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There is a famous story by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, where Sherlock Holmes solved the mystery in part by the dog not barking.
With President Erdogan busy domestically and in foreign policy, and taking on both domestic and foreign opponents, much of the press anticipation of the visit was a tough time for President Trump.
But this simply did not happen.
In answering why, one can find the keys to how the President is conducting his foreign policy.
Virtually his only foreign policy issue during the campaign was defeating Isis.
It should therefore not be a surprise that he is looking at the Middle East almost completely through this lens.
It is not about human rights violations; it is not about the post Isis political settlement; it is not about Red Lines against the Russians.
It is about shaping as effective a coalition to defeat ISIS as possible.
And in this effort, both Turkey and Russia matter.
But what seemed to not be noticed was that the President met the Russian foreign minister prior to the visit of the Turkish President.
And this meeting and the agreement in approach simply took off the table any effort by Erdogan to play Russia against the US to gain a bargaining advantage.
Even on the issue of “arming” the Syrian Kurds, there was agreement between Moscow and Washington which made the Turkish Presidents’ complaints moot.
And it should be noted that the frequent headlines about “arming the Syrian Kurds” is actually quite inaccurate – the White House is proposing counter IED weapons, not anti-tank weapons, it appears.
The President is laser focused on the anti-Isis issue.
This does leave key issues off of the table for now, but his instinct appears to be that by working the coalition it will be possible to have a shaping capability with regard to any post-ISIS order.
And coming to terms with the ambitions of the Turkish President will be important as the Middle East evolves as well.
As Kenneth Maxwell and I wrote earlier, with Europe and the Middle East both in play, the Turkish president is seeking to reshape his strategic operating area.
“The war of words between the Turkish leader and Europeans is simply the more obvious shift in the President of Turkey’s approach to shape in effect a more Islamic state which can provide for leadership in the Middle East and work with other global powers outside of Europe to enhance his position in the region.
“Turkey has already ramped up its defense industrial relations in the region and has become a source for arms in the region as well.
“And will play off the United States, China and Russia to enhance Turkey’s power in the region.”
Underlying the tactical or perhaps strategic maneuver by the President is the crucial question of the nature of the relationship between Russia and the United States.
All of the flail about Russia, the elections, and Trump misses a fundamental point – a working relationship with Russia is a key part of shaping the post-globalization phase of global development.
Obviously, protecting the integrity of the US political process is a core value.
And threats by foreign powers to this integrity are important.
But much of the political class seems to act on the assumption that working with the Russians is not something that Washington should do.
This is the “politically correct” approach to power which has undercut not only the domestic policy debates but has blinded American leaders to the nature of how rapidly the world is changing.
It is a world in which friends, enemies, competitors and adversaries are blending into one another dependent on the situation and objective.
But working Russia and Turkey at the same time is clearly the right kind of dynamic for any effective US policy in this period of global realignment.
A key dynamic with the shift from the land wars to shaping a 21st century combat fore is the crucial opportunity the US and its closest allies have to learn from each other thanks to the number of core weapons systems being bought at the same time.
Almost hidden in plain view is the emergence of a significant driver of change –-flying the same aircraft at the same time, and cross learning from each other.
There was much recent press on the arrival of USAF F-35s in Europe, landing at RAF Lakenheath and operating from there and then some of those aircraft going to Estonia and then Bulgaria. SACEUR himself showed up at RAF Lakenheath and underscored how significant the arrival of these aircraft was for a training mission in Europe.
For example, in an article by Robert Wall entitled “US jet fighters flex muscle amid Russia tensions” published in The Wall Street Journal, the arrival of the USAF jets in the UK and in Europe is highlighted. It is noted that the U.S. does not intend to permanently deploy the jets in Europe until 2020, and that “several allied air forces, are also buyers.”
But missing in plain view or perhaps plane view is the reality of the F-35 global enterprise being laid down prior to the arrival of any permanent U.S. deployment, and that global enterprise is being laid down by allies, not the U.S. simply by itself.
To take the key case, look at the United Kingdom.
Hidden in plain view is the fact that the UK is standing up its F-35 base PRIOR to the United States. And that the first squadron for the UK and Australia for that matter is being trained and equipped in the United States prior to their arrival in each of their countries. This is a case of the pilots and maintainers learning common approaches from the ground up PRIOR to standing up the new F-35 bases.
And not only that, but the facilities being established in Europe can provide a key sustainment and operational enterprise which the US as well as allies can leverage in common. Or put bluntly, the U.S. if its follows an innovative sustainment model can gain significant savings and operational advantages from leveraging the European infrastructure, rather than flying in parts and other materials to support ITS jets. The impact of savings to the lift and tanking fleet for the USAF could be very significant indeed from coming up with a 21st century approach to sustainment, support and sortie generation.
It is not just about the US sending advanced jets to Europe; it is about the US being smart enough to embed its jets in a broad scale renorming of airpower associated with the coming of the F-35 to a significant part of the allied combat fleet at virtually the same time.
Last year I visited RAF Lakenheath and recently visited both RAF Marham and RAF Lakenheath to discuss the progress in standing up F-35 bases at both facilities.
The F-35 is a data rich aircraft and needs to see a 21st century basing infrastructure built to support it as is the case of with some other aircraft like Wedgetail, P-8 and Triton. The UK and the US are rebuilding in common their respective bases from which they will operate their F-35s.
During my visit to Marham, I toured the new facilities and discussed the way ahead with senior staff.
There is a staff of 17 at the Lightning Force headquarters supporting the operational standup with nine specifically focused on the infrastructure aspects. They are busy simply in order to have the base ready next year to receive their first contingent of F-35Bs from their current base, which is in the United States.
The base will have a fully operational, training and support capability. Training, maintenance and various centers are being stood up. At the heart of the effort will be the National Operations Center in which logistics and operations are collocated and the U.S. will have personnel in this center as well.
There are multiple synergies involved with the F-35 and the standup of the Marham Air Base, two of which highlight the US-UK working relationship.
The first is the synergy from America to the United Kingdom and back again. The UK has operators at Pax River, Edwards, Eglin and Beaufort Marine Corps Air Station. The planes coming from Beaufort will provide the standup for the first RAF squadron, namely,. 617 squadron.
The second synergy is between the standup among bases and lessons learned. Marham is being stood up and generating operational lessons learned back to the United States, both in terms of the U.S.’s standup of its own bases abroad and at home, and, notably in terms of shaping a new operational dynamic for RAF Lakenheath.
The USAF F-35s at Lakenheath can become integrated into the operational, training and support elements in the UK as well, shaping a new approach for the USAF as well.
As Wing Commander Butcher, the CO of 617 Squadron, underscored the possibilities:
“We want to take forwards everything that we’ve done in the pooling and implementation agreement in the United States, and try and see how we can transpose that into a UK model.
“We’re looking to have jets taking off, F-35A’s taking off at Lakenheath. Well, what if they have an issue and they need to land in Marham. Rather than take the time to move people, spares etc from Lakenheath up to here, what’s to say that we couldn’t conceptually have some maintainers from 617 Squadron repair the jet, sign off, send it flying again.
