South African Military Exports: Key to Survival of the South African Defense Industry

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
06/20/2017

2017-06-19 By Guy Martin

The Aerospace, Maritime and Defence (AMD) Industry Association of South Africa says that exports play a crucial role in the survival of the local defence industry

Isaac Motale, Chairperson of the AMD Export Council Board, speaking at AMD’s 25 year anniversary at the CSIR on 8 June, noted that exports are the biggest contributor to the industry’s revenue. Unlocking potential in East Asia, South America and African markets is key to driving export volume and trade, Motale said, noting that Africa is the primary target market as it has huge potential for growth. AMD’s Africa focus trade missions are on the increasing, with four carried out between January and May this year. In 2016/17, AMD hosted 14 delegations from the continent, excluding those at Africa Aerospace and Defence 2016.

AMD engages with foreign countries as part of sales and marketing efforts and has had industry seminars with countries like Russia, China, Brazil, Finland, Nigeria, Algeria and Tanzania. This month industry will attend an event in Moscow, Russia.

A growing trend is that clients are moving away from straight purchases, and co-development, co-marketing, co-production are key going forward, as strategic partnerships are crucial.

Motale noted that it is challenging to get foreign clients to buy equipment when the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is not using it themselves, especially as the local market continues to contract.

Motale said it is important to find creative and sustainable ways to solve the funding/financing challenge that confronts most African countries – unlike many other countries, South Africa does not have financing mechanisms/banks for defence. This “makes things hard indeed,” Motale said.

AMD is eying United Nations/African Union missions in Africa and hopes to provide African solutions to African challenges. A number of South African companies already do business with the United Nations, such as Saab and Mechem – the latter is a preferred supplier and has delivered armoured vehicles, amongst others, to UN clients.

Motale compared South African defence industry activity over the last five years. In 2009/2010, the industry employed around 15 000 people and recorded turnover of R12.5 billion a year, with 50% coming from exports. R1 billion went towards research and development. Turnover in 2011/12 was R12.9 billion, including R922 million in tax to the government. In 2012/13 this increased to R13.3 billion in turnover, R1.2 billion in tax and R1.2 billion towards research and development. Exports accounted for 67% of revenue in 2012/13.

For 2015, AMD statistics showed that total turnover was R19 billion; research and development was R1.7 billion and tax to government R2 billion. Employee numbers have remained static at 15 000 over the last several years.

Nearly half of exports are electronics, and around 40% are platforms, mostly in the landward environment.

In addition to supplying things like armoured vehicles, missiles, simulators, UAVs and aircraft components and upgrades to the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), the SA defence industry has supplied products and services to nearly three dozen countries, including artillery systems, armoured vehicles, electronic warfare systems, Mi-24 upgrades, Seeker UAVs, missiles, training systems and more.

On the local front, the local defence industry is benefitting from Project Hoefyster for Badger infantry combat vehicles for the South Africa Army, while Armscor has announced projects Biro and Hotel for new offshore and inshore patrol vessels and a hydrographic survey vessel, but Motale warned that the industry faces compound problems, such as ratings downgrades and a domestic recession. “We are expected to do more with less,” he said.

Motale noted that AMD’s statistics are compiled from its members and the actual totals are likely to be much higher. He noted that defence imports only amount to R3 billion per annum, thus the defence industry is “a massive generator of foreign currency for this country.”

Defence analyst Helmoed Heitman lauded the South African defence industry’s achievements, but called for more funding for the support of the industry. He noted that South Africa has recorded remarkable achievements, such as providing periscopes for most submarines manufactured in Germany and the United States buying thousands of mine-resistant, ambush protected (MRAP) and mine detection vehicles. He said it was unusual for a small country like South Africa to have supplied electronic warfare systems for European aircraft.

Heitman mentioned a study that showed that subsystems developed for the Rooivalk attack helicopter (such as Mokopa anti-tank missiles) amounted to double the development costs. However, he said that Treasury doesn’t understand this and that there is little Department of Defence funding to develop new equipment, and that means fewer exports. “The industry has done incredible things,” he said, “but we need more funding.”

Republished with the permission of our partner, defenceWeb.

http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=48222:exports-crucial-to-survival-of-sa-defence-industry–amd&catid=7:Industry&Itemid=116

The Chief of Naval Operations Shapes a Way Ahead: A Look at the Future of the Navy

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-06-13 By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

The great historian Max Hastings in his seminal book Inferno about all the fighting forces of World War II said that after some very nasty setbacks early in the war, the US and Royal Navies emerged as the most effective fighting forces in the war.

https://www.amazon.com/Inferno-World-at-War-1939-1945/dp/0307475530

As Ronald Spector pointed in Eagle against the Sun: The American War with Japan:

“More battles were waged at sea and more warships sunk than in all other twentieth century naval campaigns combined.”

The U.S. Sea Services are currently facing nasty strategic military threats in ‘WestPac.” But they can build on General McArthur’s visionary leadership that created the emergence of a stable and secure freedom loving post war Japan.

Today in the Pacific, the U.S. and Japanese fighting forces are united and unified to stop aggression at sea in and the air.

Both the PLA and the North Korean Military fully know this unity of purpose.

Today’s Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John Richardson, has created a document that is essentially a nautical “rules of the road.” As implemented, it will continue to deter any threats and if necessary win decisively across the spectrum of operations.

The US Navy has been and will continue to be supported equipped and trained to decisively win tactical conventional engagements and up the escalation ladder to destroying an enemy’s strategic capabilities including their possible use of nuclear weapons.

Not to single out one branch of a heroic Sea Service team but since the CNO Admiral John Richardson commanded a Submarine it can be noted that there is a linage of war at sea success evident in the “Silent Service.”

From WWII Fleet Boats to today’s Boomers and Fast Attack it is very evident in the CNO’s thinking. With undaunted courage US Navy Submarine combat operations in WW II while sinking 52 % of all tonnage sent to the bottom.

It came with a price.

Admiral John Richardson, the 31st Chief of Naval Operations, released a White Paper on the Future of the Navy, which outlines his approach to the modernization of the sea services. The CNO calls for a build up of Naval power both in terms of accelerating platforms within an overall approach to the reshaping of the sea service recognizing huge technological advances in all things “military.”

Now, with the election of President Trump and the new President calling for a rebuilding of American military power, the CNO makes a definitive case for the kind of maritime power, which he sees as central to such an effort. Clearly, the CNO recognizes the readiness challenge, which has been inherited by the President and the need to repair any damage, which readiness levels pose to those services.

TheFutureNavy

“We need a year to consolidate our readiness and achieve better balance across the Navy. 2018 will be that year, and even as we restore wholeness, we’ll ensure that we continue to grow the Navy and establish a firm foundation for accelerating growth in following years.”

This readiness correction path is about building towards a transformation of the maritime force, not simply a rebuild on current trajectories. And it is being done in an accelerated manner, due to the dynamics of building strategic and tactical threats around the world.

His vision recognizes the National Command Authority has to always embrace the sage echo of Admiral Nimitz’s great Commanders Guidance: “train train train” to fight the current fleet that America has. The CNO’s challenge is to concurrently keep all focused on emerging technology and the resulting dynamic con-op capabilities from those technologies. It takes a very experienced weather eye to see and prioritize the “art of the possible” going into the next decade and not get caught up in paper drills in essence abstractly reaching into the 2040s.

Admiral John Richardson has chartered the continuing transformation of a maritime force which can operate from the Equator to Polar caps in a unified and also distributed manner that dynamically incorporates U.S. and allied joint force capabilities, in the air, and on the sea and land.

The American sea service is networked to leverage rapid technology insertion, because no platform fights alone and USAF 21st Secretary Mike Wynne’s Doctrine applies: “if it is a fair fight someone failed in planning.”

