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In an note published by Defense Industry Daily on March 21, 2018, it is reported that the US Army is seeking to accelerate the effort to integrate THAAD with Patriot in operations.
Defense News reports that the US Army is seeking to tie up its THAAD and Patriot air defense units with a common network within a two year framework, as part of efforts to establish a more effective, layered approach to air and missile defense (AMD).
The effort is being led in South Korea, where both systems are currently deployed and working side by side.
If successful, THAAD’s AN/TPY-2 radar will enable the Patriot missile units to expand their battlespace. It had been previously thought by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) that such integration would not be possible for another four or five years, however, a re-prioritization has allowed for this timeframe to be at halved.
The deployment of THAAD to the Korean peninsula in 2017 occurred during a period of high tensions over North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile weapon program. It received much criticism from China, who said its powerful radar was capable of penetrating its territory.
The Norwegian State Secretary within the Ministry of Defence delivered a speech to the EU Parliamenty Subcommittee on Security and Defence on February 27, 2108 which outlined Norwegian views on the threat as well as the role of NATO and the EU in dealing with the threat facing Norway.
Tone Skogen, State Secretary of Defence, Norway
Introduction
It is a privilege to be invited to this distinguished committee of the European Parliament. This is a good opportunity to share some reflections on Norwegian security policy, including our cooperation with the EU in this field.
Norway is a very close partner of the EU. We are full members of the Single Market, including for defence equipment, and the Schengen Area. We share the same values, and cooperate in handling common challenges such as climate change, economic and social disparities and migration.
Norway is also a strong supporter of the EU’s Common foreign and security policy, as well as its security and defence policy. We will continue our efforts to improve our long-standing and close relationship, both by developing existing tools, and by looking into new possibilities and areas. I will go into more detail on that later.
Before doing so, a few words on Norwegian security policy in general.
Norwegian security policy
The primary objective of Norway’s security and defence policy is to secure Norway’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and political freedom of action.
The overall framework of international law, the UN, NATO and trans-atlantic security cooperation are the cornerstones of Norway’s security and defence policy. The EU is also essential – as the prime vehicle for European unity and solidarity.
Situation in the High North and the Arctic
Norwegian security policy is closely tied to our geographic location,- in the northern-most corner of Europe. The High North is high on our agenda.
In a period of increasing tension, these are still regions of relative stability, and our overall goal is to keep it that way. Stability, sustainable development, and international cooperation are the main elements of our policy.
That said, we see a new dynamic also in our region. Climate change will open up the Arctic to new human activity, including the exploitation of resources, transportation and tourism.
Increased commercial activity in the Arctic will not necessarily have any negative consequences for security. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is the framework for solving most of the outstanding issues in the region. Most of the oil- and gas resources are within undisputed areas of jurisdiction of the Arctic coastal states. Presently, we do not foresee a race for the Arctic.
However, the consequences of a more assertive Russia are evident also in the high north. The Arctic is of increasing importance to Russia, both from a resource- and military point of view.
The Kola peninsula – located just across the border from Norway – continues to be home to the Russian sea-based nuclear strategic deterrent. We have the world’s largest concentration of non-western military assets on our door-step. Russia has revived its ability in crisis or war to threaten the sea lines of communication from the US to Europe, – and also the defence of Norway.
These developments have implications for Norway and NATO, – even if we do not consider Russia a direct military threat to Norway.
Part of our answer is continuity. The Norwegian Defence Forces already play an important role in the High North in peacetime. This routine military presence is important in terms of ensuring situational awareness, regular presence, sovereignty, and overall stability and predictability.
In view of the security situation, however, we have also seen the need to strengthen our national defences. This includes improved readiness, and procurements of new strategic assets like F-35 combat aircraft, maritime patrol aircraft and submarines. We are reviewing the army.
In serious crisis or war, Norway will relyheavily on Allied reinforcements. We welcome a somewhat increased Allied presence in the north. In the autumn we will host exercise Trident Juncture with 35 000 participants, the largest Allied exercise in Norway for years. These activities strengthen collective defence.
