CMV-22B Comes to the Fleet

05/03/2020

By Robbin Laird

On February 7, 2020, the US Navy officially received its first CMV-22B Osprey, the replacement for its venerable C-2 Greyhound aircraft.

I attended the ceremony held at Amarillo, Texas and had a chance to talk with a number of the participants before and after the ceremony.

Having followed the Osprey since 2007 and observed its impact on the USMC, it was never a simple case of the MV-22 replacing the CH-46 ‘Phrog’ and its mission.

The tiltrotor is not the same in any real sense as a traditional rotorcraft, and the increased range and speed of the Osprey and its unique operating envelope has proven to be a significant capability for the Marine Corps which they have been able to leverage to transform their core operations.

Now the US Navy will be transitioning from a fixed-wing aircraft configured to operate with the cats and traps system onboard an aircraft carrier (the C-2) to an aircraft (the Osprey), which is not limited by that system will  not operate in any way like a C-2.

It is undoubtedly going to also be a significant opportunity for the Navy to manage the transition and to understand fully how to make the most of the new aircraft’s capabilities to conduct Airborne Logistics from the Sea Base in new and innovative ways.

There is another major aspect or indeed opportunity, that has nothing to do with the COD (Carrier On-board Delivery) mission.

The Osprey has proven capable of a wide range of operations, from Special Forces transport to performing a Medical Evacuation off of a submarine, but the US Navy is not buying it for those missions.

Yet, given the demanding strategic environment in which the fleet is operating and going to operate, it is difficult to believe that the Navy will not wish broaden the envelope of what the Osprey can do for the fleet.

To do so will lead inevitably to the demand to buy more than a simple COD replacement would dictate.

Because the Osprey is a multi-service, and multi-national asset, there will be opportunities as well to leverage collaborative investment as well.

This has not been possible with the C-2 because it was and is a uniquely Navy plane.

How then might the Navy use the aircraft beyond the classic C-2 ops rhythm?

And how might the Navy take advantage of a broader investment or production set of opportunities posed by multi-service and multinational partners?

What is clear is that the challenging path of transition which the Marine Corps took from CH-46 to MV-22 will not be as difficult for the Navy.

They can already build on the experience of the Marine Corps.

Nonetheless, it is clear that there will be unique aspects of its fleet introduction.

During my visit to Amarillo in February 2020, I had a chance to talk with a retired Navy officer who was involved throughout his career with the C-2 as well as becoming involved in the process of  working the C-2 replacement effort.

Just recently Air Test and Evaluation Squadron (HX-21) and Air Test and Evaluation Squadron (VX-20) wanted to honor the final C-2A Greyhound test aircraft (BuNo 162142) before it was retired to the Pax museum. What better way than a photo flight to illustrate the passing of the Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD) mission featuring the first-ever US Navy variant of the V-22 Osprey, the CMV-22B with the venerable C-2 Greyhound. Photo credit: Erik Hildebrand / US Navy

Currently, CAPT (ret.) Sean McDermott is a commercial airline pilot who served in the US Navy for 26 years. He was involved with the C-2 during the majority of his career, starting as a Greyhound pilot and eventually commanding one of the Navy’s two fleet logistics squadrons.

In the final years of his service, McDermott was involved in working through options for the Navy as they considered C-2 replacements, with an eventual Osprey selection.

In our discussion, McDermott highlighted a key point which logistics pilots are keen to underscore: “You don’t care about logistics until you don’t have the supplies you need at the time you want them.”

He noted that when he became part of the C-2 community, there were two squadrons, based at three locations.

One, VRC-40 ‘Rawhides’ was located on the East Coast at Norfolk, VA, and the second, VRC-30, ‘Providers’, on the West Coast in San Diego California. There is also a permanently forward-deployed detachment of VRC-30 based in Iwakuni Japan.

Both squadrons fall under Airborne Command & Control and Logistics Wing (ACCLW) headquartered in Point Mugu, CA. The wing was traditionally led by officers with an E-2 Hawkeye background.

This meant that there was little opportunity for C-2 pilots to lead the community beyond the possibility of becoming a squadron commander or O-5 (Commander) rank, vice O-6 (Captain/Commodore) rank.

Lacking the upward mobility, post-squadron command has made it more difficult for the C-2 leadership to become involved in future planning and to be able to be in the best position their assets for more robust mission opportunities.

As a story published in 2010 in the Virginian Pilot newspaper noted for the 50th anniversary of VRC-40:

McDermott and the other members of his squadron, known as the Rawhides, aren’t used to being the center of attention. In naval aviation, glory usually goes to the fighter pilots and their jets, not to those who deliver mail, spare parts and passengers.

“We’re a light switch. We’re the Internet.

They expect us to be there all the time,” McDermott said.

“The only time we’re visible is when we’re not there.”

