In the September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams seminar, we focused on how the force in being can evolve effectively in the near to mid-term as investments are being made in future force capabilities, most notably the new SSNs.

This means that the services have to deal with three challenges simultaneously or what one might call the three R’s: Re-structuring or redesign, readiness and resilience.

I had a chance to discuss how the Australian Army was dealing with these challenges in a meeting in the office of Lt. General Simon Stuart on September 29, 2024.

Lt. General Stuart underscored:

We must do all three simultaneously. That means that we have to change the way we are set up and the way we work.

Previously, we did our force generation, force modernisation and readiness activities separately. They were three different parts of the force. We had a readiness model where we consumed readiness while we were deployed.

We cannot operate that way anymore, as we did in the so-called ‘wars of choice’.

We start with the consideration that time is the key resource. It is insufficient to invest our time in three different activities and then converge on an operation.

We assign land forces to the Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS), and I give him a level of assurance that these forces are ready and at a clearly defined readiness level. CJOPS assigns the mission and tasks for the particular operation, activity or investment. Now – In a new way of working, I will also assign tasks in support of force generation and force modernization objectives.

When we deploy, whether onshore or offshore, bilaterally or multilaterally, we are going to make the best return on investment we possibly can.

For example, the forward deployed forces working in Indonesia as part of Exercise Super Garuda Shield, worked with a partner, had assigned tasks from CJOPS and me. The tasks from me may be individual and/or collective training objectives, or in support of force modernization. There might be an experiment. They may have new kit, and I might task them to figure out what tactics, techniques and procedures we must adopt to employ and integrate this new kit on operations.

In other words, we are flipping the model from one where we consume readiness when we’re deployed to one where we build readiness while we deployed.

If we are doing that consistently across all operations, activities and investments, and we are doing that at scale, then we start to build readiness across the force.

We cannot afford a model where we have one part of the force at a high state of readiness, and the rest of the force at low levels of readiness. It is very expensive and inefficient. We must be disciplined in understanding the difference between training levels and readiness levels.

I noted that the Army was a crucial force for working partnerships across the region, and frankly, I consider a major contribution of the ADF to enhance its operational  capabilities out to the Solomon Islands. The Army can provide the kind of local knowledge and local partnerships crucial for the defence of Australia and for the region.

Lt General Stuart certainly agreed.

Some of the value of land forces is in presence and persistence, and those relationships you need in terms of placement, access and understanding the situation, the micro terrain, understanding the littorals, understanding the ports and the airports, understanding the language, the local culture. What does normal look like? And how do you detect what’s different? How do you characterise threat?

We then return to a discussion of readiness built as well through a change in the training process.

Lt General Stuart underscored this approach as follows:

We have changed markedly since the so-called ‘wars of choice’. Back then a battle group would go the Combat Training Center and be trained for a specific mission and theater. The trainers provided a full mission profile environment for the specific theater of operation. Today the battle group comes to the training center and is provided with a full mission profile for various operational environments and the Commander trains their unit or formation. That is how we are building readiness now.

We then shifted to the discussion of force structure redesign.

Lt General Stuart emphasized the following:

In terms of force structure redesign, it is 18 months last week since the 2023 Defense Strategic Review. The Army has moved very quickly to execute on our mission and tasks, and our transformation.

In that time, we have rewritten the land domain concept, the land operating concept (which translates the joint or the integrated force concept into the land force component), and translated the Chief of Joint Operations plans into force structure and readiness requirements for the Army.

We have rewritten a number of the subordinate concepts, for example, the special operations concept. We have re-organized the Army. We have changed its disposition, and we are getting after the reorganization of units at brigade and at battlegroup level, changed the way we do operational command and control and the physical footprint and disposition of our formation level headquarters.

We have created a dispersed nodal structure. We understand the bandwidth requirements, the data exchange requirements, the data standards and the architecture needed in order to operate in this manner. How does the Army contribute to and draw upon the combined kill web?

We have been exercising and experimenting over the last four years across northern Australia with the first brigade which is our lead unit for littoral operations. We’ve been doing that across the North of Australia and projecting into the Northwest. We’ve been doing that with our teammates in the Marine Rotational Force-Darwin, and U.S. Army Pacific and specifically with their composite watercraft company.

We have leased civilian stern landing vessels to practice and to experiment and figure out how we’re going to incorporate new weapons, new watercraft, new digital systems in order to meet our operational mission.

It is experimentation with a focus on ‘learn by doing’ and builds readiness in the process.

We are redesigning the Army in a very practical way. And the way that our soldiers have embraced innovation from the ground up to solve operational problems is just phenomenal.

