In an effort to be in compliance with GDPR we are providing you with the latest documentation about how we collect, use, share and secure your information, we want to make you aware of our updated privacy policy here
Enter your name and email address below to receive our newsletter.
The Black Sea region has in the past 12 months been dominating maritime and political media reporting.
Black Sea Ports. Credit: Risk Intelligence
There have been key political issues in the Ukraine and in Turkey.
There has been as well the re-emergence of Russian military ambitions in the Eastern Ukraine and the Crimea.
In addition, there has been the terrorism threat against the Islamic State (IS) that is currently dictating Western military operations in Syria and Iraq, which also gives the potential for Turkey to become embroiled in a conflict that could further draw NATO into a potential major conflict on the borders of Europe.
There are varying maritime issues that are currently affecting the countries in the region.
They vary considerably, but in most cases they are inter-linked, and what affects one country is likely to be felt in a neighboring country also….
Ukraine
The primary issue in the Ukraine is the widely reported conflict between the government in Kiev and those wishing to be linked to Russia in the east of the country.
The pro-Russian militia groups in the east and pro-EU politicians and the military in the west of the country are currently at an impasse and there does not appear to be an avenue to guarantee peace in the country.
Where overtures of peace are made on one day, these are normally negated in further conflict and violence on the next.
The Russian annexation of the Crimea will dominate Ukraine political and military doctrine for some time and also help to dictate UN, US and EU foreign policy for the coming 12 months at least.
Russian control of the Crimea and the continuing EU and US economic sanctions have reduced maritime trade into Ukrainian ports by in some cases as much as 60% and possibly higher in some ports.
Security at Ukraine ports is currently suspect and under scrutiny would be liable to fail to meet EU expected levels.
Georgia
There are still some legacy issues that remain from the limited conflict with Russia and the disputed Abkhazia region on the shores of the Black Sea.
There is currently a peaceful rapprochement between Russia and Georgia and the potential for further violence is currently low, despite the support that Georgia has shown to the Ukraine.
However, security is in general good at ports, although organized crime and narcotics movements are higher than the regional average.
Romania and Bulgaria
There are no significant maritime security issues affecting these two countries.
They are both new members of the EU, and port security has been raised to meet EU regulations.
There is still some significant issues regarding cargo theft, but this mainly occurs outside of the port areas.
Russia
Notwithstanding the issues regarding the annexation of the Crimea, and the conflict in Ukraine, Russia faces a serious threat of Islamic terrorism from Chechen based groups.
Port security at all Russian ports is high, but crime in ports is still higher than would be expected despite the security.
Russia is still one of the largest arms exporters in the world and a considerable amount of weapons and military cargo is shipped from Russian ports in the Black Sea.
There is a large amount of this cargo that is legitimate, but there have been several incidences of weapons that are unaccounted for or misrepresented on cargo manifests.
Turkey
With the exception of some internal political disputes, Turkey’s main security issue is the continued spread and strength of the IS, which now controls large areas of Iraq and Syria close to and on the border of Turkey.
They have yet to engage the Turkish military, and despite the involvement of US and EU nations in fighting the IS, the Turkish military has yet to become substantially involved.
The Turkish control the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, linking all the maritime traffic to and from the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, gives the country some considerable control over the maritime domain in the region.
Notwithstanding this control, over 80% of maritime traffic remains indigenous to the Black Sea, and thus does not fall under the scrutiny and control of the Turkish government agency (Turkish Straits Vessel Traffic Service (TSVTS)) which is responsible for the waterway.
However, there are still on average nearly 50,000 vessel transits every year.
The Challenges
As should be expected, maritime trade is an essential element in the Black Sea economic foundation.
There are a lot of ports on the shores of the Black Sea, some are large and important cargo hubs, and cater for a wide variety and type of vessel.
Of all the countries in the region, the Ukraine possesses the largest port potential in the Black Sea.
Turkey has the largest maritime border in the Black Sea, but many of its major ports are situated on its Mediterranean coast.
The most influential maritime country is Russia.
Its military capability and trading capacity makes its ports significant, in terms of economic and vessel handling capacity.
Of the other countries, Bulgaria, Romania and Georgia have only Black Sea access for maritime traffic, although Bulgaria and Romania also rely heavily on maritime traffic along the Danube River and the canals and waterways of Europe…..
The Black Sea region has become the focus of maritime security for a variety of reasons during the last few years.
There are legacy issues regarding security in Georgia, there are long-term problems that will be experienced in the Ukraine and the Crimea. Russia is fighting a continuing war against extremists in Chechnya and the wider Caucuses. They have targeted the city of Volgograd in 2013 and they could also target other ports and important cities on the Black Sea.
The city of Sochi, host for the Winter Olympics and now a venue on the motor racing circuit, would be an iconic target for terrorists.
Ports in Ukraine and Crimea. Credit: Sif Service
Turkey has the threat of the war in Syria and the advancement of Islamic State in Iraq on its doorstep.
There is then the overlay of narcotics and weapons smuggling, human trafficking and irregular migration.
Regional governments do not always have a central focus on joint security, but within the Black Sea, all the countries can assist in maintaining the level of control and security that the region needs.
Turkey would appear to hold the trump cards owing to its control of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, but will need to be conscious of the growing threat from IS and the movement of refugees from the conflict areas of Iraq and Syria.
Russia continues to suffer from the legacy of independence demands from the Caucuses and from former countries that made up the Soviet Union.
The issues surrounding the Ukraine will be felt for some considerable time, and the annexation of the Crimea and Russia’s involvement in the east of the Ukraine will be met with strong rhetoric and economic sanctions.
The issues of the Ukraine will not be decided in the short term, and so maritime trade will be greatly affected both into and out of the country.
The country has the port capacity to support a variety of maritime operations and this will help the Ukraine in its recovery, when the violence ends.
Romania and Bulgaria are members of NATO and now the EU and will be keen to maintain the close links that they now have to the West.
However, they will need to balance the requirements of regional governments and that of the EU with regard to maritime control to ensure they meet the expectations of both sides.
Editor’s Note: In other words, the Black Sea is both cause and consequence of tensions affecting the region and its security is affected by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and between Turkey and ISIL and other players in a volatile region.
