By Robbin Laird

As the Australian government sorts through its way ahead for the defence of Australia, the creation of a fifth-generation air force is a key element providing a foundation for innovations in the decade ahead.

But it can be forgotten too quickly the central role of airpower for a continental nation down under facing an adversary seeking to enhance their ability to pressure choke points and reach deeper into the Pacific.

Integrated air and naval power is at the heart of what needs to be done, but the challenges of sorting out what kind of navy to build, the air element has a much clearer path. Leverage its fifth-generation foundation, build out the weapons enterprise, add autonomous systems and new basing flexibilities.

From this standpoint the future can be seen in the past in terms of how the ADF evolved into a fifth-generation force. During my years of visiting Australia, I had the chance to watch the RAAF bring a new air combat system into service and then maturity, namely, the E-7.

This was a trail blazing effort by the RAAF which has led the way in many respects with regard to a new generation of air battle management C2 aircraft, and one which enters into the world of tron warfare given the software evolution driven by the Commonwealth’s partnership with Northrup Grumman.

And during my time in Australia since 2014, I followed this story closely and visited the Wedgetail base often. But that story starts with recognizing that if you do not use a capability built around software upgradeability, you cannot develop it into what you want that capability to become.

I discussed this approach with Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown in 2015:

‘Testers can only do so much.

‘Once an aircraft is functional you need to get in the hand of the operators, pilots, crews and maintainers. They will determine what they think the real priorities for the evolution of the aircraft, rather than a test engineer or pilot.

‘And you get the benefit of a superior platform from day one.

‘When I became Deputy Chief of Air Force, the Wedgetail was being slowed down by the Kabuki effort to arrange specification lines for the aircraft. There was much hand-wringing amongst the program staff as to how it didn’t meet the specifications that we had put out.

‘I said, “Let’s just give it to the operators.”

‘And the advantage of basically giving the aircraft to the operators was what the test community and the engineers thought were real limitations the operators did not. Sometimes it took the operators two days to figure a work around.

‘And the real advantage of the development was that they would prioritize what was really needed to be fixed from the operational point of view, not the testing point of view.

‘In other words, you can spend a lot of time trying to get back to the original specifications.

‘But when you actually give it to the operators, they actually figure out what’s important or what isn’t important and then use the aircraft in real world operations.’

I then wrote an article later in 2015 which built upon his argument and looked at the projected future for this software defined air battle management system:

“The underlying story of the approach to introduce the Wedgetail and then how the platform is being modernized highlights why the program is trailblazing in many ways. When I visited 2nd Squadron during the first quarter of 2014, I was impressed with the enthusiasm and intelligence of the Squadron and their approach towards innovation.

“But when I got back to Washington DC, the reaction to my experience was met with complete lack of interest or surprise. As the editor of a leading defense magazine put it: “You mean the troubled program; I thought it had been cancelled.”

“With a second trip to Australia under my belt this Summer and a chance to talk with the RAAF’s Surveillance and Response Group as well as Air Marshal Davies, Air Vice Marshal MacDonald and the recently retired Air Marshal Brown, I began to understand how the “troubled” program had not only been “salvaged” but how it was “salvaged” put in the trailblazing path.

“The Wedgetail has brought to the fight, unique battle management capabilities. To understand what they mean, one has to look at some of the Wedgetail’s core capabilities.

“Most fundamentally, the Wedgetail does not operate like an AWACs. The AWACs works in tracks directing the air battle but does so with a 360-degree rotating radar. It is the hub of a hub and spoke air combat system.

“With the coming of the fifth-generation aircraft, there is a need for air battle management, but not of the hub and spoke kind. And with the challenge of operating in the expanded battlespace, it is not simply a question of management of air assets, but management of the assets operating in the expanded battlespace, regardless if they are air, naval or ground….

“It is designed with the reach rather than range approach characteristic of fifth generation systems; the MESA radar can be dialed up in terms of energy and focused in terms of direction on priority scan areas.

“As one Northrop Grumman engineer put it: “There is a fundamental shift operationally in terms of how one uses the Wedgetail versus the AWACS. You no longer are limited or defined by a 360-degree rotator.

“You are able to configure how much power you want to put into your radar reach; it is configurable to the mission.  The integrated IFF and radar functionality also allows the system to reach much greater than other systems into the battlespace to shape greater situational awareness in the battlespace. You can put the energy in the mission area where you have the highest priority.”