It’s a work in progress, but it’s moving quickly, and we are working with every partner, whether industry, allies or the other services to get after these problems. In that way, the redesign turns upside down the capability development and delivery process.

We used to start with the major system, let’s say watercraft. We then built some facilities, we trained some people, we did some Operational Test and Evaluation, and then we fielded the system. That process would traditionally take about a decade for a major system.

One of the requirements of the 2023 Defence Strategic Review is to change the way that the Government, Defence and the other agencies do acquisition. While we wait for those changes to occur, we’re doing what we can with what we have and taking that approach already.

For example, the very last thing to be delivered for the littoral maneuver capability will be the watercraft. We’ll have the doctrine, the concepts, the tactics, techniques and procedures already adopted.

We will already have adopted different structures, different ways of working, and different equipment sets to support how our formations fight.

The third piece, which you asked about, was resilience. We are not going to fight alone nor are we going to sustain ourselves on our own. We are working with small and medium enterprises, Australian enterprises notably, as well as the large primes we are associated with, to build the magazine depth and effectors we need for today and tomorrow’s fight, particularly when it comes to long-range strike.

The other aspect to resilience is what I call ‘adaptive reuse’. In other words, what do we have that can be reused in different ways – perhaps with a technical inject? Because you go with the kit you’ve got in a ‘fight tonight’ situation.

How can we use our extant kit in different ways through the application of technology or by integrating it into a human-machine team?

We are building an ecosystem that fosters innovation from the ground up, adding resources to it, and we’re getting some great results.

We have completely changed the mission of our 1st Armored Regiment which was previously a tank regiment, but it is now the lead trace for applied modernisation in our Army. It is the center of a network of industry, military and academia focused on solving today’s problems by putting new kit in the hands of our soldiers and enabling them to figure out how they are going to best use it operationally.

Featured Image: Defence Advisor, Colonel Corey Shillabeer, Malaysian Chief of Army General Datuk Muhammad Hafizuddeain bin Jantan, Chief of Australian Army, Lieutenant General Simon Stuart AO DSC, and Malaysian Defence Advisor to Australia Colonel Mahammad Fazli pose for a group photo, during the bilateral engagement program as part of the Chief of Army Symposium 2024 in Melbourne, Victoria.

September 12, 2024

Credit: Australian Department of Defence

Also, see the following:

The Perspective of Lt General Stuart Simon: Presentation to Land Forces 24

By Robbin Laird

The panel on combat mass was chaired by the former Air Commander Australia, AIRMSHL (Retd) Darren Goldie who provided an overview to the discussion.

AIRMSHL (Retd) Darren Goldie introduced the panel with a clear overview regarding the challenge.

This is how introduced the subject:

The definition of combat mass is widely agreed as overwhelming combat power at the decisive place and time. And it’s worth remembering that this is about massing combat effects, rather than massing combat forces.

It’s worth remembering that this concept is not new. To quote Clausewitz On War, the center of gravity is where mass is concentrated. We hear a lot of negativity in Canberra: There’s not enough money, there’s not enough people, there’s not enough strategy, there’s not enough drones, there’s not enough everything.

We need to uplift this conversation and talk about the great things that are happening in the fighting parts of our force. Between the two speakers, they command 40% of the Australian Defence Force, and it’s a rare opportunity to have the two operational commanders in front of you and talking about how they are thinking through the most complex problems facing the operational force.

After the presentation by Admiral Smith, the current Air Commander Australia, AVM Glen Braz, then spoke. Let me start with his presentation and then unpack some of his thoughts to discuss the challenge of ramping up the capabilities of the ready force.

AVM Braz highlighted a number of key themes in his presentation:

Building combat mass is front and center of all of our efforts across Air Command and Air Force at the moment, and I like to think of it across a few layers. And those layers are broadly the technology layer, the human layer, the operational layer, and finally, and perhaps most importantly for us in this context, is the organizational layer.

From a technology layer perspective, there is no doubt we need the enhancements of proliferated UAS and UAV systems that are collaborative in human and machine teaming, and we are working to build the basic steps of bringing that into service as soon as we can, pending the outcomes of the good work across MQ 28 and other similar systems.

I do need off-board weapons systems, and I do need off board sensor systems as part of a mass force.

We need to be able to concentrate massive force at the time and place of our choosing. And it’s going to be a relative measure, one that will be undoubtedly constrained by the physics of our force which remains small.

I absolutely need UAS for combat effects, but I also need them for survivable distributed logistics…

In developing agile operations concepts and to orchestrate the operation of the force, I need to understand what’s going on across the force.  Situational awareness and resilience of communications are fundamental to how we achieve the tactical and operational effects that we need… to be able to synchronize and harmonize the mass effect that we need at the right time and place.