McDermott underscored the challenges facing C-2 leaders getting into a position to shape the future of their mission within the overall world of carrier aviation.

“In general, there is no upward mobility for C-2 COs.

“In general, the preponderance of the leadership of the wing are E-2 Naval Flight Officers.

“This means that you’ve got somebody who’s your boss who’s never flown your plane, never done your mission, doesn’t have a complete understanding of the challenges that are unique to deploying detachments across the planet.

“They had about 140 people in their squadron when they were commanding officers and a C-2 squadron is 400 people.”

McDermott noted that one of the encouraging signs with the CMV-22B transition is that a new Wing, COMVRMWING has been stood up, and its Commodore who is in charge of the Osprey team now being charged to take over the COD mission.

This CMV-22 wing should provide a more dedicated voice to implement new ideas for airborne logistics operations as well as exploring how the aircraft could be used to support other missions for the Navy in a distributed maritime environment.

We discussed at length his experience with the challenges of getting the Osprey engaged with the Navy fleet and eventually on to the carrier for a fleet battle experiment as well as in support of humanitarian assistance missions.

He was also involved in the efforts to deploy Ospreys onto foreign ships, and he worked closely with the Marine experimental squadron VMX-22 and Col. Michael Orr, who we interviewed often during the time frame when the Osprey transition was accelerating, to leverage the Marine’s experience with the aircraft to shepherd Navy interest.

On the cover of our book, Rebuilding American Military Power In The Pacific, we chose a photo of Col. Orr landing on the USS George H.W. Bush.

McDermott was on that carrier during those trials and highlighted how challenging it was to get support to land the Ospreys onboard the large deck carriers.

The Marine aviation leadership created VMX-22 to lead the way forward, first with Ospreys and preparing the way for the next round of aviation innovation.

Because they worked under strong leadership, they could partner with a Navy leader like McDermott to create an opportunity for the Osprey to become a large deck carrier asset.

As McDermott noted about Col. Orr: “I have a lot of respect for Mike, clearly a leader who is willing to support change and innovation.”

But as the trials evolved, there were opportunities to demonstrate how an Osprey could do things a C-2 never could do, given the flexibility of the aircraft and its speed and range.

He provided several examples of this.

One involved when Orr’s group arrived back in Norfolk on an Osprey, and when taxying, out came a chief petty officer blocking their way. They stopped and the chief said that there was an urgent need to get a part to an F/A-18 Hornet so that it can fly off of the carrier prior to getting to port.

The ship was pulling in the next day, and if they did not get the aircraft off of the ship, the aircraft would need to be craned off the ship while in port, not something the Navy likes to do.

The catapults have already been shut down on the ship and were not available.

Obviously, this was not a barrier for the Osprey which flew to the ship, delivered the part and left within 90 seconds from the ship.

McDermott recalled: “The Air Boss on the carrier was an E-2 guy and he underscored, “Let’s see a COD do that!”

We concluded our discussion by focusing upon the potential impact of the multi-mission Osprey to the fleet.

McDermott put it this way: “With the C-2 we did one thing – Carrier On-board Delivery.

“With the Osprey, Combatant Commanders already know the multi-mission capability of the V-22 and will be tempted to utilize them for a variety of other missions.

“This is not something that would happen with a C-2. Carrier leadership will eventually struggle to fence off their logistics assets from outside tasking.”

In other words, there is an anticipated operational demand that they will want to leverage fully the new versatile capabilities of the Osprey.

He noted that with the new platform being introduced to carrier aviation, it will be possible to leverage it to shape a greater range of capabilities for the COD asset.

He noted that as the Marines began to get comfortable with the MV-22, they shaped the unique Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SP-MAGTF), which has become a highly demanded asset.

He argued that such innovation was certainly possible for the Navy as it worked with its new COD aircraft.

One area he noted were forward deployed locations that would benefit like operations in Bahrain.

Ospreys deployed to these locations could not only  better support logistics but would also have the flexibility to support other mission sets for combatant commanders.

“With the coming of the new platform into the fleet, one innovation which might be considered is how to use the new Navy Osprey as part of a broader sustainment effort encompassing Marine Corps and Navy Ospreys.

“It also is an area where the multi-mission capabilities of the aircraft for the Navy can be explored as well.

“In other words, where the Marines leveraged their Ospreys to build and equip SP-MAGTF, perhaps the US Navy can leverage the Bahrain anchor from which to build regional sustainment and explore ways to build out the multi-mission capabilities it would want from its CMV-22s.”

This clearly might require the Navy to consider from the outset ways to ramp up the buy and to prepare for ways in which the fleet commanders will employ it to leverage fullythe aircraft capabilities, and, at the very least, utilizing its capability to provide improved logistics to Navy and Maritime Sealift Command ships.

