Robbin Laird, Author at Second Line of Defense

The Next Phase for the Osprey: Shaping a Global Multi-Mission Combat Asset

Posted on August 2, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

08/02/2015

2015-07-27 By Robbin Laird

This September, the Osprey will reach an 8-year mark in its operational deployment history.

The plane has not only done well, but in 8 short years has demonstrated its capability to have not only a significant impact on combat but to re-shape thinking about concepts of operations.

The result of eight years of operation and innovation is nothing less than creating a high demand force, and the Osprey-enabled assault force is redefining ways to think about the insertion and withdrawal of force and new ways to engage, prevail and disengage.

There are a number of allies interested in buying the plane. But to get to this new phase, challenges need to be met and resolved to clear the path to the next phase, a global one for the Osprey. The plane was never built as a global product, nor wa it designed for global sourcing nor for wide-ranging, high demand global support.

The program has reached a critical turning point – can the Osprey be purchased by allies, supported by a global supply chain and effectively supported worldwide? Can that allied opportunity be merged with an enhanced capacity to support forward deployed Ospreys, flown by the Marines, the Air Force and soon the Navy for its Carrier support operations?

[slidepress gallery=’ospreys-and-landing-zone-flexibilities’]

Put bluntly, the current system of support is falling short of meeting such a growing demand signal.

In interviews I have done over the past few years with Osprey maintainers and operators, it is clear that there is a concern with supply shortfalls and uncertainties unduly affecting operational demands. Again, because the demand signal is higher than DoD decision makers expected, the supply side has fallen short.

https://sldinfo.com/the-price-of-success-can-the-osprey-be-effectively-globally-sustained/

In the words of former USMC Deputy Commandant for Aviation, LtGen Trautman, “As a growing number of unprecedented new missions and operating locations are added to the V-22 community’s repertoire and new international and domestic customers seek to obtain the Osprey, we must ensure the global supply chain evolves to keep pace with this incredible revolution in military technology.”

Clearly, a global sourcing system is possible, and Boeing might look no further than their very successful C-17 global sustainment program.

The C-17 has parts sharing and support by the company worldwide and only this sustainment program has allowed allies to buy the airplane and to work completely inter-actively with the US Air Force.

Clearly, such an approach needs to be shaped to enable the global opportunity of the Osprey to unfold.

It would be a significant failure if this does not happen simply by failing to meet the strategic shift, which a new approach to Osprey sustainment requires.

The recently announced sale of Ospreys to Japan provides an opportunity to re-shape the approach and put in motion a more global approach. Ospreys operating from Japan and by Japan will operate from a high demand and high stress-operating environment. CV-22s, MV-22s and Japanese V-22s can all be sourced from a common warehouse with a higher than adequate supply part sourcing.

Because demand is flexible and the U.S. Ospreys operate throughout the region, ramping up parts stores in a regional warehouse would make sense and start the process of globalization of the Osprey on a sound footing.

As Secretary Wynne, the former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) put it with regard to a major barrier to proper global sourcing: “It would be important for the Japanese to ensure that they have significant material on their side of the export request for their parts depot.

Marines can guide, but the investment in stock really pays off in terms of operational performance.”

The demand signal will go up driven by the new capabilities associated with the Osprey itself.

One demand will be to support F-35Bs afloat. During the USS WASP sea trials in May 2015, the Osprey demonstrated that it could deliver the F-35B engine to the USS WASP. And this capability will be important for the USN-USMC team as well as for other allies looking for shipboard F-35B operations.

This capability was shaped by an industry-USMC initiative. Industry invested its own money in an effort to shape a possible way ahead.

According to Michael Chotkowski, the lead for ship integration of the F-35 engine with Pratt and Whitney: “Pratt and Whitney started the process and started to look at the capability of utilizing the V-22 to get the loaf of bread (the engine inside the breadbox, so to speak.”

Although the Marine Corps was apprised of this activity, there was no requirement no government funding in place for this project.

It was company driven, but customer appraised. The Marines flew an Osprey to the P&W facilities in Connecticut during the evaluation process, so that the P&W engineers could have accurate measurements and discuss operations with loadmasters and aircrew to craft a realistic solution set, including loading and unloading the module through the door which was about the size of the module with container cover.

Secretary Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research Development and Acquisition) pushed hard for a solution set for the power module resupply problem and the emerging skid solution seemed to fit the bill.

Industry designed the concept skid. This was an eight to nine month process.

But the next step was for the Marine Corps working with the Joint Program Office to build the rapid prototype skid seen aboard the USS WASP. Major General Walsh, Director of Expeditionary Warfare in OPNAV, was instrumental in transitioning the effort from industry to JPO sponsorship, and the JPO money crucial in funding the prototype skid.

https://sldinfo.com/shaping-a-new-capability-for-the-osprey-delivering-the-f-35-engine-to-the-uss-wasp/

The Osprey is evolving a broader range of multi-mission capabilities as well which will enhance the demand upon Ospreys as well. What is being worked in the near term is the aerial refueling piece. The USMC clearly wishes to add aerial refueling to its Ospreys to work with the F-35Bs and Harriers aboard their large deck amphibious ships.

Obviously, this adds organic capability, which expands the initial insertion options for the USN-USMC team.

It also opens up possibilities of change for the large deck carrier community as well, both US and worldwide. The capability is important, but equally interesting is the approach Bell-Boeing has developed to prepare for the possible introduction of air refueling.

U.S. Marines with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 161 transport Marines on MV-22B Ospreys during Exercise Iron Fist 2014 to San Clemente Island, Calif., Feb. 14, 2014. Iron Fist is an amphibious exercise that brings together Marines and Sailors from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, other I Marine Expeditionary Force units, and soldiers from the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, to promote military interoperability and hone individual and small-unit skills through challenging, complex and realistic training. ( Read more: http://www.dvidshub.net/image/1169668/2-11-marines-jgsdf-fire-mortars-san-clemente-island. Credit: 15th MEU — U.S. Marines with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 161 transport Marines on MV-22B Ospreys during Exercise Iron Fist 2014 to San Clemente Island, Calif., Feb. 14, 2014. Read more: http://www.dvidshub.net/image/1169668/2-11-marines-jgsdf-fire-mortars-san-clemente-island. Credit: 15th MEU

During a visit to the Boeing Osprey factory in Philadelphia, Boeing laid out the approach, which is leading to the development of the new capability.

Basically, through the use of a 3-D Virtual Reality simulation facility in which human operators are inserted during requirements definition, the process of shaping an onboard aerial refueling system is crafted whereby adjustments can be made early to the system to optimize it in terms of potential operator use.

This means that validated requirements can feed to the preliminary and detailed design phases.

Continuous use of the lab throughout the remaining engineering development tasks supports “in-process” evaluation of prototypes, which are incorporated as required to the baseline.

Instead of taking years, months are required to get an initial design right.

And all of this is being done prior to building the actual system. Another benefit is the ability to look at the impact, which any modification might have on the aircraft for the overall performance of the aircraft itself.

https://sldinfo.com/the-next-phase-for-the-v-22-multi-missionization/

In other words, the Osprey is entering the next phase of its development, a multi-mission phase.

And with that evolution come new tools to shorten the development time to introduce the new capabilities as well, such as carrier and vertical on-board deliver, rescue and medical evacuation, and intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and command and control capabilities as well.

With the demonstrated impact of the Osprey on combat operations, the evolving new multi-mission capabilities, the demand signal on the asset is going up.

With the attractiveness of the capability demonstrated, allies wish to buy the plane.

It is crucial to enhance the ability to globally sustain the aircraft to ensure a smooth and successful transition to the next phase of Osprey global operations.

For the Breaking Defense version of this piece to to the following:

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/07/the-next-phase-for-the-v-22-osprey-build-global-support-like-c-17/

Notes regarding the slideshow above:

During a visit of the Second Line of Defense team to New River Air Station in North Carolina on February 10, 2014, the team experienced during a USMC training session the ability of the Osprey to land and depart LZs rapidly and the transition and get away speed of the airplane mode.

This flexibility is a core combat capability provided to enable the Marines getting off and getting back onto the plane enhanced security and effectiveness.

Not always easy on the stomach, and it would be better to be in the front of the aircraft, when such flexibility is demonstrated, but the Osprey is clearly not a helicopter when it comes to the LZ.

Credit Photos: Second Line of Defense

Next Steps in NATO Missile Defense

Posted on August 2, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

2015-08-01 By Richard Weitz

At the 2010 Lisbon summit, NATO decided to make missile defense a priority mission and committed to protect European populations and territory from missile attacks as well as their deployed armed forces. The NATO decision did not highlight any particular country as a threat but cited general concerns about the proliferation of ballistic missiles around its periphery.

Current missile threats to Europe emanate from two geographic regions.

To the south, in North Africa and Missile Defense, NATO faces terrorism and civil wars as well as immediate and emerging missile threats from Syria and Iran.

To the east, Russia has become newly threatening, with persistent threats of nuclear targeting against NATO allies, particularly those backing missile defense systems and the modernization of Russia’s missile capability with threatening actions in neighboring states, increased Russian long-range air activity, and the deployment of Russian Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad.

The United States and NATO have defined their missile defense programs as directed against exclusively non-Russian threats. In particular, the 2010 U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) states that U.S. missile defenses are focused on defending against limited missile threats from countries like North Korea and Iran to the U.S. homeland as well as regional missile threats to U.S. allies and partners and deployed U.S. forces throughout the world. The goals are to deter and defend against threats and assure U.S. allies about their security. The Obama administration, in the BMDR and subsequently, has insisted that U.S. missile defense efforts are not directed against Russia or China.

Indeed, until recently, the United States tried to cooperate with Russia on missile defense within the NATO framework as well as bilaterally. These efforts proved unsuccessful since Moscow insisted on limiting the capabilities and deployments of NATO missile defenses.

Although Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has resulted in the suspension of formal NATO-Russian dialogue and joint projects on European missile defense, and NATO has been strengthening its conventional capabilities for defending its members against Russian threats, NATO leaders continue to state that their missile defenses are not directed against Russia.

U.S. contributions to NATO’s collective missile defense are proceeding in line with the EPAA. The United States has completed Phase 1, with the stationing of a U.S. missile defense radar in Turkey under NATO’s operational control and the sustained deployment of a rotating fleet of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)-capable ships in the Mediterranean.

The United States will complete EPAA Phase 2 later this year, with the deployment of an Aegis Ashore site in Romania that will use the same Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) interceptor as the Aegis ships.

Ceremony held last year in Romania.

The Pentagon hopes to complete Phase 3 in 2018, with the construction of an Aegis Ashore site in Poland equipped with the new U.S. SM-3 Block IIA interceptor being co-developed with Japan. The completion of Phase 3 will extend ballistic missile defense to cover all NATO European territory.

EPAA serves as the backbone of NATO’s missile collective defense architecture. The United States has been constantly changing its BMD plans regarding Europe. At times, these shifts have weakened European trust in U.S. security guarantees regarding missile defense.

At present, missile defense in no longer a divisive issue in the alliance. Ballistic missile defense in NATO Europe is seen as a shared commitment of all 28 members. Several European members of NATO have also pursued missile defense capabilities, including as contributions to NATO collective missile defense.

At the 2012 Chicago summit, NATO declared that its collective missile defense had achieved “Interim Capability;” current plans are to raise this status to “Initial Operational Capability” at the 2016 Warsaw summit, following the deployment of the Aegis Ashore system in Romania and improvements in NATO’s collective BMD command and control capabilities.

In line with U.S. and NATO doctrine, none of these programs aim to counter Russia’s large and sophisticated arsenal of ballistic or cruise missiles. NATO has no plans to change this policy, though NATO may deploy missile defenses along with other forces required for crisis management and reassurance near Russia.

The prevailing view in NATO is a desire to avoid further exacerbating Russia-NATO tensions and reduce the prospects of securing Moscow’s cooperation on other security priorities such as Iran and terrorism. It would be difficult technically and financially to develop missile defenses capable of defending against Russia’s ballistic missiles and there is no political consensus to develop such a program. NATO analysts fear that even declaring such a goal would provide substance to Russian claims that the missile defense system is indeed directed against Russia.

aegis_ashore_conceptual_view

aegis_ashore

Despite Russian actions in Ukraine, violation of the INF Treaty, and withdrawal from the CFE Treaty, many Europeans do not consider Russia a military threat to NATO. European governments also oppose spending more on missile defense.

Launching a new BMDR threat identification process will prove divisive given NATO’s previous reluctance to identify even Iran as an explicit threat, concerns about antagonizing Russia, and opposition to making significant new investments in missile defense capabilities.

However, some NATO experts are arguing the alliance should be allocating more time and resources to the missile threat posed by Russia in light of its new assertiveness, current missile deployments, and future modernization efforts. Their general position is that NATO must recognize and soberly assess current threats and adjust its deployments and capabilities accordingly.

In particular, some believe it is time for another BMDR due to the changing threat environment—new threats from Russia, possible reconciliation with Iran, evolving conflict in Syria, and political changes in the Middle East. They worry that failing to address the new threat from Russia encourages NATO members like Poland to pursue their own national capabilities, weakening NATO collective defense.

Some military analyst also want to deny Russia options to launch limited missile strikes or use threat of missile attacks to intimidate allies. In this regard, even limited capabilities would force Russia to contemplate larger missile strikes to overcome these defenses.

Noting that progress on missile defense within NATO has occurred most often when a small group of countries led by the United States has taken the lead, they believe that strong U.S. leadership could overcome current opposition within NATO to addressing Russian missile threats.

The U.S. Missile Defense Agenda in the Asia-Pacific Region: Australia and Beyond

Posted on August 2, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

2015-08-02 By Richard Weitz

The United States aims to avert regional conflicts and aggressive actions against its Asian allies and partners.

Missile defense is a core component of this U.S. strategy in Asia, along with regional diplomacy (strengthening old alliances while building new friendships), economic initiatives like the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and other measures.

Effective missile defense can, along with dispersing U.S. regional assets, hardening potential targets, and promoting military inter-operability with potential military partners, enhance regional deterrence and defense by complicating a potential aggressor’s planning and negating the value of their missile threats.

To make its extended deterrence guarantees credible, Washington must demonstrate that it will deter and defeat potential aggression against its allies despite the perceived vulnerabilities of U.S. forces in Asia and U.S. allies to the growing portfolio of Chinese and North Korean medium-range missiles.

Each country has more than one thousand ballistic missiles armed with conventional and unconventional warheads. Beijing targets Taiwan, while Pyongyang’s missile arsenal is directed at South Korea, but both countries are prepared to launch missiles against Japan and U.S. targets in Asia.

China opposes U.S. regional missile defenses since they strengthen U.S. alliances.

WATERS TO THE WEST OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA (March 17, 2013) The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain (DDG 56), front, the Republic of Korea Navy Aegis-class destroyer ROKS Seoae-Yu-Seong-Ryong (DDG 993), middle, and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS McCampbell (DDG 85) move into formation during exercise Foal Eagle 2013. McCampbell and McCain are members of Destroyer Squadron 15, forward deployed to Yokosuka, Japan, and are underway to conduct exercise Foal Eagle 2013 with allied nation Republic of Korea in support of regional security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Declan Barnes/Released)

Missile defenses are a natural evolution of the U.S. alliances in Asia. New technological threats require new technological responses, such as joint missile defenses. The Chinese discount technological developments or North Korean aggression as drivers of U.S. regional BMD partnerships. They oppose BMD cooperation for making U.S. alliances more enduring, more joint, and more effective.

In the case of South Korea, Beijing wants to loosen military ties between Seoul and Washington and eventually become the dominant partner of both North and South Korea.

Just as European countries are reluctant to define Russia as a potential missile threat, so in Asia the United States and its allies have cited North Korea as the focus of the missile defense efforts rather than China.

Asian countries have a complicated view of the China-U.S. relationship. A few years ago, Asian countries worried that Chinese-U.S. relations were becoming too close; now they worry about being caught between their worsening tensions.

The Obama administration does not pursue a containment strategy regarding China and denies that its missile defenses are directed against Beijing’s massive missile arsenal

Well before Prime Minister Shinzo Abe more openly described China as a growing military threat, missile defense cooperation with the United States ceased being controversial in Japan, despite the unprecedented level of bilateral BMD collaboration. The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report described Japan as one of the most important U.S. partners in this area. This cooperation had to overcome technology-sharing issues and Japanese concern over how China might respond.

In the end, the advantages of BMD cooperation with Washington—such as improved defenses against North Korean threats, strengthened security ties with the United States, and reduced pressure on Japan to build its own nuclear deterrent—outweighed the costs.

Japanese Aegis flight test. (Credit: US Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs, 12/18/07)

In terms of future challenges, Japan and the United States both need more missile defense ships and BMD interceptors. Japan must decide to what extent it wants an autonomous early warning system or one more interoperable with the United States, which would provide redundancy for space assets that are inherently vulnerable.

In addition to missile defenses, Japan has made progress on dispersal (many runways) and interoperability with the United States but has not hardened likely targets sufficiently.

Conversely, South Korea ignores the Chinese military threat to Japan and the United States and remains concerned about Beijing’s opposition to ROK-U.S. missile defense cooperation.

Seoul sees Beijing as an important economic partner and critical actor in resolving the DPRK problem, though it is hard to discern what China has done in this regard. The ROK has kept its missile defense program detached from U.S. regional defenses and focused on developing domestic capabilities to counter the DPRK’s shorter-range missiles, though the preference remains on more offensive and preemptive strategies.

Due to the large number of missiles and artillery systems aimed at South Korea, the ROK military aims to rely on massive artillery counterbattery strikes and some preemptive missile strikes to suppress the North’s strike weapons soon after hostilities commence.

However, the ROK has only recently begun to acquire sensors and systems (like Global Hawk and the F-35) able to locate and destroy the North’s mobile missiles, but for now ROK planners expect the United States to accomplish this mission using its own ISR and strike assets as part of their agreed “4D” strategy to detect, defend, disrupt, and destroy North Korea’s missile inventory.

The ROK also needs to acquire more precision-guided munitions and promote greater jointness in what has traditionally been an Army-dominated military.

The Pentagon would also like the ROK to upgrade its national missile defenses and allow the United States to deploy a THAAD battery in South Korea to better protect U.S. ground forces from DPRK longer-range missiles.

South Korean Air Force visiting the 33rd Fighter Wing, September 2012. Credit: 33rd FW

Although Chinese opposition to such a deployment is strong, it has become so heavy-handed as to have become counterproductive. Nonetheless, a desire for strategic autonomy, a national mission to develop indigenous missile capabilities, popular opposition to spending funds on missile defenses, the ROK military’s preference for more offensive missile and artillery systems, and limited South Korean interest in expanding its regional security role until the North Korean threat ends make it unlikely that the ROK will purchase its own THAAD system anytime soon.

These tensions between Japan and South Korea make it hard for the United States to promote the kind of regional missile defense structure already present in Europe and under construction in the Persian Gulf.

U.S. BMD cooperation in the region is primarily bilateral, resembling the overall U.S. defense relations in the region.

In addition, allied missile defenses must compete for regional attention and budgets with a number of other defense concerns, including maritime domain awareness, paramilitary deployments such as coast guards, unmanned systems, power projection capabilities, and maritime domain awareness.

Despite having a declared BMD research and development program, China has not been interested in engaging in a missile defense dialogue with the United States.

The U.S. is concerned that Beijing’s declared missile defense programs are actually designed to develop anti-satellite weapons, while the Chinese seem more concerned with U.S. nuclear and precision-strike conventional weapons than U.S. missile defenses. Efforts to sustain a China-U.S. dialogue on “strategic stability,” which could encompass these broader issues as well as missile defense, has proven difficult due to a lack of interest in Beijing.

As for Australia, its national security community has been ambivalent about missile defense.

The Labor government was unenthusiastic about missile defense and eager to sustain good relations with China as well as the United States. The current conservative government is interested in deepening security ties with Japan as well as the United States, which could extend include missile defense.

The military also wants missile defense capabilities to protect its deployed forces but its budget is constrained, the country has other defense procurement priorities, and justifying missile defenses to counter an implausible North Korean threat rather than China’s growing missile capabilities would be a hard sell in Beijing.

Against this background, the U.S. missile defense effort needs to achieve greater coordination among all the relevant U.S. agencies and with foreign partners.

Washington needs to develop some creative mechanism to promote greater intelligence sharing and missile defense collaboration between South Korea and Japan, such as creating a regional data fusion center in which the U.S, would share regional intelligence among all partners without necessarily identifying its source (sparing South Koreans from knowing what they are sharing with or learning from Japan).

Australia as well as India and the Philippines might also participate if the U.S. could justify the mechanism to the participants (though probably not China) as a transparency and confidence-building measure.

To remove possible political barriers to its regional BMD plans, Washington must overcome foreign concerns about U.S. credibility including due to inadequate defense spending and the contested prospects for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement.

Regional intelligence cooperation can improve when the sources and methods used to acquire the information are concealed, resulting in less fear of exposing assets and reducing the perceived national ownership of intelligence.

The United States has to exercise BMD capabilities regularly with regional partners since there will be no time to rehearse them in a crisis.

Preparing for the Next Phase of Asset Transparency: Global Operationally Sustainment Chains

Posted on August 1, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

08/01/2015

2015-07-20 By Robbin Laird

We have heard a lot of the years about supply chains, getting more transparency in supply chains, building “smart” supply chains, driving “value” from the supply chain and things like “just in time delivery” to lower costs while having effective support.

Of course, these civilian terms are used by the military, but only go so far to describe the challenges which the expeditionary military and coalition on fly militaries have in sustaining operations and then withdrawing from those operations.

What they need is an order of magnitude greater than the civilian sector, namely expeditionary or coalition enabled operational sustainment.

“Just in time” is not good enough for military forces facing adversaries which wish to destroy them; it is about having more effective capabilities than the other guy.

It is about doing what Secretary Wynne argues is planning to avoid the fair fight.

And planning to avoid the fair fight has built into an effective sustained engagement force.

The transformation of military logistics which has happened in part due to RFID and the IT systems, which can leverage RFID, is a good start.

There is better knowledge about inventories, better tracking, better invoicing, more realistic knowledge about stocks in movement due to sensor enabled information systems.

This is a good start; but only the start.

The next frontier is to expand this capability back into the manufacturing side to the employment and deployment side.

It is about mastering the production-operations sustainment cycle, and to do so when adversaries are doing their best to isolate and kill your forces.

This would entail three key tasks to be mastered.

First, there is the opportunity with new platforms to tag the parts and to keep a life cycle information on those parts from cradle to grave and from depot to deployment to deployment to repair, etc.

Second, there is the need for coalitions who share similar platforms to share parts. Coalition partners among the industrial democracies will move slowly to decide to do something but need to move rapidly to move to an area of interest to gain operational mastery.

And to do so, they are not going to bring national WALMARTS with them; they need to have shared knowledge about the flow of parts and parts availability at the point of engagement and even the point of attack.

Third, there is a need to know what has been moved forward in an expeditionary operation and to know what needs to be moved back from the area of interest to more secure areas when an operation is over.

Five Pillars

As Tim Gibson of Fujitsu put it: “Having a more effective logistics management system at the point of operation is crucial to security of forces going forward.

We don’t want to be Quartermasters for Terrorists.”

Put in other terms, a foundation has been laid with shaping RFID-enabled inventory and shipping systems, but only a foundation from the standpoint of 21^st century operations or to provide for the expanded role for insertion forces.

https://sldinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Insertion-Forces-Front-Line-Defence.pdf

In an interview with David South, a key member of the GlobeRanger team, who has been dealing with the defense side of their business since the early launch point ten years ago, the path GlobeRanger has taken and defense to shape a solid foundation and the opportunities for moving to the next frontier was the focus of attention.

Question: How did the initial GlobeRangaer, sensor-enabled logistics management IT approach start with the Department of Defense?

David South: It really started with a DoD mandate in the 2004-2005 time frame for vendors supplying DoD to tag their products for DoD then to be able to manage the flow of goods.

(For the Wynne Memorandum on this requirement see the following:

RFIDPolicy07-30-2004

and for the Wynne approach see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/michael-w-wynne-i-hate-logistics/).

There are somewhere around 60,000 vendors that supply the DoD through the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) or the General Services Administration (GSA).

Five Pillars Details

As their contracts came up for renewal, they to comply with the RFID tagging.

Then it was required as well that at the thousands of doors at DLA locations around the globe they had to equip their doors and their various receipt points with RFID. And then use software to run that infrastructure.

It started with a pilot project and we won the pilot project.

The pilot then expanded to a site, a small site, and then expanded to a bigger site and so on.

Ultimately it was deployed and all the DLA defense logistics agency distribution centers around the United States and abroad.

Question: Was this just for the vendors or was DLA doing this as well for their shipping system?

David South: At first, it was just the vendors.

A few years later, DLA itself began using tags to track their own shipping.

This initial phase was just receiving tags at a dock door and then integrating into the backend system for the DLA, which was an important project for us.

So if DLA shipped something to the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, GSA, Coast Guard, then they had to retag on the outbound side so that once that shipped out then they were compliant with their own mandate on the shipping side.

It was the initially it was the receipt side; then it was on the shipping side.

Unfortunately, the vendors decided to do only the bare minimum in order to comply which meant the full benefits were not realized. The result was that what became known as slap-and-ship RFID became the norm.

It’s the concept of vendors buying a roll of tags off the internet, and basically not changing any of their processes except what is necessary to get out the door by slapping a tag on it so they are compliant.

Question: This slap-and-ship approach meant that the real benefits of RFID enabled IT systems was not going to be realized?

David South: It didn’t help the vendor at all. If all you’re doing is slapping something on its way out the door doesn’t help you that much, but if you slap the tag on in the manufacturing process then it helps you.

Because then it helps you in your manufacturing process, finished goods process, stock and inventory process, and packing and shipping process.

DLA Asset Transparency

The earlier in any process that you tag the more you will benefit.

And some of the larger vendors to the DOD did do that and they benefited in both commercial and defense applications.

Question: When did you start to see a change on the government side as well or a recognition that unlocking the value of what sensor-enabled information might provide to the DoD?

David South: It was about five years into the process.

Folks began to say: “Okay, we made this investment. We put all these readers on dock doors and we put readers on weigh points in our distribution centers, and we’ve done all these things. We’ve invested in software, we’ve invested in tagging, where else can we derive value?”

And I think that once they started asking that question then they started seeing other places where they could derive value by benefiting from those tagged goods coming in the door deeper into their logistics processes inside their four walls, if you will.

And that’s when they did things like automated put-away, and high-value item tracking, and more better near real-time location of goods, high priority items.

For example, in the US Army there are a couple of metrics that their supply chain is measured by that everybody in logistics with the Army knows; it’s called RWT and CWT, or requisition wait time and customer wait time.

And it’s just the amount of time that it takes when you need a part to fix a Humvee or some other piece of equipment.

Then how long does it take to order that part, and then work its way through the procurement process, get that part at your doorstep?

And then how long does it take then to fix it and get that Humvee or whatever the vehicle is or whatever the thing is that you’re fixing, back into the hands of the war fighter or the unit.

And those are measured in days and there are different mandates by the US Army on how long that needs to be based on the priority of the item.

In other words a box of socks is a lower priority than getting a Humvee back into operation.

Question: GlobeRanger now works with all of the services.

What differences do you observe with regard to the logistics approach?

David South: There are significant differences and they range from the architecture for doing logistics to very mundane details.

For instance, the Air Force has a centralized hub and spoke architecture where they equipped RFID at the base level just to collect the data.

But then all the data is brought back to a central location in order to do transaction processing.

Whereas other branches of the service and DLA process their transactions at the edges, at each defense location as opposed to bringing it back to a central location.

One advantage of our systems and approaches is that we provide a process architecture, which can work with the different approaches and systems.

That process can be centralized or distributed and then parts of it can be put at the edge, parts can be put in a regional server, and other parts of it can be put in a central server.

We can live at the edge, we can live regionally, and we can live centrally, and it’s the same software and the same transaction processing.

Question: This lays a solid foundation, but there is a clear need to go further, to cross into the next frontier, so to speak.

Your systems obviously have been crucial for asset tracking, inventory control, and shipping tracking.

But aren’t we at the point where it would be nice to have some new metrics to measure up against what your information can open up, especially with regard to operational and manufacturing realities embedded into the operational support chain, so to speak?

You’ve laid a very interesting foundation for the next steps, which really could be breakthrough in terms of understanding operational logistic realities and manufacturing operational logistic realities.

David South: I think we can talk about and think about the next frontier if you will.

We propose ultimately to better equip the war fighter for them to do ultimately do what their job is.

And we have to optimize that each point along the way and what are the things that need to be optimized?

Anything related to any sort of a supply chain or a process, whether it be a manufacturing process or a parts repair process or a tool-tracking process, or even a human tracking process.

And all those things have distinct similarities.

It’s an asset that has a state, that has activities that it does, and activities that it has done to it.

And it moves in space and it needs to be tracked.

And it has things like maintenance and cleaning and other things associated with it.

Clearly, a new system like the F-35 global system should be set up that what to cross into the next frontier.

The F35 program can track parts through the manufacturing process.

And then after its manufactured tracking parts through the repair process to make sure they are there just in time, make sure that they’re authentic, they didn’t come from an unauthorized or un-trusted source, those sorts of things.

That is definitely the next frontier for logistics and sustainment.

For earlier pieces discussing the challenges of shaping 21^st century logistics see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/managing-defense-supply-chains-shaping-a-21st-century-way-ahead/

https://sldinfo.com/the-fujitsu-global-defense-initiative-breaking-down-logistical-stovepipes-and-shaping-global-solutions/

https://sldinfo.com/reshaping-global-logistics-support-for-allied-capabilities-the-fujitsu-approach/

https://sldinfo.com/re-shaping-logistical-support-and-decision-making-the-case-of-the-21st-century-hanger/

https://sldinfo.com/shaping-effective-solution-sets-for-logistics-management-edge-software-and-distributed-decision-making/

https://sldinfo.com/whitepapers/the-imotion-edgeware-platformreshaping-the-logistics-enterprise/

https://sldinfo.com/whitepapers/supply-chain-management-innovation-building-smart-networks/

https://sldinfo.com/the-coming-of-the-f-35-a-special-report-on-the-introduction-of-the-new-air-system/

https://sldinfo.com/the-strategic-impact-of-the-global-sustainment-approach-of-the-f-35/

https://sldinfo.com/the-raaf-and-culture-change-building-sustainable-reach/

Shaping a 21st Century Approach to Logistics: The DLA Aviation Approach

Posted on July 27, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

07/27/2015

2015-07-13 By Robbin Laird

Twenty First century air systems are building new approaches to sustainability.

But if the services worldwide do not transform their approach to logistics and sustainability then the gains built into these systems will not be realized.

Clearly, the leadership of DLA Aviation of the Defense Logistics Agency understands the importance of shaping a transition from legacy to 21^st century systems, and is working with industry to shape new ways to sustain a 21^st century force.

DLA Aviation is working closely with the services in shaping new approaches to provide for support for 21^st century combat systems.

To gain an appreciation of the approach, Charles Lilli, the Deputy Commander of DLA Aviation, was interviewed and provided a sense of the progress and the challenges for the way ahead.

Lilli has a background in both the services, industry and in government and as such is well placed to understand the challenge of transition. He served in the US Navy for 28 years and retired as a Rear Admiral and worked in many aspects of sustainment and support. He then joined Lockheed Marin where he was the director of Sustainment and Supply Chain Integration for Lockheed Martin. And in the Fall of 2012 was named Deputy Commander of DLA Aviation.

Charles Lilli

DLA Aviation supports more than 1,800 weapon systems and is the U.S. military’s integrated materiel manager million national stock number items, industrial retail supply and depot-level repairable acquisitions. Mr. Lilli, along with the DLA Aviation commander, oversees an aviation demand chain responsible for more than $4.4 billion in annual sales.

Positioned alongside its military customers, DLA Aviation manages industrial support activities at Robins Air Force Base, Ga., Tinker AFB, Okla., Hill AFB, Utah, Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, N.C., Naval Air Station North Island, Calif., and NAS Jacksonville, Fla.

DLA Aviation also manages depot-level repairable procurement operations at Robins, Tinker and Hill Air Force Bases; Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) Weapon Systems Support, Philadelphia; and at Redstone Army Arsenal, Ala.

DLA Aviation also operates an industrial plant equipment maintenance, repair and overhaul facility at Mechanicsburg, Pa.

Question: Since you have joined DLA, could you highlight some examples of progress made to shape a more effective logistics approach?

Lilli: That is a tough question.

But over the last couple of years we have developed innovative contracts that incentivize industry to work collaboratively with us to reduce material cost, improve material availability, reduce material lead times and share any additional savings generated over the life of the contract.

For example, we have a performance based contract in place with Boeing. The contract is a Fixed Price Incentive based contract that has moved us from purchasing parts to the procurement of material support for all Boeing’s sole source products to the military services.

To make the award, we started with a detailed analysis of the demand and material costs for those items in the previous 2 years. With that data we calculated the actual cost and then through some additional simulation projected what it would cost us to continue that same support. That value became the upper limit of the negotiation target for the award.

At the negotiation table, we got Boeing to agree to provide the same service at a lower price and the contract includes incentives to ensure that occurs. The total savings for the government are estimated at over 20%.

Question: You’re making a best case assessment based on past practices, and what it would cost you to do operate the next fiscal year in a particular domain.

And then you’re looking to industry to give you a better price and to maintain the level of performance, based on their unique knowledge of the technology and specific supply base.

That knowledge and a long term agreement allow them to drive the price down.

That’s essentially what that contract is doing?

Lilli: That is exactly what it does.

Mike Opela, 544th Propulsion Maintenence Squadron Director discusses the process of modifying a Marine STOVL F135 engine with Major General Jeffrey L. Harrigian, Director of the Headquarters US Air Force F-35 Integration Office during a visit to the Air Force Sustainment Center and Oklahoma City Air Logistics Complex where the modification is performed. (U.S. Air Force photo/Marlin Zimmerman)

Question: There are programs like the Osprey program that have global sales opportunities but need an appropriate sustainment structure. What is the state of play with regard to Osprey sustainment?

Lilli: The original sustainment concept for the V22 was commercial support, like the F-35. The idea was to pay Bell-Boeing for the plane to be sustained operationally.

But the approach has shifted to a more traditional approach where DoD will maintain the system through its life cycle.

But regardless of the support strategy, the original equipment manufacturers (OEM’s) play a significant and important role and they must be incentivized to keep the parts flowing in sufficient quantity and quality to operate the aircraft worldwide.

The only way industry can be incentivized to make investment in any type of sustainment beyond production, and to address obsolescence early enough in the system life to make a difference, is to put in place long term contracts specifically designed to do just that.

The goal is to keep the OEM’s involved so that they don’t just sell out the rights when the production gets cold.

I think that’s a strategy that we have to continue to pursue.

Question: The depots are not going away but you are working new ways to integrate industry with the depots to deliver a more performance-based logistics approach.

Could you provide a sense of how you are going about doing this?

Lilli: Working closely with our service partners, we are working on new approaches and contractual arrangements.

For example, we are shaping a new working relationship between General Electric and Tinker Air Force Base (Air Force Sustainment Center) to cover the F101 Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) process.

http://www.tinker.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=9404

http://www.geaviation.com/military/engines/f110/

GE is delivering a SLEP program to the USAF for F series engines. We are preparing to buy the SLEP kits from GE under contract and actually going to bring GE into the depot.

It’s not a new concept and has been effective in the past.

The idea is for commercial industry to work with our organic depots in order to introduce more efficient and streamlined maintenance processes.

The Oklahoma City Air Logistics Complex, working together with Pratt & Whitney partners, was given the challenge of retrofitting 10 U.S. Marine Corps F135 engines in a 12-month time period in order to support USMC initial operating capability. All retrofits were accomplished while also qualifying tools, validating and demonstrating tech data and performing unscheduled Fan Module Maintenance in support of the F-35 fleet. Credit: USAF

In addition, we will put them on contract to work closely with the service engineering community who is responsible for safety of flight, introduce suggested reliability improvements for the engines.

It’s important to note that for DLA to do this work, we have to work closely with the military service, in this case the Air Force to provide them what they need and we believe that the end result will allow an unprecedented level of partnership between the government and industry.

GE has indicated that in the future, if the relationship proves successful, they could use Tinker to make the repairs to engines they currently repair for various international military customers in commercial depots.

That would be a huge win for Air Force.

Question: A key challenge to shape a 21^st century logistics approach is to get beyond service stove piping and service specific approaches even when they are buying common equipment.

This challenge is already evident with F-35 and as procurement favors a smaller number of common multi-mission programs, getting more commonality out of support is crucial.

Captains of Industry Program was created in March 2012 to help the agency shape new approaches to defense sustainment.

How are you trying to encourage change in this area?

Lilli: It is a major challenge.

There is no doubt that many of our current or historically inherited support systems can stand some improvement.

As you mentioned in your question, DoD is trying to move to a single support strategy for the JSF, in order to gain efficiencies at the platform level, but different service culture and business practices make getting to a single solution challenging.

For example, we are taking it on at the component level through a contract with Honeywell that is designed to provide for PBL support auxiliary power units and a couple of other components common to Army, Navy and the Air Force.

It’s sort of JSF-lite, but it may be a way to break through some of services differences at the component level and demonstrate the potential savings that can be achieved with an enterprise wide approach.

Question: How has the DLA Captains of Industry worked to generate innovation as well?

Lilli: The Captains of Industry program was launched in 2012 and provides a venue for industry to meet with DLA leadership to suggest ways to enhance sustainment at lower cost. Industry is encouraged to submit ideas about how to look at the problems from their perspective and provide solutions for going forward.

Industry has come back with a number of innovative solutions, and the Honeywell approach to APU support was one product of this process.

The Re-Norming of Airpower: The Eurofighter Contribution

Posted on July 25, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

07/25/2015

2015-07-17 By Robbin Laird

Airpower has become a ubiquitous enabler of combat operations.

Indeed, air enablement is a key element of virtually every aspect of the US and its allies in operating worldwide against a variety of threats.

Airpower has evolved throughout the “land wars” to become an enabler for intelligence, strike, lift, and generally shaping more agile ground forces.

As the focus shifts from the “land wars” to challenges shaped by a variety of competitors and adversaries mixing advanced with more traditional technologies, airpower is undergoing a fundamental transformation.

Fifth generation aircraft are a major change agent in the evolving airpower dynamic.

We have argued for some time that the introduction of fifth generation aircraft into legacy fleets was part of a process we have called the “re-norming” of airpower.

We have even published a book with that title.

But we have emphasized that it is the overall air combat enterprise, which will change, not simply the introduction of a new production fighter aircraft.

This means in part that some legacy systems will simply be jettisoned, but some will be modernized as the air enterprise evolves.

All legacy aircraft are not created equal; a premium will be placed on those, which are inherently upgradeable and provide core capabilities for the evolving air enterprise.

https://sldinfo.com/the-f-35-and-legacy-aircraft-re-norming-airpower-and-the-meteor-example/

https://sldinfo.com/airpower-in-the-next-two-decades-of-the-21st-century-secretary-wynne-looks-ahead/

The Royal Air Force is relying on a twin transformation of the Typhoon with the F-35 to provide for its core strike capability.

This means that the modernization of the Typhoon coupled with the reshaping function, which the F-35 will bring to the reshaping of the air operations effort, are both part of the British approach to re-norming airpower.

As I wrote earlier:

The RAF is undergoing two fighter aircraft transitions at the same time.

On the one hand, the Tornado is being retired and the Typhoon is subsuming its missions. On the other hand, the F-35B is coming to the fleet and will be working with Typhoon for the period ahead.

These are three very different aircraft built in different periods of aviation history.

The venerable Tornado has seen a significant evolution over its time; from its initial use as an ultra low-level nuclear and unguided weapons bomber to an ISR-enabled precision strike and close support aircraft.

Spanish Typhoon on the platform in winter conditions during their Baltic Air Policing mission. Photo courtesy of: Spanish Air Force.

The Typhoon entered the RAF more than a decade ago as a classic air superiority fighter, but is now being asked to expand its effects and to subsume the Tornado missions.

The F-35B is entering the fleet as the Typhoon is making this transition.

This will mean that the RAF will be managing a double transition – Typhoon becoming multi-role and the F-35B operating off of land or ships to provide the fifth generation capability to the evolving RAF strike force.

It is also the case that Italy is undergoing a double transition as well.

And with the UK and Italy both re-norming under the impact of the introduction of the F-35 and the modernization of Eurofighter, cross cutting operational lessons certainly will be learned and shared in shaping an overlapping re-norming approach.

I added in another piece, a potential way to look at the Italian-UK dynamic for re-norming.

Both the UK and Italy will operate a mixed Eurofighter and F-35 fleet. Both have operated the Tornado, which is reaching the end of its service life. Both will sort through evolutions of the Eurofighter to encompass some of the mission sets for Tornado as the Tornado is retired and as the F-35 comes into the two fleets and provides the next surge for the re-working of air-led combat concepts of operations.

A key element of this transformation will be reworking the connectivity among air, sea and ground systems as well as shaping the weaponization approaches of joint and coalition forces.

Typhoon Carrying Meteor Missile. Credit: BAE Systems

In part, this is a Eurofighter transition whereby the radars are upgraded, and weapons added; in part this is the coming of the F-35 and its impact on reshaping air enabled combat operations.

And associated with this will be fundamental changes over time in C2, and the approach to strike operations.

The UK and Italy already fly together in operations through their use of Tornados and Eurofighters and have clearly shared combat learning with regard to the use of these platforms; as the F-35 comes on line this combat learning cycle will continue into the next generation of aircraft, and shaping ways to approach fifth generation warfare.

In effect, the dynamics of change for Italy and the UK will be a function of the intersection of four variables: the evolution of the Eurofighter; the impact of the F-35 and the global fleet of F-35s; changes in weaponization, and evolving C2 for strike and combat operations.

There is an inherent possibility that the UK and Italy could provide an important force for synergy in shaping concurrent approaches to evolving concepts of operations. Of course, this depends upon how effective their working relationship is and how effective cross-MOD, and cross-industrial relationships are in leveraging their working relationship.

A recent report by Justin Bronk of RUSI provides an important look at the Eurofighter modernization part of the re-norming equation. [ref]Justin Bronk, Maximsing European Combat Air Power: Unlocking the Eurofighter’s Full Potential (London: RUSI, 2015)[/ref]

The report is based on discussions with Typhoon pilots and others, and provides a look at various ways ahead with the Eurofighter as part of the European approach to re-norming airpower over the next two decades.