Cost effectiveness in terms of affordable and attritable systems need to be part of that concept.

We are outstanding at building long duration projects with exquisite platforms… But they’re not perfect, and they need ongoing investment. They need ongoing sustainment and upgrade to remain relevant, because even the major systems like F 35 need updates, and they need to be brought up to the latest standard.

It’s no different for the enhanced force in being, where we need to embrace the concept of more consumable capabilities that are more quickly adapted into the battle space and that can give us affordable and rapid mass if and when we need it.

And I’ll talk more to how we get after doing some of that in terms of manufacturing and adaptation, that is going to be key to generating and sustaining mass. And I have already mentioned that the ongoing ability to remain aware of the battle space where our own forces are in the distributed model will be fundamental to what we do.

If I look at the human layer, we have scaled up pilot training and the number of graduates. I’m actually at the point where I have to throttle the number of graduates for air force through the pilot training system at the moment, because I need to be able to absorb them downstream, and I need to sustain and operate them downstream as part of a broader force.

And while I can grow elements of the workforce as directed by the national defense strategy, I need to buy and grow all parts of the system with a degree of proportion or the system will be misshapen and will fail as a result.

So pilot training is a success story for us, but equally, we’ve ramped up our ability to scale initial military training and initial employment training across the air domain. There’s workforce allocations available across the department and in the air domain and I’m confident that we can success. We are attracting more people than ever. People want to come and join our Air Force and the ADF writ large. And I want to leverage that, and I would absolutely welcome the apportionment to the air domain to let me to continue to grow in the right shape and in the right proportion…

We’re working very hard to get better at how we apportion and appropriate relevant or minimum viable skills to the workforce…

The human layer is mindset. For example, with regards to the Combat Support Group, we are changing the mindset of that organization to be one that acknowledges that everyone is in the fight, not one wing over another, not a garrison wing versus a deployable wing, but the whole of Combat Support Group is adapting to the mindset that they will be needed to go forward to generate the mass and the resilience and the depth in the force to operate across the bases and places that we need them to function…

When you’re a small force with outstanding capabilities, you need the absolute most from your people, and you want to generate mass in time and place of your choosing, then having the ability to surge key parts of that workforce will be fundamental…

The design of how we would cluster and disaggregate and reaggregate is something that’s a core activity, mostly led by the Air Warfare Center, and I’ll come back to them in the organizational mindset in a moment, but they are working on the ideas of deception and and dispersal and how to maximize how to be survivable, including hardening and other elements that are very important to us.

Fundamental to all of this will be interoperability with our key allies and partners, and while we can generate interesting agile operations mindsets, unless they are well integrated and nested with our partners then our ability to collaboratively generate mass will suffer. I’m working very closely with Pacific Air Forces as one example, to enhance our interoperability across the c2 and across the weapon system that is the air operations center.

Finally, let me discuss the organizational layer. I want to see a pivot in our defense organization that is underpinned by what has been often mentioned this morning, namely a sense of urgency… I would love to see that permeate more broadly across the department.

The pivot that we need to take is one that moves away from the mindset of long term, very large, long duration, low risk, in some ways, projects to deliver exquisite capabilities, and one that is more adept, structured, organized, and has the risk tolerance to take on short term consumable capabilities that can rapidly and with relevance uplift the force in being.

That might take some time and will take commitment from across the organization to achieve that sense of urgency. [For the RAAF, one way to do so] is to leverage my Air Warfare Center which is a crucible for creativity and ideas and where we can bring new technologies into the force quickly. We can experiment with them. We can apply them to great training scenarios, and we can inform a rapid capability cycle inside the system in ways that will be tangible and meaningful for the enhanced force in being and help us generate mass….

Let me unpack some of these thoughts and make some comments.

As Air Commander Australia, Braz is charged with being ready for the fight tonight. He must be focused on a sense of urgency. One area where a lack of a sense of urgency is evident across the three AUKUS countries is getting at buying and deploying military kit and solution sets that are gap fillers.

Last year I interviewed a senior U.S. Admiral who put this challenge very well:

Rehearsal of operations sheds light on our gaps. if you are rehearsing, you are writing mission orders down to the trigger puller, and the trigger puller will get these orders and go, I don’t know what you want me to do. Where do you want me to be? Who am I supposed to check in with? What do you want me to kill when I get there? What are my left and right limits? Do I have target engagement authority?

This then allows a better process of writing effective mission orders. so that we’re actually telling the joint force what we want them to do and who’s got the lead at a specific operational point. By such an approach, we are learning. We’re driving requirements from the people who are actually out there trying to execute the mission, as opposed to the war gamers who were sitting on the staff trying to figure out what the trigger pullers should do.

