The Second Line of Defense team has been in Australia for the past two weeks conducting interviews and will provide highlights from the Airpower Conference being held this week in Canberra as well as updates and a final report for the Williams Foundation Conference on the shift from the land wars to high intensity warfare.

And later today, we will have a chance to meet with the Chief of the Royal Australian Navy and provide an update from his perspective on the way ahead.

Currently, the Australian Navy is conducting Exercise Ocean Explorer 2018.

According to the Australian Department of Defence:

Two submarines, 12 ships and embarked aircraft are taking part in one of the largest fleet concentration activities, Exercise OCEAN EXPLORER 2018. OCEAN EXPLORER will be carried out over a three-week period off the east coast of Australia, including the Bass Straight, Jervis Bay, Maitland Bay and adjacent sea and air spaces.

Exercuse Ocean Explorer from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

The exercise – designed to develop maritime warfare skills including the operation of sea control task groups – will feature anti-air and anti-submarine warfare, maritime strike and interdiction, maritime advance force operations and command and control.

Australian Department of Defence

March 15, 2018

Last Fall at the Australian Seapower Conference held in October, the Chief of the Royal Australian Navy laid out his thinking about the future of the Navy going forward.

3 October 2017

Chief of Navy Address at Sea Power Conference 2017, Sydney – Service Chief Session

Welcome all to Navy’s Seapower Conference 2017.

For some of you it is welcome back, for others this is a first opportunity to attend this biennial gathering. To friends old and new, some of whom have come from far away to be with us, I welcome your participation in this international naval and maritime forum.

I warmly welcome my international counterparts and their representatives. We operate in partnership with our friends and allies in this region and I look forward to hearing from all of the speakers who can provide insight drawn from their national experiences.

I welcome members of the academic community, those from trade and industry, and those who will be reporting and recording what we say here over the coming days. Your presence ensures that we who are in uniform are not just talking to ourselves, rather, we are engaging with the whole spectrum of maritime knowledge, opinion and wisdom.

I extend a welcome to my fellow service chief, Air Marshal Leo Davies, Chief of Joint Operations, Vice Admiral David Johnston and the Chief of Army’s representative, Head of Land Capability, Major General Kathryn Toohey.

The fact that we have all three services and Joint Operations Command represented in this opening session is a reminder that the Navy is an integrated part of the Australian Defence Force and we are increasingly operationally interdependent.

For those of us in uniform, this conference is also a rare opportunity to stop and reflect upon our profession.

Over the next few days we can learn from national and international experts and from our peers, and remind ourselves of the context and rationale for the sea services in which we serve.

So…In this opening session I would like to provide context for the future discussions. In doing so, I need to explain where the RAN is going and what progress has been made in keeping with the Australian governments intent.

When I spoke at the last Sea Power Conference in 2015, Navy was on the cusp of a strategic rebuilding and expansion that with the initial announcement of the government’s commitment to a national, continuous shipbuilding strategy.

Since then there has been clarity about how the Navy is to be rebuilt and expanded and much has been achieved. In early 2016 the Australian Government released a Defence White Paper and this year it followed with a companion Naval Shipbuilding Plan.

These documents outline the government’s vision for Australia’s future naval capability.

As important, they also give fidelity to the shipbuilding and ship sustainment industry by providing a commitment to a permanent naval shipbuilding industry through three distinct lines of investment.

These are:

(1) the investment in the rolling acquisition of new submarines, continuous build of future frigates and minor naval vessels;

(2) the investment in modern shipyard infrastructure, across the two construction shipyards in South Australia and Western Australia; and

(3) the investment in naval shipbuilding workforce growth and skilling initiatives; together with new generation technology and innovation hubs.

As a consequence of these decisions, the government announced that Naval Group will be our international partner to design the 12 Future Submarines. Already, we have formal government to government agreements in place; a functioning design centre has been built in Cherbourg (by Australian trades-people with Australian materials) and the Australian project team is in filling rapidly there.