“This allows much greater reach, and is also part of enhanced survivability as well.

“This means as well that it can act on demands identified by deployed fifth generation and other aircraft with regard to the areas where extended reach and focus for surveillance needs to be directed.”

This is the spirit and the approach that got the RAAF and ADF into a good place; clearly needed in the new rebuild approach is a similar spirit and approach of developing capability by use such as the plus ups to the F-35 fleet, leveraging the new Triton force, initially deploying autonomous systems and employing new weapons in the force.

The RAAF head Air Marshal Chipman underscores such an approach in a recent interview with Brendan Nicholson of ASPI. This is what he underscored about the approach:

“How difficult is it to evolve a capability once it’s operational?

“That’s the new model, says Chipman.

“The RAAF has a steady drumbeat refreshing the capabilities of platforms such as the F-35A Lightning II, the Growler electronic attack aircraft and the Super Hornet by upgrading software, hardware and firmware.

‘That ensures that we’re on the leading edge of technology. We must do that because our potential adversaries are not standing still. They’re delivering new missiles and other capabilities into inventory, new electronic-warfare systems. You’ve got this cat-and-mouse game where we need to continue to make sure our systems can compete and win.’

But the blunt fact is that airpower is the key multi-domain enabler but obviously requiring the further development of integrated offense and defense for the ADF as an operational force in its extended region.

Featured Image: An Air Force E-7A Wedgetail performs a handling display at Nobby’s Beach during the Newcastle Williamtown Air Show 2023.  Credit: Australian Department of Defence

See also the following:

RAAF Chief Air Marshal Chipman Talks About the Wedgetail Approach

By Robbin Laird

Ed Timperlake and I are working on book to be published next year on MAWTS-1, the unique USMC training center.

As LtGen (Retired) Rudder has noted: “We need to avoid smoke and mirrors. The talking points from a wargame or ideas from force design planners may sound good, but it has to have an operational look. An A plus for your ideas may equal a D for practical execution.

“If the concept or design does not make it through the physics of operational execution, the idea needs to be rejected or seriously modified.

“Giving problems and operational concepts to MAWTS is crucial to working the physics of combat in testing out new tactical approaches.”

My report focuses on the work of MAWTS-1 in 2023.

I interviewed the CO of MAWTS-1, Col Eric Purcell, in April and then visited the command in November after the second WTI of the year. This provided a chance to discuss how MAWTS-1 had progressed in working enhanced force mobility for the USMC within the broader joint force, a key emphasis of the force design effort.

The challenge is that while the Marines are working FARPs and other means to enhance force mobility, the joint force is in the throes of significant change, whether it be the U.S. Navy working distributed maritime operations or the USAF working agile combat employment.

How does the USMC effort to reorganize and enhance its contribution to the joint force while the joint force is itself in fundamental change with much uncertainty over how to do maritime distributed operations and the agile combat air combat employment?

The Navy and Air Force sides of this transition have been a major part of our work published elsewhere and provide insights with regard to how challenging the overall force transformation is within which the USMC is working to find its proper place. It is not just up to MAWTS-1 to work the training for such an effort, but NAWDC and Nellis are clearly involved as well.

To put it simply: it is a work in progress and the Marines emphasis on a MAGTF organizing principle remains important going forward in spite of the effort to find ways to operate from much smaller organizational formations.

This report includes the interviews conducted in 2023. The date indicates when the interview was published on Second Line of Defense and collectively they provide an overview of how MAWTS-1 is training for the way ahead for the USMC by preparing the force that might have to fight tonite.

As the end of course video for WTI-1-24 starts: “It is not a question of if the Marine Corps will go into combat. It is only a matter of when.

It can be read in either ebook or paperback and can be found here:

 

By Robbin Laird

When I first dealt with fifth generation aircraft, I focused on how the F-22 and a relatively expansive global enterprise of F-35s would re-norm airpower, or re-set the baseline for what would be expected from the fighter element of the air combat enterprise.

This was above all the question of how integrated sensors on the F-35 would enable both collaboration across the enterprise and the emergence and spread of a new sensor-shooter relationship in which the fighter’s role was not primarily first kill but location of targets for the multi-domain enterprise to deliver the kill.

Or in other words, the shift was from the fighter as the tip of the spear in a kill chain to becoming a key node in a multi-domain kill web.