“Lakenheath is going to be busy base with the closure of Mildenhall. Increased efficiencies working with us would make sense.
“Could we potentially have F-35As operating out of Marham on a daily basis?
“How do we organize hot pit operations on each other’s base?
“One can easily see how that could buy you a lot of combat flexibility, in terms of how you might do maintenance operations.”
And visiting RAF Lakenheath, the synergies underway are obvious as well.
According to Col. Evan Pettus, the Commander of the 48th Fighter Wing at Royal Air Force Lakenheath, England:
“We do not have a closer partner than the UK. We will both operate the F-35 from Marham and Lakenheath respectively, which are very close to one another.
“Shaping synergy between the two bases is clearly an important objective. We are working this process in a step-by-step manner, from understanding how we might operate F-35As from Marham and F-35Bs from Lakenheath, to deeper sustainment and training opportunities as well.”
But the potential is even greater for synergy from the two bases working together across the region. During my visit last year I discussed the impact of the synergy of the US and the allies standing up at the same time the new air combat force with then Col. Novotny, the 48th Fighter Wing Commander, and now General Novotny at the Air Combat Command.
“We are not flying alone; but joined at the hip. We will be flying exactly in the area of interest for which the plane was designed and can fly together, maintain together, and operate together leveraging the air and sea base for which the F-35 B will fly from as well. It is a unique and strategic opportunity for the USAF and for the nations.”
General Novotny added that the two bases joined at the hip can provide a key strategic impact as well.
“As we get this right, we can bring in the Danes, the Norwegians and Dutch who are close in geography and the Israelis and Italians as well to shape the evolving joint operational culture and approach. Before you know it, you’ve got eight countries flying this airplane seamlessly integrated because of the work that Lakenheath and Marham are doing in the 20 nautical miles radius of the two bases.”
The RAF, the RAAF, the USAF and the USMC are already learning how to integrate the F-35 into the air combat force at Red Flags, and recently have included the French Air Force in a Langley trilateral training exercise. But integration will be accelerated by the integration of normal operations from common bases throughout the European region as well.
As Novotny put it: “Doing Red Flags requires bring forces to Nellis and expending monies to come to the exercise, clearly an important task notably in learning to fly together in high intensity warfare exercises. But what can be shape from the RAF Marham and Lakenheath bases is frequency of operations with core allies flying the same aircraft.”
“The same aircraft point can be missed because the UK did not fly F-16s, the Norwegian, the Danes and the Dutch do. And the USAF does not fly Typhoons and Tornados; the UK does. Now they will ALL fly the same aircraft.”
“I did two OT assignments and we worked to get into Red Flag when we could to do joint training. Here we can do that virtually every day. We reach the Dutch training airspace, and can work with the Dutch, with the Brits, with the Germans, with Typhoons, with F3s, with the NATO AWACS. We take off and we fly 30 minutes to the east and we make it happen. It is Red Flag as regular menu; rather than scheduling a gourmet meal from time to time.”
And it is not only European allies who can engage in the cross learning.
The Aussies and the Dutch are standing up their F-35s at about the same time, and cross learning between the Aussies and the F-35 European enterprise is clearly already underway based on my interviews in Australia as well.
In short, the UK is leading the way in shaping a new infrastructure for a 21st century air combat force and with its operational footprint at RAF Lakenheath, the USAF is well positioned to interact with this dynamic of change.
With the RAF and the USAF setting up four squadrons of F-35s between them at two nearby RAF bases, there is a clear opportunity to shape a common sustainment solution.
And the impact of so doing could be significant on the North Sea neighbors, namely, the Danes the Norwegians and the Dutch. This is clearly a key way ahead in building out NATO capabilities going forward, which provides a 21st century example of burden sharing which delivers relevant capabilities.
This piece was first published by Breaking Defense
President Trump will be at the May 25 NATO meeting.
Nuclear Ballistic Missile Threats from North Korea are an existential threat to NATO members.
DPRK is presently not on NATO’s agenda.
It must be.
The Second Nuclear Age is simply not something which NATO wants to discuss or recognize.
But in the form of North Korea, it is central to the new nuclear equation, one in which nuclear weapons are not meant to serve deterrence but other values and objectives.
Avoidance of central challenges may be diplomacy; but is not effective defense strategy.
NATO was founded as a collective security organization to defend against existential threats to members. Post war core Anglo-European values that war is abhorrent, and causes of war, whether economic, political such as territorial disputes, etc. should be settled peacefully are at the heart and soul of NATO.
After the cold war, when Russia violated these core values, first in Georgia, then Crimea, and finally the Ukraine, NATO members unambiguously defended these core Anglo-European values against Russia.
Today, the greatest existential threat to the Anglo-European NATO alliance is not Russia, but coming from North Korea under Kim Jong Un.
North Korea will be able to directly pose an existential threat to at least two NATO members (Canada and USA) within a matter of years, and shortly thereafter, Western Europe. Existential threats are not just the ability to terminate the existence of an opponent.
But, “the capability to permanently change another group’s values and the way it governs itself against the latter’s will”.
North Korea pose an existential threat in at least two ways: First, by acquiring a credible capability to launch a thermo-nuclear ballistic missile strike aimed at any NATO member in Europe or North America. Secondly, by attacking core Anglo-Western values.
Western analysts and the priesthood of DPRK apologists applied their rose tinted glasses to the DPRK and presumed that they share the Anglo-European abhorrence of war. North Korean motives for acquiring thermo-nuclear weapons and ICBMs to deliver it worldwide is presumed to be for the purpose of “deterrence” rather than war fighting or other motives.
North Korea is assumed to be no different than every previous nuclear power (whether P5 or not) who have acquired nuclear WMDs as an insurance policy but have never used it after WWII. In the classic view, nuclear weapons are only useful as deterrence against existential threats.
DPRK under Kim Jong Un is in fact attacking a core post-war Anglo-European value no different than Russia unilaterally changing borders by force: No war for profit.
The Anglo-European value under attack is that economic gains is not a legitimate motive for war, and winning wars should not result in economic gain. This core value was the result of centuries of European wars fought for wealth and spoils, which in the 19th century resulted in the collection of indemnities by European and later, Japanese victors.
After the Great War, the term “indemnities” was replaced with “reparations” in recognition that no amount collected by the victors could “break even,” let alone garner a profit from the war. Unfortunately, the smaller Great War “reparations” was found to be itself a cause of World War II.
Thus, post war, the very idea of victors receiving sizable economic gains of “reparations” never entered into the equation. Germany, Japan, Italy and other belligerents that lost paid modest (or none) reparations.
The notion that a major 21st Century state can go to war for economic gain in the old fashioned European Way prior to the Great War, and in the process, collect sizable indemnities that make war profitable is nearly inconceivable to Anglo-European statesman.
