despite the Education for Seapower report’s promise six years ago, the vision remains incomplete. Re-establishing the Chief Learning Officer position and creating a Naval University to unify efforts would help develop warfighter readiness among officers and enlisted.
3. Third, revamping information warfare: Congress has expressed displeasure over cyberspace being subsumed without resident expertise to leverage specialized skillsets. The CNO should work with Congress to re-create Navy Cyber Forces as a Type Command separated from Navy Information Forces, enabling development of specialized talent necessary for maritime cyber operations.

Ryan Walker addresses industrial workforce in “Revisiting a Modest Proposal for Improving Shipyard Production and Repair Capacity.” While new shipyards won’t open until 2029 at earliest, current facilities concentrate too much work into first shift, creating bottlenecks and diminishing returns.

Walker proposes modified Dupont shift schedules (8-4-2-10) dividing labor pools into two ten-hour shifts across eight-day cycles, with crews working four days on, four days off. This could increase productive hours from 60-76 per week to potentially 140 while improving morale through predictable schedules, attracting new talent, and creating built-in training pipelines where experienced workers mentor new hires. Though requiring buy-in from unions, management, and policymakers, this approach offers realistic solutions rooted in World War II-era production tempo adapted for modern labor realities.

Strategic and Legal Frameworks

Several contributions address broader frameworks within which the Navy operates.

Professor James Kraska’s “Conduct Legal Preparation of the Battlespace” argues the Navy must rebuild capacity to shape international maritime law. From the first Code of Naval Warfare in 1900 through Law of the Sea Convention negotiations in the 1970s, the Navy led in establishing global ocean rules. This influence has greatly diminished as expertise dwindled and other nations, officials, and scholars with different priorities shaped rules for peacetime and armed conflict operations.

Kraska recommends three actions: mandating law of the sea and naval warfare be added to Naval War College core curriculum; engaging purposefully in bilateral and multilateral negotiations to ensure new rules don’t restrain naval commanders; and rebuilding maritime law expertise throughout the force. Legal preparation of the battlespace is not optional—it shapes the operational environment within which future conflicts will be fought.

Richard Mosier addresses a specific capability gap in “Expand the Navy’s Over-the-Horizon Targeting Solutions.” Since Harpoon in the 1970s and original Tomahawk Anti-ship Missile in 1982, over-the-horizon targeting has been insufficient. New weapons like Naval Strike Missile, SM-6 in anti-ship mode, LRASM, and Maritime Strike Tomahawk cannot be fully employed without supporting ISR-T. The Space Force’s Long-Range Kill Chains satellite program offers the Navy dramatic opportunities to improve fleet tactical situational awareness through continuous near-real-time moving target indicator tracks.

However, realizing this potential requires three actions: ensuring fleet requirements and wartime constraints are accepted in LRKC constellation requirements; modernizing MOC and major combatant capabilities for building common tactical pictures with LRKC inputs; and incorporating AI applications supporting rapid command understanding at operational and tactical levels. This investment in ISR-T architecture would help the Navy make the most of latest long-range weapons entering the fleet.

Nicholas Kristof’s “Technical Interoperability in Contested Environments is a Must” identifies a critical tension the Navy must resolve. Interoperability enables coalition and joint forces to share information and coordinate actions—essential when no single nation can address threats alone.

However, contested communications environments remain harsh reality, with adversaries employing electronic warfare, cyberattacks, and anti-access/area denial strategies to disrupt links. The challenge is designing systems that maximize interoperability when conditions permit while remaining effective when communications are degraded.

This demands modular open architectures, distributed C2 models, zero-trust cybersecurity, and bandwidth-efficient protocols sending only minimum bits required. Despite “interoperability” being a buzzword for years, the Navy has been slow to improve, with some recent acquisitions focusing on bandwidth-heavy, headquarters-focused systems doomed to fail in contested environments. Admiral Caudle must provide forceful direction that the acquisition enterprise prioritize systems capable of operating “alone and unafraid when necessary.”

Cognitive and Educational Development

Dr. Roshan Kulatunga’s “Navigate the Future Through Maritime Wisdom” takes the longest historical view in the series, arguing that subtle intellect remains the most essential trait for individuals steering maritime power. Maritime wisdom is cultivated through sustained engagement with centuries of thought from Sun Tzu and Thucydides through Kautilya, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Mahan, Corbett, and others who profoundly influenced strategic evolution. These intellectual traditions encompass not just technical seamanship but political, economic, and military art integrated into comprehensive understanding.

