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In 2008, the USAF selected the Airbus A300MRTT tanker. It was a clear winner from the standpoint of what the USAF wanted from a tanker.
But politics and the anomalies of the US acquisition process intruded and the next Administration picked a Boeing tanker, one which has yet to enter the USAF inventory.
For the USAF leadership, the Airbus tanker was clearly better, with its size and its ability to hold fuel in its wings, the potential for using the space on the aircraft, inside and out was especially compelling, notably with the introduction of the F-22 and the coming of the F-35 and its data rich generating capabilities.
The tanker could become part of the battlespace and work with fifth generation aircraft in a compelling manner.
There was much comment generated by the GAO, the press, analysts and pundits on that selection and that competition.
But the reality is the reality.
It is not just about points of view.
The A330 tanker has won every competition worldwide since the loss in the United States with the single exception of the recent announcement by Japan of adding the new Boeing tanker to their original order of a different variant of the 767 tanker.
And the Australians, as the lead nation, have already demonstrated what a capable platform it is, and a centerpiece for the global reach of the RAAF.
With the USAF not becoming the lead nation for the new Airbus tanker, that task fell to Australia.
The Aussies normal acquisition path is to buy a foreign product, and work with the service or services who have put that platform into practice, and then work the platform into operations leveraging the work of the lead or operating force using the platform.
This was different.
The RAAF now was in the lead and worked with Airbus to bring the tanker into operation.
As Air Commodore Gary Martin, now the air attaché in Washington from the Australian government, and then head of the Air Lift Group commented:
During my time at the Air Lift Group we took ownership of the KC-30A and worked with Airbus Military and Qantas Defence to craft an operational capability for the fleet.
The Chief of Air Force of the RAAF was impatient to add the tanking capability to the fleet as we had ceased our original B-707 tanking back in 2008. We were thin on personnel with tanking experience and knew that we would need to ramp up this capability as soon as possible.
And the new tanker was much larger than our legacy aircraft, so we realised that there would be challenges associated with our first of series aircraft fleet.
We were a demanding customer because of the pressures to get the KC-30A into operation.
Overall, our Chief was looking for the ability of the RAAF to deploy a sustainable insertion package with the C-17s and KC-30As moving out together to bring significant capability to an area of interest.
Because the KC-30A holds the fuel for its AAR in its wings, we can carry personnel and their baggage onboard the aircraft. This means that the C-17 can carry the heavy equipment; the KC-30A the fuel for AAR and the personnel to operate the capabilities when landing in an area of operation.
This combined capability is an essential force package for operating at a distance for the Australian forces.
But to get to that point has taken time.
The aircraft is a software-enabled aircraft and we had challenges to deal with to get the entire package to work operationally.
So all of our processes in the first year were aimed at getting the aircraft safely airborne, conducting our operational training and evaluation of the squadron members. We weren’t using the boom at this stage, just the pods and bringing them into operational service.
And as you know, we started with the process of getting the hose and drogue system to work with our Hornets, and then have moved onto the boom.
We clearly see both for our own use and working with coalition partners. Having a tanker that can do both and can refuel from such a large tanker reserve of fuel is a huge operational advantage for us.
Another priority was to get the whole logistical system to kick in.
Initially, we had just taken delivery of a limited spares package and were the first nation to use the aircraft. So there was no experience with mean failure rates of parts and other data important to establishing a functioning logistics system.
But the working relationship we had with Qantas Defence and Airbus Military allowed us to work through the challenges to get where we are today.
After we established a good workflow to deal with any problems evident as we starting using the aircraft, the 24-hour work flow between Spain and Australia worked to our advantage.
We had Airbus Military, and RAAF personnel in both Australia and Spain. We would identify problems and craft partial solutions and then send those by electronic means to Spain where the team would then work on them while we slept; We would then be able the next day to take their solution set and continue to work on it, and then we could send at the end of our work day our work on the solution set, etc.
It was a lot of coordination.
It took us two-and-a-half years to have a stabilized tanking process with the RAAF and fighter force and for them to integrate with our tanker aircraft.
When I visited the KC-30A squadron in March 2014, there were working five aircraft into the squadron, and preparing the boom for entry into service.
In that interview, the effort to certify the tanker with other nations, and the experience to date in supporting Aussie aircraft on deployment to exercises was a focus of attention.
Fast forward to the Fall of 2015, and the KC-30A, along with the Wedgetail, and the Super Hornets, all deploy to the Middle East for what the Aussies call Operation Okra, the effort to deal with ISIS.
And here the operational experience of the new capabilities – the Wedgetail and the KC-30A – have clearly demonstrated the value of the approach followed by the RAAF of getting the new platforms into the hands of the warfighters and letting the warfighters shape the way ahead as the platforms finish what in the US would consider to still be a procurement process.
We put these assets in the hands of the warfighter to use and to determine what systems needed to be further developed in order to achieve the operational readiness, which the warfighters actually sought.
Both platforms took time to evolve to the point where we could effectively use them; but we put them into the hands of the warfighters more rapidly than traditional procurements approaches would allow.
This is certainly part of what we mean by Plan Jericho – let the warfighters have a decisive say on what is needed from an operational standpoint, in terms of what the fleet can deliver rather than simply upgrading individual platforms organically.
And getting into operations is crucial in terms of operator confidence and coalition capabilities.
With the Wedgetail deployed, allies got use to it and considered it a very reliable asset and the radar performance to be extraordinary.
Without that operational confidence, the asset will not be used as often or as effectively.
We see this as part of the Plan Jericho approach – get into the hands of the operators to determine what capabilities are best next and from which platform?
What does a .02DB Delta on a radar range mean for an operator?
Air Marshal Leo Davies with Dr. Robbin Laird after the Second Line of Defense interview at the Air Marshal’s office in Canberra, Australia, August 3, 2015.
I don’t know.
Let’s give it to the operators and find out.
And that’s what we’ve done.
During my visit to Australia in August 2015, I had a chance to get updates on the KC-30A and its role within the RAAF from a number of senior leaders of the RAAF. Their perspectives on actual operational deployment validated the expectations of the USAF leadership when they selected the tanker in 2008. The reality is the reality.
The initial perspective was provided by Air Marshal Davies who provided his perspective on the Middle East deployment and its ongoing impact on the RAAF.
Question: What has been the impact of the operations in the Middle East on the RAAF?
Air Marshal Davies: We certainly have deployed fighters and air lifters in exercises and operations.
But this is the first time we have taken an integrated air package to an operation. It is the first operational experience for both the KC-30A and the Wedgetail and the first time the Super Hornets operated (outside of Red Flag) with F-22s.
The Wedgetail operating with the tanker affected the scope of operation of each as well.
Historically, we operate tankers in assigned tanker tracks. With the communications and other links inside the tanker and with the ability of the Wedgetail to clear the way for the flexible operations, the tanker could move closer to where fighters in operation were most likely to move for refueling.
This means that you move yourself 60 nautical miles further north because the fighters you’re about to get next need to travel 100 miles to get to you. You could make it 40 miles and stay on station for another ten minutes.
This meant getting the job done more rapidly; and reduced the fuel burn on the fighters as well.
This operational shift was facilitated by the tanker not simply acting as a flying gas can in a pre-positioned location but able to operate as a mobile combat asset to support the strike force.
Something as simple as air-to-air refueling has been simple because it’s a track at a time at an altitude with a frequency and an upload. We’re saying we can make it more complicated with the right information and be much more effective in the battle space because of situational awareness.
The entry into service of the KC-30A led to a name change for the Air Lift Squadron to that of the Air Mobility Squadron.
The first commander of the Air Mobility Squadron was then Air Commodore McDonald who is now the Deputy Chief of Staff of the RAAF.
In an earlier interview, when then Air Commodore McDonald, the impact of the KC-30A as seen from the perspective of January 2015 was highlighted in an interview.
Operation Okra has accelerated the maturing process of the KC-30A.
At the end of 2013, the squadron was transferred from a project focused Transition Team to Number 86 Wing – and in doing so was placed directly into the hands of the war fighter. In 2014 the Wing, in conjunction with the project office, addressed the training and key operational issues that were preventing the full utilization of the KC-30A.
The shift in operational focus, as a result of transferring the KC-30A to the Wing, is reflected in the increase in AAR from 40% to 75%.
The deployment to the Middle East has also accelerated the certification of aircraft able to be tanked by the KC-30A.
In three months, we have dramatically increased the number of aircraft certified.
The Honourable Kevin Andrews MP, Minister for Defence (right) is shown around a KC-30A Mutli Role Tanker Transport by then Commander Air Mobility Group, Air Commodore Warren McDonald, CSC during the 2015 Australian International Air Show. Credit: Australian Ministry of Defense.
This would not have happened without the press of events and the operational tempo associated with the deployment.
It is the tanker of choice in Iraq we are being told by coalition partners.
And in a follow-up interview in his office in Canberra, the Air Vice Marshal provided an update on the KC-30A and the ongoing operations in the Middle East.
The RAAF has deployed a single KC-30A to the Middle East operation but that single aircraft has delivered close to 30 million pounds of fuel since its arrival in late Fall 2014.
The aircraft has only needed a small technical footprint, some 10 technicians to deliver a mission success rate of around 95%.
“When you introduce a new platform like the KC-30A, you need to make sure you are not doing so under a legacy mindset.
You need to test your mindset in real operations and then draw your conclusions as to the best way to maintain that aircraft.