We focused in that conversation on the need for the ready forces to be able to order short term capabilities to fill gaps. This will become crucial as we work the payloads on air and maritime autonomous systems to fill gaps.

Or put another, a sense of urgency at this time in history requires an ability for greater acquisition authority to shift to the ready force.

And the interview I did with this Admiral also highlighted that the U.S. and its allies working together could shape a division of labor to fill gaps in addition to acquisition of things, but this required training and operative force redesign among the forces working together.

This is what the Admiral emphasized:

We need to build a centralized planning organization in the Pacific, that has intelligence, future plans, future ops, current ops, ISR, logistics, all of those things included in the discussions. And it’s made up of all of anybody who has desires to participate. This will allow us to understand what allied objectives are, and what their limits are, too, and helps us to identify the barriers such as foreign disclosure, so we can start to break down some of those barriers.

We can recognize weaknesses in our operational forces, the gaps as we have discussed, and we can focus on closing those gaps ourselves or by interchangeability with an ally. There are places where allies have capability that we do not have which can fill the bill.

Another point raised by the AIRMSHL was the need to fund and execute in a timely fashion the upgrades necessary for the core combat programs. This is especially important as air platforms have become software upgradeable, and ways need to found not only to fund but to accelerate where possible software upgradeability.

For the ready force, there is an increasing need to be able to operate with significant software transient advantage, something that has been clearly demonstrated in the battles over electromagnetic spectrum in the Russian-NATO war in Ukraine.

A final point which I will highlight is training. The relationship between training and experimentation and inclusion of the outcomes of this effort INTO the ready force rather than on the conveyer belt of science projects for some future force is central to enabling a sense of urgency to lead actually to enhanced capabilities for the ready force.

Several years ago, I talked with Air Vice-Marshal (Retired) John Blackburn about this challenge.

This is how we discussed the challenge in this 2017 interview:

During my visit to Canberra, I had a chance to discuss with Air Vice-Marshal (Retired) John Blackburn how the training approach could be expanded to encompass and guide development.

“We know that we need to have an integrated force, because of the complexity of the threat environment will will face in the future. The legacy approach is to buy bespoke pieces of equipment, and then use defined data links to connect them and to get as much integration as we can AFTER we have bought the separate pieces of equipment. This is after-market integration, and can take us only so far.”

“This will not give us the level of capability that we need against the complex threat environment we will face. How do we design and build in integration? This is a real challenge, for no one has done so to date?”

Laird: “And the integration you are talking about is not just within the ADF but also with core allies, notably the United States forces. And we could emphasize that integration is necessary given the need to design a force that can go up an adversary’s military choke points, disrupt them, have the ability to understand the impact and continue on the attack.

This requires an ability to put force packages up against a threat, prosecute, learn and continue to put the pressure on.

“Put bluntly, this is pushing SA to the point of attack, combat learning within the operation at the critical nodes of attack and defense and rapidly reorganizing to keep up the speed and lethality of attack.

“To achieve such goals, clearly requires force package integration and strategic direction across the combat force.

“How best to move down this path?”

Blackburn: “We have to think more imaginatively when we design our force. A key way to do this is to move from a headquarters set requirements process by platform, to driving development by demonstration.

“How do you get the operators to drive the integration developmental piece?

“The operational experience of the Wedgetail crews with F-22 pilots has highlighted ways the two platforms might evolve to deliver significantly greater joint effect. But we need to build from their reworking of TTPs to shape development requirements so to speak. We need to develop to an operational outcome; not stay in the world of slow-motion requirements development platform by platform.”

Laird: “Our visit this year to the Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center at Fallon highlighted the crucial need to link joint TTP development with training and hopefully beyond that to inform the joint integration piece.

“How best to do that from your point of view”?

Blackburn: “Defence is procuring a Live/Virtual/Constructive (LVC) training capability.

“But the approach is reported to be narrowly focused on training. We need to expand the aperture and include development and demonstration within the LVC world.

“We could use LVC to have the engineers and operators who are building the next generation of systems in a series of laboratories, participate in real-world exercises.

“Let’s bring the developmental systems along, and plug it into the real-world exercise, but without interfering with it.

“With engagement by developers in a distributed laboratory model through LVC, we could be exploring and testing ideas for a project, during development. We would not have to wait until a capability has reached an ‘initial’ or ‘full operating’ capability level; we could learn a lot along the development by such an approach that involves the operators in the field.

“The target event would be a major classified exercise. We could be testing integration in the real-world exercise and concurrently in the labs that are developing the next generation of “integrated” systems.

“That, to my mind, is an integrated way of using LVC to help demonstrate and develop the integrated force. We could accelerate development coming into the operational force and eliminating the classic requirements setting approach.