Carrier Air Wing innovations highlighting platforms coming onboard which will shape clusters of innovations driving forward innovation onboard the large deck carrier. Credit: US Navy

 Also, see the following:

Shaping a New Capability for the Osprey: Delivering the F-35 Engine to the USS Wasp

An Update from VMX-22: USMC Aviation Works the Future

And for our special report focused on the coming of the CMV-22B to the fleet, see the following:

The Infodemic Accompanying the Pandemic

According to the top European Union’s diplomat, Josep Borrel, there was “an infodemic accompanying the pandemic”.

According to a story by Andrew Rettman published in the EUOvserver on May 1, 2020:

“His service had recorded 400 fake news items on the virus in recent weeks, he said.

“Some of the Russian ones peddled fake cures which were “putting people’s lives at risk”, he added.

“But the EU’s debunking website had had an 800 percent increase in traffic since the pandemic began, with 10,000 readers a day, Borrell said, indicating the effectiveness of its work.”

Rettman’s story highlighted Chinese attempts to influence the European Union’s report on the “infodemic.”

In an earlier Rettman story published on March 27, 2020, the author highlighted the extensive Russian effort fueling the “infodemic.”

Russia’s top coronavirus fake news stories were about Western plots – a theme also popular in Chinese disinformation. 

There was little hope of educating people who believed that type of thing, propaganda experts said.

But some of the lies had “real-world consequences” that were hard to ignore.

Scientists: coronavirus is weapon of biological warfare” on Russian website sputniknews.com was the top bogus story with 11,210 shares on social media platform Facebook. 

Sergey Glaziev: coronavirus – artificially created biological weapon” (6,567 shares) was second. 

The coronavirus Covid-19 pandemic: the real danger is Agenda ID2020” (2,733) came third. 

Five other stories also received 1,000 or more shares:

Is coronavirus an American weapon of biological warfare as Francis Boyle believes?” (2,250).

Coronavirus, a weapon that fell from the sky for the United States in its fight against China?” (2,236).

The plague gods: the geopolitics of epidemic and the bubbles of nothing” (1,815).

Jackie Chan quarantined with suspected coronavirus – media” (1,149).

Coronavirus was created in a laboratory: military expert” (1,051). 

The Facebook engagement was calculated using Buzzsumo, an online tracking tool. 

The numbers reflected Facebook activity between January and mid-March on a set of 110 bogus Russian stories which the EU foreign service recorded in its counter-propaganda database

China also got in on the act, EU officials noted. 

The highlighted photo shows Russian president Vladimir Putin (c) at a coronavirus situation centre in Moscow (Photo: Kremlin.ru)

 

 

Remember the Russian Mistral Amphibious Ship? Certainly, the Turks Do

You may remember that President Sarkozy made a decision to build Mistral amphibious ships for Putin’s Russia.

But after some serious rethinking, that sale was voided and a new customer sought.

Eventually, the customer for the two ships which had been built was Egypt.

And if you fast forward to 2019, you find the Egyptians exercising their new ship in a Mediterranean friendship exercise which had Turkey in mind.

According to a December 20, 2019 article by Hagar Hosny and published by AL-Monitor:

Egyptian naval forces conducted military drills Dec. 11 against the backdrop of the Nov. 28 maritime border and security agreementsigned by Turkey and the internationally recognized Tripoli-based Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) headed by Fayez al-Sarraj.

The agreement providesfor the expansion of security and military cooperation between the two sides and was condemned by Greece and Egypt.

In a Dec. 11 statement, the Egyptian army said these military exercises come in implementation of an Egyptian military strategy aimed at developing its capabilities in the face of the challenges and risks witnessed in the region. The statement added that the military activities included the launch of a submarine anti-ship Harpoon missile with a range of more than 130 kilometers (81 miles). This is in addition to the combat activities of the Mistral-class amphibious assault ship, a helicopter carrier, in the Mediterranean.

During the exercise, the Egyptian forces conducted  “Friendship Bridge 2019” in the Mediterranean Sea using a task force which included the ENS Gamal Abdel Nasser (L1010), a Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) of the French Mistral class, as well as Perry-class frigates, missile boats (Soliman Ezzat), Class-209 submarine, a number of anti-submarine units and special forces.

According to a January 7, 2020, Naval Recognition article:

This naval military exercise also included different scenarios of amphibious operations showcasing the capabilities of Egypt’s general command in supervising, commanding and controlling this type of complex maneuvers.

For the first time, Egyptian Naval Forces used modern attack helicopters including the Russian-made Kamov Ka-52 and the American-made AH-64D/E Apache that took off from the Mistral-class amphibious assault ship Gamal Abdel Nasser (L1010).

ENS Gamal Abdel Nasser (L1010) is an Egyptian Navy amphibious assault ship of the French-designed Mistral-class which is also used as a helicopter carrier by the Egyptian Navy. Egypt is the first and only country in Africa and the Middle East to have that type of combat ship.

