By Robbin Laird

On July 9, 2024, I had the opportunity to visit MWCS-28 which in English is Marine Wing Communications Squadron 28. The squadron provides expeditionary communications for the aviation combat element of the II Marine Expeditionary Force. They are based at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point and fall under the command of Marine Air Control Group 28 and the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing.

I was privileged to have a robust representation of the squadron and an opportunity to have a wide-ranging discussion of their approach and their recent engagement in the Nordic region in support of the Wing’s most recent Arctic exercise.

Present at the discussion were Maj. Mikel Santiago, operations officer, Lt. Col. Craig Schnappinger, commanding officer, MWCS-28, MGySgt Marcus Jackson, communications chief, MWCS-28, Maj. Richard Wise, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, 2nd MAW G-6, 1st Lt. Kara Paradowski, communications officer, MWCS-28, and 1st Lt. Bennett Lax, communications officer, MWCS-28.

It was an interesting group to discuss the way ahead with as two of the Marines were in the first tour of duty along with Marines which much combat experience.

The nature of the challenge set for the command was outlined during my interview in June with the then CG of 2nd MAW, Maj. Gen. Benedict. In that interview, he described 2nd MAW’s time in Nordic Response 2024 when a key focus was upon distributed aviation operations.

As he described the challenge: While a FARP remains the most visible manifestation of DO, it is the final action and does not by itself reflect significant choices and work necessary to create that capability to re-arm air assets at remote and ever-changing locations – allowing the force to disaggregate for protection and then aggregate to mass combat capability, all in a rapid manner to maintain tempo.

As MajGen Benedict put it: “The difference is the backside. Where is the location? Why that location? How do we get the fuel there? How do we get ordinance there? How do we provide force protection? How do we maintain the aircraft and for how long? How long are we going to be there? When do we need to move? All of these things are what I call the backside of distributed operations.”

 MWCS-28 was working the C2 support to 2nd MAW in support of distributed aviation operations.  And we discussed this along with correlated issues.

The conversation focused on the need for a fresh approach to command and control, logistics, and force distribution in the Nordic Region. Speakers emphasized the importance of understanding new technologies and integrating them into existing command structures. They also discussed the challenges of modernizing military infrastructure and investing in mobile capabilities.

Additionally, they highlighted the significance of interoperability, communication, and redesigning Command and Control systems to accommodate small form factors and user-friendly interfaces.

And a key point was that the Marines used various COTS equipment, but as they desire to use such equipment goes up notably in the C2 area, it is imperative to ensure proper training and maintenance procedures are in place for the deployed personnel to have the ability to make full use of the equipment in the most effective manner possible.

The clear purpose of working distributed forces is to enhance survivability but this has to be done within the logic of what is feasible. So this means discrete numbers of movement with the ability of C2 to support such movement.

This was exercised during Nordic Response 24, and as one Marine put it: “We utilized existing Marine Corps assets and commercial off the shelf assets in order to make ourselves more survivable and less prone to being identified hiding within the noise, so to speak. We were operating within existing infrastructure and bases that are already owned and operated by the Norwegians and working closely with them as well.”

In other words, the Marines were working distributed aviation operations but within a Nordic/NATO operating space.

But the integration piece within the Nordic operating space is a work in progress and part of the evolution of C2 capability in general which is required going forward. DAO in the Nordic case to be most effective is not a pickup piece but a planned and thought through concept of operations piece, and in my view, something 2nd MAW can excel at as the Nordics work their defense integration efforts.

There is no part of the world with more experience at operating a protected and distributed force than the Nordics and coming from North Carolina, the 2nd MAW Marines can contribute and learn how to seamless integrate into regional distribution of forces.

The challenge is significant as well as the opportunities for innovation.

By Robbin Laird

You have heard of the USMC Force Design 2030 as an adaptation to the threat environment. But with an emergent multi-polar authoritarian world, an even larger strategic redesign of U.S. forces is warranted.

The Osprey is important for the first; but is crucial for the second.

The United States and its allies are shaping a significant strategic redesign in the defense of Northern Europe coupled with the force projected from Norfolk and North Carolina.

In a way, what is being built with the Nordic region in terms of defense cooperation and integration (from Finland to Iceland) is being reinforced by the ability of the Norfolk-based fleet and the North Carolina-based Marines to work together in shaping a new strategic capability.

