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The USAF has seen more than a decade in which a primary function has been to support ground operations.
The USAF has served as Fed Ex, a flying gas station, a strike and ISR server in the sky for various types of ground operations.
The end result is that skill sets have been honed for slo mo operations in uncontested airspace. These skill sets are not easily transferred to high tempo and high intensity conflict in contested operational space.
At the same time, technology has evolved where integrated air and maritime operations are not empowered to be able to serve a distributed C2 strike and sensor enterprise.
But again this has little in common with the training of the last decade of air power professionals.
The USAF has recognized this and their work at Nellis and at Air Combat Command is clearly evolving air combat power to work more effectively in the integrated battle space and to do with allies.
We have highlighted throughout various visits the important efforts of the USAF, the USN and USMC working through enhancing the skill sets for high tempo operations.
But what needs to happen is that this outstanding work needs to be leveraged into a broader transformation of the USAF itself.
Nothing less than a significant shift in USAF concepts of operations and enterprise performance is required to provide the nation and our allies with the kind of airpower for the Integrated Battlespace emerging in this decade of the 21st century.
We are referring to this as Integrated Battle (IB) 21.
The focus of the Air Force needs not simply to aim high but to aim for domination in high intensity conflict.
With the shift from slo mo to high tempo and high intensity warfare preparation, the USAF needs to get into the inventory war winning equipment as rapidly as possible and allow the warfighters to transition their skill sets accordingly.
This means as well avoiding one of the core propensities of the last Administration, which was to compete endlessly and go for the lowest initial cost.
Competition does not drive the cost of the most relevant equipment down; it simply puts the Air Force in the position along with industry of competing and delaying acquisition to the point where the capabilities of the force can be significantly reduced.
War winning capability is the acquisition goal; not jobs for acquisition officials to craft competition metrics to the point where the initial cost of a system really has little to do with the operational cost of systems, in terms of modernization and sustainment cycles.
And facing the return to the forefront of the nuclear threat in terms of second nuclear age powers like North Korea or first nuclear age powers like China and Russia underscore the need to modernize and strengthen the nuclear enterprise expeditiously.
This is not about simply building the largest stockpile of weapons; it is about having the right kind of weapons and the con ops to credibly deter an adversary from believing that the United States is incapable of expeditious use of those weapons in times of crisis.
And it is not just the weapons it is about the enterprise and its capability.
And clearly the Department of Defense needs an acquisition approach which allows for expeditious enhancements of the nuclear enterprise.
But the endless cycle of competition for competition’s sake and the putting aside serious consideration of the real cost of capabilities is a barrier to ensure the nation’s safety and security.
Earlier this year Michael Sirak, Mitchell Institute Visiting Fellow, provided a very insightful Mitchell Policy Paper on the crucial shift which a different set of business rules could provide to ensure that the USAF is on the right end of the outcome of conflict – winning.
For the United States to engage successfully around the globe, the Air Force, just like its sister services, must fundamentally rethink and retool how it acquires weapon systems so that Airmen are equipped to prevail. Business as usual with the mainstream acquisition system is no longer tenable.
The rapid pace of technological development is overrunning acquisition efforts that slog on for years and often decades. The status quo merely ensures obsolescence, depriving the service of essential agility required to meet rapidly evolving circumstances in the operational environment. The Air Force must strive to deliver weapon systems far more efficiently and effectively.
A key case in point is the USAF’s approach to the replacement of a helicopter, which is part of the nuclear enterprise ands, serves a critical role in the protection and defense of the operational force and Sirak highlighted this case as a core example of confusing competition with delivering timely and effective capability to the warfighter.
The UH-1N Replacement program, the Air Force’s effort to swap out its Vietnam War-era UH-1N Huey helicopters with new, more-capable airframes, offers a topical example of the trials of service acquisition today.
The current iteration of the procurement effort began in Fiscal 2016, and at first glance, it appears this program should have been straightforward and uncomplicated.
That’s because the Air Force seeks to field a mature, essentially off-the-shelf helicopter design to replace the venerable UH-1Ns that perform the vital missions today of protecting the nation’s intercontinental ballistic missile complexes, transporting senior government officials in and around the National Capital Region, and ensuring the continuous operation of the federal government during emergencies.
However, responding to myriad procurement challenges, the acquisition has morphed into something unnecessarily more complicated. This has yielded a program that has now been in the works for more than a decade in one way or another, but has become dogged by numerous schedule delays.
Based on the current, notional planning, the Air Force will not receive the first new helicopters for testing until Fiscal 2020, have the first operational unit ready until around Fiscal 2022, and will not have the full replacement fleet in place until around Fiscal 2031.16 This means some Hueys likely will be flying for another decade or more, giving them a service life of nearly 60 years.
Airmen at all levels are exceedingly frustrated by the saga of events surrounding this program. “Of all the things in my portfolio, I can’t even describe how upset get about the helicopter replacement program,” Gen John Hyten, head of US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), told the Senate Armed Services Committee in April 2017.
“It’s a helicopter for gosh sakes. We ought to be able to go out and buy a helicopter and put it in the hands of the people that need it. And we should be able to do that quickly,” he said, noting that he was the one who actually wrote the initial requirements for the replacement helicopter back in 2007.
“Now it’s 2017, 10 years later, and we’re still arguing about a helicopter,” he told the senators….
The bottom line is that the UH-1 recapitalization initiative represents an area where the procurement process is revealing significant room for improvement.
This is not a stealthy, cutting-edge bomber that will be tasked with flying around the globe at a moment’s notice into some of the most defended regions around the globe. Its mission, while vitally important, is constant and relatively unchanging, conducted within the continental United States.
There comes a point where the acquisition hurdles this initiative has had to surmount over the decade-long circuitous process present more risk to the nation than the notion of using common sense and judgment to rapidly meet established requirements.
The Air Force is now seeing a competition between a commercial off the shelf helicopter, which has literally no military heritage and is used by no one in the US military versus the Blackhawk which is main stream US Army helicopter and is in service with the Air Force (HH-60G and HH-60U) and the Navy (MH-60S and MH-60R).
Put bluntly, this means that the USAF is competing a very small number of helicopters for competition’s sake and perhaps choosing a sui generis helicopter for the force when a worldwide fleet of helicopters already deployed, sustained and being modernized exists.
This makes no sense and the capability and cost consequences are significant.
And the way the USAF has set up the competition it ensures that key capabilities are not simply being considered as part of the source selection.
For example, the life cycle cost evaluation is not considering the potential savings resulting from picking a helicopter already being developed by the USAF, namely, the HH-60W, which the Sikorsky offering of an HH-60U for the requirement and we are talking less than a hundred aircraft here.
And the obvious deployment advantages of leveraging a large US Army fleet is not being considered as well, presumably because this would suggest the core point, that why could not the USAF make a decision years ago based on common sense and move ahead?
The USAF is already flying the HH-60U so the service already currently has training, supply, logistics support, depot already fielded and ready to go.
HH60U Sikorsky helicopter.
When one combines that with the existence of the Army Black Hawk Multi-year IX (MY IX) contract in place that has options available which could be leveraged, the USAF could be buying and fielding Black Hawks now.
And by combining with the Army on the contract the USAF could drive larger quantity discounts for both services and save money for both.
The sense of urgency is simply not there – it is as if the U.S. will only face slow mo competitors who will be nice enough not exploit our slo mo decision making style in Washington which if the warriors in the field would replicate the U.S. should be prepared to lose armed conflicts in the near to mid term.
It is difficult to fathom how the competition underway would help in any way dealing with the mobilization requirements of high intensity war.
In the event of a high intensity war breaking out, mobilization is a critical capability.