The exercise highlighted the evolving role of amphibious ships away from simply being Greyhound buses moving troops from port to embarkation point, to being part of sea control and expeditionary strike operations.

The Egyptians understand this point and have been working with the Russians to purchase Kamov Ka-52K naval attack helicopters for Anwar el-Sadat, and they see the AH-64D as a gap filler until they get a marinized helicopter.

The helicopters onboard the Egyptian Mistral class are land-based operating helicopters flying from the ship rather than marinized helicopters part of the work flow of the ship. In the first case, helicopters optimized for land operations certainly can fly to and from an amphibious ship operating as an offshore operating base; they are not optimized for at sea operations with the ship as part of a fast moving task force.

In an article by Tyler Rogoway written at the time of the initial acquisition by Egypt of the French ships, the author highlights why Egypt was buying the ships.

“Egypt has been engaged in a deepening counter-terror fight against extremist elements, namely those aligned with ISIS. Geographically speaking, threats are emanating primarily from around the Sinai Peninsula, which Egypt worries could one day endanger the Suez Canal, and from the western border with Libya, which is embroiled in a full-on civil war and teaming with Islamic militants…..

“These powerful ships could be used as seabases of sorts, parking them off the coast of trouble spots on the Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Arabian Sea, but that would signal a massive expeditionary shift in Egypt’s foreign policy.”

The vides below highlight the exercise:

The featured photo shows Russian-made Kamov Ka-52K and American-made AH-64E Apache helicopters prepare to take off from ENS Gamal Abdel Nasser Mistral-class amphibious assault ship during naval exercise Friendship Bridge 2019 (Picture source: Egyptian MoD).

 

 

Spain, France and UK Work the Next Round of Baltic Air Policing

05/02/2020

Spain, France and the United Kingdom will take up NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission starting in May, guarding the skies over the Baltic region for the next four months.

The three NATO Allies are replacing air force detachments from Belgium and Poland which have protected the airspace of NATO’s three Baltic Allies Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania since January. The Spanish and British air force contingents will operate out of Siauliai airbase in Lithuania, while the French air force will fly from Amari in Estonia. Spain is the lead nation for the mission.

“We thank Spain, France and the UK for taking over NATO’s Baltic-air policing mission”, said NATO spokesperson Oana Lungescu. “This 24/7 mission demonstrates that our commitment to the security of our Allies is rock-solid and that our vital work goes on despite the coronavirus pandemic,” she stressed.

NATO’s Baltic Air Policing deployment is a defensive mission that sees allies sending planes to patrol the airspace of the three Baltic States, who do not have fighter jets of their own. The Air Policing programme keeps fighter jets on alert 24/7 and ready to scramble in case of suspicious air activity close to the Alliance’s borders.

The mission which has been running since 2004 took on greater prominence following Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014. NATO aircraft routinely intercept Russian military aircraft near the Baltic States which frequently fail to adhere to international air safety norms. In 2019, Allied jets attached to NATO’s Baltic air-policing mission scrambled around 200 times to safeguard allied airspace.

NATO

April 29, 2020.

A UK Military Response to COVID-19: RAF Helo Support

Recently, three RAF Puma helicopters have been dispatched to Kinloss barracks in Moray, Scotland.

They are there to be able to respond to COVID-19 incidents throughout Scotland.

According to a May 1, 2020 story by David Mackay published by the Press and Journal:

“One of the Pumas at Kinloss Barracks has been tasked specifically for medical evacuations with one for transporting supplies and another on standby.

“The aircraft has been selected for the task because it can land in small locations with less disruption from the blades while still being able to carry two stretchers and a medical crew.

“A support crew of 56 personnel have travelled to the Army base in Moray from Oxfordshire for the mission.

“Squadron Leader Johnny Longland, the Puma detachment commander, explained the recent training in the Western Isles has involved several agencies.

“He said: “We have paramedics from the islands working with our crewmen to look at how they can integrate their equipment with the Puma.

“NHS Scotland and coastguard teams of paramedics, clinicians and planners were primarily looking at how they can put stretchers in the back of the aircraft and continue to perform their essential care for the patient.”

The SEAD Mission in an A2AD World

By Australian Defence and Business Review

The US Department of Defense defines the Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) mission as that which ‘neutralizes, destroys or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air defences by destructive and/or disruptive means.’

The so-called ‘Endless Wars’ in the Afghan and Iraqi theatres have seen US and allied air forces operating in a largely benign air environment. Afghanistan had no integrated air defence system (IADS) to speak of while Iraq’s air defences had, for all intents and purposes, been destroyed via the US-led Operation Desert Storm to evict Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, the subsequent enforcement of no fly zones over the north and south of the country, and the opening stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 which removed Saddam Hussein from power.