I published an article in 2009 which laid out my perspective on the re-norming of 21^st century air and military operations which anticipated what is now in front of us, namely the opportunity to leverage the global F-35 enterprise as we expand in the autonomous systems domain, add new weapons, and introduce the new bomber.

This is what I wrote:

“The man-machine attributes and computational capabilities of the F–35 provide a significant opportunity to evolve the robotic elements within airspace to provide for data storage, transmission, collection, weapon emplacement, and loitering strike elements, all of which can be directed by the manned aircraft as the centerpiece of a manned-robotic strike or situational awareness wolf pack.

“Rather than focusing on robotic vehicles as self-contained units with proprietary interfaces and ground stations, the F–35 can be useful in generating common linkages and solutions to combine into a core wolf pack capability.”

But rather than enjoying this significant change in the first decade of the 21^st century, we are only now approaching the possibilities. Fighting the land wars and investing in those wars, atrophied the fifth-generation revolution but it is now being relaunched.

We have lost a lot of time and investments in strategic failures and we need to recover before the world of multi-polar authoritarianism changes the global rules to their advantage.

We are in a period where changes in autonomous capabilities, C2 and sensors can accelerate change in military operations and create a variety of ways to deliver a kill web force. But if we fail this time, no less than our liberties are at stake.

I spent more than a decade after my time working with Secretary Wynne and dealing with the launch of fifth generation aircraft to engaging in the standup of the F-35 global enterprise. My first book detailing my engagement was published in 2023 and entitled: My Fifth Generation Journey: 2004-2018.

Now I am focusing on the next phase of airpower evolution which I believe leverages the  fifth-generation paradigm but by expanding it significantly with the new elements empowering a kill web sensor-shooter distributed force.

To start this next phase, I thought it made the most sense to talk with the man who launched my initial work on fifth generation aircraft, Secretary Mike Wynne. I did so in a meeting and phone conference with him in December 2023.

I asked him what he considered the fifth-generation paradigm to consist of.

Secretary Wynne: “The fifth-generation concept really combines low observability, speed, and networking capability. We continue to push into low observability and networking capability. And we’ve expanded the networking and targeting enterprise thereby essentially introducing the kill web.”

He went back to the origin in his mind of the fifth-generation paradigm:

“The concept was born during NATO exercises during the 1980’s when USAF F-15s working the Dutch F-16s combined the long-range F 15 targeting radar system with the F-16 weapons range. In that war game we basically extended the targeting range for the F-16 and established a rudimentary kill web whereby we employed the F-15s as a targeting device and then the F-16s as a shooter device using information from the F-15.

“But every fighter pilot wanted to be his own weapon systems manager and the Dutch for that war game understood that the F-15 radar could see farther than they could, and therefore farther than the red forces as well. The F-15 could pass targets to them, and they could then employ it, in the absence of seeing the target, they remained unseen by red forces, and so they could employ the passed target to arm and fire their weapons. This was taking Beyond Visual Range to a new level, at the time.

“The paradigm can really then be characterized as better management of the air dominance that was available. And really a constructed innovation of a network enabled engagement whereby we can put the right capability to the best effect while minimizing detection. As well, that’s really increasing the probability for a successful mission.”

He noted that the F-22 was designed primarily as an air dominance fighter and became that element of the fifth-generation dyad, with the F-22 being the faster and larger plane flying at different attitudes from the F-35. But the F-22 unlike the F-35 was not designed primarily as a networked platform, as the concept of network was still aborning.

I noted that compared to when he was in the Pentagon, we simply did not anticipate the numbers of nations who would become F-35 air forces. We started with eight founding partners and now there are 17 nations in the F-35 program. And I think one major challenge is to leverage this opportunity.

Secretary Wynne: “The acceptance of the F-35 by multiple air forces creates an opportunity, but not a reality for introducing the concept of network warfare. This opportunity is not platform driven, and can as well combine different platforms in the war fighter world, but having similar configurations may allow faster force integration.

“In networked warfare, concepts of Identification of Friend and Foe (IFF) must be revamped, as having forces with the same weapons platform, or one that could be mimicked is worrisome.

“Our dominance and trust in cyber is growing still. In a desired engagement, where the engaged Blue forces have been integrated, having the information flow from lots of sensors to lots of weapons controllers will be a tremendous force multiplier.