Until Kim Jong Un’s DPRK, this consensus was shared by every nuclear armed power: Russians/Soviets, Chinese (whether communist or not), Indians, Pakistanis, Israelis, etc.
North Korea under Kim Jong Un is now challenging this core consensus by acquiring a credible nuclear arsenal with global reach for the purpose of extortion.
DPRK behavior – the long term, sustained and widespread, formal use of military capabilities – for the purpose of extortion by a government that is not a failed state has no precedence in modern history since 1945.
Extortion is the use of force or threat of force to obtain money, property. It is fundamentally and legally distinct from blackmail. (Bracken, 2017).
DPRK is primarily motivated by profit, not deterrence.
Based on DPRK’s history and precedent, and the dynamics of the Kim Jong Un regime, there is no doubt that the ultimate goal of DPRK’s nuclear arsenal programs are to extort wealth, money, etc. from anyone they can threaten and collect from.
Or in Northeast Asian lingo: Demand Tribute from vassals.
The threat from DPRK is against NATO members “within range” like the US and Canada or successfully extorting from NATO is at present limited. Other states more immediately threatened by DPRK: Republic of Korea, Japan, China, Russia are prospective tribute paying vassals of DPRK in the medium term.
If DPRK succeeds in extortion with WMDs, a core value and necessary element of global commerce will be undermined. Once North Korea breaks this taboo, it opens the door for Kim Jong Un to sell the same capability to other powers like Iran, jihadists, and any takers that want to set up their own local racket.
Global commerce as we know it cannot survive the return of extortionist regimes who “tax” commerce or require the payment of “protection money”.
If extortion successfully begins with DPRK, it will not end with Iran.
Nor will it end with economic motives but revive others like religion and race, to name a few. As such, Kim Jong Un’s DPRK is, indisputably, an existential threat to all NATO members and the world as we know it.
NATO members, including the United States, have failed to recognize the severity and dangers of this existential threat and the power of collective Anglo-European defense.
NATO was never intended to address an existential threat originating outside of Europe from Northeast Asia.
How to reorganize NATO and seek a new, closer and robust defense pact with Asian allies like Australia, Japan, South Korea, etc. is a clear, present, immediate problem.
President Trump have the opportunity to secure a new NATO consensus about the severity and imminency of the DPRK threat during the meeting.
The Trump Administration must before it is too late.
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A threshold now may have been tragically crossed in Electronic Surveillance.
Meta data collection is merging with machine-based analysis to filter actionable intelligence. And this information can now be merged with facial recognition software and ubiquitous camera presence. In a police state like the PRC, this provides significant tools to both control citizens and to deal with foreign influences which the regime will not tolerate.
The PRC also has access to commercial credit databases like Experian, etc. that is a gold mine of info for recruitment of spies in every OECD nation.
While serving as Director Technology Assessment, International Technology Security, (ITS) Office of the Secretary of Defense (2003-2009) I became familar with information systems that captured metadata and then harnessed powerful machine based analysis to filter actionable intelligence in order to make America and our Allies safer.
I personally saw the power of their vision being merged with the power of information age technology and was hugely impressed.
However, in our ITS office, we then had a series of discussions about employing such metadata collection and analytical efforts for our Counterintelligence (CI) mission. I saw tremendously powerful new tools.
But, during our ITS office robust discussions, a very smart co-worker flagged his deep concerns about proceeding down this path. This colleague pointed out that it was way too much power to give to the government.
The lowest common denominator is the key source of concern about a government information collection system gone wild.
It is not even about the integrity of the system; it is about a system that can not ensure the integrator of the lowest common denominator.
I personally don’t want a PFC Manning using my personal data for whatever advantage he believes he has the right to gain from that data. PFC Manning is most definitely at the bottom of the Chain-of-Command but what about our leaders and their performance as well?
We need a new systems architecture that compartmentalizes our personal information not just for the sake of protecting civil liberties, but to prevent misuse by both our own government and foreign powers.
We are creating a “one stop” collection effort for PLA Ministry of State Security (MSS) “collectors.”
What PFC Manning can do, certainly the PLA can do.
China to control their citizens makes no pretense about protecting privacy and routes their cellular exchanges through the Peoples Armed Police. Inside and outside of China, PLA collectors try to collect everything important t their interests and their presentation of reality.
This is their constant unrelenting pattern and practice.
We are now quickly making it very easy for them.
The issues of cyber penetration by collectors can be very simple; touch one classified secure system and very possibly a spy can touch them all.
Tragically, thanks to a recent and extremely important Washington Post story we now know that PLA cyber attacks to acquire highly guarded information about critical defense technologies have been very successful.
Hopefully the US is rapidly addressing that problem and fixing it.
Now a great human tragedy has been identified as playing out in China.
The New York Times just broke one of the most important stories about a successful 21st Century counter intelligence operation by the PRC.
The South China Morning Post gives reporting kudos to NYT and their headline captures the current state of play:
China killed or jailed up to 20 US spies in 2010 to 2012, report says
‘One of the worst US intelligence setbacks in decades’ may have been the result of hacking, code-breaking or betrayal by moles within the CIA
Beijing systematically dismantled CIA spying efforts in China beginning in 2010, killing or jailing more than a dozen covert sources, in a deep setback to US intelligence, The New York Times reported on Sunday.
What has been missed so far is the potential merging of all things in U..S total information awareness electronic files with accurately reported successful breaches by hostile intelligence services.
These services can merge data with the next step in counter intelligence technology — facial recognition technology.
Merging purloined highly classified information about U.S. Intelligence Community sponsored “collectors” or agents of influence in play inside the PRC with facial recognition technology become a powerful tool.
The PRC may well have deployed automated speech recognition software to screen a large amount of verbal conversations they monitor as well.
Already we have seen the use by China of surveillance and facial recognition systems at the 2008 Olympics.
Under Beijing’s seven year, $6.5 billion program called the Grand Beijing Safeguard Sphere, the Chinese government has installed roughly 300,000 video surveillance units around the city, according to a Los Angeles Times article. Included in that project and in conjunction with the video cameras, China has also deployed a face recognition technology in hopes of catching unwanted visitors at the Olympics in Beijing this summer (2008).
Chinese officials are hopeful that it soon will be able to identify individuals out of a moving crowd. While China does have legitimate concerns over watching for Chinese critics and activists as a recent attack killed 16 police officers, Western security experts fear that China is pushing the envelope.
In addition to video surveillance, there are reports of the Chinese Government monitoring and controlling internet access, monitoring hotels and taxis, and employing ordinary citizens as snoops for suspicious behavior.
During the run-up to the Beijing Olympics, a system of monitoring cameras that combined the optical TV scanners with facial recognition software and a database of known terror suspects was initiated.
The system was designed and able to flag people and issue alerts in near real time.
As usual, the PLA in reaching out globally would demand that the technology transfer would include database of known terrorists.
It is unknown how far the transfer of any database would have been allowed. And such merging of data is indispensable to the kind of activity reported by the New York Times by the Chinese counter intelligence services.