Once tested and verified you then need to shift your older maintenance approach to a new one, and subsequently reshape your workforce.
This does not happen right away; it is a process that will take five to seven years see fully mature.
Nothing in the personnel space happens quickly, particularly when you must adapt to such a change.
The technical workforce changes we see happening in the KC-30A will be seen in the workforces of any capability we introduce, the P-8A and F-35 are other examples.
In other words, we need to reshape our workforce to optimize the new capabilities that we are introducing, so that we aren’t stuck with a legacy of the past.
It’s not that we don’t value our maintenance personnel, they are key to our success on any operation.
However, we must acknowledge the significant advances in engineering that have occurred, and therefore reshape the balance of air maintenance personnel inside air force.”
Air Vice Marshal after the Second Line of Defense Interview at his office in Canberra, August 3, 2015. Credit: RAAF
Question: You are adding to your tanker fleet as well?
Air Vice Marshal McDonald: “Yes, we are adding two additional aircraft to our current fleet of five.
The two aircraft were purchased from the Qantas 330 fleet.
One of the two is already in Spain being modified.”
Question: You are part of the global sustainment approach of the C-17, do you see something akin to this for the KC-30A fleet?
Air Vice Marshal McDonald: Yes we are a part of the very successful C-17 sustainment system and I would like to see a similar model bought in for the KC-30A.
But what first needs to be worked out is how to tap into the commercial parts pool for the global commercial A330 fleet.
Right now the military certification of the KC-30A does not readily translate into the commercial certification of a A330 so that even though the parts are often the same we cannot tap into the commercial parts pool.
Obviously, this makes little sense.
It’s blindingly obvious, but sometimes you have to be quite innovative to make that blinding obvious come into an executable outcome.
We can have a KC-30A parked on the tarmac next to a group of A330s and know they have the parts we need in their repair and support bays but we cannot access them.
We need to solve this one.
Question: Australia has been the lead nation on the KC-30A, how has this impacted on others who are looking to buy a tanker or are introducing the tanker?
Air Vice Marshal McDonald: It was a challenge getting the KC-30A into service, but the results are there for all to see, particularly in the Middle East.
The Singaporeans talked with us at length about the aircraft and we provided them with our experiences associated with the program and aircraft. I am aware that the success of the Australian program fed into their own decision as it did in South Korea.
The thing that’s sometimes missed with being a lead customer on the KC30 means you must also forge a path for air to air refueling clearances.
Without them it is just a transport aircraft and useless to the fight.
Clearances are about enabling the tanker fleet to operate in a global context and thereby contributing meaningfully to coalition operations.
We are well underway with clearances, which then other global users can simply draw upon.
For example, Singapore is obviously watching us closely as we move into F-35 clearances the latter part of this year, because for Singapore when their tanker is delivered there will be a JSF clearance already taken care of.
We are working very hard to get as many clearances for the KC30A as possible, as such we’re working towards at the C-17 in the second quarter of 2016.
And then in the third, fourth quarter we’re looking at P8.
With Singapore and South Korea operating the KC-30A as well, means that we can mass capabilities in an area.
Operating in the Middle East also allows us to become more and more comfortable and flexible working with other countries using our platform.
And interviews with the Air Commander Australia and of the Air Combat Group, highlighted how the tanker affected operations of the RAAF and the allies, including the USMC in the Middle East.
Question: Your chief of staff has described in his interview how the tankers are adjusting their operations to the fighters and that these adjustments are driven by increased connectivity in the battlespace and cited this as an interesting step forward.
How would you describe this evolution?
Air Vice Marshal Turnbull: It is important.
The way that we’re using the tankers is very much an innovation generated by our tanker pilots.
They are driving that change, not so much being driven.
That was the really pleasing part about how they are operating in the battle space; they saw a need and worked with the E7 (Wedgetail AEW&C) to get situational awareness that allowed them to put themselves in the right place at the right time.
Knowing that someone was going to need them shortly, they weren’t waiting to be asked.
Indeed, the KC-30A will be a key contributor to our transformation approach.
We are thinking outside of the box with regard to the tanker for there is a lot of unused real estate on the aircraft and we will work on what should be on the plane and what can be off-boarded via links to extend the operational capabilities of the platform.
As Air Commodore Roberton, the head of Air Combat Group and recently returned from Middle East operations underscored as well how the tanker contributed to operational effectiveness for the RAAF and coalition partners:
Question: Operation Okra is the first time that the RAAF took an integrated lift-tanker-reconnaissance and strike package to a long distance operation.
You were the initial Commander of the Australian Air Task Group 630 in the Middle East in September 2014 and what has been the impact of your ability to self-deploy?
Air Commodore Roberton: This would be the first time ever that we’ve been able to self-deploy. We were able to do that well inside our normal preparedness timelines., simply because we weren’t having to rely on that critical tanker resource that the US would normally provide.
From the government saying go, we were ready for combat ops in 12 days. We’ve never been able to do that before.
The bigger issue with theater though was I think there’s yet to be a modern air war of any type where the air component commander sits around and says, “I’ve just got too many tankers.”
Question: The RAAF arrived at the outset and brought its new tanker and what was the impact of both, coming early and bringing your new tanker?
Air Commodore Roberton: By coming early, we were able to play a more important coalition role. And with the tanker, we early on not only established a lead position with regard to the other three nations using the new tanker but also with regard to the non-US side of the tanking force. We became, in effect, the lead coalition nation for tanking with regard to non-US assets.
When we came into theater we were cleared only to tank our Hornets and Super Hornets. But rapidly we were cleared to tank 12 different aircraft from seven different nations, and certainly the USMC and USN became major users.
This meant that we were a net contributor to the operation rather than having to rely on US assets only.
And our tanker crews became highly valued because they were able to listen on the JTAC frequencies and able to anticipate fighter fuel demand and to move closer to where the fighters would then move to get refueled.
The flexibility to anticipate fighter demand – which clearly happened in both the US and Canadian cases – meant the difference between getting weapons away on several occasions or not.
And in an interview which highlighted the impact of the KC-30A on the RAAF and its operations was with the new head of Air Mobility Group, Air Commodore Richard Lennon.
The key focus in the discussion with Air Commodore Lennon was upon the strategic shift from being a lifting force to becoming an engaged combat force for the Air Mobility Group.
Lifters and tankers are not simply functioning as transportation and fuel off loaders, but are operating in the battlespace and their role can expand as the concept of operations is shifted via additions of appropriate technology to allow them to shape greater capability within the integrated battlespace.
Rethinking the Role of air mobility in the transformation of jointness. Graphic credited to Second Line of Defense
There is a lot of real estate inside and outside of the KC-30A.
How we use that real estate needs to be determined by evolving concept of operations, not simply applying a technology solution set offered by a prime contractor.
From a support perspective, software-enabled systems of the sort prevalent in today’s C2 and ISR systems, are almost throw away systems within five years.
We need to build in cost effective systems, which do not go on forever and are not expected to be repaired beyond a certain period but simply replaced by new, better and cost effective technologies.
A final interview was with the recently retired head of the RAAF, Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown, who discussed how important the Wagtail and tanker experiences are to the transformation of the RAAF.
Question: As Chief you decided to push your new aircraft – Wedgetail and the KC-30A – out to the force rather than waiting for the long list of tests to be complete.
Why?
Air Marshal (Retired) Brown: Testers can only do so much.
Once an aircraft is functional you need to get in the hand of the operators, pilots, crews and maintainers. They will determine what they think the real priorities for the evolution of the aircraft, rather than a test engineer or pilot.
And you get the benefit of a superior platform from day one.
When I became Deputy Chief of Air Force, the Wedgetail was being slowed down by the Kabuki effort to arrange specification lines for the aircraft. There was much hand-wringing amongst the program staff as to how it didn’t meet the specifications that we had put out.
I said, “Let’s just give it to the operators.”
And the advantage of basically giving the aircraft to the operators was what the test community and the engineers thought were real limitations the operators did not. Sometimes it took the operators two days to figure a work around.
And the real advantage of the development was that they would prioritize what was really needed to be fixed from the operational point of view, not the testing point of view.
In other words, you can spend a lot of time trying to get back to the original specifications.
But when you actually give it to the operators they actually figure out what’s important or what isn’t important and then use the aircraft in real world operations.
Question: Clearly, when you launched Plan Jericho, you were focused on tapping into the operational community and unleashing creativity inherent within that community.
Could you discuss your thinking in that regard?
Air Marshal (Retired) Brown: I think the KC-30A operators are a good case in point.
It is about changing what you call the mental furniture.
Here the KC-30A operators were looking at their role in the battlespace and working out new ways to execute the mission rather than the traditional way of flying around in tanker tracks and operating as a flying gas station.
They understand that they were not simply flying gas stations but a key asset in the battlespace enabling the fighters and all air assets for that matter.
The crew looked at their operational situation and determined ways to move closer to those fighter assets and anticipated when the fighters would need to be refueled BEFORE those fighters even asked for fuel.
When I was onboard the KC-30A over Iraq, and saw the operators determine that Marine Corps F-18s engaged over an area of interest, and the tanker crew then determined when they thought the Marines would need fuel and moved closer to them and picked a refueling spot and put out the hoses to get ready to tank the USMC Hornets BEFORE the Marines even had requested refueling.
That is the kind of change which we want to encourage in the RAAF.