“We need to set aside some aspects of the traditional acquisition approach in favor of an integrated development approach which would accelerate the realisation of integrated capabilities in the operational force.”

 Let me close by examining more closely the AVM’s comments on off-boarding.

When I worked for Secretary Wynne as a consultant beginning in 2004, I was focused primarily on the challenge of building a F-35 global enterprise. Wynne often made the point that a major problem for fighter pilots with fifth generation was that often they would not be delivering the kill shot, for their role was to identify targets for other shooters.

The off-boarding of weapons and sensors is at the heart of the kill web force, whether manned or inclusive of unmanned or autonomous systems.

This strategic shift to off-boarding is what allows one to consider massing force from different locations, from different platforms, from the joint force or the coalition force.

But how does the emergence of off-boarding affect the future of platform acquisition or the design of “next generation” core manned platforms?

In other words, adding new autonomous systems is not simply additive but goes to the core of weapons design and I would argue will change significantly future force design. That is why I would argue that adding autonomous systems to a ready force which is built around a kill web con-ops of off-boarding is not simply a gap filler but a strategic shift in next generation platform design.

Featured Image: AIRMSHL Braz with Rear Admiral Smith at the September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation Seminar.

By Robbin Laird

When you are a medium-sized force and not adding a lot of manned platforms in the next five years, how to you enhance combat mass?

Or put another way how does the ADF as a ready force create mass effects with what they must fight with tonight and what they can plus up with in the short to mid-term?

This was the focus of the panel chaired by AIRMSHL (Retd) Darren Goldie with participation from the commander of the Royal Australian Navy, RADM Christopher Smith and the commander of the Royal Australian Air Force, AVM Glen Braz.

In this piece, I will deal with RADM Smith’s remarks and in the next with AVM Braz’s remarks.

Let us start with RADM Smith’s remarks and then unpack them.

Considerations of agility are paramount to our force structure. But how is this achieved framed against the scope and the pace of today’s military challenges, while preserving the flexibility to respond to contingencies of climate change and mass migration>

How do we generate the necessary mass to deliver on this broad remit of diplomatic constabulary and warfighting missions?

Generating mass will continue to challenge us, but I will attempt to articulate specific methods I think can assist. I’ll focus particularly on generating mass by increasing survivability of our forces, generating mass through partnerships, both with industry and in our region, and finally, generating mass by developing multistage force structures that add scalability, resilience and agility relative to our traditional conceptualisation of mass.  Today, the challenge we face pairs near persistent, wide area surveillance capabilities with advanced, long range precision strike.

Moreover, the volume and pace of the PRCs naval program has altered the landscape in which we must conceive of mass. Collectively, these challenges require us to reappraise our methods of confronting that challenge.

The first way in which today’s RAN in is able to build combat mass and depth by incorporating distribution forces operating across the maritime domain aim to defeat our adversary’s ability to find, fix, track, target and engage Australian forces.

This methodology seeks to distribute our forces in less detectable, less targetable means that present no clear center of gravity to the opposition. This approach eschews optimizing defeat of the adversary’s missiles in lieu of defeating their ability to effectively employ them.

Distributed forces are also able to match their firepower across a wider area compared to denser concentrations.

In this way, our forces become more survivable and better able to safeguard our maritime communications and trade. Echoing the wisdom of the classic theorists, distributed maritime operations places emphasis on massing effects vice platforms to generate the necessary depth of lethal force at the decisive point.

Distribution as a core concept of our operations therefore seeks to manage a defensive problem while seizing an offensive opportunity.

But there is tension between greater distribution and effective c2. Distributed forces will need to be supported by scalable and flexible c2, elements able to operate, either ashore or afloat and remain connected by resilient, low signature, redundant data networks that can withstand the contest for spectrum.

To support our survivability and decision advantage, we must dominate the various spectra in which our forces operate, employing techniques of deception and maneuver to install doubt in the mind of our adversaries.

The contest for spectrum will impact the wider contest for decision making advantage critical to our ability to dictate the tempo of conflict.

Together, these concepts will enable the RAN to achieve electromagnetic mass simultaneously flooding the spectrum and manipulating the pace of decision making of our adversaries.  Decision superiority and the ability to dictate the scale and tempo of operations will thus be generated through distribution and manipulation of the perception of mass that we present to our adversary.

This brings me to the second point on how we will deliver mass. The concepts I’ve outlined will require leveraging our critical partnerships across industry and across borders.

The pace and scale of change is perhaps nowhere where more obvious than in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Of particular note is the ability of Ukrainian forces to generate a sea denial capability against the Black Sea Fleet through employment of remote and autonomous systems delivered by industry partners to fill a critical capability gap for Ukraine.

