2015-04-04 By Richard Weitz

The Russia-Ukraine war has highlighted the security dilemmas of Eurasian countries that find themselves outside of any regional military alliance.

Although recent attention has focused on Ukraine, the Caspian littoral countries have, for several years, considered themselves vulnerable to renewed Russian assertiveness and have complained about declining U.S. and European engagement in their region.

In response to these challenges, as well as in pursuit of new opportunities for regional energy cooperation, Azerbaijan and Turkey have partnered with Georgia, Iran, or Turkmenistan in recent years to pursue targeted trilateral economic, energy, and security collaboration.

The trilateral format, most often seen in meetings of the three countries’ foreign ministers, supplements bilateral and other multilateral mechanisms and helps the participants advance their national security, economic development, and geopolitical independence.

The Caspian triangles also enable these states to achieve diplomatic compartmentalization and manage antagonistic relationships by aligning with different combinations of partners in pursuit of mutually beneficial goals.

Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia

The most developed of the Caspian trilateral partnerships is that among Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Georgia.

These three states have enjoyed good relations since the breakup of the Soviet Union, but they only formalized their trilateral cooperation following the 2006 opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the August 2008 Russian-Georgian War, which challenged their mutual economic and security interests.

Since then, the three countries have built additional energy pipelines, a trans-Caucasus railway, and undertaken joint military exercises.

Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Iran

Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Iran represent a more complex Caspian triangle.

The three countries’ foreign ministers have discussed various regional energy, investment, transportation, and security projects since their first meeting in April 2011.

Mutual distrust, regional rivalries, international sanctions and other obstacles have impeded realization of most initiatives.

As a result, the parties have concentrated on making incremental progress now, while hoping to expand their partnership should more favorable conditions arise, such as following a nuclear deal that ended most international sanctions.

Given Iran’s poor relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, this trilateral construct has also aimed to manage their differences in a conflict-prone region.

Past tensions have centered on Ankara’s and Tehran’s backing of opposing local actors in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, and Iranian concerns about Azerbaijan’s secular and Western orientation.

 Azerbaijan, Turkey and Turkmenistan

The foreign ministers of Azerbaijan, Turkey and Turkmenistan only began meeting last year.

This triangle has focused on promoting economic cooperation, but energy and security collaboration may follow.

In particular, Turkey would like Turkmenistan to send gas westward through the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline.

However, the unresolved territorial dispute between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan over several energy deposits in the Caspian Sea, as well as other constraints on Ashgabat’s foreign policy flexibility, limit this triangle from realizing its potential.

The Lynchpins

Turkey and Azerbaijan form the linchpin of the three triangles.

Turkey needs more energy sources and wants to become a bridge between Europe and Asia, while Azerbaijan seeks to expand its regional energy and security connections.

The two countries share cultural, religious, and ethnic ties – Azeris are a Turkic people.

The official discourse of both countries highlights their special relationship, which is ascribed to historical, ethnic, cultural and other ties, by referring to them as “one nation” living in two states.

In a regional context, ties with Turkey strengthen Azerbaijan’s position in negotiations on Caspian energy and transit projects.

Without Turkey’s participation in the triangles, Azerbaijan has much less to offer Georgia, Iran, and Turkmenistan.

The Caspian triangles stand out as one of the few successful Turkish foreign policy initiatives in recent years.

Through its economic and political cooperation with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkmenistan, Turkey amplifies its regional economic and security influence in the South Caucuses and the Caspian Basin.

Ankara also establishes itself as an important transit corridor and energy hub between the Caspian countries and Europe, which has become even more important with the Ukraine crisis.

Although Ankara’s ties with Tehran remain troubled, the triangle reduces the prospects of a military confrontation between Iran and Azerbaijan that could easily drag in Turkey and other countries, like Russia.

The remaining Caspian triangle countries are excluded from the Washington-led NATO alliance, the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, and other regional security structures. Although Ankara remains in NATO, Turkish policy makers fret about their limited influence on the European Union’s security policies.

Turkey’s efforts to develop alternative ties with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) have been stymied due to Russian-Turkish differences over Syria and other tensions.

Although Iran has observer status in the SCO, Beijing and Moscow have made clear that Tehran’s prospects for full membership depend on a resolution of its nuclear dispute. Whereas Azerbaijan and Georgia are most interested in bolstering their Euro-Atlantic orientation, Iran and Turkmenistan are also eager to strengthen ties with China.

While none of these governments characterize their Caspian triangles as being directed against any country, the partnerships increase their independence from Russia without their aligning with other great powers, like China and the United States.