The Marines were expecting to need 112,000 pounds of fuel for the mission but because of the repositioning of the tanker, they only needed 84,000 pounds.
You clearly are not always going to operate the tanker that way, but the point is that our tanking crew is involved and integrated into the battlespace and are thinking in terms of dynamic operations, not in any static sense.
The tanker case also shows the impact of flying new systems on maintenance as well, which will require changes in how we think about maintenance modernization and evolution as well. We only need 15 maintainers to maintain the KC-30A in the Middle East operations.
In short, the KC-30A with the Aussies as the lead nation has already demonstrated that the new tanker is a key part of the transformation of 21st century operational capabilities.
And operational performance of the aircraft in the hands of one of the most professional air force’s in the world is a a good reminder that the USAF leadership in 2008 had it right.
For a PDF version of this article see the following:
The Danes are holding a 10-day Arctic exercise to train to support emergency operations.
In an article published by the Danish Ministry of Defence on September 9, 2015, details were provided concerning the exercise.
The purpose of the exercise is to train the Arctic Command in Nuuk to work with the Arctic Protection Force. The Arctic Command is in the lead to conduct operations at sea, on land and in the air on both the east and west coast of Greenland.
Defence contributes to Arctic Emergency Power with forces from the Army, the Navy, Air Force and Special Operations forces. All Defence parts of the Arctic Protection Force are being trained to work in Arctic conditions.
Forces included the following:
Infantry soldiers from Slagelse, members of the Frogman Corps, specialists in anti-chemical warfare agents from both the Armed Forces and the Emergency Management Agency, and members from the Special Forces and Air Force medical evacuation unit.
Keflavik base is used as the headquarters of supplies to the East Coast. Iceland also participates directly with ships, aircraft and a special Arctic rescue team that specializes in search and rescue.
The exercise on the west coast took place in the area around Nuuk, Greenland to relieve a ship in severe distress and combating pollution. On the east coast, part of the exercise was to rescue persons involved with an airplane crash.
If a plane crashes on the ice cap, it is important that survivors are quickly able to receive shelter and warmth , and that they are provided with food and drink. In an inaccessible terrain, this task can best be solved by means of aircraft. During the exercise survival pallets were delivered from aircraft close to the accident site. The soldiers from the 2nd Brigade tested these survival pallets containing survival equipment such as tents, water and food.
Thanks to our partner Risk Intelligence for providing this link to the Danish Ministry of Defence.
The Army has so hijacked the concept of jointness that the broader transformation of jointness being shaped by the evolution of the amphibious forces has escaped attention as precisely what it is – the transformation of joint capabilities.
In broad terms, amphibious operations has shifted from primarily providing a transport capability to providing a base of operations for the air-land-sea domains, and the flexibility of the evolving amphibious task force allows it to focus on the primary domain necessary for the mission: ground, air or sea.
It is a flexible Swiss army knife for joint operations. The V-22 Osprey has been a key agent of change whereby ground forces can be inserted at greater distance, resupply can be managed from land to the sea base, or force packages built around the Osprey can execute missions previously only possible with the “large deck” amphibious ships.
There is little question that there is a significant shortage of L-class ships and the enablers for what the evolving amphibious task force needs, but it is also clear that allies are looking at Navy-Marine Corps innovation and seeing the future of a key joint capability.
Whether it be South Korea, Japan or Australia, in the Pacific the core U.S. allies see the amphibious force as part of their joint force transformation as well.
My recent trip to Australia highlighted the importance of the Navy, Army and Air Force getting the HMAS Canberra right as a key element in their approach to transforming joint forces. And the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps are clearly important partners in working the way ahead to do so.
When I was on USS Wasp last Spring, I had a chance to talk with the Commander of Expeditionary Strike Group Two Rear Adm. Cindy Thebaud.
U.S. Marine Corps Col. Matthew Kelly, military assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, provides background on the Marine Corps’ F-35B program to Air Marshall Bollam, Chief of Defence Material Air, United Kingdom, aboard USS Wasp while embarked in the Atlantic Ocean May 20, 2015. Royal Navy and Royal Air Force pilots are scheduled to begin flying the F-35B from the UK in 2018, and are on track to operate from the Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers in 2020.
She discussed the ship integration dynamic involving the F-35B with the Wasp and the ESG, and emphasized that it was not just about the aircraft, but about the integration of the Marines, the airplane, and the fleet.
I had a chance to follow up with her during a visit to Norfolk, Va. to see the Navy’s elevated causeway build and exercise.
During the interview, Capt. Michael M. McMillan joined the conversation. McMillan is the Commander of Amphibious Squadron Eight and had just returned from command of the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group off of the waters of Yemen.
Rear Adm. Thebaud described the role of the ESG and the importance of the evolving amphibious capability for the Navy and the Marines.
“My primary responsibility is the readiness of east coast amphibious forces. This includes the ships, the amphibious squadrons, the tactical squadrons that support aviation on the big decks, and the Beach Group, which includes the LCACs, LCUs and Beach Masters. It also includes the amphibious construction battalion which was building the elevated causeway system you saw earlier.”
A clear focus is upon shaping integrated combat capability, and getting the Navy and Marine Corps back to their amphibious roots after a dozen or more years of less-traditional deployments. “We need to understand each other’s planning processes, capabilities, limitations, the type of missions they might get assigned and ways to work up joint taskings.”
With the impact of the Osprey and now the coming of the F-35B, the amphibious task force is much more than a transportation asset, and as such, joint operation capabilities need to be forged, shaped and transformed going forward.
With the refocusing efforts in tandem with platforms like the Osprey and F-35B, the Navy is shifting from a strictly transport force from point A to B to becoming an expeditionary tactical strike and power projection asset as part of the national security equation.
An MV-22 Osprey with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 261 prepares to land onto the Karel Doorman, a Dutch warship, during an interoperability test near Marine Corps Air Station New River, N.C., June 12, 2015. The unit worked jointly with the Royal Netherlands Navy to perform the first MV-22 Osprey carrier landing aboard a Dutch warship and strengthened the existing partnership between the two countries. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Fatmeh Saad/Released)
When I asked her about that, Thebaud acknowledged that she sees such an evolution as having an impact on the evolution of the Navy overall.
“We already have 80% of the ships and other major equipment we’ll have 20 years from now. The key is to evolve its capability and to draw upon the new systems to shape a more effective combat force,” she said.
The evolution of amphibious capabilities will allow the rest of the surface fleet, and the aircraft carriers to evolve as well.
An important aspect of the joint capability, which a dynamically evolving and integrated Navy-Marine Corps capability brings to the fight, is to support what we have called force insertion.
One can come to an area of interest, execute the mission with organic logistics support, and then leave without providing logistics support ashore for possible adversarial use.
When I asked Thebaud about her own experiences along those lines, she noted, “if we look back at the Operation Damayan Philippines relief effort, we brought capability to the crisis to support the relief effort. We stayed as long as necessary and then left.
We came, did the things that needed to get done that were uniquely military to provide the initial response and stabilize the situation, enabled the NGOs and the other organizations to come in that have the intrinsic capabilities to do it over the long haul, and then we left.
While granted, this wasn’t a combat operation, the end result was mission accomplished, with minimal residual military footprint left behind.”
Capt McMillan’s recent operational experience provided many examples of the evolving capabilities of the Amphibious Ready Group and challenges to be met in enhancing its capability to deliver joint effect.
As McMillan put it, “We felt that what we did during the operation was unique, but I think that over time, our ‘unique and unusual’ will become the norm.”
He added, “Put another way, our unique joint capabilities as a Navy-Marine Corps force can be mixed or matched to deal with a variety of tasks in the battlespace, and that flexibility is probably becoming the norm as a requirement, and we are looking to enhance that flexibility going forward.”
Normally, the Navy is supporting the Marines in sustaining their air and ground combat force readiness and operations; the Amphibious Ready Group is supporting the Marine Expeditionary Unit. But with the crisis in Yemen, there was immediate need for maritime security, sea control and the ability to monitor the situation off of the coast of Yemen and in surrounding waters.
McMillan noted that during his deployment, “The Marines supported the Navy by providing air assets to build the recognized maritime picture, conduct presence ops and non-traditional ISR .
We shaped packages consisting of a mix of the Air Combat Element aircraft to conduct sea control and maritime security missions. In addition, we moved aircraft throughout shipping to enhance flexibility and effectiveness.
For instance, the combination of 3 MV-22s with 3 new Hueys provided the LPD excellent capability for the missions of Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP), Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC), Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and Rotary-Wing Close Air Support (CAS.).
These flexible packages provided capability, which historically would have only been on the large deck carrier (LHD/LHA), albeit on a smaller scale.
But we were able to provide the 5th Fleet commander with essential core capabilities.”
This kind of joint capability can be missed if one simply subsumes this under a notion of historical or classic amphibious operations. And the fleet was able to contribute significant command and control for the force as well.
Notably, the upgrades on the San Antonio-class LPDs provide an added option for command and control not seen historically in the amphibious fleet.
150612-N-HX127-145 Baltic Sea (Feb. 12, 2015) — Amphibous assault ships participating in Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) 2015 sail in formation off the coast of Sweden. BALTOPS is an annual multinational exercise designed to enhance flexibility and interoperability, as well as demonstrate resolve among allied and partner forces to defend the Baltic region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communications Specialist 3rd Class Timothy M. Ahearn/Released)
Indeed, in the most recent BALTOPS exercise this summer, USS San Antonio was the flagship for the multi-national exercise, with three Flag officers and elements of their staffs embarked.