The numbers of operational Eurofighters and their evolving capabilities make them important elements of the defense modernization effort. A recent press release from Eurofighter highlighted the baseline achievements of the enterprise in providing for a core European capability.

Eurofighter Typhoon has now achieved more than 300,000 flying hours since the entry-into-service of its worldwide fleet. Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH confirmed the milestone today (July 17, 2015) adding that, with 571 aircraft ordered and 438 delivered, the programme has “delivered unprecedented levels of reliability”.

Eurofighter Typhoon in flight. Credit: Eurofighter

The first 5,000 flying hours were achieved in November 2005. 10,000 hours came in August 2006 and 20,000 in May 2007. By August 2008, the Eurofighter Typhoon fleet had surpassed 50,000 hours and 100,000 flying hours was reached in January 2011. In July 2014 the consortia announced that the 250,000 flying hour milestone had been reached while, at the same time, Eurojet, the makers of the Typhoon’s EJ200 engines, celebrated half a million flying hours on the aircraft…..

The global Eurofighter fleet now comprises 22 operating units with locations in Europe, the South Atlantic and the Middle East.

The RUSI reports highlights some core modernization requirements and opportunities for the Eurofighter.

In order to complement, and eventually take over from, Tornado in the strike and interdiction role in the RAF, Aeronautica Militare and later Luftwaffe service, the Eurofighter requires not only fleet-wide software upgrades to P1Eb standard (or equivalent), but also integration of the Storm Shadow stand-off air-launched cruise missile and the dual-mode Brimstone or Brimstone II anti-armour missile which has proved so successful in Libya and more recently over Iraq. The integration of these weapons is planned and early test flights are underway on instrumented production (test) aircraft in the UK (page 20).

Another aspect of the modernization challenge is to more effectively integrate Eurofighter into the evolving air enterprise being reshaped by distributed air operations.

To ensure that the Eurofighter can maintain the capabilities which the

Tornado, F-18 and Harrier currently provide to European air forces once the latter types are retired is only part of the challenge.

Whilst armament, software and sensor-payload upgrades required to accomplish this are known quantities, the longer-term challenge is to ensure maximum interoperability with the F-35 as it enters front-line service in the 2020s.

This challenge comprises issues including datalink security and bandwidth, communications, and sensor fusion. During Red Flag, F-22s and Eurofighters could only communicate through a Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) due to the unique communications equipment on the F-22.

Through Link 16, the Eurofighter can receive information in real time from networked ground and air assets. Whilst it does not employ the sort of centralised sensor-fusion architecture found on the F-35, and to a lesser extent the F-22, the Eurofighter’s attack and identification system (AIS) presents a combined picture to the pilot via the multifunction information distribution system (MIDS). AIS also integrates data from the Eurofighter’s own radar, PIRATE, DASS and navigational aids to present the pilot with the best possible situational awareness from an otherwise federated sensor architecture. However, this still requires a significant amount of data management on the part of the pilot and could be significantly streamlined (pages 21-22).

In our interview with Sqn Leader Hugh Nichols, he highlighted what he saw as important modernization priority for Eurofighter:

Question: Secretary Wynne made the point that modernization of legacy aircraft should be taken going forward from the perspective of working with the F-35.

How do you view that approach?

Sqn Ldr Hugh Nichols: It makes sense.

F-35 BF-17 from the F-35 Integrated Test Force in Formation with RAF Typhoons, Edwards AFB, CA April 4, 2014 F-35 test pilot LtCol Jon "Miles" Ohman performs interoperability testing. Credit: USAF — F-35 BF-17 from the F-35 Integrated Test Force in Formation with RAF Typhoons, Edwards AFB, CA April 4, 2014 F-35 test pilot LtCol Jon “Miles” Ohman performs interoperability testing. Credit: USAF

Each aircraft brings different strengths to the fight and we will fly them both, with the tactics will evolving over time.

Software modifications will undoubtedly be required in order to get the most out of each aircraft and ensure full interoperability; take Link 16 for example, where the F-35 could put out a huge amount of information.

We need to ensure that Typhoon is able to receive and display the information without overloading the pilot.

Question: Typhoons have flown for some time with F-22s and now with F-35s.

What is the impact on the Typhoon?

Sqn Ldr Hugh Nichols: It makes the Typhoon more lethal and survivable.

Today, every legacy aircraft that can fly with a Raptor clearly wishes to do so.

But there is going to come a point where they will prefer to fly with the F-35 due to the data linking capability of the F-35 and how that capability enhances the situational awareness of all aircraft in that fight.

For example, we can push information out to the legacy fleet so they know where the threats from integrated air defense platforms are and therefore they have a better understanding of where they are safe from those systems.

Modernization to enhance the range of the Eurofighter to play a wider role in a sustained air operation is clearly possible.

A variety of airframe and engine upgrades have been suggested such as thrust-vectoring engines and leading-edge root extensions (LERX) to improve the aircraft’s already formidable WVR performance, and conformal fuel tanks (CFTs) to increase range without significant drag penalties.

The CFTs can theoretically be mounted on all Tranche 3 aircraft if certified and would certainly give a boost to the aircraft’s ability to mount long-range interdiction missions.

However, the RAF has a very capable tanker fleet in the A330 MRTT and extensive experience operating with other NATO-member tankers. This means that the Typhoon’s range is more than adequate without CFTs, except in situations where aerial tanking is in critically short supply. Even without aerial refuelling, a large wing and fuselage and the ability to carry up to three supersonic external fuel tanks give the Eurofighter an impressive range. (page 22)

Its ability to carry significant ordinance externally is an important contributor to the overall ability of the air combat enterprise to deliver effects in the battlespace.

A flight over Tallinn City, Estonia, by two Royal Air Force Typhoons from 6 Squadron on NATO's Baltic Air Poilicing Patrol. Credit: UK MoD — A flight over Tallinn City, Estonia, by two Royal Air Force Typhoons from 6 Squadron on NATO’s Baltic Air Poilicing Patrol. Credit: UK MoD

And modernization to enhance this capability is important as well.

Indeed, the combination of fifth generation aircraft operating forward with significant weapons loads of a variety of types with a modernized Eurofighter would clearly enhance European combat power.

Based on discussions with pilots, the author highlighted a core point which I have also heard from Eurofighter pilots – the big ticket upgrades are important but significant change could come from a more comprehensive effort to fill operational gaps.

Instead, pilots across the RAF, Luftwaffe and Aeronautica Militare want the small-scale problems with subsystems fixed as a priority. Whilst huge progress has been made in eradicating the majority of software and equipment bugs since the aircraft first entered service in 2003, there are still noticeable deficiencies with some subsystems such as the radios. Fixing these issues should not be nearly as capital-intensive as major modifications such as CFTs or the CAPTOR-E radar. However, they offer very significant performance gains through removing performance bottlenecks in both system architecture and pilot workload.

The report also offers an important warning about the future for multinational programs.

Real capabilities emerge from a program like the A400M by keeping the aircraft common and having modernization proceed across the fleet. This has not been the case with Eurofighter and has slowed down the modernization process.

Part of the problem surrounding the Eurofighter’s development followingits introduction into service in 2004–06 has been the substantially differing mission priorities of the four development nations. Under the original consortium arrangements, upgrades were supposed to be jointly funded and developed. This has proved a predominantly unworkable model given the significantly different operational imperatives and doctrinal role for the Eurofighter in British, German, Italian and Spanish service. (page 19).