160113-N-AT895-251 PATUXENT RIVER Md. (Jan. 13, 2016) Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. John Richardson views the MQ-4C Triton unmanned aircraft system at Naval Air Station Patuxent River. Richardson also held an all-hands call, toured facilities and viewed aircraft and systems including the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye and F-35C Lightning II carrier variant joint strike fighter . (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Nathan Laird/Released)

A software upgradeable revolution is upon us and for example the F-35, P-8/Triton and USS Gerald Ford are all leading this 21st Century technology revolution.

https://sldinfo.com/rolling-out-the-f-35-fleet-from-the-testing-perspective-an-interview-with-the-chief-test-engineer-for-the-f-35-itf-at-pax-river/

https://sldinfo.com/the-right-stuff-f-35-style-the-edwards-f-35-integrated-test-force-talks-about-the-roll-out-of-the-global-aircraft/

https://sldinfo.com/the-software-upgradeable-combat-aircraft-the-case-of-the-p-8/

https://sldinfo.com/triton-and-shaping-the-21st-century-fleet-approach-to-distributed-lethality/

 (Nov. 24, 2016) An MV-22B Osprey with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 264 (Reinforced), 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), lands aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1) Nov. 15, 2016 with Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson to visit Marines and Sailors for Thanksgiving. The 22nd MEU, deployed with the Wasp Amphibious Ready Group, is conducting naval operations in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations in support of U.S. national security interests in Europe and Africa. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Ryan G. Coleman)

Across the Navy, the CNO is providing guidance to employ core new technologies such as directed energy and distributed decision making down to the individual Naval Aviator.

With regard to the platform side, as is the tradition of the United States Navy, a partnership with industry is always crucial in building out of new ships, subs and aircraft.

Notably a key platform build out involves an area where significant innovation is under way namely the amphibious fleet.

“Very important here is the potential for increased capability and flexibility of amphibious ships, enabled by new aviation and weapons systems. Over the longer term, the range of possibilities will expand to more fully integrate space, surface, air, undersea, and cyber and electronic warfare capabilities.”

It is clear that software upgradeable systems like F-35s, P-8s and Tritons can provide a benchmark from which more rapid insertion of technology can be leveraged.

The platforms need to be designed with inherent upgradeability in mind.

160113-N-AT895-148
PATUXENT RIVER, Md. (Jan. 13, 2016) Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. John Richardson views an E-2D Advanced Hawkeye at Naval Air Station Patuxent River. Richardson also held an all-hands call, toured facilities and viewed aircraft and systems including the MQ-4C Triton unmanned aircraft system and F-35C Lightning II carrier variant joint strike fighter. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Nathan Laird/Released)

“The pace of change demands that we design ships with modernization in mind. The “core” of those future ships – the hull, and the propulsion and power plants – will be built to last for decades. To leave room for future modernization, Naval Architects, engineers and sea going commanders have all focused on building in to Carriers, surface combatants and newer Amphib hulls as much electrical power capacity as possible.

“On top of that hull and power plant, we must plan from the outset to modernize the “punch” — the combat systems, sensors, and payloads — at the speed that technological advances allow. Future ships should be made for rapid improvement with modular weapons canisters and rapidly swappable electronic sensors and systems. Related, future designs must aggressively go after ways to drive down the costs to operate and maintain the future fleet, no matter its composition.”

He does not explicitly use the term “kill web,” that Admiral Manazir (N9) so effectively described in Australia and to the USAF Mitchell Institute in his CNO white paper.

However, “kill webs” is clearly the combat idea throughout the white paper as the CNO discusses his approach to the netted fleet where distributed decision making at all levels of command is truly becoming a key force multiplier.

https://sldinfo.com/the-deputy-chief-of-naval-operations-for-warfare-systems-look-at-the-way-ahead-rear-admiral-manazir-on-shaping-kill-webs/

“Netting the battle fleet together in ways that are reliable and secure will allow for maximum flexibility. Strengthening and extending our nets will “raise all boats.” Those networks will support multiple functions, but increasingly will also be a key enabler of artificial intelligence-enabled tools, informed by data analysis, that will allow our commanders to make better decisions faster than our enemies.”

In other words, the CNO highlights the twining of two key processes: shaping a way to accelerate the more rapid build out of platforms with the change in the nature of the combat impact which the fleet can deliver to the joint and combined force. It is about twining numbers with combat effect.

“A 355-ship Navy using current technology is insufficient for maintaining maritime superiority. We must grow, yes. But we must also implement new ways of operating our battle fleet, which will comprise new types of ships. The clear conclusion is that linear expansion and improvement will not achieve the exponential pace that will enable us to win in the future.”

To get where the sea services need to go, more agile acquisition processes are necessary, both in terms of how to accelerate platform build out and system innovations.

“If we build with faster improvement cycles, the inherent cost of our systems and platforms can come down. Shifting more heavily to unmanned surface, undersea, and aircraft will help us to further drive down unit costs. Energy-based weapons can be both more effective and put the Navy on the right side of the cost curve. Designing in the ability to modernize – plug and play hardware matched with software-programmability – will make upgrades quicker and more affordable even as we stay more capable.”

160113-N-AT895-242 PATUXENT RIVER Md. (Jan. 13, 2016) Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. John Richardson sits in the cockpit of an F-35C Lightning II carrier variant joint strike fighter at Naval Air Station Patuxent River. Richardson also held an all-hands call, toured facilities and viewed aircraft and systems including the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye and MQ-4C Triton unmanned aircraft system. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Nathan Laird/Released)

We have written about the central role, which we see the sea base being able to play in the emerging future of the United States and its allies in dealing with the evolving environment for the decade ahead. The key role of insertion forces along with more effective collaborative impact of the air and sea services as the U.S. shifts from the land wars of the last decade is a central theme of our work over the past few years as well.

Our 2013 book on Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific which we wrote with Richard Weitz highlighted the importance of such a transformation. With the election of Donald Trump and challenges such as North Korea and the CNO’s call for the transformation of the maritime forces, it is crucial to re-examine effective ways to deliver new combat capabilities to US and allied forces.

Some of the key questions, which the CNO’s White Paper currently puts in play for a public discussion, are:

How best to accelerate the production of the kinds of ships which are crucial to enhanced combat capability for the fleet?

It is not just about numbers but the right fleet mix, so how best might that be defined going forward?

How best to ensure that an acquisition process is put in place that inherently allows the sea services to insert rapidly new technologies?

How might the acquisition process to embrace fleet wide the ability to rapidly upgrade not just communication capabilities but platforms be put in place to let industry and the warfighters rapidly upgrade systems with the ever necessary quality assurance?

How to best build out and modernize the kill web approach to combat capabilities, including the human dimensions at all levels of Navy leadership?

How to keep the Navy war wining combat tradition from Admiral Nimitz—“train, train train” inside a finite resource base of support?

What is the best trial and error approach to accelerate the man-machine learning cycle, central to evolving combat capabilities and rapid decision-making?

How best to include unmanned systems within the combat learning and capability evolution cycles?

How to more effectively work with core joint capabilities, notably with the USAF in the offense and defense enterprise and with the US Army notably with their air and missile defense capabilities?

How to build out more effective trusted distributed command and control so that the distributed fleet has more effective combat capability?

How to fight the F-35 with strike ops that are stealth and EMCON passive?

How to accelerate the weapons revolution, including directed weapons to provide for an accelerating cycle of greater combat punch and defense?