The full impact of what these developments may mean for potential great war conflict in our own region may not be fully known yet it appears there are. Opportunities available for their employment as a complicating feature of the contested physical and informational battle space.

The potential of these systems to raise the noise floor for our opposition may go well beyond their presence in the physical domain to what signatures can be synthetically manipulated and what synergy may be found with loitering munitions and decoys.

The full realization of these capabilities to generate electromagnetic mass will necessitate the type of technology and information sharing with our partners that AUKUS can deliver and will be reliant on our continued engagement with domestic industry partners to push the boundaries of what is viable.

Finally, pairing the two points above, the RAN will seek to generate mass by reshaping its multistage system that leverages the potential of modern, uncrewed systems and spectrum manipulation with the long range understood benefits of distributed forcesin the maritime domain.

A multistage system can be understood as a combat force that maximizes the versatility, adaptability, survivability and controllability of multiple layers of the fleet and maritime forces.

The combat power of a stage system is simultaneously concentrated and distributed to generate mass in the battle space that commanders will leverage to dictate and scale the the tempo of combat.

Importantly, a multistage system requires all components to be defeated in order to negate its combat power. This increases the resilience of the systems, degradation and attrition.

The next evolution in a multistage combat systems will almost certainly involve increased reach, persistence and agility by inclusion of remote and autonomous systems that are able to pair with or operate independently from their associated crew platforms.

Future multistage systems will incorporate adaptability and interchangeability that goes beyond the power of carrier centric forces, as the diminished size and the crewing requirements make this capability available and affordable additions to even frigate and destroyer sized platforms.

But more than just uncrewed systems, future multistage forces will leverage the joint capabilities of distributed land and air assets throughout the maritime environment. The ability of future ground and air forces to contribute essential kinetic, non-kinetic effects to multi domain strike missions in the maritime environment will be essential to improve the economy of effort and generate sufficient precision and firepower at the decisive points.

The conception of mass in modern maritime combat demands clarity in the development of our doctrine and concepts. As past examples have shown us, challenges Australia faces today are not unique, and our thinking around combat, mass and depth should be informed by previous incarnations of this conundrum. We so we must again today, reconceive our thinking around mass.

Our fleet has embarked on this journey, but full clarity around the destination remains ambiguous.

Concepts of distribution and spectrum manipulation will support our requirement for decision superiority. Uncrewed systems will add complexity to the adversary’s situational awareness while simultaneously refining our own.

Pairing these ideas as a network of scalable and adaptable teams to form multistage systems will build necessary depth, versatility and resilience.

Yet the final product remains to be fully conceived, articulated and engineered to success.

Engagement with industry and coalition partners will remain pivotal to delivering this end state.  Along the way, we will require no small amount of innovation and an appetite to deal with the concomitant risk.  

What makes this presentation so interesting is that it combines ways to enhance the current force going forward with the end state which he sees as necessary for the Royal Australian Navy. In the near to mid-term, one needs to enhance the ability of the fleet to be augmented with the additional of uncrewed systems but do so by having significant creativity in creating combat clusters afloat which can leverage ground and air capabilities as well supporting distributed fleet operations.

While not talking directly about ship building his emphasis on mass effect is upon what he calls a multi-stage system or what I would call a maritime kill web. The idea is simply that through ISR, C2 and Counter ISR, the maritime maneuver force is able to mask, and to integrate with joint or coalition forces to deliver the mass effects necessary to confuse, mis-direct and defeat adversary forces.

It is really about building kill web maneuver forces. In a recent interview I did with LtGen (Retired) General Heckl, the recent head of the USCM combat development command underscored that what Force Design for the USMC is really all about was creation of a maneuver force able to operate against a force with better ISR and significant long-range precision strike.

And in that interview, we focused on what I see is a major unsolved problem – the need to use autonomous systems now as part of the maneuver force and how to begin solving the ability of manned and autonomous systems to work effectively in crafting the required capabilities of a successful maneuver force.

One problem he highlighted was the following:

“How we effectively communicate with autonomous systems is the key to using them effectively. We don’t want rogue robots in the battlespace.  And bandwidth is a key challenge. How do I work with multiple autonomous and manned systems? How do I communicate? How do I exercise fire control? And how do I provide the kind of interactive support and guidance with the Ground Combat element as it works the kind of offensive-defensive maneuver required in the conditions of being threatened by adversarial long-range fires and capable surveillance systems?”

This is a key element for working the kind of multistage system Smith is talking about. And this is not a long-range problem. It is part of the challenge in the next 2-5 years and as it is worked, the scope and nature of the future force will change significantly in ways no future force planner can now accurately predict.