In view of Russia’s policies in the Ukraine, Norway has aligned herself closely with the EU-sanctions policy, and NATO’s suspension of practical military cooperation. At the same time we aim for a balanced approach. We have a long history of practical cooperation with Russia in the north, in areas like fisheries, and people-to-people. We continue to cooperate with Russia in certain areas, including the border guard, search and rescue, the Incidents at Sea-agreement, – and a hotline between Joint Operational Headquarters in Bodø and the Northern Fleet. This is our contribution to regional stability in the north.
NATO
NATO is a main pillar in Norwegian security policy. NATO – just like the EU – today faces serious challenges from both the East and the South.
The challenges from the East are the key driving force in re-directing NATO’s attention towards collective defence. This includes not only enhanced forward presence in the Baltics and Poland, but also updated defence plans for all exposed regions, improvements in readiness, logistics, and exercises. NATO has also agreed on a revised command structure, including a new dedicated headquarter with responsibility for the Atlantic. NATO’s increased focus on collective defence – including the maritime dimension – is highly relevant for our needs in the north.
Today’s Russia reminds us of some basic facts. The transatlantic link is vital for credible collective defence. We welcome the increased US military presence in Europe, – including in Norway. However, collective defence is a two-way street. The Europeans have to do more. Burden-sharing is a key part of this. Norway remains committed to moving towards spending 2 % of GDP on defence, as agreed upon by the Allies in 2014.
Another observation is the necessity of NATO-EU cooperation, also in relation to Russia. NATO is responsible for creating military deterrence, but the EU is vital in terms of the broader political and economic relations, including sanctions. The two organizations complement each other in a crucial way.
The challenge from the South is different in nature. NATO has decided to take a somewhat increased role in the South, and in the fight against terrorism. The fight against ISIL is approaching the end, but the real challenges lie ahead. It is related to post-conflict stabilization. This will guide NATO’s role, with a focus on capacity building and security sector reform. Military instruments are only part of the answer. Cooperation with other organizations will be vital, – especially the EU with its wider range of political and economic instruments.
Development of the CSDP
Developments in NATO cannot be seen in isolation from developments in the EU. Norway supports the idea that Europe must take a larger role in security and defence. It is natural and inevitable.
A coordinated EU that takes greater responsibility for European security is also good for our transatlantic relations, – as an expression of burden-sharing.
A key goal for Norway over the last twenty years has been to associate herself closely with this key European development. On foreign policy we have a strong tradition of aligning ourselves with EU-declarations and restrictive measures. We have contributed to several EU-led crisis management operations. We are a significant contributor to the European Defence Agency.
We follow with great interest the more recent initiatives which have been launched from the EU to strengthen the CSDP further.
This relates in particular to the establishment of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), and the establishment of the European Defence Fund (EDF). Norway participates – as the only non-member country – in the research part of EDF.
PESCO, EDF and MPCC are all welcome. It is however important that a further deepening of CSDP does not lead to the emergence of new dividing lines in the security policy field. This brings me to my next point, – namely
EU- NATO Cooperation
Since the joint EU-NATO Declaration in Warsaw, there has been considerable progress on cooperation between the two organizations. There is a now a clear recognition that we face the same challenges. The resources are owned by the same member countries. The issue is no longer how to avoid competition or duplication, but how to ensure interoperability. HR Mogherini and Secretary General Stoltenberg lead the way by their dialogue at the strategic level.
The new dynamic of the CSDP – combined with the current security situation – is a strong incentive for further intensifying the cooperation between the two organizations. We have on the table several concrete proposals for cooperation.
The challenge is implementation. A realistic near-term goal should be to zoom in on a limited number of proposals of common interest. One of the most promising is aimed at reducing obstacles to the movement of military forces across European borders in crisis or war. It should be a deliverable for the July NATO Summit, – and it would give concrete content to a renewed common EU-NATO statement.
There is also room for increased cooperation in the Western Balkans, and on exercises. NATO-EU relations will be a key theme for the NATO-summit. By then we must have some tangible results.
Brexit
The new dynamic in European defence cooperation comes in parallel with Brexit. Brexit has helped to release a potential on the part of the EU, which is taken forward under the lead of major member states. This is significant.
