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This is the latest in a series of Second Line of Defense reports on fifth generation aircraft, and the shaping of fifth-generation enabled combat operations. The testing onboard the USS America as well as the work of the squadrons at Yuma USMC Air Station, namely, MAWTS-1, VMX-1, VMFA-121 and VMFA-211 is highlighted.
This special report provides an update on the introduction and integration of the F-35B into evolving USMC operations. With the significant change introduced into the amphibious fleet and for USMC land based operations by the Osprey, the F-35 B is accelerating the transformation of the CORPS into a wide-ranging insertion force able to operate across the range of military operations.
The report begins with an update on the recent testing onboard the USS America with regard to the F-35B with the Osprey onboard as well. We then turn to insights provided from Yuma Marine Corps Air Station by MAWTS-1, and the two operational F-35 squadrons, which have been based there. The Green Knights or VMFA-121 is on the move to Japan and will go back to the origins, namely Pacific operations.
We will then conclude with a series of articles, which look at the impact of the integration of the Osprey and the F-35B on the sea base and the evolving strategic options, which are emerging along with the tactical innovations of the new force. The ampbhious ready group is being transformed into an amphibious task force, which is highly “Integratable” with air, and maritime based combat forces which together will shape what the US Navy leadership refers to as a kill web.
In short, although the F-35 is an innovative piece of combat technology it is its interaction with other key elements of innovation, which are opening up new capabilities and options for an integrated air and maritime force. And closely associated with the Marines in all of this is the UK, which is a core participant from the ground up in terms of integrating the F-35B with their new sea basing capabilities as well.
If there is a political will to build up the US Navy ship numbers, no better investment can be made than in the ampbhious fleet where the sea base is experiencing a revolution. Investment in new amphibious ships coupled with the investments in Ospreys, F-35s and CH-53Ks will provide US leaders with significantly expanded strategic flexibility and tactical operations.
The phone call between President-elect Trump and the President of Taiwan has sent shock waves to many in the diplomatic community.
But it is about time to turn the page and include Taiwan in the shaping of a 21st century deterrent strategy for Pacific defense.
The People’s Republic of China has made it clear by its actions and expressed intentions that the regime is moving out into the Pacific and asserting its power and influence and directly threatening U.S. interests and U.S. allies.
It is reaching beyond Taiwan in its military and diplomatic strategy and leveraging its expanded power projection capabilities into the Pacific to reach out to the Japanese Island chains as well as the key maritime access points to Australia.
It is clear how important control of Taiwan would be it shaping a pincer strategy against Japan and Australia and American military installations in the Pacific.
Why would the United States then simply stand by and ignore the defense of Taiwan and its key place in a strategic reshaping of Pacific strategy?
That would be turning the Pacific Pivot into the Pacific Divot.
There is little reason to be frozen in time with Kissinger and Nixon who pursued a strategy rooted in deterrence of the Soviet Union by embracing Communist China, Last time we looked the Soviet Union has collapsed.
Russia is not the Soviet Union in an essential sense of seeing no commonality of relationships with China except and only with regard to realpolitik.
As such, there is little to be gained by appeasing the PRC in hopes of containing Russia. Deterring Russia is a task all unto itself, as it forges a 21st century approach to power, using its military capabilities to shape outcomes seen as essential to Russian national interest by Putin.
Now China is a power unto it itself, one has virtually nothing to do with its condition or role in the global system when Nixon and Kissinger negotiated the Shanghai Communiqué.
“Normalization of relations with the PRC was accomplished through the issuance of three communiqués in 1972, 1979, and 1982 that defined the relationship. In those documents, the PRC and US explicitly acknowledged their differences.
“There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies.” (para 8, 1972) and made clear that the differences are only papered over temporarily for the sake of peace. Temporarily is the operative word.”
This was converted to the “one China policy” at the end of the Carter Administration where Carter severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan and recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China. Reagan came to office and rearmed the Shanghai Communiqué.
But Carter’s policy was also forged in the time of battling what is now the non-existent Soviet Union and before China turned into a military power seeking to assert that power deep into the region.
It is time to exit the Madame Tussaud museum of policy initiatives and shape a Taiwan policy for the 21st century, which is part of a broader deterrent strategy.
Both the technology available to the United States and the policy shifts of core allies in the Pacific are enabling the forging of a deterrence in depth strategy.
As Japan has focused on its extended defense, Australia upon the integration of its forces with a capability also for the extended defense of Australia and with U.S. forces focus on shaping a force to operate over the extended ranges of the Pacific, now is the time for a serious rebooting of the role of Taiwan in extended Pacific defense and security.
As then MARFORPAC Commander, Lt. General Robling put it with regard to deterrence in depth:
“I like the term deterrence in depth because that’s exactly what it is.
It’s not always about defense in depth.
It’s about deterring and influencing others behavior so they can contribute to the region’s stability, both economically and militarily, in an environment where everyone conforms to the rule of law and international norms.”
U.S. Navy leadership has pioneered the concept of building integrated kill webs which can allow for presence assets to integrate across the extended battlespace to provide for an integrated “no platform fights alone” multi sensor-shooter solutions. Taiwan can be seamlessly integrated in to a Pacific Island deterrence strategy with the political will expressed by President Elect Donald Trump.In our discussions with the new head N-9, Rear Admiral Manazir, he highlighted the key role of shaping integrated forces across a distributed operational area.
It is clear that both the Air Force, the Navy and Marine Corps team are focused on shaping the force for the high-end fight against peer competitors.
The Army’s main contribution in such considerations is the expanding and evolving role of Army Air Defense (ADA) Missile Defense systems. But in so doing, the focus is upon shaping a modular, agile force, which can operate across the spectrum of military operations; not just be honed simply for the high-end fight.
It is about shaping platforms into an integrated force, which can deliver lethal and non-lethal effects throughout the battlespace.
It is clear that Taiwan can enter easily into a force structure operating in terms of distributed defense with a deterrence in depth approach. One can start doing so by involving them in various security efforts associated with allied coast guard forces in the region.