The trilateral framework facilitates cooperation without compromising diplomat flexibility.

Pursuing trilateral partnerships offers an advantage over bilateral alliances since participants can cooperate with neighboring states without having to negotiate formal alliances that could compromise their members’ independence, national identity, or other strategic relationships.

The triangles are easy to create but also to dissolve as the goals of each partner naturally evolves.

Nonetheless, the unresolved dispute over maritime boundaries and usage rights in the Caspian Sea remains a major constraint on realizing the Caspian triangles’ energy potential.

Not only have the littoral states failed to resolve their overlapping territorial claims, but Russia and Iran have vetoed trans-Caspian energy pipelines by insisting that all five littoral states must approve their construction.

The lukewarm U.S. and European support for trans-Caspian projects has also limited the triangles’ impact.

The West has strained relations with all five governments directly involved in the triangles, as well as with many other Eurasian states. Western governments and NGOs have criticized the Caspian countries’ restrictions on political pluralism and free market principles. For their part, the five governments participating in the Caspian triangles have complained about insufficient Western respect and support for their interests and values.

Western governments need to look past these differences and recognize that these trilateral partnerships can enhance Eurasian-European energy collaboration, discourage Iranian and Russian predatory behavior, and stabilize a region primed for problems.

2015-03-25 By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

Late March 2015, we interviewed Secretary Wynne with regard to the evolution of coalition airpower over the period ahead.

Earlier, Wynne laid out a wide-ranging perspective on the evolution of airpower in his article entitled: “Airpower in the Next Two Decades of the 21^st Century: Secretary Wynne Looks Ahead.”

That article addressed in Wynne’s words the following:

Globalization may have brought the world closer together in terms of collaboration, but the United States remains a singular continent that can now be reached by the forces of military globalization, missiles and nuclear weapons.

Without air superiority, we can neither defend our land nor project power abroad.

If we rest our assumptions of superiority on an aging stock of proud yet outdated airplanes, we can never hope to prevail in the face of rising and adventurist powers like China and other modern adversaries.

I would like to examine a way forward in understanding how we can recapture air superiority and the enthusiasm necessary to build and sustain it. 

Quite clearly, coalition capabilities are evolving as well, and a key challenge is how best to mesh U.S. and coalition developments to shape forces appropriate to the 21^st century missions facing the democracies.

In this interview, we discussed with Secretary Wynne his thoughts on the nature of the challenge and ways to shape an effective way ahead.

Question: How important is the coalition aspect of operations going to be for the United States?

Secretary Wynne: I think it will be the norm, whether you are following a concept of leading from the front or from behind.

The emphasis on coalition warfare will be the norm and driven by two factors.

The first is the relative equality of the technology across the coalition, as well as the role of bases provided by coalition partners.

The second is the lack of sufficient investment by any of the coalition partners to shape an overall dominant national force structure.

The U.S. and its allies will need to reach out to other nations to have a completely capable dominant force structure.

Question: In other words, the U.S. and allies achieve mass only by connectivity and convergence of capabilities?

Secretary Wynne: That is a good way to put it.

A challenge, which we face, is the perceptions, which core competitors have of the United States.

Namely, the Russians and the Chinese clearly perceive US forces to be exhausted and stretched thin.

Our peer competitors see an advantages in increasing their leveraging power and capabilities to pressure those U.S. and coalition forces as well.

Question: The Russians are pushing hard on the Baltics and the Nordics. 

How can their reactions help shape a response to provide a deterrent strategy?

Secretary Wynne:  The recent threat articulated by the Russian Ambassador to Denmark clearly is an Article Five issue for NATO.

But solid defense modernization and regional cooperation of the Baltic republics with the Nordics is crucial for shaping any effective credible deterrent strategy, as the Russians would see it.

And with the coming of the F-35 to the region, the coalition partners can shape new capabilities to deter the Russians with which we can interact and work with effectively as well.

In fact, the coming of the global F-35 fleet will enhance overall coalition capabilities and provide the U.S. with an opportunity to provide some key enablers for enhanced coalition effectiveness as well.

Each member of the coalition will now bring a specific set of expertise.

And in that bringing of expertise, we’re finding ways to integrate older technology into the newer systems.

And what we bring really, although we are very good at increasing the technology level of our weapon systems, we are really good at increasing the command and control technologies.

Our coalition partners are going to require that aspect of our own improvements and so I would say we will be drawn in first by our command and control expertise.

And I think then by our weapons systems and then by the commonality that we have, should there be a need, augment the coalition force.

I see us as offering to support and essentially provide command and control throughout wherever the theater develops.