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North Korea responded to President Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia and $110 billion arms sales on behalf of Iran with a ballistic missile test.
Coming a week after the last missile test, the medium range ballistic missile is believed to be a solid fueled Pukguksong-2 with a potential range of 1,200-3,000km.
Sent as a proxy message from Iran, all of Saudi Arabia and Yemen, as with parts of NATO members like Germany, Italy, Poland is within range.
DPRK’s message sets the stage for President Trump’s first NATO meeting in Brussels.
At present, North Korean nuclear ballistic missiles are regarded by NATO members except the United States as a non-proliferation nuisance that barely warrant a protest note and perhaps a desultory discussion at a leisurely disarmament conference.
Iran is the primary financial sponsor of DPRK’s missile and nuclear arsenal programs and will be the beneficiary of the technical data and expertise garnered from the tests.
The United States and Canada are no longer the only NATO members threatened by NORK WMDs: When Germany, Italy and Southeastern NATO members like Poland, Turkey, are within range of Iranian-DPRK nuclear missiles, it is indisputably an existential threat to NATO as a whole.
Far from the mind of NATO members, including nuclear armed UK and France, is that extended deterrence may fail given DPRK’s thinking in the historical and martial traditions of Northeast Asia.
North Korean and Iran are in fact an imminent, clear, and present existential threat to NATO members in two ways: First, as an existential threat where thermonuclear ballistic missiles can destroy significant portions of NATO. Second, an existential threat in that North Korea have indisputably and repeatedly demonstrated that they intend to use their nuclear arsenal for the purposes of extortion.
Once the taboo against using nuclear arsenals any other purpose beside deterrence is breached by its use for economic extortion by North Korea under Kim Jong Un, it opens the door for its use for other purposes: e.g. compel adoption of a particular religion, genocide, etc.
In other words, the destruction of Anglo-European values, and with it, the global economic system on a grand scale.
Perhaps NATO officials should have a deep look at how in fact they fit this description as shown by their collective blind eye and refusal to look at, let alone acknowledge the DPRK-Iran nuclear arsenal problem.
President Donald J. Trump brings to the table a unique perspective.
He is probably the only NATO head of state/government that have had a lifetime of experience dealing with extortionists. As a major real estate developer, President Trump have on more than one occasion been “shaken down.” He knows intuitively how much he will tolerate, and at what point, summon the police.
DPRK has a history of and is presently making extortionate demands, e.g. to be paid to halt WMD development and deployment.
Iran was handsomely paid off by the Obama Administration, only to shift their nuclear arsenal and missile development to DPRK with their new found access to tens of billions of cash.
Once paid off, both DPRK and Iran are back at it again unless they get paid more: The classic behavior of an extortionist.
President Trump is now the leader of the world’s police force: A weak, fractious “federal” police force at the UN with no direct military power, and a potentially powerful police force of US, NATO and non-NATO allies.
During the NATO Summit, President Trump has the opportunity to sound the warning about the true character and nature of the DPRK-Iran Axis like Sir Winston Churchill did in November, 1934, when war weary European leaders are obsessed with appeasing that Austrian Corporal.
Sir Winston Churchill’s early warning was ignored until well into late 1930s. By then, it was too late to prevent another world war.
President Trump, by alerting NATO allies to the threat and forging a consensus for collective action, can accelerate the process of fielding a more credible deterrent against DPRK-Iran and others, before it is too late.
The RAF is positioning itself for a triple transition.
The first transition is from the Tornado to Typhoon.
The second is the transition is to a fifth generation enabled air combat force.
The third transition is the deployment of F-35s aboard the new Queen Elizabeth class carriers and shaping their operational integration with land based Typhoons into an air-sea-land combat package.
The weapons revolution is being set into play enabling the capability to shape an integrated offensive-defensive strike force.
And at the heart of this transition are MBDA weapons being acquired through the UK’s Team Complex Weapons approach.
This is an approach which expands the partnership between industry and government whereby the customer can work more closely with industry to shape and drive the needs customized to its force development.
In this case, the customer needs to enable its high end legacy aircraft with an integrated approach to fifth generation enablement.
The first transition is about the Tornado going out of service with the Typhoon subsuming many of its core missions.
And this is being done by modifications to the Typhoon in its cockpit and software and the incorporation of key Tornado weapons, such as Storm Shadow and Brimstone.
This overall transition is referred to by the UK as the Centurion program which is designed to transition Tornado capabilities to the Typhoon by the end of 2018.
The incorporation of Tornado weapons is part of the Phases 2 and 3 Enhancement packages for Typhoon and also includes the introduction of a new missile the Meteor that can be considered to be a new capability being added to the force.
The Meteor adds range and lethality to the Typhoon in terms of its ability to carry out its air superiority missions.
While the incorporation of the Tornado weapons provides for an expanded Typhoon role, the addition of Meteor represents the next step in the weapons revolution enabled by fifth generation aircraft.
The Meteor’s longer range means that forward targeting by F-35s with data sent to Typhoons enables the air combat force to significantly enhance its overall capability to deliver longer range strikes against adversary air forces.
It shifts the consideration from the role Meteor can play on Eurofighter organically, to one whereby Eurofighter is providing strike for the penetrating air combat force enabled by the F-35.
This has already been seen at Red Flag 17-1 one this year.
Discussions with the Aussies, Brits and Americans involved in this year’s high end exercises emphasized that Typhoon’s strike weapons were enabled by targeting data from F-35s operating deeper in the battlespace.
When Meteor is added to Typhoon this means that Typhoons can fire its weapons load against targets identified by the F-35 force at a greater distance because of Meteor with network enabled kill capabilities.
This is the template for weapons to come.
It is about weapons in the force being empowered by forward targeting and decision making by the F-35 which in turn then highlights the importance of high weapons load outs which the Typhoon is designed for.
The Meteor then provides a strike means of much greater range than current US shorter range strike weapons.
In other words, the RAF is preparing itself with its longer-range strike weapons, Storm Shadow and Meteor, to be a core weapons carrier for an F-35 enabled combat force.
And the force is being designed along these lines.
There are other key advantages of the approach as well.
With various European legacy air forces buying Meteor and Storm Shadow, stockpiling of weapons can be enabled to reduce costs and to enhance capabilities at the same time.
With Meteor to fly on multiple European air frames, development costs can be reduced, modernization enhanced and logistical reach enhanced.
This also is a template upon which forces can build.
Both templates – off-boarding of strike and weapons stockpiling across air frames – are key to the next phase of the weapons revolution.
The first will be about building out capabilities from a force which no longer is focused on what the single combat aircraft or its close proximity wing men can deliver but upon what the combat force can deliver enabled by F-35 forward based decision making and target identification.
A glimpse of this future was seen in Red Flag 17-1 one where one RAF pilot asked “Where are our SEAD weapons for Typhoon?
The F-35 identified clearly the targets; but why is it dropping weapons in the SEAD mission?
Why not pass that on to us and we can then fire the long range SEAD weapons against targets identified, selected and ordered up by the F-35s?”
