Information War and Hybrid Threats: Finland Launches a New Center to Focus on the Challenge

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
10/06/2017

2017-10-06 Information war and hybrid threats have been honed to a 21st century art form by the Russians under President Putin.

But these are really early days for shaping ways to deal with the IW/hybrid threat challenge and to deal more generally with the use of military power for limited political objectives, short of war.

Clearly, in Northern Europe, a broader zone of security is evolving from the Arctic through to the Baltics and includes the UK, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and various other NATO allies.

A key challenge will be to shape effective crisis management tools and approaches to deal with this targeted threat which is designed to obtain political and strategic objectives without the use of overwhelming military force.

The liberal democracies are shaping a new set of military capabilities and concepts of operations which can be used in such an effort; but the civil side of the effort needs to be developed and evolved in order to do so.

The broad fault line between the liberal democracies versus the illiberal powers is defining the nature of conflict in the decade ahead to go along with the continuing challenges associated with terrorist organizations like ISIS.

The Government of Finland has stood up a new Centre designed in part to shape better understanding which can in turn help the member states develop the tool sets for better crisis management.

This is how the Finnish government put it with regard to the new center in its press release dated October 1, 2017.

The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats has reached initial operational capability on 1 September 2017. The Act on the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats entered into force on 1 July 2017, following which Matti Saarelainen, Doctor of Social Science, was appointed Director of the Centre. The Centre has now acquired premises in Helsinki, established a secretariat consisting of seven experts and made the operational plans for this year.

“Hybrid threats have become a permanent part of the Finnish and European security environment, and the establishment of the Centre responds well to this current challenge. Since early July, rapid progress has been made to allow the Centre to begin its operations. The Steering Board will be briefed on the progress at its meeting next week,” says Jori Arvonen, Chair of the Steering Board of the Centre.

The Centre will launch its activities at a high-level seminar to be held in Helsinki on 6 September. The seminar will bring together representatives of the 12 participating countries, the EU and NATO. Approximately 100 participants will take part in the seminar. The Centre’s communication channel (www.hybridcoe.fi) will also be opened at the seminar. Minister for Foreign Affairs Timo Soini and Minister of the Interior Paula Risikko will speak at the seminar as representatives of the host country. The official inauguration of the Centre will be held on 2 October.

The Centre is faced with many expectations or images. For example, the Centre is not an ´operational centre for anti-hybrid warfare´ or a ´cyber bomb disposal unit´. Instead, its aim is to contribute to a better understanding of hybrid influencing by state and non-state actors and how to counter hybrid threats. The Centre has three key roles, according to the Director of the Centre.

Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the official inauguration of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Finland

“First of all, the Centre is a centre of excellence which promotes the countering of hybrid threats at strategic level through research and training, for example. Secondly, the Centre aims to create multinational networks of experts in comprehensive security. These networks can, for instance, relate to situation awareness activities. Thirdly, the Centre serves as a platform for cooperation between the EU and NATO in evaluating societies’ vulnerabilities and enhancing resilience,” says Director Matti Saarelainen.

The EU and NATO take an active part in the Centre’s Steering Board meetings and other activities. As a signal of the EU and NATO’s commitment to cooperation, Julian King, EU Commissioner for the Security Union, and Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security, will participate in the high-level seminar on 6 September.

Currently, the 12 participating countries to the Centre are Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. EU and NATO countries have the possibility of joining as participant countries.

http://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/article/-/asset_publisher/1410869/eurooppalaisen-hybridiosaamiskeskuksen-toiminta-kaynnistyy-helsingissa

The web site of the new center provides an overview on the organization and focus of attention.

Hybrid CoE is to serve as a hub of expertise supporting the Participants’ individual and collective efforts to enhance their civil-military capabilities, resilience, and preparedness to counter hybrid threats with a special focus on European security. It is intended that the Centre will offer this collective experience and expertise for the benefit of all Participants, as well as the EU and NATO. The Centre will follow a comprehensive, multinational, multidisciplinary and academic-based approach.

The aim of Hybrid CoE is to provide a single location dedicated to furthering a common understanding of hybrid threats at strategic level and promoting the development of comprehensive, whole-of-government response at national levels and of coordinated response at EU and NATO levels.

In addressing these questions, the functions of Hybrid CoE include the following:

  • to encourage strategic-level dialogue and consulting between and among Participants, the EU and NATO;
  • to conduct research and analysis into hybrid threats and methods to counter such threats;
  • to develop doctrine, conduct training and arrange exercises aimed at enhancing the Participants’ individual capabilities, as well as interoperability between and among Participants, the EU and NATO for countering hybrid threats;
  • to engage with and invite dialogue with governmental and non-governmental experts from a wide range of professional sectors and disciplines; and
  • to involve, or cooperate with, communities of interest (COI) focusing on specific activities that may constitute hybrid threats, on methodologies for understanding these activities, and on ways to adjust organisations to better address such threats effectively.

The Steering Board (SB), consisting of representatives of the Participants, is the principal decision-making body in the Centre. Staff representatives from the EU and NATO are invited to attend the Steering Board meetings. 

The SB is to set the policies and approve the work programme, to approve the budget and the accounts, to approve the annual participation fees, to approve the admission of new Participants, to adopt internal regulations and to approve such guidance as may be necessary for the functioning of the Centre and its organs. 

The host country of the Secretariat is Finland. The Centre has a domestic legal personality and capacity to perform its functions in the Republic of Finland in accordance with national legislation that entered into force on 1 July 2017.

The secretariat in Helsinki, headed by the Director, will manage the Centre’s administration and common functions. It will coordinate the relevant activities of the communities of interest on (1) hybrid influencing, (2) terrorism and radicalism, and (3) vulnerabilities and resilience. The secretariat is also to prepare and organise the meetings of the Steering Board and cooperate and liaise with Participants, the EU and the NATO.

The initiative to establish Hybrid CoE originates from the Joint Communication by the European Commission and the High Representative to the European Parliament and the Council “Joint framework on countering hybrid threats – a European Union response”, decided in Brussels on 6 April 2016. The initiative was supported in the Common set of proposals for the implementation of the Joint EU/NATO Declaration, endorsed by the Council of the European Union and the North Atlantic Council on 6 December 2016.

https://www.hybridcoe.fi/about-us/

The focus of the Centre is upon thinking through how best to counter hybrid threats.

We live in an era of hybrid influencing. There are state and non-state actors that are challenging countries and institutions they see as a threat, opponent or competitor to their interests and goals. The range of methods and activities is wide: influencing information; logistical weaknesses like energy supply pipelines; economic and trade-related blackmail; undermining international institutions by rendering rules ineffective; terrorism or increasing insecurity.

Hybrid threats are methods and activities that are targeted towards vulnerabilities of the opponent. Vulnerabilities can be created by historical memory, legislation, old practices, geostrategic factors, strong polarisation of society, technological disadvantages or ideological differences. If the interests and goals of the user of hybrid methods and activity are not achieved, the situation can escalate into hybrid warfare where the role of military and violence will increase significantly.