But this capability needs to be enhanced throughout the amphibious fleet and Captain McMillian argued that organic ISR and better C2 capabilities need to come to the LSD and the follow on LXR (LSD Replacement) class ships as well.
Another challenge is taking an increasingly capable force, breaking up the assets and chopping them to different command elements.
This is clearly happening with regard to assets such as the Ospreys within the task force, whereby the Combatant Commanders are moving organic assets from the task force and using these assets directly themselves.
The demand side drivers are creating disruptive pressures for the unity of command and control crucial for the combat effectiveness of the ARG-MEU or the amphibious task force.
The triple dynamics of a significant demand signal for forces, coupled with the evolving flexibility of the amphibious forces as joint capabilities, with the shortage of numbers of relevant naval assets overall is almost certainly going to lead to commanders tapping into the amphibious fleet and leveraging its assets.
This is challenging for amphibious commanders.
It is the combination of the price of success at evolving capabilities, flexibility in shaping the tool sets, and the cost of shortfalls in other areas of maritime capabilities.
Rear Adm. Cindy Thebaud
Upon assumption of command as commander of ESG-2, Thebaud began her fourth command tour. She joined the Navy in 1985 after graduating with distinction from the U.S. Naval Academy. Previous commands include USS Decatur (DDG 73), Destroyer Squadron 60 and Logistics Group Western Pacific/Task Force 73/Navy Region Singapore.
In addition to overseeing and managing the readiness of the east coast amphibious fleet, ESG 2 provides amphibious advocacy and expertise, and and deployable staff for crisis response.
MAYPORT, Fla. (August 19, 2015) – Rear Admiral Cynthia Thebaud, commander of Expeditionary Strike Group 2, arrives aboard amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7) for an all-hands call with Iwo Jima Amphibious Readiness Group Sailors. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Andrew Murray/Released)
Supporting the entire range of military operations, ESG 2’s commands are involved in theater security cooperation events, major combat operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, ranging from the East Coast of the United States to the Mediterranean Sea to the Persian Gulf.
A Connecticut native, Rear Admiral Cynthia Thebaud graduated with distinction from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1985 with a Bachelor of Science in Chemistry. She also holds a Master of Arts in Security Policy Studies from The George Washington University, is an honors graduate of the Naval War College, and is qualified joint specialty officer.
At sea, Thebaud has served in ships in both the Atlantic and Pacific fleets with deployed operations in the Western Pacific, Arabian Gulf, Indian Ocean, Horn of Africa, Central America, Mediterranean Sea, Black Sea, and Gulf of Guinea/West Africa areas of operation. Her tours include communications officer in USS Norton Sound (AVM 1), the Aegis and Vertical Launch Systems at-sea weapons test platform; boilers and machinery officer, deck division officer, navigator and navigation/administration department head in USS Prairie (AD 15); engineer officer in USS Platte (AO 186) and USS Hayler (DD 997); executive officer in USS Ticonderoga (CG 47) and commanding officer in USS Decatur (DDG 73). In Decatur, she deployed to the Middle East as part of the Navy’s initial Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG 1) in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. She subsequently commanded Destroyer Squadron 60 where, in addition to serving as the 6th Fleet surface combatant force commander (CTF 65), she also commanded two multi-national African Partnership Station deployments focused on maritime security capacity-building in West and Central Africa. Most recently, on July 17, 2014 she assumed the duties of commander, Expeditionary Strike Group 2.
Ashore, her assignments have included commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific and commander, Task Force 73; chief operating officer, Naval Education and Training Command; policy branch chief (N512) on the Chief of Naval Operations staff; director, Division of Professional Development at the U.S. Naval Academy; chief, Southeast Asia Division in the Joint Staff, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5); Taiwan desk officer in the Joint Staff (J-5); executive assistant/flag secretary to commander, U.S. Naval Surface Force Pacific; Surface Warfare Junior Officer detailer; U.S. Naval Academy company officer; Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps instructor at George Washington University; and a joint staff internship in J-5/Policy Division.
Thebaud’s decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit (2 awards), Meritorious Service Medal (3 awards), Joint Service Commendation Medal, Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal (5 awards), Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal (2 awards) and various unit citations and campaign medals.
MAYPORT, Fla. – More than 4,000 Sailors and Marines from the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) completed a seven-month deployment July 15-20, returning to Naval Station Mayport, Fla., Naval Station Norfolk, Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, Va. and Camp Lejeune, N.C.
Deployed since Dec. 11, 2014, the Iwo Jima ARG and 24th MEU supported theater security cooperation and provided a forward naval presence by providing crisis response, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and combat capabilities in the U.S. 6th and 5th fleet areas of operation. The Iwo ARG/24 MEU team played a crucial role in Yemen evacuation and contingency operations, participated in multiple bilateral and multi-lateral training exercises and conducted strategic transits of the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb.
The 24th MEU conducted sustainment training in Kuwait and Djibouti as well as bilateral and multi-lateral exercises in Jordan and Kuwait.
“The Sailors and Marines of the IWOARG and the 24th MEU did an outstanding job during this deployment,” said Navy Capt. Michael McMillan, commodore, Amphibious Squadron (PHIBRON) 8. “This ARG/MEU team was ready to plan and execute complex tasking in very dynamic environments, which was made possible by the hard work and dedication of each Sailor and Marine.”
The Iwo Jima ARG, led by PHIBRON 8, consists of the amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7), the amphibious transport dock ship USS New York (LPD 21), the amphibious dock landing ship USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43), the 24th MEU, PHIBRON 8 staff, Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 28 (HSC 28) Detachment 5, Fleet Surgical Team 8, Tactical Air Control Squadron 22, and detachments from Assault Craft Units 2 and 4, Naval Beach Group 2 and Beach Master Unit 2.
The 24th MEU is comprised of the 24th MEU Command Element; the Aviation Combat Element, Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 365 (Reinforced); the Ground Combat Element, 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines; and the Logistics Combat Element, Combat Logistics Battalion 24.
“I am very proud of our Sailors and Marines aboard USS Iwo Jima,” said USS Iwo Jima’s Commanding Officer, Capt. Dana Gordon. “They have worked extremely hard over the last seven plus months completing various missions and exercises, while receiving recognition and accolades from senior leadership in every theater we’ve been in. Many of the Sailors and Marines have also completed numerous personal and professional goals that they set for themselves, earning warfare qualifications as well as promotions. The spirit and “can do” attitude of each of them is absolutely amazing. As their CO, I could not have asked for more. They performed their jobs flawlessly and delivered each and every time something was asked of them.”
During the deployment, the ARG transited nearly 135,000 combined nautical miles and logged nearly 5,000 flight hours. Amphibious craft completed more than 4,000 passenger transfers and moved more than 350,000 pounds of cargo and mail to and from ARG shipping.
“It was an honor to deploy with such a professional group of Sailors and Marines,” said Lt. Cmdr. Cristobal Yera, HSC-28’s officer-in-charge. “We accomplished a lot on this deployment and I definitely think we were an important player in the areas we operated.”
The Iwo Jima ARG conducted port visits in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Montenegro, Israel, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Jordan. The visits provided an opportunity for the U.S. military forces to strengthen ties with the host nations and foster relationships.
The Essex ARG and 15th MEU relieved the Iwo Jima ARG in the 5th Fleet area of operations in July.
In this interview, the discussion continues with Group Captain Robert Denney, Chief of Staff, for the Air Combat Group.
In an interview conducted at Williamtown Air base on August 12, 2015, Denney discussed the challenges of current operations and working the transition whereby Super Hornets have come into operation, and the ACG is preparing for Growlers next year, and F-35s thereafter.
Group Captain Denney has an F-111 background, and then was involved in the Super Hornet transition, became a Super Hornet squadron commander (6th Squadron), was involved in the CAOC during Operation Okra in the last part of 2014, and now has assumed his current position at Williamtown.
The Governor-General, His Excellency General the Honourable Sir Peter Cosgrove AK MC (Retd) greets Leading Aircraftman Kieran Ferguson from No 77 Squadron during a visit to RAAF Base Williamtown. February 3, 2015.
Both Roberton and Denney have recent combat experience associated with Operation Okra and the ACG is supporting and force generating for the continued Middle East operations as well as other current demands. This means that meeting the current operational needs is the priority but at the same time, the ACG is involved in the transition whereby Growlers and then F-35s are coming to Williamtown and Amberley air bases.
“A major challenge we are facing is managing the double transition, the first with the Growlers in 2017 and thereafter the F-35s.
We already have folks training at Luke AFB and our initial F-35s are there.
But they will be based at Williamtown.”
Question: How do you see the impact of the Growler on the ADF?
Group Captain Denney: Many are looking at this as just another new airplane.
But when the force starts using it they will grasp quickly what this electronic warfare asset can bring to the joint operational combat space.
And once that happens, the appetite for this kind of capability will grow.
Question: You have only fairly recently introduced the Super Hornets, you have modernized your Hornets, are adding the Growler and the F-35 is coming to the force, how does that affect your thinking about the way ahead?
Group Captain Denney: With the compressed introduction of combat capabilities, this allows us to expand our thinking about how to use the various platforms in a diversity of ways.
The rules are, there are no rules.
We get to make the rules over the next five years,
We can shape how we will employ these platforms and we do not have to be constrained by how we used them in the past, because there is no past literally speaking.
When we first did the F-111 to Super Hornet transition we tried to hold on to some F-111 isms but then as we got smart we kept the relevant ones and threw the rest of those isms away. Having done that, we understand that a transition is not about replicating past approaches and concepts of operations. It is about shaping new ones.
First RAAF Growler as seen at Boeing plant. Credit: Boeing
When we got the Super Hornet we understood the goal was not simply to make it an above average Hornet, but really a very different asset.
We understand with the coming of the F-35 it is not even in the Hornet family and we will work how to leverage it to rework the entire strike force.
We have adjusted our entire fighter tactics to what the Super Hornet has brought to the force rather than simply extending our previous Hornet tactics.
We expect the same with the coming of the F-35.
It’s normal to be different.
Question: You have modernized the Hornet and have leveraged the Super Hornet to change tactic. How would you describe that process?
Group Captain Denney: We have focused not just on optimizing what the Super Hornet can do but how it improves the capability of the classic Hornet.
How do we integrate a package of classic hornets with Super Hornets to create a more significant effect in the battlespace?
How can we augment what Hornets can do?
How can we leverage what Super Hornets can do and be reconfigured to do to expand the effects in the battlespace?
We are already developing a leapfrog approach to the introduction of new platforms, and this is preparing us to think about the coming of the F-35.
The first Royal Australian Air Force F-35A Lightning II jet arrived at Luke Air Force Base Dec. 18, 2014. The jet’s arrival marks the first international partner F-35 to arrive for training at Luke. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Staci Miller)
How do we leverage the F-35 to get greater effect from the Super Hornets and Growlers?
How do we use our air warfare packages with out naval assets such as the Air Warfare destroyer to get better effects in the battlespace?
It is not just about your platform; it’s about the capability you can bring to bear in that joint and coalition arena.
Question: Australia faces a large air and space extended area for defense. How does this impact on the evolution you are describing?
Group Captain Denney: In a way, there is a moat surrounding Australia, but to defend the area and to work with allies requires extended reach.
What we can do, if we do a good job integrating capabilities, is to shape an air-ground-naval force with reach and capability to shape the kind of effects we need to have in the extended defense area surrounding Australia.
And new platforms coming into service, such as the LHD, can provide an important impetus to shaping how we will support from an integrated air-sea-ground space point of view.
Question: Australia has done significant modernization of its classic Hornet force.
What unique modernizations has the RAAF done?
Group Captain Denney: The basic modernization path has been from a classic fighter platform to one able to be integrated into the IT combat space and to deliver precision weapons on moving targets; and to do so when informed by other air and ground assets of where the targets are and when to hit them.
That is a big change over the 30-year life of the classic Hornet. Over the past 15 years we have moved the classic hornet into the network-centric pilot warfare world.
There are unique Hornet adaptations, such as using ASRAAM, and adopting onto it kit we had on the F-111s such as the ALE-47, which provides for self-protection.
We have adopted US Navy modifications as well as our own to evolve our classic Hornets.
And integrated with the new helmet and sighting system we can fire ASRAMM over the shoulder. With today’s systems, you can kill the adversary from where he is not expecting it; it is not a dogfight world anymore.
Question: So for you Plan Jericho underscores the legitimacy of how you see the transition challenge and reinforces the legitimacy of rewriting the rules of concepts of operations with the new capabilities coming into the force?
Group Captain Denney: That is a good way to look at it.
What Jericho provides for is that opportunity to rewrite the rules.
It really is a great opportunity to push the boundaries that we previously had on ourselves and to start thinking about better ways to operate across platforms, and to break out of the single stove piped platform-centric type of thinking.
We are only just starting the journey.
Plan Jericho Report:
A comprehensive report on the Williams Foundation 6 August seminar, Plan Jericho, Shaping Design-Led Innovation, has been prepared for the Foundation by Dr Robbin Laird.
Dr Laird has been reporting on the RAAF’s Jericho journey since the first Williams ‘5th Gen’ seminar in March 2014, and has been an active and supportive participant in the Williams seminars over the last 18 months.
Dr Laird’s report explores and analyses the themes and issues discussed at the seminar on 6 August as well as presenting an excellent summary of each of the presentations. He has used an episode from the Battle for Britain as a means of ‘setting the scene’ and highlighting the centrality of a concept of operations to provide the framework and foundation for integrating across platforms and enablers.
Dr Laird postulates that without such a conops to support the future 5th generation enabled ADF, our warfighting effectiveness will be sub-optimal.
Dr Laird also conducted a series of interviews with the RAAF’s senior leadership to inform his analysis of the RAAF’s transformation challenges and opportunities.
Interviews with CAF and DCAF, operational and FEG commanders, and the outgoing CAF give this report a unique perspective.
Current operations are reviewed, future challenges embraced, and the Jericho implications for the joint battlespace and Defence Industry are candidly discussed.
During my visit to Australia in August 2015, I had a chance to talk with an experienced fighter pilot and squadron commander, and now commander of Air Combat Group about his time in Operation Okra and the way ahead for the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF).
Air Commodore Steven P. Roberton is Commander of Air Combat Group (ACG), responsible for force generation and command of Australia’s air combat operations. ACG comprises the three wings encompassing Hawk Lead-In Fighter training and maintenance training; F/A-18A/B ‘Classic Hornet’ training and operations; and F/A-18F ‘Super Hornet’ operations; and Joint Terminal Attack Controllers and Combat Controllers.
Air Commodore Roberton led the transition team that brought the Super Hornet into the RAAF which declared its IOC in 2012.
This is the first combat aircraft which the RAAF has flown with an AESA radar, and the size and two man crew have provided important benefits for the RAAF as well which Air Marshal (Retired) Brown discusses in his interview.
Question: Operation Okra is the first time that the RAAF took an integrated lift-tanker-reconnaissance and strike package to a long distance operation.
You were the initial Commander of the Australian Air Task Group 630 in the Middle East in September 2014 and what has been the impact of your ability to self-deploy?
Air Commodore Roberton: This would be the first time ever that we’ve been able to self-deploy. We were able to do that well inside our normal preparedness timelines., simply because we weren’t having to rely on that critical tanker resource that the US would normally provide.
From the government saying go, we were ready for combat ops in 12 days.
We’ve never been able to do that before
The bigger issue with theater though was I think there’s yet to be a modern air war of any type where the air component commander sits around and says, “I’ve just got too many tankers.”
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Question: The RAAF arrived at the outset and brought its new tanker and what was the impact of both, coming early and bringing your new tanker?
Air Commodore Roberton: By coming early, we were able to play a more important coalition role. And with the tanker, we early on not only established a lead position with regard to the other three nations using the new tanker but also with regard to the non-US side of the tanking force. We became, in effect, the lead coalition nation for tanking with regard to non-US assets.
When we came into theater we were cleared only to tank our Hornets and Super Hornets. But rapidly we were cleared to tank 12 different aircraft from seven different nations, and certainly the USMC and USN became major users.
This meant that we were a net contributor to the operation rather than having to rely on US assets only.
And our tanker crews became highly valued because they were able to listen on the JTAC frequencies and able to anticipate fighter fuel demand and to move closer to where the fighters would then move to get refueled.
The flexibility to anticipate fighter demand – which clearly happened in both the US and Canadian cases – meant the difference between getting weapons away on several occasions or not.
Question: You also introduced the Wedgetail as well as your Super Hornets flying for the first time in combat with the F-22s. How would you describe those experiences?
Air Commodore Roberton: With regard to Wedgetail, it really is a new aircraft with an incredible radar. And as such is clearly something new in the air battle management world, and we experienced US AWACS personnel seeking us out to discuss the Wedgetail and its capabilities as part of their thinking about the future as well.
We have practiced the working relationship between our Super Hornets and the Wedgetail but in the operation we worked out various combinations of how best to work the two aircraft in combat. The sensing capability shared by the two aircraft really allowed us to enhance the lethality of the Super Hornet in the operations. We were able to deliver weapons very rapidly and in late December during the air campaign I was able to authorize seven different weapons releases inside of an hour as they rapidly rolled into the target area.
The Wedgetail was able to handle a very complex combat situation.
There were really three quite separate and distinct conflicts in Syria, Northern Iraq and Central Anbar Province, with a very different shape and feel to them. The ability of the Wedgetail to handle a high volume of information and to shape it into effective decision making packages for three very different air operations going on at the same time was impressive.
For the fighters, the fidelity of the data generated by the Wedgetail was a key to the kind of combat confidence one needs to make decisions in a complex combat environment.
And given the age of the AWACS, there were breakdowns and challenges to keep them operating. The result was that Wedgetail was extended in its operational time on station to fill the gap.
Question: And your F-22 experience?
Air Commodore Roberton: In broad terms they have the fifth generation sensor package which can help provide information you wouldn’t otherwise get from something standing off.
We’ve got great capabilities in Wedgetail, but sometimes you really need a penetrating capability that can use the full spectrum and pass on information closer to the target.
Operating the Super Hornet with the F-22 and then receiving their data allowed us to operate more effectively. Our training with the F-22s in exercises like Red Flag has been crucial not only to prepare ourselves for combat but also to rethink how we operate our own fighter fleet.
We have adapted a lot of our tactics and procedures to do that same sort of leverage that the F22 practices with the Eagle community but clearly at lower levels between our Super Hornet to Hornet. That becomes pretty important for us to get the most out of our classic Hornets.