This means that in preparing for the prospect of high intensity war, a premium is placed on planning, establishing and meeting the requirements for the U.S. and allied industrial base to surge war winning platforms and weapons to the fight.
To be clear – the USAF would choose against a mobilization and commonality capability in favor of a unique small number of helicopters for a crucial nuclear support mission?
The Huey replacement competition provides an important case study in what not to do.
And it is through case studies one gets principals changed; it is not about an endless debate by the high priests of acquisition reform – it is about shifting into a higher gear to deliver more kit and more rapidly of the right sort to the warfighter.
It is not about slo mo competition to run in place or in this case to go backwards in terms of fleet management.
Editor’s Note: We are addressing the challenge of transitioning from slo mo to high tempo and high intensity operations on our Forum
The Indian Air Force is about to launch competition to add new fighter aircraft.
This would be in addition, to the acquisition of 36 Rafale fighter aircraft, already in place.
The Indian Chief of Staff of the Air Force has indicated that the IAF will buy additional Rafales but also add a new a single engine jet to modernize its fighter force.
The frontrunners in the single engine competition are Saab’s Gripen and Lockheed Martin’s F-16.
Such a competition is not simply a platform competition, but a capability one as well in terms of the industrial and combat ecosystems associated with each aircraft.
There are clear differences, not the least of which the F-16 is combat proven and being upgraded by several F-16 users, and the Gripen is not combat proven and is being upgraded almost completely by the Swedish Air Force.
If the Gripen were to be selected by the IAF, the Indians would undoubtedly pay the lion’s share of upgrades in the future.
The F-16 being offered is what Lockheed and USAF are calling the Block 70, which has significant upgrades in terms of avionics, sensors and radars.
Not only is the aircraft being significantly modified in terms of what the aircraft is capable of doing in the battlespace, but also in terms of how the pilot workload is being changed by the new systems onboard.
New data management, sensors, processing and displays allow for significantly enhanced workload efficiencies for the Block 70 F-16 pilot
The differences between what an F-16 and a Gripen means for the future of the IAF goes far beyond a platform discussion.
It is really the strategic impact of the global F-16 enterprise and its ties to the evolving F-35 renorming air combat enterprise versus the Gripen as a Swedish air platform, which is flown by a very small number of air forces globally, and certainly not cutting edge ones.
For the Indian Air Force the choice is rather stark if one takes an enterprise or global combat learning curve point of view.
The F-16 is flown by a great number of Air Forces and key parts are built worldwide. This means that India is not tied to the United States and its operational or manufacturing experience.
Rather, the F-16 built in India could leverage a global enterprise as well as expand its global working relationships.
In contrast, purchasing the Gripen does tie the Indians tightly to Sweden and the partnerships they have had, many of them American, in building their combat aircraft
For example, the UAE Air Force flies both the most advanced F-16 to date, the Block 60, as well as French combat aircraft. The Indians flying Rafales and F-16s might well find a working relationship with the UAE in shaping interactive concepts of operations or the development of mutually beneficial technology to enable their air combat forces.
The “Made in India” part of the F-16 engagement would clearly be about opening the Indian air combat aperture to a variety of F-16 global partners.
The SAAB “Made in India” would be more about literally making a Swedish Aircraft in India for Indians with little prospect of amortized modernization cost by other Gripen partners or the Swedes for that matter.
And that brings up the impact of USAF modernization as well.
The USAF is structurally modernizing a significant part of its F-16 fleet with the so-called SLEP program that adds 50% additional service life up to and beyond 12,000 flight hours.
At the same time, they are introducing an advanced Northrop Grumman radar, the APG-83.
The radar on the F-16 Block 70 and the spill over effects from the F-35 program as well are important considerations when buying a Block 70.
The migration of the radar on the Block 70 F-16. Credit Graphic: Lockheed Martin
The software on the Block 70 radar has more than 95% in common with the APG-81, the AESA radar that’s on the F-35.
And the hardware is 75-80% in common.
Collectively, there is about 85-90% in common between the Northrop radar on the F-35 and the F-16 Block 70.
And this obviously has a significant impact upon both the path and cost of modernization.
The U.S. and the F-35 partners will invest significantly in the evolution of the F-35 radar, which will have an impact as well on the Block 70 radar modernization as well.
This radar, the latest of four fighter aircraft based electronically scanned array fire control radars from Northrop Grumman, shares much in common with the F-35 radars as well, which means that when it comes to the evolution of the sensor-EW-command functions provided by advanced AESA radars.
The Indians would be benefiting from USAF combat learning with the new systems and as well as those global partners engaged in a similar modernization effort.
Beyond the USAF, this may well have been part of the decision making process with air forces in Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and currently being contemplated by Greece that have led to several hundred F-16 upgrades with this radar.
And it is clear that the impact the F-35 will be significant upon the evolution of air combat, something I have labeled, the renorming of airpower.
An Indian Block 70 clearly would be a beneficiary of this evolving air combat learning process as new radars and sensors enter the air combat force, with the new Northrop Grumman radars as an open ended evolving combat capability.
Put in blunt terms, the IAF could choose a platform qua platform in terms of its organic capabilities at the time of acquisition or it could buy a enterprise enabled platform which is part of a global enterprise, with several key air combat forces world wide, and flying with key elements of the ongoing air combat revolution driven by the F-35.
Made in India could be part of engaging in the global enterprise or it could be narrowed down to assembling a combat aircraft in India itself as the focus of effort.
Being part of a global F-16 force has many other advantages.
There are many F-16 pilots worldwide; there are a variety of training centers; and if the IAF needed more aircraft in a crisis they could go to an F-16 partner and find ways to lease aircraft as needed as well.
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With a global inventory, there is always a possible of a rapid plus up.
It would be difficult to do this while attempting to dip into the global pool of Swedish, Thai, South African or Brazilian Gripens.
The enterprise advantage clearly seems to go to the F-16 and this advantage would seem as well to have been augmented by the different partnering arrangements, which Lockheed and SAAB have taken.
SAAB is partnering in India with a company with no experience in aerospace, namely the Adani Group.
It is a partner that would clearly help with the Made In India part with regard to investments domestically.
As the Adani Group website highlights:
The Adani Group is one of India’s leading business houses with revenue of over $11 billion.
Founded in 1988, Adani has grown to become a global integrated infrastructure player with businesses in key industry verticals – resources, logistics, energy and agro. The integrated model is well adapted to the infrastructure challenges of the emerging economies.
Adani Group’s growth and vision has always been in sync with the idea of Nation Building. We live in the same communities where we operate and take our responsibility towards contributing to the betterment of the society very seriously. Through Adani Foundation, we ensure development and progress is sustainable and inclusive; not just for the people living in these areas, but the environment on the whole. At Adani, we believe in delivering benefits that transcend our immediate stakeholders.
What is not so clear is what such a business brings to the question of force modernization and accelerated introduction of combat aircraft?
This appears to be a significant differentiator between Lockheed and Saab as the Government of India moves forward with this challenging and ambitious project.
Recently, I had a chance to discuss the F-16 opportunity with India with the Lockheed Martin Aeronautics head of F-16 and F-22 business development, Randall Howard, during a visit to Fort Worth to view and discuss the final assembly line for the F-35.
Howard has had many years of experience working with allies in acquiring and operating advanced aircraft with allies, notably both with the F-16 and the F-35. He spent 20 years with the USAF and now 10 years with Lockheed Martin working with allies on air combat issues.
According to Howard, the F-16 line is closing at Fort Worth, with the last F-16 produced at Fort Worth being for the Iraqis. Now a “hot line” is being established at the Lockheed Martin facility in Greenville, South Carolina which will build up to 19 new F-16s for Bahrain’s Air Force.