From a Norwegian perspective, it is vital to ensure that the new dynamic in CSDP – in combination with Brexit – does not have negative consequences for any of the parties involved – including the EU, the UK – and Norway.
We must avoid a weakening of CSDP as a result of Brexit. At the same time we want the UK to maintain her role as a key player in the CSDP – and European security. The most recent signals from the UK indicates a clear desire to be closely integrated into the CSDP. That is welcome.
At the same time we note that the UK’s desired arrangements for participation go well beyond what Norway currently has as a third party. The UK’s future third party arrangements with the CSDP is of considerable interest also to Norway.
Norway is not party to the negotiations between Brussels and London. But we have a legitimate interest in the outcome, due to our membership in the European Economic Area (EEA), our close cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, as well as our participation as third party in the CSDP. We are therefore interested in keeping a close dialogue with the EU on the state of play. Being here today is a key part of the dialogue. This brings me to my last theme, namely…
Norway’s participation as partner in CSDP
It is important that the CSDP is developed in a transparent manner, and with the possibility for participation of Allied countries that are not members of the EU.
As indicated, Norway has a strong interest in being closely associated with the CSDP. We have made visible contributions to the CSDP over the years, including participation in three military- and nine civilian mission. We have assigned forces to the EU Battle Groups. We are among the most active contributors to EDA. We welcome the opportunity to participate in the research part (Preparatory Action on Defence Research/PADR) of the new European Defence Fund, – as the only non-member state.
Generally, we appreciate the existing opportunities for third parties to cooperate with the EU on security and defence. However, there is room for improvements in certain key areas.
In particular, a closer involvement in discussions, “decision-shaping” and information sharing would make participation in, and contributions to, future CSDP operations and missions more attractive to partners like Norway. We believe such involvement could best be achieved through differentiation between various partner countries, taking into consideration their individual characteristics. In other words, – a more tailored approach.
Another key issue is related to the new European Defence Fund. For Norway, it is important that we are invited to participate in the second part of this fund, – the European Defence Industrial Development Program (EDIDP). Our participation here would benefit all parties involved in this program, for a number of reasons:
Firstly, Norwegian defence industry is high-tech and internationally competitive, playing an important role in the European defence industry supply chain.
Secondly, for the EU, Norway is a highly relevant partner, as an integral part of the European defence equipment market, an active partner in Europeans armaments cooperation, and a large customer for European defence industry, It seems artificial to view the defence market as distinct from the internal markets Norway is an integral part of. This would be to the benefit of all 31 countries.
Thirdly, through our participation in the research part of the fund, Norwegian defence industry will make a significant contribution to research on defence capabilities. To be included in research on defence capabilities, but excluded from the development of those capabilities, is not logical.
We therefore believe it would be of mutual interest and benefit to invite Norway and its defence industry to take part in EDIDP-projects, where Norwegian participation is promoted by participating EU member states. Norway would shoulder its own costs linked to this participation.
We would also like to have the possibility for future participation in individual PESCO-projects.
EDF and PESCO illustrate a broader point. Finland and Sweden today have status as “Enhanced Opportunities Partners” in NATO and enjoy extensive participation in relation to operations and policy deliberations. There is unfortunately, an increasing asymmetry between the rights Finland and Sweden have as partners in NATO, and the rights Norway has, as a non-EU member in the EU.
This asymmetry is odd, given that NATO and EU are strategic partners and should aim for openness and involvement of all EU- and NATO-countries.
We welcome that the EU has initiated a process based on a more “strategic approach” towards partner-countries. We hope this process could also address the concerns of close partner countries like Norway.
The fact that there is room for improvement should not distract from my main message. Norway values very much the opportunity to be closely associated with CSDP. We have made significant contributions to this part of the EU-cooperation, and our clear aim is to continue to do so in years to come. It is in the common interest of all European countries.
Thank you again for inviting me, and for your attention.
Brimstone is clearly a key part of that transition.
And according to a news story published March 27, 2018 on the UK MoD website, the UK MoD is investing £400m in the new capability.
The ultra-accurate Brimstone already has a successful track record, playing a critical role from Tornado fighter jets in the fight against Daesh in Syria and Iraq, and the deal will now see the missile upgraded to become compatible with Typhoons.
The £400 million Brimstone 2 Capability Sustainment Programme with MBDA UK will also build new equipment to support the capability and develop a stockpile of weapons available for operations, creating around 130 brand new jobs and sustaining hundreds more across the country.
A Typhoon from 3(F) Squadron Royal Air Force departs for air combat training during EX INIOCHOS at Andravida Air Base, Greece. Royal Air Force Typhoon Aircraft from 3 (F) Squadron of RAF Coningsby, have been taking part in EX INIOCHOS at Andravida Air Base, Greece, Working in both an air-to-air and air-to-ground role, the 6 RAF Typhoons have been training alongside aircraft from the USA, United Arab Emirates, Italy, Cyprus, Israel and the host nation, Greece. The exercise, involving over 70 aircraft, has allowed RAF pilots and ground crew to train alongside partner nations and NATO allies in Air Combat Tactics and working practices. During the Exercise, RAF Coningsby Station Commander Group Captain Baulkwill accompanied British Ambassador to Greece, Kate Smith CMG, meeting distinguished guests from participating nations, as well as Royal Air Force personnel involved EX INIOCHOS.
Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson said:
“Our world-class defence industry is a key foundation on which our great military is built, and the weapons it produces like the pinpoint Brimstone missiles have been crucial in helping our fighter pilots on missions such as driving down Daesh territory in the Middle East.
“This massive £400m investment is a huge boost to the proud workforce equipping our Armed Forces and will create and protect hundreds of jobs across the country, bolstering both the power of the Typhoon jet and British prosperity.”
The new variation is being developed through the Brimstone 2 Capability Sustainment Programme will replace all earlier variants in 2022 and have an upgraded seeker, rocket motor, warhead and guidance system, making it an even more effective weapon.
The new missile will arm Typhoon when it takes over as the RAF’s principal ground-attack aircraft in 2019.
The work has created around 130 new jobs and sustains a further 270 existing jobs at MBDA’s sites in Stevenage, Bolton and across the company’s significant UK supply chain.
Brimstone is currently in use by the UK’s Tornado squadrons in Iraq and Syria as part of Operation Shader and has also been used on operations in Afghanistan and Libya.
Chief of Material Land at the MOD’s procurement organisation, Lieutenant General Paul Jaques said:
“The Brimstone 2 CSP contract enables us to continue to deliver a world class air to surface missile in support of the RAF’s Typhoon Squadrons on operations worldwide.
It is excellent news not only for our troops but also for the UK economy, with jobs and skills being sustained across the country”
The programme will also allow the weapon to be further developed for use on future aircraft.
Brimstone is among weapons being considered for use by the British Army’s new AH-64E Apache attack helicopters and the RAF’s next-generation Protector unmanned aerial system.
During our visit to Australia in March 2018, we had a chance to get an update on the next round of modernization of the RAAF which is driven by the F-35, the operation of the Growler and the incorporation of the new robotic boom into the KC-30A as well as software upgrades to the Wedgetail supporting all of the above.
We visited Williamtown airbase which is the lead base for standing up the F-35 in the RAAF, and discussed the standup with head of the Air Commodore Kitcher, head of the Air Combat Group. One of his responsibilities is the transition at Williamtown from Hornets to the F-35 in the near future.
We will publish our interview with the Air Commodore in the near future in which he discussed the transition of the RAAF from the standpoint of ACG and the introduction of the F-35.
As Murielle Delaporte noted in a forthcoming article leveraging her time at Williamtown as part of the SLD team:
“The RAAF has gone through significant transition as the C-17, KC-30A, Super Hornet and Wedgetails have all already been added to the force over the past few years.
“The air combat capability for the RAAF required rapid and significant change and the RAAF is leveraging that experience as it shifts from a legacy to a next-generation fighter force.
“The pace of transformation is rather breathtaking: if you thought that the five past years brought quite a change, wait to see what the next three years are about to bring about!”
A recent article by Andrew Tillett, published by the Financial Review, looked at the F-35 coming closer to entering service with the RAAF.
