2016-11-25 By CAPT. Paul E. Mawn, USN (Ret.),

The US Air Force and Naval Aviation owe a generally unacknowledged debt of gratitude to Ivy League Colleges, and Harvard in particular, for their key role in the initial development of US military aviation and combat fighter pilots.

In the years leading up to 1903, Professor Samuel Langley of the Harvard College Observatory and later the US Naval Academy had failed to achieve powered flight; after thousands of glider flights, Otto Lillenthal was killed in the air; a Russian admiral also failed; and the possibly successful work of Gustave Whitehead (originally Weisskopf) was little known and doubted.

Then two unknown amateurs, brothers who owned a bicycle shop in Dayton, Ohio, electrified the world by demonstrating that powered, heavier-than-air flight from a level take-off was possible.

At once there was an almost magical attraction to this exciting, but extremely dangerous, adventure; and it especially appealed to many young men in the elite colleges during the first years of flight.

War Clouds on the Horizon.

We all know that the US Air Force evolved from the US Army Air Corps after World War II and that its creation was preceded by the aero squadrons of the US Army Signal Corps during World War I.

The initial combat foundation for Navy and Marine Corps “airdales” (i.e. aviators) was the Northern Bomber Group in World War I, initially based in the UK and later in France.

However, prior to these developments, it was the graduates of Ivy League Colleges – not West Point or Annapolis- who were the initial airborne pillars of US national security.

As World War I began in Europe, it was clear that aircraft would be involved in large numbers and in varied roles.

First, they were used for reconnaissance, observation of enemy movements, photography, then bombing, for ground attacks, and eventually aerial combat.

Following the start of World War I in August 1914, the war clouds on the European horizon motivated over 565 adventurous young men in the United States to volunteer to serve as military aviators for the British and French of which over 11% were Harvard alumni.

At that time there were several undergraduates and alumni from Harvard and a few other Ivy League colleges who wanted to fly military aeroplanes (as they were then called) among whom were several qualified pilots and members of the college aero clubs who had regular access to their own or club aircraft.

As a result, the US instantly had several squadrons of trained pilots with combat experience after entering the war in April 1917, of few were from the US Military Academy or the Naval Academy.

Prior to the US entry into World War I in April 1917, the surest way for current and prospective US aviators to join the fight was to cross the Atlantic Ocean by steamship to France and enlist into the French Foreign Legion.

As most of us know, federal law prohibits US citizens from joining foreign militaries and that may lead to the loss of their US citizenship.

However, service in French Foreign Legion by US citizens was specifically permitted by the US government.

Since Canada hardly had any Air Force in 1914, flying for Canada was not a viable option, and most Canadians who wished to fly operationally joined the Britain’s Royal Flying Corps or its Royal Naval Air Service (later consolidated in 1918 as the Royal Air Force).

By the end of the World War I, about 25% of the RAF pilots were Canadians.

By final tallies, the Brits eventually developed a formidable air force starting initially with only 36 aircraft to over 3,000 planes before the cessation of hostilities in 1918.

It was understood that Americans might join the RFC by going to Canada to enlist, but with the risk of the potential loss of their US citizenship.

It may be noted that this prohibition of foreign military service by US citizens has rarely been enforced except during World War II for those who joined the Axis Powers.

A further limit on the opportunity of Americans to join British flying formations during World War I, was the fact that the RFC was able to draw the majority of its pilots from the United Kingdom and Commonwealth countries, especially Canada and Australia, and this pool of qualified personnel limited possibilities for Americans.

Having said this, some American pilots found their way into RFC service.

The other option was France, which had significantly more planes and aero squadrons at the start of and during World War 1 than the British, and the French organization therefore required many more foreign pilots than the RFC.

Thus, in spite of language issues, the French welcomed American volunteers with open arms since they lacked a substantial flow of colonial volunteers with aviation experience.

The French Connection

After successfully completing the French Foreign Legion boot camp in Marseilles, those adventurous Ivy League heroes could petition their French chain of command to send them to one of the flight schools of the French Air Service (i.e., Armée de l’Air), especially since many of them were already qualified pilots.

An interesting and little noted aspect of this effort, were the financial subsidies provided US volunteers who wished to fight for the French via the French Foreign Legion from US industrialists including William Vanderbilt, who was a Harvard alumnus and future Naval officer, and John Pierpont Morgan whose grandson was a Harvard graduate as well as a future aviator and Medal of Honor recipient.