This means that the F-16 partners will see new work generated as well.
“Key elements of the F-16 are built by the partners, in Greece, South Korea and Israel and the Bahrain program and the standup of the new facility in Greenville substantiates the continuing customer demand for the F-16 and will drive new demand for our partners.”
Howard pointed out that this meant that India would benefit from the new standup as well as the working relationship with F-16 industrial partners in moving the sole production line to India itself, if the F-16 were chosen by the IAF.
The performance of the F-16 certainly is not in question; nor the existence of a significant F-16 global user base.
“The success of the F-16 is unmatched as a program in terms of bringing countries together, shaping relationships which have delivered significant combat capability, and an unparalleled track record on delivering bombs on target for the past three decades in the US and partner air forces.”
We then discussed the different ecosystems so to speak of the Gripen versus the F-16.
“One of the difference between F-16 and our global competitors is economies of scale that drive industrial business case realities.
“Where competitors have fielded a few hundred aircraft globally, the global F-16 community includes more than 25 countries flying approximately 3,200 of those 4588 F-16s that were produced; 3200 of them are flying today.”
“The U.S. Air Force and other allied Air Forces are upgrading their F-16s and many of these aircraft are being service life extended out to 12,000 hours and are going to be flown for 30 more years.
“This means that there is a clear opportunity for industry to be part of that modernization process, which would clearly be available to India as well.
“Our recent joint announcement with TATA during the Paris Air Show provides an exceptionally strong, experienced, and proven team capable of delivering on the challenges of establishing F-16 global production in India and building a defense ecosystem that supports the global demand.”
The F-16 is also part of entire upswing in the capabilities of legacy aircraft as new systems are added which have an additive impact on the combat capabilities of the legacy aircraft as well as change the workload and work processes of the combat crew as well.
If one looks at the Canadian Aurora variant of the P-3, or the KC-130J, as examples, new capabilities have been added to what looks like a legacy airplane but it does not perform in the same manner at all.
This clearly applies to the F-16 as well – it may look like a legacy F-16 but it has only aerodynamics and some core combat performance characteristics of the airframe in common.
Otherwise, it is evolving into an enhanced 4th generation combat capability integratable with fifth generation renorming combat aircraft.
And the process of evolution will continue.
Given the USAF’s commitment as well as the global partners who are still and will continue to use the aircraft modernization and upgrades are guaranteed as part of any Indian F-16 experience.
As part of the USAF F-16 SLEP program, they are enhancing the expected operational life of the air frame as well.
“It is certified at 8,000 equivalent hours.
“The USAF has contracted Lockheed Martin to evolve the airframe to a 12,000 equivalent hour capability.
“We’re “productionizing” the airframe changes.
“We’re going to build these new Block 70s for Bahrain and the customers that come behind them, to be able to operate through to 12,000 hours.
“This delivers about 50% more service life than any other aircraft in its class.”
In short, the F-16 provides India with a strategic opportunity not just to add new platforms, but to shape a more effective global engagement in the innovations underway by the U.S. and its partners in evolving air combat capabilities.
Editor’s Note: See our earlier piece by Danny Lam on the F-16 and India.
We highlighted the following with regard to Dr. Lam’s piece on the F-16 for India:
Editor’s Note: One does not have to agree with everything, which Lam has argued in this article, but there clearly are three key takeaways, which are very significant for India.
First, what are the benefits of having a manufacturing line for the most widely used 4th generation aircraft?
How can one leverage a global user base and support or supply such a user base?
Second, how will the Indian armed forces connect their platforms?
For the Indian Air Force this is absolutely critical given their propensity to buy a wide variety of platforms.
Third, given the experience Indians have in the software business, how can this be transferred to the defense business, notably in terms of shaping a combat cloud for the armed forces?
How will India shape a connected combat force which can overmatch the Chinese forces?
Fourth, if India can build real competence on connecting its disparate air combat force, there clearly will be markets globally for such a competence and again if one is building an aircraft which is already the largest 4th generation deployed air combat aircraft, then that simply opens up significant market opportunities.
Editor’s Note: The slideshow highlights photos of aF-16 Aerial Demonstration Team during the opening ceremonies of Aero India 2017 at Air Force Station Yelahanka, India Feb. 14. (U.S. Air Force photo by Capt. Mark Lazane)
2017-10-28 Earlier this Fall, it was announced by Northrop Grumman that they intended to acquire Orbital ATK. It was noted at the time by Doug Cameron writing in the Wall Street Journal that:
Northrop’s proposed $7.8 billion acquisition of Orbital, announced Monday, would help Northrop to produce and launch large and small spy and communications satellites and develop new high-speed weapons and missile-defense systems to deter potential adversaries such as Russia, China and North Korea
Although this aspect makes sense, it should also be noted ATK’s key role in the production of composite parts, and with Northrop Grumman to build the new bomber having such capability within the company makes a great deal of sense.
ATK is one of the major suppliers of composites in the production of the F-35.
According to an October 24, 2017 story by UPI and written by Richard Tomkins, the ATK role in producing composite parts for the F-35 is expanding as well.
Oct. 24 (UPI) — Orbital ATK said Tuesday it has been tapped to produce additional composite components for Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning IIfighters.
The requested components are F-35 bullnose and blade seals, the Virginia-based company said in a release. The company already makes upper and lower wing skins, engine nacelles and access covers for the aircraft.
The contract is for three years and is worth $24 million, Orbital ATK said.
“Orbital ATK excels at providing advanced composite structures that require robust manufacturing processes to affordably fit our customer’s needs,” Steve Earl, vice president and general manager of Orbital ATK’s Aerospace Structures Division, said in a statement. “We are pleased Lockheed Martin is entrusting us with additional work on the most advanced combat aircraft in the world – the F-35 Lightning II.”
Workers will make the products at Orbital ATK’s facility in Clearfield, Utah
With the primary focus on the land wars in the Middle East, the priorities has been on the training, skill sets, and equipment for land warfare concepts of operations against an ideologically motivated opponent.
For much of this period, stability operations and counter-insurgency war has been the dominant theme.
This has meant that high intensity skill sets and equipment investments have atrophied or downplayed.
With the return of the Russian global engagement, and Putin’s skillful use of military power, the rude awakening of the second nuclear age with the North Koreans as nuclear extortionists, and the pushing out into the Pacific of the Chinese military, preparation for high intensity or high tempo operations has returned to the forefront.
There is no effective deterrence if there is not a credible capability for competitors and adversaries to take seriously.
But as skill sets are reshaped for the decade ahead, it is not simply bringing back older skill sets; it is about adapting historical lessons learned to 21st century technologies.
This is notably true with anti-submarine warfare, where the new skill sets adapt the alone and unafraid focus of the P-3 crews to the mastery of the new technologies, which allow for an ability to leverage reachback systems, robust networks, and distributed strike.
In the North Atlantic, the U.S. and its allies are shaping what the U.S. Navy calls a kill web approach.
In effect, a Maritime Domain Awareness highway or belt is being constructed from the Canada through to Norway.
And this belt is about shaping a data stream of actionable intelligence to guide decision making for effective strike capabilities and operations. It is not ISR; it is a kill web.
With regard to the UK, Denmark, Norway and the United States, P-8s, Tritons and F-35s are being introduced in shaping a new domain awareness sensor shooter capability for the allied forces.
A key challenge will be establishing ways to share data and enable rapid decision-making in a region where the Russians are modernizing forces and expanded reach into the Arctic.
The return of the Russians in terms of the threat from the Kola Peninsula and building new submarines has come at a time when ASW capabilities have eroded for the allies in the North Atlantic.