Commander Air Combat Group Air Commodore Michael Kitcher said while there had been delays, Australia’s aircraft were being delivered on time and pilots liked what they experienced.
“The best way I can describe the capability of the aircraft is there are a lot of people who have never flown the aircraft that might choose to be purported experts on it,” he said.
Air Commodore Kitcher after taking command of the Air Combat Group last year.
“But when I talk to the aircrew that fly the aircraft there is nothing but praise for its capabilities and the fact that it is a step change in capability from anything else we’ve got.
“The jet is performing well [but] that is not to say there are no challenges. It is still a new aircraft being introduced but I believe we understand the nature of most of those challenges and are working through them.
“The guys talk about the fact they will go flying and they will do things as a two-ship and four-ship F-35s (missions) they would not even dream about doing with the classic Hornet or Super Hornet, and achieve kill-ratios that you could not replicate in other non-fifth generation platforms.”
And further insight has been provided by a recent version of 3rd Squadron news concerning the shift from the Hornets to the F-35. In a note written by Wing Commander Darren Clare, the new Commander of No. 3 squadron:
Welcome to 2018!
This is a significant time for 3 Squadron, as we continue the transition from the F/A-18 Hornet to the F-35A Lightning II.
I was fortunate enough to make it home to Williamtown for our Change of Command on 14 December last year, where WGCDR (now Group Captain) John Haly officially handed over the Squadron to me. I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate 3 Squadron ‘Hornet’ and GPCAPT Haly for their outstanding contribution to the defence of Australia, and to also congratulate them for being awarded the Kittyhawk Trophy for being the most effective 81 Wing Fighter Squadron for 2017.
Returning immediately to Phoenix the following day, we held a small function to recognise the standing-up of “3 Squadron F-35A”, and I had the fantastic opportunity, in my first official act as Commanding Officer, to promote seven of the team over here. This had been kept as a surprise for them and, I think, happening right around Christmas was an added bonus.
The next significant milestone for us here will be the arrival of aircraft AU-003 in early February – the first aircraft bearing 3 Squadron markings [pictured above]. It will go into service initially with the 61st Fighter Squadron here at Luke AFB (our host squadron) and will be the Squadron’s first 3FSoftware aircraft, which brings with it some great enhancements in capability.
Following aircraft AU-003, seven more F-35A aircraft will enter service this year – two of which will return to Australia with us at the end of the year.
It is truly a privilege to take command of such a fine Squadron, and I look forward to updating you as we continue our transition.
The Wing Commander then recalled his first flight on the F-35A.
“The jet feels very similar to a Hornet in most flight regimes and it was exciting to take-off in the airplane for the first time solo. The Operations and Maintenance Teams made sure I flew an Australian aircraft for the flight, and I was also launched by an Aussie ‘Crew Chief’, which made it all the more special.
The F-35A is a lot more powerful, especially at low level. The ‘Helmet Mounted Display’ takes a little bit of getting used to. It’s similar to the one used in the Hornet and Super Hornet [‘Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System’].
Wing Commander Darren Clare after his first flight on the F-35. Credit: RAAF
If looking out the side of your cockpit, however, you need to physically face the front to see the [virtual] Head-Up Display for flight vector information, which in the Hornet is presented on a physical HUD.
The sensors and datalinks are pretty amazing, giving the pilot a very good awareness of what is going on around them, both in the air and on the ground. This is driving us to a philosophical change in how we fly; operating far more autonomously than in previous aircraft.
A graduate from the F-35A Operational Conversion course is going to be making far more tactical decisions (given the amount of information that they have) than we would have expected from a Hornet graduate in the past. This will be just one of the changes in how fighter flying will adjust as we introduce the F-35A Lightning II.
I can see the momentum building, and our people will be ready when Air Force receives its next eight F-35As in 2018, as the transition hits full swing.”
The editor for the 3rd Squadron newsletter provided this update as well:
The team charged with bringing home Australia’s F-35A Lightning II in December 2018 has now passed important milestones, with dozens of maintenance crew having completed their technical training.
