By Ed Timperlake

The famous Navy saying “we are ready now” also means Navy R&D focus is to always be ever vigilant in building for the future.  The future is now but it is anchoring as well a way ahead.

In fact, for 2025 and beyond, the US Navy is the gold standard for the world for R&D research in understanding the technological imperative of an action/reaction cycle of weapons development against a reactive enemy. 

We have moved from an organic Carrier Battle Group to a kill web “no platform fights alone” approach which expands the impact of the carrier on the battlespace and in turn the carrier can leverage joint capabilities not present on the carrier itself.

There is also the great historical demonstrated strength in the combat history of the Navy with their famous “Ready on Arrival” combat ethos. 

With the current endless wars, a lot of attention has been focused on the combat effectiveness of the large deck carrier.

When a Carrier Strike Group, previously called a Carrier Battle Group sorties into harm’s way it is a global power projection combat capability. 

In 1966 the US Navy made a short movie about what was then called an “Attack Carrier.” 

The movie describes going to flight quarters and conducting combat air operations from an aircraft carrier off Vietnam. 

The US Navy when sent in harm’s way does whatever is asked to their last full measure, combat is their profession and loyalty to the Constitution not politics is their code.

“Ready on Arrival” highlights a simple truth evident today off Afghanistan that the direct lineage of the large deck aircraft carrier is an American point of pride. 

A modern carrier ready today launching into Afghanistan personifies the fundamental point of the movie that the U.S. can with unexpected events put a Carrier on Station to support friends and confront enemies.

Note that at times, as stated, the surface Navy can also undertake independent offensive operations, as the Russians in combat support for the President of Syria recently found out, after the Syrian President used chemical weapons on his opponents:

“They that go down to the sea in ships that do business in great waters.”

Psalms 107:23-31

When President Trump gave the go order to attack Shayrat Air Base Syria, where a chemical attack had been launched, two US Navy surface warships stood ready to implement the order.

In one shining moment with Tomahawks fired from USS Porter and USS Ross, the world knew a new Commander-in Chief was at the helm.

It was reported that 59 of the 60 Tomahawks hit the intended target. Our way of war was to actually warn the Russians to minimize any chance of Russian’s being hit or killed — how nice for them. 

The USS Porter and USS Ross successful attack showcased the command structure of the 21^st Century Navy.

No finer complement can be given to the 21^st Century navy and the dynamic and extremely successful contribution’s being made by the admission of women to the US Naval Academy than seeing the Commanding Officer of USS Porter have her crew earn an historic famous Flag Hoist “Bravo Zulu” for Job Well Done. 

Cmdr. Andria Slough graduated from the academy with a Bachelor of Science degree in ocean engineering. She serves as the commanding officer of the USS Porter, a Navy destroyer in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.

Performance counts from day one regardless of how one earns a commission.

The Skipper of the USS Ross, Commander Russell Caldwell, hails from Johannesburg, South Africa. Commander Russell Caldwell graduated the University of Kansas with a Bachelor of Science in Political Science and was commissioned on January 10, 1998.

The other “ready now” teams engaged in direct combat have been the special warfare community, the Navy SEALs, who also work with the Navy’s Silent Service. 

I had the opportunity in December 2011 to see an advanced preview of the movie “Act of  Valor,” an action thriller about US Navy SEALs, and my first impression was that it was sending a very powerful message to the enemies of America: Navy SEALs will be coming and you will be killed.

It was refreshing and rather unique to see a movie identify the real enemy; fanatical, death-loving Islamist extremists and no politically correct BS with surrogate enemies such as machines, fighting robots or space aliens. 

Also appreciated was how the film depicted the military without emoting or second-guessing their chosen profession. 

The almost obligatory Hollywood “Oh the inhumanity of it all!” moment did not arrive. 

Some SEAL teams may have pensive introspective poets or tortured souls in their ranks but not in this movie.

The real payoff of taking the risk of using actual SEALs was the fluidity of their motion. 

They moved like real warriors. 

Based on my many years of experience, the real military is just as it is depicted in the film. 

The physical movement, use of technology, submarine featured, and firepower and an ending that provides a sobering reminder of the human cost of fighting terrorism make this film outshine your standard action/adventure movie.

What President Putin and his IW propaganda team do not understand is that as a Carrier Strike Force goes forward the Admiral and his entire team are ever vigilant about unknown submarines. 

Just because the Navy doesn’t talk much about all aspects of Anti-Submarine Warfare doesn’t mean they ignore that domain, in fact it is just the opposite.

This is the third piece in our series on the response to Putin’s escalatory rhetoric and force structure planning.

By Robbin Laird

During my visit to Germany in February 2019, I had the chance to discuss the return of direct defense in Europe and the way ahead for German defense with an experienced Bundeswehr officer and thinker with many years of NATO experience, Brigadier General (ret.) Rainer Meyer zum Felde.

Meyer zum Felde is currently a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Security Policy Kiel University (ISPK).

From July 2013 to September 2017, he was the Senior Defence Advisor at the Permanent Delegation of Germany to NATO in Brussels and the German Representative in NATO’s Defence Policy and Planning Committee.

Prior to this, he served for two years as Vice President of the Federal Academy for Security Studies in Berlin. He worked in various national assignments related to security policy in the Ministry of Defence, including twice on the Minister’s Policy Planning and Advisory Staff (1996–98; 2006–09) and in the Politico-Military Department (1989–1991).

He has gathered extensive experience at NATO through integrated assignments at both Strategic Command Headquarters in Mons and Norfolk VA, as well as through national assignments at NATO HQ in Brussels, at military as well as political level.

Brigadier General Meyer zum Felde studied educational science at the University of the Bundeswehr in Munich (1974–1977) and holds an MA equivalent (1996) in Security Policy and International Relations from the University of Geneva and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP).

Question: How would you characterize the strategic shift in Europe after the Russian actions in Crimea?

Meyer zum Felde: After unification, the basic belief was that friends surrounded us. We wrote in the 2006 White Book, that we did not face a direct threat from Russian anymore and that only the most likely missions, i.e. crisis prevention, crisis response and peace enforcement mission such as in the Balkans and Afghanistan should guide the German defense posture.

“But the Russian aggression against Ukraine, which hit Germany and many other Europeans as a strategic surprise, made clear that this was a wrong assessment. Russia is back as a threat to Europe in the short and mid term.

“And what we have to be concerned about in the long run is an emerging axis between Russia and China, ganging up on a global scale against the West or what then may be left from the “West.”

“Now we face the challenge to rebuild and reconstitute our armed forces at the high end.

“But different from our Eastern European neighbors, who very clearly see themselves threatened by Russian behavior and power, we need to do so in a social context where many Germans do not share the assessment of the NATO governments that Russia poses a direct threat to Europe.

“Unfortunately, even within the coalition government, the consensus on our future defence posture broke during the federal election campaign in summer 2017 and this has not yet been fixed due to purely domestic tactical party politics.”

Question: You have had several tours of duty within NATO and during your time there you were part of the rethink and refocus on the need for higher end forces.

How would you describe that reawakening?

Meyer zum Felde: In 2013 it was increasingly clear that after a 20-year long set of missions at the lower or mid-level COIN and crisis management operations, NATO had lost core skills to provide NATO with the necessary set of forces and capability for high-intensity warfare.

“Although we still talked about the need for sustained collective defense from the mid-1990s on, we failed to underpin direct defense with usable capabilities, larger combat formations and a realistic defense planning process.

“Most European nations decreased their level of readiness, eliminated forces which they believed they no longer needed, notably heavy ones, and turned their forces the kind of expeditionary forces recommended and requested by the Americans and the Brits.

“We certainly followed suit in Germany.

“And the last two decades we no longer prioritized the forces for high-intensity warfare.

“Instead, we used the German armed forces formations since the mid-1990s as a pool for generating contingents for sustained crisis management operations abroad, while shrinking the entire posture to a much lower size and decreasing the defense budget from about 3% to 1.2% of GDP.”

Question: How do you see the way ahead?

Meyer zum Felde: The Germans need to continue to engage with our forces in crisis management missions at the southern periphery of Europe.

“That doesn’t come to an end; but the context has changed.

“Priority must now be again on collective defence and related high intensity warfighting capabilities for credible deterrence.

“The Bundeswehr must become again essential part of the conventional backbone of defence in Europe, similar to its role in the Cold War.

“NATO has significantly changed since 2014 as there has been a clear focus on preparing NATO to deny Russia the option to conduct a hybrid invasion of allied territory or win a regional war in Northeast or Southeast Europe.

“We have accelerated the political and military decision making processes by introducing Graduated Response Plans which more similar to the former General Defence Plan of the Cold War era than to the insufficient recent contingency plans.

“We sharply increased NATO’s responsiveness by tripling the NATO Response Force to a division-sized joint task force of 40.000, with a “spearhead brigade” (called VJTF) in very high readiness.

“These forces are nearly purely European, and complemented by the very impressive return of a full-fletched heavy US division to Europe in the context of the U.S. European Reassurance Initiative.

“Last not least, we promised at Wales in 2014, and have iterated this pledge at every Leader’ Meeting since then, to stop the decline of budgets and move towards the 2 Percent target within a decade, including investing 20% on modern equipment.

“All that is being done in order to prepare NATO better to react in a credible way and more effectively reassuring the eastern member states that are all threatened deeply by Russia and had the feeling they were the next after Crimea and have requested NATO as an alliance to protect them.

“The package produced at the Wales NATO Summit in 2014 from my perspective was reasonable, was meaningful, was balanced, and first what needed to be done.

“General Breedlove, the SACEUR at the time, underscored the central significance for NATO to maintain unity and resolve. Resolve meant to agree upon a really meaningful package of forces with sufficient capability to send a message to reassurance allies and to deter Putin.”

Question: Obviously, you were engaged as a German representative in NATO in these various efforts, what have been the major German foci during this refocusing effort?

Meyer zum Felde: We took a very constructive approach to keep the Alliance together. On the one hand, Germany has emphasized the need to have a two track approach like we did during the Cold War, namely enhancing deterrence but keeping open lines for dialogue with Russia.

“On the other hand, the Germans accepted an increased responsibility for protecting and supporting the allies in our neighborhood. Notably with regard to the Baltics we have deployed an armored battalion to the region, as core of a the multinational battle group in Lithuania under German lead as framework nation. The Brits took care for Estonia, the Canadians for Latvia. All these battlegroups are similar in size and function to the American, British and French Berlin brigades in the time of the Cold War.

“But to be credible these enhanced forward presence battlegroups need to be reinforced and that was the rope of the enhanced NATO response force.  Currently for 2019, Germany is providing for the second time after 2015 the brigade sized “spearhead force” (VJTF Land), and given the current state of the German armed forces this is a challenge. The force was trained and certified during the Trident Juncture 2018 exercise and now provides NATO’s first response force in case of need.

“With a view on further reinforcements, we are committed to provide one brigade after the other in the years to come to be able to form two combat divisions with six combat brigades and by the early 2030s, a third division with another two brigades.

“This cannot be done overnight.

“It requires time to reconstitute forces as combat formations, but it is in the plans and under implementation.

“From my perspective, one challenge to winning the debate in Germany for commitments to the kind of deterrent force we need has been President Trump’s position taken during the campaign claiming that NATO is not really relevant but obsolete.

“His calling into question of Article V puts at risks what we have so successfully achieved at the NATO summits in Wales and Warsaw: to maintain unity and resolve as the West’s centre of gravity which is under attack by Russia.

“However, he is right in urging the European governments, in particular Berlin, to fully implement the 2% pledge.

“Here he has a valid point, shared by a broad majority of allies.

“For Germany, it is only through a strengthened NATO that such a commitment will happen.

“Or put another way, to demand that Germany doubles its defense spending, will not happen without reinforcing the notion that NATO matters.

“And what matters most for German defense experts is what Germany cannot substitute on their own, namely a credible nuclear umbrella for Europe.

“It would have far reaching geopolitical consequences, if we could not longer count on the US extended deterrence.

“In that case, being a non-nuclear ally, we would have to reconsider much of what we have agreed and implemented so far.

“If the West failed to maintain its unity and resolve, the only winner of such a development would be Russian and China.”

The featured photo shows an armored platoon of the German Battlegroup of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force Brigade attacking with main battle tank Leopard 2 from the Norwegian city of Engerdal towards Drevsjo. NATO exercise Trident Juncture, in Norway, at November 04, 2018.

Photo: SGM Marco Dorow, German Army.

By Edward Timperlake

In the first article in the series, we introduced the notion developed by Paul Bracken of breaking escalation dominance into smaller chunks.

In his book on the Second Nuclear Age , he argued that mastering the maneuver space for the threat to use nuclear weapons was part of escalation dominance which leaders who have access to nuclear weapons have access to and work to master.

Nuclear weapons thus made the calculation of “next moves” central to strategy. A mistake, a careless decision, or a misestimate could lead to a lot more than political embarrassment. Big decisions over war or peace were broken down into lots of smaller ones about the use of force and where it might lead.

And even the smallest decisions got high-level attention. In the Berlin crisis of 1948, the decision as to the kind of rifles U.S. guards carried on trains running to Berlin, M-1s or carbines, was kicked all the way up to the White House. 