Meanwhile, the construction site in Osbourne is being secured and yard design is in progress. The project is meeting its milestones.

Concurrently, Navy’s two new tankers have been selected and work will soon commence on their construction – the first ship is expected to be delivered in 2019 and the second in 2020.

Much work has been done on progressing the acquisition of 12 new Offshore Patrol Vessels.

These vessels will provide us with an advanced capability to undertake constabulary missions and be the primary ADF asset for maritime patrol and response duties.

Tender evaluation is complete and a decision expected from Government later this year. Construction of the first two vessels will begin in 2018.

We have also made significant progress on the acquisition of nine Future Frigates. These frigates will be able to conduct a range of missions, with a particular focus on anti-submarine warfare and will incorporate the Australian-developed CEA Phased-Array Radar. We are on schedule to commence construction in 2020.

All of the Seahawk Romeo Helicopters have entered service and are undertaking operations, deployed in ships in the region and beyond.

Both LHDs HMA Ships Adelaide and Canberra have been commissioned and are already proving their utility and versatility with participation in major exercises and deployments this year.

And just last week we commissioned HMAS Hobart – one of the most sophisticated warships ever to be operated by the RAN. She is Aegis fitted, the first in her class with two more to follow and the first destroyer for the RAN since HMAS Brisbane was decommissioned 16 years ago.

The delivery of such new capability has allowed the RAN to revert to its practice of complex Task Group operations. This practice offers strategic utility to government by delivering the agility and responsiveness that is at the heart of our approach to maritime warfare and enables more effects to be achieved against an ever‐growing set of threat scenarios.

This year the Australian Defence Force has successfully completed Talisman Sabre 2017 – it provided us with invaluable task group operational experience and improved our training, readiness and interoperability. It also provided us the opportunity to test and prove the readiness of the LHD HMAS Canberra.

And as we speak the other LHD, HMAS Adelaide is currently leading the Indo-Pacific Endeavour 2017 Task Group deployed into the South East Asia region.

This deployment will demonstrate the ADF’s Humanitarian and Disaster Relief regional response capability as well as further supporting security and stability in Australia’s near region through bilateral and multilateral engagement, training and capacity building.

Whilst this is not the first such deployment by the RAN in South East Asia it will be the largest coordinated Task Group operation since the early 1980s. And these deployments will become a regular part of the ADFs ongoing commitment to regional security.

Indeed, it is important to note that beyond a commitment to new capability, the Defence White Paper also foreshadows a significant increase in investment in regional engagement – with plans to contribute to maritime security in several ways.

Firstly, with programs like the Pacific Maritime Surveillance Program which will deliver up to 21 patrol boats with long term sustainment to our South West Pacific neighbours to improve maritime awareness in that region.

And secondly, with increased funds for Defence cooperation in the vast array of maritime security fora and exercises that exist to provide stability within the region through the deliberate and disciplined approach to problem solving and by reducing the chance of miscalculation.

But the generation and deployment of self-supporting and sustainable maritime task groups capable of accomplishing the full spectrum of maritime security operations calls for more than just an equipment list.

There are fundamental attributes that a credible fleet needs to demonstrate to allow this to occur.

Over the last few years the Navy has taken great steps forward in the regulated management of seaworthiness within the Fleet. This follows a similar path to the improvement in airworthiness of the aviation force.

We are better managing and sustaining our platforms, infrastructure, communications and information systems, intelligence, and other mission and support systems for our current capabilities. That’s not to say we have it all right but the lessons learned are being applied to the projects that will introduce the future fleet.

We are working to have an integrated, diverse, resilient and deployable workforce that has the skills and competencies to deliver Navy’s warfighting effects.

We are also improving our culture to ensure that it supports an agile, resilient and innovative Navy that actively seeks ways to better deliver our warfighting effects.

As a result, we are participating more regularly in multinational exercises and through expanding our cultural understanding and language capabilities, to understand how we can make more effective and meaningful contributions during those exercises.