Hybrid tactics have been under discussion, in particular, since the conflict in Ukraine and the ISIL/Da’esh campaign in Iraq. Hybrid threats have a connection to both Eastern and Southern challenges. In order to meet the challenges, it is important to develop integrated national responses, including threat analysis, self-assessment of vulnerabilities and comprehensive security approach. An integrated international response – including EU and NATO efforts – is needed to support the assessment of threats and vulnerabilities as well as coordinated action.

https://www.hybridcoe.fi/hybrid-threats/

And on October 2, 2017, NATO released the following article which highlighted the participation of the Sec Gen of NATO in the launching of the Centre.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, together with European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission, Ms Federica Mogherini, are in Helsinki, Finland today (2 October) to attend the inauguration of the Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats. They are attending as guests of Finland’s President Sauli Niinisto and Prime Minister Juha Sipilä.

“The centre will make an important contribution to our security” the Secretary General said. It will help nations and international organizations like NATO and the EU to better understand modern, complex threats and to strengthen our societies against them.”

It is also interesting to note how the Norwegian government described the Centre and its importance in Norwegian government press release regarding their joining the Centre.

Norway signed an agreement today (2017-07-14) on participation in the newly established, Finnish-led European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats.

Increasingly complex challenges and constellations of actors are affecting the security landscape. The use of hybrid strategies has become steadily more widespread. A number of countries are experiencing disinformation activities, propaganda campaigns linked to elections, and the hacking of critical infrastructure. The effects of these and other hybrid strategies are compounded by our societies’ increased dependence on cyberspace. 

In order to address these challenges, taking a coherent approach and cooperating closely at the national and international level are essential. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, and the Ministry of Justice and Public Security have therefore together decided to intensify efforts in this area, and Norway’s participation in the new European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats is part of this. Norway will cooperate with allies and close partners at the Centre, with a view to gaining a better understanding of hybrid threats, and finding better ways of dealing with them. NATO and the EU have also established cooperation in this area.

The aims of the centre are to increase our understanding of hybrid threats, of vulnerabilities that can be exploited in hybrid operations, and of how the resilience of societies can be improved.

https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/norway-to-join-international-centre-for-countering-hybrid-threats/id2564689/

In short, the Finnish government is enhancing regional cooperation to deal with a core challenge from a real world power player willing to use military intervention as a normal tool of political power within the European continent.

Augmenting European Defense Capabilities: New Tanking Assets

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
10/05/2017

2017-09-26 Recently, the French, Norwegian and German Air Forces have added new tanking capabilities to their forces.

And in the Norwegian and German cases did so under a collective European defense acquisition approach.

In a press release dated September 7, 2017, Airbus Defence and Space noted the first flight of the new French tanker.

Airbus Defence and Space has today successfully completed the maiden flight of the first A330 MRTT Multi Role Tanker Transport for France.

The aircraft, which will be known in French service as Phénix, is the first of nine-ordered byte French Defence Procurement Agency DGA, plus another three expected to be confirmed.

It is the second new standard A330 MRTT to fly, featuring structural modifications, aerodynamic improvements giving a fuel-burn reduction of up to1%, upgraded avionics computers and enhanced military systems. 

The aircraft was converted in Getafe from a standard A330 assembled in Toulouse.

The crew reported that the aircraft performed in line with expectations during the 3h 25 minute flight.

The Phénix fleet will be equipped with combination of the Airbus Aerial Refueling Boom System (ARBS) and underwing hose-and-drogue refueling, and can carry 272 passengers or be configured for medical evacuation.

First delivery is due in 2018.

Fifty-One A330 MRTTs have been ordered by eight nations of which 28 have been delivered.

The Australians were the launch customer for the A330MRTT and as such the later buyers, like the French Air Force, have benefited directly from the operational experience of the RAAF. 

This is the benefit of having a global fleet of military aircraft.

And Norway and Germany have moved out on the earlier agreement to procure their initial tanker aircraft.

In a press release by Airbus Defence and Space dated September 25, 2017, the order for new aircraft by Norway and Germany was highlighted.

Airbus Defence and Space has received a firm order for five Airbus A330 MRTT Multi Role Tanker Transports from Europe’s organisation for the management of cooperative armament programmes – OCCAR – on behalf of NATO Support & Procurement Agency (NSPA) and funded by Germany and Norway. 

The order follows the announcement on 29 June of a Memorandum of Understanding under which the two nations would join Netherlands and Luxembourg in the European/NATO Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet (MMF) program.

A contract amendment signed at the OCCAR headquarters in Bonn, Germany today adds five aircraft to the two previously ordered by Netherlands and Luxembourg and includes four additional options to enable other nations to join the grouping. It includes two years of initial support.

The program is funded by the four nations who will have the exclusive right to operate these NATO–owned aircraft in a pooling arrangement. The aircraft will be configured for in-flight refueling, the transport of passengers and cargo, and medical evacuation flights. 

The first two aircraft have already been ordered to be delivered from Airbus Defence and Space’s tanker conversion line at Getafe near Madrid and all seven are expected to be handed over between 2020 and 2022.

The European Defence Agency (EDA) initiated the MMF program in 2012. OCCAR manages the MMF acquisition phase as Contract Executing Agent on behalf of NSPA. Following the acquisition phase, NSPA will be responsible for the complete life-cycle management of the fleet. 

Airbus Defence and Space Head of Military Aircraft Fernando Alonso said: “This new order further demonstrates the A330 MRTT’s position as the world’s premier tanker/transport aircraft.

“But it also firmly establishes the MMF as one of Europe’s most important collaborative programs and a model for the future European defence projects which are expected to be launched in the coming years.”

We focused on the importance of the Norwegian-German agreement in a piece published earlier this year.

2017-06-29 Norway has expanded its defense industrial relationships to provide for its 21st century defense capabilities.

This includes F-35, P-8, Joint Strike Missile exports, a new working relationship with Germany to acquire submarines.

Now the A330MRTT, the global tanker used by several air forces, is being acquired by Norway and Germany.

According to a press release dated June 29, 2017 by Airbus Defence and Space, “Germany and Norway formally join Netherlands and Luxembourg to operate pooled fleet of NATO-owned Airbus A330 MRTT tankers.”

Madrid, 29 June 2017 – Germany and Norway officially joined the European/NATO program to acquire Airbus A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport aircraft along with Netherlands and Luxembourg.

RAAF A330 MRTT (KC-30A) refueling an F-16 through ARBS. Credit Photo: Airbus Military

The two nations committed to participating in the project through the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding at NATO HQ in Brussels today.