Sous Lt. Norman Prince-Armée de l’Air: Among the first American pilots in the Armée de l’Air was Norman Prince who was from an old Yankee family on the Massachusetts North Shore and graduated from Harvard College in 1908 and Harvard Law School in 1911. While at HLS, he also took flight training under an alias and became the 55th American to be licensed to fly an aeroplane by the Aero Club of America. After practicing law for 3 years in Chicago, Prince crossed the Atlantic by ship and enlisted in French Foreign Legion.

After completing FFL boot camp in Marseille, he convinced the French to send him to flight school because he was a licensed pilot, fluent in French and for the additional reason that his family owned an estate in France. Prince served in 2 French aero squadrons (VB 108 & 113).

He then noticed that there were many Americans pilots serving in various French Squadrons. Using his lawyerly skills, he persuaded the French authorities of the many benefits of assigning all Americans in the same squadron.

This proposal was approved and resulted in the formation of the “American Escadrille” (i.e. French for squadron) which was later changed to the “Lafayette Escadrille” after pressure from Germany since the US was neutral at the time.

Prince was later promoted to the grade of sergeant and flew 122 aerial combat engagements. He was designated an “Ace” since he was officially credited with shooting down 5 enemy planes, and his record included 4 more unconfirmed kills.

On 12 October 1916 Prince flew as an escort for a bombing raid on the Mauser rifle works at Oberndorf, Germany, during which he shot down an enemy plane. Returning to base, his landing wheels hit telegraph cables near his air base and his plane flipped over and crashed. Prince was severely injured. He died three days later.

On his death bed he was promoted to sous lieutenant and awarded the Legion d’Honneur.

Previously, Prince had also been awarded the Médaille Militaire as well as the Croix de Guerre the French government.

The French Formations

Initially there were 38 pilots in the “Lafayette Escadrille” (also known as SP# 124) who, on average, had the following characteristics.

They were approximately 26 years old, 23 were from the eastern part of the United States, 30 were college graduates, 11 were the sons of millionaires, 9 had attended Harvard College, 9 had qualified as pilots before joining the French Foreign Legion, but none were graduates of the US Military or Naval Academy. The squadron pets were 2 young lions named “Whiskey and Soda”.

Prior to April of 1917 when the US declared war, the flow of US volunteers trained and qualified as pilots in the French Air Force exceeded the need of the “Lafayette Escadrille” and the surplus was sent to other French aero squadrons which along with “Lafayette Escadrille” became part of the “Lafayette Flying Corps”.

That formation included an additional 170 American aviators. In total, over 265 American served as a under the French Aéronautique Militaire, including 57 who were not in the “Lafayette Flying Corps”. With the US entry into the War and mounting British casualties, more Americans found their way into British formations.

Therefore, to the number who served with the French there must be added the approximately 300 Americans who ultimately served and were trained as pilots with the RFC.

Among the 28 American Aces of World War I, 22 flew with the RFC.

Of all the Aces, 13(or 46%) were Harvard alumni.

Harvard ROTC

Besides Sous Lt. Prince, other notable Harvard members of the “Lafayette Escadrille” included a significant number of aviators who are indicated in the graphic at the end of this article.

A mere glance at this list will suffice to indicate the importance of the contribution to World War I military aviation – and the scope of the sacrifices of Harvard alumni and their families.

As a Harvard alumnus, I have been concerned that the military and patriotic history of this great institution of learning should not be completely lost or fade into the unread footnotes of its history.

It is not generally known that 18 Harvard alumni have been awarded the Medal of Honor, including one aviator who served in both World Wars.

Only West Point and the Naval Academy alumni have received a higher total of this highest award for valor.

In a work of progress, at least 127 alumni of Harvard are known to have been awarded the 2nd highest valor award (i.e. the Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross or Air Force Cross) for extreme gallantry of which 49 were aviators.

The highest award for valor conferred by France is the Legion d’Honneur which was established by Napoleon and has been awarded to at least 21 Harvard alumni, including 5 aviators. Over 98 Silver Star Medals have been awarded to Harvard alumni, including 49 aviators, for extraordinary heroism in military operations against an enemy of the US.