The two together – the return of the Russians and the erosion of ASW NATO capabilities – defines the challenge.
How best to meet the challenge in the presence of new 21st century technologies is a work in progress.
Earlier this year, the Norwegians released their threat assessment of the challenges facing Norway.
In that assessment by Norwegian intelligence, NIS head Lieutenant General Morten Haga Lunde stressed when presenting the report, the following with regard to the Russian submarine threat:
“We are seeing an increase in Russian submarine activity and that the vessels are moving further west. Meanwhile their submarines have such well-developed technology that they are becoming increasingly difficult to detect,” he told broadcaster NRK.
Russia’s upgraded and newly developed submarines can move almost noiselessly under water, according to NRK’s report. They also contain advanced missile systems and a water jet system which makes them very difficult to detect at low speeds.
“Russia has undergone a modernization in recent years. They have new submarines, surface ships, aircraft and weapons technology,” Lunde said.
Canada’s approach to engaging in the revival of ASW systems, platforms and skill sets is to evolve the capabilities of its CP-140 and to add a new innovative helicopter to the mix in the North Atlantic and the Pacific.
The introduction of the CH-148 Cyclone is not simply a replacement for the Sea King but rather the inclusion of a new platform within the new maritime domain awareness strike context.
The shaping of a maritime domain awareness and strike enterprise in the North Atlantic to deal with the introduction of a Russian, not a Soviet, submarine threat into the North Atlantic.
New capabilities, among them P-8s and Tritons, are being introduced by Canada’s allies, the US, Norway and the UK, which are part of a broader reshaping of the information and decision making web necessary to deal with 21st century threats.
The helicopter was crafted as a replacement for the Sea King, which could incorporate Romeo type technology into a larger aircraft, which could also do Search and Rescue. And the helicopter had to be designed to land on Canadian sized frigates in high sea states.
The high sea state environment was a calibration made from calculations of deck accelerations.
The helicopter also had to fit within the Canadian concepts of operations, whereby the crew could multi-task while in flight, without a need to return to the ship to reconfigure for changing missions.
The new helicopter is built on a commercial S-90 foundation but the defense customizations fit where 21st century technology was going, namely an information, communications and decision making transformation.
And the work flow onboard the helicopter very much fits into what the Block 3 upgrade to Aurora provides along with the P-8 — the front end and back end of the aircraft shape a workflow for the entire flight and work crew. Screens in the cockpit of both the Cyclone and the Aurora bring the data in the back forward to the cockpit.
Bill Brown, Senior OMS Officer of 404 Long Range Patrol and Training Squadron (LRP&T Sqn) gives a briefing to Lieutenant-Colonel Ray Townsend, Commanding Officer 404 LRP&T Sqn, Dr. Robbin & Murielle Laird, Lieutenant-Colonel Brono Baker, Acting Commanding Officer 14 Wing Greenwood and Ralph Hippman, Simulator Operator, in the Throney Island Simulation Centre at 14 Wing Greenwood, Nova Scotia, Canada. Photo: MCpl Rory Wilson, 14 Wing Imaging
A work in progress is to determine exactly who does what, but SA for Search and Rescue is now available to the front end of the aircraft which obviously allows for better decision-making and outcomes.
What the helicopter will connect to in terms of information flow is a work in progress, but the platform is coming to the force PRECISELY when the entire maritime domain awareness and strike enterprise in the North Atlantic is being reworked, and this helicopter has the information tools to both contribute too and leverage the new approaches being shaped.
Along with the introduction of the new helicopter, the CP-140 is evolving its capabilities, or to put into the words of the RCAF Chief of Staff, the “brains” of the aircraft.
The various block upgrades have introduced new technologies for sensing, analyzing and communicating information for operations onboard the aircraft.
But as these new technologies are introduced, training needs to be provided to shape appropriate skill sets both to handle the information and to work in the evolving decision making environment.
And this is being done as the transition is being made from the land war role of the Aurora as an overland manned ISR asset to a back to sea multi-mission ISR/Strike asset.
At the heart of working that transition is the training squadron in the 14th Wing of the RCAF.
And within the 404 Squadron, the RCAF has an impressive simulation capability to shape the way ahead.
During our visit on September 19, 2017, we had a chance to meet with and discuss the challenges with the key members of the 404 Squadron responsible for the simulation training within the Wing.
We met with Lt. Col Ray Townsend, Commanding Officer 404 Sqn, Rodney Ward, Chief Simulation Officer, Bill Brown, Senior Operational Mission Simulator Officer, Rolf Hippman, Operational Mission Simulator Exercise Director, Michel Carriere, Senior Full Flight Simulator Officer and Scott Hale, Full Flight Simulator Instructor Operator.
The team has years of operational experience and serve as Department of National Defence (DND) employees, rather than being contractors.
Under the umbrella of 404 Long Range Patrol and Training Squadron, the Thorney Island Simulation Centre is located adjacent to the Hornell Centre at 14 Wing Greenwood.
Classroom instruction and administration for CP140 aircrew and maintenance personnel take place in the Hornell Centre, while aircrew simulation takes place at Thorney Island.
The Simulation centre is uniquely located within walking distance to all three CP140 Squadrons at 14 Wing Greenwood.
The Canadian government owns the source code for the simulation activity, so that the team can work the simulation environment directly to adapt to evolving developments facing the ASW force.
They work closely with industry in shaping new scenarios for training as well as training on a regular basis to ensure that ASW skill sets are enhanced, even as the overland operations became a key element of what the Aurora force has been doing over the past few years.
It was clear from our discussions, that the team is leaning forward to thinking through how to deal with the new threats and context of the threats in terms of training crews for the decision making and information environment in which they are operating and will operate in the period ahead.
Even though the group has embodied knowledge of doing ASW in the Cold War years, they are keenly aware of the new technological and threat environment.
Ralph Hippman (right), Simulation Operator of 404 Long Range Patrol and Training Squadron (LRP&T Sqn) provides a briefing in the Throney Island Simulation Centre at 14 Wing Greenwood, Nova Scotia, Canada. Photo: MCpl Rory Wilson, 14 Wing Imaging
And like the rest of us, they are sorting what it means for concepts of operations for a 21st century combat force.
The simulation training facility provides a significant complement to real world flying, something especially crucial when flying an older aircraft, even if it has seen a service upgrade on the airframe. As with other air forces, there is the challenge of striking the right balance between simulated operations and actual flying operations.
According to Lt. Col. (retired) Rodney Ward, Chief Simulator Officer:
“The Aurora fleet allocates flying hours between operations and training, and what we call these days Force Employment and Force Generation, respectively.
“In all the RCAF military fleets today it has become important to Commanders – who are minding their bottom-line budgets, that the ratio of simulation flying to real flying is at a high proportion so that they can demonstrate that they are wisely obtaining the necessary training for their troops. It is more cost effective to simulate where you can & conserve the real aircraft for real operations, not training.
“This fleet is doing very well in that respect as our simulation hours (all four devices) run at approximately 73% of our annual real flying rate.
“Combining this fact with the powerful learning value of authentic and well researched simulation makes me proud to say that this fleet exploits simulation very well.
“The payoff is that we have managed to carry through the last decade, with very few Op Force playmates out there on the high seas, with lots of very valuable Force Generation through simulation.
“We always challenges crews so that they come away with a ‘been there, done that’ moment, what we refer to as ‘experiential learning’.
The well-researched simulation point is especially important when looking at the new strategic, technological and operational environment.
A key event for the simulation team is the annual SIMEX exercise. Here the force is tested against creative scenarios, which test challenging conditions to operate in coalition to be able to make decisions in hybrid environments.