This progress gives me great confidence that we are on track to achieve the long term objectives that we have set ourselves to ensure that Navy is seen as a fighting system which is part of a joint warfighting organisation and as a national enterprise.

As you can see we are building a capable, lethal and agile Navy able to fulfil the tasks required of it now and into the future.

A Navy that has the ability to deliver targeted and decisive lethality if government so requires.

A Navy that has the ability to take decisions quickly, to manoeuvre naval force with speed and flexibility, and to enhance survivability by ensuring that our warfighters are able to adapt doctrine and tactics to meet the needs of the moment.

A Navy that can adapt to the ever-changing strategic environment.

Even since the last Sea Power Conference in 2015 there have been unpredictable shifts in our strategic environment.

The unprecedented missile and nuclear weapons testing conducted by North Korea, the impact of the South China Sea Arbitration and the increased possibly for miscalculations which could result in armed confrontations at sea.

The shifting of old alliances; the rapid rise in global terrorist networks in South East Asia; changes in migration patterns; the increased activities of international criminal syndicates whether it be from co-ordinated illegal fishing enterprises to smuggling illegal migrants.

These are just a few.

And so we seek a Navy that has the ability to maintain our sovereignty, defend our territorial integrity, and protect our national interests wherever they may be threatened – regionally and indeed globally from the Middle East across the Indian Ocean, through the South China Sea, and in the Pacific.

And because we know that no country can truly expect to act alone to solve the dynamic maritime challenges which are faced in our region, we seek to build a Navy that can work with and support our neighbours, friends and allies.

It is working with our neighbours to maintain and advance the internationally-recognised, rules-based global order that has been so conducive to ensuring maritime stability, and open and reliable maritime trade in our region.

We all have a vested interest in regional peace and stability, unimpeded trade, and freedom of navigation and overflight in our region.

Sea Power Conference 2017 affords us the opportunity to reflect on the work that has been done over the past two years: to consider if our current thinking about what the Navy of the future needs to be is accurate; and to develop the ideas and concepts that inform our future thinking and planning all while meeting the current and future challenges of the dynamic regional environment in which we operate.

2018-02-14 By Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha (Retd)

New Delhi. The age old debate rages on worldwide between strategists of both blocks, the ayes and naysayers, on the relevance of the aircraft carriers with respect to their combat power vs. vulnerability.

This has undergone periodic pendulous harmonics.

Whether it is the US, Russia, United Kingdom and now China apart from India, the debate is identical. Even in countries with fewer maritime ambitions, such as Italy, Brazil, Spain and Thailand, this debate has been used either to acquire or to scuttle the process.

The very famous critique of aircraft carriers John Lehman who articulated all ills of this platform when not part of the US administration, found himself appointed as the Navy Secretary by President Ronald Reagan after an administration change in the US.

He, after much briefing on strategy and geopolitical realities, authored the policy of 13-carrier Navy for the US.

This policy remains the driving policy document of force structure till date, although a couple of years ago, President Barrack Obama mentioned 11 carriers in his Asia-Pacific Pivot Policy.

The United Kingdom Navy aircraft carrier force was scuttled completely by none other than the Royal Air Force post demise of the Soviet Union and the Cold War by justifying diminished Soviet threat from long range maritime patrol aircraft.

The Strategic Defence Review document outsourced the fleet air defence and strike from seawards role of the Royal Navy to the NATO despite their carriers having proven their worth in the Falklands (Malvinas) conflict with the Argentines in 1982.

In the post Soviet era, Russia is also attempting to resurrect its naval power as a necessity towards greatness, but has only one aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, deployed in Mediterranean for operations in the ongoing Syria/ Iraq ISIS conflict.

Emergence of Chinese Naval power

China, which was not a great maritime player till not so distant past, has literally churned out numerous diesel/electric submarines as also several nuclear powered boats in pursuance of its near sea and apparently larger global ambitions.

In a White paper, China had declared in 2015 that it will now be concentrating on far sea Maritime capability, pre-positioning warships – like the way US Navy does.

Carrier Task Forces are apparently part of such a strategy, although China does not always give details.