In addition during World War I, 13 Harvard alumni were Aces which are often considered to have merited the Silver Star had it had existed at that time. From World War I through the Vietnam War, a total of 1,352 Harvard alumni of all military branches and designations made the supreme sacrifice in the military service of our country.

As noted on the walls of Memorial Church in the Harvard Yard, “While a bright future beckoned, they freely gave their lives and fondest hopes for us and our allies that we might learn from them courage in peace to spend our lives making a better world for others.”

 

 

Capt. James N. Hall USA (H-11) – Distinguished Service Cross, Legion d’Honneur, POW twice & 3 kills;

1st Lt. Walter Lovell USA (H-05) – Croix de Guerre; Sergeant Harold Willis Armée de l’Air (H-08) Shot down & POW but escaped in 6 months – Croix de Guerre; Sergeant Victor Chapman Armée de l’Air (H-13) – Killed in action; Lt. Charles Bassett USN (H-17) later attached to RAF – Navy Cross; Major Charles Bassett Jr. USAAC (H-17) – Navy Cross, USN in WWI & USAAC in WWII;1st Lt. Hugh Bridgman USA (H-19) – later to 49th Aero Squadron & 1 confirmed kill; 1st Lt. David Putnam USA (H-20) – Distinguished Service Cross, “Ace of Aces” (20 kills -14 confirmed) – killed in action; Colonel Raynal Bolling US A (H-00) – Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit & Legion d’Honneur – killed in action; Captain Leonard Hammond USA (H-01) 91st Aero Squad.– Distinguished Service Cross & Ace with 6 kills; Major Stephen Noyes USA (H-03) 1st Aero Squadron – Distinguished Service Cross; Lt. (j.g.) Ralph Loomis USN (H-08) Lafayette Flying Corps & Northern Bombing Group) – Navy Cross; Captain Charles Biddle USA (H-14) Lafayette Flying Corps & 103rd Aero Squad.–Distinguished Service Cross & Ace with 8 kills; 1st Lt. Charles Plummer USA (H-14) Lafayette Flying Corps & 88thAero Squad.–Distinguished Service Cross – killed in action; Major Lloyd Hamilton USA (H-16) 17thAero Squad.–Distinguished Service Cross & Ace with 8 kills – killed in action; Lt. (j.g.) David Judd USN (H-16) Lafayette Flying Corps & Northern Bombing Group – Navy Cross; Captain Ralph Bagby USA (H-16) 88th Aero Squadron – Distinguished Service Cross; Lt. Charles Gray Little USN (H-16) Naval Dirigible Squadron – Navy Cross; Lt. David Morgan US Navy (H-16) Northern Bombing Group – Navy Cross; 1st Lt. Thomas Abemethy USA (H-17) 147th Aero Squadron – Distinguished Service Cross; 1st Lt. Arthur Alexander USA (H-17) 96th Aero Squadron & 1st Day Bombardment –Distinguished Service Cross; 1st Lt. Walter Avery USA (H-17) 95th Aero Squadron – Distinguished Service Cross; Captain John Mitchell USA (H-17) 95th Aero Squadron – Distinguished Service Cross; Captain Doug Campbell USA (H-17) 94th Aero Squadron – 5 Distinguished Service Crosses & Ace with 6 kills; Lt. (j.g.) George Roe USN (H-17) (attached to: Royal Naval Air Service) – Navy Cross & POW for 7 months; 1st Lt. William Taylor USA (H-17) 6th Balloon Company – Distinguished Service Cross; Lt. (j.g.) Alfred Gardner (H-18 ) USN (attached to: Royal Naval Air Service) – Navy Cross; Captain James Knowles Jr. (H-18 ) USA 95th Aero Squadron – Distinguished Service Cross & Ace with 5 kills; Captain John Lambert USA (H-18) 91st Aero Squadron – Distinguished Service Cross; 1st Lt. Chester Wright (H-18) USA 93rd Aero Squadron – Distinguished Service Cross & Ace with 8 kills; Lt. (j.g.) Addison Center Burnham Jr. (H-19) USN Naval Dirigible Squadron – Navy Cross; Capt. Hamilton Coolidge USA (H-19) 94th Aero Squad. – Distinguished Service Cross & Ace with 8 kills – killed in action; Lt. (j.g.) William Gaston USN (H-19) Northern Bombing Squadron – Navy Cross; Lt. (j.g.) Charles Edward Hodges Jr. USN (H-19) 5th Squadron USMC – Navy Cross; Major General Pierpont M. Hamilton (H-20) USAF (WW1& WWII – AAC & then USAF) – Medal of Honor; Capt. Sumner Sewall USA (H-20) 95th Aero Squad. –2 Distinguished Service Crosses & Ace with 8 kills; Major Charles Biddle USA (HLS-14) “LFC”& 13th Aero Squad. – Distinguished Service Cross & Ace with 8 kills; Major Benjamin Harwood USA (HLS-17) 12th Aero Squadron – Distinguished Service Cross; Ensign Albert Dillon Sturtevant USN (HLS-17) (attached to: Royal Naval Air Service) – Navy Cross – killed in action; 1st Lt. Donald G. Graham USA (HLS-17) Air HQ – AEF – Distinguished Service Cross (WW1 & WWII service); 1st Lt. Howard Knotts USA (HLS-21) 17th Pursuit Squadron – Distinguished Service Cross; Rear Admiral David S. Ingalls USN Northern Bombing Group–Distinguished Service Medal (WW1 & WWII service); 1st Lt. Lloyd Andrews Hamilton USA “RFC” & 17th Aero Squadron – Distinguished Service Cross – killed in action. Many detailed biographies and pictures of these aviation pioneers and heroes may be found in the article Crimson Aviators at www.advocatesforharvardrotc.org/Harvard.