Adapted from Strategic Insights, 54, November 2014
For the full article and the other assessments provided by Risk Intelligence via its regular publication Strategic Insights please go here:
In the development of airpower, one has to look ahead and not backward and figure out what is going to happen, not too much what has happened.
— Brigadier General William ‘Billy’ Mitchell, USAS 1926.
Although we are only fourteen percent of the way through the 21st century, it is not too early to begin asking ourselves what constitutes airpower in 2014.
Already, we have enjoyed over one hundred years of maturation that has been complemented by a diverse array of scientific advancement serving to augment our notion of flight.
To wit: we have gone very slowly with vertical take-off and landing, very fast with the breaking of the sound barrier, and we’ve achieved commercial and military supersonic transport capability.
Most experimentation, however, was conducted during the first half-century of flight, and this advancement culminated with manned space exploration and a future frontier that has been left to a new generation of explorers.
For a very good look at the reactive enemy and the dynamics of change and innovation in airpower, this Nova program is really first rate. When World War I began in 1914, the air forces of the opposing nations consisted of handfuls of rickety biplanes from which pilots occasionally took pot shots at one another with rifles. By the war’s end, the essential blueprint of the modern fighter had emerged: it was now an efficient killing machine that limited the average life expectancy of a front line pilot to just a few weeks. To trace the story of this astonishingly rapid technological revolution, NOVA takes viewers inside The Vintage Aviator, a New Zealand-based outfit of aviation buffs dedicated to bringing back classic World War I fighters such as the SE5A and Albatros DV. NOVA joins the team as they discover the secrets of some of aviation’s most colorful and deadly early flying machines and explores how their impact played a key role in the nightmare slaughter on the Western Front.
The airpower domain in its present construct lies in a controlled state where actions can be planned, modeled, and forecast with routine predictability.
This configuration, while a familiar and reliable process, has unfortunately led to atrophy in our quest to inject modern and innovative means into this domain.
In contrast, what we are witnessing in China is great enthusiasm for their space program as well as a drive to shape new and modern aerospace strategies.
The biggest challenge we may well face from China is our own lack of enthusiasm and a complacent assumption of superiority that was born from past achievement but not paid for in the achievements of the future.
From our perspective, cost has become a driving factor that puts the air domain well beyond the scientific realm and into the context of engineering.
Unfortunately, financial constraints have hampered the competitive spirit that brought us so much success in the past, and it has opened the door for competitive nation-states to overtake our capability and it positions them to best us in both domestic and global respects.
What does seem clear is that modern breakthroughs of the late 20th century featured fast transmission of information.
This led to concepts such as information as an asset and displays allowing great portability of decision making processes.
In military terms, this translates into situation awareness, and command and control.
This flattens hierarchies; and puts decision control closer to the point of application of weapons.
As this was largely an inspiration of American Ingenuity, it seems easy to forecast this infusion into Airpower in the coming decades.
This allows for connectivity much talked of, and seen between the ground, maritime, and air domains, throughout the beginning stages of this century.
Conceptualizing the Way Ahead for Airpower: Rethinking the OODA Loop
We have reached a point where we must assess the airpower domain, and this should be accomplished using an appropriate contextual approach.
John Boyd during the Korean War Credit: Wikepedia
One approach that bears examination includes the underpinning of our armed forces’ raison d’être as cited in our constitutional preamble: “To Provide for the common defense” of the nation.
Utilizing this founding premise as a fundamental benchmark, we will assess whether we continue to appropriately fulfill this critical mission.
Globalization may have brought the world closer together in terms of collaboration, but the United States remains a singular continent that can now be reached by the forces of military globalization, missiles and nuclear weapons.
Without air superiority, we can neither defend our land nor project power abroad.
If we rest our assumptions of superiority on an aging stock of proud yet outdated airplanes, we can never hope to prevail in the face of rising and adventurist powers like China and other modern adversaries.
In this piece, I would like to examine a way forward in understanding how we can recapture air superiority and the enthusiasm necessary to build and sustain it.
I am going to champion the ideas of John Boyd that, while initially targeted towards individual pilot, can also serve as a tool to building overall force capability in the next twenty years.
Leveraging the OODA Loop
A significant component of our mission is to preserve America’s ability to act in its best interests and preserve national security.
In this context, let us look at the contribution of the airpower domain as a part of the larger Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) Loop- a concept first brought to our attention by military strategist Colonel John Boyd (“The Essence of Winning and Losing,”1996) when dissecting air combat. Boyd breaks this cycle into four interrelated and overlapping processes through which one cycles continuously:
Observation: the collection of data by means of the senses
Orientation: the analysis and synthesis of data to form one’s current mental perspective
Decision: the determination of a course of action based on one’s current mental perspective
Action: the physical playing out of decisions
In later years, Boyd expanded the OODA Loop concept and applied it to other forms of competition in society.
This included multiple sensor functions that deliver data or convert it into amplifying information.
Further, the Loop was applied in academic circles as it examined mental processes and allowed for a different approach to cultural, genetic and other inputs that arrive in later stages of the orientation period.
According to Boyd, decision points and sound courses of action are achieved by converting a wealth of information into useful, actionable data.
This provides a person with sufficient command and control relative to a situation, and ultimately this guidance allows for the successful carrying out of one’s objective within the OODA Loop construct.
This procedural overview provides some intellectual backdrop as we take a good look at airpower in the 21st century, and as this discussion has already argued, shaping a force that leverages the OODA Loop is a key strategy in the way ahead.
Strategic Dominance
Another element that bears examination is determining whether the Air Force has remained on the strategic path fostered by the Mighty 8th in the Second World War, and also espoused by General Curtis Lemay.
Are we committed to strategic dominance in airpower, or are we just willing to have a checkmate with our adversaries and potential adversaries?
With the end of the air battle in Europe, the Army Air Corps and the services certainly understood that without air superiority and dominance, the Nazis would have been difficult to dislodge- let alone to defeat.
But what about today’s Air Force?
Does it adopt a “just enough” approach in supporting the coalition of the willing-but-unable, or does it continue to serve as the strategic backbone for deterrence and global warfighting?