Traditional thinking that land warfare is all important is irrelevant in Beijing today and China has decided to master far Sea Operational ability keeping in consonance with its growing stature in the world.

Acquisition of naval bases, Gwadar from Pakistan in the Indian Ocean, is its biggest strategic asset.

China commissioned its aircraft carrier Liaoning in 2012 and a number of pilots have qualified from her deck by now.

Construction of a second carrier is underway and there are reports that work on few more carriers is also in progress.

It is only matter of time that the Chinese Navy will emerge in the Indian Ocean in a big way with two naval bases, Djibouti and Gwadar, supporting carrier and submarine operations.

The recent agreement between China and Malaysia to develop the port of Malacca will lead to the Chinese Navy having major operational presence in all three critical choke points in the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR), i.e., Gulf of Oman (mouth of the Strait of Hormuz), Gulf of Aden (Exit from Red Sea) and Malacca Straits.

Its aircraft carrier (s) and submarines will provide capability to block and disrupt adversaries transiting through these crucial sea routes between the Atlantic and Pacific.

It may be kept in mind that China is building anti aircraft carrier missiles but then its own carriers will also face similar threats.

India Supersonic Brahmos cruise missile is a very potent weapon for both attack and counter measures.

US Naval Power

The US Navy has dominated the oceans for decades now.

It has a declared strong presence in the Indian Ocean as well as the Pacific, and it has refused to accept the unilateral annexation of the South China Sea by Beijing.

The US Navy has 11 aircraft carriers, and this is the number that is likely to stay in the coming years.

The potency of the carrier based aircraft is bound to be strengthened by the induction of 5th Generation F 35 aircraft and land-based long range Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) like the General Atomics Predators and Northrop Grumman Global Hawks which can stay over the waters for nearly 30 to 40 hours.

China will take time to match the US strength but then, given an assertive intent and access to land bases like Gwadar, the Chinese Navy can cause enough of headache to the US and other navies.

Nonetheless, the election of a new president notwithstanding, the US Navy will continue to dominate the oceans with new generation of warships, submarines, aircraft and high technology assets, cyber disruptions included.

The US Navy will continue to be the most formidable force to check dominance of the waters by China.

The Role of Indian Navy

What does the rise of Chinese Navy and its collaboration with the Pakistani Navy mean for the Indian Ocean countries, particularly India?

The Indian Navy’s procurements have remained stymied by complicated procedures and internal roadblocks of the Finance and Defence ministries where many have shown lack of strategic foresight.

Fortunately, with the present political dispensation, there has been a welcome change and, in a recent seminar on submarines, the Indian Defence Minister has at least called for a larger number of underwater boats than earlier planned.

With that mindset, the direction towards aircraft carriers should also be positive.

Notably, a Carrier Strike Group remains the fastest means of deployment of forces whether it is in a show of force or in support of own land operations as well as for providing security to friendly countries in the IOR.

As India does not have a policy of overseas basing, a carrier force remains the only suitable alternative for a regional power like India to conduct out of area contingencies. In any case, foreign bases are expensive and difficult to get given the nature of political dimensions.

That increases the relevance of aircraft carriers.

With the arrival of the Chinese, their basing rights in Djibouti and Gwadar, Equity holding (likely) in Colombo South port, and Maldives increasingly falling in the Chinese lap and, importantly Pakistan becoming a proxy state of China, IOR maritime scenario has become more uncertain and complex.

With the de-induction of Sea Harriers and impending decommissioning of the Viraat, INS Vikramaditya is the only aircraft carrier that the Indian Navy has for operations in the entire IOR.

There is no doubt that Mig 29 K fighters and Kamov31 helicopters have provided force multiplication to the Indian Navy’s firepower.

The AEW capability of the Ka 31 and its data link compatibility with the Mig 29 K/ Vikramaditya combination has added speed to execution of both interception and strike tasks at, and from sea.

The longer endurance of the Mig 29K permits it to perform dual tasking in the same sortie.