How best to prepare the Fleet for an S-cubed (Sensors-Stealth-Speed) weapons revolution?

https://sldinfo.com/shaping-an-s-cubed-combat-revolution-preparing-for-the-coming-hypersonic-cruise-missile-threat/

How to more effectively include the USCG in a range of operations from littoral to blue water in terms of safety, security and fleet management? How to better integrate the USCG in a fleet build out strategy?

How to leverage, empower and engage with key allies who are also modernizing their combat forces?

How will the second nuclear age affect the role of the maritime forces in nuclear modernization efforts?

These are just some crucial questions going forward which can be posed leveraging the CNO’s approach to building the future maritime force.

UK Troops in NATO Exercises: NATO as Key Element of British Defense Policy

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
06/18/2017

2017-06-18  According to a piece on the UK Ministry of Defence website published on June 14, 2017, currently there are 1,500 UK military personnel involved in NATO exercises underway in five countries in Europe.

The Defence Secretary Sir Michael Fallon has today visited some of the 1,500 British personnel currently exercising across five countries in Europe, joining NATO allies in a sign of solidarity against any potential threat.

Sir Michael met with the troops in Romania, including the UK’s 20th Armoured Brigade as part of NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force Land component, which the UK took the lead of in January this year. The approximately 500-strong British force have been deployed on Exercise Noble Jump, working alongside 14 partner nations and testing NATO’s ability to deploy forces quickly and in response to a crisis.

Defence Secretary Sir Michael Fallon visits some of the 1,500 British personnel currently exercising across five countries in Europe. Crown Copyright.

Elsewhere in Europe, a company of 45 Commando of the Royal Marines joined the US-led Sabre Strike exercise in Latvia and Lithuania, working alongside Norwegian and Polish forces. Troops from the Light Dragoons and amphibious engineers from 75 Engineer Regiment also joined the exercise in Poland while the Enhanced Forward Presence Battlegroup 5 Rifles exercised in Estonia.

Defence Secretary Sir Michael Fallon said:

“The UK is playing a leading role in the NATO alliance and with around 1,500 British personnel exercising in Europe this week, nowhere can this be seen more clearly than in this region. We are standing side by side with our allies in the East, a sign of our unwavering commitment to European security.”

While in the country, Sir Michael is also visiting Royal Air Force personnel deployed to Romania as part of the NATO Southern Air Policing mission.

The detachment of four Typhoon fighter jets from 3 Fighter Squadron has been based in Mihail Kogalniceanu Airbase in south east Romania since May. Deployed for up to four months, they are working alongside the Romanian Air Force to police the skies over the Black Sea.

Sir Michael added:

“The UK is stepping up in its support for NATO’s collective defence from the north to the south of the alliance. Through this deployment, RAF planes will be ready to secure NATO airspace and provide reassurance to allies in the Black Sea region.”

During his visit, Sir Michael toured the airbase and spoke with RAF personnel deployed on the Mission. The Defence Secretary also witnessed the fighter jets participate in a practice Quick Reaction Alert.

 

Shaping Force Integration: The Aussies Work a Way Ahead

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
06/15/2017

2017-06-02 By Robbin Laird

In Colin Clark’s recent coverage of the visit of RAAF Air Chief, Air Marshal Leo Davies,, to the United States, he highlighted the “institutional interoperability which the RAAF was shaping with its closest allies, and notably with the USAF and the USN.

On a regional level, the F-35 provides “interoperability not only of Australian and US forces, but other regional and allied JSF operators.” Japan and South Korea are buying F-35As and Singapore is widely expected to buy F-35Bs.

Combine that with his country’s decisions to buy the P-8 Poseidon, the EA-18G Growler and the MQ-4C Triton (the maritime version of Global Hawk) and the two countries now boast what Davies called “institutional interoperability.” Parts and equipment can be shared and many pilots have trained together.

But the Aussies are not simply camp followers – they are shaping a way ahead an integrated force, rather than staying at the service platform level.

Air Marshal Davies presentation at CSIS.

When Air Marshal Davies introduced the new RAAF strategy at the Avalon Air Show earlier this year, he highlighted how he saw the way ahead for the RAAF:

“I don’t believe we, as an Air Force, understand how joint we need to be.

“We have come a long way – we talk a lot about joint, but I am not sure we are culturally able to shift from doing Air Force stuff first. I would like the Air Force in a joint context to begin to put the joint effect before our own Air Force requirements.”

air-force-strategy-2017-2027

When I interviewed him last month in his office in Canberra, Davies underscored that the Air Force and the other services were adding new platforms as part of force modernization.

But adding a new platform, even a key one like the F-35 was not enough to generate force transformation.

“It is not about how does this new platform fit into the force as it is, it is about how does this new platform enable the force to fight the way we need to be able to in the future?

“It has to be realistic but in a sense the reality we are looking at is not just the Air Force as it has fought in the past and present, but the Air Force as it vectors towards the future fight.

“If you don’t do this you will be only discussing and debating platforms in the historical combat space.

“And when we come to new platform decisions, we are positioning ourselves to ask the right question of the services: How does a particular platform fit how we will need to fight in 10 year’s time? Is the Navy or the Army or the Air Force entitled to that particular capability choice if it doesn’t fit that criteria?”

https://sldinfo.com/focusing-on-the-joint-effect-air-marshal-leo-davies-and-the-way-ahead-for-the-raaf/

The Aussies are debating ways to shape a more integrated force and did so at two seminars at the Williams Foundation last year, one on air-land integration and the second on air-sea integration.

This year, the Foundation addressed directly the question of how to design a more integrated force at its April 11th seminar on designing an integrated force. In simple terms, this means that the services are looking at how they could get beyond a service concept such as the Naval integrated fires approach to a Joint integrated fires approach?

http://www.williamsfoundation.org.au

There are a number of key factors or reasons why getting a better strategic grip on the evolution of the force from a joint perspective is essential.

First, given the shift in focus to high intensity operations the need to maximize one’s combat effect compared to the adversary is essential. A connected force can provide an advantage but only if it is synergistic and survivable; otherwise it is vulnerable and can generate fratricide rather than destruction of the adversary’s forces.

Second, the core enablers of combat power, such as C2 and ISR, are being dispersed throughout the services. Creating a tower of Babylon is not the outcome you want to have.

Third, a number of the new platforms being acquired are software upgradeable. It is desirable to be able to be able to manage tradeoffs among these platforms in terms of investments to get the best impact on the joint force. It is also the case that getting the kind of transient advantage one wants from the software enabling the combat force requires agility of the sort that will come with applications on top of middleware on top of an open architecture system.

Fourth, much of the force, which will be operating in 2030, is already here. This means that there will be considerable adaptation of the platforms towards greater joint effect. How to ensure that the legacy modernization programs provide effective joint effects, rather than simply stovepiped upgrades?

Fifth, the information and communication systems, which are the enablers for the joint force, are dynamic elements subject to market change and adversary disruptions. How to best develop IT and Coms packages which can support cross-cutting modernization and evolving force integration?

Sixth, to get the kind of cross cutting modernization one needs with an evolving 21st century force, how can the acquisition system be altered in order to provide for open-ended change? How to move from a platform linear project approach to a broader program approach which allows trade offs to be made with regard to platforms within a capability stream?

Seventh, the only way there will be the ongoing rapid transformation of the force will be shaping an effective industrial-military partnership whereby there is shared understanding and shared risk to achieve outcomes which are more targets than well defined platforms. How can this be achieved?

There are just some of the core questions, many of which were discussed during the seminar. But the core point is that raising questions, which drive you towards where the force needs to go, is the challenge; it is not about generating studies and briefing charts which provide visuals of what a connected force might look like. It is about creating the institutional structure whereby trust among the services and between government and industry is high enough that risks can be managed, but creative destruction of legacy approaches is open ended as well.