Good question and will be answered by the next phase of the weapons revolution.
Another part of this evolving template was seen in tests earlier this year whereby MADL data (the video data stream which the F-35s use to transfer machine to machine data) was passed to Typhoons.
This development opens up the possibilities of transferring selective targeting video packages to other elements of the combat force.
And this could well see the transfer of another of the Tornado experiences, namely, the role of the weapons officer.
The Tornado has continued to fly for so long with effectiveness largely because of the combination of a weapons officer on board and the arrival of dual seeker Brimstone.
This strike package is a bus containing weapons which are independently directed to their target and managed by the weapons officer onboard Tornado.
Spear 3, a new MBDA weapon, will allow the single cockpit aircraft to use automation to replicate some of this capability.
But the role of the weapons officer could well be transitioned from a platform like Tornado to the combat force itself.
There is no reason that the weapons officer could not be flying on the Wedgetail, or A400M or another aircraft whereby the distributed strike force has embedded in it lower cost weapons which are guided to their targets by a weapons manager supporting the fifth generation enabled strike force.
And this will clearly be the case as the capabilities of the naval surface fleet flow into the air combat force as well.
Clearly, there is no reason weapons from a surface ship could not become part of the strike arsenal of an F-35 enabled air combat force.
RAF Typhoons leaving EOR at JBLE for an Atlantic Trident ’17 vul.
Last year, I discussed this development with a number of UK, Australian and US naval officers and clearly the ultimate meaning of the US Navy’s focus on NIFCA is to enable a JIFCA.
The Navy is working on the integration of several assets to deliver integrated strike but there is no reason that this effort should not break service boundaries and become joint.
The UK is in a good position to do this as their F-35 force will be flown by an integrated team of Air Force and Navy pilots and enabling a carrier strike force.
From Presentation by Captain Walker, Royal Navy, at the Williams Foundation seminar on Air-Sea Integration, August 2016
The opportunity was highlighted in an interview I did with, Rear Admiral Mayer, the Commander of the Australian Fleet, last year in Australia.
Clearly, a key part of the evolution is about shaping a weapons revolution whereby weapons can operate throughout the battlespace hosted by platforms that are empowered by networks tailored to the battlespace.
And that revolution will have its proper impact only if the network and C2 dynamics discussed by Rear Admiral Mayer unfold in the national and coalition forces.
“The limiting factor now is not our platforms; it’s the networks and C2 that hold the potential of those platforms down.
“When the individual platforms actually go into a fight they’re part of an interdependent system, the thing that will dumb down the system will be a network that is not tailored to leverage the potential of the elements, or a network that holds decision authority at a level that is a constraint on timely decision making.
“The network will determine the lethality of our combined system.”
In short, the way the RAF is approaching Typhoon-F-35 integration prioritizes the weapons revolution and network enablement.
This is clearly the way forward for a 21st century air combat force.
And the shift in how integration is done and the reshaping of combat effects was evident in Red Flag 17-1.
With the F-35 in RF17-1, the entire combat force was reconfigured to get maximum advantage from the performance of the other air combat assets.
This reshuffling was driven by the forward operating SA of the F-35 and its ability to make decisions on the fly and to drive appropriate information to informed combat assets to deliver ordinance on target.
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With regard to the RAAF and its participation in Red Flag 2017-1 and the role of Wedgetail, Group Captain Bellingham had this to say about the evolving approach to fifth generation enabled air combat:
Question: I think Red Flag 17-1 is a good example of how we collectively are shaping a way ahead.
In effect, we are seeing the training of a network of operators who can shape high intensity air operations under the impact of fifth generation warfighting concepts.
The technology is crucial; the platforms are important; but it is the training towards where we need to go that is crucial, rather than simply training to the past.
Is that not where your experience with Wedgetail and working with allies comes in?
Group Captain Bellingham: That is a good way to set up the discussion.
I think the strength of everything we’re doing at the moment only comes from a strong cooperation with our allies. Obviously, we’re a tiny force, and our relevance and real strength becomes fully apparent when we tie our capabilities with those of our allies.
At Red Flag 17-1, we saw the US, the UK and Australia blending advanced assets together to make the entire force more lethal and survivable in the high end threat environment.
RAF Typhoons on the ramp with Strike Eaglesat Joint Base Langley-Eustis during Atlantic Trident ’17.
And in a discussion with RAF pilots participating in Red Flag 17-1, the key impact which the F-35 has on the combat force.
“As we introduce the F-35, the pilots have to adjust to the fact that their machines will see and convey data that they themselves are not looking at.
“And different airplanes will have different levels of SA in the battlespace.
“How to adjust the operation of the force to meet this challenge?”
And there are legacy and then legacy aircraft when it comes to the impact of the F-35.
“If you optimize the relationship between fourth and fifth-gen surely you’d have your fourth-gen as out of harm’s way as you could as they are not low observable amongst those things.
“Therefore, you’d want to have onboard the 4th gen aircraft longest-range weapon you could possibly manage and I don’t think a Hornet of any variety is the right platform for that.
“And actually Typhoon, whether it’s by accident or by design, does give you that especially with Meteor.”
And the RAF is moving ahead with F-35 and Typhoon integration on the connectivity level as well.
In the Babel Fish III trial in February 2017, enhanced connectivity was demonstrated.
“During the trial, the Northrop Grumman Airborne Gateway connected the fifth-generation F-35B, which communicates using the stealthy Multifunction Advanced Data Link, and the fourth-generation Typhoon, by translating MADL messages to Link 16 format. Link 16 is the U.S. and NATO military tactical data link used by some military aircraft, ships and ground forces to communicate and exchange tactical data.
The F-35 and the Typhoon can communicate directly via Link 16 but previously could not communicate or share certain fifth-generation information.”
Andrew Tyler, chief executive, Northrop Grumman Europe said:
“Being able to network sensor data between fifth-generation and fourth-generation fast-jets and other battlespace assets in a stealthy manner is critically important to enabling the full capability offered by fifth-generation aircraft.
We are pleased to have played our part in this successful trial, the output of which will help the MOD to broaden its understanding of the effect that can be generated by its fifth-generation combat-air fleet.”
Air Commodore Linc Taylor Senior Responsible Owner for the UK’s F-35 Programme said:
“I have been enormously impressed both by the collegiate effort to make the Babel Fish III trial happen so successfully, and the specific outcomes of the trial.
This marks another great step forward in interoperability between our fourth- and fifth- generation aircraft, putting the RAF at the forefront of this work. We plan to continue to understand and develop where the most capability and interoperability benefit lies through a series of future trials along similar lines.”
According to the company:
“Bridging this fifth-to-fourth generation platform interoperability gap was made possible by the inclusion of a Northrop Grumman Freedom 550™ software-defined radio in the Airborne Gateway.
The Freedom 550™ is derived from the integrated communications, navigation and identification avionics suite the company developed and manufactures for the F-35; it was validated under the Jetpack Joint Capability Technology Demonstration programme, an effort sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S. Air Force that concluded in 2014.