We raised the question of flying in simulators and not getting a sense of what failure actually means in combat.
They provided two responses to this challenge.
First, because of the operations in the land wars, their ISR role has exposed them to getting shot at.
So there was a real world sense of danger drawn from those experiences.
Second, the major SIMEX exercises are crafted with an eye to recording actions and events so that failures are visible and crewmembers take those lessons learned forward as peer competition underscores success and failure in the process of learning from simulated combat operations.
Dr. Robbin Laird (left) is greeted by Lieutenant-Colonel Ray Townsend (centre), Commanding Officer 404 Long Range Patrol and Training Squadron, in the Hornell Centre at 14 Wing Greenwood Nova Scotia, Canada. Photo: MCpl Rory Wilson, 14 Wing Imaging
The SIMEX exercises are a yearly event and were described as such as follows:
“SIMEX is a yearly program where the crews go through an iteration of training with the most experienced people we have.
“The simulator operators are the people from 404 squadron at the Wing.
“The crews are operating on their own as they would on a mission and they’re getting tasks, which are very realistic.
“They are operating in a realistic combat environment right down from the messaging format with regard to how they brief and right up until the end; and they’re real time missions, they’re very long.
“At the end of SIMEX they get an assessment of how they did.
“That gives the commander here a picture of what is the state of affairs with the personnel and its performance levels.
“Because we do it every year the crews are on an upward learning curve. It’s an interesting program that has maintained and improved ASW skills for us, for the fleet.”
The focus is on training for a complex, dynamic and fluid combat environment.
As Lt. Col. Bruno Baker put it:
“When I started in the fleet the synthetic environment provided training based on a number of canned scenarios.
“These were cold war based scenarios that you saw repeatedly as you operated.
“They told you what scenario it was, you just went in your drawer and you pulled out your notes from your earlier training and experience and you just re briefed whatever you briefed every time you did this.
“The scenario was always the same, with some minor changes, but you always knew what you were getting into.
“It became repetitive it became a procedure trainer.
“Now this is a different ball game altogether.
“The people crafting the scenarios are gifted at coming up with relevant current scenarios that aren’t procedure trainers, but are making our crews problem solvers.
“It’s about training your crew that is capable of operating in a complex environment and being able to make decisions in such an environment.
“It is moving beyond being alone and unafraid to becoming an operational decision maker within a coalition in a 21st century maritime threat environment.”
This Canadian simulation center can make an important contribution not just to Canadian but to NATO defense as it is linked up with other ASW forces coming on line in the UK, Norway and the United States.
In fact working the intersection of new platforms and capabilities on the allied side with the evolving capabilities of the Canadian force can be a key part of what the center can assist in going forward.
And the simulation team sees a key role for Canadian forces in the transition NATO effort as they themselves transition.
According to LCol Ray Townsend:
“We’re well positioned for the next decade to be a stopgap.
“We’re able to be the ones that can perform key 10’Oclock and 2’Oclock duties for Canada and North America in the ASW area.
“There are so many other nations that are transitioning right now with the introduction of the P-8 and Triton, from Australia to the UK to the Americans, to Norwegians.
“A lot of people are doing that transition right now, and as you know with any transition there is significant downtime.
“We can provide a major role as the transition unfolds.”
Rod Ward (right), Chief Simulations Officer of 404 Long Range Patrol and Training Squadron (LRP&T Sqn) gives a briefing to(from left to centre) Lieutenant-Colonel Ray Townsend, Commanding Officer 404 LRP&T Sqn, Dr. Robbin & Murielle Laird, Lieutenant-Colonel Brono Baker, Acting Commanding Officer 14 Wing Greenwood and Ralph Hippman, Simulator Operator, in the Throney Island Simulation Centre at 14 Wing Greenwood, Nova Scotia, Canada. Photo: MCpl Rory Wilson, 14 Wing Imaging
The 2017 US Marine Corps Marathon is over and is now another chapter in the history of a great event.
The Second Line of Defense team would like to congratulate the Marine Corps and all the runners who participated in the 2017 Marine Corps Marathon.
It is a joyous event with an historic course which is run throughout the Nation’s Capital.
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To say that it is a fun run is not to minimize what a significant accomplishment is being made by a runner in the event to forge a life time of memories.
Each year every runner has a great story.
This year, we were struck by a uniformed police contingent walking fast together holding special flags for “Project Remember.”
It was a warm Sunday day in October.
But there were a number of dedicated uniformed Police walking in unity to remember their fallen brethren.
They were joined by many service members and their families, who also ran to honor the sacrifices made by a few for the safety of us all against enemies both foreign and domestic.
It was that kind of event and that kind of a day-OORAH Marines!
2017-10-23 According to a story published by the Australian Department of Defence on October 12, 2017, the ScanEagle has completed its operational evaluation during an Australian deployment to the Middle East.
HMAS Newcastle has conducted the RAN’s first simultaneous operations of manned and unmanned aircraft during its current deployment to the Middle East on Operation Manitou.
In September, Newcastle’s MH-60R helicopter and ScanEagle Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) were employed on concurrent surface search sorties in the Gulf of Oman in support of Task Force 50, US Navy 5th Fleet.
Commanding Officer, HMAS Newcastle, Commander Mark Sirois said the integration of manned and unmanned aerial operations offered significant flexibility to Commanders at sea.
“The cooperative employment of both aviation platforms allows Newcastle to effectively conduct wide-area search and persistent surveillance by employing the appropriate asset,” he said.
“The advent of unmanned aerial systems within the RAN, specifically in Newcastle for OP Manitou, has provided an excellent asset for both the CMF mission and for future use within the RAN.”
Newcastle has four ScanEagle air vehicles embarked as part of an Operational Evaluation (OPEVAL) to support the introduction of Maritime Tactical Unmanned Aerial Systems and their teamed employment with manned aircraft, under Project SEA 129.
HMAS Newcastle’s Flight Commander, Lieutenant Commander Ian Holmes said the deployment of manned and unmanned systems had seen Newcastle operate at flying stations for extended periods, which was based on comprehensive planning and coordination.
“The successful, concurrent MH-60R – ScanEagle mission was a result of detailed planning and preparation to ensure that the conduct of the flying operations could be supported effectively by Newcastle,” Lieutenant Commander Holmes said.
“This required a comprehensive understanding of the capabilities of both aviation platforms.”
During the manned-unmanned teaming sortie, ScanEagle was equipped with a ‘Video Detection and Ranging’ (ViDAR) camera that automatically detects surface contacts, increasing operator situational awareness and search capacity.
Due to the longer endurance of ScanEagle, and a need to ensure safe recovery of the manned aircraft to the single flight deck, the MH-60R was operated after ScanEagle launch and prior to its recovery.
Prior to the simultaneous manned-unmanned operation, the ScanEagle had been used as a platform to conduct surface search and persistent, covert surveillance in support of CTF 150 Maritime Security Operations, including chokepoint transits in the Bab al Mandeb.
As of late September, ScanEagle had flown 140 hours over 29 OPEVAL sorties.
The UAS is fully integrated into Newcastle’s combat system, enabling live streaming of ScanEagle imagery to the operations room for analysis and exploitation.
As the NATO allies focus on new threats and those posed by historic competitors, the need to reinforce North Atlantic defense is coming back into focus. As the former head of NORAD, Admiral Gortney, put it in an interview shortly before his departure:
Put in simple terms, we need to shape a more integrated air and maritime force that can operate to defend the maritime and air approaches to North America as well as North America itself.
We can look at the evolving threat as a ten o’clock and a two o’clock fight, because they originate from the ten and two.
And the ten o’clock fight is primarily right now an aviation fight.
They’re moving capability there, but it’s nothing like what they have at the two o’clock fight.