It is about empowering a network of 21st century warriors and let the learning cycle being generated by this network drive acquisition, modernization and operational concepts.

It is about innovations within concepts of operations generated by the network to flow up into strategic change.

Rather than pursuing after market integration or simply connecting stove piped service platforms after the fact with a bolt on network, how might integration be built from the ground up?

The approach being taken is not theological or an application of set of propositions or laws written down in a guidebook. The approach is to work greater integrative processes within and among the services, and to highlight the need to pose hypotheses along the way concerning how greater integration is achievable where appropriate and ways to achieve more effective outcomes for the development of the force.

It is a quest, which is being shaped by realigning organizations, and trying to build from the ground up among the junior officers a willingness to shape interconnectivity from the ground up. With regard to organizations, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, VADM Griggs is in charge of much of the force structure redesign. There is a Force Design office headed by AVM Mel Hupfeld and the Joint Capability and Management and Integration Office headed by RADM Peter Quinn which are especially direct reports to the Vice Chief as part of the way ahead in shaping force integration.

In his presentation to the seminar, VADM Griggs underscored that “we are seeing real changes in culture and behavior across defense.” In part this is due to the fact that the warfighting domains are blending and becoming highly interactive with one another.

He argued that as we returned to a more congested and contested environment the five war fighting domains are becoming increasingly blurred. Effective integration then is critical to gain superiority in 21st century warfighting.

He argued for an integrated strategic direction but flexibility in shaping operating concepts. “We need central orchestration of the effort rather than a top down dictat.”

He highlighted the need to shape a continuous capability review cycle within which to manage ongoing modernization, new acquisitions and effective management of trade offs in budget terms. He chairs the investment committee where the principals met to make strategic decisions on investments. Obviously, control of the purse strings is crucial to make suggestions turn into recommendations with clout for force structure development.

Shaping a way to conduct the quest is very difficult; but the ADF is clearly been empowered to do so by Government.

Such a quest inevitably will fail and succeed along the way; but without setting this objective from the ground up, it will be difficult to change the operating concepts and the then the concepts of operations, which can drive the transformation of the force.

The United States may have Joint Forces Quarterly; the ADF has a transformation process underway.

They are definitely following the Nike model: Just do it!

And for the United States, even when the Aussies are adopting out own platforms, they are doing so in a very different context in which force integration is set as a strategic goal, rather than the pursuit of service modernization. In effect, the Aussies are providing the experimental model, which can be quite relevant to others, including the United States.

In the mid 1990s when I worked at the Institute for Defense Analyses, one of the tasks on which I worked was for the Roles and Missions Commission. One of the key tasks, which the Congress had tasked the Commission to pursue, was to determine what the United States might learn from allies. We worked hard on our white paper but when delivered to the Commission we were told by a very senior member of the Commission: “Good work; but why did you really examine the question? We are so much bigger than any of our allies, there is very little we could learn from them or apply to our own practices!”

Unfortunately, not much as changed in the attitude of many defense civilians, but many leaders in the US military do not share such views, notably with allies and the US adopting some of the same key platforms at the same time, like P-8, Triton, and the F-35, and some allies operating more advanced equipment than the US itself.

Obviously this is a work in progress and perhaps always will be.

The challenge is to get in place a template which allows for greater capabilities to shape force integration but in an ongoing manner; more of an ongoing inquiry rather than a fixed point on the compass.

In short, the Aussies are taking the new platforms and systems and working to bend these towards a more integrated force.

And being Aussies they will not lie to you and argue that this easy or not contentious.

But it is the way the technology and the warfighting capabilities are pointing.

but remaining within service islands will not get you there.

This is something the United States will continue to learn until it leverages the new platforms more effectively to shaping greater warfighting capabilities from the new platforms it is introducing, developing and innovating with largely on a service level.

https://sldinfo.com/designing-the-integrated-force/

Editor’s Note: The interview with Air Commodore Chipman provided some significant insight with regard to integration and shaping a way ahead.

2017-04-20 By Robbin Laird

I first met Air Commodore Chipman when he was leading the initial Plan Jericho movement.

He now has become Director General of Capability Planning in the RAAF and is now faced with the challenge of infusing the forward thinking represented by Plan Jericho into actual capabilities.

And doing so clearly is about shaping the evolving force into a more integrated direction.

https://sldinfo.com/the-co-directors-of-plan-jericho-group-captain-rob-chipman-and-group-captain-jake-campbell-discuss-the-way-ahead-for-the-raaf/

Plan Jericho is a compass not a road map; but now is working the challenge of shaping programs to move down the direction where the compass is providing some guidance.

And it is clearly not easy.

Notably, with the RAAF introducing new platforms across the board, weaving those into a comprehensive capability, let alone an integrated one, is very challenging.

Slide from Presentation by Air Commodore Chipman, Williams Foundation Seminar, April 11, 2017

In his remarks to the Williams Foundation seminar on force integration, he underscored the importance of generating key thrusts within force development that allow movement in the right direction.

In my interview with him, he underscored that one of the problems is clearly ensuring platforms stay on track, such as the F-35 transition effort which is under his office’s responsibility.

His office also has responsibility for the missile defense program discussed at Williams.

He highlighted that the challenge of generating a future direction comes into conflict with program management.

“The biggest danger, is that as things crop up, and one particular project has a crisis, a financial crisis or something that jeopardizes what government has approved you to achieve, then you get focused in on solving that problem at the expense of thinking more broadly about our strategic direction.”

He sees a key ahead as shaping a community of 21st century operators who have a shared perspective on shaping joint effects as the strategic direction.

Effective joint force design is essential, but it won’t deliver an effective joint force in the absence of greater collaboration in the operational community.

He saw the Air Warfare Centre and its service counterparts as a key locus where shaping such a community of thinking and interest in shaping a way ahead for building a joint force.

Slide from Presentation by Air Commodore Chipman, Williams Foundation Seminar, April 11, 2017

“I don’t own the Air Warfare Center, but I think what I can do is start to influence the goals that we set for the Air Warfare Center so that we start to drive the kind of collaboration we need to integrate Air Force, and the Australian Defence Force.”

And clearly there needs to be practical cases or thrusts within program development which can provide the push necessary for greater program design for integration.

“We need to have broad enough of a perspective so that we can drive programs towards joint outcomes.

“For example, it will be crucial to bring E-7, with F-35 and air warfare destroyers into a common decision making space so that we can realise built in capabilities for integrated air and missile defense.”

“And that needs to be informed by shaping a common perspective with the USN and USAF as well.

“Let’s take integrated air missile defense as an example, because the project part of that at the moment within Air Force is Air 6500, a project that I’m responsible for.

“We’ve received strategic guidance that we should be interoperable with the U.S. in their Pacific theater.

“We need to put a little bit more definition to that. What is our vision for a theater air missile defense system between Australia and the U.S.?

“We need to integrate our platforms with a clear view of how to maximize our working relationship with the USN and USAF as a key driver for change as well.”

Air Commodore Robert Chipman, Williams Foundation Seminar on Force Integration, April 11, 2017

He emphasized the need in effect for practical steps forward at the tactical levels as key drivers for change as well.

“The force is clearly innovating tactically and we need that innovation to be informing ways to reshape integrated capabilities going forward.”

For example, the RAAF is looking at a new UAV to add to the force, and the Air Commodore saw that as best done by shaping and leveraging the creation of the ISR hub at RAAF Edinburgh.

And any new UAV should emerge from the integrated P-8/Triton efforts from that hub.

“Our new platforms need to plug into a common organization that is thinking broadly about the mission rather than simply buying a new UAV and handing it to the common organization.

“Platform acquisition in future clearly will need to be informed by integrative innovations and the 21st century network of warfighters, as you put it.”