Northrop Grumman’s Airborne Gateway translates and relays information from various sources across diverse platforms and domains to enhance interoperability, situational awareness, communications and coordination for warfighters in the air, on the ground and at sea. The system is derived from the combat-proven airborne communications node that Northrop Grumman provides to the U.S. Air Force.”
F-35 aircraft have also successfully passed target data off to Typhoon jets who then successfully engaged the target during Exercise Red Flag.
The F-35 is designed to share what it sees with legacy aircraft.
The US Air Force state that the lethality of the aircraft comes from ‘a combination of stealth, electronic attack, information sharing, and other features make the platform an invaluable part of a modern air-strike package.’
Col. George Watkins, 34th Fighter Squadron commander said:
“Our strength with the F-35 has been finding the threats.
We use our onboard system to geo-locate and get a picture of the target, day or night, through the weather. We pass that threat information to others while using our stealth capability. We can get a lot closer to the advanced threat than anyone else can get.
That allows us to target them out and take out critical assets.”
Lt. Col. Dave DeAngelis, F-35 pilot and commander of the 419th Operations Group said:
“During one scenario, the Airmen were given a general location by advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft. The F-35s were tasked with finding a convoy carrying a high-value target.
The F-35s advanced targeting capabilities were able to pinpoint the convoy’s location. They then communicated that to British Typhoon fighters who took out the target.
The thing that’s great about having Link 16 and MADL onboard and the sensor fusion is the amount of situational awareness the pilot has.
“I’m able to directly communicate with specific formations and I can see the whole war, and where all the other players are, from a God’s-eye view.
“That makes me a lot more effective because I know who to talk with and at what times, over the secure voice.”
The F-35 uses the Link 16 secure architecture to communicate with fourth-generation aircraft in the Red Flag fight and combined with the Multifunction Advanced Data Link, which allows pilots to see the battlespace and share that data with other F-35 pilots.
Using the F-35 as a broad area sensor can also significantly increase a warships ability to detect, track and engage a target.
An unmodified US Marine Corps F-35B from the Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron, based in Edwards Air Force Base, acted as an elevated sensor to detect an over-the-horizon threat.
The aircraft then sent data through its Multi-Function Advanced Data Link to a ground station connected to USS Desert Ship, a land-based launch facility designed to simulate a ship at sea.
Using the latest Aegis Weapon System Baseline 9.C1 and a Standard Missile 6, the system successfully detected and engaged the target.
The exercise was the first live fire missile event that successfully demonstrated the integration of the F-35 to support Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air and represent a very promising exploration into the interoperability of the F-35B with other naval assets.
The F-35 will drastically increase the situational awareness of the forces with which it will deploy and for the UK, where deployed numbers may be a concern, it represents a fantastic way to enhance combat capability in any coalition or national effort.
Editor’s Note: The photos of Typhoon at Red Flag 17-1 are credited to the RAF.
President Trump has come to power at a time when a very flexible force able to insert from the sea and rapidly return to the sea has emerged.
This USN-USMC capability has migrated beyond the classic Amphibious Ready Group-Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG-MEU) into a very flexible and lethal amphibious task force.
The evolving Marine Corps aviation assets, coupled with the reshaping of Marine Corps concepts of operations for conducting force insertion from the sea, are shaping a new capability and within that capability unmanned aerial assets are playing a key role.
One of the key architects of the Marine aviation revolution has been Lt. General (Retired) Trautman.
During his tenure as Deputy Commandant for Aviation, the Osprey began its first deployments to the Middle East, the H-1 Venom and Viper were introduced to the Fleet and the F-35B was coming to its initial fruition.
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With the continued development of the CH-53E into the K and the addition of unmanned aviation, the mix of flying assets that would work with the Ground Combat Element to shape new MEU capabilities was put into motion.
I had a chance recently to talk with Lt. General (Retired) Trautman about the unmanned element and its role in the evolving way ahead for Marine Corps transformation.
Question: The UAVs going on ships now really had their origin in the land wars.
How did the process get started?
Lt. General (Retired) Trautman: It goes back to the time General Jim Conway was in Iraq with the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and he found a little company that was making the Scan Eagle UAV.
Believe it or not, the Scan Eagle was being used for the Albacore fishing fleets up in the Pacific Northwest at the time.
In other words, Scan Eagle has a shipboard legacy already built right into it.
But, the Marines evolved the Scan Eagle principally as an asset for land based operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
And, in recent years with the focus placed on returning to the sea it became obvious that a similar capability on board our amphibious task force would be quite useful.
That is what led us to make the selection of the RQ-21 Blackjack which is now deploying on our Marine Expeditionary Units and by all accounts it is doing quite well so far.
Question: It is very challenging to operate unmanned air systems onboard ships and could you discuss those challenges?
Lt. General (Retired) Trautman: Many people who have not spent a lot of time at sea really don’t grasp the inherent challenges that you have when you launch and recover from a sea base.
The Marines over the years, along with their partners in the US Navy, have built an aviation force that’s quite credible from the sea. F-35Bs, MV-22s, H-1s and the evolving CH-53K all come into the force at a very important time as our nation evolves into a better understanding of the value and proper use of the amphibious task force.
In parallel with those developments, we must figure out how to take advantage of unmanned aerial systems.
As we do that operationally, we at the same time have to experiment and learn and use systems from the sea in ways that cause us to understand what new systems we should procure in the coming decade as well.
In other words, the foundation for the future is being built with our experience on board our amphibious ships today as the new aviation assets marry up with the unmanned systems onboard our ships.
Question: And having the UASs onboard allows the Marine Corps commanders to sort out how best to use those assets in operations as well. How might they do that?
Lt. General (Retired) Trautman: If I’m a task force commander and I’m deployed somewhere around the globe, I want to be prepared to conduct operations at a moment’s notice when the mission dictates.
I also want to have the flexibility to conduct all of my sorties from the sea or if necessary transition to an expeditionary land base for short duration operations that make an impact on the enemy before quickly returning to sea.
I want unmanned aerial systems that enable me to do whatever I need to do in order to accomplish the mission.
That means I need range, speed, endurance, the ability to take off and land vertically, a wide range of payloads, non-proprietary payload “hooks,” and the best Size, Weight and Power (SWAP) advantage I can attain.
To do that, you have to think long and hard about the types of capabilities that you wish to procure.
Whether it’s classic UAS capabilities like intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, the delivery of precision weapons, or electronic warfare, there are a whole host of missions that unmanned systems can do with the right payloads.
The key is to have those systems with me, use them and determine how to get the most effective use from them in the widely varied operations that an amphibious task force will pursue.
Question: When you were DCA you worked the decision to sunset the Prowler electronic warfare aircraft.
That clearly has an impact on the payloads which you want to have on a UAS as well?
Lt. General (Retired) Trautman: It does.
We made the decision in 2009 to sunset the Prowler a decade out in 2019.