Question: You have several points in your briefing about the opportunity to leverage legacy forces and make the point that 80% of what the coalition will have in 2030 already exists. In highlighting command and control going forward how do you view the challenge of re-shaping the force?

Secretary Wynne:  You have new forces coming in the airpower arena, which allow you to redesign a lethal C-2 extended force.

The new systems enable transformation but the older platforms need to be reworked to ensure that they can actually play the role of an effective operational reserve.

And in shaping a lethal C-2 extended force, the role of exercises with the allies is a crucial element of force modernization and concepts of operations innovations.

Question: We focused in earlier work on the role of the 12^th Air Force in working with the Dominican Republic to provide the C2 and ISR which enhanced the effectiveness and lethality of the Super Tucano force against the drug lords operating in their airspace. 

C2 can be a tool as well working with allies and how does this affect you sense of the coalition approach going ahead?

Secretary Wynne: The current ACC Commander, Hawk Carlisle, put it well: as allies bring capabilities to the forces; the goal is to fit it into a coalition operation and capability as appropriate to the agreed upon coalition mission.

Question: The Russians are stepping up their engagement in the Baltic region and beyond.  Do you see what there doing as part of what we have called tron warfare, namely probing Western defenses to see how they respond electronically?

Secretary Wynne:  I would say it this way.

We are being probed, and in those probes the Russian are seeking to gain domain knowledge.

We should assume that the Russians bombers are accepting the trons being pinged at them and retrainsmitting them to analysis station, rather than carrying bombs.

Why carry bombs?

That’s dangerous.

Why not carry electronic equipment so the Russians can learn with regard to how sophisticated the West has become?

That’s far more useful information than simply being escorted out of allied territory by Typhoons.

Question: And speaking more generally, clearly the Russians are engaged in probing operations across the board and pushing the political-diplomatic-military envelope to achieve objectives where effective resistance is not operational.

If you take the probing warfare point coupled with the perceived exhaustion of US forces, don’t you end up with an effort by the Russians to essential seek to open gaps in NATO and other bilateral relationships to seek to expand Russian power?

Secretary Wynne:  You do.

And we are not far from a tipping point which could parallel the Pueblo incident.

There we pulled back from seizing the Pueblo to avoid a major confrontation with North Korea.

But what would happen if a Russian bomber or escort fighter crashes or is shot down over Western territory.

What would the Russians do then? When the probability of warfare increases from the captivity of a foreign force, what happens then?

We were restrained this time, but ‘Remember the Maine.’

Question: A major challenge facing the democracies in dealing with probing warfare is the timeline whereby democracies make decisions.  Another is how non-democracies play into democratic ideals and use them against us.

How do you view this challenge?

Secretary Wynne: We clearly in a period of lawfare whereby our adversaries use our own concepts of law against us.

The ISIS declared themselves a state in order to be subject to international law with regard to prisoners of war.

They have no intention themselves to abide or be limited by international law, but know that the West will self deter.

And more generally, our non-democratic adversaries are leveraging the forms of legality as tools in their warfare kit.

Putin did not seize territory in Ukraine; rather plebiscites of concerned Ukrainian citizens voted themselves out of Ukraine.

Our own self-deterrence is a key challenge facing the US and its coalition partners in meeting the challenges of the period ahead.

 

 

 

 

2015-04-04

Recently, the second Future Force Conference was held in the Netherlands.

From March 23-25 2015, the Future Force Conference was held to look at the challenge and opportunities offered by technologies to allied or enemy forces.

http://www.ffc2015.com/

In the video above, the Dutch Chief of Staff, General Middendorp, provides his view of the way ahead.

“Together, we must go in search of the answers for meeting the challenges of tomorrow.”

That was the Chief of Defence General Tom Middendorp’s rallying cry at the conclusion of the Future Force Conference on 25 March.

“We must work at our credibility, build networks, anticipate new developments and continue to innovate.”

He highlighted a number of challenges and argued that “inaction is not an option.”

He focused on what he sees fundamental global challenges shaping significantly different threats.

“Europe is surrounded by a ring of fire,” is a rather dramatic way to put it, but that is how he put it.

“We are increasingly vulnerable to global shocks,” which he identified as rather wide ranging in terms of the shocks to which our systems must respond.

The growing nature of  “hybrid threats” would be challenging enough but given their cross-global interactivity they are even more challenging.

In this hard hitting, and in many ways grim, assessment of the way ahead, the Dutch head of the Dutch forces provides a sober corrective to those who would reduce military transformation in the face of economic difficulties.

“We are all part of the evolving defense and security eco system which is continuously evolving.”