And the RAAF needs to find ways to prepare and promote disruptive change.

In part that will be done by shaping a community, which has confidence in its ability to promote change and work towards a joint effect from any acquisitions going forward.

“Predicting the future accurately is hard. What we need is to develop confidence in our ability to adapt quickly as the future changes and evolves in front of us and to be able to respond to those changes.

“It is about creating organizational capacity and confidence to be able to respond to an evolving future.”

The Jericho project team is now working on ways for the RAAF to understand and anticipate disruptive change.

They are focusing on a concept called disruptive thinking. We are working with the private sector and with academia to find pockets of excellence able to come up with new ideas and new ways of using fielded technology to help with defense’s mission.”

He articulated where he would like the RAAF to be able to position itself in the future.

“I would love to see Air Force become earlier adopters of technology. I think at the moment we wait until technology is too mature before we bring it into service.

“We live in a region where competitors are clearly innovating rapidly.

“If we’re able to bring ourselves forward on that technology acceptance curve, I believe that would be a really good outcome for us.”

The original version of this piece appeared on Breaking Defense. 

More Than Joint: The Aussies Forge A Way Ahead

 

Munitions Supply for High Intensity War in Korea

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
06/13/2017

2017-05-31 By Danny Lam

During the Korean War, US forces were able to draw on ample surplus inventory left over from World War II.

Nevertheless, ammunition shortages materialized as consumption rates far exceeded expectations early in the conflict. Later, General Ridgeway’s use of firepower to save allied lives strained supply even more.

Shortages recurred again during the Vietnam, Gulf War I, and presently the anti-ISIS campaign depleted stocks of precision munitions faster than they can be produced with existing facilities.

Draws by allies are an additional strain on US stocks.

Stockpiling of ammunition was practical when they have long shelf lives (e.g. .50 cal rounds) and can be inexpensively stored in depots or dumps. Modern precision munitions are expensive items to stockpile.   PGMs are made with sensors, electronics, and other high tech components – both hardware and software – that require periodic maintenance, particularly if it is deployed at sea or land that makes it costly and difficult to retain large peacetime stockpiles.

Munitions use to be relatively simple to produce industrial products. Precision munitions that have become dominant today require many components that have complex and tightly controlled manufacturing processes and long lead times combined with rapid obsolescence.

Many components are (often sole) sourced from outside the US from facilities in Asia that may be disrupted by war or embargos.

JSOW is a family of low-cost, air-to-ground weapons that employ an integrated GPS-inertial navigation system and thermal imaging infrared seeker. Credit: Raytheon

Or require processing from facilities that are located in potential belligerents.

Globalized supply chains with suppliers of many components required for military systems located in belligerent or neutral nations have not been tested in a large scale war since WWII.

How quickly these issues can be worked around during wartime and what it would cost is the question.

The long life of many military systems (measured in decades) historically necessitate “lifetime buys” of components which are then stored or stockpiled in order to assure availability.   Parts stockpiles face the risk of both rapid depletion and obsolescence from unexpected surge demands.

While newer defense systems are beginning to be designed for regular technology refreshes and software upgrades during their life, many existing legacy systems remain costly and difficult to upgrade.

All of these issues are manageable during the post-war era of slow motion, minor wars.

A high intensity, long duration conflict that exhaust or obsolete the existing stockpiles, or disrupt global supply chains, however, will overstress these antiquated logistics systems and overwhelm them.

While supplies of munitions for expected conventional operations in the Korean peninsula (e.g. a) offshore, b) aerial, c) high-tech options) are adequate under the replenishment proposed in the 2018 defense budget.

The question is, what contingencies would upend existing plans?

A major contingency are allies that have failed to lay in adequate stocks of their own that will be turning to the US as the lender (or supplier) of last resort.

Time and time again, the US have had to rush supplies of consumables and weapons to allies that failed to anticipate and provide for what they committed themselves to: whether it is the European led anti-Gadhafi Libya campaign that required US provided ISR assets and supplies of precision munitions, or allied troop contingents that required US operated logistics for something as simple as fuel in Afghanistan.

It is a foregone conclusion that Japan and South Korea, beside other allies, will rapidly exhaust their stockpile of consumables in a high intensity Korean conflict.

Or allies will deploy antiquated CF-18s against a potentially state-of-the-art DPRK air defense system that require extensive SEAD support just to survive.

Since Gulf War I, the US was able to count on the use of precision weapons with little concern for their obsolescence.

The COTS revolution, however, opened the door to competitor regimes not only breaking the US monopoly on PGMs, but also for extensive reverse engineering, spoofing and hacking of PGMs.

This is particularly the case for the older stocks that have been extensively used in many theaters that gave peer competitors like Russia and China and enemies plenty of opportunity to capture or retrieve samples from the field.

Realistically, if a renewed Korean conflict involved ether overt or covert assistance from the PRC, Russia, or Iran, it is a foregone conclusion that they will field counters to many of the PGMs in US inventory. Older model JDAMs, for example, cannot be expected to work reliably.

Obsolescence puts a premium on the US being able to expeditiously field follow on generations of existing technologies, both hardware and software to replace or update the existing inventory faster than they can be obsoleted again.

That in turn, may run into major problems if the hardware supply chain is disrupted.

Then there is the problem of security of supply lines.

Throughout most of the post war period, the US and allies have taken for granted that their supply lines from homeland to theater will be secure without the need for defense or escorts.

That cannot be taken for granted in a conflict with DPRK equipped with nuclear ballistic missiles that can put “at risk” both population centers in CONUS and large concentration of high value targets like a carrier strike group.    

For example, DPRK’s alleged inability to precision target a US Carrier is a moot point if they have no compunctions about crossing the nuclear threshold.

A conventional military option against DPRK will be a costly, difficult, and risky proposition in the event of a long duration, high intensity conflict.

Presently, US planning evolves around optimistic assumptions that diplomacy, sanctions and perhaps a limited conventional war will be sufficient to eliminate DPRK’s nuclear ICBM threat.   Or to cause the regime to collapse on its own.

If these rosy assumptions fail, and the US have to consider the unpalatable option of a major long duration high intensity war — that may or may not have the support of allies like South Korea and may involve Iran, PRC and Russia — it can be an extremely costly and difficult affair.

All the more so if the above contingencies are not thought through beforehand.

 

 

 

Trump, NATO and Shaping a Way Ahead

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-05-28 By Robbin Laird

President Trump is certainly not a laid back type of leader.

Then again he would not have been elected if he was, given the nature of the evolving U.S. political process.

He also was elected much like his predecessor with regard to domestic issues.

President Obama promised “Change You Could Believe In” and President Trump promised to “Make America Great Again.”

During his campaign, President Trump said many things but with regard to foreign policy the core theme was the defeat of ISIS and this has been the most compelling part of his narrative as President with regard to foreign and defense policy.

This was clearly on display during his first foreign trip.

Trump at G-7. Credit Photo: Reuters

During his Presidency, the issue of North Korea has emerged a core issue as well so that to date, the two issues, how to respond to a rising nuclear power and how to defeat a dispersed terrorist enemy have come to the top of his operational agenda.

The North Korean issue was not raised at NATO but was raised at the G-7 which provides its own comment with regard to NATO and its focus on critical defense issues. 

When President Reagan came to office, the East-West conflict was coming to the fore and was expressed in the Euro-missile crisis. The President pushed nuclear modernization within a contested European environment as the litmus test of NATO solidarity to deflect and defeat Soviet pressure.

President Trump’s version of this has been different, namely, focusing the Alliance on the defeat of ISIS and key European states providing greater means and capabilities for their own defense.