We did that with our eyes wide open knowing that the F-35B would be coming into the force in a more robust way by that time.
There are inherent electronic warfare capabilities resident in the F-35 but our vision also included the need for unmanned aerial systems to proliferate in the battle space to round out the electronic warfare requirements that the force will have.
We’re in our infancy right now in developing those capabilities, but the first step in achieving something is to get started, and to put the capabilities in the hands of young men and women who are in the force and then evolve the capability in a way that makes sense.
I’m confident that we are on that trajectory with our unmanned aerial systems and the payloads that we will develop for those systems in the next few years.
Question: And the experience being gained now and in the next decade will clearly shape the way ahead not only for the amphibious task force but for the unmanned element. In other words, the approach is to experiment by operational use.
What happens next?
Lt. General (Retired) Trautman: The current Deputy Commandant for Aviation has been very prescient in laying out a requirement for a program called MUX (MAGTF Unmanned eXpeditionary UAS) which the current aviation plan says will be ready for initial operations in the 2025 time frame.
That platform, whatever it becomes, should have the capability to take off and land from the sea base, to take off and land from an expeditionary operating location ashore and deliver long range relatively high speed service to the fleet so that you can use that range and speed to your advantage.
It should also come in with adequate power and non-proprietary “hooks” so that future users can employ whatever payloads make the best sense for the force as it evolves.
This is a very exciting time for the development of unmanned systems in support of the amphibious task force and the Marine Corps.
Editor’s Note: The photos and videos highlight Blackjack training aboard the USS San Diego with the 15th MEU.
The Marines refined their launch and recovery procedures of the RQ-21A Blackjack during COMPTUEX in order to provide reconnaissance for the planning and execution of future missions.
Through a high degree of unit training, the 15th MEU forms a flexible sea-based Marine Air-Ground Task Force capable of mobilizing personnel and equipment to any corner of the globe.
For Todd Miller’s look at the preparation of the 15th MEU see the following:
The question of DPRK’s motives for acquiring a nuclear arsenal is central to the current debate about international security.
Motives are ephemeral constructs that are difficult to assess. To wit, historians are still debating the motives of leaders of Germany, Japan, Britain, France, and US as to why they entered WWII.
But without an effort to understand DPRK’s motives, it is impossible to craft a viable set of policies.
Coming just 10 days before the NATO head of state summit meeting, DPRK’s test of an intermediate range Hwasong-12 missile on May 14 was a landmark event that indisputably demonstrated their ability to reach targets within 4,500km. The technical ramifications of this test of a single stage missile based on an indigenously developed engine quantitatively and qualitatively increased the credibility of the North Korean threat.
Studies of the long term behavior of DPRK over decades their behavior across a range of issues ranging from formal DPRK involvement recently in robbing central banks, narcotics manufacture and smuggling, kidnapping of foreign nationals abroad, targeted killings, counterfeit currency printing and distribution, arms exports, missile proliferation, nuclear weapons exports, cyber extortion, and sensitive material exports show the genetic code of the regime see nothing beyond them historically and right up to the present.
DPRK behavior – the long term, sustained and widespread, formal use of military capabilities – for the purpose of extortion by a government that is not a failed state has no precedence in modern history since 1945.
Extortion is the use of force or threat of force to obtain money, property. It is fundamentally and legally distinct from blackmail. (Bracken, 2017). Nuclear blackmail has precedence with Israel’s threat to use nuclear weapons unless they received urgent conventional arms aid during the Yom Kippur War.
Nuclear extortion has no known precedence EXCEPT DPRK.
Reviewing the regime long historical evidence of DPRK behavior, when set in the context of the history and traditions of Northeast Asia, it is as obvious as night and day to all but the priesthood of Korean “handlers” and “arms control advocates” that motives for North Korea’s WMD, Missile, and Nuclear Weapons program since 2011 materially changed.
DPRK’s nuclear arsenal program being explicitly motivated by extortion and economic gain — rather than regime survival like every other nuclear weapons state is alien to the North Korean analyst priesthood.
If we assume that DPRK did not make enormous sacrifices internally to fund their accelerated nuclear arsenal programs (as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said, “Eat Grass”), and we take seriously the indisputable evidence of an INCREASE in the standard of living in DPRK under Kim Jong Un — particularly for the military and security elite in and around Pyongyang, then money had to have come from somewhere.
The question is where?
The default explanation is a significant and material injection of economic resources at least in the USD billions range into DPRK must have happened somehow since about 2013. It is hard to believe that Pakistan, jihadists, Syria, or non-state actors would so fund DPRK at this level. Or that funds of this scale could have been raised by traditional DPRK state sponsored criminal and other enterprises (e.g. North Korean restaurants abroad).
It could have been raised by being a major player in the global narcotics trade, but we are seeing no signs of such mass movements of physical commodities, be it product or cash). There had to be wealthy patrons that most likely, are a middle power state or parts of such a state that have the capacity for such wealth transfers.
Likewise, the “product” or “service” sold by DPRK must be of such a nature as to be readily exportable because it is small, compact, easy to smuggle — like data from simulations and drawings on a flash card.
Nuclear arsenal and missile technology fits this bill nearly perfectly as a sanction buster.
Few in the arms control community have recognized that circa 2014, when the US began to lift sanctions on Iran and enabled them to access USD tens of billions of wealth was, curiously, directly correlated with DPRK acquiring state of the art tooling, equipment, and systems to forward their weapons programs.
And to conduct a series of expensive tests despite the tightening of sanctions.
DPRK motives for acquisition of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and WMDs do not conform to previous nuclear arsenal states. If DPRK’s motives under Kim Jong Un was solely an “insurance policy” against existential threats to the regime, that goal could have been achieved with a modest, but credible nuclear arsenal similar to what Israel or Pakistan developed.
Neither went the next step to developing long range MRBM or ICBMs.
What are the economic & political impetus then?
Sometime after Kim Jong Un assumed power in 2012, North Korea’s behavior, posture, and pattern changed abruptly. Economic reforms that were long stalled by Kim Jong Il was revived, resulted in an explosion of state capitalism similar to what the southern Chinese provinces experienced circa 1978.
Prior “opening” reforms under Kim Jong Il was ad hoc responses to the famine and hardships brought about in the 1990s by the collapse of their Soviet patrons and the unwillingness of Beijing-China to continually expand subsidies.
After Kim Jong Un consolidated power, these initiatives have become a more or less permanent feature — with concomitant benefits no different than the explosion of wealth and incomes seen in PRC, Russia and former Soviet Republics, and everywhere communist regimes based on the early 20th Century model abandoned tightly controlled central planning and severe limits on private enterprise.
Today, the image of a starving, Stalinist DPRK of 1994-98 that staggered under sanctions is no more appropriate than an image of Shenzhen, PRC in 1984 at the height of the Cultural Revolution in 1967.
What are the political consequences of the Kim Jong Un economic reforms?