The two o’clock fight is more of a maritime fight.
And he underscored the importance of Canada in shaping capabilities to work the challenges.
For 58 years, we have had a bi-national command, NORAD. The current government faces a set of tough problems, not the least of which due to past governments not addressing re-capitalization.
This is a notional rendering of the 10 and 2 O’Clock challenge. It is credited to Second Line of Defense and not in any way an official rendering by any agency of the US government. It is meant for illustration purposes only. Credit: Second Line of Defense
Clearly, what they need to do is to recapitalize their air and maritime force, and preferably one that can work together from the ground up as an integrated force.
I think NORAD needs to become a multi-domain command, and their forces could flow into that command and out of that command as a key enabler.
The current chief of staff of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Lt. General Hood, provided his perspective on the Canadian contribution to the challenges posed by Admiral Gortney, Lt. General Hood highlighted in a recent interview that a key element of how Canada was shaping its approach to working the challenges and working with allies was the modernization of their P-3, namely the Aurora CP-140.
While the UK, Norway, and the US Navy were adding new platforms, namely, the P-8 and in the case of the US Navy the Triton, the Canadian Air Force was focused on the modernization of the brain of the P-3, and shaping a new workflow within the aircraft as the 21st century maritime domain awareness and strike enterprise evolves in the North Atlantic.
“Out of all the NATO ASW platforms in there,” says LGen Hood, “the most effective one has been our CP-140. I am exceptionally proud of our ASW capability, and when I couple it with the new advanced capability on our upgraded frigates, I see us a backbone of NATO’s ASW capability.”
RCAF Commander LGen Michael Hood (Photo: Sgt Paz Quillé, RCAF PA Imagery)
Over the decade ahead, as the maritime domain awareness and strike enterprise is reworked with the coming of the P-8 and the Triton (among other assets) Canada will add an unmanned capability, continue upgrading the CP-140, and work closely with allies in reshaping the maritime domain awareness and strike networks. New satellite sensor and communications systems will also be added.
According to LGen Hood, this will allow the RCAF to leverage developments in the next decade to determine what needs to be put on their replacement manned air platform and to determine which air platform that would be. “The government’s new defence policy lays out a 20-year funding line that recapitalizes our air force.”
He acknowledges that the eventual replacement of the CP-140 is funded in that policy but explains that this is not a near term need. “We have better capability from an ASW perspective in the CP-140 than comes off the line presently in the P-8. We have just gone through a Block III upgrade that has completely modernized the ASW capability as well as adding an overland ISR piece. We have replaced the wings on many major empennage [tail assembly] points and the goal is to get our CP-140 out to about 2032 when we’re going to replace it with another platform.”
He notes that next year, the CP-140s will receive a Block IV upgrade which will include new infrared counter measures, a tactical data link 16 to complement link 11 and full motion video, imagery, email, chat, and VOIP.
Recently, we had a chance to visit 14 Wing at Greenwood, located in Nova Scotia.
During our visit on September 19, 2017 we spent a full day on the base flying on the Aurora, being briefed on the evolving approaches to training for ASW and other operations, and discussing the way ahead with Lt. Col. Bruno Baker, Deputy Commander of the Wing.
Lt. Col. Baker recently was the commanding officer of the training squadron as well which provided him with a unique knowledge set about the modernization and operational approach of the Aurora and working with allies. He has been a P-3 operator during his entire service in the Air Force
Question: Why is it the CP-140 and not the P-3?
Lt. Col. Baker: “Canada purchased empty P-3 Orion airframes and added to it the best anti-subwarine warfare suite of the day which was found in the S-3 Viking and have modernized from that hybrid forward.
“We were one of the leading nations in ASW, unquestionably, in the 1980s because we had the best equipment with the best airframe, put together.
“The plane has undergone a life extension program.
“The plane was stripped down to become a virtual tube and the new wings and tails were installed which overall gives us 15 more years of operational life in the airframe.
“Throughout the Alliance, there was not much appetite to invest in ASW once the cold war was over.
“We tended to run in place.
“To move forward, we have focused on the Aurora Incremental Modernization Program or AIMP.
“Block One is considered the original airplane.
“In Block 2 we focused on a cockpit-centric modernization. We added flight management systems, gps and much more to facilitate modernization in terms of operating the aircraft.
“But it didn’t change anything in our operational capabilities.
“In other words, Block 2 were front end upgrades.
“We did add a new capability in the course of modernization not tied to any particular block, namely the MX-20 EO IR camera that was a significant upgrade to enhance our capabilities for persistent surveillance.
“The addition of this capability caused a shift in our mission sets to add providing support to overland operations.
We are the main ISR operating asset for the RCAF and as such have operated for some time in this role in the Middle East.”
Lieutenant-Colonel Bruno Baker, Acting Commanding Officer 14 Wing Greenwood in the Throney Island Simulation Centre at 14 Wing Greenwood, Nova Scotia, Canada making a point during the meeting with Laird and Delaporte.Photo: MCpl Rory Wilson, 14 Wing Imaging
Question: What changes did Block 3 bring?
Lt. Col. Baker: “This was the game changer for the Aurora operationally.
Block Three brought basically all new capabilities in the tactical side of the airplane for ASW, communications, and just a new way to look at things.
“The capability enhancements were such that we gave a new designator to the airplane.
“Block Three modified airplanes are referred to as the CP-140M.
“Improvements were made in all areas, but the biggest change was in the acoustic sensing area.
“We added new computer and sensing capabilities.
“The technology onboard –notably the display screens and the interchangeability of data displayed on those screens including in the cockpit — now allowed for a different workflow as the cockpit crew could now see the information being generated in the back end so that enhancing SA to all stations, including in the cockpit, provided a greater synergy and potential for new workflows throughout the airplane.
“Block Three has also brought us an increased level of automation in the aircraft.
“So the sensors, as opposed to just spinning raw data that the operator needs to look at and analyze and make a decision what he’s looking at, there is a level of interpretation that is done by the systems that is actually tailorable by the operators: how much they want, how much they want to look at, what do they want, what type of information.
“A lot of it’s much more visually intuitive, as well, as opposed to just looking at a gram dropping in front of you or lines on a gram and having to do the entire interpretation.
“There’s some visual representation of the information that the sensors are getting.
“For the younger generation of operators this really appeals to them. And they can process the information so much faster than the older generation. This is a shift in generations and approaches which will inform our way ahead as well.”
Question: Somewhat similar or perhaps anticipating what is happening in the P-8?
Lt. Col. Baker: Somewhat similar and allows us to share these workflow experiences and new approaches to SA with our allies as well.
Question: MPAs are very flexible assets, and have been used widely in land operations, but this takes away from the ASW focus and skill sets. How has this challenge affected you?
Lt. Col. Baker: We have been deployed in the Middle East since October of 2014.
“We’re it for ISR platform in Canada. We’re not an ideal platform, but we can do it.
“What I tell people is, it’s a little bit like taking a Ferrari to go grocery shopping. Sure you can do it. It’s not really what it’s designed for.
“And there is the challenge of keeping the ASW skill sets fresh as well.
“The skill sets are different. With regard to the ISR overland role, we are providing information for someone else to make the targeting decision.
“With regard to ASW, you are multi-mission and putting yourself in the position to either make the targeting decision or executing it.
“Clearly, the first is different from the second and the second more demanding.
Question: In your ISR role, you are operating somewhat like a manned drone; but with ASW you are a C2, ISR, strike platform.
These are very different skill sets.
This must pose a challenge for training as well?
Lt. Col. Baker: “It does and we are facing manpower shortages as well in our area of competence.
“We need to wring out the capabilities we already have in Block 3.