Combining this optic of strategic dominance with a macro look at the OODA Loop, how does our current approach stack up?
The Air Force Vision for 2013 was released just as the new Chief of Staff was feeling the harsh realities of a constrained fiscal environment.
With such restrictions in mind, his vision would ultimately be considered an aspirational perspective, in spite of the ideas communicated by the Commander.
Still, his guidance could not be wholly disregarded, as it remained instructive in measuring his strategic ideas against the intellectual foundation of the OODA Loop.
A look at excepts of the Vision Statement will provide a better understanding:
“The world’s greatest Air Force – powered by Airmen, fueled by innovation
This poster shows all nine of the USAF strategic bombers. All but the B-2 were flown by the Strategic Air Command. Although the Cold War has long been over and SAC disbanded, three of these aircraft (the B-1, B-2 and B-52) are still part of the USAF arsenal. SAC’s mission included strategic reconnaissance, and many bombers were modified to perform it. The famous SR-71 Blackbird was built for that purpose and was flown by SAC, so it is included. We have been waiting for sometime for the new USAF long range strike bomber. http://www.science-store.com/gt-transportaion/aviation/usaf_strategic_bombers.htm
The Air Force’s enduring contributions are rooted in our original roles and responsibilities that were assigned in 1947.
Today we call them:
(1) air and space superiority;
(2) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance;
(3) rapid global mobility;
(4) global strike; and
(5) command and control.
We already combine our air, space, and cyber forces to maximize these enduring contributions, but the way we execute these five calling cards must continually evolve as we strive to increase our asymmetric advantage.
“To strengthen our enduring contributions, the Air Force will:
• Deter and defeat adversaries with a credible first look, first shot, and first kill capability;
• Hold our adversaries and what they value at risk while operating on a global scale with unmatched joint integration;
• Exploit and defend air, space, and cyberspace, especially in contested environments, while denying our adversaries unrestricted use of the same;
• Integrate and organize our Active, Reserve, and Guard forces to leverage the unique strengths and perspectives of each to seamlessly execute Air Force missions;
• Enhance relationships and interoperability with our sister Services, other government agencies, allies, and partners;
• Better train Airmen to bring their unique specialties together in more realistic, intense, and diverse environments to advance integrated airpower operations;
• Emphasize readiness to ensure the highest quality force, regardless of size;
• Modernize our capabilities to reduce operating costs while attaining desired effects with greater persistence, survivability, longer range, and more versatile payloads.”
While this language provides more of a forward looking and futuristic perspective, it is also important to consider the past if we are to gain some grounding in moving forward.
An example of this involves the modern day dilemma of incorporating the cyber missioninto The Mission of the Air Force.
At present neither the Air Force nor the nation possess superior capability within this discipline, however it should be remembered that Air and Space missions once undergone similar struggles while in their formative years.
In this regard, it is important to not only look forward, but also rely on lessons learned of past initiatives.
The OODA Loop As A Measuring Stick
Casting the new Air Force Vision against the underpinnings of the OODA Loop is a revealing and worthwhile effort.
In this section, each step in the Loop cycle will be applied to our modern concerns with reinforcing airpower.
Observe
Strategically, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities fits nicely into the Observe element, as does the emphasis on Space operations.
This is all about gaining access to information that might otherwise be denied, but there is also an emphasis on enhancing relationships and interoperability with our ‘go to war’ partners.
In this modern era of social media, this reach must now extend to areas undergoing current analysis- to include the Observable Data that is captured by all of the flying or orbiting sensors that the ‘go to war’ partners currently provide.
This is element is one that our intelligence services currently grapple with, and it goes hand in hand with managing the impressive flow of observable data that is shared all around the globe each day.
With the acceleration of modern technology and the capability to collect increased amount of data, it is incumbent upon the Air Force to recognize that significance of this influx of data.
An increased awareness across the service will facilitate the possibility that information sharing will be achieved between its forces and allied or sister service sensors.
For the moment, let us presume that the groundwork exists to increase the flow of data and apply advanced analytics to enable awareness of all available observable facts.
Let us also presume that these data points can be converted into actionable information that is readily available to commanders and planners.
In achieving this, we can fulfill the requirements of step one of the OODA Loop by fully addressing the Observe function.
For the purposes of the Air Force, this must mean that an investment stream is effected that can extract maximum knowledge from all information culled ‘see deep’ radars- whether they are on airborne, maritime, or space platforms.
With such an abundance of tactical data, the critical question becomes, ”Where do all of the captured observations go, and how will they contribute to the next step in the OODA Loop with respect to achieving airpower?”
Orient
Looking at the Orient part of the OODA Loop, the Air Force Vision emphasizes readiness and training in two major areas: training for airpower exercises (which points to the exploration of capabilities), and limits or surprise elements that may be available to the engaged forces.
Such readiness and training in the form of joint and partner exercises will add to the critical leverage and agility in this step of the planning cycle.
Admittedly, training the decision makers in force capability can be a tricky element.
Most have grown up inculcated by only their service orientation, and any shared knowledge for sister service capabilities is only superficial because it is brought to the table from outside of a particular service’s native environment.
It takes engagement in joint exercises before one can truly begin to understand how unfamiliar systems can boost operations during an engagement.
It is this element of synchronizing our resources that is explored in the concept of operations, and it underscores the importance of recognizing alternatives that can fill a gap in capability.
This concept must be resident in the mind of a commander if he or she wishes to seek and successfully solicit methods capability of achieving his objective.
Concepts for joint effect such as The Long Reach of AEGIS (published in the U.S. Navy publication Proceedings) aptly demonstrate this compounding effect of application of our modern systems.
An F-35C Lightning II carrier variant joint strike fighter makes an arrested landing aboard the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68). An integrated global fleet of F-35s is a key asset for shaping joint and coalition capabilities for 21st century combat operations.
It is this synthesis of data that serves as the benchmark of the Orient portion of the OODA Loop.
Situation awareness can now be shared among combatant units from ground and maritime units with their air elements and with strategic air elements to both deter or destroy aggressors, and so in real time Command Authority intent can be rapidly translated to action and effect.
At its most basic essence, orientation really drives at the nature of readiness.