This raises what I think is a key conundrum: If the force structure in being is modernized through the digital enablers for an integrated force –- C2, ISR, and Counter-ISR – and autonomous systems which are also software upgradeable payloads, how then do you know what exquisite platforms to buy for the future?

Featured Image: RADM Christopher Smith speaking to the Sir Richard Williams Foundation September 26, 2024

General Kevin Schneider, Commander of U.S. Pacific Air Forces and AVM Mark Flewin, Air Officer Commanding 1 Group Royal Air Force both spoke at the September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation Seminar.

The first presentation was by a video recording and the second was an in person presentation after the long flight from the UK. Together, the two provided insights into USAF and RAF thinking about the way ahead with allied airpower.

General Schneider underscored the close working relationship between the U.S. and Australia over the years and provided several examples of recent collaborative activity.

He focused on the recent Pitch Black exercise which was especially notable because of the expansion of partners in the Pacific region who participated.

Exercises like Pitch Black are not only increasing our interoperability, but they are helping our allied and partner nations rapidly to grow their capabilities. This in turn, helps secure their nations and provide stability to the region.

Your leadership in that exercise was evident, and the work accomplished there reached audiences around the world. You brought in so many firsts, the deployment of the Philippine Air Wing, our partners in Papua, New Guinea, and you worked tirelessly to bring in critical NATO allies from France, Spain, Germany, Italy and the UK.

NATO recognizes the importance of the Indo-Pacific and understands the impact it has on Euro Atlantic security. They also know where to find world class training with allies like you as well.

He then when on to highlight Australian cooperation in Filipino training as well as a key contribution to the common defence in the region.

I found quite interesting his spending time discussing the E-7 as well. When I first came to Australia in 2014 and then subsequently visiting the RAAF Wedgetail squadron, it was clear that the ADF had something special in the Wedgetail. But the United States and the United Kingdom even though looking for AWACS replacements, were slow to embrace the Wedgetail option. But now they have.

He noted:

The RAAF’s significant focus and role in air domain awareness stems from your nation’s early investment in the E-7 Wedgetail. It is a critical asset in our most advanced high-end training. The US Air Force Weapons School hosted the RAAF’s No. 2 Squadron for the first time as part of the weapons school integration phase in May and as part of the modernization of our own fleet.

We are excited to see the expansion of the exchange program, because now No. 2 Squadron is a multinational, integrated unit whose regular participation in global exercises with joint partners is a must, because we are developing and testing E-7 tactics with their air superiority and support for maritime strike forces. We wouldn’t be able to accomplish any of this without the genius of our collective airmen who are doing wonders at the tactical edge.

The General underscored: Australia adds immense value at the cutting edge of our most advanced tactics, techniques and procedures.

Quite obviously, the USAF needs to operate very differently in the evolving contested combat environment. And in this effort, it is working hand in glove with the RAAF.

This is how PACAF put it:

We must reorganize ourselves to tackle the high-end fights in the future, where we must be lethal while surviving in an anti-access area denial environment. We are learning to operate from austere locations, testing critical capabilities like our bomber Task Force and stressing our agile combat employment concept through a series of complex exercises at scope and at scale.

Through tremendous support from you, we’ve increased the rotational presence of U.S. capabilities in Australia across all domains, ensuring our forces work as interchangeable teams who are efficient during peacetime and lethal and survivable during wartime…

We want to find more ways to operate from different locations around the region to drive solutions to logistical challenges and to conduct rehearsals like hot pit refueling events and integrated flying operations to make our footprints even more lean and agile.

The bomber task forces, and our strategic aircraft play a critical role in our collective ability to support counter-maritime missions, something that we must do because the rise of competitors in both the Indo, Pacific and European theaters has brought anti-ship capability back to the forefront of the ASW mission. The bomber fleet is finding innovative ways to integrate modern weapons capabilities to increase survivability in an anti-access area denial environment and to support the joint fight.

He then discussed Agile Combat Employment and immediate ways ahead on training for this capability.

Next summer, we’ll partner with like-minded nations to host a large scale exercise to test agile combat employment at speed and scale in the Pacific that will coincide with the Talisman Sabre exercise, and as we anticipate the exercise will include fifth generation fighters, ISR, C-2, airlift and air fueling, and all the enablers to test our ability to deploy from the continental United States into theater to regional hubs in the first and second island chains.

We will disperse, aggregate, disaggregate, and recover aircraft. It is a highly complex logistical challenge in terms of access, spacing and overflight, maritime domain awareness and maritime strike capabilities, as well as generating and sustaining the force, making it even more challenging, we are adapting this new operational scheme of maneuver under significant fiscal constraints, a challenge that we all face as exciting as all these things are, I will never say that what we are doing is fast enough, that we have integrated enough, that we have prepared enough, or that we are ready enough.