Known as the Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet (MMF) the programme was initiated by the European Defence Agency (EDA) in 2012. Europe’s organization for the management of cooperative armament programmes – OCCAR – manages the MMF acquisition phase as Contract Executing Agent on behalf of the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA). Following the acquisition phase, NSPA will be responsible for the complete life-cycle management of the fleet.

The Programme is funded by the four nations who will have the exclusive right to use these NATO–owned aircraft which will operate in a pooling arrangement. The aircraft will be configured for in-flight refuelling, the transport of passengers and cargo, and medical evacuation flights. The first two aircraft have already been ordered to be delivered from Airbus Defence and Space’s tanker conversion line at Getafe near Madrid in 2020. Five additional aircraft will now be ordered, and that order will include options for up to four further aircraft.

NSPA GM, Peter Dohmen said “As NATO’s Support and Procurement Agency, we are proud to be a key enabler of this critical project to help European nations meet their air transport and refuelling requirements. The successful cooperation in this project – bringing together all our capabilities – bodes extremely well for further future NATO / EU collaboration.”

OCCAR Director, Arturo Alfonso-Meiriño said: “The MMF programme has broken new ground in bringing together the combined capabilities of the EDA, NSPA and OCCAR as one team, with each organisation working within its particular sphere of expertise. I very much welcome that this important initiative has now attracted additional partners to join, and it still includes options for the participation of even more countries.”

EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq said: “The MMF is a prime example of European defence cooperation which shows that once a capability shortfall has been jointly identified, European nations can pull together, work on a common project aimed at filling the gap, and eventually deliver. It’s Pooling & Sharing at its best”.

Airbus Defence and Space Head of Military Aircraft Fernando Alonso said: “The A330 MRTT has established itself firmly as the world’s premier tanker/transport aircraft. It is extremely satisfying to now see it adopted as the core asset of one of Europe’s most important cooperative defence programmes. We hope that this collaborative approach will serve as a model for future joint procurements.”

This announcement comes on the heals of the Royal Australian Air Force, the launch Air Force for the KC-30A, announcing their 1000th mission in the Middle East with the Aircraft.

RAAF 1000 Sortie with KC-30A in the Middle East Operation from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

According to the RAAF in piece published on June 15, 2017:

The Air Task Group (ATG) of Operation OKRA, is operating at the request of the Iraqi Government within a US-led international coalition assembled to disrupt and degrade Daesh operations in the Middle East Region (MER).

The ATG comprises six F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter aircraft, an E-7A Wedgetail airborne command and control aircraft, and a KC-30A Multi-Role Tanker Transport air-to-air refuelling aircraft.

Additionally, the ATG has personnel working in the Combined Air and Space Operations Centre, and embedded with the ‘Kingpin’ US tactical Command and Control Unit.

The ATG is directly supported by elements of Operation ACCORDION including the Theatre Communications Group, Air Mobility Task Group, and the Expeditionary Airbase Operations Unit, whose mission is to provide airbase and aviation operational support to sustain air operations in the MER.

There are up to 300 personnel deployed at any one time to the Air Task Group, with an additional 100 personnel deployed in direct support of Operation OKRA.

Australian Department of Defence

June 15, 2017

 

 

Cross-Partner Cooperation Facilitated by the F-35 Global Enterprise

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-10-05 Approximately 50% of the airplanes coming off of the final assembly line at Fort Worth are partner F-35s.

And because of how the supply chain is designed, companies in partner states not only play a key role of that partner’s plane but on the global enterprise as well.

This also means that cross partnering among the partners themselves is facilitated.

A recent example is an agreement between a Danish and Australian company both working on the F-35 program.

According to the Australian Defence Connect website in an article published on October 4, 2017:

A memorandum of understanding (MoU) between a high-tech Danish business and an Australian manufacturer has been signed at Pacific 2017 in Sydney.

Victoria’s Marand and Denmark’s Terma have agreed to explore, identify and discuss specific areas of mutual interest as Terma looks to support the Australian industry capability (AIC) for its Australian defence activities.

Terma senior vice president Jorn Henrik Levy Rasmussen and Marand chief executive Rohan Stocker were at the ceremonial signing of the agreement, with Rasmussen saying it is a good indication of its plans to increase its Australian activities.

“The agreement we sign today is strong evidence of Terma’s present and future presence in the Australian market and interest in co-operating with the local industry,” he said.

“In recent years Terma [has] delivered a number of naval and surveillance systems in Australia and now we intensify our activities.”

Stocker said Marand’s work with Terma on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program 

“Terma have been a wonderful customer on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program,” explained Stocker. “We have proven capabilities and experience supporting global defence primes and we look forward to further co-operating with the Terma business here in Australia.”

Marand has previously worked with defence primes BAE Systems, Lockheed Martin and Boeing, and commercial giants BHP and Rio Tinto.

Terma specialises in developing products and systems for defence security applications, including command and control systems, radar systems, aircraft self-protection systems, aerostructures and space technology.

https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/key-enablers/1343-danish-company-eyes-off-australian-industry

Exercise Aurora 17: Sweden Focuses on Deterrence

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
09/30/2017

2017-09-26 Aurora 17 is the largest Swedish exercise in more than 20 years, and is intended to exercise Sweden’s defense capability against a larger, sophisticated opponent.

According to the Swedish Ministry of Defence:

In order to increase military capabilities, Swedish Armed Forces will conduct Exercise Aurora 17 – a national exercise that will build a stronger defence and increase the overall capability to face an attack on Sweden.

The overarching mission of the Swedish Armed Forces is to defend the country´s interests, our freedom and the right to live the way of our choice.

Deterrence lies at the core of a strong defence, one that rises to all threats and overcomes all challenges. It is designed to deter potential attackers, and force them to carefully consider the risks of attacking our country.

For a deterrent to be effective, it needs to be credible and visible. Through frequent and extensive training and exercise, especially with other defence forces, Sweden is strengthening its deterrence effect and makes it more credible.

Aurora 17 will be conducted in the air, on land and at sea. Units from all over Sweden will be involved, but the main exercise areas will be the Mälardalen and Stockholm areas, on and around Gotland, and the Gothenburg area. 

The Exercise will contribute to the development of Sweden’s total defence capabilities. Therefore, it is planned that around 40 other agencies will participate. In addition, in order to have as good an exercise as possible, and at the same time exercise Sweden’s defence capability against a larger, sophisticated opponent, other countries have been invited to participate in Aurora 17.

http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/activities/exercises/aurora-17/

The exercise is the largest in Sweden for more than 20 years and involves the forces of several other nations, including  Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Norway, Lithuania, and the United States.

More than 20,000 troops are involved.

According to an article published in The Express on September 11, 2017:

The three-week Aurora 17 drill kicked off on Monday and will chiefly take place around the strategic Baltic Sea island of Gotland and the regions surrounding Stockholm and Goteborg.

But the show of military might has rattled Russia, who branded the drills aggressive and said it was not necessary as Russia posed no threat to Sweden.