For one of the best explanations of the development of military aviation during the first world war, see the video below:

2016-11-23 By Danny Lam

Americans have a long history of not seeing the trees for the forest when it comes to East Asia.

During the Korean war, UN forces were amazed by the human wave assaults by Chinese troops and implicitly presumed that the PRC had endless reserves of manpower based on its population even as     General Ridgeway’s strategy of using massed firepower dulled the offensives and ultimately, enabled UN forces to pursue peace talks based on status quo ante bellum.

Little noticed was that human wave attacks by Chinese troops were mostly former soldiers for the KMT regime that the CCP regarded as disloyal and security risks.   Incoming dynasties customarily disposed of troops loyal to former regimes by making them front line troops.   The CCP tasked them to invade Taiwan, be PVA in Korea, or otherwise deployed on frontier adventures.

When that supply ran low and the CCP began to have to use the much smaller cadres of trusted communist PLA troops, CCP enthusiasm for the war dwindled very quickly.

Incidents that devastated the morale of Mao Tse-Tung and members of the ruling circle escaped notice in the west. For example, Mao Anying, the elder surviving (and only fit) son of Mao Tse-tung who was killed in Korea on November 25, 1950 by an UN Airstrike in a supposedly safe rear area was not well recognized and exploited.

Had PVA command and control nodes that are staffed by loyal CCP cadres with ties to high ranking officials been specifically targeted, it would disproportionately impacted regime behavior.

The weakness of detailed local knowledge has hindered US policy toward China in general, resulting missed opportunities.

Detailed knowledge of familial, clan, provincial, ethnic, linguistic and other ties is what is needed to understand Chinese signals and meanings and to dissect local from so called national interests.

When President Xi Jinping told President Elect Trump by phone, “facts have shown that cooperation is the only correct choice”, it could be interpreted in at least two ways:

Pleading for cooperation as opposed to conflict between the between United States and the People’s Republic of China;  or, Preserving a monopoly by Beijing on relations with the United States.

It follows from this that President Xi is pleading for is for the Trump Administration to not bypass Beijing on key issues and to endorse the CCP/PRC monopoly of power that, de facto, it may or may not have.

In Western diplomacy, acceptance of a recognized regime’s monopoly on legitimate power is explicit and recognized regimes are rarely bypassed even when facts on the ground clearly dictate otherwise, like the interregnum between the proclamation of the PRC in 1949 and de-recognition of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1978.

With a limited agenda between the US and PRC well into the early 1980s, beginning with Kissinger’s initiatives and Nixon’s visit in 1972 it was readily managed and tightly controlled by the Priesthood of Western “China scholars”.

This arrangement worked well before the “opening” of China by Deng Xiaoping that unleashed a China that much more closely resemble China historically, where local authorities are subservient to the Emperor in name, and are free to do much as they pleased as long as the Emperor received their taxes and the visible manifestations of obedience to Beijing were adhered to.