In other words, we are adapting our concepts of operations anticipating the entry into service of the F-35 and the readjustment of the role of the Super Hornet.
We are preparing ourselves thereby for the transition to the F-35 enabled force. The Super Hornets and Growlers are enhancing our current capabilities, and we can work through how the F-35 will redefine their roles in the evolving force. We know we’ve got a lot to learn.
One problem with how people interpret the F-35 is thinking fifth generation is only about stealth; it is about data fusion and the capability to make the other air combat assets more viable and effective. It is a significant force multiplier, rather than commentators who want to see it as some kind of silver bullet.
Question: Do you have anything else to add about the impact of Operation Okra on the way ahead?
Air Commodore Roberton: As we work to transform the force, we have a combat experienced force.
We have an entire generation of combat hardened crews.
That’s going to position us pretty well for this transition to a next generation air force we’re trying to build, which is centered around the F-35.
We are focusing on a transition in which the force packages are the critical combat enabler.
We really only ever think in packages now.
And we need to get the best information available as fast as possible to the package.
What platform we’ve decided to deliver the final effect, which may or may not be kinetic, is not as important as how we get the most out of the assets that are up there.
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More About ACG Commander Roberton:
Air Commodore Roberton is a Category A Fighter Pilot with over 3000 total hours, mostly in F/A-18A, B, C, D, E and F fighters. He entered the Royal Australian Air Force in 1989 as a direct entry pilot trainee having completed a Bachelor of Science degree in Chemistry and Mathematics at the University of Queensland. He graduated from Number 153 Pilots Course in 1990 and F/A-18 conversion in 1993 He flew fighter tours at Number 3 Squadron RAAF Williamtown; an exchange flying F/A-18s with the United States Marine Corps at Beaufort, South Carolina; and at Number 3 Squadron as the A Flight Commander until 2000.
Roberton completed a joint staff tour in Capability Development Group in Canberra and Australian Command and Staff College. He commanded Number 75 Squadron at RAAF Tindal from November 2003 before returning to Canberra to stand up the Air Combat Transition Office and lead the transition to F/A-18F Super Hornet. He commanded Number 82 Wing at RAAF Amberley and then completed the UK’s Higher Command and Staff College in 2012 before returning on promotion as Director General Aerospace Development. He was the initial Commander of the Australian Air Task Group 630 in the Middle East in September 2014 prior to returning to RAAF Williamtown to command Air Combat Group from January 2015.
About Air Combat Group
Air Combat Group commands all the Royal Australian Air Force’s fast-jet combat aircraft to deliver Australia’s capability to control the air and conduct precision strike.
Headquarters Air Combat Group (HQ ACG) commands three operational wings:
No 78 Wing conducts operational training (ground and air) on the F/A-18B Hornet and Hawk at Nos 76 and 79 Squadrons
No 81 Wing controls the air with Nos 3, 75 and 77 Squadrons (all F/A-18 Hornet squadrons) and No 2 Operational Conversion Unit
No 82 Wing strikes designated targets and conducts reconnaissance with Nos 1 and 6 Squadrons (Hornets) and Forward Air Combat Development Unit (PC-9/A)
Air Combat Group is one of the largest Force Element Groups in the Air Force with 145 aircraft, 163 aircrew and 2000 support personnel based across Australia. It is responsible for all of the Air Force ’s F/A-18 Hornet and Hawk squadrons, plus PC-9/A Forward Air Control aircraft. Units that make up Air Combat Group are based at:
RAAF Base Amberley, near Brisbane, Queensland
RAAF Base Williamtown, near Newcastle, New South Wales
RAAF Base Pearce, near Perth, Western Australia
RAAF Base Tindal, near Katherine, Northern Territory
Air Combat Group was formed in January 2002 by merging the Tactical Fighter Group and Strike Reconnaissance Group. The merger enhanced our ability to deploy combat air power in a prompt, effective and highly integrated manner.
HQ Air Combat Group is at RAAF Base Williamtown.
Since its formation, Air Combat Group squadrons have experienced a level of operational activity not seen in many years. F/A-18 Hornets were deployed to provide air defence as part of Operation Slipper (international coalition against terror) in Diego Garcia and again during Operation Guardian II to protect the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in south-east Queensland. Air Combat Group personnel, including a F/A-18 Hornet squadron, also deployed to Iraq in 2003 as part of Operation Falconer, providing air defence for high-value assets such as Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft, close air support for ground troops and striking enemy targets.
Air Combat Group also maintains a busy training schedule for both air and ground crew on the F/A-18 Hornet and Hawk. Highlights have been providing support to Operation Acolyte (Melbourne Commonwealth Games 2006) and participation in high-end exercises such as Exercise Pitch Black in Australia and Exercise Red Flag in the United States.
The photos in the slideshow highlight aircraft based in Williamtown, or in the case of the KC-30A working with aircraft based at Williamtown.
An F/A-18 Hornet conducts an aerial display over RAAF Base Williamtown in preparation for the Wings over Illawarra Air Show.
F/A-18A Hornets based at RAAF Williamtown, NSW, participate in Exercise Aces North which was conducted in the Northern Territory. Exercise Aces North 2015 is the culmination of Fighter Combat Instructor (FCI) course held at RAAF Base Tindal and Darwin over the period 28 May-25 June 2015.
Exercise Aces North is supported by personnel and assets from Number 1 Squadron and Number 2 Operational Conversion Unit.
Two F/A-18A Hornets take off in formation from RAAF Base Williamtown during Exercise DAWN STRIKE. Dawn Strike represents the final mission of the Fighter Combat Instructor (FCI) Course held at RAAF Base Williamtown.
FCI course was run from 12 January to 26 June 2015 at Number 2 Operational Conversion Unit (2OCU). The aim of FCI course is to graduate expert leaders and instructors capable of tactics development, validation and instruction and is run every two years.
KC-30A MRTT and E-7A Wedgetail conduct Air to Air refueling testing in the airspace near RAAF Williamtown. From 1-13 June 2015, air-to-air refueling (AAR) trials were conducted between a RAAF KC-30A Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) and an E-7A Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft.
A Royal Australian Air Force No. 2 Squadron E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft completes a night-time air-to-air refuel from a United States military KC-10 Extender Air-to-Air Refueling Tanker Aircraft.
Australian F-35A flying out of Luke Air Force Base, USA (credit Lockheed Martin)
The first squadron of ten F-35B Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) are operational after the United States Marine Corps (USMC) declared Initial Operating Capability (IOC) on 31 July 2015.
RAAF personnel working with JSF will be tapped into an international support network and will have the opportunity to work alongside Defence industry to sustain the JSF fleet.
Australia is scheduled to achieve IOC for its first Squadron of F-35s to be based at Williamtown in 2020.
No 76 Squadron Hawk-127 aircraft return to Squadron lines after conducting an aerial display during the No 76 Squadron Family day at RAAF Base Williamtown.
F-16 C aircraft from the 132nd Fighter Wing (132FW), Des Moines, IA are seen operating from the Williamtown Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Base in preparation to launch during a Dissimilar Air Combat Training (DACT) mission at the Williamtown RAAF Base, Australia on February 23, 2011.
The 132FW is seen conducting DACT mission “Sentry Down Under.”
All but the F-16 photos are credited to the Australian Ministry of Defence; the others to the USAF.
The second slideshow focuses on Air Commodore Roberton.
The first two photos highlight the Super Hornet transition.
The third photo shows The Minister for Defence, the Hon Kevin Andrews, MP (left) speaks with Commander Air Task Group, Air Commodore Steve Roberton during a visit to the Middle East Region.
The fourth photo shows outgoing Commander Air Combat Group Air Commodore Anthony Grady, AM, (right) Officially hands over his duties to Air Commodore Steven Roberton, AM by signing the Change of Command certificate.
The fifth photo shows Commander Air Combat Group, Air Commodore Steve ‘Zed’ Roberton listens to an address by Local Worimi Elder Uncle Neville Lilley during a ceremony at RAAF Base Williamtown during NAIDOC Week.
The final photo shows. Commander Air Combat Group, Air Commodore Steve ‘Zed’ Roberton presents a framed Aboriginal flag and Worimi Hornet print to Local Worimi Elders Uncle Neville Lilley (right) and Uncle John Ridgeway during a ceremony for NAIDOC Week at RAAF Base Williamtown.
Plan Jericho Report:
A comprehensive report on the Williams Foundation 6 August seminar, Plan Jericho, Shaping Design-Led Innovation, has been prepared for the Foundation by Dr Robbin Laird.
Dr Laird has been reporting on the RAAF’s Jericho journey since the first Williams ‘5th Gen’ seminar in March 2014, and has been an active and supportive participant in the Williams seminars over the last 18 months.
Dr Laird’s report explores and analyses the themes and issues discussed at the seminar on 6 August as well as presenting an excellent summary of each of the presentations. He has used an episode from the Battle for Britain as a means of ‘setting the scene’ and highlighting the centrality of a concept of operations to provide the framework and foundation for integrating across platforms and enablers.
Dr Laird postulates that without such a conops to support the future 5th generation enabled ADF, our warfighting effectiveness will be sub-optimal.
Dr Laird also conducted a series of interviews with the RAAF’s senior leadership to inform his analysis of the RAAF’s transformation challenges and opportunities.