During my visit to Norway this year, the Norwegians went out of their way to highlight the importance of Article III as a keystone for providing engagement capabilities for core allies to come to their aid in times of crisis.

Not insignificantly, having modern defense capabilities also helps Norway to play a credible role in the defense of other NATO partners.

Danny Lam has highlighted the importance of Article III in any evaluation of the way ahead with regard to Europe and defense.

President Trump could have addressed this issue of persistent dishonesty by unilaterally initiating the preparation of a semiannual annual report by US-DoD on every NATO member that rates their performance on meeting Article 3 obligations.    

 A report that would publically identify the threats facing each NATO member, and assess what they have done and actual readiness and preparedness to mitigate the threat. These facts, independently compiled by DoD, can be considered as a factor like progress toward 2% GDP spending in any consideration of Article 5 obligations beyond the requirement for “consultations”.

A semiannual Article 3 Report on every NATO member would be a much better gauge now that members have taken the lead in using Arthur-Anderson accounting. If exhortations to do the right thing have no effect, perhaps public shaming semi-annually to their electorate can do better.

 At some future point, the Article 3 reports might delve into the capacity, readiness and willingness of NATO members to come to the aid of the United States, e.g., in the Pacific theater.

Wouldn’t it be a revelation and revolutionary for NATO obligations to be truly mutual?

http://www.sldforum.com/2017/05/tough-love-americas-nato-allies/

Putting aside President Trump, fundamental changes are afoot which are dramatically changing the context facing NATO and altering forever how key European nations will deal or not with their defense.

There is no given that key European states will indeed deal with their defense, and the United States under whatever President will then have to come to terms with those states who are indeed approaching defense and security in a way congenial to how the United States can in fact protect its interests.

Put bluntly, Article V is not a given in the real world as opposed to the policy wonk world.

Amazingly, The New York Times editorial board went after President Trump on the grounds virtually that it is a given.

President Trump’s first NATO meeting was the moment to show that he would honor the example of his predecessors in leading a strong and unified alliance that has been and should remain the anchor of Western security.

He failed.

Instead of explicitly endorsing the mutual defense pledge at the heart of the alliance, Mr. Trump lectured the members for falling short on pledges to spend 2 percent of their gross domestic products on the military, much as he had hectored them on this subject during his presidential campaign. There were signs, too, that Mr. Trump and the allies remain at odds over Russia, which is deeply unsettling given mounting questions about Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election.

Mr. Trump has a point when he says the allies should increase their military budgets, which they have started to do, partly in response to Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine.

But his obsession with the matter has reinforced the impression that he sees NATO as essentially a transactional arrangement, not as an indisputably important alliance that has kept the peace for 70 years and whose value cannot be measured in dollars and cents. Against this history, Mr. Trump’s repeated scolds are not just condescending but embarrassing.

 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/26/opinion/donald-trump-nato-russia.html?_r=0

NATO is a transactional entity just like every other treaty.

And the continued expansion of NATO was always a bet that somehow the Russians would not call into question the very, very uncertain relationship between expanding the territory covered by the treaty with the declining assets available to provide for expanded NATO defense.

This bet rested on a weak Russia and the absence of a direct threat to the expanded NATO treaty territory.

This bet has been lost.

Russia has returned to the table and although sanctions are in place, what military moves might the Chancellor Germany wish to initiate if the Russians move against the Baltic states?

Not President Trump, but Chancellor Merkel what are your operative plans for defeating a Russian maneuver force?

NATO has been changed beyond recognition by its expansion East, by the land wars in the Middle East, and by the engagement in the Middle East, which amazingly is considered out of area by NATO.

There is little real continuity between the organization designed to fight the Soviet Union occupying much of Europe and NATO today.

That means as well the management of interests among the member states can not be in any real way managed the same way by the United States or the larger member states.

And the exit of Britain from the European Union certainly raises fundamental questions as well about defense and security relationships within Europe.

President Trump’s questioning of the way ahead certainly makes sense but has not been put as a Kissinger or Brzezinski might have put it; but we need more effective considerations of how best to shape that way ahead worthy of a fundamental strategic rethink.

The Article III consideration is as a good a way to start the refocusing as any.

If we were to apply Article III to the Germans we would find a very serious void at the center of Europe.

From left, British Prime Minister Theresa May, U.S. President Donald Trump and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg listen to Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel as he speaks during a working dinner meeting at the NATO headquarters during a NATO summit meeting.

Germany in no way could defend itself and has no plans really to do so.

Forget 2% which the Germans will not meet any time soon – if they were serious about self defense and one useful to alliance commitments it would not be too difficult to sketch out.

Namely, significant strengthening of its air force and its ability to integrate with a significant missile defense capability would be the core of its ability to defend itself, and to provide significant inputs to Polish and Baltic defense.

And it is about defense not some offensive thrust against Russia.

This would requires a significant commitment to modernizing Eurofighter, adding a new combat air capability able to integrate ground based missile systems with air systems, and a rapid and significant build out of MEADS or similar systems.

And oh by the way all of this is already being built in Germany or could be augmented with new European or alliance systems.

And the impact of Brexit is significant as well in changing the Alliance calculus.

What will be the relationship of Brexit Britain to the defense of the continent?

The question of Britain’s defense relationship with continental Europe is a question with a very long history, but now Brexit will write a new chapter.

The French military have relied on their relationship with Britain and the United States as key ones to shape their own more advanced warfighting capabilities.

President Macron has been hugging the Chancellor of Germany, but which outcome comes to play.

What will be the outcome of this love fest: France looking like today’s German defense structure or Germany becoming more Article III compliant?

And although for The New York Times this would count as a Trump obsession, as a person who also lives in Paris, this matters a great deal to me.

And the major question hanging over all of this for Trump is the same as Reagan ironically, how to deal with the Russian nuclear threat?

And now we have the Second Nuclear Age nuclear powers entering the calculation as well, which very few European analysts and governments are prepared in any way to contemplate, and as de Gaulle posed many years ago, the nuclear dimension always raises fundamental questions concerning self-defense.

In an interesting comment on the recent NATO meetings, two European analysts not only decided to roast Trump, but also argued for expanded European versus NATO defense but conveniently left out of the discussion nuclear issues.

The reason this is so important is that if the US is not reliable and the Brits are exiting Europe, then that leaves the French who have NEVER been willing to commit their nuclear deterrent to broader European defense.

And does anyone really expect President Macron to invest in an expanded defense let alone nuclear defense structure?

According to Olivier de France and Sophia Besch, “There is some discomfort in Europe at the protection racket approach Trump is applying to Nato, and the idea of increasing military spending to please him is playing out to the detriment of European defence.”

So how to get beyond the Trump “protection racket?”

Would it not be possible to come up with a European metric that looks to European aims and interests, is forward looking, output-focused and creates consensus on both side of the Rhine? 

By setting their own targets and indicators, European leaders might help curtail anti-American sentiments, not to mention the suspicion they are feeding into American industrial interests. 

A European metric would give Europe some leg-room to build a narrative that is in line with its own world view, one that thinks of security as more than a military matter, and would help to make the case for spending more on security and defence.

And lest you wonder what kind of defense capabilities you would get, here is the answer:

This year could be the year to kick off a European debate that goes beyond the 2 percent and looks to European priorities. 

It might trigger a broader rethink about different European national security identities: countries with conventional conflict at their borders could spend more on territorial defence, countries that are particularly affected by the refugee crisis could include their contributions, countries with interests abroad might want to focus on peacekeeping missions. 

https://euobserver.com/opinion/138038

US President Donald Trump, right, reacts as he sits next to Britain’s Prime Minister Theresa May, centre and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as they participate in a working dinner meeting, during the NATO summit of heads of state and government, at the NATO headquarters, in Brussels on Thursday, May 25, 2017. US President Donald Trump inaugurated the new headquarters during a ceremony on Thursday with other heads of state and government. (Thierry Charlier/Pool Photo via AP) THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Put in blunt terms, you eliminate the nuclear problem but simply not discussing it.