Chinese civilization of the 21^st Century, however, found the priesthood of Western China Experts that focused on Beijing increasingly out of touch with the widening and divergent interests of different parts of China.

Beijing centric interpretations of policies have faced challenges in explaining the lack of consistency in regime behavior across regions:

For example, the declaration of an ADIZ in East China Sea was not matched by similar moves in South China Sea.   Nor are the island building ventures in South China Sea replicated elsewhere.

Divergences like this raise questions as to what are the local dynamics that are driving Chinese policies, rather than Beijing’s official policies .

China experts, because of their predominant training in one dialect and their preponderance in a few major Chinese cities, are an obstacle for a more nuanced understanding and foreign policy under the Trump Administration toward the many Chinese “local” authorities.

Crafting a nuanced set of foreign policies toward the different parts of China that simultaneously recognizes the limitations of Beijing’s power and influence, and the diversity of interests, behavior and concerns that make up the vast Chinese civilization require an expansion of capacity and broadening of expertise that will take time.

Meanwhile, acceding to Xi’s demand for a monopoly plays right into Beijing’s hands as it enable the regime to play off issues like the North Korean Nuclear Threat, South China Sea Grab, Trade, Currency, Climate Change and many other issues all at once with a Washington Foreign Policy priesthood eager for diplomatic “solutions”.

In Western diplomacy, the dominant paradigm is to compartmentalize differences and disputes to within a particular policy area, and to limit / prevent its bleed / spread to other issues.   If there is a trade dispute that is not settled amicably through legitimate mechanisms, sanctions by one party are limited to that trade area.

Example: France once restricted customs clearance of Japanese VCRs to one small custom post, causing month’s long tie-ups.   Japan retaliated by issuing a “health” regulation that Perrier water had to be boiled.

Notably, at the height of US-Japan trade disputes in the 1980s, the military-strategic relation was never impaired or disrupted.   China, and particularly the Beijing regime, however, do not follow this protocol.

Astute observers will notice that there is a noticeable correlation between the diminishing of US and Allied pressure on China in key areas like trade, currency manipulation, intellectual property theft, state-sponsored hacking, human rights, and the flaring up of strategic issues like North Korea, South China Sea, confrontations with Japan, etc.

Every one of these “crisis” have been used by the Beijing regime to make themselves indispensable, knowing that the priesthood of “China experts” in the US and allied regimes will back China up and cause the US to back down or sideline lower priority issues.

The priesthood of China experts has nowhere to go except Beijing, and cannot afford to appear to have no influence.

Beijing is happy (after intense negotiation and hard bargaining) strike deals that appear to meet key US and allied demands for the priesthood of China experts to deliver to Washington.

Beijing, in turn, can rely on the lack of consequences from the US when they fail to deliver on their commitments, or to only deliver for a brief period (to make it look good), and then renege, confident that Washington will have lost interest or focus on the issue.

With rapid turnover of Administration staff and the revolving door to and from K-Street lobbying firms, Beijing can count on whoever playing “hardball” with them on one issue to be needing to be on Beijing’s payroll, either directly or indirectly for US firms that have interest in China in due course.

At the same time, Beijing can by diktat, in the short and medium run, threaten US economic interests with highly visible moves that impact iPhone sales, Boeing, American automakers, agricultural imports, or the old trick of limiting or encouraging mass diversions of Chinese tourists and students studying abroad.   Indeed, this explicit threat was made along with President Xi’s call to President Elect Trump.

It is in this context that President Xi’s advocacy for “Free Trade” at the APEC meeting has to be understood.

Xi’s Beijing regime wants “free trade” where OECD nations that have a bona fide, legitimate monopoly of power to open their markets to Chinese products under the existing regime.

However, there can be no expectation of reciprocity or expectations of fair dealing by the local Chinese authorities to foreigners whose governments negotiated the deal with Beijing.

Post “deal”, the regime in Beijing that have little interest, let alone power to enforce terms Beijing agreed to, and is happy to use the traditional tactics of bureaucratic delay, obfuscation, and use of formal dispute settlement mechanisms to stall as long as possible — while other pressing issues move up the agenda.

Demands on Beijing to honor deals can be frustrated in any number of ways, ranging from “the next strategic crisis”, to the facility with which Beijing can carry out “barbarian management” operations.