The war in Syria has been the transitional conflict for US and allied forces as the harbinger of the Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) strategies that these forces may face in future confrontations.

Initially the conflict resembled an insurgency: a civil war pitting the regime of President Bashir al Assad against an assortment of opposition groups. But Russia’s overt involvement from 2013 saw the deployment of at least two batteries of Almaz-Antey S-400 (SA-21 Growler) high-altitude, long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.

This was concurrent with the commencement of US-led air strikes against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) insurgency group, and against chemical weapons targets belonging to the regime. The latter followed Assad’s chlorine gas attack on the city of Douma in south-west Syria in April 2018.

Thus these retaliatory air strikes performed by British, French and US forces were undertaken in contested airspace, placing SEAD at centre stage as a key component to counter A2AD strategies, while underscoring the fact that the US and her allies can no longer expect to always conduct air operations in benign environments….

SEAD can be brought to bear via specific aircraft, weapons and subsystems.

The RAAF’s purchase of 12 Boeing E/A-18G Growler air defence suppression aircraft has led the field vis-à-vis regional enhancements of SEAD capabilities. These aircraft currently use the AN/ALQ-99 Tactical Jamming System (TJS), reportedly capable of jamming, from 30,000ft, ground-based air surveillance and fire control/ground-controlled interception (GCI) radars transmitting across 30MHz to 10GHz wavebands at ranges of up to 400 kilometres.

But the AN/ALQ-99 will soon be replaced, initially by Raytheon’s AN/ALQ-249(V)1 Next Generation Jammer-Mid Band (NGJ-MB). This covers a 2GHz to 6GHz waveband and is considered a sea-change in capability by employing an active electronically scanned array (AESA) and a software defined architecture making the system more reliable and capable than its predecessor. The RAAF and the US Navy could receive these pods early this decade.

The ALQ-249(V)1 will be followed by the (V)2 Next Generation Jammer-Low Band (NGJ-LB) encompassing a 100MHz to 2GHz waveband (for which Northrop Grumman and L3Harris have been awarded development contracts), and the (V)3 Next Generation Jammer-High Band (NGJ-HB) covering the 6GHz to 18GHz band of the spectrum. These latter two pods could enter RAAF and US Navy service in the mid-to-late-2020s.

To replace the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) gathering capabilities of the RAAF’s Lockheed Martin AP-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, fitted as they are with an early version of BAE Systems’ AN/ALR-2001 Odyssey Electronic Support Measure (ESM). Gathering SIGINT across a 500MHz to 18GHz waveband, the air force will acquire four Gulfstream MC-55A Peregrine electronic warfare support aircraft (see ADBR Nov-Dec 2019 issue).

The kinetic aspects of the RAAF’s SEAD posture will be enhanced via the acquisition of Northrop Grumman’s AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile, an evolution of the Raytheon AGM-88C HARM (High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile). The ‘echo’ version adds a Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation System (GPS/INS) and a Millimetric Wave Radar (MMW).

While the MMW will collect detailed radar imagery of the missile’s end game for later battle damage assessment, the GPS/INS addition is vital for nullifying the ‘switch off’ tactic where radar operators may believe that they are under attack and switch off their radar in hope that the incoming anti-radiation missile will lose its lock on the radar’s RF (Radio Frequency) emissions. The GPS/INS can store the coordinates of the targeted radar should it be deactivated.

The use of GPS coordinates also enables the missile to be loaded with a set of parameters within which it can engage targets but which beyond it cannot fly, thus helping avoid collateral damage. In 1999 during Operation Allied Force, the NATO-led effort to end ethnic cleansing in the Balkans territory of Kosovo, an AGM-88B erroneously hit houses and cars in the Bulgarian capital Sofia.

Some air forces may choose not to procure dedicated ARMs, as these weapons are not cheap – the AGM-88E has a reported unit price of up to US$870,000. Jamming pods offer a potential alternative. They are cost-effective as a one-time purchase open to repeated use, unlike ARMs which must be replenished.

New pods and ARMs are in the offing from European suppliers, including the pan-European Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) pod, Saab’s Electronic Attack Jammer Pod (EAJP), and MBDA’s SPEAR-EW loitering electronic attack weapon.

France, Spain and Sweden are jointly developing the AEA via a European Union initiative to develop an escort jammer to protect packages of aircraft in contested airspace. Specifically, the pod must counter contemporary and emerging SAM systems with engagement ranges of up to 400km – a veiled reference to the S-400 which could greatly restrict EU air forces’ use of stand-off weapons during future conflicts, according to the original AEA solicitation.

While not disclosed, the pod may be effective against radars transmitting in frequencies of 2GHz to 40GHz, encompassing the majority of early warning, ground-based air surveillance, and FC/GCI radars that such aircraft may encounter in a future conflict.