The skill needed to identify these smaller decisions was learned on the job. It was not anticipated. Everything said here about the calculated use of force to achieve various purposes, basing decisions about using force on estimates of an opponent’s reaction, breaking down sweeping decisions on war or peace into much smaller “chunks,” and high-level attention given to micro moves—none of this was foreseen. It was “discovered” by national leaders and, even then, usually after they got into a crisis.¹

Developing and showcasing a sub-based hypersonic cruise missile can be considered a “smaller chunk” in any escalation/de-escalation cycle.

Since the beginning of the first nuclear age into the second not only are the technological capabilities and intentions of force capabilities of paramount importance, it is also the intangibles of information war (IW) statements that directly impact on Professor Bracken’s point about any ops-tempo in times of crises.

Russia’s Putin understands Information War messaging about the use of nuclear weapons: 

“All Russians will go to heaven” as recently stated by a “deeply” religious former KGB Officer. 

“About a third of the way through, Putin conjured the specter of nuclear war, most likely with the United States, though he didn’t name the enemy explicitly. 

“As martyrs, we will go to heaven,” he promised. 

“And they will just croak because they won’t even have time to repent.”²

What a really nasty statement.

But it almost certainly aimed at Islamic extremists and is designed to take off the table any advantage that would accrue to those who believe that Russians fear death at the hands of Islamic extremists.

Now in addition to his IW mysticism he has personally threatened America, especially President 

Trump and his family, by having the White House and Camp David mentioned on his target list. 

This is threatening on so many levels.

The US Navy is standing ready at all levels of combat effectiveness, because  in over a hundred years of successful  Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)  from the Chief of Naval Operations down Navy Leadership has always  recognized that the future is now in standing  ready to meet threats. 

The President of Russia in February 2019  directly threatened the US with a nuclear strike from his submarine fleet off our East Coast. He and his war planners must be puzzled by a simple question; how did the United States already anticipate this threat?

Navy Chief of Naval Operations seemingly knew that Putin would eventually make such a bold threat.

President Putin and your sailors meet our newly reestablished 2nd Fleet established by CNO Admiral John Richardson, who graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1982 with a Bachelor of Science in Physics.

As Admiral Richardson noted at the ceremony establishing the command:

“Although deeply consequential, the meaning of this establishment can be summarized simply as a dynamic response to a dynamic security environment — a security environment clearly articulated in the National Defense Strategy,” said Richardson.

“We first need to understand this competitive security environment and why it demands every ounce of our tenacity, ingenuity and fighting spirit. Then we can focus on the mission and how best to accomplish it; 2nd Fleet will enhance our capacity to maneuver and fight in the Atlantic, and as a result, help to maintain America’s maritime superiority that will lead to security, influence and prosperity for our nation.”³

Put in blunt terms, the US Navy has anticipated what Putin is now trying to establish as an advantage in a future battle.

But the Navy is clearly working the challenge of preparing and training for a 21st century battle of the Atlantic.

And this time, the US Navy is leveraging not just its own service technology but the full panoply of what the joint and allied forces can provide as well to shape a nuclear-nuclear-tipped kill web that can dominate in a crisis and provide significant maneuver space for the President in dealing with Putin in a pre-crisis situation.

It is not about assuming strategic dominance with a so-called anti-access and area denial approach; it is about having to confront a 21st century combat force which is constantly innovating  and training to defeat a peer competitor.

As the CNO noted in 2016:

“To ensure clarity in our thinking and precision… We’ll no longer use the term A2/AD as a stand-alone acronym that can mean all things to all people or anything to anyone – we have to be better than that.”

“Since different theaters present unique challenges, ‘one size fits all’ term to describe the mission and the challenge creates confusion, not clarity. Instead, we will talk in specifics about our strategies and capabilities relative to those of our potential adversaries, within the specific context of geography, concepts, and technologies.”⁴

Remember Putin — we shoot back.

And before that we have significant maneuver forces to affect pre-crisis decision making of even the consummate chess player like Putin.

The featured photo shows Commander, U.S. 2nd Fleet Vice Adm. Andrew “Woody” Lewis talking with Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson and Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Adm. Chris Grady, following the 2nd Fleet Establishment Ceremony aboard the nuclear aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77).

U.S. 2nd Fleet will exercise operational and administrative authorities over assigned ships, aircraft and landing forces on the East Coast and North Atlantic.

NORFOLK (Aug. 24, 2018)

This is the second piece in our series on the response to Putin’s escalatory rhetoric and force structure planning.

By Edward Timperlake

President Putin has recently threatened a direct attack against the United States with nuclear weapons if we do not comply with his strategic approach to Europe and the West.

The Russian PR machine has kicked in and we have a recent you tube visit from a St. Petersburg choir highlighting a historical tune threatening such an event.

Notably, President Putin focused on the employment of nuclear tipped hypersonic cruise missiles launched from his navy’s submarines off of the East Coast of the United States.⁵

In effect, what Putin did was to sound “General Quarters” for a combat proven warfighting Navy to go on high alert.  The United States has now joined allies like Denmark which are the focus of the use of nuclear weapons threats as part of normal diplomacy.

But Putin has really picked the wrong adversary; one that can only shoot back with devastating results on Russia itself but operate in ways that can shred his own navy.

The greatest intangible strength of the US Sea Services is the fact that the diverse backgrounds of all Americans are forged together into a fighting Navy  based on honor, and  team play that has as it’s very foundation the principle of always being a performance  based meritocracy.

The greatest tangible strength is that from the heavens to the deepest of the deep, the American Navy has world class state-of the art weapons and platforms integrated seamlessly into  an evolving kill web, nuclear tipped.

No platform fights alone and the Navy always “trains trains trains” for evolving contingencies.

Refocusing on Core Threats

“Putin also announced the coming deployment of the new Zircon hypersonic missile for the Russian navy, saying it’s capable of flying at nine times the speed of sound and will have a range of 1,000 kilometers (620 miles).

He said the Zircon program will not be too costly as the missile has been designed to equip Russia’s existing surface ships and submarines.”

“Potie Poot” as he was called by President Bush 43 or the man President Obama could do flexible business with after the 2012 Election has yet again miscalculated.  Our President and the military will take his threats very seriously and act appropriately to show and not tell him that threatening United States with a sub launched nuclear strike is not a good plan.

The Cold War legacy to this day is that the number one event that can destroy America is a successful attack by an enemy that can launch a multiple nuclear warhead strike on the United State. 

Everything else that currently takes probably 99% of our worries in print is second order. 

This is not a bad thing because it reflects that our national command authority and Commander-in Chief are getting it right by refocusing our defense efforts on those peer competitors which seek to hurt us most.

Today a barrage fire targeting America with a massive strategic strike using nuclear warheads by Russia or China is still the ultimate strategic threat. The American military triad of ready launch missiles in silos, USN Boomers on station and strategic bombers comprise our strategic response force that is standing ever vigilant.

Deterring Russia and China with massive retaliation is the easiest theory to understand in this murky 21st Century “Second Nuclear Age”. 

In a seminal book Professor Paul Bracken of Yale University underscored the challenge of deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age:

What I wanted to do was to shift the debate.  

There are many, many studies of books about deterrence, but deterrence really needs to be broken up into what I would call smaller chunks, which really gets into the subject of escalation and de-escalation.  

I don’t think it’s possible to talk about deterrence and not talk about escalation and de-escalatio⁶

In his book, he argued that mastering the maneuver space for the threat to use nuclear weapons was part of escalation dominance which leaders who have access to nuclear weapons have access to and work to master.

Nuclear weapons thus made the calculation of “next moves” central to strategy. A mistake, a careless decision, or a misestimate could lead to a lot more than political embarrassment. Big decisions over war or peace were broken down into lots of smaller ones about the use of force and where it might lead.

And even the smallest decisions got high-level attention. In the Berlin crisis of 1948, the decision as to the kind of rifles U.S. guards carried on trains running to Berlin, M-1s or carbines, was kicked all the way up to the White House. 

The skill needed to identify these smaller decisions was learned on the job. It was not anticipated. Everything said here about the calculated use of force to achieve various purposes, basing decisions about using force on estimates of an opponent’s reaction, breaking down sweeping decisions on war or peace into much smaller “chunks,” and high-level attention given to micro moves—none of this was foreseen. It was “discovered” by national leaders and, even then, usually after they got into a crisis.⁷

What the Putin threat is really about is putting on the table elements of trying to dominate escalation management.

“If you respond to my violations of the INF treaty, by actually reshaping your capabilities to defense your allies, I would move my chips on the table and move to destroy you at the heart of government with a new technology which you have no response to.”

Sounds interesting: but let us look at how Putin is working to shape an escalation declaratory control policy and how the United States can not just respond, but pre-empt?

This is not about arms control; it is about the maneuver space in a pre-crisis situation in which declaratory policy coupled with capabilities can shape outcomes, without even firing a shot.

Editor’s Note: This article is the first in a multiple article series which will be capped by a publication of the articles into a single report when the series is completed.