SQNLDR Leigh TINKER, Senior Engineering Officer for the F-35A Transition Team, announced late in 2017 that he now has a trained cadre of personnel stationed at Luke Air Force Base, Arizona, after initial maintenance training was completed at Eglin Air Force Base [Florida].
A number of maintenance personnel – many ex-3SQN Hornet – have returned to Australia to prepare for the arrival of the aircraft at the rebuilt RAAF Base Williamtown.
Most of them will form the core of the revitalised No.3 Squadron when it stands up as the Royal Australian Air Force’s FIRST Operational F-35A Squadron, with other technicians posted to No.2 Operational Conversion Unit (co-located at Williamtown).
The caption provided by the editor of the 3rd squadron newsletter for the lead photo above was as follows:
The magnificent ceremonial “3-Formation”, flown on 8 Dec 2017, marking the LAST official operation of the Hornets of 3SQN.
Inset: On Thursday 14th December, command of the Squadron officially passed to the new “CO3”, WGCDR Darren CLARE. Seen here with Vicki Crighton and the freshly-promoted [and much-acclaimed!] GPCAPT Johnny HALY.]
The RAAF process of change was highlighted by Ed Timperlake’s piece published in 2016 highlighting the key role of squadron pilots in driving combat innovation in the combat force.
During our latest visit to Australia, the Second Line of Defense team had a chance to talk with the commander of the Air Mobility Group, Air Commodore Bill “K9” Kourelakos, during our visit to Richmond Airbase and with Group Captain Steve Pesce, Office Commanding 86 Wing, at Amberley Airbase.
During that visit we had a chance to discuss a range of air mobility issues, and to revisit the KC-30A evolving air system as well.
The Aussies shaped a new force package during their most recent Middle East engagement with C-17s, F/A-18As and F/A-18Fs, operating with the E-7 Wedgetail Air Battle Management aircraft and the new A330MRTT.
In the photo below, two key elements of shaping the new RAAF air mobility foundation for Australian Defence Force operations are highlighted, namely the C-17 and the KC-30a.
The Aussies have been the lead military force in introducing the KC-30A (e.g. their name for the A330MRTT), which is now operated by several allied Air Forces.
The RAAF as the lead customer for the KC-30A has been a key force in driving how the new tanker operates to support a task force with nearly ten years of experience under its wing (literally).
We discussed at length the coming of the robotic boom to the tanker and its impact.
That discussion will be highlighted in forthcoming published interviews with both the Air Mobility Group Commander as well as the 86th Wing Commander.
That key addition to the tanker along with the introduction of F-35 and Growler into the fleet as well as the evolution of capabilities onboard the Wedgetail forms a key material foundation for the next round of the evolution of the RAAF.
In an interview last year with Air Commodore Lennon, then the Air Mobility Commander, the coming of the new robotic boom was explained this way:
“The best way to think about the new boom capability is that it is an automatic boom similar to how autopilot works in the cockpit. The automatic pilot simplifies the pilot load, but the pilot is still there and can override the autopilot in case of need.
“There will always be an operator monitoring what’s going on with the boom, deciding what the boom should do, and when it should do it, but now he can let the boom do all the work of positioning and marrying up with the receiver.”
The KC-30A is a refuelable aircraft so with a fatigue reducing automatic boom, the crew can stay airborne for longer to generate additional operational impact and enhanced sortie generation effects.
“If it can anticipate and react to movements of the receiver aircraft faster than the boom operator can, then you end up with faster contacts.
You also potentially end up with more consistent contacts when the turbulence level increases, in cloud or when night falls.”
Put in other words, the robotic boom is both an enhanced safety feature and an enabler of expanded sortie generation rates.
And when one adds enhanced communications capabilities to the fleet, notably with the coming of the F-35, the reworking of C2 within the fleet, a key objective of the RAAF as they work fifth generation warfighting, the robotic boom enabled tanker becomes a key stakeholder in the evolution of the RAAF and its approach to 21st century warfighting.
The photos in the slideshow above are credited to Second Line of Defense and were shot at Amberley Airbase on March 15, 2018.