In the modern warfare environment, warfighters cannot be effective if they only possess an understanding of the capabilities of their own platforms.
In order to fully understand the synergy and extension available through the interaction of the various offered platforms, they must be smart on assets available from the ‘Go To War’ partners.
Further, data flow in the modern day has become far more automated as transmissions occur from machine to machine and no longer requires a question and response trigger in order to facilitate communication exchange.
This automation impacts the Orient step at an individual level as the lone Battle Manager must ensure a “human” and therefore logically sound synthesis of information is achieved.
This step away from automation at the ground level is critical as assessments and judgments are often fed directly to strategic decision makers and perhaps even the National Command Authority.
The discussion on Orientation could extend, as it does during wargames, from the diplomatic level to the time-sensitive and wartime scenarios of competitor reactions and tactics.
It is important, therefore, that we not limit ourselves to only the decisions executed by higher-level strategists and decision makers.
As previously mentioned, Colonel Boyd developed his theories by examining ‘dogfights’ between two competent fighter pilots.
In the modern day, it is a rarity to witness this ‘mano a mano’ conflict, and for the focus has shifted to training towards a ‘many on many’ premise, ideally with leverage from numerous available systems and support platforms.
Ed Timperlake with Admiral Scott Conn outside of the NSWC building at Fallon after the Second Line of Defense interview. According to Admiral Conn, “We are working at Fallon at expanding the capability for Naval aviation to operate in an expanded battlespace.” And the Admiral made it clear that this was being done with adding capabilities like the F-35, and leveraging joint and coalition capabilities into what we are calling an attack and defense enterprise.
It is a far more difficult and complex problem to match our force against the evolving combat environment, and the capability to conduct dogfights has been replaced by the need to influence events in a 360 degree operational space.
Today there are far more systems working to deny us the capability to maintain airpower superiority.
Interestingly; our army and naval commanders are already familiar with the depth and breadth of synthesized planning as they participate in fleet and theater operations in a joint environment.
In the past many of these same strategies have been applied as air armada operations reprising World War II tactics have been utilized.
These pre-strike sorties have enable understanding of enemy strengths and weaknesses, in addition to accurate targeting data and localization of anti-access systems.
Dynamically, the use of fifth generation aircraft as target location systems may not be seen as satisfying to the traditionally trained pilots, but it can serve a vital role for forward observers in concealed locations.
If executed fluidly, the flow of information on targets can be near real time so that the data is oriented and proved useful to commanders in pressing a plan.
In sum, the 360-degree revolution and the ground-to air revolution that is already witnessed with the remotely operated visual enhanced receiver (more commonly known as ROVER) provide a key perspective to shaping the future of airpower, as well as a view of airpower beyond what the USAF traditionally considers its operating domain.
Decision
Billy Mitchell represented both enthusiasm, and forward thinking and also impatience with the absence of both. But the B-17 experience preparing for World War II represents another. https://sldinfo.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/B-17-Returns-to-France.pdf
We now arrive at the decision point and its associated methodology.
The Vision statement describes command and control systems as a paramount operating commitment to the Air Force.
The operation of this resilient system could very likely be under assault during the run up to an engagement, as the world saw during the run up to the invasion of Georgia by the Russian forces and the run up to diplomatic negotiations with Estonia.
Our peer competitors got to practice with real time integration of cyber and physical forces, and this has been accomplished in joint exercises ever since.
Whether it is a day without space, or communication under duress, it is all a part of the Decide point in the OODA Loop.
To put it in more concrete terms, when one sends two B-2s or two F-22s to the North Korean deterrent fight, what options does the national command authority really have if their bluff is called?
As the Air Force considers itself to be a part of the run up and flow down Decision points, it is incumbent on the Air Force to ensure the integrity of the data flow in both directions.
By extension, there then exists a sharing of this integrity amongst the various agencies that serve as information providers and decision executors.
The Air Force mission to be in Cyber is all about an awareness of this responsibility and the impact of trusted data to its forces, and this will only grow in importance over time.
Action
The final element in the OODA Loop is Action.
We have seen the Air Force’s role in the Observe, Orient, and Decide elements, but it is in the Action portion that the essence of military force resides.
Sir Winston Churchill has best described our state of affairs as, “The power of an air force is terrific when there is nothing to oppose it.”
This has been the state of play in the engagements for the past quarter century, and this has misled key decision makers to consider investment in the air domain as a waste.
Decision makers failed to look to forward and anticipate a future with peer competitors, and instead they decided that sitting on their lead was sufficient in the name of saving resources.
Secretary Robert Gates once said in a speech to the Economic Club in Chicago:
Consider that by 2020, the United States is projected to have nearly 2,500 manned combat aircraft of all kinds.
Of those, nearly 1,100 will be the most advanced fifth generation F-35s and F-22s. China, by contrast, is projected to have no fifth generation aircraft by 2020.
And by 2025, the gap only widens.
The U.S. will have approximately 1,700 of the most advanced fifth generation fighters versus a handful of comparable aircraft for the Chinese.
Nonetheless, some portray this scenario as a dire threat to America’s national security.
This projection, although seemingly ominous, turned out to be false in two respects.
First, Chinese and Russian fifth generation fighters were indeed manufactured, and domestic cutbacks started almost immediately prior to the F-35 program.
T-50 shot airborne.
The potential of a threat to America’s security was certainly not yet dire; but one cannot help but wonder if these developments have signaled a drift in priorities.
As General George Kenney was said, “Airpower is like poker. A second-best hand is like none at all — it will cost you dough and win you nothing.”
Even Secretary Donley, who while Secretary Gates was in the position wrote a letter supporting Gates’ decision to stop producing F-22’s has now testified that ” The Air Force has stretched the risk we can prudently take and must push now to get the most combat power possible from our forces.”
Strategically, “action” is where most armed forces dwell and operate most effectively.
This is also the beauty of the OODA Loop, as it transcends levels of scope and allows each stage to explore uses of the components of its forces.
At the same time, this devolvement may result in independent behavior and what has become ‘islands of excellence’ or ‘stovepipes’.
One of the best examples of this involves the use of geography to establish operational division between ground units.
In Iraq 2003 for example, the Euphrates River was used by commanders to separate successful campaigns by the Coalition Army and Marine forces.
Each supported one other by protecting the common flank, which was the river itself.
This effort became muddled as progress reports became discordant, and command authorities began to order slow downs and halts- a move that was strikingly similar to Eisenhower’s commands of British and American forces in the Second World War.
For these reasons and more yet; it is heartening to see the Air Force Vision statement utilizing terms like integrate, and interoperability, and building relationships.
Actions taken in the rapid fire future engagement will need nearly machine to machine coordination as the weaponry flies farther; and with more devastating effect, and mastering these concepts of integration, interoperability and relationship building will become crucial stepping stones.
Additionally, with our forces diminished by obsolescence and budgetary drawdowns; we must believe our ‘first look, first shot, first kill’ slogan so as not to waste precious commodities of the future fight that include projectiles, missiles, bullets and cruise missiles.
Credible feedback as the battle progresses may be a difficult commodity, but it is incumbent on the Observe element to continue to provide situation awareness to every level of command.
We must fully integrate the force so that every shooter is a sensor, and some sensors as shooters can provide facts about targets and anti-access platforms that will minimize our own casualties.
This enterprise is composed of all the elements for expeditionary warfare, to include resupply.
The Air Force, in designing its force structure, also serves as the supply element for other services in rapid mobility exercises.
As an example, the tanker force does not only function as a self-servicing agent, but also as an asset for joint and coalition forces.
In the same vein, in this time of reduced resources, the Air Force must look to coalition partners as it has in the past to provide needed firepower and support elements that go beyond airfield support.
When Admiral Mike Mullen was alluded to building a “thousand ship Navy,” he envisioned that our coalition partners would be included in our own force element.
Similarly, the Air Force must also count the tankers, C-17s, as well as the complementary fighter elements that may be made available to counter competitor actions. It has become increasingly clear that our governing body will not be able to provide a complete complement of ready forces as we formerly were accustomed.
How this risk is characterized should be left to the word of the active military commanders, but it has been clear that in future operations, a reliance on coalition equipment is paramount.
Four F/A-18A Hornets from No. 3 Squadron (SQN) perform a mock air to air refuelling pass with a No. 33 SQN KC-30A Multi Role Tanker Transport aircraft. This flight demonstration was performed during the Centenary of Military Aviation Air Show at RAAF Williams – Point Cook, (held in early March 2014) commemorating 100 years of military aviation in Australia. Credit: RAAF
By 2025, the Air Force should size its offensive capability around the fifth generation force construct. The fourth generation aircraft should be dominantly assigned to the defensive enterprise, chiefly protecting the Homeland and some expeditionary locations.
The vulnerability of large command and control aircraft is well known, but America continues to believe that we will own the skies in the future fight.
This is an unsustainable prediction.
Our aircraft may retain utility as requirements develop and evolve, but one wonders about the allocation of resources between assured victory and the aftermath.
This is the decision that must underscore the future of airpower.
As one fighter pilot put it when asked about the results of ‘Cope India’ in early 2007, “Thank goodness we competed with degraded capability, because when the competitor discovers they can kick your ass;, they won’t stop at their border or yours.” Should this occur, thing will be sure to get ugly.
In the case of Space, Cyber and Transportation, funding should not be spared with respect to training and support of the offensive enterprise with respect to national objective support.
Unfortunately, when funding constraints start to where they are trained and support the offensive enterprise or can be shown to become a reality, objectives can become obscured.
Our dominance in Space currently rests in quantity, and this should not be confused with military dominance other than when it is used in support of military operations.
We have not had a conflict involving space assets, but we have seen other nations training to conduct such conflict. The rules for such a conflict are not yet clear, and thus research into resiliency such as fractionated satellites or other survivable mechanics have not been invested.
During this interwar period, such an invention might well turn future tides in battle.
With our forces growing more and more reliant on space capabilities, a ten-year target for truly resilient space should be developed.
Cyber has already seen application in war as demonstrated during the campaign in Georgia.
In this case the national ability to connect was denied in parallel with aggressor action that crossed the border.
Such denial resulted in a successful invasion that persists to this day with hostile troops occupying a part of that nation.
The current cyber war is more economic than military, but it is also so clandestine that attacks and aggressive defense have been masked in the related activity.
There will need to be research on how to ultimately defend or cover our intended activities.
The current concept of mutual assured destruction as adapted to each domain is currently in vogue, but the extension into cyber belies the low barrier to entry, and makes it mandatory to put in place true barriers. That said, tailoring for each service application will continue to dominate current investment.
Nothing has happened to detract from making Cyber more and more intrinsic into operations and administration, and war logistic and humanitarian activities- especially as commercial applications- become increasingly adaptable.
Adaptability and agility will dominate this domain, thus impacting command and control activities. Investment in training and integration with other force elements will therefore become critical.
Re-Shaping the Technological Advantage
One of the first uses for the OODA Loop was to foster energy maneuverability in fighter design.
This application of physics was at first left to the winners of engagements during World War I and World War II; but Colonel Boyd used it to advocate for the design of the lightweight fighter that became the F-16.
In a famous photo comparison; his theory was played out illustrating the turning radius of the F-4 and the F-16, where it was clear that the F-16 could start out as the hunted and end up quickly as the hunter.
From this illustration, well over 7,000 aircraft have been produced for use by air forces all over the world, and many more for configurations of missiles.
The engagement process of content in context empowers dynamic situational decisions at all levels and gives the fighting force the best chance of prevailing. The “engagement process of content in battle context” which empowers dynamic situational decision making at all levels has the best chance of prevailing. It is the foundation of war winning in the 21st century.
This use of the OODA Loop has clearly resulted in fewer one on one fights, and a greater concentration on force to force operational concepts. ‘First look, first shot’ is the war cry today and not ‘Give them the gun’.
During this same period, concepts for anti-access; and counter anti-access became design elements, and conceptions for 5th Generation Fighters came about via the F-117, B-2, F-22, and F-35.
It is safe to say that the ferocity of the anti-access forces appearing in a less than peer competitor during the Vietnam War was a strategic surprise, and it was countered by technological advance and investment.
It is clear that the “Action” part of the OODA loop is highly dependent on whether this technological advance is followed through to a real force advantage.
All of the elements of our current Air Force- whether Space, Cyber, Transport, and our magnificent Airmen who provide at a moments notice- work at a deliberate pace in responding to the national command authority decision to act.
My own doctrine ” If you are ever involved in a fair fight; it is the result of poor planning.” emphasizes proper action throughout the OODA loop; and entails actions by resource decision makers and department leadership to maintain our strength and resilience in periods of high activity and periods of pause.
Even with the chastisement of Secretary Gates for his prognostication, the words of a former Russian diplomat ring in my mind:
“The future is not understandable, and we do not entertain predictions.”
There must be planning that reasonably reflects the desires for maintaining our national sovereignty, and the opportunity to contribute to lasting peace through strength can be achieved by implementing the OODA Loop.
Conclusion
Airpower in the 21st Century will be all about maintaining a sufficient deterrent capability to preserve the always-fragile peace.
Airpower provides leverage to our diplomats and it provides credibility to our joint operations.
We spent the better part of the 20th Century identifying and developing the lead technology of stealth and we embedded it into our fifth generation of fighters and bombers.
This progress must be maintained.
The fusion of information transmission between the land, Maritime, and Air Combat components must be a near term goal to leverage every aspect of our forces engaged.
The core image, which General Hostage, at the time the ACC Commander, in our interview put on the table of where the transition needs to go, is the ability to shape a combat cloud as a key element of the battlespace within which the various deployed aircraft interact together to shape air dominance to achieve joint force objectives. With a fifth generation enabled combat capability, one could put the pieces in place to deliver the operational situational awareness critical to joint forces, but this would be difficult if one does not have the fifth generation aircraft in the numbers required. Credit Images: Bigstock
This accelerates the OODA loop by insisting that every shooter be a sensor; and some sensors as shooters as well.
Transmission of information will strain our capabilities, and stress the security element; but with the pace that all discuss in future war; keeping the command authorities abreast of the action will serve all well.
There will be fewer resources available for our military as our assets dwindle and the capability to leverage forces from engaged partners emerge as the key to victory in the future fight.
The recognition by our international partners is clear evidence that this investment was in the right direction, and this investment must continue.
To close; let it be said by our past leaders:
If our air forces are never used, they have achieved their finest goal.
— General Nathan F. Twining
If we maintain our faith in God, love of freedom, and superior global airpower, the future [of the US] looks good.
— General Curtis Lemay
This is the mission and goal of airpower in the 21st Century.
Editor’s Note: This article by Secretary Wynne is part of our look at the evolving airpower dynamic, notably with regard to shaping an attack and defense enterprise.
We have benefited from the insights of current airpower leaders in shaping such an enterprise:
And we have a forthcoming interview with the current head of Naval Air Warfare Admiral Manazir, which provides an overall perspective on the reshaping of Naval airpower with regard to the dynamics discussed by Secretary Wynne.
And from the core team of Second Line of Defense we have contributions of our own:
Lt. General (retired) Deptula has focused on the empowering of the air combat cloud as a key element of the attack and defense enterprise:
Ed Timperlake will publish soon a piece looking at the evolution of Tron Warfare and how the fifth generation fleet adds new tools to the toolbox to empower the attack and defense enterprise.
Of course, Mike Wynne has provided and continues to provide an important leadership role with regard to shaping thinking about the future of airpower.
Recently, the former Chief Scientist of the USAF, Dr. Mark Lewis, visited the Astronautics Department at the USAF Academy and found this recognition of Secretary Wynne’s accomplishments:
Indeed we have built a series, which looks back at his time in government and industry highlighting past engagements:
The USN both in its carriers and its amphibious fleet provides a significant expeditionary capability.
The USMC-USN team has been reshaping amphibious assault forces under the influence of the Osprey, the coming of the F-35B, the addition of new ships such as the T-AKE and USNS Montford Point, the USS Arlington, and the USS America.
Less visible has been the coming of the USS Ford and the reworking of the strike fleet.
The USS Ford is less about operating as a traditional carrier than as a key C2 and strike enabler for an entire sea-base force, surface, subsurface, joint and coalition.
As Admiral Moran, then the head of Naval Warfare in the Pentagon noted in an interview which we did with him in 2013:
The Ford will be very flexible and can support force concentration or distribution.
And it can operate as a flagship for a distributed force as well and tailored to the mission set.
When combined with the potential of the F-35, Ford will be able to handle information and communications at a level much greater than the Nimitz class carriers.
People will be able to share information across nations, and this is crucial.
We call it maritime domain awareness, but now you’ve included the air space that’s part of that maritime domain.
To get an update on how the USN aviation leadership is preparing for the coming of the F-35 and other new strike assets as well as for the USS Ford pairing with these strike assets, we have travelled to Fallon Naval Air Station to understand how the USN trains for forward leaning strike integration.
And we followed up that visit with a discussion with the new head of Naval Air Warfare, Rear Admiral Manazir.
The two visits function as two parts of the same puzzle:
How is the Navy preparing for current strike integration as it anticipates the future?
And how is the Navy shaping concepts of operations for the future and providing that approach to those who are preparing strike integration?
Fallon Naval Air Station is in the desert of Nevada.
It is where the Navy trains for the advanced tactics for core air platforms but most importantly shapes its integration of the air wing prior to going to sea for final preparation for combat. Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) is known in the Navy as “strike university.”
Strike U was set up to deal with combat failures of naval aviation, and to shape better tactics, training and concepts of operations to prevail going forward.
The mission we have here started with TOPGUN, 45 years ago.
TOPGUN was founded out of failures in combat during the Vietnam War.
TOPGUN training led to measurable improvements in Air to Air kill ratios.
Through the years, other communities have mirrored the TOPGUN model including the EA-18G HAVOC course, the E-2 CAEWWS course, and the H-60S/R SEAWOLF course.
These courses target advanced training at the individual level.
Additionally, as a result of failures in combat in Lebanon, STRIKE University, now call simply Strike, was stood up in 1984 to target training at the Integrated warfighting level.
We have learned a lot of lessons at Fallon and we have had a lot of time to shape an effective combat learning environment.
Bottom line: My job here is to prepare our forward deployed air wings to fight and win in a wide variety of missions across the globe.
Strike Integration Training and Support to the Deployed Fleet
The first lesson learned from a visit to Fallon is how the Navy is doing strike integration as part of the deployed fleet.
That is, it is not a process of integration focused on the past, but it is part of support for the currently deployed air wings. Training encompasses not simply preparation for integration; but “consulting services” to the deployed fleet.
We support the Combatant Commanders as well as prepare strike integration ashore so to speak.
For example, we have had daily contact with the USS BUSH via email, phone calls and VTCs.
This is an aspect of connectivity, which folds nicely into reshaping the impact and meaning of the training function.
Admiral Conn provided us with a concrete example of the approach:
An historical example of how NSAWC provided reach back support to the forward deployed warfighter was in the early stages of Afghanistan operations.
Ground commanders needed aircraft to strafe at night. To do this strafing mission at night, aircrew needed to put an airplane below mountaintops, perhaps in a valley, provide bullets precisely and then pull off target, and not fly into the terrain.
When NSAWC got this request, in a matter of weeks because it wasn’t overnight, a couple weeks, we came up with the tactics, techniques, and procedures for the fleet to execute that mission.
We then folded those Training, Tactics and Procedures (TTPs) into our training for follow on deployers.
And the connectivity we have with the fleet through modern communications allows for an ongoing combat learning process between Fallon and the fleet and this flow of information is central to the process of training in the 21st century.
Training for the Expanded Battlespace
The second lesson learned is that the Navy is not waiting for an adversary to hone its anti-access area-denial skills to reduce the capability of the USN-USMC team to operate where they need to.
The USN is not sailing ashore and surrendering its sword to adversaries claiming capabilities which they may or may not have, and certainly understands the need to prepare now for the evolving future.
As Admiral Conn put the challenge:
I think it important to emphasize that adversary A2AD capabilities pose a serious threat not only to Navy, but to our entire Joint ability to fight and win.
Again, I think of A2AD as the proliferation of precision for potential adversaries and how this proliferation of precision effects joint forces ability to maneuver where we need to be and when we need to be there.
For me, it is about expanding the battlespace and training with regard to how to do this.
Training for an expanded battlespace means that the extensive ranges at Fallon are not enough to train to prevail in the evolving battlespace.
This is why the Navy is spearheading a broad effort to expand the envelope of training to combine live training with what is called Live Virtual Constructive training.
What is entailed is folding in red and blue assets to shaping an evolving strike integration training process.
As Captain McLaughlin explained:
The current Fallon ranges – although large – are too small to train against an advanced threat, which can shoot longer than the ranges.
We need to train to a 21st Century Plus type of threat with very long-range missiles in the mix.
It is not about succeeding; it is about how are we going to do this with highest probability of success.
We are rolling in Live Virtual Constructive Training to provide the extenders for our operators to work in that threat environment and to reach out to other assets – Navy and joint – which can allow us to fight in an expanded battlespace.
Forward Leaning Integration
The third lesson is that NSAWC is focused on the Rumsfeld admonition that you have to fight with the force you have, they are anticipating ways to work more effectively in the expanded battlespace.
There is clearly a “red” component to the LVCT effort – folding in new assets and tactics of adversaries – as well as a “blue” component, how to leverage a diversity of USN, joint and coalition assets in expanding the capability of an integrated fleet as new capabilities are added.
We work closely with VMX-9 at China Lake to work with them in connecting their testing efforts with how those efforts might integrate with the strike force.
They will come up on a routine basis and support NSAWC where we can take a look at some of the newer systems that they have in developmental or operational testing and see what kind of results you get with using those systems.
The F-35 is a key element of shaping Navy thinking about operating in an expanded battlespace.
Aviation leadership is looking forward to the impact of F-35 on the evolution of the strike fleet, much as a leaven for change than the sum and substance of that change.
As Admiral Conn put it:
Looking forward, we need to continue to provide trained and ready aircrew to operate forward.
In looking to the future, in five years we are going to have JSF in the fleet.
In five years we may have UCLASS on our carriers. In five years, the Super Hornet of today is going to be different. In five years the E-2D capabilities and our networks will have matured. In five years the threat is going to change and competitors will have more capability.
In working with Naval Aviation Leadership, we are on a journey of discovery of how to best create a training environment that replicates potential adversary’s capabilities.
Training for Future Dynamics of Integration
The fourth lesson is that the focus on forward leading integrative training means that each element of the strike force needs to train for a particular platform’s proficiency but to do so with an understanding of what is coming with regard to future dynamics of integration.
For example, with regard to rotorcraft training, CDR Herschel “Hashi” Weinstock, current Department Head for SEAWOLF, NSAWC’s Rotary Wing Weapons School noted that:
The USN as a whole is working through how to best use UAVs in the years ahead.
There are so many missions where they can bring complementary capabilities, or new ones.
We have subject matter experts in my department and others who work on these issues, and we are paying close attention to the opportunities in that arena.
I can clearly see the day when manned assets operating above the water will work closely with UAVs, managing them and sending them forward as needed for coverage.
The UAV’s would greatly expand the battlespace awareness of the strike group, and if necessary, the manned assets could redirect UAVs to areas of greater interest. They could, and probably will, play in other mission sets as well.”
Taping Into and Supporting Joint and Coalition Forces
The fifth lesson is that augmenting the capability to tap into joint and coalition assets is a key enabler for the naval strike force as well as learning how best to support joint and coalition forces as well.
In the past decade the USN has provided important support for the joint forces.
For example, in an interview with CDR Mike “Beaker” Miller, Naval Strike and Warfare Center, Airborne Electronic Weapons School (HAVOC) we learned from his experience how he supported the US Army in Iraq.
We flew carrier planes – the Prowler – out of a former Soviet base, that was an Army base, as part of an Air Force Air Expeditionary Wing in Afghanistan (one of the most land-locked places on earth) in support of the ground scheme of maneuver.
We had not really focused on that mission before Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, but the red side was leveraging commercial technology to create an asymmetric advantage against the ground forces.