And how does such a rag tag collection of “capabilities” add up to a military force for the defense of Europe?

Perhaps the answer lies in constructing a nice new building for graduates of ENA and other Eurocrats.

And then we face the other aspect of the fundamental shift facing Europe, namely the rewriting of borders in the Middle East.

Europe has a long history of Middle Eastern engagement and map writing – indeed Europe wrote most of the borders in the contemporary Middle East.

And the battle against ISIS which Trump is prioritizing is also about the rewriting of borders and coming to terms with the two dynamic national entities in the Middle East pushing from each end of the region to reshape their influence and reach – namely Turkey and Iran.

Neither state is performing up to “European value” standards but they are the key states who will rewrite the terms of reference for the region in the wake of the defeat of ISIS.

How to come to terms with states in evolution politically to sort out common interests to shape an effective regional situation?

What is the European defense strategy to deal with Iran and Turkey?

How will Europe deal with Russia and the United States and China for that matter as outside powers who will be key players in dealing with Turkey and Iran and part of the reshaping function?

The problem for NATO is that is not simply an effective organization to deal with these kinds of questions regardless of whatever Trump does or does not do.

It is time to get past the Trump news focus and get real about the fundamental challenges facing Europe where Trump may seem an irritant but not a cause.

Editor’s Note: Chancellor Merkel in the run up to the German elections in the Fall is clearly playing on both Trump America and Brexit Britain to augment her role within continental Europe as a whole. 

Angela Merkel has suggested Germany and Europe can no longer rely on the US under Donald Trump.

Speaking at a campaign event held in a Bavarian beer tent, the German Chancellor emphasised the need for friendly relations with the US, Britain and Russia, but added: “We Europeans must really take our destiny into our own hands.” 

Ms Merkel said that as the traditional western alliance is threatened by the new US presidency and Brexit, “the times in which we can fully count on others are somewhat over, as I have experienced in the past few days.”

While Germany and Europe would strive to maintain relations with the US and Britain, Ms Merkel said, “we need to know we must fight for our own future as Europeans for our destiny.”

It is also the case that within Germany, there is very uncertain support for shifting resources to defense and providing for the broader defense of the alliance.

And this has little or nothing to do with the Trump phenomenon — it is much more fundamental in terms of the German approach to defense and security in 21st century Europe.

A very revealing comment was made in a recent Spiegel article addressing the question of how ought NATO to address the Russian threat:

The situation today is altogether different.

The NATO staffer points to northern Norway at the top of the map and then moves to the right, across the Baltic Sea to the Baltic states, Poland and, finally, down to Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey.

It is an enormously long line stretching from the Arctic Circle to the eastern reaches of the Black Sea. Such is the external borders of the NATO alliance today – and it is a difficult one to defend.

The alliance has prepared several deployment plans. There is one for the Baltic region, in the event that Russia attempts to replicate its operation in Ukraine there.

There is also one for Romania and Bulgaria, in case the onslaught comes across the Black Sea. Plans are still being developed for Turkey and northern Norway.

Norway? Really?

Yes, the NATO official confirms.

The Norwegian government is keeping a close eye on the Russian military, the official says — the exercises, troop movements, the submarines, the ships, the aircraft.

In Germany, few are paying attention.

For a look at Trump channeling his inner deGaulle during the campaign see the following:

The Second Nuclear Age and American Security: Trump Channels His Inner De Gaulle

 

Shot Down: A Son Honors The Greatest Generation

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-06-13 By Robbin Laird

I had the opportunity to participate in a ceremony in France honoring B-17 crew members.

The families of the 10-crew members who crash-landed onto the waters of Noirmoutier Island, France on July 4, 1943 were invited to attend the unveiling ceremony honoring their World War II combat crew members.

Thousands of French joined the ceremonies on Sunday June 30, 2013.  It was indeed a festive occasion.

For the families and the participants in the ceremony, the event was a two-day experience.

The first day focused on visiting various parts of the American presence in France story and notably, the areas targeted by the B-17 raid on July 4, 1943.  It was a chance to come into contact with the reality of the physical quality of the terrain and location of the B-17 bombing effort.

To a person, the members of the families were clearly moved by the level of attention provided to the B-17 memory and to Americans more generally.

As Colin Clark, editor of Breaking Defense entitled my piece on the event: “French Gather by the Thousands to Honor US Pilots Downed on July 4 – 1943.”

Indeed, that aspect of the event came through in wandering through the village and experiencing the vintage cars, the World War II vehicles, the many French dressed in World War II uniforms or outfits and the re-enactment on the beach of the return of the allies to France.

I prepared background materials for the event and spent a good deal of time doing research on the B-17 story.

And ended up producing several articles and a Special Report on the B-17 and its crews.

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Remembering-June-2013.pdf

It was with significant interest that I read a recent book by Steve Snyder entitled Shot Down: The True Story of Pilot Howard Snyder and the Crew of the B-17 Susan Ruth.

Howard Snyder is the father of the author.

The book is written as a remembrance of his father in the broader context of the B-17 crews and their European combat and war experiences.

What is striking about the stories about the B-17 crews is how diverse and simply regular guys these folks are.

They are not born as unique heroes and born to destiny kinds of folks.

They are regular Americans who served the cause of freedom; did their duty and fought against the tyranny of one of the nastiest regimes in the history of the world.

It is the way they did it as well as what they accomplished which make them the “greatest generation.”

But what can be forgotten is that the current generation of warriors carry the same attitude and perform at significant levels of courage for their country, and remain the bedrock of freedom against the rising influence of the illiberal powers.

In other words, Howard Snyder and his generation are an inspiration but not the end of the story of American courage and contribution to making the world safer for democracy.

Steve Snyder walks us through the training of his father and his deployment to England.

He provides the historical context for the Mighty 8th and its operations from the United Kingdom.

I have visited many of the sites from which the Mighty 8th operated and have had lunch in the dining room near where one can find “Bomber” Harris’s bust and his office.

Notably, it has only been in the past few years that the UK finally erected a memorial to the crews and their contribution in London and it is located not far form the RAF Club in London.

The author then takes us on the missions his father flew, notably arriving after the costly raids on ball bearing plants deep inside Germany.

His father’s own missions are described vividly and we can fly with him on those missions.

During his last mission, his plane was shot down over enemy territory and the narrative now shifts to the fate of the crew and their efforts to remain uncultured and alive.

Unfortunately, three members were captured and executed with little regard to the Geneva Convention or any other rules of civilized behavior.

His father was hidden by brave resistance fighters and the author does an especially nice job of talking about those resistance fighters and the high cost they paid for aiding the downed American pilots.

Those fighters had a choice to make; they could have done nothing and focused on survival.

But they did not – they aided those fighting the Nazis with their own support and active efforts. Civilian courage combined with military efforts were certainly a powerful combination that would eventually put the Nazis where they belonged – on the dust heap of history.

I would highly recommend reading this book and enjoying this tribute by Steve Snyder to his father and the greatest generation.

He put the challenge for the B-17 crews rather well in these words:

The men who made up the crew of a B-17 Flying Fortress were each specially trained for their position.

Nonetheless, on every combat mission they faced possible death and destruction.