“We haven’t been able to develop the best way to tactically employ those new toys we got in ASW in part because of the focus on overland ISR.
“The Block Three airplane is still being operated as a Block Two because we haven’t had a chance to really develop the new tactics, which would allow us to exploit it to its full potential.”
A CP140 taxis to a halt 14 Wing Greenwood, Nova Scotia, Canada. Photo: MCpl Rory Wilson, 14 Wing Imaging
Question: When you deploy an Aurora, how many people are involved in supporting the deployment?
Lt. Col. Baker: “If we deploy two crews, two airplanes that is roughly eighty people. That’s once you add the maintenance and the staff to run what we call a detachment.”
Question: There is a new framework underway, which the US Navy calls the kill web, in which the ability to reachback to various assets in the coalition allows one to enhance the reach in terms of the effect of one’s platform. It is also about the evolving sensor-shooter relationship in the distributed environment. What is your sense of this change and how it affects the RCAF?
Lt. Col. Baker: “We will always operate in a coalition or allied environment where you need to have those efficiencies by being able to integrate fully with each other.
“And we seek to maximize synergy.
“The older ASW approach was to operate alone and unafraid. The anti-submarine warfare platform was a fire-and-forget platform. You were given a mission, you took off, comms silent, did your job, and come back after eight hours.
“That is not the emerging approach.
“We have reachback, and we have command and control that is much more involved in operational and tactical operations.
“We need to reassess the ASW approach going forward and to shape an approach that is more capable of leveraging reachback but ensuring the proper C2 to get the job done where the impact of our systems can be greatest in terms of impact on a threat.
“And the introduction of new UAVs, like the Triton, could become a game changer as well.
“Is the next approach to park UAVs to monitor a wide, wide area and your manned platform becomes a sonobuoy carrier where it goes and lays barriers and then it leaves?
“Does the manned platform become the shooter in a broad UAV enabled sensor grid?
“The position that Canada is in might be an interesting one where for the next few decades, technology will develop, processes will develop, and platforms will evolve.
“Because our commitment to a new platform is a decade away, we might be able to position ourselves with the best solution that is emerging for us.”
Question: Does Block IV enable some of the changes we have been discussing?
Lt. Col. Baker: “It does.
“Block IV is focused on hardware changes, which allow for continuous software upgrades and software changes which allow for software upgradeability.
“And will include some changes to communication systems as well which allow for changes in how the plane can work with others in the battlespace.
“In fact, with Block IV, the CP-140 will become its own Local Area Network which brings an interesting question from a maintenance perspective.
“Who maintains our software?
“We can’t just think of aircraft technicians as being propeller specialists, or engine specialists or airframe specialists.
“We now also need to have IT specialists to fix our airplanes.
“The question then becomes: do we train IT technicians to become aviation technicians or do we take airworthiness indoctrinated technicians to become IT specialists?
“Canada opted to go with the latter.
“The first Block IV configured Aurora will come to Greenwood next year. It will come to the 415 Squadron here, which is our force development squadron.
“Clearly, the days of the CP-140 are counted. But the technology development is still going on, because the lessons learned from the new technology development will be applied to the next platform.
“The government is not going to invest a whole lot of money in the platform anymore, but they will keep investing in the technology, in the war-fighting capability of the CP-140.”
Question: In your training capacity, how do you see the changes for the younger generation coming into the service?
Lt. Col. Baker: “Many of the new personnel coming in off the street are being trained over a period of only a couple of years and then being put directly into operational experiences. When I became an Aurora pilot, I was one of the younger (in service) pilots because I had served for five years. The norm in those days was more around 7 years of service. That meant that pilots had had 5-7 years to be molded in the military norms.
“This is changing now as new entrants gain operational experience much faster. And we are working to change our training methods as well from being based on printed manuals to more intuitive computer based learning.
“We have very high capability simulation on the operational side that has been used to great effect to prepare our crews to deploy. That’s the only reason we can graduate them and send them in theater immediately, is because of the quality of the simulation we have.
“By involving the younger generation early in operations, we are highlighting their intuitive learning skills as well. With the shortages of human resources that we have now, it means that for many of them, they graduate from the OTU, they’re full crew members, and go to their operational squadron, and the first thing they do is get ready to deploy and deploy immediately after. And they are performing brilliantly well.
“For example, I have the case of a pilot, where I signed his logbook as graduating being an Aurora co-pilot in my role as the training squadron commander, and my congratulations, left a little note in his log book.
“Then I deployed to Operation IMPACT where I saw him a couple weeks later. He’s deploying, and the first flight he does is with me in theater. There’s a guy that I just graduated a few weeks before, now he’s flying with me in a no-duff theater of war. That’s pretty special.”
Editor’s Note: The Royal Canadian Air Force describes 14th Wing as follows:
Nestled in the heart of Nova Scotia’s beautiful Annapolis Valley rests 14 Wing Greenwood, the largest air base on the East Coast. Aurora crews conduct sovereignty and surveillance missions over the Atlantic Ocean routinely, while search and rescue capabilities are maintained 365 days of the year.
In 1942, CFB Greenwood was established as Royal Air Force Station as part of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (BCATP). The BCATP was a plan to expand all Commonwealth air forces. In keeping with this objective, Greenwood was used as a training base during WWII, and before the end of the war, produced operational forces.
Today, 14 Wing is home to three operational Squadrons. CP-140 Aurora Long Range patrol Aircraft are flown by 405 Long Range Patrol Squadron. 404 Long Range Patrol & Training Squadron, which operates both the Aurora flight deck and tactical simulators, also uses the long range patrol Aurora for operational and training purposes. 413 Transport and Rescue Squadron is responsible for search and rescue throughout Atlantic Canada and eastern parts of Quebec.
The Squadron members carry out their missions with both CC-130 Hercules Aircraft and CH-149 Cormorant Helicopters. In addition to its diversified operations, 14 Wing Greenwood is home to 14 Air Maintenance Squadron, responsible to maintain the entire CP-140 Aurora fleet operated here in Greenwood. The Wing has a large recreational facility (including a pool and an arena) and is home to hundreds of Air cadets every summer.
14 Wing is located at Canadian Forces Base Greenwood.
Editor’s Note: A recent experience of Lt. Col. Baker was highlighted in this story by Ashley Thompson and published April 10, 2017 in the King’s County Register:
GREENWOOD – It’ll be hard for Lt. Col. Bruno Baker to ever top his latest homecoming adventure.
Based at 14 Wing Greenwood, the military pilot recently flew a CP-140 Aurora over his hometown near Vimy-Ridge, Que. April 9 as part of a commemorative fly-by for the 100th anniversary of the Battle of Vimy Ridge.
“(I felt) a great amount of pride to be able to go to my hometown area that I grew up in and help them commemorate this, and show them what the Royal Canadian Air Force has, and what we do for Canada,” said Baker, recalling the events of the previous day in an interview with Kings County News April 10.
Baker worked as a reporter in the area from 1984 to 1990, and noted that some of the journalists he used to encounter on assignments were watching the fly-by.
“There were a few relatives, many friends and my father was also the master of ceremonies of that day.”
Baker’s crew made three passes over the ceremony at varying speeds. Flying at an altitude of about 500 feet, he could tell there were about 200 people watching from the ceremony below.
“We could see the people very well on the ground waving at us as we were going by,” he recalled.
He knew there’d be familiar faces on the ground and an added bonus – his father’s voice in his ear.
“To be able to talk to my father as we were coordinating this fly past is something I would have never thought I would do in my dreams, so that made it extra special,” said Baker, commanding officer of 404 Long Range Patrol and Training Squadron.
