In our recent report on Australian and UK defence transformation, we highlighted the opportunity for the two nations to collaborate on a number of efforts, one of which is a remote platform or family of platforms to worked with manned platforms, notably in the Australian case with its loyal wingman flying with the F-35.

We noted in that report, that the loyal wingman program was part of the Australian effort as well to ramp up their indigenous development and manufacturing capabailities.

Part of the defense rethinking going on in Australia involves finding ways to enhance a sustainable fifth generation force. Building out a lethal and effective offensive-defensive force, which can expand the perimeter for the defense of Australia and provide for allied extended deterrence, is a core focus of ADF modernization.

To do so in a crisis management situation needs a serious look at how long Australian operations could be sustained if a determined adversary sought to disrupt imports into Australia to support a modern society and a modern combat force.

The sustainment issue could be solved in part by enhanced domestic manufacturing capabilities and sustainment approaches, such as the projected shipbuilding effort or the F-35 regional support hub.

But clearly, there is an opportunity as well to build out manufacturing in Australia and with the ranges and potential workforce augmentations, missiles and unmanned air vehicles would be a clear area of interest, not just for Australia but for its partners as well.

As a member of the F-35 global enterprise, there is a clear global partnering opportunity whereby the Australians could do “a Konigsberg” and build missiles or related capabilities for themselves but in a way that makes them a natural partner with other key F-35 partners.

The recently announced “loyal wingman” program could be a case in point.  

To be clear, the amount of money being discussed at the program launch at Avalon makes it, in the words, of a senior Australian strategist “a PR stunt.”

What he was focusing on was a key reality – the money being proposed could hardly achieve a program of record.

But one way to look at it might be to see an Australian effort to leverage their position geographically and in terms of training ranges to provide a foundation for several partners to come and to build out an Australian-based test, development and manufacturing capability.

It is clear that already fifth generation led training in the United States is extending the range of training – quite literally – and it will be virtually impossible for European and Asian F-35 partners to do such training without the geographical scope that Australia provides.

If we take a look at the proposed loyal wingman program, a key element is affordability and the expectation that these are assets which can be consumed in a combat scenario, more like weapons than airplanes.

And to get a low cost, it is clear that the wingman will not be an organic festival of advanced sensors, C2 or other features.

It will be a plus up in mass for what Secretary Wynne has called for in terms of ‘the wolfpack.”

But some of the analyses surrounding the proposed program suggests that this will be an asset which can provide the tip of the spear into contested airspace or fly with legacy aircraft in a way whereby the legacy combat asset somehow has thinking capabilities which they simply do not have.

Clearly, as a low-cost wingman is developed modifications to systems like Wedgetail or to tanker could occur to make them adjuncts to an operation, and as one considers the range of combat scenarios they could complement.

But the management capability onboard the mother ship so to speak is a key consideration of what will fly with it to make for an effective combat team.

One Australian enthusiast for the program highlighted what he sees as the contribution of this program to Australian sovereignty.

“We should now concentrate our efforts on breaking down barriers between further technological and industrial co-operation so we can build a sustainable sovereign defense industrial capability.”

Makes sense, if you are willing to invest significantly greater money in the program; but if it is a leveraging effort, then it is certainly conceivable that American, Japanese, and European F-35 partners would invest.

But it is also crucial to keep in mind the program’s limitations if it is to be a disposable lower cost asset.

The Australian analyst made a core point which he then seems to forget later in his analysis.

“The idea is that F-35s will be tasked with entering dangerous environments, relying on stealth and electronic warfare capabilities to survive, while spotting targets for lower-tech unmanned systems, like the new RAAF-Boeing drone, and non-stealthy fighters that remain outside the range of adversary defences.”

This statement is good up to a point; but the F-35 is a multi-domain air combat system with a brain big enough to work combat teaming with “slaves” in the wolfpack.

This is not true of 4^thgeneration aircraft.

“This “loyal wingman” will be paired with fourth-generation manned aircraft such as F-18s and will likely act as decoys, scouts and communication relays. Eventually they may play a “bomb truck” role, carrying additional missiles and ordnance for both air-to-air combat and other strike missions.

“The largest benefit of these systems will be to beef-up its mass, or the amount of presence and firepower it will be able to project across the region against large numbers of adversary aircraft.

“A single F-18 with four to six autonomous wingmen in tow would be better able to survive, while being more lethal and numerous, multiplying its impact.”

 The problem with this is that a legacy aircraft like the F-18 will have a difficult enough time to survive without trying to manage “slaves” in tow.