The AEA programme may also reflect the reality that, in future, EU nations might have to perform operations outside NATO auspices if the US is unable or unwilling to offer assistance. Hence, they will require robust electronic attack capabilities to accompany the robust kinetic SEAD assets currently maintained by EU members in the form of the Panavia Tornado-ECR air defence suppression aircraft –flown by Italy’s Aeronautica Militaire and Germany’s Luftwaffe – deploying the AGM-88.

Saab’s EAJP is designed to engage low frequency radars across a 150MHz to 4GHz waveband. Early-warning and ground-based air surveillance radars transmitting in VHF/UHF wavebands are an increasing concern – Russia has made notable investments into such systems with NIIDAR’s Podsolnukh-E and NNIIRT’s 55ZH6M Nebo-M VHF radars which entered service from 2000 being two examples.

Such radars may be able detect aircraft with a low radar cross-section. While not capable of producing sufficient track quality for SAM systems, they could indicate to fighters an area where hostile aircraft may be present. Jonas Grönberg, Saab’s head of emerging EW products, says that the EAJP is an escort jammer designed to get strike packages safely through contested airspace for use “against low frequency threats… to help get a strike package within stand-off range to fire their weapons”. The EAJP has been developed privately by Saab and a prototype is undergoing flight testing. Grönberg says the pod could complete development in the next three years.

Meanwhile MBDA has revitalised the air-launched decoy via its SPEAR-EW initiative. SPEAR-EW is an outgrowth of MBDA’s Select Precision Effects at Range-3 (SPEAR-3) air-to-surface weapon currently under development for the RAF.

MBDA says the SPEAR-EW, “will act as a stand-in jammer to greatly increase the survivability of friendly aircraft and suppress enemy air defences”. It is reasonable to assume the SPEAR-EW will transmit jamming waveforms across an 8GHz to 40GHz waveband, allowing it to engage a range of airborne, ground-based and naval FC/GCI and weapons guidance radars.

The concept of operations is for the SPEAR-EW to be launched while an aircraft is in contested airspace to jam hostile radars as and when they transmit. It could be teamed with the SPEAR-3 so that such threats can either be electronically or kinetically engaged. The UK Ministry of Defence has awarded MBDA and Leonardo a technical demonstrator programme contract, and MBDA says “both the electronic warfare payload and missile are already at advanced stages of maturity.”

A contract from the MOD to procure the SPEAR-EW may emerge, and MBDA says that the weapon could equip both the RAF’s Eurofighter Typhoon F/GR4 and Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning jets….

“In the past you had particular aircraft which specialised in SEAD missions.

“Will this be the case in the future?” asks Prof Baltrusaitis.

To an extent, the RAAF may have answered this question as it is already viewing the mission through a holistic prism where the whole force is employed to defeat A2AD postures. The RAAF says the service looks “across the force to support the SEAD mission”.

In addition to the E/A-18G, other platforms such as the F-35A and Boeing F/A-18F Super Hornet will aid the fight by “mixing kinetic and non-kinetic effects” including the AN/ALQ-99, Next Generation Jammer and AGM-88s.

This mission, the RAAF says, could be aided by Australia’s other armed services as and when required. “We have assets across the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to contribute to this mission including army and navy fires.”

This imperative to use and coordinate other segments of the RAAF and the ADF writ large is mirrored at the international level. “Due to platform commonality with the US Navy, we often look to them for doctrine and leadership, particularly in the context of the E/A-18G. The integration of the F-35A into the force also gives us shared interest with the US Air Force … Collectively, we train together with the US services in exercises such as Red Flag which is a natural way to test our ideas.”

The need to coordinate the force and work closely with allies is imperative vis-à-vis SEAD and A2AD. Any future confrontation with China or Russia is almost certain to be executed by a coalition, most probably under US or NATO leadership. Using SEAD to defeat A2AD, particularly at the campaign level, will require the close coordination of assets.

For the complete article, see ADBR, April 29, 2020

W recommend that our readers become frequent readers of Australian Defence and Business Review, both in terms of their article and video websites.

This excerpt as does the original article remains the copyright of ADBR.

Featured photo: A RAAF KC-30A Multi-role Tanker Transport from RAAF Base Amberley provided refuelling operations for USAF B-1B Lancers in addition to RAAF F/A-18F Super Hornets and E/A-18G Growlers during Exercise Lightning Focus. The B-1B Lancers’ participation in this exercise was part of the Enhanced Air Cooperation program, which aims to increase the interoperability between Australia and the United States.

The Evolving Role of Rotary Wing Platforms in the Integratable Carrier Air Wing

05/01/2020

By Robbin Laird

During my last meeting with Vice Admiral Miller in San Diego, we discussed the way ahead with regard to the air wing as it become integrated into a wider kill web concepts of operations.

In that conversation, we highlighted the shift as one from building an integrated air wing to working an open ended and evolving integratable air wing.