Chinese diplomats are competent at calculating the impact of their actions on particular constituencies; estimate their impact on particular legislators in Congress or Administration officials, as any lobbyists.

They have watched how their counterparts from Taiwan played Congress and the Executive Branch, and lobby State Governors and state houses over the decades, and have adopted the same tactics.

While there are extensive efforts to coordinate foreign policy between US and Allies, there is far less coordination in economic policy beyond macro issues (e.g. currency valuations, trade balances, etc.) toward China.

This opening is exploited by Chinese by salami slicing.

Slicing and dicing US and allied interests has been effective because the US and the closest allies do not speak with one voice.

There is no economic and trade equivalent to NATO, and in particularly no equivalent to Article 5 in dealing with Beijing when the regime target a particular OECD nation.

China routinely successfully mount retaliatory moves against key US allies. For example, punishing the UK by diverting business to EU for meeting with the Dailai Lama knowing that no EU member or the US backed UK on a minor issue by standing united.   Or disrupting Japanese interests by singling them out for persecution.

Similarly, when US firms are targeted for a shakedown like Qualcomm for “anti-competitive” practices, there was no action of consequence from the Obama Administration beyond verbally raising the issue, let alone efforts to form a united front of western interests and tit-for-tat retaliation.

President Xi goal toward the Trump Administration is status quo ante.

Xi knows how to exploit the present system that makes US and allied foreign policy ineffective except for the biggest issues between Beijing and Washington such as preventing all-out Nuclear War, or enabling perfunctory access to the Chinese market for western interests.

In order to be effective in reform, President Trump will have to secure a consensus within OECD to develop a common policy toward the tactics routinely used by Beijing and be willing to use the leverage.

Beyond that, China must face immediate, measurable, quantifiable consequences for their behavior targeted at not just Beijing, but the local Chinese interests most concerned with the issue and most able to influence behavior.

This is not statecraft in the western sense.   But it is statecraft nevertheless.

Danny Lam is an independent analyst based in Calgary.

Editor’s Note: Danny Lam is one of the VERY few foreigners who called the Trump election months before it happened.

Indeed, three weeks before the election, he sent a forecast to us with regard to the electorcal colleage vote for Trump, which was, it would turn out to be, exactly right.

 

 

2016-11-22 By Richard Weitz

The Russian speakers at Valdai differed on the impact of the Western sanctions applied against Russia’s energy, defense and banking sectors in response to Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and its support for the separatist insurgency in eastern Ukraine.

Since 2014, the United States and the European Union (EU) have renewed and expanded these economic sanctions several times.

Western governments believe such sanctions punish Russia by imposing costs for its past behavior, deterring further Russian aggression, underscoring Western solidarity in the face of common threats, and compelling Russia to make concessions regarding Ukraine and other issues.

The Western sanctions have been directed against individual Russian leaders and companies as well as limited sectors of the Russian economy.

The most stringent of the EU and U.S. sanctions limit Western economic engagement with Crimea, apply travel and asset freezes to prominent Russians and Ukrainians responsible for Moscow’s actions in Ukraine, and constrain the transfer of military items and sophisticated energy technologies to Russia.

Experts debate the extent the sanctions have harmed the Russian economy by amplifying the adverse impact of the Russian ruble’s fall in international value, the flight of assets from the Russian economy, and the decrease in global prices for Russian oil and gas.

In 2015 the Russian economy did decrease by about 3.8 percent. Nearly half of Russia’s federal budget is derived from its oil and gas export revenue, so the fall in prices for these commodities since 2014 has forced major cutbacks in non-military spending.

This loss of revenue combined with limits on high-tech energy sales to Russia have degraded the modernization of Russia’s energy sector.

The sanctions and downgrading of Russian government bonds has restricted Russian access to Western financing and required the central bank and government to draw from the country’s previously large national reserve funds.

Despite their economic costs, the sanctions have not changed Moscow’s policies towards Crimea or any other critical national security issue. The sanctions have not stopped Crimea’s integration into the Russian Federation nor have they reduced Russia’s political-military support for the war in the Donbass region of Ukraine.

The Obama administration expressed hope that Moscow might alter its course if Russian President Vladimir Putin’s popular support began to seriously erode due to the economic costs of the sanctions.