With the Indian Air Force’s fighter force just about adequate for tasking in two front air warfare situation, till such time the Rafale gets inducted, Mig 29Ks will provide breathing space to the IAF’s downsized inventory by freeing it from certain maritime roles.

But the question is: Is it adequate?

The Indian Navy has 45 Mig 29Ks, much more than what Vikramaditya can operate.

The ship has two carrier borne squadrons, Numbers 300 and 303. A Training Squadron is also in the offing.

India’s Long Term Perspective Plan envisages at least two operational aircraft carriers at any one time with the third one as hot reserve to substitute during maintenance of either.

Therefore, the next two aircraft carriers become an urgent operational necessity,

The first indigenous aircraft carrier IAC-1 or Vikrant is being built at the Kochi Shipyard.

Due out in a couple of years, it will operate both the Mig 29K and the indigenous Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Navy as and when it becomes a reality some years later.

Significantly, there are reports that US experts have found Vikrant falling short of meeting operational tasks in her present state of construction.

These glitches are bound to occur given that it is the first time an Indian yard is attempting to build an aircraft carrier.

Processes of development are always slow and painstaking.

These may not produce a carrier of the class of the US, but it will be an Indian aircraft carrier. The next one would be better.

There is a technological and production engineering process gap of 70 years between the US and India.

We hope our shipbuilders learn fast to bridge the gap.

India has over 50 years of experience in maintaining and operating aircraft carriers and carrier borne aircraft.

A very confident return to tail-hook aviation after a VSTOL era of over 33 years bears testimony to Navy’s professionalism.

Building a carrier strong Navy is the only way forward.

Vice Admiral Sinha (PVSM AVSM NM & Bar – Gallantry) is a former Naval Aviator. He retired as Commander in Chief of the Western Naval Command.

First published by our partner India Strategic in December 2017 and republished with their permission.

http://www.indiastrategic.in/2016/12/08/relevance-of-aircraft-carriers-for-the-indian-navy/

2018-02-09 The Williams Foundation will continue its series of examining the transformation of military forces by looking at the challenges of the shift from the land wars to higher tempo, high intensity operations.

According to The Williams Foundation, the focus of the seminar is as follows:

Most Air Force and senior military leaders in the western world begin their military careers either around or shortly after the Falkland Wars which were watched globally as an epic air, sea, and amphibious campaign; conventionally fought at the ends of the earth and at the end of an immense supply chain for the British Forces.

The decades that followed saw warfare in the Balkans and Middle East, and counter insurgency operations in Afghanistan; warfare very different from that postured for during the cold war, and exercised in high end air combat exercises.

The Australian Defence White Paper 2016 and the associated Force Structure Review was written to an Office of National Assessment Strategic Environment to 2035 against this paradigm, whilst recognizing impending change. The subsequent rate of change in global security has shocked even pessimistic observers and we face the heightened risk of high intensity, non-permissive air environments non-discretionary wars”.

Questions to be addressed at the Seminar

• What will be the impact on the delivery and expectation of 5th Generation systems as the world has changed so dangerously and so rapidly?
• Have hostile forces been watching the development of our 5th generation systems and developed active asymmetry to defeat us?
• Has the combination of our cold-war legacy and participation in irregular wars led us to make decisions that will limit our freedom of movement?
• As we rediscover the concept of denied area (A2AD / beyond FEBA) and need to re-invest in strike capabilities, are there areas of concern?
• [Range / Payload / Escort requirements / requirement to step non fast-air platforms / risk of hypersonic AD systems]
• [Basing options / Life Support / Force Protection / Multi-domain threats]
• Do we need to reconsider air campaigns in the light of Joint Force / Joint Strike options?
• Do our national systems support the requisite battlespace awareness in denied areas to conduct effective targeting and effect generation?

http://www.williamsfoundation.org.au/event-2742419

The seminar will be held in Canberra on March 22, 2018 and be held at the National Gallery of Australia, ACT.

The preliminary program is as follows:

WFHIProgramMar18

For our look at the challenge of transition, see the following: