Robbin Laird, Author at Second Line of Defense

F-35s at Beaufort Air Station: The B as a Strategic Asset

Posted on August 22, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

08/22/2015

2015-08-22 Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, South Carolina

Two F-35B joint strike fighter jets conduct aerial maneuvers during aerial refueling training over the Atlantic Ocean, Aug. 13, 2015.

The mission of Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 501 is to conduct effective training and operations in the F-35B in coordination with joint and coalition partners in order to successfully attain the annual pilot training requirement. VMFAT-501 is based at Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, South Carolina.

The British are already training there and are an integral part of the USMC effort, including the key mission of ship integration.

The Italians will be coming next.

And Lt. General Preziosa, the head of the Italian Air Force, understands why getting Bs is a smart strategic choice.

For the kind of missions we face we needed the flexibility which the B can add to the fleet.

We need to go to the mission not the airfield.

We will operate in many areas where there are only short runways; the B allows us to operate in those conditions.

We can mix the fleet and operate at sea on land, on our own ships or own others.

It is the kind of flexibility, which we see as crucial to a 21st century setting.

I will give you an example of what we don’t want.

We planned to operate with the USMC in Afghanistan.

But we were three months later in the deployment than we intended because our Tornados could not operate in the same conditions as the USMC.

We had to take three months to build out the air base from which we would operate with them.

Time is crucial to many of the missions in which we will be engaged.

The Bs give me a more rapid insertion aircraft.

The B provides significant strategic advantages to having to rely on fixed airfields, as is being discovered by the USAF operating off of Turkish airfields.

The B will provide an option to operate in Kurdistan for a period of time, and LEAVING rather than working with the Turks whose agenda is clearly not the same as that of the United States.

And the ability to operate off of ships or expeditionary bases provides a significant augmentation capability and flexibility as well.

The F-35 is part of enabling a coalition of like-minded states and of shaping a global fleet capability.

Notably, allies worldwide are building ships upon which the F-35B could land and operate.

Coalition partnerships need to be shaped by who really contributes and who you really wish to work with, rather than needing someone’s airfield.

For our visit to Beaufort see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/visiting-mcas-beaufort-air-station-f-35b-and-renorming-airpower/

https://sldinfo.com/the-coming-of-the-f-35b-from-probation-to-ioc-to-transformation/

https://sldinfo.com/preparing-to-operate-off-of-the-hms-queen-elizabeth-working-with-the-marines-at-vfmat-501/

Ed Timperlake in a 2012 piece identified a number of key contributions which the F-35B brings to the strategic calculus:

Now something entirely new and revolutionary can be added to an Air Force, the VSTOL F-35B.

Traditionally the VSTOL concept, as personified by the remarkable AV-8, Harrier was only for ground attack. To be fair the RAF needed to use the AV-8 in their successful Falklands campaign as an air defense fighter because it was all they had.

The Harrier is not up to a fight against any advanced 4th gen. aircraft—let alone F-22 5th Gen. Fighters that have been designed for winning the air combat maneuvering fight (ACM) with advanced radar’s and missiles.

Now though, for the first time in history the same aircraft the F-35 can be successful in a multi-role.

The F-35, A, B &C type, model, series, all have the same revolutionary cockpit-the C4ISD-D “Fusion combat system” which also includes fleet wide “tron” warfare capabilities.

https://sldinfo.com/the-f-35-as-a-%E2%80%9Cflying-sensor-fusion-engine%E2%80%9D-positioning-the-fleet-for-%E2%80%9Ctron%E2%80%9D-warfare/

There has been a lot written about the F-35B not being as capable as the other non-VSTOL versions such as the land based F-35A and the Large carrier Battle Group (CBG) F-35, the USN F-35C.

The principle criticism is about the more limited range of the F-35B. In fact, the combat history of the VSTOL AV-8 shows that if properly deployed on land or sea the VSTOL capability is actually a significant range bonus. The Falklands war, and recent USN/USMC rescue of a Air Force pilot in the Libyan campaign proved that.

The other key point is limited payload in the vertical mode. Here again is where the F-35 T/M/S series have parity if the F-35B can make a long field take off or a rolling take off from a smaller aircraft carrier-with no traps nor cats needed it can carry it’s full weapons load-out.

The Royal Navy just validated this point by reversing back to the F-35B.

https://sldinfo.com/the-uk-rethinks-the-f-35c-decision-shaping-a-british-led-expeditionary-strike-group/

https://sldinfo.com/the-uk-allies-and-re-thinking-the-f-35c/

Give all aircraft commanders the same set of strategic warning indicators of an attack because it would be a very weak air staff that would let their aircraft be killed on the ground or flight deck by a strategic surprise.

Consequently, the longer take off of the F-35 A, B or C with a full weapons complement makes no difference. Although history does show that tragically being surprised on the ground has happened.

Pearl Harbor being the very nasty example. Of course, USN Carrier pilots during the “miracle at Midway” caught the Japanese Naval aircraft being serviced on their flight deck and returned the favor to turn the tide of the war in the pacific.

In addition to relying intelligence, and other early warning systems to alert an air force that an attack is coming so “do not get caught on the ground!” dispersal, revetments and bunkers can be designed to mitigate against a surprise attack.

Aircraft survivability on the ground is critical and a lot of effort has also gone into rapid runway repair skills and equipment to recover a strike package. All F-35 TMS have the same advantages with these types of precautions.

The strategic deterrence, with tactical flexibility, of the F-35B is in the recovery part of an air campaign when they return from a combat mission, especially if the enemy successfully attacks airfields.

The Key Role of Military Sealift Command in the Pacific: An Update from Hawaii

Posted on August 22, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

2015-08-19 By Robbin Laird

During a visit to Hawaii at the end of July 2015, I had a chance to sit down with two senior Navy personnel who work the MSC aspect for PACFLEET.

CDR Corey Turner and Bruce Stewart are senior personnel with the MSC Detachment PACFLEET and discussed the key role of MSC in PACFLEET and MARFORCPAC operations (as well as the USCG) and provided updates on new platforms, which have entered Pacific operations only this year.

In writing a series on the Pacific for Breaking Defense, a series which presaged my book with Ed Timperlake and Richard Weitz on Pacific defense, I started the series with a look at Military Sealift Command, for sustainable reach is at the heart of effective operations.

Logistics is usually looked at last, and considered the tail of the operation.

But when trying to build a distributed force over an area as large as the Pacific it is much more than that.

The U.S. can afford to build a 21st century power projection force able to provide a lynchpin for Asian security. But it won’t be able to if we don’t take advantage of new concepts of operation, new technologies and new approaches.

A key element for deploying a forward presence force is sustainability. There is probably no subject less discussed in the strategic debates than logistics and sustainment. As a version of the old adage goes: “Amateurs discuss strategy; professionals think logistics.”

This could not be truer when it comes to the Military Sealift Command.

The Military Sealift Command is not the most visible element of the Navy-Marine Corps team, unless you are at sea and need them.

Whether that support comes from underway replenishment, from ships at sea or air assets, the more than 100 MSC ships are the lifeblood of our fleet.

We started the discussion with a base line point: the MSC fleet in the Pacific represents 33.16% of the entire PACFLEET inventory. One trend line has been tapping into MSC to supplement some of the operations of the L-class ships, but clearly MSC hulls and crews are not the same as L-class ships and crews.

There are cases where in a crisis or in a high demand situation, a T-AKE ship has replaced an L-class for the mission. This clearly is in response as well to shortfall in L-class ships. It is also the case that the T-AKE ship is a high demand asset as well in the Pacific.

Landing support specialists back away after connecting a Humvee to a U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey during external lift training at Subic Bay, Philippines, during exercise Freedom Banner 2013. The training was the first time an Osprey has conducted an external lift with the Sacagawea. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Pfc. Kasey Peacock/Released) — Landing support specialists back away after connecting a Humvee to a U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey during external lift training at Subic Bay, Philippines, during exercise Freedom Banner 2013. The training was the first time an Osprey has conducted an external lift with USNS Sacagawea (T-AKE -2). (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Pfc. Kasey Peacock/Released)

A major shift is underway as well with the Navy and Marine Corps looking to distribute forces over the Pacific, a term which some Navy leadership refers to as distributed lethality.

This changes how the MSC fleet needs to operate.

“We are shifting from a hub and spoke delivery system, skin to skin, and to an afloat support approach whereby support ships can offload to a variety of MSC ships to support the gray hulls on deployment.”

With the emergence of an Afloat basing approach, the MSC fleet is adjusting the relationship among its deployed assets as it in turn supports a more dispersed and disturbed combat fleet. In effect, there is a double transition underway in the Pacific.

“Given the tyranny of the Pacific, this shift is challenging.

But the MSC is a crucial fleet enabler providing a wide body of services to the deployed force It operates as a force multiplier, notably for a distributed fleet.”

This year, the Montford Point and the Joint High Speed Vessel have both come to the Pacific, and the two interviewees provided an update on their first impressions.

With regard to the Montford Point, it is designed to be assigned to the pre-positioning fleet and will provide a viable alternative to landing supplies and equipment directly to a port. The Montford Point can help tansitiion those supplies and equipment directory to shore. There are sea-state limitations to the ship which will affect how it is used.

And the important addition of a module air support capability on the ship will be an important increase in capability as well.

As Admiral Buzby, then head of the MSC, put it in an interview in 2013:

Admiral Buzby: With the MLP-Afloat Forward Staging Base (MLP-AFSB) or AFSB variant of the ship, you are seeing the versatility built into the ship.

The main capability of the ship is its versatility.

The AFSB will be the latest incarnation of what one can fit into that 800 feet of empty space that fills a need, fills a requirement without having to go out and purpose build at great expense, and at great length of design, a capability to serve the war fighter.

With the AFSB, you will see a fairly robust aviation capability; a fairly robust boat capability to support a whole host of different missions. I think it’s a very strong, and very positive step forward in this ship’s future.

You could very easily, given the dimensions that we are currently envisioning in the design of AFSB, hanger space, deck space, we’re designing it on the big side for CH-53s and that kind of asset.

But you could conceivably have an ACE aboard that ship, supporting a reinforced MEU or something like that because you could probably carry Cobras on it, UAVs, and could envisage putting some joint strike fighters on there in small numbers if you really needed to, or MV 22s. One could be very creative in mixing the aviation assets on that ship.

https://sldinfo.com/admiral-buzby-on-the-evolving-capabilities-of-a-usn-usmc-msc-enabled-fleet/

The USNS Lewis B. Puller, MLP-3 AFSB undergoes Builders Trials April 9th, 2015.

This June the first AFSB variant has been delivered to the US Navy,

The first General Dynamics NASSCO built Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) delivered to the U.S. Navy on Friday, Naval Sea Systems Command said.

USNS Lewis B. Puller (MLP-3/AFSB) — based on an Alaska-class commercial crude carrier — is designed to host special operations forces (SOF) and mine countermeasure (MCM) helicopters as part of the Navy, U.S. Military Sea Lift Command and the Marines push to more capability for amphibious forces and capacity for seabasing with less expensive ships.

“This ship represents a leap forward in flexible capability for the U.S. Navy,” said Capt. Henry Stevens, Strategic and Theater Sealift program manager in Program Executive Office, Ships said in a statement.“NASSCO was able to leverage a mature design and hot production line to meet the Navy’s requirements for an AFSB platform while minimizing program cost and risk.”

The ship is the third based on the Alaska-class following two MSC Mobile Landing Platforms — USNS Montford Point and USNS John Glenn

For the interviewees, the new variant of the Montford Point “will enhance the ability of the ship to support autonomous operations with deployed forces.”

Give the transition to a distributed operational template, such a capability will be even more important than in a traditional MSC support role.

The Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) has been in the Pacific for about three months, and they find the ship a useful at sea truck to support a diversity of tasks, in which an at sea truck is useful.

One example was the use of the ship to move an air wing around Japan by sea rather than doing so by land using trucks.

The modularity built into the JHSV, and its speed make it a useful support ship and notably in helping support low end missions with which the fleet is tasked.

DA NANG, Vietnam (Aug. 17, 2015) – The Military Sealift Command joint high speed vessel USNS Millinocket (JHSV 3) arrives in Vietnam, Aug. 17. Vietnam is the fifth stop for Millinocket and embarked Task Force Forager. Millinocket and embarked Task Force Forager are serving as the secondary platform for Pacific Partnership, led by an expeditionary command element from the Navy’s 30th Naval Construction Regiment (30 NCR) from Port Hueneme, Calif. Now in its 10th iteration, Pacific Partnership is the largest annual multilateral humanitarian assistance and disaster relief preparedness mission conducted in the Indo-Asia Pacific region. While training for crisis conditions, Pacific Partnership, missions have provided medical care to approximately 270,000 patients and veterinary service to more than 38,000 animals. Additionally, Pacific Partnership has provided critical infrastructure development to host nations through the completion of more than 180 engineering products. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. j.g. Elizabeth Feaster/Released) — DA NANG, Vietnam (Aug. 17, 2015) – The Military Sealift Command joint high speed vessel USNS Millinocket (JHSV 3) arrives in Vietnam, Aug. 17. Vietnam is the fifth stop for Millinocket and embarked Task Force Forager. Now in its 10th iteration, Pacific Partnership is the largest annual multilateral humanitarian assistance and disaster relief preparedness mission conducted in the Indo-Asia Pacific region. (U.S. Navy photo by Lt. j.g. Elizabeth Feaster/Released)

When asked what they thought are the short list of needs for the MSC fleet beyond the question of numbers of platforms, they suggested two.

The first was the need to modify the gray hulls and the MSC fleet to have more effective ways to transfer assets from the MSC ships to the Gray Hulls. We saw earlier that this is a challenge for the F-35 engine, but it is a broader problem.

One issue, which they highlighted, was the challenge of transferring weapons going forward from MSC ships to the gray hulls, and obviously crucial need going forward.

The second was the impact of the decline of the US merchant marine due to global shipping trends.

“With the dearth and aging of US mariners, where are we going to get the people to work on the MSC fleet? This is a national problem; not just one facing MSC.”

For our interviews with the current and recent heads of the Military Sealift Command, see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/admiral-shannon-discusses-the-evolving-roles-of-the-military-sealift-command/

https://sldinfo.com/admiral-buzby-on-the-evolving-capabilities-of-a-usn-usmc-msc-enabled-fleet/

https://sldinfo.com/the-seabasing-revolution-rear-admiral-buzby-discusses-the-latest-addition-to-the-msc-fleet/

https://sldinfo.com/anticipating-the-usns-montford-point-an-interview-with-admiral-buzby/

https://sldinfo.com/admiral-%E2%80%9Cbuz%E2%80%9D-buzby-on-the-military-sealift-command-providing-global-support-for-forward-deployment/

Also see the interview with the builder of the Montford Point:

https://sldinfo.com/building-a-new-ship-fred-harris-discusses-the-mobile-landing-platform/

Shaping an Amphibious Coalition: An Interview with Brigadier General Mahoney, Deputy MARFORPAC

Posted on August 22, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

2015-08-13 By Robbin Laird

Last year I visited MARFORPAC, and interviewed the staff and the then head of MARFORPAC, Lt. General Robling During my last visit, I focused on the broad strategic restructuring which the Marines were undergoing which they refer to as the distributed laydown.

The U.S. Marine Corps is in the throes of a significant shift in the Pacific in the disposition of its forces. Because two thirds of Marines are deployed to the Pacific, such a shift is a key event in shaping the Marine Corps stance in the decade ahead.

The demand to support distributed forces is rising and will require attention to be paid to the connectors, lifters and various support elements. Part of that demand can be met as allies modernize their own support elements, such as Australia and Singapore adding new Airbus tankers, which could be leveraged to support Marine Corps Ospreys as well as other aircraft.

Indeed, a key element of the distributed laydown of our forces in the Pacific is the fact that it is occurring as core allies in the region are reshaping and modernizing their forces as well as partners coming to the table who wish to work with and host USMC forces operating on a rotational basis with their forces. The military and political demands for the kind of forces that the Marines are developing also are what allies and partners want for their operations.

In turn, this drives up the importance of exercises in the Pacific with joint and coalition forces to shape new capabilities for the distributed force.

The distributed laydown, the evolution of the capabilities for distributed forces, the modernization of allied forces and the growing interest in a diversity of partners to work with the USMC are all part of shaping what might be called a deterrence-in-depth strategy to deal with the threats and challenges facing the United States and its allies in shaping a 21st-century approach to Pacific defense.

https://sldinfo.com/meeting-the-challenges-of-the-demand-side-of-the-distributed-laydown-in-the-pacific/

https://sldinfo.com/the-distributed-laydown-in-the-pacific-and-deterrence-in-depth-lt-general-robling-discusses-the-evolution-of-the-usn-usmc-team-in-the-pacific/

https://sldinfo.com/the-umscs-distributed-laydown-in-the-pacific-a-key-element-in-a-deterrence-in-depth-strategy/

https://sldinfo.com/the-usmc-shift-in-the-pacific-and-the-role-of-exercises-a-marforpac-perspective/

https://sldinfo.com/the-umscs-distributed-laydown-in-the-pacific-a-key-element-in-a-deterrence-in-depth-strategy/

https://sldinfo.com/the-marines-the-aussies-and-cross-cutting-modernizations/

https://sldinfo.com/challenges-in-pivoting-in-the-pacific-the-perspective-of-marforpac/

https://sldinfo.com/the-challenge-of-persistent-presence-in-the-pacific-an-interview-with-lt-general-robling/

In a visit to Hawaii on the way to Australia in late July 2015, I had a chance to sit down with Brigadier General Mahoney, Deputy Commanding General of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific.

The key focus of discussion was on the evolving approach to shaping a coalition among amphibious nations in the Pacific, and the concurrent evolution of capabilities by the USN-USMC team with regard to their own amphibious capabilities under the twin impact of the Osprey and the coming of the F-35B to the fleet in the Pacific.

In May 2015, the Navy and the Marines hosted a first ever meeting of nations either with or aspiring to shape amphibious capabilities in the region.

“We just had the PACOM Amphibious Leaders Seminar here, PALS 2015, the first of its kind. Twenty-four countries either have an established capability, a burgeoning capability or an interest in amphibious operation. The PALS, the symposium I think was a great success just in folks who wouldn’t have ever talked to each other were now talking directly. We connected a matrix of people who now understand that there are other friends and capabilities out there that they can connect with. And I think we’re going to try and do that again next year.”

The clear focus of an emerging coalition is upon the application of amphibious capabilities to the 21^st challenges posed in the Pacific region. How best to shape and use the tool sets provided by amphibious forces?

The May conference is an important step forward in shaping a narrative to craft a teaming approach for amphibious operations.

“One of the larger points in the evolving narrative is the teaming of force projection capabilities where the amphibious element is a core capability. It is not simply about amphibious ships being transport vessels; it is about reshaping forces to deal with 21^st century operations.”

BG Mahoney discussed how under the concept of amphibious, there are very different notions at play, ranging from a transport and support fleet to a strike or force insertion fleet.

The term “amphbiosity” was used to express the broad umbrellas under which diverse notions of what kinds of amphibious forces a nation might wish to operate.

“What we learned during the, the PACOM Amphibious Leaders’ Symposium was what people understand and appreciate with regard to amphibiosity is sometimes completely different. There are close partners as well as some in our own joint force who in their mind’s eye really view amphibiosity as a floating a chow hall, an airfield, a hotel, and a mode of transportation; not a maneuver element, not a C4I node, not a presence effect.”

But clearly, the shortfall in amphibious ships, and support vessels, is of concern the Navy and the Marines.

“The demand side for Phase Zero operations in the Pacific is insatiable. And now we are in the process of distributing our presence among several different locations in the Pacific. Great, but how do we connect all of this into a true operational network? A challenge is that we do not have enough L-class ships; the Commandant and the CNO have made this point very clearly.”

[A U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey prepares to land on the flight deck of the Republic of Korea ship Dokdo (LPH 6111), at sea, March 26, 2015.]

When asked if investment could be increased where would he put it to deal with the demand rhythm and distributed operational requirements, the BG put it this way:

“Give me my 10th Amphibious Ready Group, and more L-class ships in the FDNF (Forward Deployed Naval Force). Then in teaming with PACFLEET, get after the job of dealing with the demands in the Indo-Asia-Pacific which is a growth industry.”

Given the high demand tempo, the Navy and Marines cannot wait around for the proper number of ships to show up, so the approach is to work a broader amphibious coalition and to work various pairings between grey hulls and MSC ships.

“I think that there’s a huge area under the curve to be exploited in experimentation and pairing, or combinations of, gray hull ships with other class ships. I know that in some quarters, that notion is blasphemy; it’s the proverbial slippery slope. But the fact of the matter, it is a practical reality that we need to explore capabilities in combining hulls like LMSR, TAK-E, AFSB, MLP, LCS, JHSV with that L-class ship and see what we can do with it, not assume what we can’t do with it.”

It should be noted that pairings do not make an MSC ship as capable as an L-class ship; but they do provide for greater operational sustainability and enablement of the L-class ship. In a discussion with the Navy, a senior Naval captain made a key point that pairing is crucial as long as one does not equate each member of the pair in terms of capability. A gray hull is neither an MSC ship nor does an MSC ship magically have the capabilities of an L-class ship.

The Osprey has been an element of disruptive change with regard to amphibious operations.

It has led to shaping a distributed operational capability for the classic three-ship formation for the ARG-MEU, and is enabling the USN-USMC team to connect to allied ships as well. Personally, I think it makes little sense for the USN to buy any combat ship which can not land an Osprey onboard, given its key role in connecting afloat or ashore assets seamlessly.

But the recent sale of the Osprey to Japan does raise the question of stepping up the game to support the Osprey globally.

“We’re becoming victims of our own success. Being good Marines we need exploit this success by considering and developing a true global logistic support network. Forward movement in our thinking about how to execute a seamless logistics laydown will maximize the capabilities of the airplane for us. We also need to get and keep other partners on board to matrix with us and also get into the support line.”

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/07/the-next-phase-for-the-v-22-osprey-build-global-support-like-c-17/

And the coming of the F-35B is an important force extender, but it is about leveraging the fleet, not simply operating a new aircraft.

“The F-35 is a hugely capable aircraft. But it clearly only starts there; I think the part that we really need to develop is how we can combine our integrated F-35 capabilities- whether it’s the Navy or the USAF or the Japanese or the Australians flying them, or any partner . And then linking all that capability together to shape an operational combat matrix with well-established TTPs.”

Shortly after I interviewed, the BG, the Commandant of the USMC declared the F-35B combat ready. I asked the BG to comment on this development as it related to his efforts in the Pacific.

[Ship integration operational testing of the F-35B aboard the USS Wasp. When visiting both PACFLEET and MARFORPAC, it is clear that these testw are about integrating the F-35B with the ship and with the ARG-MEU, not just about flying an airplane.]

“With IOC I hope we can stop talking as much about a platform and what it can do as airplane and continue hammer and tongs with the business of true 5th generation integration across the warfighting domains. Our ability, as a Naval Expeditionary Force, to sense, visualize and understand a hugely complex environment, with F-35 as a critical transformative enabler, carries a significant competitive advantage.”

In short, the Marines are leading the way in transforming the very meaning of amphibious operations.

We are only at the beginning of understanding what an F-35B and Osprey enabled amphibious fleet can do and might do; and with it the leavening effect such capability can have on the evolution of a Pacific amphibious coalition.

But one thing is certain: the MARFORPAC organization is crucially involved in shaping an evolving future.

Also see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/shaping-an-operational-strategy-in-the-pacific-an-interview-with-rear-admiral-john-aquilino/

https://sldinfo.com/combat-transformation-and-the-amphibious-force-a-pacfleet-marine-corps-perspective/

Multiple Osprey Flyoff of USS Bonhomme Richard from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

06/27/2015: U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Ospreys flight operations on the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6), off of the coast of South Korea, April 2, 2015.

The aircraft are with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 262 (Reinforced), 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit.

The 31st MEU is the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward-deployed expeditionary unit and is prepared to respond to a wide range of military operations ranging from humanitarian assistance missions to limited combat operations.

Shaping an Operational Strategy in the Pacific: An Interview with Rear Admiral John Aquilino

Posted on August 18, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

08/18/2015

2015-08-09 By Robbin Laird

Pac Fleet operates in the largest area of operations for US forces.

The immensity of the theater of operations, as well as the dynamics of change in the region, pose ongoing challenges of matching resources against tasks in protecting US interests and working closely with allies and partners.

Recently, I had a chance to sit down with the PACFLEET’s Director of Maritime Operations, Rear Admiral Aquilino to discuss the challenges and the way ahead.

In his current position, he is at the vortex of the operational capabilities and deployment of the fleet, and is positioned to understand the dynamics of shaping strategy up against the ongoing challenges and threats in the Pacific.

Against the backdrop of a growing chorus of comments Inside the Beltway about the growing ability of the Chinese to purse an effective area denial strategy, Admiral Aquilino presented a different perspective.

Clearly, China is improving its capabilities to operate in the Pacific, and quantity has a quality all of its own, but the Chinese are coming out into the Pacific, and the are not “12 feet tall.”

The Admiral highlighted that the Pacific when all is said and down is a maritime domain, and learning to operate in the blue water and to operate from the sea into the littorals is an art form which needs to be learned, and not just assumed.

The US Navy has a long history in the region, and has gone through many learning cycles.

And the strategy in the Pacific was simply put by the Admiral: “We need to have the ability to operate where it matters and when it matters. And we can do that.”

He followed the lead of the CNO who emphasizes that if one fight the high end fight, one can adapt to the other challenges; but the reverse is not necessarily true.

We discussed distributed lethality and the evolving US Navy’s joint and coalition approach to deploying diversified and distributed capabilities which can when combined in coordinated concepts of operations deliver what is needed in the area of interest.

“What I think is meant by distributed lethality is an ability to have an agile and diversified force operating over an extended battlespace but with an ability to concentrate force against the crucial tasks, targets and goals to execute an effective strategy.”

F-35C on approach to a landing aboard the USS Nimitz. Credit Photo; Breaking Defense

When asked what technologies are coming to the Pacific which we enable PACFLEET to achieve this strategy more effectively, he quickly focused on the coming of the F-35 to the fleet and to the region.

“I mentioned earlier that our task is clearly that we need to have the ability to operate where it matters and when it matters.

The F-35 will enhance our ability to do so.

Although I am a naval aviator, I am not speaking as one when I make this point about the new aircraft.

It is a force multiplier and enhancer not just a new combat aircraft. It clearly will enhance or air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities, but it as a deployed and integrated sensor aircraft it extends our reach and expands our flexibility and agility.”

He focused on the F-35’s role organically with PACFLEET (on carriers and on amphibious ships) but also in terms of being able to draw from the sensor stream of a deployed USAF as well as allied force of F-35s.

“The integration of the sensor grid is a crucial and evolving capability which will be expanded as the F-35 enters the Pacific.”

My colleague Ed Timperlake referred to the evolution, which the Admiral was discussing as the 21^st Century variant of the “big blue blanket.”

As we put in our book on the evolution of Pacific strategy:

“In World War II, the USN shaped what became called the big blue blanket of ships to cover the Pacific operations.

Obviously, this is beyond the ken of current realities, but shaping a connected set of U.S. and allied forces able to work together to shape defense and security in the Pacific is not.” [ref]Laird, Robbin F.; Timperlake, Edward (2013-10-28). Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st-Century Strategy: A 21st-Century Strategy (The Changing Face of War) (Kindle Locations 213-215). ABC-CLIO. Kindle Edition.[/ref]

The Admiral clearly had a similar thought in mind in our discussion.

And clearly was not ceding ground against those who assume that an area denial strategy was already effectively in place.

U.S. Navy Biographies – REAR ADMIRAL JOHN C

India’s Choice: Rafale, Su-35 or HAL Tejas?

Posted on August 18, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

2015-08-18 By Zbigniew Mazurak

India has recently announced its decision not to buy 126 Rafale fighter jets and to reopen the competition to replace its aging fighter fleet, this time the scope being 90 aircraft as New Delhi has already ordered 36 Rafales from France.

So the whole replacement contract will be re-competed – but on a smaller scale (90 aircraft).

According to some sources, the Russians are trying to woo India into buying the Su-35 fighter, the newest variant of the Flanker family of air superiority fighters. (Russia is desperate to sell the Su-35, which, so far, has failed to obtain a single firm export order.)

This is supposed to be an alternative to the French Dassault Rafale, which the Indian defense minister called “too expensive” several months ago.

Meanwhile, India’s domestic aerospace industry is heavily lobbying the Indian government to extend the production of the lightweight HAL Tejas fighter instead.

Yet neither of these aircraft is comparable to the Dassault Rafale, and they are significantly inferior to the French fighter by virtually all metrics.

Comparing the Rafale to the Su-30/35

If we look at the two fighters’ aerodynamic and kinematic performance as well as their capabilities, it becomes evident that the Rafale is decisively superior to the Russian aircraft. Let’s look at following metrics.

PILOT VISION: The Rafale offers unobstructed, 360 degree, all around horizontal vision from its cockpit for its pilot. The same is not true for the Su-35, whose pilot’s rearward view from the cockpit is obstructed by elements in the aircraft’s rear (the pilot only has a 158-degree horizontal vision from the cockpit). Obstruction of view from the cockpit often causes a fighter pilot to be unaware of opposing aircraft and thus to be shot down by them – throughout the history of air combat, 80% of fighters shot down went down with their pilots not knowing what hit them. Advantage Rafale.

SUSCEPTIBILITY TO DETECTION: The Su-35 is far larger and far hotter, and thus far easier to detect both visually and with infrared sensors, than the Rafale – the fighter has significant infrared signature reduction measures. The French fighter is overwhelmingly superior on this criterion.

SENSORS: Both aircraft have Infra-Red Search and Tracking systems (the OSF and the OLS-35, respectively), but the Rafale’s is better, as it has a longer range (80/130 kms, versus 50/90 kms for the Su-35’s OLS-35 IRST) and a wider looking azimuth. In addition, the Rafale has an AESA radar (and a very good one at that – the RBE2), while the Su-35 does not. Points go to the Rafale, then.

WEAPONS: Both fighters carry missiles with a wide range of seekers (radar- and IR-guided), but the Rafale can carry more of them (14 for the C variant, 13 for the B and M variants) than the Su-35 (12). The two fighters’ guns have the same caliber – 30 mm. The Rafale thus has a slight advantage here. And Rafale is being upgraded with the latest MBDA missiles as well such as Meteor.

AGILITY AND MANEUVERABILITY: This is a completely different matter. On this score, the Rafale is unquestionably better. It has a wing loading ratio of only 328 kg/sq m (275 kg/sq m according to Picard) at 50% fuel – far, far lower than the Su-35’s 408 kg/sq m. In addition, at a full fuel and weapon load, the Rafale’s engines provide a 0.988:1 thrust/weight ratio – slightly better than the Su-35’s 0.92:1. Points go again to the Rafale.

CLIMBING RATE AND ACCELERATION: On this score, the Rafale also enjoys a clear advantage: its climbing rate is 305 m/s, versus only 280 m/s for the Su-35. This also shows that the Rafale accelerates better.

MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS: This characteristic is of utmost importance, yet it is hardly ever mentioned by those who write about combat aircraft. The Rafale has a lopsided advantage over the Su-35: it only needs 8 hours of maintenance for each hour flown, while its Russian competitor needs 32 hours for each hour flown, allowing it to fly for only 22 hours per month. The Su-30 and the Su-35 are veritable hangar queens.

UK tanker refuels Rafale during operation against ISIL. October 31, 2014. Credit: Air Tanker

Moreover, the Rafale doesn’t need significant preventive maintenance and any damaged or worn-out component of it can be replaced in an hour. Replenishing fuel and ammunition takes just 20 minutes. Its maintenance and operational costs are lower than those of either the Su-27, Su-30, Su-35.

Of course, the Su-30 can’t even fly that often – it can’t fly more frequently than 22 hours per month, while the Rafale can fly for 80 hours per month – almost FOUR TIMES as much as the Su-30! Only the Rafale will allow IAF pilots to train frequently enough to shape real combat capabilities for the IAF.

This is not surprising at all. Even the earliest Flanker variants – the SU-27PU, Su-27UBK, and Su-30MKI – are very complex and very maintenance-heavy aircraft.

FUEL FRACTION: The Rafale engines’ fuel fraction, at 33%, is one of the most efficient among currently operating combat aircraft. greater

FUTURE UPGRADE COSTS: These will also be much lower for the Rafale than for the competition. For example, the Rafale already has an AESA radar; and the Flankers do not.

RUNWAY REQUIREMENTS: In a war, the IAF’s runways might be destroyed by the enemy. The IAF would then have to fly its aircraft from highways. The Rafale is capable of this – it only needs 400 m of runway and has an 11 meter wingspan. The Su-35 needs at least 450 meters and has a wingspan of 15 meters.

CARRIER ADAPTABILITY: The single-engine Tejas is unsuited for carrier operations. The Su-33, the Flanker’s carrier-based variant, is an obese, super-heavy, unmaneuverable, and underequipped. By contrast, the Rafale M is a very good carrier-based fighter in the world today. It has all the capabilities of other Rafale variants and has been operating off the Charles de Gaulle (R91) aircraft carrier since 2001.

Now, What of the Domestically-Produced HAL Tejas?

India produces domestically the HAL Tejas fighter. While ordering more such aircraft would be in line with PM Modi’s “Make in India” pledge, it would also be a costly in combat terms choice, notably because the HAL Tejasis notyet a fully capable fighter. Also, it can carry only 9 weapons (missiles and bombs), compared to 14 for the Rafale C and 13 for the Rafale B and M. And again Rafale is being upgraded with MBDA missiles as well which India can then adopt without further test costs.

The HAL Tejas also requires a long (1,7 km runway) to take off, while the Rafale only needs a 400 m runway.

As for the HAL Tejas’ maneuverability, acceleration, and combat persistence, the less is said about them, clealry Rafale is superior to this aircraft.

And the HAL Tejas offers very poor visibility (especially rearward visibility) to its pilot from the cockpit while lacking an infra-red search and tracking system and thus relying exclusively on an active sensor: radar. Thus, the HAL Tejas, despite its small size and thermal signature, is easier to detect for anyone with a Radar Warning Receiver and very easy to shoot down by surprise than is a Rafale.

Which Supplier Should India Choose?

Finally, let us consider one last important issue: dependence on foreign suppliers.

One of the purposes of PM Narendra Modi’s “Make in India” campaign is to make his country – currently the world’s largest importer of weapons – less dependent on foreign arms suppliers, and the overwhelming majority of these are imported from just one country: Russia. PM Modi certainly recognizes just how unhealthy and dangerous this dependence is.

But how is India supposed to wean itself off this dependence if it imports yet more Russian aircraft (thus greatly increasing its dependence on Moscow?

This would make India even more dependent on Russia when Russian behavior is creating clear challenges for the economic viability of Russia itself.

Editor’s Note: Having started with Rafale, the logical choice is to continue.

As we argued earlier:

The IAF is going to be part of the transformation which the French forces have seen with Rafale, it is not simply about buying 36 planes.

The French will engaged in the maintenance of the Indian rafales which will make the French forces part of the Indian landscape as well for deterrence, not a bad idea in today’s uncertain world.

And as maintenance is stood up in India for Rafale and Indian firms become involved the foundation for building Rafale in India can be built. It is really up to the Indian government, the IAF and Indian industry to make this happen.

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/france-india-and-21st-century-challenges/

And in a recent report The Economic Times the initial Rafale deal is still being worked out.

India has tried to insert an offset deal, as well as modifications in the program which of course drive up cost and delivery time.

Even more interesting is that the Indian government wishes to add an additional base to the deal, which is amazing for it is clear this would drive up cost significantly.

Both Qatar and Egypt, which have struck similar deals with the French government, have gone in for one base only.

“Can understand that India’s strategic needs might be different but generally two bases are needed when one has more than just two squadrons of a particular aircraft. Setting up of two bases will also cost more,” the sources said.

“The benchmark for the prices are already there since the deals with Egypt and Qatar have been struck.

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/48500832.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

One might note that bureaucracies kill deals; they do not defend the country.

Keeping Danish F-16s in the Fight: Three Lessons

Posted on August 13, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

08/13/2015

2015-08-10 By Gary Schaub, Jr.

Last September, Denmark reacted quickly and enthusiastically to the American call to join the anti-Daesh coalition, contributing a C-130 Hercules transport aircraft early on, 7 F-16s, and 120 soldiers to train Iraqi security forces.

During the past 10 months, Danish F-16s have flown over 452 missions, flown over 4,000 hours, and used over 397 PGMs.

Dr. Gary Schaub, Jr of the Centre of Military Studies. Opening the Danish Airpower Conference in April 2015. Credit: SLD

It has been a stalwart American ally since Operation Allied Force, sustaining significant military contributions to operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali, and Syria, but its military is straining under the stress of repeated deployments, decades of being underfunded, and continued budget cuts.

The newly-formed Danish government of Lars Løkke Rasmussen announced in the first week of August that it intended to continue the participation of Danish F-16s in the air campaign against Daesh and that it would seek parliamentary approval to extend the mandate before it expires in October.

Now, however, it is reconsidering this pledge.

Major General M.A.L.T. Nielsen, the Chief of the Royal Danish Air Force, as well as the union representatives of the men who maintain his aircraft, have warned that Denmark’s F-16s and the personnel who keep them flying are being stressed to the breaking point. “We cannot continue,” concluded General Nielsen.

Although the government’s initial response was to find a way to maintain the deployment, the new and inexperienced defence minister, Carl Holst, has indicated that he may abandon that option.

“I have a clear feeling that the military value of radar support is very usable.

It can be an element” in Denmark’s contribution to the fight against Daesh.

While Denmark’s TPS-77 Long-Range Air Surveillance Radar might indeed prove “usable,” it certainly would not be as useful as Denmark’s 7 F-16s.

The inability to sustain their deployment would indeed be “embarrassing” and damage Denmark’s reputation as a remarkably reliable ally.

There are three lessons to be drawn from this episode.

First, Denmark’s F-16s are reaching the end of their useful service life.

The government chose to delay buying new aircraft in 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011. At each juncture it and the political parties behind the defence agreements chose to reduce the number of operational aircraft, engage in creative management of flight hours, and increase already extensive maintenance in order to keep a smaller fleet of F-16s flying.

Danish F-16 fighter jets takes off from Flyvestation Skrydstrup in Jutland, Denmark, on Oct. 2, 2014. (AP / Janus Engel, POLFOTO)

These solutions will no longer work. When the Parliament reconvenes it must quickly engage in choosing a new type of aircraft.

Whether it is the Eurofighter Typhoon, the F/A–18 Super Hornet, or the F-35 Lightning II, the parliament should also enable the government to speed up the procurement so that the new aircraft are delivered quickly.

Otherwise Denmark may lack an air force that can participate in international air campaigns for a number of years, an outcome that will be even more likely if one of the increasingly decrepit F-16s crashes from an equipment failure.

Second, Denmark must increase its spending on defence.

The shortage of maintenance crews, the restricted number of new mechanics being trained, and indeed the insufficient number of the new mechanics in the training pipeline resulted from deliberate decisions taken given the budget cuts mandated in the December 2012 Defence Agreement.

That agreement cut defence spending by 15% in total and directed that those cuts come entirely from the half of the budget that provided support to the operational forces.

Military leaders did as they were ordered and cut where they hoped the least damage would be done.

Now it should be clear to all that support functions are important and necessary for Danish military operations to continue and for the Danish Armed Forces to perform at the level of professionalism that has been their hallmark.

Furthermore, politicians should not be sanguine and expect its partners will understand given Denmark’s chronically low defense spending. Denmark has never met NATO targets for its defence spending, whether in the Cold War or since.

Danish defence spending has been declining steadily since 1990 and now rests at approximately 1.2 percent of GDP. More cuts are forthcoming through 2017, when the current defence agreement expires.

In an atmosphere in which European countries that are not meeting their budgetary and fiscal obligations are being manhandled by those countries carrying what they feel is an unfair share of the burden, Denmark will be opening itself up to criticism and embarrassment.

The inability to sustain a deployment because of budget cuts is precisely the sort of failure that the United States has warned its allies about. Repeatedly.

Third, if Denmark cannot do it alone it must do it with others.

This has worked for Denmark in the past.

As I argued in a report released this past April by the Centre for Military Studies of the University of Copenhagen, when the Danish Air Force suffered a severe pilot shortage in the 1980s, the United States Air Force manned 1 of Denmark’s 4 F-16 squadrons to train Danish pilots, an arrangement that bent Denmark’s prohibition on basing foreign forces on its soil.

When Denmark deployed 4 F-16s to Afghanistan in 2002, it did so with the Norwegians and the Dutch, sharing support personnel and enabling a deployment that none could have achieved or sustained alone.

It must be emphasized that such cooperation requires political leadership.

The decisions of Norwegian and Dutch political leaders precluded the multinational deployment of a joint Danish-Dutch-Norwegian squadron for operations in Libya in 2011, but if Denmark needs their help then these decisions will block Danish efforts.

Danish diplomacy ought to be devoted to encouraging the better integration of air force deployments with these countries, particularly since they cooperate deeply with Denmark in the maintenance of their F-16 fleets.

Cooperation should not be pursued on an ad hoc basis or handled by other coalition partners.

While Denmark need not go as far as the Netherlands and Belgium, which have indicated the ambition to fully integrate their air forces in the coming decade, Danish leaders should think creatively about how to develop concerted efforts with these countries.

Given the goodwill that Denmark has earned through blood and treasure over the past 15 years, it is almost certain that the United States or other coalition partners will help to keep its aircraft in the fight against Daesh.

But it should be clear to Danish parliamentarians that they are in this predicament because they have consistently underfunded their military.

The United States certainly appreciates Denmark’s reliable political support but it has been its ability to sustain meaningful military contributions to coalition efforts that have won American respect.

Quickly acquiring a replacement for the F-16s, increasing defence spending, and pursuing meaningful cooperation with Norway and the Netherlands are three actions that the new government ought to take to keep it for the long term.

Combat Transformation, and the Amphibious Force: A PACFLEET Marine Corps Perspective.

Posted on August 11, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

08/11/2015

2015-08-11 By Robbin Laird

During my visit to PACFLEET at the end of July 2015, I had a chance to discuss the perspective of Colonel Jeffrey “Face” Hagan who is on the staff of Admiral Swift, the PACFLEET Commander.

His role is to operate as link between PACFLEET and the Marines, both in terms of the Marines working directly for PACFLEET as well as with MARFORPAC,

The transformation of the amphibious fleet is a key driver for change in the Pacific and one, which the current PACFLEET commanders are working to leverage for overall combat transformation in the Pacific.

Col. Hagan is a CH-53 pilot with significant MEU experience in the both in the Pacific and in the Atlantic/Middle East. And he has tours of duty in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

“80 percent of my time is spent with the N3 working with the PACFLT/MARFORPAC amphibious campaign plan.

Where do we put the amphibious warfare pieces in all of our future operations?

Are the ships supporting the schemes of maneuver that MARFORPAC wants?

And is MARFORPAC supporting the schemes of maneuver that PACFLT wants?”

For Col. Hagan, the shift from a preoccupation with the land wars created more than a decade gap in prioritizing the maritime integration of the Marines and the Navy.

The transformation of the amphibious warfare mission is occurring precisely as the two services are working to enhance their ability to operate more effectively together in the maritime domain.

He believes PACFLEET leadership recognizes the changes associated with the amphibious ready group and the Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG-MEU) and is working to leverage those changes within their overall strategy in the Pacific.

“If you picture the World War II storming of Tarawa, that’s not the amphibious assault we’re talking about today.

And I think carrier operations and naval operations as a whole are evolving in exactly the same way.

The picture of how we operated in World War II is not how we plan to do it today.”

The dynamics of change associated first with the Osprey and now with the F-35B are showcasing the strike capability of the amphibious fleet.

The fleet is becoming a base from which one would conduct the operation instead of offloading where one would do an operation.

He put the change bluntly: “The amphibious capability now gets a front row seat for consideration for every flavor of operation across the range of military operations (ROMO).

They can deploy, execute the mission, and when the mission is done – leave.

We still have the ability to mass the force if that’s what’s required for the mission.

I can mass the force and overwhelm you with power projection right in your face if needed.

But there are a lot of missions where I don’t want to, or need to, mass force on force; it’s not always the best way to accomplish the mission.”

The Osprey was a key element of the change.

The range and speed of the Osprey and its quality of a plane, which can land as a helicopter meant that one could go to an area of interest, do the task and then return to base or to a ship.

You did not need to be an additional logistical burden on the area in which one would insert; you could be sustained elsewhere.

“Some look at the Osprey as a helicopter which can fly like an airplane; I look at it the other way around.

It is a plane, which can land like a helicopter and dramatically enhance where you employ your forces.

You’ve made a lot of things more manageable through your ability to self-deploy.

Its self-deployment capability has changed forever how we can operate throughout the Pacific area of operations.

It provides the commander with a speed to respond capability which can put a force where you want it but with a smaller logistical footprint, then it can leave and be sustained elsewhere.

With the nature of the terrain in the Pacific, even on a lower end HA/DR response, show the decisive advantage gained from the combination of platforms like the MV-22 and amphibious ships.”

The F-35B is bringing new capabilities to the ARG-MEU which will enhance significantly the capacity to operate from the ships to operate across the ROMO rather than having to forward deploy to land, set a support base and then to operate.

In other words, operating the F-35B from the sea is a key part of reshaping how the USMC-USN team is planning to work from the sea.

And as the USN-USMC team was working through its own combat transformation, allies and partners in the region are looking at enhancing their own amphibious capabilities as well.

Notably, at the lower end of the ROMO, the ability of the US to work with allies with the same TTPs and common C2 means that the ability to work in HA/DR operations with allies and partners can enhance the ability to respond and lower the demand on the US fleet.

“We are seeing a growth industry in the Pacific for amphibious capability.

But we’re seeing two flavors of that.

There are countries that see that amphibious capability more in terms of a mobility asset.

They need an L-class ship to move equipment areas they have to protect.

And some are not ready or able yet to make the intellectual leap of fighting from the ship.”

But there clearly are allies that are looking to evolve like the USN-USMC team towards the strike force capability, which the ARG-MEU is in transition to do more effectively over time.

Working with allies in partners in both areas is important for PACFLEET going forward.

Given the nature of the dynamics of change in the Pacific is crucial for the US to work on transforming its capabilities and to do so with a core effort on cross cutting modernizations with allies.

In an interview last year with Lt. General Robling, then MARFORPAC Commander, highlighted that the Aussies are a good example of an ally building out its capabilities as the US does so and working out a very interactive and mutually reinforcing defense structure.

“The two allies see a mutually beneficial relationship.

The intersection of Australian training ranges with those we are modernizing in Guam is a key element of working cross cutting modernizations.

This will allow us to work with a set of allies in the region as well within the Guam context to facilitate mutual modernizations of the allies as well.

We are not just building our bilateral relationships; we are facilitating multi-national collaboration AMONG our allies as well. This is a clear force multiplier.”

In other words, the opportunity is not just for training but shaping relevant capabilities for 21st century operations.

https://sldinfo.com/the-marines-the-aussies-and-cross-cutting-modernizations/

The slideshow above is from operations during an 11th MEU long-range insertion in 2014.

10/12/2014: MV-22B Ospreys with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 163 (Reinforced), 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, take off from the flight deck of the USS Makin Island for a long-range insertion to Camp Bellows, Hawaii on the Pacific Ocean July 30, 2014.

The 11th MEU and Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group deployed as a sea-based, expeditionary crisis response force capable of conducting amphibious missions across the full range of military operations.

USS MAKIN ISLAND, Pacific Ocean — Marines from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, supported by sailors from Amphibious Squadron 5 and the Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group, conducted a long range insertion of more than 800 nautical miles into Bellows Training Area, Hawaii, July 31, 2014.

Four MV-22B Ospreys, refueled en route by a KC-130J Super Hercules, departed the USS Makin Island and arrived at their destination several hours later.

“Missions such as these highlight the extensive reach of the MEU, as well as our ability to arrive swiftly where our forces may be needed and with the capability to have immediate impacts,” said Col. Matthew Trollinger, the 11th MEU’s commanding officer.

Predeployment training began for the 11th MEU in January, when the unit grew from a staff of fewer than 100 to a flexible, combined-arms, seagoing force of more than 2,500 Marines and sailors.

The MEU’s major subordinate elements are Battalion Landing Team 2/1, Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 163 (Reinforced), and Combat Logistics Battalion 11.

The MEU departed San Diego on July 25 and is currently deployed as part of WESTPAC 14-2.

Credit:11th Marine Expeditionary Unit

July 31, 2014

A seminal example of the changes under way was the engagement of the Marines, the Navy as the lead elements in responding the Phillipine relief mission in 2014.

Americans and others around the globe have seen the moving images of Marine Ospreys and KC-130Js initially based in Okinawa arriving quickly to aide relief efforts in the Philippines.

The Marines are the only force other than Special Operations that uses their C-130s as tankers (hence KC) and this allows for extended missions for the Ospreys.

These ready on arrival Marines in the aftermath of a horrific Typhoon were the initial tip of the spear of a US relief effort, called Operation Damayan.

As one senior Marine has put it:

1st MAW had Ospreys and Hercs in Tacloban about 72 hrs after the storm passed. And I am not talking just about people on the ground but real, self-sustaining capability to move the mountains of relief supplies to where it was needed and where nothing else could get the job done so effectively.

There is no question it is a just a small effort against an immense catastrophe but the combination of rapid deployment and true capability is a crucial part of getting the response in play.

Only a few months ago, the Ospreys had come to Okinawa, and did so in the face of significant orchestrated public protest to their arrival.

Now they are a unique lifesaving asset of the initial engagement of American forces in the effort.

https://sldinfo.com/we-are-ready-now-sir-the-21st-century-version/

https://sldinfo.com/the-initial-response-to-the-philippine-relief-mission-an-osprey-squadron-in-action/

https://sldinfo.com/we-are-ready-now-sir-the-21st-century-version/

https://sldinfo.com/3rd-meb-and-the-philippine-relief-missionveterans-in-the-making-working-on-veterans-day/

https://sldinfo.com/getting-the-initial-job-done-time-is-the-most-precious-commodity/

https://sldinfo.com/the-initial-response-to-the-philippine-relief-mission-an-osprey-squadron-in-action/

https://sldinfo.com/preparing-aid-for-delivery-in-operation-damayan/

https://sldinfo.com/establishing-a-farp-guian-during-operation-damayan/

https://sldinfo.com/sorting-through-supply-packages-to-support-relief-in-the-philippines/

https://sldinfo.com/lt-gen-wissler-visits-tacloban-air-base-after-typhoon-haiyan/

https://sldinfo.com/marines-in-airlift-support-at-tacloban-air-base/

https://sldinfo.com/more-osprey-photos-from-philippines-relief-operation/

https://sldinfo.com/flying-tigers-engage-in-support-of-the-philippine-rescue-effort/

https://sldinfo.com/the-history-of-the-flying-tigers/

https://sldinfo.com/multi-national-relief-aid-in-tacloban-during-operation-damayan/

https://sldinfo.com/usmc-provides-initial-airlift-for-philippine-rescue-effort/

https://sldinfo.com/from-protests-to-leveraging-its-presence-the-osprey-in-japan/

https://sldinfo.com/ospreys-and-c-130js-depart-from-villamor-air-base-manila/

In these photos taken by the “Flying Tigers” Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. “Sniper” Brown over the past few days, one gains a perspective on the mission

[slidepress gallery=’an-osprey-squadron-in-action’]

The first three photos show the Ospreys after having landed on a school field in the midst of significant devastation.

When the digital support for the mission was down, the Ospreys used aerial reconnaissance (their own) to determine where to take relief aid.

Initially, the team thought this was a soccer field but determined upon landing that it was a schoolyard.

Upon delivering aid, the Filipinos worked with the Marines and the local police who were present to deliver aide in an orderly fashion. According to Brown: “The school children were very happy to see us and the parents and children responded with enthusiasm to our arrival.”

The fourth photo shows the C-130 working closely with the Ospreys to support the mission. Indeed, because the C-130J squadron commander lives next door to Brown in Okinawa, they started planning the joint mission several days prior to its execution.

The fifth photo shows the presence of the large deck carrier with an Osprey coming in for refueling.

According to Brown, “A hub and spoke system is emerging in which the Navy helos are being supported by Marine FARPS (Forward Area Refueling Point) with the Ospreys using either the C-130s or the large deck carrier for refueling.”

In its role the USS Washington is a seasbase operating a few miles offshore and is integrated into the overall operations, rather than being considered as something apart from the overall role of airpower supporting the HA/DR mission set.

Concepts of operations can change as new technologies are added to the fleet.

The Marines have operated as the forward deployed force for the operation, and reminds one of the importance of forward presence.

Having integrated capability for the point of the spear is crucial and the Osprey clearly functions as the tip of the tip of the spear for rapid insertion.

As one senior Marine put it:

There is no question it is a just a small effort against an immense catastrophe but the combination of rapid deployment and true capability is a crucial part of getting the response in play.

And it has been clear that the Marines see themselves as part of the overall joint and coalition force and working as a supporting command to the Philippine’s Armed Forces overall.

Working Digital Interoperability: A Natural RAAF and USMC Sweet Spot for Cross-Learning

Posted on August 11, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

2015-08-11 When visiting the Royal Australian Air Force Base at Richmond earlier this week, there was an opportunity to talk with the C-130 squadron, including the training team, about the RAAF reworking the role of the C-130 with the operations of the C-17 and the KC-30A largely in place.

The focus is upon moving from being a point A to point B transport asset to operating as a connected asset in the battlespace, which can enable the joint force to insert, sustain and operate for a period of time in an area of interest.

Although the RAAF C-130 team has not worked closely with the USMC, this is a natural fit, notably given the USMC rotational detachment in Australia.

Indeed, the squadron is doing an exercise in August, which will highlight Live Virtual Constructive training with Nellis (with a full complement of aircraft) and with the Canadians, who are also bringing a C-130 team into the training exercise, focused on a Pacific scenario.

RAAF C-130J at Richmond Air Base, August 10, 2015. Credit: Second Line of Defense.

And the next month, the C-130s are exercising with the Australian Army in an exercise, which will highlight the evolving C-130 capabilities for connectivity as a key enabler for the Army in an exercise called Iron Moon.

The RAAF is looking to push out their support to the Army rotary wing community in shaping a force insertion package which is connected and interoperable.

The senior RAAF officer interview during the C-130 visit suggested that the Plan Jericho approach would lead the RAAF to broaden and widen their international engagement strategy beyond a bandwidth largely focused on other Air Forces.

And with the Harvest Hawk operating in the USMC, clearly the widened aperture needs to encompass the USMC as a partner in evolving the Jericho approach.

The Marines are working hard to shape a more effective ground-air integrated team in part by enhancing the digital interoperability of the force.

In a recent article by Lance Cpl. Jason Jimenez, the evolution of the USMC approach was described as “digital interoperability speeds up the kill chain.”

Innovative technology such as tactical data links are changing the way battles are won and strategies are implemented on the battlefield.

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 467, Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2, and U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command, participated in an exercise testing data movement between different tactical networks.

“This exercise focused on integrating field radios and commercial ‘off the shelf’ tablet systems to rapidly and securely pass converted LINK 16 messages to HMLA aircraft in a tactical training exercise,” said Capt. Justin Pavlischek, the intelligence officer with VMU-2.

Access to LINK 16 data allows interoperability between pilots of certain aircraft, joint terminal attack controller, maneuver units and VMU aircrew, provided the assets and the conversion protocols are present and can be utilized.

“A lot of our systems have requirements and are difficult to modify,” said Capt. Michael Marron Jr., an AH-1W Super Cobra pilot with HMLA-467. “We overcome that by leveraging a specific combination of current technology to provide access to two tactical networks and move some specific messages between those networks – in this case LINK 16 and ANW2.”

According to Marron, digital interoperability is the way the Marine Corps will be able to communicate between multiple type/model/series aircraft in an objective area that is comprised of enemy threats, friendly air positions and ground forces.

“For the rotary-wing aircraft, up until recently, the Marine Corps has been using paper maps and objective area diagrams to plot friendly and enemy locations using a pen or pencil,” said Marron. “Now with tablets, we have modern technology in an aircraft that is 30 years old. It allows us to tap into a tactical picture that was previously out of our reach.”

Assets that are LINK 16 capable can send information to unmanned aerial systems ground control stations, which acts as a network gateway to then push out specific information in a readable format to non-LINK 16 enabled aircraft. Those aircraft can then see that information, provided they are carrying a specific radio and tablet running an application called “KILSWITCH” (Kinetic Integration Lightweight Software Individual Tactical Combat Handheld).

Systems that monitor the aircraft’s status can also be tapped into and that information can be transmitted off the aircraft. “In the future, it will tell how much fuel an aircraft has and how many weapons it possesses,” said Capt. Christopher Cain, a pilot training officer with HMLA-467.

Additionally, there are efforts underway to integrate technologies that will have the ability to populate threats. “If one aircraft can see a threat, it can notify everyone connected, show how far away and how to stay away to mitigate it … It will speed-up the kill chain.”

Among the military aviation community, the jargon “speed-up the kill chain” refers to utilizing the most efficient method toward negotiating a nine-line expeditiously. A nine-line is the method of establishing the scene of an objective area and incorporating necessary information to achieve mission success.

“Passing of that nine-line over the radio is going to take a minute or two, at the very least,” said Cain. “The building of a nine-line using KILSWITCH can take as little as 30 seconds. There is less of an opportunity to copy down a wrong grid or mix up information.”

With this upgraded technology, someone building an attack brief in a KILSWITCH tablet can send it electronically, and quickly ask for read-backs – ultimately the close-air support players will be more effective and able to get more attacks in during their time on station, said Cain.

“The longer it takes to figure out where the enemy is and where the friendlies are, the longer it will take to put down effective fire on the enemy” added Marron. “If I have situational awareness before I show up into an objective area, then I don’t have to spend precious time figuring out what’s going on.”

By design, unmanned aircraft are capable of providing persistent coverage and can be fitted with “plug-and-play” radios and payloads, which will extend the ranges and capability of digital networks into disparate battlefields and areas of operation, explained Pavlischek.

When fitted with these payloads and radios, the MQ-21A Blackjack will be ideally suited to provide airborne data network relay and gateways for aviation and ground units.
In addition to the VMU’s traditional role of providing aerial reconnaissance, the VMU’s mission has recently been expanded to include “supporting arms coordination and control.” The foresight developed into this exercise demonstrated a potential role the VMUs could fill in the future – enhancing the lethal and non-lethal capabilities of the Aviation Combat Element and Marine Air-Ground Task Force through digital interoperability.

According to the 2015 Marine Aviation Plan, digital interoperability will be tested and validated with an “integration through innovation and experimentation” approach. This exercise between VMU-2 and HMLA-467 is one example of this innovation and experimentation within the fleet, explained Pavlischek. It demonstrates how technology present in the Marine unmanned aviation ground control station can provide a critical link, or node, in extending and enhancing the situational awareness, survivability, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability for ground units and aircraft distributed across the battlefield.

In the slideshow below, some highlights of the exercise can be seen.

In the first three photos, a UH-1Y Huey flies with an AH-1W Super Cobra during a training exercise testing a digital interoperability system at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, N.C., July 24, 2015. Digital interoperability is the technology capable of increasing prowess on the battlefield. The exercise included Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 467, Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2, and U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command, testing a LINK 16 conversion system for one of the first times within an explicitly rotary-wing exercise.

In the fourth photo, Sgt. Cyrus Brown operates an AN/PRC-117 G wideband tactical radio, inside a UH-1Y Huey while flying alongside an AH-1W Super Cobra during a training exercise testing a digital interoperability system at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, N.C., July 24, 2015. Brown is a radio operator with VMU-2.

In the final photo, Cpl. Cassie Mousaw operates an AN/PRC-117 G wideband tactical radio and KILSWITCH tablets, during a training exercise testing a digital interoperability system at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, N.C., July 24, 2015. Digital interoperability is the technology capable of increasing prowess on the battlefield. Mousaw is a field radio operator with VMU-2.