The Swedish military said the exercise by the non-NATO nation is designed “to deter potential attackers, and force them to carefully consider the risks of attacking our country.”

The drills are being held amid fears over Russia’s military buildup in the region, which also has also seen several reports of airspace violations by Russian military aircraft.

Swedish Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist told the Financial Times: “If you control Gotland, you have control over the sea and the airways towards the Baltic states.

“It’s about handling the realities of the security situation in our part of Europe.

“It’s an important signal to the Swedish population and also to other countries and partners that we take this security situation seriously.”

http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/852842/Sweden-military-exercise-Aurora-17-drill-Nato-Vladimir-Putin-fight-Russia-Zapad-drill

It should be noted that Sweden is reintroducing conscription as well.

The Swedish government has decided to reintroduce military conscription – a move backed by the country’s MPs.

The decision means that 4,000 men and women will be called up for service from 1 January 2018, a defence ministry spokeswoman told the BBC.

They will be selected from about 13,000 young people born in 1999, who will be asked to undergo a military assessment, Marinette Nyh Radebo said.

Non-aligned Sweden is worried about Russia’s Baltic military drills.

In September, a Swedish garrison was restored to Gotland, a big island lying between the Swedish mainland and the three ex-Soviet Baltic states.

Why is this happening?

Ms Nyh Radebo said the return to conscription was prompted by “the security change in our neighbourhood”.

“The Russian illegal annexation of Crimea [in 2014], the conflict in Ukraine and the increased military activity in our neighbourhood are some of the reasons,” she said.

How will it work?

The 13,000 who undergo the military tests will be a mixture of volunteers and conscripts. “You are part of the conscript system once you’ve done the tests – men and women are treated equally,” Ms Nyh Radebo said.

“The authorities choose the ones who are willing, interested and motivated.”

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39140100

The Russians have created their own impact from their actions in Ukraine and elsewhere which is creating significant concern and strengthening of defense capabilities in Northern Europe.

The Russian major ZAPAD 17 exercise has highlighted the capability of the Russian military to threaten directly the Baltic and Nordic states.

And it also underscores the question of providing operative reminders of the Russian ability to threaten these states might not be short sighted.

https://euobserver.com/foreign/139016

It is not unusual for Russia or the United States to exercise their forces and to test them in various scenarios.

Zapad 2017 is such an exercise but given its relative size and proximity to an area of clear European and American concern (the Baltics) significant political sensitivities are raised.

The challenge always is to ensure that an exercise is not a prelude to an actual military operation something which Baltic states have more than a little historical reason to be concerned with.

And as the most significant area of NATO undergoing modernization is Northern Europe, the exercise is likely to enhance the positions of the Nordics, the UK and other NATO states about the need to reinforce Northern European defense.

That is why the political and military cost to Russia might well outweigh whatever training benefits might accrue to the Russian forces.

(For a Russian discussion of ZAPAD 17 in which we participated, see the following:

http://www.rbc.ru/politics/13/09/2017/59b914279a79471a6de07429?from=center_3)

In the video below,  Marines with Marine Rotational Force-Europe take part in Exercise Aurora 17 on
Gotland Island, Sweden.

Exercise Aurora 2017 from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

LäRBRO, SWEDEN

09.19.2017

Video by Staff Sgt. Emma Mayen 

American Forces Network Europe

NATO Allies and North Atlantic Maritime Threats

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-09-30 By Robbin Laird

© 2017 FrontLine Defence (Vol 14, No 4)

The rebuilding of Russia’s Northern fleet and its defense bastion built around the Kola Peninsula creates a direct challenge to the Norwegian area of interest. Clearly, the expanded reach of Russia into the Arctic also affects the nature of the air and sea domains of strategic interest to all of the Arctic Council States.

Norway

In its Long Term Plan (issued on 17 June 2016), the Norwegian Ministry of Defence notes that “the most significant change in the Norwegian security environment relates to Russia’s growing military capability and its use of force. The military reform in Russia has resulted in a modernization of Russia’s conventional forces as well as a strengthening of its nuclear capabilities.”

It goes on to mention Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, and the continued destabilization of Eastern Ukraine. Both “constitute violations of international law, which have had a dramatic effect on European security,” the document asserts. “Russia has repeatedly proven itself willing to use a wide range of measures, including military force, to sustain its political dominance and influence.”

Even though Russia is not considered a military threat to Norway, the combination of military modernization and the will to exert military power is a “central factor” in Norwegian defense planning.

The country recognizes that areas in Norway’s immediate vicinity are also “central to Russian nuclear deterrence,” and that “Russia’s military presence and activities in the North have increased in recent years.”

The High North, it asserts, continues to be characterized by stability and cooperation, and Russian strategies for the Arctic still officially emphasize international cooperation. However, as the report notes, “we cannot rule out the possibility that Russia, in a given situation, will consider the use of military force to be a relevant tool, also in the High North.”

Allied Interoperability

The United States, the UK and Norway are all bringing new capabilities to bear on maritime threats in the North Atlantic. The commitment to the new maritime surveillance and strike aircraft, the Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft (P-8), and the introduction of the new Triton UAV are part of refocusing attention on the North Atlantic.

The Norwegians are procuring the P-8 in part to deal with this challenge and are looking to collaborate with both the Royal Air Force and the U.S. Navy in the region as British and American P-8s (and in the American case, the Tritons) come into the region for maritime defense.

Major General Skinnarland, Chief of Staff of the Norwegian Air Force, commented that “with the P-8s operating from the UK, Iceland, and Norway, [the Allies] can shape a maritime domain awareness data capability which can inform our forces effectively as well, but again, this requires work to share the data and to shape common concepts of operations.” She noted the importance of exercising “often and effectively together” to shape effective concepts of operations. This, she says “will require bringing the new equipment, and the people together to share experience and to shape a common way ahead.”

After the last RAF Hawker Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft was retired in 2011, the challenge became how to keep those key skill sets alive. NATO exercises provided interim opportunities, however in 2016, the MoD announced a decision to purchase nine Boeing P-8s. I visited RAF Lossiemouth in north-east Scotland earlier this year, where the Brits are standing up their new P-8 base. The new base will also allow Norwegians to train, and the U.S. to operate as well.

Indeed, what was clear from discussions at “Lossie” is that the infrastructure is being built from the ground up with broader considerations in mind, notably creating a 21st century maritime domain awareness information and strike network. The RAF is building capacity in its P-8 hangers for visiting aircraft such as the RAAF, the USN, or the Norwegian Air Force to train and operate from. In many ways, the thinking is similar to how building the F-35 enterprise out from the UK to Northern Europe is being shaped.

Flying the same ISR/C2/strike aircraft will create synergies with regard to how best to share combat data in a fluid situation that demands timely and effective decision-making.

The UK is clearly a key player in shaping the way ahead on both the P-8 and F-35 enterprises, not just by investing in both platforms, but in building the infrastructure and training a new generation of operators and maintainers as well.