Interviews with CAF and DCAF, operational and FEG commanders, and the outgoing CAF give this report a unique perspective.
Current operations are reviewed, future challenges embraced, and the Jericho implications for the joint battlespace and Defence Industry are candidly discussed.
During my recent visit to Australia, where the Royal Australian Air Force is shaping its path ahead with regard to transformation via what it calls Plan Jericho, its combat experience in the Middle East is providing an important input to the way ahead.
Question: Your Super Hornets flew for the first time in combat with F-22s.
What was the experience and what did you learn from that?
Air Marshal Davies: We have flown in Red Flag with F-22s and that training was crucial to operations in the Middle East. The pilots came back and said “it was just like in Red Flag.”
For us, at the moment the F-22 is a surrogate for the F-35, although with regard to combat systems and roles, the F-35 will be superior to the F-22.
But the point is to get the operational experience.
And the head of the RAAF Air Combat Group added that his recent combat experience with the F-22 highlighted the transition to fifth generation-enabled concept of operations as a core contributor to the way ahead for the RAAF.
Air Commodore Steven P. Roberton, Commander of Air Combat Group (ACG) and Commander of the Australian Air Task Group 630 in the Middle East in September 2014 highlighted the impact of the F-22 on the RAAF and its operations as follows:
In broad terms they have the fifth generation sensor package which can help provide information you wouldn’t otherwise get from something standing off.
We’ve got great capabilities in Wedgetail, but sometimes you really need a penetrating capability that can use the full spectrum and pass on information closer to the target.
Operating the Super Hornet with the F-22 and then receiving their data allowed us to operate more effectively. Our training with the F-22s in exercises like Red Flag has been crucial not only to prepare ourselves for combat but also to rethink how we operate our own fighter fleet.
We have adapted a lot of our tactics and procedures to do that same sort of leverage that the F22 practices with the Eagle community but clearly at lower levels between our Super Hornet to Hornet. That becomes pretty important for us to get the most out of our classic Hornets.
In other words, we are adapting our concepts of operations anticipating the entry into service of the F-35 and the readjustment of the role of the Super Hornet. We are preparing ourselves thereby for the transition to the F-35 enabled force. The Super Hornets and Growlers are enhancing our current capabilities, and we can work through how the F-35 will redefine their roles in the evolving force. We know we’ve got a lot to learn.
One problem with how people interpret the F-35 is thinking fifth generation is only about stealth; it is about data fusion and the capability to make the other air combat assets more viable and effective. It is a significant force multiplier, rather than commentators who want to see it as some kind of silver bullet.
In other words, the RAAF is working a fifth generation warfare transition under the impact of their own experience with the F-22 as well as operating with the USAF in the Middle East in terms of its impact on operations in the Middle East.
Although interesting to discuss this transition in Australia, it made a great deal of sense to go to where the F-22s are based to generate the operations which the Aussies discussed.
During a visit to Langley AFB on September 2, 2015, I was able to discuss the USAF implementation of a fifth generation warfare approach and the impact of the F-22 and the coming of the F-35 upon the re-working of fleet ops seen in the Middle East and elsewhere.
Carlisle emphasized throughout our meeting the importance of the training transition throughout the fleet, not simply the operation of the F-22 and the coming of the F-35 as in and of themselves activities.
It is about force transformation, not simply the operation of the fifth generation aircraft themselves as cutting edge capabilities.
An F-22 and an F-35, flown by Air Force Reserve Command pilots from the 514th Flight Test Squadron here fly over the Utah Test and Training Range during a functional check flight approximately 75 miles west of Hill AFB. (Air Force photo) 2/10/15
General Carlisle: “It is important to look at the impact of the F-22 operations on the total force. We do not wish, nor do the allies wish to send aircraft into a contested area, without the presence of the F-22.
It’s not just that the F-22s are so good, it’s that they make every other plane better. They change the dynamic with respect to what the other airplanes are able to do because of what they can do with regard to speed, range, and flexibility.
It’s their stealth quality. It’s their sensor fusion. It’s their deep penetration capability. It is the situational awareness they provide for the entire fleet which raises the level of the entire combat fleet to make everybody better.”
The shift is to a new way of operating.
What is crucial as well is training for the evolving fight, and not just remaining in the mindset or mental furniture of the past.
It is about what needs to be done NOW and training towards the evolving and future fight.
General Carlisle: “The F-22s are not silver bullets.
The F-22s make the Eagles better, and the A-10s better, and the F-16s better. They make the bombers better.
They provide information. They enable the entire fight.
And its information dominance, its sensor fusion capability, it’s a situational awareness that they can provide to the entire package which raises the level of our capabilities in the entire fight.
This is not about some distant future; it is about the current fight.”
He emphasized the need to shift from a fourth generation mentality where a large combat force is moved to enable any single platform, such as the A-10. It’s a change of mentality to fifth generation thought.
“It’s the way we train the airman and the crews. It’s the scenarios we put them through. It’s the Red Flags and the integration phase of weapon school.
What we teach right now is fifth generation con-ops. That includes the Raptors and what they bring to the fight, and the F-35s and what they bring to the fight, and what the cyber systems bring to the fight.
How do you bring space into that environment?
How does C2 operate inside of an information flow that is inside of anything the adversary can do?
How do you put the C2 at the point that it can execute at a rate and with information superiority that is far better greater than an adversary can react to?
And then it’s the way we train our airmen to think in fifth generation terms, rather than just flying a new platform.”
He also emphasized that in the current Middle Eastern operations, F-22s because of their multi-mission flexibilities, are pressed into duty across the spectrum of operations and perform a variety of missions for the force, ranging from C-2 to ISR to strike to air defense to other missions as well.
Question: When we visited Nellis earlier this year, we highlighted that one key advantage, which the USAF brings to the evolution of fifth generation, enabled warfare, is the ability to fly LO versus LO aircraft.
How important is that to shaping the way ahead?
General Carlisle: “We think it is very important.
We are shaping tactics and approaches for LO aircraft to fight LO aircraft, and to think in terms of LO enabled forces to fight against LO enabled combat forces.
The F-35 brings incredible EW and other capabilities into the fight and how do we operate those capabilities in a jamming and non-jamming environment for legacy systems or LO-enabled legacy systems?
How do we build a realistic threat to be able to do that?
We are working on it.”
Question: Training to leverage fifth generation capabilities is crucial to the modernization and training of the other elements of the air combat force so that those elements are adjusting their thinking and approaches as well.
How do you view this challenge?
F-22 Raptors from the 94th Fighter Squadron, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Virginia, and F-35A Lightning IIs from the 58th Fighter Squadron, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, fly in formation after completing an integration training mission over the Eglin Training Range, Florida, Nov. 5, 2014. It was the first operational integration training mission for the Air Force’s fifth generation aircraft. The F-35s and F-22s flew offensive counter air, defensive counter air and interdiction missions together, employing tactics to maximize their fifth-generation capabilities. (U.S. Air Force photo/Master Sgt. Shane A. Cuomo)
General Carlisle: “With the need to use our training funds to prepare for the threats we are facing and will face, we need our airmen and crews to think forward not backwards towards yesterday’s concepts of operations.
Training for the concepts, which enabled the legacy aircraft, is simply not what we need to do going forward.
And with our young and innovative airmen, they are going out there and reinventing approaches to warfare.
Fourth generation system can operate much better and effectively when enabled by fifth generation SA and information, but that will not happen by itself, and requires rethinking how fourth generation systems will operate going forward.
We have young airmen who are flying F-15Es or F-16CJs and they’re going, hey, the Raptor can give me a particular capability.
The Lightning can provide an additional capability, which means I can do something, which I could not do before. It’s designed for this but I can make it do something different, and make it even better.
And that thought process really is a fifth generation dynamic of change, but does not happen if you do not put fifth generation in the driver’s seat driving that process of change.
It is not about improving the techniques of what we used to do; it is about rethinking fundamentally how we shape and execute information dominance in a fluid battlespace.”
Question: How important are key allies like Australia in shaping an innovative approach going forward?
General Carlisle: “The F-35 is a global aircraft and will provide significant opportunities for cross-cutting learning.
The RAAF is at the cutting edge of rethinking warfare, under the influence of fifth generation capabilities.
I think the RAAF because their size comes with a relative lack of bureaucracy and a more open approach are actually leaning further forward in some areas than we are.
But I think the joint aspect of the F-35 will be a powerful engine of change for the air services in the US as the Marines, the USAF and the USN work through lessons learned going forward from using their F-35s and reshaping on joint concepts of operations.
In this sense really the F-35 is a central part of our broader effort to transformation jointness.”
Editor’s Note: The term fourth and fifth integration may confuse things.
Question: Too often integration means shooting for the lowest common denominator, and combat is not a place where the lowest common denominator is where you want to go.
Assimilation often passes for integration, but obviously you have in mind a much higher target for integration.
How would you characterize your target goal?
Air Vice Marshal Turnbull: Assimilation I think is a word that we don’t need to even have in our vocabulary because it’s implies vanilla and gray.
Lethal is the world we live in and people need to keep their eye on that fact.
We don’t play games and we’re here for a reason.
It is really about the shift to fifth generation warfare and the shift of legacy assets to work within a strategic shift to a new concept of operations.
It is also the case that fifth generation aircraft can do a variety of things as an integrated force that a fifth gen force working with legacy can not simply do.