If we return to the sovereignty bit, it is clear that if the loyal wingman program is a trigger to investment and engagement by the USAF and the RAF and others in leveraging the test ranges and future training facilities in Australia, this could well be a viable program.

But certainly not one for the amount of money being put on the table currently.

The demonstrator is being developed under the Loyal Wingman Advanced Development Program, which is being supported by A$40 million ($28.5 million) over four years in Australian government funding and by Boeing as part of its A$62 million investment in research and development in Australia in 2018.

The other limitation is clearly the current industrial capacity in Australia.

Boeing Australia has a modest industrial footprint in Australia, which might be considered seed corn but clearly not the kind of workforce and industrial facilities which will require a significant investment and build out.

Put in blunt terms: the loyal wingman could be part of enhanced Australian sovereignty and a trigger for global industrial partnering with Australia as a launch point rather than an importer.

As one senior Australian analyst highlighted:

“The price quoted is only for the development of the first three prototypes.

“Boeing has what was left of the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation (CAC) and the Government Aircraft Factories (GAF) which produced their own designs in the 80s and early 90s. 

“It’s now Boeing Aerostructures.  

“BAE have the autonomous brains to the system, which they produced for Tarinis, and there are no hydraulics in the system only electrics. 

“And they are designing it to a price point.”

Dr. Alan Stephens, the noted Australian military historian and a research Fellow at the Williams Foundation, in his discussion of a Plan B approach to Australian defense policy going forward, underscored the importance of the Australian loyal wingman program for shaping a way ahead for the next round of airpower modernization, leveraging the foundation which is being currently put in place.

“Channeling their inner Sir Richard Williams, the Air Force’s senior leadership appears to have redefined Australian air power through the agency of Project Jericho. Described as a “marriage of minds and machines”, Jericho implies a transformed organization based on artificial intelligence, robotics, machine learning, manned-unmanned teaming, networks, and innate intellectual flexibility. 

“Concurrently, and channeling their inner L.J. Wackett, the Air Force, the Defence Science and Technology Group and the Boeing Company have announced the cooperative development of a stealthy unmanned combat air vehicle under the rubric of “Loyal Wingman”. This is the most exciting initiative undertaken by the Australian aerospace community since World War II. If the project succeeds, the implications are profound.”

And with regard to the UK we drew upon interviews during a May 2019 visit to highlight thinking about the way ahead with a remote-manned aircraft pairing:

As MoD focuses on future airpower developments, a key opportunity rests with regard to how the carrier could work with their version of loyal wingman. With the capabilities built in to the F-35 to manage the battlespace, a loyal wingman with significant range could add the strategic bomber function to the fifth generation enabled carrier.  The reach of the carrier is significantly enhanced as data flows into the carrier-based F-35s to provide targeting solutions at longer range which can then be passed onto a loyal wingman as a targeting solution…..

Recently, we discussed with a well-placed UK defense analyst, the potential UK approach with regard to remotes going forward.

In this discussion, he argued that at the heart of an effective remote development and deployment strategy was leveraging the F-35. The F-35s fusion engine and ability to do C2 at the tactical edge provided significant opportunities to expand the effectors.

And with a loyal wingman approach one could build a relatively simple and relatively cheap wingman for the F-35 led force.

But the concept of a wingman was greatly expanded and different with a fifth-generation fighter.

One saw this as the F-22s started to sort out the distances and which they flew to support one another and with the F-35 and its fusion engine and low observable data transfer system, the notion of the wingman is migrating to other platforms, other assets and a much broader diversity of ways to provide a targeting solution.

With a longer-range loyal wingman – a modular remote with a data link and an ability to be directed by the F-35 and its interactive networks – can operate from a variety of air launch points which provides for the kind of airbase mobility and flexibility necessary to deal with an adversary which is prioritizing strike on fixed bases and targets.

The UK analyst argued this was a way to give the RAF back a capability for de facto strategic bombing as well as providing for much more flexible employment of the existing force. And with modularity, one could envisage a wide range of potential payloads, which could evolve with technology and with the evolving weapons mix required for diverse missions in a crisis environment.

Such an approach could open the window significantly for partnering for the UK forces and industry, which this analyst felt was crucial to a post-Brexit environment.  This could tap into a much broader F-35 enabled market place, much like the weapons manufacturers are doing as well as provide entry points as well into working with initiatives like FCAS. And obviously, there is a natural point here for collaboration with the Australians.

And we concluded with regard to UK and Australian collaboration on the capability the following:

a clear focus of common interest would be variants of the loyal wingman.