The deadly Battle of Vimy Ridge occurred during the First World War, and began on April 9, 1917.
”The Battle of Vimy Ridge proved to be a great success, but it only came at a heavy cost. The some 100,000 Canadians who served there suffered more than 10,600 casualties, nearly 3,600 of which were fatal,” states a post on Veterans Affairs Canada’s website titled “The Battle of Vimy Ridge.”
Baker was honoured to play a role in the fly-by paying tribute to the brave Canadians who travelled to France to fight in the crucial battle 100 years ago.
“Everything is exciting about flying but this is special because that’s where you get the feedback of how truly the population appreciates what you’re doing and how important it is,” said Baker, reflecting on the Vimy Ridge fly-by.
“It sort of re-emphasizes that what you do is right, and it’s something to be proud of.”
Editor’s Note: Two tours of the Aurora are highlighted in the following videos, the first by a Canadian TV station and the second by an independent photo journalist.
When the UK cancelled the Nimrod MRA4 program, the RAF faced a significant challenge: how to keep UK ASW and MPA skill sets alive?
The UK established the seedcorn program to provide a bridge to what would become an acquisition of the P-8 by the RAF several years later, namely in 2016.
This meant that there has been a several year gap whereby the UK needed to keep its skill sets alive.
According to Flight International in an article written by Craig Hoyle and published in 2012:
Efforts by the Royal Air Force to retain core skills in maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) operations will include 33 personnel and a total investment of £3.2 million ($5.1 million) for the current financial year, the UK government has revealed.
Dubbed Project “Seedcorn”, the measure is intended to allow RAF crew to fly with allied air forces to maintain experience in MPA operations following the cancellation of the UK’s BAE Systems Nimrod MRA4 programme. This covers anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare duties, plus intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance tasks.
The agreements now in place have enabled the RAF to allocate personnel to support operations involving MPA assets flown by Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA, including during last year’s NATO-led operation to protect Libyan civilians.
In our visit to 14th Wing at Greenwood, we had a chance to discuss as well with Lt. Col. Bruno Baker, the current Deputy Wing Commander, the Canadian role in project Seedcorn.
He recently left his position as the Commanding Officer of 404 Long Range Patrol and Training Squadron.
RAF officers have been regular contributors to the Greenwood mission during the seed-corn program, and indeed some of these participants have even become residents of Canada.
“The systems onboard the Aurora and our modernization approach fitted quite well with the new workflow process which is on the P-8.
“We have already built into our Block 3 upgrades a new workflow process and increased the data available to the cockpit, which is reshaping our workflow possibly similar to the P-8.
Earlier last year we had a chance to discuss the seedcorn program with RAF officers at RAF Lossiemouth, the base chosen to operate the new P-8s.
In a piece published on November 17, 2016, we provided a look at the UK perspective.
2016-11-17 By Robbin Laird
On a recent visit to Norway, the UK Minister of Defence signed a new agreement with Norway to shape enhanced cooperation on maritime patrol operations. This was done in part due to the coming of the P-8 to the United Kingdom.
In the story on the UK MoD website it was noted:
Work on the UK’s MPA programme is progressing well, including the investment on infrastructure in Lossiemouth in Scotland, where the planes will be based.
Former armed forces personnel who previously served on UK Nimrod are also re-joining the RAF to help operate the future P-8s.
12 have recently re-joined and more will re-join in the future
(L-R) Lieutenant Commander (USN) Hankins, Captain Jennings, Major Jacob, Corporal Walsh and Sergeant (RAF) Murphy take part in a training exercise in September 2013.Photo Credit: MP&EU Graphic Arts.
The UK MoD retired the Nimrod in 2011; recently, the UK government announced that the P-8 was coming into the force in 2019.
The Nimrod MK2 MPA was taken out of service in 2010 with the UK accepting the capability gap until the MRA4 came into service.
How do you maintain the skills necessary to stay in the maritime domain awareness game when your aircraft goes away?
According to the MoD, a “seed-corn” program was put in place to provide for a transition.
With the first aircraft due to arrive in the UK in 2019/2020, the RAF has been committed to maintaining the skills needed to operate these MPAs through the ‘seed-corn’ programme, which has embedded former RAF MPA operators within the MPA squadrons of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA.
Air Vice-Marshal Gerry Mayhew, who is responsible for the RAF’s fast jets and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance assets, said:
The seed-corn initiative has been vital in ensuring that our future MPA aircrew are prepared to regenerate the UK’s MPA capability. By retaining those essential skills, our aircrew are already on the front foot when it comes to operating these new aircraft.
But doing so is not easy, and notably because the P-8 is not really a Nimrod replacement.
As Wing Commander Paul Froome put it during my April visit to RAF Lossiemouth:
“The P-8 is clearly not Nimrod.
“If we think that we’re going to take an old-fashioned air electronics operator, and use him in the same way on the P8, we’re missing a trick.
“We need to be developing the crews now to be maritime warfare operators, not electronic operators, and radar, and wet and dry, we need to be thinking bigger than that.
“The training that was already in place for the MRA4 saw more use of Link 11 and 16 and ensuring that the information flow between assets was as slick as possible. The Nimrod was used as more than an MPA spending more time supporting overland operations in the Middle East than over the sea.
“If we don’t, then you end up making problems for your F-35, your Typhoon, your P8, your Reaper, your Son of Reaper.”
During a June visit to RAF Lossiemouth, there was an opportunity to meet with a former Nimrod commander who is part of the seed corn effort, and it was clear that getting the P-8 into the force was an important step to allow the challenge of skill transition to be met successfully.
The discussion with this RAF officer from No. 602 Squadron, which is a Royal Auxiliary Air Force squadron, highlighted the transition effort.
“We are predominantly former Nimrod personnel and I spent 32 years flying in the MPA role.”
He highlighted how important NATO exercises have been to shape a transition.
Joint Warrior which this year brought various NATO aircraft to RAF Lossiemouth, including the P-8, has provided a crucial opportunity for former Nimrod operators to go onboard US and allied Maritime Patrol Aircraft to keep skill sets current.
Lossiemouth is a fast jet base; it is not yet fully set up to support larger MPA aircraft. There is a clear challenge with the decision to standup the P-8s at RAF Lossiemouth. One should note that the Nimrod base, which was located close to Lossie, was closed down and is now an Army base.
Currently, Lossie supports two large Joint Warrior exercises a year, which includes MPA aircraft at Lossie as well. The location of Lossie is important in terms of the area of interests for the UK and its allies as well.
The base is manned 24/7 for the Quick Reaction Alert capability. This provides a foundation for thinking forward towards the future MPA as well. The personnel is used to expeditionary operations as well.
The decision-making facility for MPA and the Royal Navy, more generally, is located at Northwood; and with the deployment of P-8s at Lossie will shape a new decision-making dynamic between the two centers as well.
The MPA community is very international in character; with the Joint Warrior exercises, the RAF has had an opportunity to keep skill sets current; but is not the same as flying your own aircraft.
But what this means as the P-8 comes into the RAF inventory, the broader multinational orientation built into the exercises, and the Nimrod/P-3 working relationships can be carried forward.
“We have continuously sent officers to work with our allies abroad to keep their skills current as well.
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“We are well placed to deal with the new challenges.
“The training we have given our ex-MPA guys in flying and operations with our allies is crucial.
“This will allow us to slot in people very quickly as the P-8 becomes operational.”
“But it is a clear challenge.
As the USN’s 6th Fleet Commander put it recently, we are seeing the fourth Battle of the Atlantic take shape as the Russians take to sea once again.
For the British, making a key contribution to this effort is crucial and will be provided a new aircraft is married to the transitional “seed corn” approach.