The challenges each crew member faced on every mission was formidable: enduring the physical strain of using oxygen in an unpressurized aircraft at an altitude where the temperature dropped to minus 60 degrees; suffering the heartache of watching a buddy’s aircraft suddenly blow up and instantly disappear in a cloud of grey smoke; seeing the tail, wing, or engines break off and the plane then drop like a stone; witnessing a bomber slowly rolling over and begin its slow plunge to the earth below; and watching for parachutes to see how many men got out, if any.

If a plane went down too fast, the crew would be sealed into what would become their coffin. Worse yet was the sudden horror when a crew’s aircraft was hit by flak or enemy fighters five miles above the earth. Many men would be reported missing or killed after only one or two missions, while others might survive only to be killed on their final mission.[1]

https://www.amazon.com/SHOT-DOWN-story-Howard-Snyder-ebook/dp/B00N5CL5XG/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1497379755&sr=8-1&keywords=shot+down

[1] Synder, Steve (2014-08-29). SHOT DOWN: The true story of pilot Howard Snyder and the crew of the B-17 Susan Ruth (Kindle Locations 1254-1262). Sea Breeze Publishing. Kindle Edition.

 

The Challenges of Responding to North Korea with Missile Defense

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
06/08/2017

2017-06-08 By Danny Lam

The successful test of an interceptor by the Missile Defense Agency May 30 caused Vice Adm. James Syring to claim that CONUS is “safe” until 2020, or at least 3 years ahead of DPRK ICBMs.

Let’s begin by taking this claim at face value.

VAM Syring’s assuring statement only applies to CONUS and Alaska, which exclude Canada, Japan, South Korea, US bases like Guam, Australia, New Zealand, all of Europe and the Middle East if an ICBM is launched from DPRK’s axis partner Iran or from DPRK.

Testing ICBM Intercept from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

With the exception of Japan, there are minimal defenses in South Korea and Poland (limited coverage that faces South against Iran) and effectively none elsewhere.

For American allies, VAM Syring’s statement is a veiled and stark warning that America First is the de facto missile defense policy for any ally who don’t avail themselves of the means to defend themselves like Germany and Canada (i.e. NATO Article 3 obligations).

The May 30 BMD test in no way address the proven ability of DPRK to overwhelm defenses with SRBM and MRBMs of Japan and South Korea by the sheer force of numbers. DPRK’s recent multiple simultaneous missile launch exercises confirmed this doctrine.

Presently, DPRK is known to have sufficient quantities of Short and MRBM missiles to inundate the deployed missile defense in much of Japan, S. Korea and nearby US bases.

In other words, the May 30 test provide no comfort to US allies.

American priorities for extension of BMD coverage will begin with states like Hawaii, extending to Pacific major US bases like Guam and Diego Garcia, and then to allies that carry their fair share of the defense burden which exclude a majority of NATO members.

The question is, how might DPRK defeat the CONUS US BMD?

The weakest link in the US BMD is in sensors and communications.

Continuous and extensive monitoring of launch sites by airborne and space based sensors worked well against liquid fueled rockets that require large convoys of trucks to support each launch and a long setup / fueling / launch preparation time.

Solid fueled missiles, however, require just a few — though distinctive TELs — that can be moved about quickly. To pick out a relatively small S/MRBM canister TEL moving about in the area the size of North Korea, with many hills and terrain clutter, is a difficult feat before consideration of the likely deployment of decoys or active interference with sensors and platforms (e.g. by shooting down airborne radar platforms).

If DPRK to adopt a “launch on warning” or “launch under attack” doctrine that pre-emptively attack both the US and allies by striking first, and bet that a mass attack will defeat any BMD.

Alternatively, there is the option of an offensive first strike that takes advantage of their plentiful supply of liquid fueled missiles by using it first. The first warning of launch we may have may be from the SBIRs spotting the missile plume.

The May 30 test show this can be handled up to the saturation of the BMD system.

Who says NORKs will play this game?

NORKs can use their nuclear devices for combination high altitude EMP and sensor blinding purposes.   The present policy of US and allies is to not shoot down DPRK missile launches that do not appear to threaten to land on their territory even if they see the launch preparations over days.

This plays right into DPRK hands if they were to loft a sensor blinder / EMP device that detonates just outside of territorial waters of nearby allies. TYP-2 radars in Japan and Alaska can conceivably be blinded by a single nuclear device while another tackled Wake Island’s TYP-2 and the SBX radar.

Once the sensors are blinded, a strike on CONUS or allies can proceed with the BMD system down or severely degraded with their next volley of liquid fueled missiles.

Solid fueled mobile missiles can then be retained as deterrent against retaliation.

Did the May 30 test consider this?

DPRK have other options besides using nuclear weapons on land targets. There is an implicit assumption that DPRK will adhere to the Outer Space Treaty and not deploy or use nuclear weapons in orbit or space.

Suppose if DPRK were to launch “peaceful” satellites that orbits over CONUS that contain a thermonuclear device optimized to generate EMP?

How would the US be able to determine in a short timeframe if the “satellite” do not contain a nuclear device?

Would the US pre-emptively destroy it?

Or take the time to examine, inspect it first?

Should we presume that DPRK will play “fair” or “by the rules”?

Can we take the chance based on what we know about DPRK now?

A nuclear detonation with a combination EMP / sensor blinding function could be used as a prelude to an ICBM launch from DPRK. Exo-atmospheric nuclear detonations will be devastating to vital communications links in orbit and terrestrially for a time.

Since the vast majority of electronic devices are civilian and not shielded, their disruption by EMP will lead to, at least in the short term, a collapse of the civilian economy in the footprint affected. If the device is thermonuclear, the EMP pulse generated can readily overwhelm any conceivable defenses and have a footprint exceeding CONUS.

Have the US military thought about how something as simple as tens of thousands of disabled cars blocking choke points like bridges, roads, ramps, etc. will impede their ability to mobilize?

Or dissipate resources for aiding civilians faced with a collapse of all essential services including food, water, medical, etc.?

Imagine if the commute to a radar site that once took 35 minutes became impossible unless crews are fetched by helicopter?

Assuming that the helos did not have their electronics knocked out and are not grounded by something as simple as lack of fuel because the pumps don’t work. Or the technicians that know how to repair it and source parts cannot be found?

Would the US order a nuclear retaliatory strike against DPRK immediately after an EMP strike that disabled most of the US civilian economy but yet caused few civilian casualties?

Such a strike against DPRK will no doubt cause massive contamination and casualties throughout northeast Asia.

What would be the consideration if DPRK retains a capacity to launch a “counter value” strike against civilian targets of US and allies?

Could the US conceivably back down and sue for peace? Japan? South Korea?

VAM Syring based his estimate of a 3 year lead on the intelligence community’s consensus forecast and projections of where DPRK’s will be with respect to DPRK reentry vehicle, countermeasures, and rocket motor technology.

No doubt that VAM is acting in good faith when he assured the Trump Administration and Congress that MDA’s interceptors will work.

And no doubt they will work against the anticipated threat based on the IC’s assessment.

But what if the threat is not a nuclear ballistic missile strike on CONUS population / military targets?

What if NORKs decided to target the electronics infrastructure of the US?

What the IC have not done, however, is to think like a North Korean rather than a Soviet or PRC military.

NORKs are not constrained by the abhorrence of war that Russians and Americans have, or squeamish about striking first even if it cause hundreds of millions of casualties, as long as they can prevail in a war termination situation.

Or to target the highly vulnerable, fragile monoculture of electronics based technology in the US.

The above analyses illustrate how one might consider defeating the rudimentary missile defense of CONUS if one thinks like North Korea, and not a traditional First Nuclear Age power.

Let’s err on the safe side.

We may not have a 3 year lead.

Editor’s Note: If you wish to comment on this article, see the following:

Thinking Like North Korea: How to Defeat US BMD?