The British can bring relevant industrial capacity to the challenge along with Boeing Australia capabilities which can then leverage Australian test and development areas to shape a range of loyal wingman, some designed to fly with the F-35 and its fusion sensor enabled C2 capability and some designed to work with differently configured manned systems.

Now the British have officially launched their loyal wingman effort.

In an article by Andrew McLaughlin published by ADBR on July 23, 2019, the launch was highlighted.

The UK’s RAF Rapid Capabilities Office (RCO) and Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) have announced the awarding of preliminary design contracts for the RAF’s Lightweight Affordable Novel Combat Aircraft (LANCA) concept.

Under a technology demonstrator project known as Mosquito, the Phase 1 contracts were awarded to Blue Bear Systems Research, Boeing Defence UK, and Callen-Lenz (a partnership of Team BLACKDAWN, Bombardier Belfast and Northrop Grumman UK).

The Phase 1 contracts will produce preliminary system designs for unmanned air vehicle, and will assess the key risks and cost-capability trade-offs for an operational Loyal Wingman concept. It is hoped these studies could lead to initial flight trials of demonstrator air vehicles as early as 2022.

The LANCA program was initiated by the Dstl in 2015 to develop and better understand innovative future fast-jet air combat technologies and concepts, and was subsequently brought under the RAF RCO as part of the Future Combat Air System Technology Initiative (FCAS TI). 

LANCA aims to explore the utility and feasibility of unmanned capability adjuncts to existing and future Fast Jet aircraft, specifically those that offer substantial reductions in traditional cost and development timelines. Project Mosquito has two planned phases. After Phase 1 which is scheduled to run for a year, Phase 2 will select up to two solutions to further mature the designs, complete manufacturing of the technology demonstrator and conclude with a limited flight-test program.

With Boeing Defence UK involved, it is possible that company will offer a variant of its Airpower Teaming System  (ATS) concept currently under development by Boeing’s Phantom Works for the RAAF’s Air Force Minor Program DEF 6014 Phase 1 requirement for a Loyal Wingman demonstration.

Fifth-Generation Enabled Military Transformation: Australia, the UK and Shaping a Way Ahead

 

 

With the strategic shift, the importance of regional conflict, and of regional allies is enhanced within the overall context of full spectrum crisis management.

And with it, the need for enhanced self-reliance of allies as well.

But enhanced self-reliance in the context of dealing with global authoritarian challenges for the liberal democracies, their partners and allies requires a balancing act.

On the one hand, the regional partner or ally requires access to the force capabilities and the industrial underpinnings of those capabilities evident in a relatively small number of defense industrial powers. And this entails the capability to plug and play between the larger power and the regional partner or ally.

On the other hand, there is a growing need for indigenous industrial support for sustainment and the development and production of selected national or regional defense capabilities by regional partners or allies.

It is not a zero sum game, but does challenge the dichotomy of exporting and importing nations for more advanced equipment.

It is about how the regional partner or ally can shape enough sustainability and defense capability within the boundaries of its nation or regional setting to be able to work with a larger ally who needs to plug and play with the capabilities of that nation.

In our work with the Williams Foundation, the Australians are clearly working to enhance their sustainability and industrial infrastructure to support the evolution of their integrated force.

But clearly they are not alone.

In a recent piece published by our partner Front Line Defence,Brett Boudreau, a retired CAF Colonel, a Fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, and former Director of Marketing and Communications at CADSI (2013-14), assessed the presence of Canadian firms at the International Defence Exhibition and Conference (IDEX) at the National Exhibition Centre in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.

In so doing, he underscored the evolving trend and the challenges which this trend posed to Canadian industry:

One important take-away from IDEX with strategic consequences for Canada is how aggressively Saudi Arabia and the UAE alone and in partnership, have pursued strategies to substantially expand their respective homegrown defence industries.

Vision 2030 sets out Riyadh’s ambition for at least half of the national security and military equipment it needs to be produced locally by 2030, from about 2 per cent now.

To help achieve that, the state-owned Saudi Arabian Military Industries (or SAMI) was stood up in May 2017, and was already a major exhibitor at IDEX 2019. Chief Executive Andreas Schwer, in an interview with Reuters at a conference on the margins of IDEX, said SAMI “will generate 30 per cent of its revenues from export markets by 2030” and generate $10B in revenue over the next five years, aiming to create more than 40,000 jobs locally by 2030.

Schwer also said since 2018, SAMI had signed 19 joint venture deals with companies [none Canadian] and planned to sign 25 to 30 more in the next five years.

Emirati national leadership is also not shy to dream boldly, to set out long-term development visions, and to aggressively pursue ideas that seem fantastical at the time, be it in fields of tourism, transport or even space.