A key element in such a shift is when new platforms come onboard, the carrier or parts of the air wing, work with non-organic combat asset with  integratability as key challenge and opportunity to be  worked across the force to ensure that the distributed force can exercise maximum effectiveness.

Carrier Air Wing innovations highlighting platforms coming onboard which will shape clusters of innovations driving forward innovation onboard the large deck carrier. Credit: US Navy

This focus creates a major training challenge but also significantly expands the impact which training can have on operations.

I discussed this challenge with VADM Miller and Rear Admiral Brophy, the head of NAWDC or the Naval Aviation Warfighting Center, during my last visit to San Diego.

The head of Fallon, Rear Admiral Richard Brophy, joined the conversation with the Air Boss, and clearly underscored the challenge: “How do we best train the most lethal integrated air wing preparing to deploy, but at same time, prepare for the significant changes which introducing new platforms and concepts of operations can bring to the force?

As the Air Boss put it: “We need to properly train the integratable air wing and we are investing in expanded ranges and new approaches such as Live Virtual Constructive training.

“I often use the quote that ‘your performance in combat never raises to the level of your expectations but rather it falls to the level of your training.’

“This is why the training piece is so central to the development for the way ahead for the integrable training.

“It is not just about learning what we have done; but it is working the path to what we can do.”

NAWDC is working with the key American warfighting centers to shape a way ahead for Naval aviation within the broader world of building an integrated distributed force operating across the spectrum of warfare.

This affects each platform or core competence being worked at NAWDC.

Recently, I had the chance to talk with CDR Jeremy “Shed” Clark, Senior Leader at the Naval Rotary Wing Weapons School (SEAWOLF) at NAWDC.

The Seawolf School focuses on Romeo, Sierra, and Fire Scout training, with Romeo being the sensor rich ASW/SUW/EW and related tasked focus helo onboard the Navy’s large deck carriers.

We discussed the shift which the Admirals had outlined in my San Diego meeting and how it affected the training approach for the helicopter communities.

The shift from focusing largely on a targeted task for carrier defense and upon how the organic capabilities on the Romeo and Sierra could play their task most effectively to one where the focus is on broadening the sensor and strike partners of these platforms who can contribute to carrier strike and defense is a significant one.

Rather than quote the CDR directly, I will identify a number of takeaways which I drew from the conversation but for which I am not going to hold him responsible for.

The first point is that the aperture of considering the role of all rotory wing assets expands significantly as one shifts from a legacy carrier strike operation focus to broader support to a distributed maritime force.

Due to the nature of where helicopters deploy this means that the sensors onboard these platforms can see their reach significantly expanded by being able to integrate with other sensors in the battlespace.

Rather than being platform focused, the shift is to empower the Romeo/Sierra/Fire Scout and their reach with an expanded sensor network.

This sensor network will be found both onboard each helicopter as well as with other aircraft onboard the carrier, but more broadly into the interactive allied working capabilities in the expanded battlespace.

The second point is that new assets coming onboard the carrier are going to be looked at from the outset in terms of what they can contribute to the sensor network and decision-making capabilities of the strike force.

For example, we discussed the coming of the MQ-25. The Romeo community is already looking at how having sensors onboard the MQ-25 can expand the reach and range of what the Romeo’s onboard sensors can accomplish for the maritime distributed force.

It is also the case that as sensor demands currently made on the Romeo can be shifted elsewhere.

The Romeo can refocus its task priorities and enhance its contributions to broader mission sets such as ASW and to focus on contributing capabilities that other platforms within the strike group are not prioritized to perform.

The third point is that the new generation of Navy operators are clearly thinking in kill web terms – they are not focused simply on what their platform can do based on how they were  trained, but how they can work in the broader battlespace to deliver the desired effects working closely with partners in the sensor, decision-making and strike web.

He argued that this meant that NAWDC is looking at how to change the entire dynamic of the strike group with such an approach.

The fourth point is that with the distributed sensor network being built, manned helicopters can reduce the amount of time they need to be airborne to provide a core sensor set of tasks.

The so-called unmanned revolution is ultimately about expanding the sensor network and allowing the manned operators within that network to operate more efficiently and more effectively; it is not primarily about replacing them in the battlespace.

The fifth point is that the kill web learning curve has a major impact on thinking about acquisition.

Rather than focusing on the systems proprietary to a specific task oriented platform, the focus is shifting towards integratability: what system can I tap onboard my platform via integratability with other combat assets, and what systems do I have onboard which provide a specific capability which the kill force needs to be able to leverage to enhance combat effectiveness?

The sixth point we discussed was the repurposing of the Fire Scout unmanned system.

Originally, this was platform tasked, namely, to support the littoral combat ship.

But with the new approach of utilizing all assets within a kill-web, the question is how the helicopters working with Fire Scout can add the fleet needed capabilities, and where might the Fire Scout operate from within the fleet to gain maximum impact?