At the heart of this learning process are the solid working relationships among the professional military in working towards innovative concepts of operations. This is a work in progress that requires infrastructure, platforms, training and openness in shaping evolving working relationships.

Having visited Norway earlier this year and having discussed among other things, the coming of the P-8 and the F-35 in Norway, it is clear that what happens on the other side of the North Sea (the UK) is of keen interest to Norway. In talking with the RAF and Royal Navy, it is evident that changes in Norway are part of the broader UK consideration when it comes to the reshaping of NATO defense capabilities in a dynamic region.

To lay down a foundation for a 21st century approach, the U.S. Navy is pairing its P-8s with the Triton – a new high altitude, long endurance (HALE) unmanned aircraft developed by Northrop Grumman– and is working an integrated approach between the two.

In a very narrow sense, the P-8 and Triton are “replacing” the P-3. However, the additional ISR and C2 enterprise being put in place to operate the combined P-8 / Triton capability is a much broader capability than the classic P-3. Much like how the Osprey transformed the U.S. Marine Corps prior to flying the F-35, the P-8/Triton team is doing the same for the US Navy as the F-35 comes to the carrier air wing.

The team at Naval Air Station Jacksonville is building a common Maritime Domain Awareness and Maritime Combat Culture and treats the platforms as partner applications of the evolving combat theory. The partnership is both technology and aircrew synergistic.

It should be noted that the P-8 and the Triton (which draws heavily on F-35 systems) as well as the F-35 are a new generation of software-upgradeable aircraft, whose software will be reworked in interaction with the sharing of data and the reworking of core platform capabilities.

It is about shaping a combat-learning cycle in which software can be upgraded as the user groups shape, in real time, the core needs they see, to rapidly deal with a reactive enemy.

As the COS of the Norwegian Air Force put the challenge: “We should plug and play in terms of our new capabilities; but that will not happen by simply adding new equipment – it will be hard work.”

Canadian Perspective on Maritime Threats

I recently had a chance to talk with the commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Lieutenant-General Mike Hood, about the Canadian approach and contribution to the evolving threats and challenges in the North Atlantic to maritime defense and security. Obviously, Canada is a key partner and occupies key geography as Russia returns to significant maritime operations from the Kola Peninsula into the High North as well.

As the Brits, Norwegians and Americans build new capabilities to operate in the North Atlantic, what is the Canadian approach and contribution? And what new investments and capabilities might be offered by Canada to the coalition effort?

Canada’s current anti-submarine warfare capabilities are built around an upgraded CP-140 Aurora, a new CH-148 Cyclone ASW helicopter developed by Sikorsky (although grounded earlier this year due to a “momentary change in descent rate”), and frigates recently modernized by Lockheed Martin Canada – all integrated into coalition ASW operations.

“Out of all the NATO ASW platforms in there,” says LGen Hood, “the most effective one has been our CP-140. I am exceptionally proud of our ASW capability, and when I couple it with the new advanced capability on our upgraded frigates, I see us a backbone of NATO’s ASW capability.”

Over the decade ahead, as the maritime domain awareness and strike enterprise is reworked with the coming of the P-8 and the Triton (among other assets) Canada will add an unmanned capability, continue upgrading the CP-140, and work closely with allies in reshaping the maritime domain awareness and strike networks. New satellite sensor and communications systems will also be added.

According to LGen Hood, this will allow the RCAF to leverage developments in the next decade to determine what needs to be put on their replacement manned air platform and to determine which air platform that would be. “The government’s new defence policy lays out a 20-year funding line that recapitalizes our air force.”

He acknowledges that the eventual replacement of the CP-140 is funded in that policy but explains that this is not a near term need. “We have better capability from an ASW perspective in the CP-140 than comes off the line presently in the P-8. We have just gone through a Block III upgrade that has completely modernized the ASW capability as well as adding an overland ISR piece. We have replaced the wings on many major empennage [tail assembly] points and the goal is to get our CP-140 out to about 2032 when we’re going to replace it with another platform.”

He notes that next year, the CP-140s will receive a Block IV upgrade which will include new infrared counter measures, a tactical data link 16 to complement link 11 and full motion video, imagery, email, chat, and VOIP.

Canadians have also contributed to keeping the RAF in the game prior to the P-8 acquisition. “We have been flying two members of the RAF crews on our ASW aircraft in the interim between the sunset of Nimrod and the sunrise of the P-8.” Canadians have helped manage the “GIUK gap” by operating from either Lossiemouth in Scotland or Keflavik in Iceland. The Greenland-Iceland-UK “gap” is an area in the northern Atlantic Ocean that forms a naval choke point between the three landmasses.

The General also notes that the new defence policy has authorized adding a unmanned aerial systems capability for the ASW effort as well. “In the next three years, we’ll be under contract for a medium altitude UAS that is going to have both domestic and coastal abilities as well as expeditionary strike capabilities.

LGen Hood confirms that Canada is among the allies funding the NATO AGS (Alliance Ground Surveillance) programme to acquire an airborne ground surveillance capability on five remotely-piloted Global Hawk aircraft. NATO will operate and maintain them on behalf of all NATO member countries.

There is a satellite component to ASW, and Canada’s new RADARSAT Constellation (planned to launch in 2018) will provide enhanced sensor coverage. There are also plans to launch a polar constellation satellite system to provide for High North communication needs. “That is actually going to finally allow us to operate UASs up above 70° North.”

The evolving maritime domain awareness network and the reshaping of its capabilities as new sensors, platforms and C2 systems come on line adds new opportunities. The integration of new UAS capabilities with manned capabilities will reshape expectations of the platforms, and it is from this context of evolution that the head of the RCAF sees the question of a replacement aircraft for the CP-140.

“Canadian industry has played a key role in shaping capabilities onboard the CP-140 and I would see that role continuing on our replacement manned aircraft. It’s less about the platform, [and more about] the brains of that platform.”

Editor’s Note: Republished with permission of Front Line Defence.

http://defence.frontline.online/article/2017/4/8102-Maritime-Threats-to-the-North-Atlantic

Perspectives on the Indian Fighter Competition

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-09-30 This month, our partner India Strategic published two articles, which provide updates on the Indian Air Force competition to add new fighter aircraft.

This would be in addition, to the already decided acquisition of 36 Rafale fighter aircraft.

The government is looking to acquire a single engine jet to build up its fighter force.

The frontrunners in this are Saab’s Gripen and Lockheed Martin’s F-16.

The first article addresses the F-16 and the second the Gripen offering.

Lockheed Martin in Jet Speed to Make F-16s in India

By Air Marshal VK Jimmy Bhatia (Retd)

During the Paris Air Show, on June 19, the company announced a coproduction agreement with the Tata Advanced Systems Ltd (TATA), and now it has disclosed that in anticipation of a contract from the Indian Air Force (IAF) for a single engine aircraft manufacturing facility, it has already initiated steps to create the required ecosystem in the country.