For instance, in 2014 the Dubai International Airport overtook London’s Heathrow to become the world’s busiest for international travellers, with more than 88 million passengers in 2017, up from 16 million in 2002, according to the airport authority. Dubai’s Expo 2020 expects to welcome at least 25 million visitors.

The five-decade-long national development vision – Centennial 2071 – has as its ambition nothing less than to make the UAE “the best country in the world”, with a focus on education, economy, government development and community cohesion. The emphasis on higher education and the application of advanced technology is at the heart of many national priorities and projects. The world’s first commercial hyperloop transport system – using electro-magnetic levitation to propel the capsule to speeds in excess of 1,100 km/h, is in production and will eventually link Abu Dhabi, Al Ain and Dubai in a 150-km network at a cost to build of $20-40M US per km, with the first 10 kms expected to be ready this year.

Last October, the UAE’s first locally-made satellite was launched into orbit from Japan, just one offshoot of the National Space Strategy 2030 to turn the country into a major global hub for space-related science and technology. The UAE will send its first astronaut to the International Space Station in 2019 (two are in training now), as well as a probe to Mars in 2020. In 2017, the UAE unveiled a 100-year plan to establish a colony on Mars by 2117 (!) – and are building a simulated prototype Mars colony in the desert: according to the Emirati project manager, the prototype 1.9 million square feet Mars Science City  near the Mohammad Bin Rashid Space Centre, will be 3-D-printed and operational in four years.

So, when leadership including Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, says the country wants to transform its defence industry to realize multiple strategic objectives in short order, we can expect that a national defence industrial strategy currently being developed will have big ambitions and heft behind it.

This muscular approach to a made-in-UAE defence industrial strategy is visible also by the upcoming exhibition schedule in the country.

Later this year is the Dubai airshow, and in early 2020, the Unmanned System Exhibition (UMEX) for drones, robotics and unmanned systems – the only one in the Middle East – and the Simulation and Training Exhibition (SimTEX) for defence, civil aviation and healthcare in Abu Dhabi,  expected to draw 12,000 visitors and 120 international exhibitors.

Comparing national efforts at a premium show like IDEX provides a stark visible contrast of different national strategies and approaches to indigenous defence and security industries.

“You can see it here at the exhibition and conference,” said one Canadian business representative.

“Some nations don’t look to be trying very hard at all, some look to be trying, some are serious, and some are really serious. At the very least, Canada should wish to move from the ‘look to be trying’ to the ‘we are serious’ category.”

“What we’ve seen in other nations is the nut we have to crack,” says Cianfarani. “We can keep talking about icing all these little cakes that we have now in Canada, but I do not believe they will make the tremendous impact in little bits and pieces that you get with a $15B [General Dynamics Land Systems] sale.

“The fact is 80% of the revenues driven by the industry are from less than 10% of the companies.”

To make a substantive difference in the industry, she says, “you’d have to pick five to ten major domains or procurements and go after them hard as a nation. You’d have to go after them like the French do, like the Germans do, like the UK does.

You’d have to mobilize the politicians, you have to mobilize the military to some extent [attaches] as sales people.”

That is particularly the case in Defence, she explains, since that is a marketplace that by definition is considerably more managed compared to other sectors such as IT.

“What we would love to see,” says Cianfarani, “is a contract that gets awarded under the IDEaS program or any other innovation program that’s happening, that actually gets purchased on an active procurement for Canada under the investment plan and then gets supported and promoted by the Trade Commissioners, Canadian Commercial Corporation and Global Affairs as a viable export from our country.”

Walking amongst so much military hardware of every sort imaginable at IDEX, one wonders about Canadian defence industry prospects in the face of focused competition from other countries and strained relations (including the spill-over effect of the Saudi Arabia boycott to its neighbours including the UAE, plus the uncertainties for exports stemming from the Liberal Government’s self-declared “values-based foreign policy”).

The latter doesn’t faze Cianfarani, however.

She says that so long as national leaders are clear about countries they have decided they no longer want to do business with, and why, being in the business of defence exports and having a values-based national foreign policy can co-exist. 

The featured photo highlights one country clearly interested in leveraging the regionalization trend line, the PRC.

The strategic challenge for the United States is clear:

How best to deal with the cross-cutting of two trend lines?

The first trend is the rise of global authoritarianism, something which was not anticipated with the optimistic end of history dominance by liberal democracies.

The second is how best to work the challenge of  reworking the industrial base in order to deal with the aspirational dynamics of regional partners and allies for the liberal democracies while maintaining cutting edge capabilities?

How to deal with both trends effectivley?