At the Williams Foundation seminar on the shift from dealing with the land wars to higher tempo and higher intensity operations, one of Australia’s leading strategic thinkers, Dr. Ross Babbage, addressed the question of “the strategic face of conflict in the 21st Century.”
A key focus of his presentation was to highlight the crucial importance of understanding the nature of the strategic competitors to the liberal democracies, notably China and Russia, and how they are reshaping their forces and engaged in a wide range of cyber and other intrusions within liberal democratic societies.
During his presentation he highlighted how he saw the changing threat environment in the following manner:
I had a chance to sit down with Dr. Babbage during my time in Canberra to discuss more fully the character of the adversaries we are dealing with and how best to understand the nature of the challenges being posed by Russia and China, as peer competitors.
“The starting point for any discussion of threat facing Australia and its allies clearly is the nature of the regimes we are dealing with. This is something even many people in government don’t fully understand. These are Leninist regimes of a fairly sophisticated type. They’re different in some respects, but their overall goals are very similar.”
For the West, the tendency is to think that there is peace and there is war with nothing much in between.
For a Leninist regime, there is a broad area in between peace and war in which they believe one can aggressively contest the West, and engage in political warfare and use their militaries to enhance their influence.
Put in other terms, a much broader gray zone has been created within which the authoritarian regimes are contesting the liberal democracies with little fear of direct retaliation.
“And both regimes, have got great political stories to tell domestically to support their foreign policy actions. For Russia it is about restoring Russian influence and power status and rebuilding a buffer zone.
“And doing so enhances the Russia’s abilities to act elsewhere. For Beijing, it is about restoring the Chinese civilization’s globally dominant position to it’s their rightful place. Recently Xi Jinping has emphasized that they will spill blood if required to achieve their rightful place in the world.”
And when one looks at the nature of their domestic systems, the ever-present role of repression and tight regime control is obvious. .
“For the Russians, the national leadership comes largely from intelligence and security force backgrounds. With the Chinese, the government has developed and is developing high-technology control mechanisms, which include powerful sets of incentives to comply with the regime’s policies.
“They have a vast national database on their citizens, something which would be completely illegal in the liberal democracies. They have developed a Social Credit System whereby they monitor citizens and evaluate their behavior and can build detailed report cards on their citizens. And dependent upon your grade, so to speak, you can receive or be denied credit for things like work promotions and foreign travel.”
In effect, the Russian and Chinese regimes are consolidating internal controls and are expanding their capability to operate in the gray zone internationally to reinforce their domestic and international authority.
“They’re waging political warfare using a very wide spectrum of instruments right now; whereas the liberal democracies continue to think of warfare as a radical shift from the normal condition, which is peace. Since the Cold War the West has paid little serious attention to operations in the gray zone.”
Dr. Babbage sees growing recognition in both the United States and Australia about the nature of the challenges facing us. “To respond is not simply about military capabilities; it is about whole of government capabilities and indeed whole of nation and whole of alliance capabilities.”
“And we need to have a much more open and frank discussion with our publics about the nature of the challenges we are facing. I think the starting point is to share factual stories about what the Chinese and the Russians are actually doing both within their own societies and also within ours. “
In short, the challenge we are facing is fundamental and requires us to take a hard look at how the Chinese and Russians are already operating against our interests internationally and and simultaneously seeking to undermine the liberal democracies from within..
My visit to Helsinki to the Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats provided a European view of ways to get governments focused on the nature of the challenges and the nature of the responses, which we need to shape to modern political warfare, and information operations generated by the illiberal powers.
According to Juha Mustonen, Director of International Relations, at the Centre:
Adversaries are using many instruments of power. One may identify a demonstration affect from the limited use of military power and then by demonstrating our vulnerabilities a trial of a psychological affect within Western societies to shape policies more favorable to their interests.
“If you are using many instruments of power, below the threshold of warfare, their synergetic effect can cause your bigger gain in your target societies, and this is the dark side of comprehensive approach.”
“The challenge is to understand the thresholds of influence and the approaches.
“What is legitimate and what is not?
“And how do we counter punch against the use of hybrid influencing by Non-Western adversaries?