Diplomatic sources indicate that the US Government is also aggressively backing the Lockheed Martin proposal in Government-to-Government (G-2-G) talks with the Indian Government.

Mr Abhay Paranjpe, Executive Director, International Business Development and Mr Randall L Howard, Business Development head for F 16 said during a recent tete-a-tete with Team India Strategic in New Delhi that the company had already worked out the best available systems that could be integrated in the aircraft, assuring: “We will provide whatever the IAF asks for, and our technology will be unmatched and unprecedented.”

An artists view of F-16 Block 70 with nose-mounted IRST on take off roll. Credit: India Strategic

We pointed out that the Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa, had told us in an interview that IAF now logically expects better specifications than were asked for in the 2007 tender for the Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA). The F 16, which was the first to bring a powerful Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar on board in its Block 60 aircraft delivered to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) way back in 2004, does not yet have the Infra Red Search and Track (IRST) system.

IRST, which is there on board the French Rafale already taken by IAF, is a passive system and can detect hostile aircraft and targets between 60 to 100 km or so without being detected itself, unlike any radar system including the AESA. As the world’s biggest military hardware company, “we will be able to offer whatever the IAF wants, on time and cost,” said Paranjpe, adding that the Lockheed Martin proposal will include assured periodic upgrades.

AESA is a key component for contemporary and future aircraft, and can look up to 400 km depending upon the radar’s power and aircraft’s height.

Paranjpe also said that the new AESA, to be acquired from Northrop Grumman which had made it first for F 16 Block 60 and later for F 22 and F 35, will be of a new 4th generation, and compared to the earlier versions which are liquid cooled, will be air cooled and still perform better. It will be multimode, able to lock onto 20 targets simultaneously, and a pilot can priorities which targets to engage first.

Randall said that the company will meet any specs required by the IAF. The aircraft is comfortable in power and weight and can accommodate whatever is needed. Lockheed Martin will leverage some future technologies from its F 35.

“As the F 16 Block 70 will be a new generation aircraft, it will also share some components and latest technologies with those of the F 35 to the extent of 70-75 percent. The Block 70 will also have conformal fuel tanks for longer range.”

The company will shift the entire factory and production line from Fort Worth in Texas to India if – repeat if – the Ministry of Defence (MoD) selects the aircraft.

Notably, the global standard for aircraft availability is about 70 percent. This, or whatever is required by IAF, will be matched, Randall said

Paranjpe pointed out that IAF’s urgency in aircraft requirement is no secret, and the Indian order for a minimum of 100 first to be followed by many more later will be huge. “We have a great partnership with TASL, and we should be able to produce three to four aircraft every month for Indian and global requirements. We will create a big defence industrial base, a supply chain for not only India but for the world, and that will include spares.”

Asked about how much investment the company will put in, Panajpe and Randall said that they hoped that India will follow the US business model. There, a runway is shared by the US Air Force (USAF) and industry, the two being on either side of it, and that will determine how much Lockheed Martin will have to invest. Sharing facilities will help save costs and production and testing time.

With TASL and IAF working with us, it will simply be great, Panajpe observed, adding: “We are also ready to pass on the required knowledge and knowhow to local partners.”

Randall said that Lockheed Martin had produced nearly 4,600 aircraft in 138 variants and sold to 27 countries, including the US. Sixteen of these countries placed repeat orders.

He also pointed out, significantly, that while the Indian Ministry of Defence is yet to place the order under its new policy of Make in India and having a Strategic Partner, Lockheed Martin is doing its homework in anticipation of winning it. We have worked out the technologies onboard, Display Systems, Software, Air to Air and Air to ground Targeting Systems, and what to do with whom as part of our effort to create an enabling ecosystem and move literally at jet speed.

http://www.indiastrategic.in/2017/09/21/lockheed-martin-in-jet-speed-to-make-f-16s-in-india/

Saab, Adani Collaborate in Aerospace and Defence

New Delhi. Swedish Saab has literally offered a sweet dish to India, saying it will share the best of its aerospace technologies for the Indian Air Force (IAF) and give it full controls like the vital source codes on aircraft equipment and components so that IAF can play with them for modification to its requirements now and in the coming decades.

Pitching to sell the latest variant of its combat jet, Gripen E, Saab CEO and President Hakan Buskhe announced his company’s partnership with India’s Adani Group to Make the aircraft in India, observing: “ We are committed to the India-Sweden relationship and in bringing the latest technology and skills to India.”

Asked specifically about the source codes by India Strategic, Mr Bukhse indicated that the Swedes would give unfettered control over technologies to India, and hopefully meet whatever demands the Ministry of Defence (MoD) makes with regard to technologies.

The Saab Chairman addressed newsmen September 1 along with Adani Group Chairman Gautam Adani, pointing out that Saab had finalized this partnership as the “Adani group is one of India’s largest conglomerates … with a long history of entrepreneurship spanning through decades of dynamic growth.”
“We are committed to the India-Sweden relationship and in bringing the latest technology and skills to India,” Mr Buskhe said adding: “Our plans in India are to create a new defence eco-system that would involve many partners, vendors and suppliers. To achieve this, we need a strong Indian partner who can help create the framework for the infrastructure and eco-system to come into place.”

Mr Adani said, “We are proud of our enduring relationship with Saab and look forward to partnering in major projects such as Gripen. Our various collaborations in aerospace and defence sectors will help establish new production lines in India, generate employment and build sustainable skills.”

He expressed confidence that his rich team of engineers and professionals, engaged in oil, infrastructure and other projects, would do well in defence industrial infrastructure also, and meet any specifications and timelines set by the Government for manufacturing the aircraft. The Group has several global partnerships already and employs 50,000 people.

MoD is looking for a single engine fighter to be produced in India, and the two companies in competition are the US Lockheed Martin and Sweden’s Saab. One of them will be picked up under the Strategic Partnership model with an Indian company to produce a minimum of about 100 but over the years some 300 to 400 or more Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) with periodic upgrades both for the Indian market.

Mr Ashish Rajvanshi, Head, Defence & Aerospace, Adani Group, said that the Group was firmly placed in expanding in the defence industrial sector. It is not just an opportunity for the industry but the need of the country which has to induct new and futuristic technologies towards self reliance.
Source Codes to a system are important, so that IAF and Indian engineers can integrate its own private algorithms in onboard computers and maintain its exclusive maintenance and operational control over the aircraft.

Sweden’s new envoy to India, Ambassador Klas Molin, who arrived only that day in the morning from his previous posting in Thailand, graced the occasion but declined to make any comment.

Notably, Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa had told India Strategic in an earlier interview that IAF was looking for technologies newer than those stipulated in 2007, when the MMRCA tender was floated among six global aircraft manufacturers. Mr Bukhse promised that, saying that the latest generation Gripen E would meet the Indian expectations.