This a significant shift and part of the dynamics of change unfolding at NAWDC.

And CDR Clark highlighted that his team is working on ways to deliver some EW capability via Fire Scout integration with assets onboard the Growler EW aircraft.

In short, the shift is dramatic.

Historically, training was done in stove pipes.

One would train to be the best operator you could be on that platform.

Now, that is not enough; obviously critical but the foundation for working a different way.

The focus is upon working in a kill web and cross-linking capabilities within a distributed integrated force.

Featured Photo: Singapore (May 29, 2015) An MH-60R Seahawk helicopter and a MQ-8B Fire Scout unmanned aircraft system are displayed on the flight deck of the littoral combat ship USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) while the ship is moored pierside in Singapore. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. James Arterberry/Released

 

Sea Mines and the Chinese Threat: An Australian Perspective

By Greg Mapson

In mid-2018, the Chinese navy conducted one of the largest mine warfare exercises in living memory, involving some 60 minelayers and minesweepers, aircraft and submarines practising laying and countering live mines. This unprecedented exercise, supported by some of China’s top scientists and mine development specialists, increased the already growing unease about China’s expansion into the South China Sea.

Some 10 years ago, a US Naval War College study revealed that China possessed over 100,000 sea mines, and that their use was fundamental to its strategy of constraining US naval forces operating in Beijing’s area of interest.

While, at the time, most strategists saw this as a direct reference to the Taiwan Strait and North Korea, that’s no longer so.

With China’s expansion into the South China Sea and its militarisation of several reefs far from its shores, its minelaying forces have a more expansive role to play. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has a fleet of ships and conventional submarines with crews that are well practised, and indeed lauded, for their minelaying skills.

They also possess very capable minelaying aircraft. The exercise demonstrated China’s commitment to mine warfare as a pillar of its naval strategy.

Notwithstanding China’s potent capabilities in laying mines, many strategists wrongly believe they’ll be used in offensive operations, but they’re more versatile than that.

One possible scenario is that China will use its growing mine stocks in a period of tension to further control access to areas surrounding its South China Sea claims by laying protective minefields—or even just claiming to.

International law allows for protective mining in a nation’s own waters, though an international court has ruled against part of China’s claim after it was challenged by the Philippines. By announcing the presence of such protective fields, it would provide the necessary warning to all comers. The answer, then, is for concerned nations to do something about the mines.

In 2018, Senator Jim Molan and the chair of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Andrew Hastie, drew attention to the parlous state of Australia’s fuel stocks with only three weeks’ supply in the country.

All of Australia’s imported fuel passes through the Malacca Strait via Singapore and through other narrow passages through the Indonesian archipelago. We are particularly vulnerable to the closure of any of these vital seaways.

So how well prepared is Australia to counter a mining incident to our north, or near our priority ports or trade routes? After six Huon-class coastal minehunters were built in the late 1990s, two of the ships were laid up in 2014 due to defence cut backs. Both were so badly cannibalised that they have since been sold. The Royal Australian Navy once had a world-class minesweeping capability but it’s seldom used now.

It was recently announced that the four remaining Huon-class vessels will not have life of type extensions but will be retired within five years. A very modest program to introduce a minesweeping and mine-hunting capability is running years late and will provide an almost experimental-level capability of small individual technologies.

The government announced last year that two steel-hulled ships, based on the offshore patrol vessel, will be built in Western Australia and designated for mine countermeasure operations to fill the gap left by the withdrawal of the Huons.

It appears that these ships will be built without any shock hardening, magnetic degaussing system or acoustic silencing and will carry some autonomous systems augmented by other systems yet to be announced. So, it would seem that the answer to the question ‘how prepared are we?’ is self-evident.

Close to two decades of underinvestment and neglect has once again rendered the navy’s mine-clearing force impotent. The last major strategic review, in 1991, was highly critical of the lack of attention to the mine threat and called for action. Out of that inquiry came the six coastal minehunters, a command support system, new sweeping systems, exercise mines and a completely rebuilt headquarters at HMAS Waterhen in Sydney.

Fast-forward to 2020 and we now face a much greater mine threat in our region than ever before, with most of our mine-hunting capability in decline—even though Australia remains totally dependent on sea-borne trade. A potential adversary to our north has the mine stocks, aircraft and submarines to completely shut down all sea traffic into our ports or sea lines of communication.

If our strategic situation turns bad, our maritime lifeline can easily be targeted, and we don’t have the means to stop that happening.

Greg Mapson, a former commander of the Royal Australian Navy’s mine countermeasure forces, has carried out specialist training in a number of world navies and conducted extensive work on autonomous mine countermeasure systems.

This article was published by ASPI on April 15, 2020.

Image: Australian Department of Defence.