“Knowing such an engagement could be in colleague with ground or naval integrated networks expands this multiplier, and may allow weapons to target matching, such that minimizing expendables lengthens by minutes or hours of available time on target.

“I used the terminology ‘every weapon a sensor, and some sensors a weapon’ to push for an integrated, and information-based war plan. Now, as we are seeing in Ukraine the span of war concepts is from before WW l to tomorrow, but with limited application of such a concept terminology.

“The flow of information to appropriate weapon systems is seen to be hampered by factors of command and connectivity. Soon, I can see every projectile a sensor to reduce needs for bomb damage assessment. We are entering a period where expending munitions can be a crucial logistics element in the fight.

“The global F-35 enterprise is an unparalleled partnership opportunity. It provides us with an opportunity for multi-domain integration from space to air to ground with the integration of at sea assets as well.

“But we have to work the challenges of protecting the network and preventing adversary entrance into the network to affect our behavior and capabilities. But we need to do this in any case for the entire force, not just the F-35 element.”

Wynne highlighted the importance which the F-35 can provide for time urgent battle damage assessment as they operate which furthers enhances the more effective use of the overall force’s available weapons. With sensors able to see battle damage as sensor rich platforms move into the battlespace, more effective weapons use is possible as we have seen with how the Ukrainians have used their drones in attacking and assessing Russian targets.

But to get the full use of an F-35 global enterprise and one which could lay an effective foundation for the autonomous, weapons and fighter enhancements which are on the way, it is necessary to attenuate the information sharing limitations of current security arrangements.

As Billie Flynn noted after attending the most recent international fighter conference:

“Flynn emphasized that the F-35 global enterprise was gaining momentum in ways that most European political leaders simply did not anticipate. But he saw a divide between the AUKUS three – the U.S., Australia, and the UK – and the rest of the F-35 global enterprise with regard to the kind of collaboration which the jet clearly empowers.”

Wynne returned to the evolution of warfare.

“The next decade is shockingly already here. Concerns for escalation in warfare has turned the engagement ethics back nearly to feudal times. The current survivor from modern warfare is information warfare that is employed thus far to weaken resolve on both sides of each fight.

“The use of drones as sensors and shooters also highlights the move to less expensive autonomous systems. We have also learned that information for shooters and defenders is key. As for altering the nature of warfare, it has highlighted that owning the skies is more important than ever, with the asymmetric approach to warfare cost coming from overhead.”

I asked him a final question: what would he be prioritizing now in terms of new systems?

Secretary Wynne: “Creating a network-based kill web will start with the OODA loop of long ago. Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. With each level of approval or review adding 10 minutes into the process. The broader the mission set, the more applicable the networked kill web is to success. Artificial intelligence can hasten, but might not eliminate the process. We as well are witnessing the schism in the ethics of warfare. Boundaries are both recognized and ignored purposefully.

“Applied to Air Combat, the mission set initially could be to dominate the air. With this mission set the next generation has clear guidance, and low visibility, speed and range will be key.

“Sensors will be pulling target sets from space and surrounding domains. The integration with the other domains could reduce the rate of weapons and cost expenditure, but not so much in the end game where maneuverability, and partnering may well set the mark.

“Applied this to the simpler mission of penetration and destroy becomes a different mission set which might follow quickly.  Integration in the air and space domain will then be valuable. Here, persistence will be key, and that means low visibility, range, payload, and safe refuel will become valuable elements.

“Our Air Forces as a coalition are prepared, but must be trained together on the kill web, and ready for a vicious fight. Sir Winston’s quote comes to mind. ‘Air Superiority is the ultimate expression of military power.’ Presently we might add Space and Cyber superiority as well, to make the full mission set.

“We are seeing a proliferation of weapon systems. By weapon systems, I mean the bullet, the shell, the rocket, and the bomb which can be delivered by a variety of weapons carriers. Notably in this regard are autonomous systems, which challenge one’s ability to control them to ensure that you are getting the effect which is desired. Swamping a target with swarming capabilities is fine as long as that it brings a desired outcome. Not so good if it doesn’t.

“My other concern is to ensure that we build an air combat system which delivers the promised air superiority. We should be investing significantly into figuring out what that mission success looks like in the evolving warfare environment.”

Credit Featured Image:  Photo 88649569 | Warfare © ibreakstock | Dreamstime.com