However, polls show a surge in President Putin’s popularity following Crimea’s annexation, despite the resulting Western sanctions, collapse of the Russian ruble, and general economic downturn.

Russian policy makers may have thought that the Western sanctions regarding Ukraine would weaken over time, given the rapid reversal of their earlier sanctions imposed after the 2008 Russia-Georgia War. This experience likely dissuaded Russian leaders from making major concessions to end the sanctions.

Russian policymakers may also have hoped that Western businesses, certain Russian-friendly political figures, and other interest groups that favor good economic or energy ties with Russia would dilute or circumvent the sanctions. European political movements opposed to sanctions have been especially prominent in Austria, Greece, Hungary and Slovakia.

Russian strategic communications and counter sanctions on EU imports have sought to feed European resentment at being forced to “pay the bill” for U.S. policy in Ukraine.

(The main Russian sanctions on the United States have been entry visa bans on current and former U.S. officials such as ex-U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul).

Russian policymakers may also have expected that bellicose nuclear rhetoric and assertive military maneuvers might have aroused Western peace groups alarmed by the recent war threats in Europe, which have reached Cold War levels.

In Asia, Russian policymakers may have anticipated that Japan and South Korea would avoid harsh sanctions that could threaten diplomatic ties with Russia.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has strived to reach a deal with Moscow over their islands dispute (what Russians call the Kuril Islands, and the Japanese their Northern Territories), while South Korean officials want Moscow to press Pyongyang to curtail its aggressive actions and join Russian-sponsored economic integration plans between the Koreas.

Yet, until now the Western governments have shown surprising solidarity behind the sanctions on Russia.

In particular, European governments have renewed them on several occasions despite suffering much greater economic losses than the United States from the foregone trade and investment.

Donald Trump’s election as the next U.S. president has increased Moscow’s prospects for sanctions relief.

Many expect Russian-U.S. relations to improve under Trump, leading to a repeal of at least some U.S. sanctions, along with those of Asia and, despite deeper misgivings about Russia’s intentions, some European countries.

At a minimum, the change of power in Washington has made it unlikely that the United States, NATO, and the EU will adopt more comprehensive (Iran-style) sanctions on the Russian economy and society, deny Russia access to U.S. and EU financial systems like the SWIFT global electronic payments system, or curtail additional science and technology projects, including in the civilian space and energy sectors.

At Valdai, most of the Russian officials downplayed the negative effects of Western sanctions, describing them as strengthening the Russian economy by promoting diversification as well as self-sufficiency.

They also highlighted the costs to European countries in maintaining them.

They agreed that Russia needed further integration with the world economy to spur innovation and efficiency, but insisted that they would never compromise Russian national security imperatives to do so.

One senior Russian official who spoke at the conference said that the sanctions had made it harder for Russia to secure foreign investment and loans to pursue large infrastructure projects and other undertakings, citing the first quarter of 2015 as being particularly difficult.

However, he still claimed that through “internal administrative mobilization” and “active economic policies,” Russians have been able to mobilize their internal reserves while government policies, including privatization of major state corporations, have encouraged domestic entrepreneurship. In the assessment of one official, “the combined effect, at the present time, is more positive than negative.”

Another official, taking a long-term perspective, noted that the recent setbacks had not erased the large growth in Russia’s GDP that had occurred during the past two decades: “despite all the turbulence in the economy and the international scene. In 15 years we moved from low-income country to a medium income country.”

In a public session, Putin argued the adverse impact of the sanctions had been overstated, and that they cost Russia well below 0.5 percent of its GDP.

He also said that European countries “have lost almost 60 billion dollars or euros – I don’t remember exactly” in foregone exports to Russia.

Putin stated that the fall in oil and gas prices began a cascade that pulled down the value of Russia’s exports of related products like petrochemicals and fertilizers. Putin also acknowledged that the sanctions had discouraged investment in Russia due to the uncertainty.

Putin said that Russia “will work to get rid of them but this should be a two-way street.”

In contrast, former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin estimated the sanctions annually cost Russia one percent of its GDP growth.

He told the media on the sidelines of the Valdai conference that, “whoever says that these sanctions are insignificant” does not understand that they “seriously affect our economy, growth, and standard of living.”

Given this burden, he argued, “we should take measures to reduce the sanctions for the sake of our people.”