AVM Mark Flewin then provided an RAF perspective on the way ahead.

He conveyed the sense of urgency as the West faces increasing threats and challenges. He looked back at World War II to remind the audience of the cost of the failure of deterrence.

But his presentation underscored the need for the West to get it right in terms of deterrence and although there is clear progress in the West’s capabilities, the tenor of his remarks that as an enterprise, we need to get better in order to ensure that deterrence prevails.

He underscored what he saw as five critical challenges that needed to be met on an urgent basis. The first is the need to generate greater combat mass.

He noted: We need to have the capacity to scale. It doesn’t need to be exquisite in terms of combat systems though it can be. It needs to be on the right side of the cost curve. It can be cheap.

We’ve seen from Ukraine that there’s a heavy mix of exquisite and non-exquisite capability that is ultimately delivering effects. But we need to absolutely partner with industry to be able to do that.

The second is enhancing our ability to fight tonight. The majority of the equipment we will have in 10 years we already have so we need to engage in continuous force improvement and training to ensure our force in readiness is at the level needed for deterrence

He underscored: We need to work together to optimize and get the most out of our platforms.

We’re working that in the Royal Air Force through a program called Optimize. It’s seen significant benefits already. We’ve seen the 20% improvement in availability on some platforms.

With Typhoon, for example, we’ve managed to remove 750,000 maintenance hours from that platform based on some data analysis and a risk aware approach which means we get more availability, and our mechanics are available for other tasks.

And it’s really important that we continue to spiral develop these platforms. They are going to be the baseline of our capability up to 2040 and they need to be ready to deliver.

The third is to ensure that we can adapt rapidly to technological change and to be able to incorporate relevant combat innovations being unveiled in the regional wars we see in front of us.

He put it this way:

My next point is on the criticality of embracing technological change. We talked about the electromagnetic environment today. What we witnessed in eastern Ukraine is that it’s an absolutely denied electromagnetic environment, we need to get around how we work in that environment, how we evolve in that environment. How we can bring operational advantage in that environment. We also need to not be afraid to fail and test and fail fast. It’s something we’ve worked on a lot in the UK. Naturally, we’ve moved away from it because we’ve been risk averse.

The fourth is the challenge of overcoming risk aversion and become more agile and capable of rapid innovation in our tactics and warfighting skills.

AVM Flewin emphasized:

We need to continue to change our mindset and make sure that we’re ready for the fight tomorrow. You might throw back at me that our processes aren’t efficient enough. We procure very slowly, our commercial process isn’t proficient enough.

We’ve learned a lot about that through Ukraine. We’ve adapted our process with industry. And I’d argue now that we are, we are getting after it, but there’s more to do. And we clearly need to transition from risk aversion to risk aware and objective focus.

Note: This is what the RAF has to say about the E-7:

The E-7 Wedgetail AEW Mk1 is the RAF’s successor to the E-3D Sentry and will provide a 5th Generation Airborne Early Warning and Control capability (AEW&C), with a Multi-role Electronically Scanned Array (MESA), that is interoperable and interchangeable with key allies.

The Wedgetail is the most technologically advanced AEW&C system available and will provide UK Defence with eyes in the sky, for at least the next 20 years, to see far beyond ground-based systems and fighter aircraft sensors. Capable of generating a 360-degree view of the airspace and as a force multiplier, it will provide advanced warning of approaching threats to enable commanders to fight effectively in complex environments.   

Already in service and proven with the Royal Australian, Republic of South Korean and Turkish Air Forces, the UK’s Wedgetail will serve under No 8 Squadron. It will be located at RAF Lossiemouth alongside the Poseidon Maritime Patrol aircraft, both of which are based upon the widely used Boeing 737 Next Generation airframe, allowing the RAF to take advantage of synergies between the fleets.

CAPABILITY

Capable of fulfilling a wide range of missions, Wedgetail can provide high fidelity and accurate target information utilising its cutting-edge MESA sensor housed in a distinctive fin on the spine of the aircraft. The sensor, combined with an advanced communications suite, enables the crew to provide tactical control to other assets via voice and tactical data link whilst enhancing the situational awareness of Joint Force commanders. 

The mission crew will utilise the ten state-of-the-art workstations to deliver a multi-domain battle management capability: providing situational awareness to other assets, directing offensive and defensive forces whilst maintaining continuous surveillance of an area. The Wedgetail significantly enhances the capability of friendly combat aircraft and warships, enabling their missions and increasing their survivability in a hostile environment.

The featured Photo: AVM Flewin presenting at the September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation Seminar.