They can become a regular participant as a presence force associated with allied and U.S. security operations.
Their involvement with their Air Force and Navy in engaging in partnership in the evolving distributed approach to an integrated Pacific defense strategy is important. And over time their Air Force and Navy can fit into a strategy, clearly designed for defense.
To defend against a PRC pushing out its military capability into the Pacific, a Taiwan isolated unto itself and NOT part of an overall deterrence in depth force generated by the US, Japan and Australia will simply leave it as a an apple to be plucked from the tree for an aggressive and assertive Beijing government.
President Elect Donald Trump’s phone call put a very powerful marker down for a new chapter in deterring the PRC.
As we wrote in our book on Pacific strategy published three years ago, Taiwan is considered by Beijing from the perspective of holding together their control over the centrifugal forces in their empire; and we can consider as clearly part of a strategy to do the opposite.
“The conflict with Taiwan is subsumed in Chinese thinking as part of the core territorial-integrity challenges.
The Island of Formosa was part of China since its conquest in the Qing Dynasty in the 17th century. It was ceded to Japan in 1895 and returned to China after the war.
In the ensuing Chinese civil war, the forces of Chiang Kai-shek were pushed off the Chinese mainland and relocated to Formosa. Here the Republic of China was established.
Over time, the Republic of China has evolved into a vibrant democracy, and it is the quality of Taiwan as a modern democracy that is a major challenge to the authoritarian Chinese leadership on the mainland.”
Laird, Robbin; Timperlake, Edward; Weitz, Richard (2013-10-28). Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st-Century Strategy: A 21st-Century Strategy (Praeger Security International) (pp. 25-26). ABC-CLIO. Kindle Edition.
A new Taiwan policy and indeed a new approach to Pacific islands is a key part of any new “constrainment strategy” towards China. Taiwan lies at the juncture of any effective Pacific military strategy with the PRC coming out deeper into the Pacific.
The PRC has changed the nature of the game; Neither Tawian, the United States, Japan nor Australia should accept their encroachment on freedom of the sea in the Western Pacific and South China Sea.
A PRC dominated Taiwan would be militarily poised to disrupt US and allied operations and significantly disrupt the ability to operate in a strategic quadrangle. If the PLA (generic for all PRC military forces) is given time to dig in and build a robust redundant ISR network from survivable hardened ground facilities and dug in and hardened 2nd Arty missiles batteries, it would be a significant new combat challenge.
The PLA combing survivable ISR 100 plus miles off the China coast linked with sea based platforms, PLAAF attack planes, and their satellites (if they are allowed to survive) can be very deadly at sea for the USN and allied forces.
With the PLA propensity for digging, they will literally dig in, and shape combat capabilities at the heart of the strategic quadrangle. It is no wonder that the self-declared ADIZ was yet another round of the PRC trying to assert its reach and affecting Taiwan.
Enhancing the defense of Taiwan is a legitimate right of Taiwan and is permitted by the Taiwan Relations Act. “In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 3301 of this title, the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”
But self-defense of Taiwan against a PRC reaching deep into the Pacific can not be done without shaping interactivity with the US, Japan and Australia and a broader strategic effort.
We can look for ways to both enhance Taiwan’s ability to defend itself and contribute to Pacific defense. One key way would for Taiwan to build up their ISR reach into the area and enhanced C2. These capabilities could evolve as the US Army builds out its Air Defense Artillery or ADA capability in the region.
A new way to think about the ADA approach is to build the support facilities throughout the Pacific whereby THAAD and air defense can be supported. THAAD–globally transportable, rapidly deployable capability to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles inside or outside the atmosphere during their final, or terminal, phase of flight. THAAD Weight launch vehicle, fully loaded 40,000kg=88, 184 lbs or 44 short tons.
The Gross Vehicle Weight Rating (GVWR) of missile battery truck alone is 66,000 lbs. Now let us rethink how it might be deployed to remote islands as part of a flexible grid. The CH-53 can take 30,000 lbs internal or sling 36,000 external-range unrefueled is 621 nm. The MV-22 human capacity is 24 combat-loaded Marines-range app 700 miles.
The actual missile battery is 26,000 lbs and well inside the lift capacity of a CH-53.
The problem is the mechanics to raise and lower the battery and rearm. A battery lowered from the air sans truck on reinforced concrete pads with calibrated launch points may make sense. A separate modular lift device could be put in place to load and reload.
Consequently, taking apart modules doesn’t appear to be a showstopper, and Marine MV-22s flying in Army ADA troops into any reasonable terrain is absolutely no problem. The weight of TOC and Radar maybe of concern, and it appears that in todays world there may have been little appreciation by Big Army on using MV-22 and CH-53Ks.
To be very fair the US Vietnam War Army did get it brilliantly by setting up firebases in remote areas with helo lift of very heavy guns. A THAAD island maneuverability concept is the same in principle but with different technology.
Combine ADA Batteries with the ability to move a floating airfield as needed inside the potential sanctuary of a 200+ KM protection umbrella of disbursed island bases with ADA batteries and power projection of the sort needed in Pacific defense is enhanced.
As the US shapes a defensive belt and operates within a strategic quadrangle, Taiwan could be plugged into this belt as it shapes its ISR and C2 capabilities. At some point in the future, Taiwan could operate its own version of ADA and become part of the defensive grid.
The Taiwan Relations Act clearly permits such actions: “To maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”
The way ahead is to shape a template, which creates synergy between the self-defense of Taiwan and the evolving US, and allied strategy for deterrence in depth.
President Trump has started the process of setting in motion a new policy. There is the possibility that history may record with Donald Trump taking a phone call from President of Taiwan that just taking the call may resonate with the same moral imperative of “tear down this wall” did for President Reagan in Berlin.
Until recently, except in the case of Iran, the Obama administration did not address Russia as a major factor in its Middle East strategy.
The administration withdrew the U.S. military from Iraq and promoted Israel-Palestinian reconciliation without thinking of Moscow’s potential contribution or opposition.