The three N’s (Nordics. Norfolk and North Carolina) are reshaping Northern European and North Atlantic defense, where the region is working its own defense and the United States (and Canada and Britain) provide reinforced capabilities to the overall strategic deterrence of Russia.

This is has come about with the interaction among three key dynamics:

• The Nordics post-2014 ramping up their defense capabilities and integration with the entrance of Finland and Sweden as an expression of this;
• the standup of Second Fleet and the establishment of the only NATO command on U.S. territory under President Trump (there are three commands under the 2^nd Fleet Commander which are 2^nd Fleet, Allied Joint Forces Command and the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Center of Excellence (CJOS COE));
• And the enhanced focus of attention of the North Carolina-based Marines on the Northern European region.

All three developments I have documented in detail in recent book length publications, so those books can be examined for detailed looks.[1]

But for the purposes of this article, the key point is that these three developments are creating the opportunity for a significant strategic redesign of U.S. and allied forces whereby the United States is reinforcing key allies and not replacing capabilities they should but don’t have developed themselves.

It is open ended in the sense that as the Nordic allies work through how to use their territory as a common defense capability, the U.S. Navy and USMC can work on how to operate in concert with these allies whereby the fleet can operate in the High North as well as in support of air and missile defense of the Nordic region. Additionally, the Marines can work on how to embed themselves in the Nordic region whereby the Nordics are the “inside force” to use the language of the USMC force design effort.

I have frequently visited 2^nd Marine Air Wing, and in one of the more recent visits (May 2024), the departing CO of 2^nd MAW, MajGen Benedict highlighted how he saw the opportunity.

“I went to a senior commander course in Naples where we focused on maritime combined arms operations. It struck me that both the Navy and Marines almost solely focus on Marine capabilities being employed from the sea, but not so much on how we can come from the land to support the naval campaign.”

“The opportunity to work with the Nordics as they continue to enhance defense integration clearly allows us to demonstrate and take advantage of that opportunity and to shape innovative ways to do so. And we did that in the Nordic Response 2024 exercise as well. There is a lot we can achieve in littoral operations without solely operating from an amphibious ship.”

The Marines have moved from their classic Cold War role of arriving in Norway and pulling out equipment from storage facilities as part of the reinforcement of Norway to become increasingly part of an integrated Marine Corps-Navy team reinforcing the Nordics, who are enhancing their capability to defend themselves.

But what role can the Osprey play in this strategic redesign?

In what I am calling the “3N” strategic redesign, the Nordics are working collectively together to enhance their ability to operate in strategic depth across their region, in addition to enhancing local or national defense capabilities. 2nd Fleet and the NATO command are working to shape more effective maritime reach and cover over the region reaching back to North America.

The Marines can project into the region, and through their innovations in distributed operations, in concert with the Nordic nations, can work through various combat nodes across the region. Supplies can be pre-positioned across the region and flown by Ospreys from the land to the fleet.

And with the CMV-22Bs coming from Norfolk, and working from the fleet and within the fleet, they can work together with USMC MV-22Bs to shape a cross-linking logistical capability for the fleet operating in support of Nordic and Marine Corps operations in the Nordic region, including the High North.

The Osprey, whether operating from the ship or the land, becomes a key logistical connector in the operations that can link up Nordic land and air defense with maritime reach.

Because the Osprey can land virtually anywhere, and has speed and range, the logistical reach from sea to land or land to sea becomes a key enabler for the evolving strategic redesign of the defense of the Nordics and the reach into North Atlantic defense.

There is no other logistic link which can work the distribution of supplies embedded in the Nordic region with the range and speed of the Osprey in order to connect the various nodes of the warfighting force across an integrated land and maritime extended battlespace.

[1] Robbin Laird and Murielle Delaporte, The Return of Direct Defense in Europe: Meeting the 21^st Century Authoritarian Challenge (2020); Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake, A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the 21^st Century (2022); Robbin Laird, The U.S. Marine Corps Transformation Path: Preparing for the High-End Fight (2022).

Featured Photo: Aug. 17, 2023) A CMV-22B Osprey, assigned to the “Titans” of Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Squadron (VRM) 30, returns to Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70). Vinson, Carrier Strike Group 1’s flagship, is underway conducting routine operations in the U.S. 3rd Fleet area of operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Isaiah B. Goessl)