For 21st-century officers and sailors confronting conventional challenges plus piracy, illegal fishing, climate-driven insecurity, cyber threats, and hybrid tactics, understanding this tradition proves vital. Cognitive preparation must be a key CNO consideration for knowledge alone is inadequate without intellect. Prominently embedding these traditions in military education ensures sailors become not just ship operators but custodians of enduring wisdom guiding humanity’s engagement with the sea.

This educational imperative connects to broader themes about how the Navy develops its people. The repeated emphasis on warfighting development, tactical literacy, human-machine teaming, and professional military education reflects recognition that technology and platforms matter far less than the humans employing them. The most advanced systems become liabilities in the hands of poorly trained operators who lack tactical understanding or cannot make sound decisions under pressure. Conversely, well-educated, tactically proficient sailors can maximize the potential of even imperfect platforms.

Synthesis and Path Forward

The “Notes to the New CNO” series reveals remarkable consensus on several key points, despite contributors’ diverse backgrounds and perspectives:

First, the status quo is insufficient. Whether discussing force structure, training, personnel policy, or institutional culture, contributors agree that incremental adjustments will not prepare the Navy for great power competition. The coming decade requires boldness matching the challenges it presents.

Second, tactical literacy matters more than technology. Sophisticated platforms and systems provide advantages only when operators understand the fundamental logic of naval combat. Without this understanding, the Navy cannot make sound decisions about force design, operational concepts, or resource allocation.

Third, resilience trumps exquisiteness. In contested environments against capable adversaries, expensive platforms optimized for permissive conditions become liabilities. The Navy needs forces that can operate when communications are degraded, that present harder targeting problems through dispersion and deception, and that can continue core functions autonomously when disconnected from networks.

Fourth, people remain the decisive factor. Physical health, education, training, command opportunities, career incentives, these human factors determine whether the Navy can execute any operational concept or employ any technology effectively. Platforms are replaceable; institutional knowledge and tactical expertise are not.

Fifth, alliances multiply power but require active cultivation. The Navy cannot meet global demands alone, and coalition operations provide strategic advantages. However, interoperability doesn’t happen automatically—it requires sustained investment in common systems, shared training, sports diplomacy, and persistent engagement.

Sixth, institutional reform is organizational imperative. Administrative overhead that doesn’t directly support warfighting consumes resources and attention that should focus on preparing for combat. Ruthlessly eliminating non-essential requirements isn’t about doing less—it’s about concentrating effort on what matters most.

For Admiral Caudle, these themes suggest several overarching priorities:

• Establish warfighting as the organizing principle. Every decision about platforms, personnel, training, or administration should be evaluated against the standard: does this help us fight and win? The CNO’s voice and authority must consistently reinforce that passing inspections matters far less than defeating adversaries.
• Invest in human capital systematically. Physical fitness, tactical education, technical training, leadership development, and career progression that rewards warfighting contribution—these must receive sustained attention and resources. The Foundry determines Fleet capability.
• Reform warfighting development governance. Creating high-echelon warfighting development command with authority to truly integrate community tactics into fleet-level doctrine would address systematic problems in how the Navy develops forces. This structural change would enable implementing many specific recommendations about training, education, and readiness.
• Accelerate acquisition and fielding timelines for critical capabilities. Whether long-range precision fires, ISR-T architecture, autonomous systems, or cyber capabilities, the Navy cannot wait for perfect solutions. Rapidly fielding good-enough systems and iterating based on fleet feedback beats prolonged development of exquisite platforms that arrive obsolete.
• Cultivate reformers and protect institutional memory. Personnel policy should identify and promote independent-thinking officers willing to challenge orthodoxy. Retaining human factors expertise, establishing chief learning officers, and maintaining specialized communities like cyber warfare operators ensures institutional knowledge persists beyond individual tours.
• Communicate strategic vision persistently. The CNO’s bully pulpit through testimony, documents, speeches, and sustained engagement can shape how the Navy, Congress, and the public understand the service’s role and needs. Articulating powerful vision unifies internal effort while building external support.

The recommendations in this series are not exhaustive, nor do all contributors agree on every point. Some tensions remain unresolved such between building more platforms versus improving existing capabilities, between standardization for interoperability versus specialization for contested environments, between distributing authority and maintaining unified command. These tensions reflect genuine complexity in modern naval warfare, not failures of analysis.

What emerges clearly, however, is that the U.S. Navy stands at an inflection point. Decisions made during Admiral Caudle’s tenure will shape the service significantly, determining whether the fleet can compete effectively with China, maintain global presence, honor commitments to allies, and deter or defeat aggression. The path forward requires courage to make hard choices, wisdom to learn from history and recent operational experience, and commitment to putting warfighting first despite competing demands.