Then external events—the Arab Spring, NATO military intervention in Libya, and the uprising against the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad—increased Russia’s influence in the Middle East and also heightened U.S.-Russian tensions.
Though some in Washington expected that the Russian Aerospace Forces would become bogged down in their Syrian campaign, the operation has proved more successful than any foreign military intervention in the Middle East since the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War.
Suffering few military losses, the Russian forces saved the Assad regime from likely defeat and made Moscow the key external player in the Syrian conflict.
Perhaps due to the war in Syria, the Russian-Iranian alignment is also much stronger than many U.S. policy makers and analysts expected.
The Obama administration hoped that the nuclear deal with Iran would result in a weakening of Tehran’s ties with Moscow and an Iranian foreign policy more open to cooperating with the West on other issues.
Instead, Russia and Iran have furthered their bilateral and region-wide partnership since the Iran nuclear deal.
Russia has increased its arms sales to Iran, deepened its civil nuclear and other joint economic projects, and engaged in an unprecedented degree of regional security cooperation centered on Syria.
Russian warplanes have even been allowed to land and refuel at Iranian military bases.
It remains uncertain if the Russian-Assad-Iranian-Hezbollah alliance can consolidate control over all of Syrian territory in the near future, let alone claim a major victory in the war on international terrorism.
Despite the recent re-conquest of Aleppo, the Assad government still controls less than half of Syria’s territory, while millions of Syrians reside outside its control, including in foreign countries.
Even with substantial Hezbollah and Iranian manpower and Russian air power, the Syrian government’s depleted armed forces lack the strength to launch simultaneous offenses.
Instead, the Syrian government coalition must launch sequential campaigns—one attack at a time in different sectors—rather than concurrent attacks.
Furthermore, Russia has also not yet effectively leveraged its Syrian intervention and enhanced Middle Eastern influence to induce the United States or its NATO allies to weaken Western sanctions on Russia over Ukraine.
It has managed to secure greater cooperation from Turkey, whose government has become alienated from the Obama administration, but Turkish-U.S. ties should initially improve under Trump due to his indifference to Turkey’s internal affairs beyond the issue of anti-terrorism.
Still, Trump understands that the United States cannot ignore Russia’s diplomatic priorities and military potential when pursuing U.S. goals in the Middle East.
In fact, Trump says he is looking forward to a robust U.S.-Russian partnership against Middle Eastern terrorist threats.
Putin and other Russian leaders have repeatedly called for such a broad-based antiterrorist front.
However, the limited U.S.-Russian collaboration against terrorist threats, evident in the shortfalls that contributed to the April 2013 Boston Bombings by two Chechen brothers, has yet to recover from the adverse impact of the Ukraine crisis.
The Trump team will find it difficult to balance the goals of cooperating with Russia while rolling back Iran’s regional influence, unless Moscow decides to subordinate its ties with Iran in order to strengthen relations with Washington.
The Obama and Putin administrations were able to achieve some short-term agreements regarding Syria, such as the chemical weapons demilitarization agreement, but not an enduring peace agreement.
Despite years of direct talks over Syria, they were not able to move cooperation beyond basic de-confliction.
A recurring problem has been that the two governments have had conflicting definitions of which Syrian groups should be labeled as “terrorists,” and therefore excluded from the peace process. Even so, the strength of the extremists in the Syrian armed resistance to Assad has brought U.S. and Russian policies regarding the conflict closer in practice, if not in rhetoric.
For example, Trump has joined Russian officials in expressing doubts about the wisdom of arming moderate rebel groups in Syria.
However, cutting off all contact with the non-governmental insurgents could harm U.S. intelligence gathering efforts in Syria, unless U.S.-Russian information exchanges expand to fill any gap.
Although U.S. officials have contested whether the Russian forces in Syria have consistently targeted ISIS as opposed to bombing the West-backed Syrian insurgents, and while there have been sharp exchanges over civilian casualties due to Syrian-Russian air strikes, a focused effort by Russia in the future to eliminate the ISIS presence in Syria would make Moscow a more attractive partner for the new Trump administration which is likely to generate a more robust air operation than that pursued by the outgoing Administration.
During the election campaign, Trump’s most visible remarks on the Syrian conflict have primarily revolved around defeating and destroying ISIS. He also repeatedly expressed his support for working with Moscow to defeat ISIS and favorably described the Russian military intervention in Syria for helping relieve the U.S. burden of fighting international terrorism.
As long as the invitation remains open, the Trump administration could attend the planned Syrian peace talks in Astana, currently scheduled for mid-February, as well as engage in the parallel peace negotiations through the United Nations.
Russia has positioned itself as a necessary but not sufficient partner for achieving peace in Syria.
Although Russia, Iran, and Turkey conducted Syrian peace negotiations without U.S. or UN participation in mid-December, the United States and others later joined the deal through adoption of a UN Security Council resolution that endorsed its terms.
The parties might also resurrect a version of the Russian-U.S. Joint Implementation Group agreement, in which they pledged to minimize civilian casualties, foster a political transition in Syria, and share operational intelligence and targeting data through a joint headquarters.
Importantly, the agreement would have entailed bilateral military collaboration to defeat ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra, the main al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria.
Cooperating against al-Qaeda, as well as ISIS, will likely become more urgent during the Trump administration.
Some experts worry [http://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-dies-al-qaeda-rises-zarqawi-bin-laden-syria-iraq/28197759.html] that al-Qaeda is exploiting the ISIS difficulties to make a comeback.
Greater U.S.-Russian collaboration against both groups and their affiliates would be welcome in dealing with the ISIS challenge.
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During our most recent visit to USMC Air Station Yuma, we had a chance to meet with the head of MAWTS-1 and discuss the way ahead for USMC concepts of operations as seen from this key tactical innovation center.
The MAWTS logo as seen on the MAWTS-1 Building at Yuma MCAS. Credit: Second Line of Defense
In our book on Pacific strategy, we highlighted the key role which the Marines are playing in shaping a new concepts of operations for US forces working with the joint and coalition forces in the region.