The aircraft will be equipped with Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) combat radar, the passive Infra Red Search and Track (IRST) system to locate hostile targets, Anti Radiation attack capability, a powerful Engine for longer range than before, and Stealth features.

The 2007 Request for Proposals (RfP) had included all these specs. At that time, one requirement for an anti radiation missile was available only from the US war technology giant, Raytheon, which produced its High Speed Anti Radiation Missile (HARM) for attack on radar facilities. It was integrated then only on board Boeing’s F 18 Super Hornet.

A similar system is now available though in Europe.

Besides better specs overall in the new requirements, five key systems are the heart of any deal, that is, AESA, IRST, Anti Radiation Attack capability, Range, and Stealth. Saab has promised all of them in its Gripen E.

The 2007 contest for 126 combat aircraft with an option for 63 more, included both the single engine aircraft now in competition for Make in India, the US Lockheed Martin F-16 and Swedish Saab Gripen.

SAAB Gripen. Credit: India Strategic

The contest was however scrapped and the Indian Government decided to buy 36 twin engine French Rafale, which led the competition, first in technology along with Eurofighter, and then in price.

In a joint statement, Saab and Adani said that their collaboration plan (is) within aerospace and defence in India, aligned with the Government of India’s Make in India initiative. The intended collaboration would encompass design, development and production of Gripen for India and other high-tech products of national importance for India and also the creation of joint ventures in India in line with and in support of the Make in India policy.

“Saab, in partnership with Adani Group, will discuss possibilities to offer solutions to bring required design and manufacturing capabilities in defence and aerospace to India. A collaboration between Saab and Adani will combine the technical and product excellence of Saab, along with the industrial engineering, system integration and mega project execution capabilities of Adani with the intention to manufacture defence systems locally in India.”

The two companies would keep in mind India’s focus on creating future-proof and home-grown capabilities across all industries, explore how to cooperate to develop a wider aerospace and defence ecosystem in India and encourage the development of small and medium sized enterprises along with a robust national supply chain.

The statement added: Gripen would be offered to the Indian Government as the best solution for India’s single-engine fighter aircraft programme. The collaboration would also include projects, programmes and technologies of national importance to India. The parties’ plan to develop the relationship into a structure of joint ventures in India for execution of the programmes, including the single engine fighter program, in order to support the Make in India policy and exhibit the parties long term commitment to be jointly successful.

Gripen is a modern multi-role fighter aircraft featuring state-of-the-art technology, including advanced data links and sensors plus a unique extensive electronic warfare suite. Gripen can perform all air-to-air, air-to-surface and reconnaissance missions with the most modern range of weapons and systems.

http://www.indiastrategic.in/2017/09/01/saab-and-adani-collaborate-in-india-aerospace-and-defence/

These articles have been republished by arrangement with our partner India Strategic.

 

Hiding in Plain View: North Korean Nuclear Intentions

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
09/29/2017

2017-09-29 By Danny Lam

JCS General Joseph Dunford informed the Senate Armed Services Committee at his Sept 26, 2017 hearing that DPRK is assumed to have the capability to attack the US mainland with a nuclear armed ICBM.

While it is not yet proven or demonstrated that North Korea can do so with a thermonuclear warhead that will survive re-entry and accurately strike a target, General Dunford noted it is a matter of time.

This brings to the forefront the question of what DPRK will do with their nuclear strike capability in the future.  

Every nuclear weapons state prior to North Korea have used their WMD capability as a defensive, last resort insurance policy.

No nuclear weapon was used in anger since 1945.

US policy makers since 1994 have wishfully hoped that DPRK is an anomaly that will go away on its own. (Bracken, 2017)

But that has not happened.

Is, or will North Korea be different or will they be the first of a new breed of “Second Nuclear Age” powers?

DPRK Foreign Minister Ri Young Ho’s UN speech on Sept 23, 2017 (which few read in full), unambiguously and clearly laid out their aims and objectives.


Minister Ri said at the UN:

“Through such a prolonged and arduous struggle, now we are finally only a few steps away from the final gate of completion of the state nuclear force.”

This statement make clear that things will change when DPRK is a nuclear armed state.

They are willing, able, and intend to use it to achieve their goals.

These goals are not just geopolitical, but economic.

“The day will certainly come in near future when we settle all damages inflicted to our peaceful economic development and improvement of the people’s livelihood and all the sufferings imposed on our innocent women, children and elderly by the heinous and barbaric sanctions against our Republic.”

Minister Ri’s stated goals here are limited to damages caused by sanctions.

However, this is not narrowly defined to UN and member state (e.g. US) sanctions dating from 2006 when DPRK went nuclear.

Minister Ri elaborates by stating:

“The U.S. had put sanctions against our country from the very first day of its foundation and over the 70-year long history of the DPRK..” (p. 7)

Thus, the claim for damages dates from the first day of the founding of DPRK (September 9, 1948).

“The DPRK already organized a national damage investigation committee to make comprehensive study of total damages inflicted on our Republic by all kinds of sanctions.”

Note the reference to “all kinds of sanctions” rather than to specific sanctions (e.g.) against their missile or nuclear or WMD programs.

This is broadly defined by DPRK to include sanctions at the outbreak of the Korean war (1950) that included UN Security Council Resolution 82 that “Calls upon all Member States to… refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.”

What kind of damages?

“This committee will thoroughly investigate and compile all physical and moral damages imposed upon the DPRK by the U.S., its followers and also those countries that submitted to the U.S. coercion.”

There are two key points here: precisely how DPRK intend to “investigate and compile all physical and moral damages” and, what is the list of “all those countries that” that damages will be sought from?

DPRK have previously (2010) assessed damages the US caused since 1945 to 2005 at US$65 trillion.

This breaks down to $26 trillion for US “atrocities”, and $13.7 trillion of sanctions over 60 years, and property damage/loss of $16.7 trillion.

Moral damages is an interesting term of art.

DPRK have asserted that Japan owe damages for colonialism (1910-1945) and demanded compensation and reparations.

Moral damages could also, in the DPRK view, including any interaction that polluted the purity of the “Cleanest Race” including the practice of religion.

Claims will be made to each and every nation that participated in the Korean war against DPRK, and participants in sanctions or other perceived wrongs against DPRK since.

It is not known how DPRK will assess damages from sanctions from countries like PRC and USSR/Russia that effectively switched sides and joined sanctions.

Claims that DPRK have against just about every country in the world will likely amount to multiples of the claim against the US at $65 trillion (to 2005).

How will DPRK enforce these claims?

Minister Ri answer this question:

“When this racket of sanctions and pressure reaches a critical point, thus driving the Korean peninsula into an uncontrollable situation, investigation results of this committee will have a huge effect in holding those accountable.”

The “uncontrollable situation” in this context is likely to mean the start of hostilities that DPRK expects to end with a North Korean victory so they can dictate terms.