The author concludes with the importance of modernizing the Eurofighter fleet as the F-35 enters service and, in effect, reshapes or re-norms airpower.

Developing maximum network, systems and tactical interoperability between the Eurofighter and the initially small numbers of F-35s, which will enter service throughout the 2020s, offers significantly increased combat effectiveness for both types. Each is capable of offering strengths where the other is comparatively weak.

The Eurofighter offers exceptional performance, heavy- and diverse-ordnance capacity, long-range and combat mass, whilst the F-35 will bring unmatched situational awareness, low-observable survivability in defended airspace and powerful electronic warfare capabilities. (page x).

https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/WHR_1-15_Maximising_European_Combat_Air_Power.pdf

Also see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/upgrading-and-modernizing-the-eurofighter-aerodynamic-upgrades/

70th RAF Squadron Receives New Standard, and New Aircraft

Posted on July 24, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

07/24/2015

2015-07-24 No. 70 Squadron (also known as No. LXX Squadron) of the Royal Air Force will be the first operational unit to use the new Airbus A400M Atlas.

According to an article published July 25, 2015 on the UK MoD website, the Squadron has also received a new standard.

Her Royal Highness, The Princess Royal, today attended the Re-formation Parade for LXX Squadron, Royal Air Force Brize Norton. Princess Anne, Honorary Air Commodore to Brize Norton was the Reviewing Officer for the parade and presented LXX Squadron with its new Standard.

Princess Anne was accompanied by Chief of The Air Staff, Air Chief Marshall Sir Andrew Pulford and Royal Air Force Brize Norton Station Commander, Group Captain Simon S Edwards, as she reviewed the Squadron. LXX Squadron, commanded by Wing Commander Simon Boyle, looked impressive as they paraded in front of one of the new A400M Atlas aircraft. The presentation of the new Standard is a very significant moment in the history of the Squadron. Princess Anne acknowledged the importance of the Standard and wished the Squadron a successful future.

Officer Commanding LXX Squadron, Wing Commander Simon Boyle, explained that the Standard: “was traditionally the rallying point, unique to the Squadron and a symbol of the trust that the monarch places in the Squadron. It includes the badge and the battle honours that have been bestowed upon the Squadron.”

LXX Squadron will be the first Squadron to operate the A400M Atlas in support of military tasks and humanitarian relief efforts across the world. The A400M Atlas will replace the existing fleet of Hercules which has been the tried and tested workhorse of the Royal Air Force’s transport fleet for decades.

The A400M Atlas is a new aircraft coming into service in the RAF. LXX Squadron, based at RAF Brize Norton, will be the first squadron to operate the aircraft in support of military tasks and humanitarian relief efforts across the world. The aircraft will replace the existing fleet of C-130 Hercules which have been the tried and trusted workhorse of the RAF’s air transport fleet for decades.

Manufactured by Airbus Defence & Space, A400M Atlas will represent major advances on its predecessor, capable of flying almost twice as fast, twice as far and carrying almost twice as much cargo. With a cargo capacity of 32 tonnes and a hold optimised for carriage of heavy vehicles, helicopters or cargo pallets, the aircraft is capable of supporting a wide range of operational scenarios. The UK is the third country to operate the aircraft, after France and Turkey and the £2.8 billion programme will see a total of 22 aircraft delivered to the RAF in the coming years.

http://www.raf.mod.uk/news/archive/lxx-sqn-standup-24072015

History of Number LXX Squadron

Formed at South Farnborough on 22 April 1916, Number LXX Squadron was the first Royal Flying Corps Squadron to fly the Sopwith 1½ Strutter. The unit transferred to Fienvillers in France one Flight at a time such was the gravity of the situation between May and August 1916 to take up fighter patrols. As the Germans perfected their tactics, losses on the Squadron rose, and a year later the Squadron converted to the more capable Sopwith Camels.

After the Armistice, the unit remained in Germany until February 1919 when it returned to the UK, disbanding briefly during January 1920 only to reform nine days later at Heliopolis, Egypt by renumbering No 58 Squadron equipped with Vickers Vimy heavy bombers. Within three years, No LXX Squadron had moved to Iraq and re-equipped with Vickers Vernon bombers/transports which were flown on the Cairo-Baghdad air mail run until 1927.

During this time, the Squadron also took part in operations against rebel tribesmen and insurgents on the Turkish frontier and received Vickers Victorias shortly before the famous evacuation of Kabul in 1928. Vickers Valentias arrived in 1935, and these lumbering aircraft spent the first year of World War II on transport duties around the Middle East until Vickers Wellington bombers replaced them in late 1940.

Successive versions of the Wellington were used during the North African and Italian campaigns and it wasn’t until February 1945 that Consolidated B-24 Liberators replaced them and remained with the Squadron when it returned to the Middle East at the end of the year and disbanded in April 1947.

In May 1948, No 215 Squadron based at Kabrit, Egypt, was renumbered No LXX Squadron, and the unit resumed transport duties around the region with Douglas C-47 Dakotas. Shortly before re-equipping with Handley Page Hastings in late 1955, the Squadron and its Vickers Valletas transferred to Cyprus, subsequently taking part in the Suez campaign in 1957. Following a short-lived period with Armstrong Witworth Argosys, No LXX Squadron began converting to the C-130K Hercules and finally returned to the UK, joining the Lyneham Transport Wing in 1975 after 55 years overseas.

In September 2010 No LXX Squadron stood-down once more to await the arrival of the Royal Air Force’s new Airbus A400M ‘Atlas’ aircraft; the Squadron Colour was lodged at Royal Air Force College Cranwell and marked the end of the Squadron’s outstanding period of C-130K Hercules operations around the world.

Number LXX Squadron is the first operational Airbus A400M Atlas Squadron. The Squadron stood up in an administrative and engineering support capacity on 1 October 2014, allowing sufficient time for it to be configured and manned appropriately prior to formally accepting air transport tasking from Summer 2015.

The Atlas is an extremely flexible aircraft that will provide both tactical and strategic Airlift capability to all three Services in peace, crisis and war. Tactical and strategic Airlift is a critical component of the UK Armed Forces and this hugely versatile aircraft will be a significant complementary capability to its existing fleets.

http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafbrizenorton/organisation/lxxsquadron.cfm

Next Steps for the A400M: French Air Force Validates Paratroop Operations

Posted on July 24, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

2015-07-24 In a first for the French Air Force (FAF), on July 16, 2015, 91 paratroopers jumped from the rear of an A400M in flight.

According to the FAF website:

“After several months of analysis and preparation by the CEAM and the STAT, a new operational capability was shaped….

At 4,000 meters in altitude, 91 paratroopers participated in three experimental flights with the Atlas which validated the procedures established by Airbus and the armed forces….

Next up is to airdrop from the side doors to shape a complete paratrooper capability with regard to the aircraft in accordance with the objectives established by the FAF.”

http://www.defense.gouv.fr/air/actus-air/premier-largage-de-parachutistes-militaires-depuis-l-a400m-atlas

The CEAM or in French centre d’expériences aériennes militaires is the military air experimentation center which is located at Mont de Marson Air Base in Aquitaine.

The STAT is the Technical Section of the French Army or in French section technique de l’armée de terre.

Translation by Second Line of Defense.