MAWTS pilots and trainers are looking at the impact of V-22 and F-35 on the changes in tactics and training generated by the new aircraft. MAWTS is taking a much older curriculum and adjusting it to the realities of the impact of the V-22 and the anticipated impacts of the F-35.
MAWTS is highly interactive with the various centers of excellence in shaping F-35 transition such as Nellis AFB, Eglin AFB, the Navy/ Marine test community at Pax River, Maryland, and with the United Kingdom. In fact, the advantage of having a common fleet will be to provide for significant advances in cross-service training and CONOPS evolutions.
Additionally, the fact that MAWTS is studying the way the USAF trains combat pilots to be effective flying the F-22 in shaping the Marine F-35B Training and Readiness Manual is a testimony to a joint-service approach.
This is all extremely important in how MAWTS is addressing the future. An emerging approach may well be to take functions and then to redesign the curriculum around those functions.
Laird, Robbin; Timperlake, Edward; Weitz, Richard (2013-10-28). Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st-Century Strategy: A 21st-Century Strategy (Praeger Security International) (pp. 258-259). ABC-CLIO. Kindle Edition.
Question: When we were last here, MAWTS-1 did not yet have its own F-35s.
Now you do.
How are working its integration with the MAGTF?
Col. Wellons: The great thing about MAWTS-1 is we run the Weapons Training Instructor course at Yuma twice a year, and as a former CO of MAWTS put it to me, WTI is where the USMC comes together every year to train for war.
We are able to do the high end training in terms of aviation support to the MAGTF.
The F-35 is integrated into every mission that we do, whether it is close air support, helicopter escort, or, at the high end, air interdiction operations against a high-end threat including integrated air defense as well.
When we come back from a typical WTI mission exercise, and we debrief it with the helo and fixed wing guys and the C2 guys and the ground combat guys, more often than not it is the F-35 which is identified as the critical enabler to mission success.
It is the situational awareness we gain from that platform, certainly when dealing with a higher end threat like dealing with air defense, that provides us with capabilities we have in no other platform.
I am pleased with where we are with the airplane right now.
We have declared IOC and we are getting to deploy it to Japan.
Question: How does the integration of the F-35 into your operations, change how you think about those operations?
Col. Wellons: A lot of that can be quickly classified but let me give you an example, which does not fall into that category.
Historically, when we could come off of L class ship with Mv-22s, CH-53s, Cobras and Harriers and we then faced a serious AAA or MANPADS threat we would avoid that objective area.
Now we do not need to do so.
It changes the entire concept of close air support.
In Afghanistan and Iraq we have not had prohibitive interference in our air operations.
With double digit SAMS as part of threat areas we are likely to go, the F-35 allows us to operate in such areas.
Without the presence of the F35, it would be a mission that we wouldn’t be capable of executing.
The SA of the airplane is a game changer for us.
Rather than getting input from the Senior Watch Officer on the ground with regard to our broader combat SA, we now have that in our F-35. This allows us to share SA from the pilot flying the airplane and interacting with his sensors. He can share that information, that situational awareness, with everybody from other airborne platforms to the ground force commander in ways that are going to increase our ops tempo and allow us to do things that historically we wouldn’t have been able to do.
The ability of the F35 to be able to recognize and identify the types of prohibitive threats that would prevent us from putting in assault support platforms and ground forces is crucial to the way ahead.
The F-35 can not only identify those threats, but also kill them.
And that is now and not some future iteration.
Question: You are innovating as well with the F-35 as you integrate with your forces.
Can you describe an example of such innovation?
Col. Wellons: Absolutely.
One example has been something we did in the last WTI class, namely hot loading of the F-35 as we have done with the F-18 and the Harriers in the past.
We worked with NAVAIR and with China Lake and Pax River and came up with a set of procedures that we can use to do the hot load of an F-35.
We did it successfully at this last WTI class, and it shortens significantly the turn time between sorties.
When you think about us operating in some places around the world we do, the number of additional sorties we can generate as a result of being able to do that, and the reduction in the vulnerability that we have in terms of the turn around is crucial.
Also whenever you shut an airplane down, whether it’s a fifth-gen airplane or a legacy airplane, it has a greater tendency to break.
We did GBU-12 last class, we’ll be doing GBU-32 and AIM-120 this upcoming class.
Question: Obviously, you are working with the USAF and the US Navy on reshaping air operations affecting the MAGTF, can you give us a sense of that dynamic?
Col. Wellons: For the USAF, the capabilities of the airplane in terms of the sensors that we have, the weapons that we have, the way that we’re employing this airplane, they’re remarkably similar.
We are in lockstep with Nellis, with the weapons school, with the 53rd Tests and Evaluation Group in terms of how we’re doing operational tasks, and we are very closely aligned with them in terms of how we employ the airplane, how we support the airplane.
We do quite a bit of work with Fallon. They are on a different timeline from the Air Force. They’re a couple of years behind in terms of where they are, but I anticipate that we’ll have similar collaboration with the Navy as they begin to lean forward into the F35 in the next couple of years.
Biography of Col. James Wellons
Colonel James B. Wellons grew up in Victoria, Virginia. He graduated from the United States Naval Academy in May of 1992, earning his commission as a Second Lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps. After completion of The Basic School and Naval Flight Training, he reported to VMAT-203, Cherry Point, NC for AV-8B Harrier training.
Colonel Wellons completed AV-8B Harrier training in 1997 and reported to the VMA-231 “Ace of Spades,” where he served in various assignments and deployed twice with the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, first in 1998 and again in 1999.
In March of 2000, Colonel Wellons returned to VMAT-203 for duties as an AV-8B instructor pilot and graduated from the MAWTS-1 Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) Course.
In January of 2002, Colonel Wellons returned to VMA-231 as WTI and was promoted to Major. He then deployed as Future Operations Department Head for HMM-263 with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit from August of 2002 through May of 2003, during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I.
In July of 2003, Colonel Wellons reported to MAWTS-1 in Yuma, Arizona for duties as an AV-8B instructor pilot. While at MAWTS-1, Colonel Wellons served as AV-8B Division Head and TACAIR Department Head; he also flew as an adversary pilot in the F-5E with VMFT-401.
In June of 2006, Colonel Wellons reported to the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) at Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, graduating in June of 2007 with an M.A. in Airpower Art and Sciences. Upon graduation, Colonel Wellons reported to Marine Corps Forces Central Command (MARCENT) for duties as an operational planner. While at MARCENT he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel.
In August of 2009, Colonel Wellons reported to Eglin Air Force Base, FL, where he stood up and commanded VMFAT-501, the F-35B Fleet Replacement Squadron. In February of 2012, Colonel Wellons relinquished command and reported to the U.S. Naval War College, in Newport, RI, where he graduated with highest distinction in March of 2013 with an M.A. in National Security and Strategic Studies.
In March of 2013, Colonel Wellons reported to U.S. Southern Command in Doral, FL for assignment as Executive Officer to the Commander. He was promoted to Colonel during this tour.
In June of 2015, Colonel Wellons reported to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, where he assumed command in May of 2016.
Colonel Wellons has held qualifications in the AV-8B, F-5E/F, and F-16C/D. His decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with gold star in lieu of third award, Air Medal, Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal, and various unit and campaign awards.
In addition to the interview which we had with the CO of MAWTS-1, Col. Rowell, we had a chance to talk with Lt. Col. Nelson, the XO of MAWTS-1 and Major Duke.
Lt. Col. “Cowboy” Nelson was on the deployment under the command of Lt. Col. Bianco when we conducted an interview with the first squadron of MV-22s which deployed to Afghanistan in early 2010.
In that interview conducted by telephone when the squadron was in Afghanistan, Lt. Col. Bianco highlighted a number of key contributions of the aircraft to the fight.
The most compelling point underscored by the squadron commander is how, in effect, the Osprey has inverted infrastructure and platform.
Normally, the infrastructure shapes what the platform can do. Indeed, a rotorcraft or a fixed wing aircraft can operate under specific circumstances.
With the range and speed of the Osprey aircraft, the plane shapes an overarching infrastructure allowing the ground forces to range over all of Afghanistan, or to be supported where there are no airfields, or where distributed forces need support.
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The Osprey photos from Afghanistan in 2010 are credited to the USMC.
The envelopment role of the Osprey is evident in Afghanistan as well, whereby the Osprey can provide the other end of the operational blow for the ground or rotorcrafts in hot pursuit of Taliban.
The Osprey can move seamlessly in front of rotorcraft and land forces, allowing the pursuit of different lines of attack. The envelopment role was not the focus of the interview because of security considerations, but anecdotal evidence suggests such an emerging role.
The progress of the Osprey since then in terms of its performance and impact on the evolution of USMC concepts of operations has been significant.
The F-35B coming into the force is having a similar impact but is building upon the prior experience, which the Marines have had with the Osprey.
Given “Cowboys” long experience with the Osprey and its maturation, he brings the experience of Marines shaping a way ahead with revolutionary technologies associated with the Osprey to the new task, namely, the integration of the F-35 into the USMC.
“Part of the mission at MAWTS-1 is to familiarize the students with the new options associated with the F-35 and that requires a mind shift for Marines in working through how to best leverage the aircraft.”
Ed Timperake with Lt. Col. Nelson and Major Duke outside of the MAWTS-1 Building After the interview with Second Line of Defense.
The digital interoperability initiative being conducted by the USMC is a key part of shaping the situational awareness thread for the insertion of the assault force via the Osprey and the F-35.
The F-35 as a key generator of SA to be distributed to the incoming assault force.
“The new generation is so technologically sophisticated that they will thrive in the evolving digital environment of which the F-35 is a key element.”
A key impact of integrating the MV-22 with the F-35 will clearly be with regard to the Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel or TRAP mission.
The Osprey has already demonstrated a sea change on how TRAP is done.
This has already been demonstrate din combat in the Odyssey Dawn operation.
With the USS Kearsarge off of (ironically enough) the shores of Tripoli, the Air Combat Element or ACE began to deliver unique resupply capabilities to the Kearsarge, which allowed the Harriers to triple their sortie generation rates.
By being able to fly directly to Sigonella rapidly and back the Ospreys kept the Harriers in the air much longer than anticipated.
And the TRAP mission over Libya saw the Marines execute the mission at least 45 minutes faster than the next available platform and did so very rapidly after having received the go order.
We interviewed Marines involved in the Trap mission and its was clear that to these Marines there was growing awareness of what the Osprey could provide to the MAGTF.
As Maj. B.J. Debardelebe, one of the Osprey aviators involved with the TRAP mission highlighted:
We made the judgment that we had to accelerate the mission.
We moved towards our top speed as the pilot was moving to a new location on the ground.
The pilot on the ground indicated that “they’re still going at us, and things are getting worse.”
And he is clearly on the move.
We had the grid of the plane crash site and we got a new grid and realized that it was much further away from where the original crash site was. So he’d been on the move the whole time.
Major Debardeleben during the Trap Mission Interview (Credit: SLD)
If I had been flying a SEA KNIGHT, by the time I had gotten the new information with regard to the shift in the grid, and flown for the 40 minutes under those conditions, I would have been relatively exhausted by the time I got there because you’re holding the controls, and you’re getting shaken the whole time.
On the Osprey, I am on autopilot.
So I can take a sip of water, I’m assessing everything, and I’m listening to what’s going on very clearly.
The V22s very quiet in airplane mode so we can hear the radios very well, but if I was in a SEA KNIGHT the noise would make it difficult to hear.
The grunts in the back were able to look at a moving map that they can look at to have both SAs when we’re getting closer and closer to coast line
And so in that flight task now they’re relaxed and comfortable instead of them shaking in the back because usually with all the shaking makes you groggy you sleep, so you have to wake them up when you land.