North Korea’s damage claims will be used to extract tribute (or compensation) from just about every country in the post Korean war world.

How might a war start once DPRK is sufficiently well armed and confident of victory?

DPRK makes clear their intent is to preemptively strike “U.S. and its vassal forces” that “show any sign of … military attack against our country.” (p.6).

What is not defined is what constitute “any sign”?

Would it be routine military maneuvers?

Increasing defensive capabilities like deploying more ballistic missile defense systems?

More sanctions?

A bit more rhetoric?

Kim Jong Un’s speech on September 22, 2017 that the US have declared war on DPRK and “will make the man holding the prerogative of the supreme command in the U.S. pay dearly for his speech calling for totally destroying the D.P.R.K.” in this context leaves no doubt that North Korea will use their nuclear capabilities offensively against the US.

DPRK Foreign Minister Ri’s speech publically stated in front of the UN General Assembly that North Korea intend to handsomely profit from their ability to enforce settlement of their alleged grievances against the world with thermonuclear weapons.

That much, is perfectly clear: North Korea will be the world’s first nuclear armed extortionist.

Editor’s Note: If you wish to discuss this article, please do so at the following:

North Korean Nuclear Intentions

 

Hardly Neutral: The PRC and Russia in the Korean Crisis

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-09-29 by Danny Lam

Recent PRC and Russian military exercises suggest both preparation for and a policy stance towards the Korean crisis.

Sino-Russian exercises this week held outside of Vladivostok and the Sea of Okhotsk included anti-submarine drills with 11 surface ships, 2 submarines, ASW aircraft and helicopters. Drills held September 5 involved a “surprise attack” with multiple missiles being shot down in Bohai Gulf.

The exercise was described as “boosting the forces expulsion mission capability”. This follows another large scale exercise in August in the same area.

Anti-submarine and anti-missile exercises by PRC and Russia are tailored to prepare for preventing a repeat of the cruise missile strike on Syria during the Trump-Xi summit with the added twist that it be launched from US submarines on either side of the Korean peninsula. It can hardly be aimed at the DPRK submarine fleet.

It is clear that PRC (and possibly Russia) intend to enforce their policy to come to the aid of DPRK “if the US attacked”.

For the PRC, this is also supported with a formal mutual defense treaty that require China to “immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal”. Although PRC’s commitment to treaty obligations, like UNCLOS, however, is open to question.

What is known and demonstrated repeatedly recently is PRC and Russia’s insistence on “peaceful settlement”, which expressly supports the continued expansion of DPRK WMD capabilities beyond the point of no return where they will be too dangerous to be stopped without all out nuclear war.

Russia and PRC’s support of DPRK’s goals is explicit in their opposition to a US led military solution.

No matter what they do at the UN to “support” the US, it is clear that neither party are neutral and both are well on the way to becoming belligerents on DPRK’s side.

PRC and Russia have extensive radar and other sensors monitoring the approaches to DPRK on either side of the peninsula on land, air and sea.  Space based surveillance assets are in turn supplemented by commercial satellite imagery that are readily available.

Formal assets are in turn, backed up by a well-organized maritime militia, spy network and open source intelligence that will give early warning of any major or irregular activities at allied airfields, military bases and ports.

These ISR networks communicating via commercial channels and will be able to work with Pyongyang in real time, including activating pre-positioned agents and forces outside of DPRK.

Thus, OPSEC is going to be a major problem for allied forces.

Early warning will facilitate the axis forces deploying and other assistance to support DPRK: making surprise difficult to achieve.

PRC have been actively preparing for preemptive S/MRBM and cruise missile strikes on US and allied bases with both conventional and almost certainly nuclear weapons.  PRC has a veto backed by military force on US action against DPRK.

The question is, will they use it when such overt moves will have major consequences?

Intervention by PRC and Russia this time, however, are tempered by two major factors.   Russia is not USSR that have limited economic ties with the west. Russia relies on western markets and additional sanctions would pinch the Putin regime further.

PRC, on the other hand, is in a bind.

As a member of the UNSC, PRC cannot undo the UN resolution 82 and 84 which remains in effect after it was passed by ROC with USSR absent. Furthermore, Russia and PRC’s recent string of votes in favor of sanctions on DPRK affirmed the past resolutions validity which PRC would violate if they entered the war with DPRK.

The deep and broad economic links of PRC to the world economy is another problem.

Formal entry into the Korean war will immediately impair these relationships, likely leading to a World War style full embargo including US and Allies locking belligerents out of the western financial system and seizure of their assets abroad.

The economic consequences will be to almost certainly plunge the PRC economy into severe recession — with its debt load exceeding 300% GDP.

Thus, in as much as PRC and Russia both used military exercises to bluff, actually crossing the line of initiating hostilities will require deliberation.  

It is potentially severely destabilizing domestically. Thus, cold war style massive intervention that include movements of troops, material, and PRC/USSR military operations similar to Korean War I, or the Vietnam war is unlikely at the first instance.

During the Korean war, support came from USSR and PRC via detectable movements of troops, equipment, and trainloads of supplies. Aircraft, experienced and highly trained pilots, and equipment that can have no other source beside USSR or PRC are traceable.

Notably, the PVA forces had excellent OPSEC and did not reveal themselves until October, 1950.   This longstanding strength of CCP should not be underestimated.

Once can expect a repeat of this scenario where substantial technical and material aid will come from PRC via difficult to trace in real time channels.

Covert, or at least, plausibly deniable intervention by PRC (whether Beijing-China or other elements) and Russia in support of DPRK is a foregone conclusion regardless of any pledges by Beijing-China to “stay neutral” if DPRK attacked US.

It is almost certain that the PRC and Russia will disguise any physical movements of material as “humanitarian” aid ostensibly to prevent DPRK refugees from flooding across the border.

The lame excuse that PRC is afraid of influxes of refugees has, to date, not been challenged by the US and allies even as PRC deployed troops on the border in anticipation of occupying DPRK to prevent a US victory.

The most probable aid will come in the form of ISR on behalf of DPRK conducted by PRC/Russian systems to aid their defenses.  This will, in turn, be supplemented by EW and interference with allied systems by means ranging from jamming to cyberwarfare against both military and civilian networks.

In other words, the US and allies should be expecting to encounter an enemy with state-of-the-art capabilities — not a poverty stricken and backward military machine.

Other aid like provision of hardened and secured facilities across the border for DPRK C2 is to be expected.   From there, could “people’s volunteers” be far behind?

The question that such intervention by axis allies of DPRK raises is central to the Anglo-European world’s relationship with the PRC and Russia:

Can we continue an economic relationship with them and turn a blind eye to great power and ideological conflict when it overflows into a proxy war against an offensive minded nuclear state?

That is the problem of the 21st century that must be resolved.

Editor’s Note: If you wish to comment on this article, please do so here:

PRC and Russian Intervention in the Korean Crisis