For one, it accelerated the loss of formal control over the regime as officials from top to bottom discovered that their position and power translates into rent-seeking opportunities. That be the case whether it is the border guards that took a fee for letting goods through (both exporting and importing), to the officials that control people, facilities, resources, knowhow, etc. who all of a sudden, are free to flog their resources to anyone willing to pay them or work with them (aka joint venture). P
RC managed this very same transition with the PLA/N going into business for themselves.
That be the case whether it is the setting up of factories in DPRK that are “contractors” for firms in PRC, who are in turn, selling the goods worldwide, or the export of DPRK labor (a traditional cash earner for the regime). Such opportunities, however, are not evenly distributed throughout the DPRK regime.
What about the sectors that are left behind?
The largest and most critical sectors that are left behind are the military and security forces (beside the party and government) upon which Kim Jong Un depend on for his grip on power. The opening up that saw wealth flow to other (formerly less influential officials like border guards and managers of run-on-the-mill state owned enterprises) at the expense of the bureaucracy and military.
Where have we seen this before?
This is virtually a cookie cutter description of what happened in PRC circa 1989 just prior to Tiananmen, when the opening of the economy and inflationary pressures brought on by new found wealth impoverished the traditional privileged class of senior officials who did not have rent seeking opportunities.
Recall that the proximate cause of Tiananmen protests was students who’s elite, privileged parents got them into the most prestigious institution in PRC after they themselves survived grueling exams discovered that, a) they were not getting what they expected in cushy jobs in the bureaucracy; b) even if they did, inflation made the “iron rice bowl job” reward nominal; c) “lesser” people who did not have their connections and paper qualifications are surpassing them in opportunities and outcomes.
The upending of the established pathway to wealth, power, and success by economic reforms in PRC nearly collapsed the regime. It was fortuitous that when the PLA was called to restore order in Beijing, they obeyed and the regime survived.
Kim Jong Un’s DPRK no doubt saw this direct parallel. His father, for the same reasons, resisted economic reforms for these reasons to the very end.
But Kim Join Un is different.
He was Swiss educated in one of the wealthiest countries in the world, where he is exposed to wealth and riches that are unimaginable in DPRK for all but the elite ruling clans. He more likely have some language abilities beyond Korean, possibly English, French, or German. What’s more, as a member of the ruling elite, he had first-hand experience and access to the explosion of electronics, games, communications, and outside influences well before he assumed leadership of the Dynasty.
Kim Jong Un, like his assassinated brother, had no illusions as to how backward and perilous the regime he inherited was and is.
Economic reforms by Kim brought not just newfound riches but also political problems in a Stalinist system. Wealth are expressed in many different ways, from more freedom, more (and deeper) penetration of knowledge about the outside world and culture into DPRK. As recently as 2005, it was a big deal and the height of luxury to have access to old (obsolete / junked) Video Cassette Recorders (VCRs) to be imported from China and Japan, with tapes of South Korean shows smuggled in.
Today, that is largely displaced by the smuggling of portable media players, content on flash memory sticks and SD cards. A significant portion of the population is well within broadcast range for cell phone and data transmissions, let alone other broadcasts, and have easy access to the means to receive and enjoy such “forbidden” content such as the latest K-Pop shows.
No doubt illicit wireless repeaters easily sourced from China have extended the reach of South Korean, PRC, Japanese, and Russian wireless to much of DPRK. DPRK, as of 2011, is no longer a “Hermit Kingdom”.
The greater concern faced by the Kim Jong Un regime is that such opening up not only create new wealth and centers of power outside of the formal state system, but it places the DPRK regime in direct competition with the new “private” enterprises and the couture of state capitalist officials being enriched by new opportunities.
Each of these are a potential threat to his power and regime.
Regime stalwarts in the military, security services and government have to be adequately compensated beyond what can be extracted in monopoly rents or taxes from the economy. Otherwise, Kim Jong Un’s DPRK risk a Tiananmen. The old days of Kim Jong Il when scarce foreign products like imported brandy etc. served as an adequate bribe is over.
Kim Jong Un had to do better, and fast.
KCNA extensively cataloged how Kim Jong Un did inspection tours of facilities once he assumed and consolidated power. Western trained analysts often laughed at these events as crass propaganda exercises of Kim being taken to Potemkin Villages as his father was for decades. But what if there is more to this?
A look at the propaganda and how it changed revealed how Kim initially inspected the standard KWP showcases that made food, etc. and then moving to him inspecting military units. Standard socialist fare until 2013.
A very telling tale was how Kim Jong Un visited a Missile Factory in 2013 and “angrily demanded” that the plant be updated with state-of-the-art robotics, CNC machines, etc. which was promptly done, resulting in a precision metals manufacturing capability that is more than adequate for their missile programs that was evident during his next inspection. It would be farcical to presume that the young Kim would not have the wherewithal and language skills to access the web to see published photos and catalogs of advanced manufacturing facilities of manufacturers like Samsung.
Or to think that the Swiss educated Kim could not recall how a tiny country manufactured a range of ultra-high tech goods and services.
Kim recognize that DPRK economy inherited from his father is well behind the times. And he had the capacity to look, see by just consulting material found on the internet.
Turning to the next problem beyond the absolute priority of holding onto power. Sanctions notwithstanding, if DPRK is to spend on importing high tech equipment, training, expertise, and development, however, must realize a profit in some way shape or form so as to provide rewards and maintain the loyalty of Kim’s power bases.
While no public estimate is available, clearly, the DPRK missile and nuclear programs must have had significant costs at least since Kim’s reign.
In the modern history of costly (and relatively unusable) weapons development programs like ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons by all but the wealthiest, largest nations, financing and funding these programs have proven to be a budget busting burden.
Thus, it is not a surprise that strategic cost sharing partners are sought after.
Is it even plausible that DPRK can undertake such programs without a clear, substantial profit motive and pathway to riches?
DPRK motives for acquiring a credible nuclear arsenal with the capacity to strike anywhere in the world (including the United States and Western Europe) is both current profit (paid by regimes like Iran) that is essential for rewarding the regime loyalists, and almost certainly with that, for purposes of extortion in the future against any and all states.
It changes our calculus as to what is likely to be an acceptable outcome to DPRK if the US and Allies do not develop a viable military option.
Clearly, de-nuclearization in any way, shape or form is off the table for DPRK.
Can DPRK stop at just developing a nuclear arsenal?
What to do when clients like Iran are no longer willing to pay billions for nuclear weapons and missiles from DPRK?
What will they sell then?
What will the Kim Jong Un regime do to bring in cash for the next round?
To see the dangers from DPRK and what policy options must be acquired, we must speculate as to what his next move will be.
If Kim Jong Un failed to raise the living standards of his core power base, he is history.
The question is how?
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RAF Typhoons leaving EOR at JBLE for an Atlantic Trident ’17 vul.
From Presentation by Captain Walker, Royal Navy, at the Williams Foundation seminar on Air-Sea Integration, August 2016
RAF Typhoons on the ramp with Strike Eaglesat Joint Base Langley-Eustis during Atlantic Trident ’17.