So they’re in the back at least relaxed and calm before we drop them off.
This capability is a significant strategic capability and one, which is crucial in the fight against ISIS, a terrorist group more than willing to torture and kill pilots.
Now with the F-35 replacing the Harrier and flying with the Osprey, the range of operational conditions into which the TRAP mission can now be flown is expanding significantly.
PACIFIC OCEAN — An MV-22B Osprey takes off from the flight deck of USS America (LHA 6), November 19, 2016. The Osprey dropped off distinguished visitors and media before the Lightning Carrier Proof of Concept Demonstration. The demonstration is the first shipboard Marine Corps F-35B integration demonstration alongside other Marine Corps Air Combat Element assets. (U.S. Marine Corps Photo by Cpl. Thor Larson/Released)
Even into contested areas the F-35 can work with the Osprey to save lives and to extract pilots from harm’s way.
This micro capability is reflective of what the USMC-USN team can do from the sea with an F-35 enabled force and be able to deliver the ground combat element via the Osprey backed by the F-35 as a significantly expanded close air support aircraft.
The dynamics of integration with the F-35 with the Osprey and changing concepts of operations provides political leaders with new strategic options for inserting and withdrawing force against a threat.
We also discussed a key shift as the number of F-35s goes up, the role of the user groups will be enhanced in shaping the future evolution of the aircraft.
Major Duke noted that already at WTI courses NAVAIR engineers are coming to the courses and observing how the aircraft is being used by Marines in those courses.
“They sent two engineers last Spring.
This has happened in the past, so it is back to the future in effect as we shape the way ahead for the F-35.”
In short, the role of MAWTS-1 and its students will become key demand side driver for how the software defined and upgradeable aircraft which is the F-35 evolves.
Col. Rowell is the first Commanding Officer of VMX-1: Marine Corps Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron 1.
VMX-1 includes the operational test & evaluation (OT&E) and science & technology (S&T) activities that have supported Marine Aviation from HMX-1, VX-9, MACCS-X and MAWTS-1.
One of its predecessors was VMX-22, which was established in 2003 for the express purpose of introducing the Osprey and shaped its evolving con-ops.
More than a decade later the Marines of VMX-1 are now helping to integrate the F-35B into Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and are preparing for the next new Marine Aviation asset, the CH-53K.
The first CO of VMX-22 was then Colonel Walters.
General Walters is the current Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps.
In an earlier interview Col. Walters indicated how the Osprey had changed operations.
They had their normal fair share of general support, resupplies, etc. But we started accelerating their use as my time there went on, and used them for both the conventional and Special Forces operations.
The beauty of the speed of the Osprey is that you can get the Special Operations forces where they need to be and to augment what the conventional forces were doing and thereby take pressure off of the conventional forces. And with the SAME assets, you could make multiple trips or make multiple hits, which allowed us to shape what the Taliban was trying to do.
VMX-1 Logo
The Taliban has a very rudimentary but effective early warning system for counter-air. They spaced guys around their area of interest, their headquarters, etc. Then they would call in on cell or satellite phones to chat or track. It was very easy for them to track. They had names for our aircraft, like the CH-53s, which they called “Fat Cows.”
But they did not talk much about the Osprey because they were so quick and lethal.
And because of its speed and range, you did not have to come on the axis they would expect. You could go around, or behind them and then zip in. We also started expanding our night operations with the Osprey. We rigged up a V-22 for battlefield illumination.
A lot of these mission sets were never designed into the V-22 but you put it into the field and configure it to do the various missions required. And we have new software for the Ospreys in Afghanistan where you can pick your approach, angle, approach speed and let the aircraft do it all. That is a huge safety gain.
We started the interview with Col. Rowell by recalling the original VMX-22 in this manner.
“When we were setting up the office, a Marine came in and said we had some old gear we needed to dispose of, including an older flight helmet.
I turned the helmet around and the name on it was Walters.
It now occupies the top shelf in my office.”
About 2009, the OT&E missions of HMX-1 were ported over to VMX-22 to work through innovations with the CH-53E. The same had been done with the attack and light lift/utility helicopters years earlier with VX-9.
All of those missions, along with the F-35B and CH-53K efforts, have taken root in VMX-1 as well.
The unit is one which now has its foot firmly planted into the future while simultaneously shaping today’s fight.
VMX-1’s F-35Bs are at Edwards AFB as part of the Joint Operational Test Team which is working with their developmental test counterparts to evaluate and integrate the ongoing upgrades of the aircraft.
The VMX-1 F-35Bs will come to Yuma in 2018 and will be the center of excellence for global F-35Bs as well after the Block 3F software is complete.
VMX-1 will continue to shape the demand side for the F-35B community with regard to upgrades as well.
We asked about how integrated the British have been with Rowell and his Marines.
He noted that there is very close integration.
“It is crucial.
We carrier qualified a Royal Navy pilot onboard the USS America in USMC airplanes.
We are exchangeable.
There is no light between the Brits and the Marines.
On the America, you had UK maintainers, and you had observers from HMS Queen Elizabeth on board the USS America as well.”
“It is very important for the community to remain focused on commonality.
There is widespread recognition of this requirement.
The Marines are a key stakeholder in this process with the services and the allies.
We are well tied into the community to shape commonality for upgrades and shaping the way ahead.”
This applies in strategic terms to shape integrated airpower from the UK to Norway to Denmark to the Netherlands and operating off of US and UK seabases.
“The interoperability between the USMC and the UK is a key thread in that effort with our ability to operate off of each other’s ships.
It is like flying with someone else nationally but part of your own squadron.”
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How did the maintainability go aboard the USS America during your recent tests?
“We took an aircraft and pulled the engine, drive shaft and lift fan – then reinstalled and flew it off of the ship in sea state three.
We validated many of the toughest maintenance tasks at sea with that maintenance evolution, and that jet was one of the first planes off of the boat during the Lightning Carrier demonstration.