Ed Timperlake’s work on the F-35 and tron warfare is one of the few pieces in the public domain that identifies a fifth generation way ahead.
Close air support in the context of the fight against ISIS is about providing support for those forces on the ground engaged in the fight against ISIS.
A key force in the fight is the Peshmerga who clearly need supplies and air support to enhance their effectiveness against the radical Islamic force.
The discussion of how to provide CAS is not simply a technical issue of providing JTACs and US or allied airpower; it is about positioning support in a way that the forces on the ground, in this case the Peshmerga can see strategic as well as tactical support.
The problem for the US and its allies is simply that the Peshmerga know how to fight; the Iraqi government does not.
Now the US is using Turkish bases to prosecute the fight, but Turkey is at best an ambiguous player in this fight, and certainly is no friend of the Kurds.
Kassab added that the President of Kurdistan has offered a former Iraqi air base to the US and its allies from which to fight ISIS, a move which would not only reinforce the relationship with Kurdistan but be recognized instantly by ISIS as a significant threat to their activity in Iraq.
“We really do prefer that we use it for the Kurdistan itself rather than coming from Turkey because this will give a lot more strength to the Kurds.”
Such a base would be far enough from indirect fire weapons yet close enough for CAS and perhaps a Forward Operating Base (FOB) for helos as well.
Such an airfield not only can be an effective move inside Kurdistan but it also sends a signal to Syria/Russia, Iran AND Turkey.
In addition to a base from which the U.S. and allied aircraft could fly, we need to understand how important CAS support is in striking against pop up threats like ISIS.
We argued earlier that there was a clear need for an airpower transition in Iraq prior to the US precipitously leaving the country in 2012.
What may be needed is a forward look at the Table of Organization and Equipment or TOE that will remain for the Iraqi Armed Forces and Police—what lies beyond rifles, trucks, and body armor.
Training for such activities is what we have been exposed to by the media; but there is much more that is needed, notably with regard to air and naval forces.
We added in a later article that year, the following:
As the transition accelerates the most significant U.S. forces are air and naval forces.
These forces are crucial in training Iraqis but also working with nascent Iraqi forces to ensure their territorial integrity as well as to build upon US working relationships in the region.
The war in Kuwait was about territorial integrity, which remains a fundamental issue in the region.
With all the emphasis on MRAPing operations, it is now time to step back and to re-invigorate air and naval forces in the region able to re-assure Iraq and deter Iran.
Obviously, this did not happen but could be introduced into the current environment to build an integrated Iraqi Air Force flying Super Tucanos and Helos in close air support missions.
There is a key advantage of training a professional air corps, which can provide as well the kernel for the rebirth of the nation as well.
We argued the case of for the airpower element to transition in Afghanistan as well and the Iraq case may be reemerging as a key area to shape an airpower transition strategy.
And we underscored with regard to the transition in Afghanistan, laying a solid foundation in countries with whom we are collaborating in the fight against terrorists, shaping a CAS air corps provides some key advantages.
As the U.S. looks forward to work with allies worldwide in the years to come on COIN and related operations, the U.S. will not be bringing the entire gamut of capability to the party. Working with allies in current and projected financial conditions requires a new formula: the U.S. supports allies who can fend for themselves, up to a point.
But allies likely to need COIN assistance are not in the top 10 financial giants of the global economy. And they will need and can afford what the Super Tucano can offer.
As an article by Chris Kraul highlighted:
Unsleek and unsupersonic, the Super Tucano hardly fits most people’s concept of a modern warplane. But Brazilian manufacturer Embraer is finding a growing market for the retro “light attack” propeller-driven aircraft among nations looking to secure their borders, fight drugs and support counterinsurgency operations.
Ecuador is one such customer. The two Super Tucanos that flew into Manta air base late last month were the first delivered on a 24-plane order that President Rafael Correa placed shortly after Colombian armed forces entered Ecuador’s airspace in March 2008 to kill a high-ranking FARC rebel leader, Raul Reyes.
Although the $250-million purchase was seen as a reaction to Colombia’s violation of its sovereignty, Correa in his weekly television address Feb. 6 said that the aircraft acquisition didn’t signal an arms buildup. Rather, he said, the planes were replacing Ecuador’s fleet of mostly 30-year-old A-37 Dragonfly aircraft made by Cessna.
But Correa is wrestling with a problem that the planes can help him confront: the persistent presence in his territory of guerrillas with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or, FARC. Without specifically mentioning FARC, Correa said the aircraft would help support the Ecuadorean military as it fights “regular and irregular forces” inside the country’s borders.
(It was a Colombian air force Super Tucano that dropped the “smart bomb” that killed Reyes, then second in command of the FARC, as he slept at a camp a mile inside Ecuadorean territory.)
And the model has already been highlighted by the 12th USAF in working with Columbia: what needs to happen is to recognize this model and move ahead in global support for these types of operations with the U.S. providing its complement to those allies willing to field counter-insurgency airpower.
As we emphasized earlier
The 12th is supporting nations just off our shore and recently held a U.S. Air Power demonstrationin celebration of 100 years of aviation in the Dominican Republic.
Unheralded success has just been achieved by this partnership between SOUTHCOM and the Dominican Republic Air Force flying the Embraer Air Super Tucano. This remarkable and replicable success is made possible by U.S. “Hi” ISR technology in partnership with the Dominican Republic “Lo” technology the Super Tucano.
It has not been widely reported that this war against drug barons is being won in the sky.
Although drug money is unrelenting in finding ways to supply their corrosive product for now in the war against narco-criminials and terrorist this is a huge accomplishment, and the opening headline from Dominican Today quoted above says it all.
Along with the success in Dom Rep, the Colombian AF is wining the fight against the FARC with sensors and shooters—again the Super Tucano.
Consequently, this “Hi-Lo” mix is beginning to look like a winning formula for world wide partnerships between the U.S. and other nations by using American ISR that can give hot vectors in both the air-to-air and air-to-ground mission to a Light Armed Attack Aircraft (LAAR) like the Super Tucano.
Regardless of what country and service there is a combat bond between Squadron Pilots and those affectionately called “the grunts.”
The USMC has that factor as one of their most cherished way of war.
The USAF and US Army in close quarter combat has the same life and death combat bonding.
As technology is relative and always progressing the mission of taking out targets from the air will evolve because the goal is survival in combat against a reactive enemy in both the air and on the land.
CAS is a partnership forged in battle and the U.S. has been historically very good ever since the USMC perfected it in WW II.
Today’s coalition CAS is excellent and there is no doubt U.S. and its Allies will be the world class gold standard into the future.
This video shows that partnership in combat, and an intangible factor that is creating a generation of experience:
In short, shaping CAS capabilities can be part of a strategy of Iraq transition and not simply a capability that the U.S. has to insert every time one has a pop up threat like ISIS to deal with.
The U.S. has the technology and combat skills to be effective in any aspect of CAS.
If U.S. Airpower services have to engage with other forces employing their aircraft in being the “low” part of the mix it will still be an effective combat force.
As the old proverb goes: “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime.”
What is clear from my recent trip to the Pacific is that amphbiosity is a growing capability.
This true not just in terms of nations building out capabilities and working with the USN-USMC team on ways to use that capability, but in terms of shaping more effective tool sets going forward.
Amphibious forces have the core advantage of going to the point of need, attack or area of interest and then LEAVING when a tactical or strategic task is done.
They provide core needs for the insertion of force or capability for a time, and provide means to execute missions with a time limit.
And policy makers clearly need to learn the lessons of time limited missions whether for tactical or strategic objectives.
On August 24, 2015, I had a chance to see the work of Seabees and Sailors assigned to Amphibious Construction Battalions (PHIBCB) 1 and 2 along with other Naval Beach Group (NBG) 2 commands who are constructing the Elevated Causeway System-Modular (ELCAS-M) on Anzio Beach at Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek/Fort Story through September 2015.
In effect, they are taking a capability, which has been around for some time, but bringing back in the period of significant change in the rethink about amphibious operations.
The over the beach logistics capability is clearly designed to provide a robust support capability to bring support from the sea to an area where there is no pier or where a pier has been damaged heavily by natural or man-made activities.
The most obvious use of such a capability would be a situation like in Haiti several years ago when humanitarian relief was limited by the absence of a pier to bring in supplies from sea.
In addition to the HA/DR mission, clearly the capability can be useful for crisis response or pre-combat situations in addition to resupplying Marines ashore in an austere location.
As the U.S. works to support a HA/DR mission in the Pacific, this capability can be used as well to train with a country’s military to reinforce a partners more remote territory in times of crisis.
When a big power in the Pacific decides to push a smaller country around in an island situation, this capability can be used to reinforce an island as part of a partnership effort.
And the US could use the capability to support islands where missile defense systems might be brought over the shore to install equipment in a diversity of austere locations which can provide forward defense for US and allied combat assets as well.
And if it seems desirable to bring Army aviation or Air Defense Assets into a more austere location, then the modular pier can be used to offload significant support equipment as well for more extended operations.
In the video below, a Seabee explains the nature of the ELCA-M and answers questions about its potential use.
The photos in the slideshow show various aspects of the operation.
The first credited to 2nd ESG shows the pier in toto.
The other photos are credited to Second Line of Defense and show the crane as well as the piles being driven into the sides of the pier to support its operation.
The pier can be built out to 3,000 feet and can be configured to accommodate the ships needed to support an operation.