“How can we prevent our adversaries from exploiting democratic fractures and vulnerabilities, to enhance their own power positions?
“How do we do so without losing our credibility as governments in front of our own people?”
In short, although Helsinki and Canberra are literally on the other sides of the globe, the threats they face are not.
Editor’s Note: The photo is of Dr. Babbage during his presentation to the Williams Foundation seminar.
According to a story published on the Finnish Ministry of Defence website, a Finn has been appointed to a major position at the European Defence Agency.
Director of the Defence Materiel Unit Olli Ruutu at the Ministry of Defence will start, on 16 March 2018, as Deputy Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency (EDA).
The Deputy Chief Executive will work together with Jorge Domecq, the Spanish Chief Executive of the EDA, under Federica Mogherini who is also the Head of the Agency.
Finland has not had as significant a task at the EDA before this.
The appointment is important also because until now Finland has had very few high-calibre tasks like this one at the EU level.
Ruutu’s appointment strengthens, for its part, Finland’s opportunity to influence the development of the permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and the defence of the EU, both of which fall within the mandate of the EDA.
Olli Ruutu is an internationally recognized expert with a strong level of competence.
Before the appointment, he worked as Director of the Materiel Unit in the Ministry of Defence.
The Unit is responsible, among other things, for steering materiel projects in the defence administration, international cooperation, and export control of defence materiel.
Established in 2004, the EDA functions under the Council of the European Union with the task to support member countries to develop their military capabilities.
The EDA plays a central role in developing the PESCO and defence of the EU. Apart from Denmark, all of the EU countries take part in the Agency’s activities.
The EDA promotes cooperation, starts new projects and produces solutions that develop defence capabilities. It also plays a major role in developing resources for the common defence and security policy.
For Norway, the changing strategic environment includes not only an expansion of the Russian tool set to challenge Norwegian and European security, but the clear inclusion of the Arctic and its evolving role in North Atlantic defense and security,
We have focused on this evolution over the past few years and most recently highlighted the evolving strategic environment in a series of special reports. Recently, in a press release by the Norwegian government dated March 23, 2018 underscored the requirement to expand digital coverage in the High North.
Today, broadband coverage in the High North is poor and unstable. The Government now wants Norwegian satellites to make broadband communications available in the Arctic.
“Fast, stable internet is important to anyone operating in the High North, whether in shipping, defence, fisheries or research,” says Minister of Trade and Industry Torbjørn Røe Isaksen (Conservative Party).
Space Norway AS has been working to establish satellite-based broadband communications capacity in the High North since 2015. Space Norway’s project is based on a system of two satellites providing coverage 24 hours a day in the area north of 65 degrees N latitude. The expected lifespan of the satellites is 15 years. If all goes according to plan, the satellites will be launched in 2022.
For negotiations to proceed with customers, suppliers and banks, the company needs a promise that the Norwegian state will contribute, in its capacity as owner, about NOK 1 billion in equity capital if the company manages to negotiate good agreements.
The Government is therefore proposing a conditional pledge to Space Norway AS of about NOK 1 billion in equity capital to realise this project. This means the state will contribute equity if Space Norway lands agreements ensuring, among other things, the project’s commercial profitability. In addition, the customers must bear market risk by securing project income across the lifespan of the satellites.
“Space Norway AS’s project represents an exciting opportunity to meet society’s needs for broadband communications at low cost to the state. A solid communications system will also facilitate increased value creation in the High North,” says Røe Isaksen.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Ine Eriksen Søreide (Conservative Party) added: “The High North is Norway’s most important strategic area of responsibility. It is quite natural that we take a leading role in establishing better communications in the region.”
Poor coverage in the High North makes it harder for the authorities to carry out security and emergency services such as search and rescue at sea, oil spill protection and crisis management. Not least, the Armed Forces requires stable and secure communications for operations in Norwegian waters.
“Space Norway’s project is important to the Norwegian Armed Forces, and can also serve the needs of our allies,” says Minister of Defence Frank Bakke-Jensen (Conservative Party).
The Aussies have been the lead military force in introducing the KC-30A (e.g. their name for the A330MRTT), which is now operated by several allied Air Forces.