The two Yuma squadrons plus VMX-1 were working the maintenance and almost all of the maintainers had never been to sea as well.
Availability and maintainability was good.
We did not lose any flying time due to maintainability.
Very unusual for an aircraft at this stage of the game.”
The test community is shifting its focus on airframe testing to the software upgradeability dynamic.
“We are internalizing that.
The biggest item I saw was the growing realization of what a software defined and upgradeable plane is all about. Many of your hardware dynamics are also about software.
For example, with regard to the fuel pump, what it does and how it performs is software driven.
You have to tweak the software a bit and you can get the fuel pump do what you want to do with it.”
We then discussed the coming of the CH-53K to the USMC and the role of VMX-1 in that process.
“Not only is the lift much greater and the maintainability significantly better, but the aircraft will play into the enhanced situational awareness (SA) with the F-35, along with the speed and range of the MV-22 as an assault asset.
The pilot flying the F-35 will shape much greater SA to the MV-22 and the CH-53K as they inform and support the overall assault force.
In effect, this is the flying infrastructure for the future MAGTF.
We will continue to refine the tactics, techniques and procedures (TPPs) as the force matures as well.”
Col. Rowell Biography
Colonel Rowell received his commission upon graduation with Honors from the United States Naval Academy in 1992. Upon completion of the Basic School, he was assigned to flight training at Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida.
After flight training in the T-34, T-2, and TA-4J he was designated a Naval Aviator in August 1995 and reported to VMFAT-101 in MCAS El Toro, California for conversion training in the F/A-18 Hornet.
Captain Rowell reported to MAG-11 at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California, in 1996 for duty with VMFA(AW)-225, where he served as the Schedules Officer, Airframes Officer, Assistant Maintenance Officer and Pilot Training Officer. He made two deployments to the Western Pacific in 1997 and 1999 in support of the Unit Deployment Program. While serving with the “Vikings”, he graduated from the Weapons and Tactics Instructor course at MAWTS-1, and the TOPGUN course at the Navy Fighter Weapons School.
Captain Rowell then transferred to MCAS Yuma, Arizona in 2000 for duty as an instructor pilot at Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One. During this tour he served as the Air-to-Air Employment SME, GPS Guided Weapons SME, Joint Strike Fighter SME and single-seat Forward Air Controller (Airborne) project officer. In 2002, Captain Rowell was promoted to Major. In 2003, Major Rowell deployed from MAWTS-1 to Al Jaber Air Base, Kuwait to augment VMFA(AW)-533 during Operation Iraqi Freedom. During his time in Yuma, Major Rowell was also NATOPS qualified in the F-5E/F and augmented the Snipers of VMFT-401.
In 2004, Major Rowell reported to Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia where he earned a Master’s degree in Military Studies and was a distinguished graduate of the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College.
In 2005, Major Rowell reported to MAG-31 at MCAS Beaufort, South Carolina where he served as the MAG FA-18 tactics training officer for a year prior to reporting to VMFA-122 as the Aircraft Maintenance Officer. The “Crusaders” deployed to the Western Pacific in 2006 in support of the Unit Deployment Program. Upon return, Major Rowell reported back to MAG-31 to serve as the Group Operations Officer.
After serving at MAG-31 Headquarters for a year, Lieutenant Colonel Rowell reported back to VMFA-122, the “Werewolves” in 2008 as the Executive Officer. In September 2008, he deployed to Al Asad Air Base, Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In January 2009, he detached from VMFA-122 and reported to 2d Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) for duties as Battle Captain in the Tactical Air Command Center. During his time in the TACC, Lieutenant Colonel Rowell continued to augment VMFA-122 and VMFA-314. He returned from Iraq in July 2009 and again assumed duties as the MAG-31 Operations Officer.
In June 2010, LtCol Rowell assumed command of VMFA(AW)-533. Under his command, the Hawks completed a training deployment to El Centro, CA and a deployment to the Western Pacific in support of the Unit Deployment Program. The Hawks were the first FA-18 squadron to obtain the highest level of combat readiness while on deployment, and were the recipients of the Robert M. Hanson Trophy as the 2011 Marine Fighter Squadron of the Year.
LtCol Rowell relinquished command of The Hawks in November, 2011 and served as MAG-31 Executive Officer until June, 2012 when he reported to U.S. Army War College. He graduated from the U.S. Army War College in June, 2013 and reported to the Pentagon for duty on the Joint Staff. He served two years in the Capabilities and Acquisition Division of the J-8 as the Strategic and Tactical Systems branch chief with responsibilities for air munitions, manned aerial systems and nuclear weapons.
Colonel Rowell has converted to the F-35B and MV-22B in anticipation of commanding Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron 1.
Col Rowell has over 3400 flight hours in the F/A-18, F-5, F-35B and MV-22 with 2900 hours in the F/A-18, and has held every tactical and flight designation qualification in that aircraft. His personal awards include the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with gold star, Air Medal Individual Action with combat distinguishing device, Air Medal Strike/Flight Award with numeral five, Navy/Marine Corps Commendation Medal with two gold stars and combat distinguishing device, and the Navy Achievement Medal.
Editor’s Note: The photos in the first slideshow show U.S. Marine Corps, Col. George Rowell takes the position of Commanding Officer of Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron 1 (VMX-1) on Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Ariz., May 13, 2016.
Also seen is U.S. Marine Corps, Col. Robert. L. Rauenhorst, Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron 22 (VMX-22) Commanding Officer gives his last remarks before changing the command over to Col. George Rowell, Commanding Officer of Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron 1 (VMX-1) on Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Ariz., May 13, 2016.
The photos in the second slideshow of F-35B pilots onboard the USS America were shot by Todd Miller.
Now We have an appeal for contributions to a very worthy effort this Christmas.
After we published the article written by Al Santoli, about his direct on the ground engagement with Philippine citizens, we were struck by the plights of 4 year old Brille Gonzales who needs to travel to Kaoshing Tawain Hospital for a life saving liver transplant.
Al wrote the story of Brille below and is making a direct appeal for donations.