The force we need is one capable “of being networked and networking” within the overall defense and security eco system.

“We need to turn the ring of fire into a ring of firefighters.”

 

 

 

 

2015-04-04 By Gulshan Luthra

According to Admiral Harry Harris Jr., Commander of the US Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), the US Navy has a Congressional mandate to keep 11 aircraft carriers, and six of these should be in the two oceans along with some 200 ships by 2020.

The first of the three new generation Gerald R Ford class aircraft carriers, will also be deployed by then although it will be stationed around the US coast.

The US Navy plans to have a total of 300 ships worldwide by 2020.

Notably, the four-star Admiral is due to be elevated shortly as Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command (PACOM).

Admiral Harris, who was in New Delhi to discuss Indo-US naval cooperation with Naval Chief Admiral Dhowan, observed that cooperation between India, US and other major powers like Japan and Australia was imperative for peace and stability in the Asia Pacific.

The US was looking forward to a pivotal role by India, he reminded by reiterating what former US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta had said in New Delhi in 2012 while elaborating the US Rebalancing strategy.

India, he had stressed then – while addressing the capital’s strategic community at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) – would have to play a key role in Indian Ocean’s stability.

Admiral Harris said that the US had no problem with Chinese ships visiting the Indian Ocean or elsewhere but China should not block ships from other countries visiting the free waters of South China Sea. Chinese actions like reclaiming land in the area were not acceptable.

Significantly, ASEAN countries, particularly maritime neighbors of China, have already condemned Chinese claims and assertions in this regard, although India has observed that border disputes should be mutually resolved between neighbors concerned.

As for the US, Adm Harris was categorical that the US does not recognize Chinese claims in South China Sea.

US ships and aircraft go wherever they have to, and all the time, he pointedly told India Strategic on the sidelines of an interaction at the National Maritime Foundation (NMF), the Indian Navy’s think tank March 3.

“China has a right to operate in the Indian Ocean as much as India has a right to operate in the South China Sea,” he said.

Admiral Harris observed that a strong, prosperous China that follows international norms would be good for the world.

But China’s lack of transparency in general and assertiveness create ripples of unacceptable discomfort.

As for Indo-US naval exercises, he said that the Defence Technology Transfer Initiative (DTTI) and other arrangements offered ample scope to grow.

The Malabar series of exercises had yielded positive results for both the US and Indian Navies, and it was time to expand and increase their levels by involving Japan and Australia.

There were still some unresolved issues like Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) and Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) but given the increasing diplomatic proximity at the highest levels, military interaction between India and the US is bound to grow, the Admiral said.

The two countries also hold Army and Air Force exercises periodically.

Notably, according to a US Navy statement, it has had its presence in the two oceans for a century and a half.

The Admiral’s statement made it clear that an assertive and a non-transparent China is not going to make the US Navy shy away, notwithstanding the rapidly growing Chinese naval presence in both the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

According to some estimates, China could have about 70 nuclear and diesel attack submarines in the Asia Pacific over the next few years, and some 20 or 30 more supplied by it to friendly countries like Pakistan under cooperative or proxy arrangements.

The Admiral declined to answer a question on the importance of China’s presence in Pakistan’s Gwadar port near the strategic Strait of Hormuz.

Notably, the Admiral had told the US Congress in a recent briefing over his new appointment that an assertive China will be a major threat in the Asia-Pacific region.

“China’s rise as a regional military and global economic power, and in particular, its rapid military modernization and assertive behavior toward regional neighbors present opportunities and challenges that must be managed effectively. This is our most enduring challenge.”

In a light-hearted remark, the Admiral told newsmen that his area of responsibility to maintain peace and stability extended from waters off Hollywood US West Coast) to Bollywood (India’s west Coast).

It is worth recalling here the official position of the US Government on global maritime presence as stated by Secretary Navy in the Pentagon, Mr Ray Mabus:

America’s Sea Services – the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard – uniquely provide presence around the globe. During peacetime and times of conflict, across the full spectrum – from supporting an ally with humanitarian assistance or disaster relief to deterring or defeating an adversary in kinetic action….

This (necessarily) has affirmed our focus on providing presence around the world in order to ensure stability, build on our relationships with allies and partners, prevent wars, and provide our Nation’s leaders with options in times of crisis. It has confirmed our continued commitment to maintain the combat power necessary to deter potential adversaries and to fight and win when required.”

Republished with permission of our partner India Strategic:

http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories3719_US_to_Deploy_6_Aircraft_Carriers_and_200_Ships_in_Asia_Pacific.htm