In this holiday season we are trying to help and please note the procedure in USA medical centers of excellence can run to over half a million dollars.
This is Al Santoli, President Asia American Institute’s appeal:
Citizen diplomacy is built on shared values and trust between the people in allied countries, in a separate relationship apart from bilateral political maneuverings based in the capitols of each country.
In the central and southern province areas of the Philippines includes the province of Iloilo on Panay Island, where Asia America Initiative has had community-based programs dating back to the super storm Haiyan in 2013.
4 year old Brielle Gonzales is struggling to survive from a rare disease called Alagille Syndrome.
Her only hope for survival is to receive a liver transplant.
Her donor is her mother Lissette.
They must go to Kaoshiung , Taiwan, where the only hospital in the region with surgeons qualified to conduct this rare life-saving process are located.
We are humbly asking for your support.
Please help Brielle triumph against Alagille Syndrome (ALGS).
We still need $20,000 to cover the cost of surgery and follow-up care.
Please help little Brielle receive the gift of life this Holiday Season.
Send your tax deductible gift to Asia America Initiative at 1521 16th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036 or via credit card online to Asia America Initiative on the web site of Global Giving [$1,200 of the $20,000 is asked for in the online appeal].
As we end 2016 and look forward to 2017, it is difficult not to believe that we face a year of upheaval.
Several dynamics in play at the same time and these dynamics will interact with one another to generate profound change in the world as we know it.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, we had a period up to 9/11 where the world was characterized by the increasingly power of the United States and Europe while China emerged as a global economic power. The Islamic-Western conflict was already there but with the 9/11 crises it emerged full blown.
As we end 2016 and look forward to 2017, it is difficult not to believe that we face a year of upheaval. Several dynamics in play at the same time and these dynamics will interact with one another to generate profound change in the world as we know it.
And then the two decades of the war on terrorism entered the Western agenda, with the strikes in Afghanistan and the ill fatted invasion of Iraq. As the Middle East began to resemble the 12th century landscape of the crusades (a period which generated even more intra-Muslim conflict than that between Christians and Muslims), the ability to manage the geopolitical landscape became secondary to the struggle against various brands of Jihad, something not reducible to geopolitics.
The new phase of global development sees the continuing influence of the conflict with the Jihadists for sure, but with the inevitable collapse of the “deal” with Iran, the Israelis and key Arab states are very likely to confront the Iran leadership directly.
How violent the confrontation will be is anybody’s guess, but the challenge for the outside powers is direct: who is supporting whom and for what purpose?
The anti-terrorism paradigm and the flawed from the start policy of putting Western forces into the Middle East to reform societies that do not share Western values is over.
It has FAILED and both the military which has been sent on these missions and the citizens that support them recognize this, although many American strategists somehow think this will go on.
Certainly, Europe and the United States will accelerate their efforts at energy independence from the Middle East which poses significant challenges as well for the Middle Eastern and Russian oil producers.
What Western policies will be crafted to deal with the Iran conflict and with other Muslims and the Israelis?
And how best to define one’s interests in the Middle East when you are not largely dependent on energy imports from the Middle East?
Also changing are the global macro-economics as industry is starting to come back from Asia to the West, and both the Chinese and Russian leaders face significant economic challenges.
Their response to failure to meet these challenges are that they very likely to use military means to gain domestic support in the face of declining economic performances at home.
Europe is in fundamental change.
With the Brexit negotiations to start this year and with a new French Preisident for certain and a new German Chancellor probably, the Prime Minister of the UK will look to those two leaders for shaping what form Brexit actually takes.
At the heart of the change certainly will be the end of the free flows of people which was never part of the Treaty of Rome in any case.
Domestic security will return with a vengence with states having to demonstrate to one another that the proteciton of the lives of their citizens matters more than excessive protection of individual privacy rights.
Europe could divide on this issue and as it does, Britain could work with those states serious about domestic security and be part of a new European coalition.
The Euro will not survive in its current form, and how growth will be generated will be a serious issue in the period ahead.
It is into this world where Mr. Trump is becoming President of the United States.
His election should provide cautionl to those over confident in their predictive abilities.
One book which I just read is Imperium by Robert Harris which is the first of a trilogy which I now will have to acquire and read all of the volumes.
It is a book from the perspective of Cicero’s (slave) secretary and tells the story of Rome in the period of the late Republic and early Empire, in other words, the time where the public life of Rome’s most famous lawyer and orator unfolded.
There are many good comments throughout the book but this seems especially relevant now:
“You can always spot a fool, for he is the man who will tell you he knows who is going to win an election.
But an election is a living thing you might almost say, the most vigorously alive thing there is — with thousands upon thousands of brains and limbs and eyes and thoughts and desires and it will wriggle and turn and run off in directions no one ever predicted, sometimes for the joy of proving the wiseacres wrong.”
Trump is more of an independent than a Republican and has come to power promising significant change.
But then again so did President Obama (Remember Change You Can Believe In?)
But Trump certainly is different in that he ran against the leadership of the party whose nominee he eventually became.
It is somewhat akin to the Progressive era in the late 19th century where both parties where in meltdown over corruption and other issues and the election of President Theodore Roosevelt opened a new era.
In this sense, Trump is somewhat akin to his New York predecessor, although TR was known for his famous statement about speaking softly and carrying a big stick.
TR came to power by accident and in a period of Western ascendancy and self-confidence and relative calm.
Trump is not coming to power in such a period of history.
And although to date his discourse about defense seems to revolve around cost, he will quickly find that capability and skill will matter more and are in short supply.
After a long period of fighting land wars against locals and jihadists expeditionaries, neither the U.S. military nor diplomatic elite are well prepared for the decade ahead.
This is one in which armed conflict with peer competitors has already started and skill in maneuver warfare and diplomacy will be learned or not.
Contemporary history is learned on the fly; it is not about inherited skills; it is about shaping skills appropriate to one’s age and with an old one ending a new one opening we shall see if we are up to the challenge.