We were tasked to disrupt and deny those advantages, by providing supporting non-kinetic fires to protected entities (mounted and dismounted troops).
Following my deployments with the Navy to Afghanistan, I had the opportunity to embed directly with the Army as a Brigade EWO with the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 101st Air Assault Division in Iraq.
That experience helped me understand the synchronization and employment of non-kinetic fires from the supported commander’s perspective.
In effect, our effort became part of a broadened notion of close air support (CAS) or “fires.
In the four-week course which NSAWC offers as the various elements of the strike force train to integrate prior to going to sea and their final training before operational deployment, the last week is spent taping into the joint community.
As Captain McLaughlin explained the process:
We have a number of core training programs for graduate level proficiency of the primary platforms, such as TOPGUN, for example, with regard to fighters.
But that is for training at the individual level.
The next round of training is for what we call ARP or Advanced Readiness Phase, which is primarily focused at the squadron level.
While the Fallon Ranges are used for ARP’s, the primary instructor cadre comes from the weapons schools located at the fleet concentration centers. Again, using the F-18 example, the weapons schools at Naval Air Station Oceana and at Naval Air Station Lemoore are primarily responsible for ARP training.
The final strata are at the integrated level, which is what we do here at STRIKE. This involves not only all the squadrons in a given air wing, but external naval and joint assets as well.”
MEDITERRANEAN SEA (Aug. 15, 2013) An EA-18G Growler assigned to the Zappers of Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 130 lands on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75).
As part of the broadening of the training environment, NSAWS has Aegis weapons officers and others to shape an expanded strike envelope for the training process.
As we learned from our interview with Rear Admiral Manazir and will discuss in the next article: “The initial operational capability of fifth generation fundamentally changes the way that we’re going to fight.”
It is Manazir’s job to sort through how to shape capabilities to do that; it is Fallon’s to deliver combat capability, which embodies those capabilities in the world of real combat.
And clearly, you want to train to the high-end threat, the most capable potential threat out there — their hardware, their assessed pilot capabilities, their integrated air defense networks.
You train against that as best you can, or something generically mimicking a high-end threat.
Combat is a complex environment that does not suffer fools.
For the interviews conducted at Fallon Naval Air Station see the following:
For a Special Report with all the Fallon interviews along with interviews with the past and current heads of Air Warfare for the USN see the following:
As we concluded our visit to The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, we had a chance to discuss the Center and the way ahead with Rear Admiral Scott Conn, Commander of the Center. Rear Admiral Conn has had a distinguished career as a naval aviator.
His prior command tours include Carrier Air Wing 11 embarked in USS Nimitz (CVN 68), the FA-18 series Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 106 aboard Naval Air Station Oceana, and VFA-136 deploying in USS George Washington (CVN 73).
Conn’s sea tours include a division officer tour in Fighter Squadron (VF) 11 deploying twice in USS Forrestal (CV 59), as division officer and department head with VFA-15 deploying in USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) and USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67), and as a department head with VFA-81 deploying in USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69). He also deployed serving as a battle director at the Combined Air Operations Center in Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar.
Ashore, Conn’s flying tours includes serving as an adversary pilot in VF-43 flying the A-4, F-5 and F-16 aircraft, and as a department head and instructor pilot in VFA-106.
His staff tours include serving as the Staff General Secretary and PACOM event planner at the Joint Warfighting Center, Suffolk, Virginia, as the Executive Assistant to Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command and as the Strike Branch Director in OPNAV N98. Conn is also a graduate of the Naval War College.
He has flown over 100 combat missions in Operations DELIBERATE FORCE, Southern Watch, Deny Flight, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom.
He has accumulated over 4,700 flight hours and 1,000 arrested landings. He was the recipient of the 2004 Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale Inspirational Leadership award.
Learning Lessons from Combat Challenges
The Admiral noted that the “mission we have here started with TOPGUN, 45 years ago.
TOPGUN was founded out of failures in combat during the Vietnam War.
TOPGUN training led to measurable improvements in Air to Air kill ratios.
Through the years, other communities have mirrored the TOPGUN model including the EA-18G HAVOC course, the E-2 CAEWWS course, and the H-60S/R SEAWOLF course.
These courses target advanced training at the individual level.
Additionally, as a result of failures in combat in Lebanon, STRIKE University, now call simply Strike, was stood up in 1984 to target training at the Integrated warfighting level.
We have learned a lot of lessons at Fallon and we have had a lot of time to shape an effective combat learning environment.”
Bottom line, My job here is to prepare our forward deployed air wings to fight and win in a wide variety of missions across the globe.
Training to Fight in the Extended Battlespace: The Enhanced Role of Virtual Training
Question: You have focused on counter-insurgency missions a great deal in the past decade, but clearly the next will return you to high end warfare and the challenges of dealing with denser defenses and fighting in contested air space. How are you preparing for those contingencies?
Admiral Conn: There are clear challenges in terms of fighting the high-end fight in the period head.
And if you look at the map in front of us which shows our ranges in Fallon in terms of miles, depth and breadth, it is clear that I am running out of real estate (land and airspace) to train to the entire kill chain of integrated fires.
Question: We have seen a similar situation with MAWTS at the Yuma Marine Corps Air Station as well and they expanding their operational area by using other ranges such as at Nellis or the Goldwater Range near the Luke AFB.
Admiral Conn: We work in close coordination with our counterparts in Nellis.
We maximize every opportunity to work together in developing joint solutions to the high end fight of the future.
Through the process we better understand the capabilities the joint force brings to bear, and develop the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to fight jointly.
But this issue of training to the high end fight is not only about real estate, it is also about our desire to not reveal to potential adversaries how we intend to fight.
These considerations are driving us to live, virtual, and constructive training solutions as part of our overall operational training environment game plan.
Let me be clear, as far as I can see there will always be a requirement to conduct training in aircraft.
At Fallon, in addition to developing and practicing those TTPs to fight and win in any scenario, we also provide the opportunity to stress the various systems with end to end live fly validation.
As an example, when a mission is planned that requires the delivery of ordnance, whether that ordnance be bullets, bombs or missiles, Sailors have to build up the weapons, then the weapons are loaded on an aircraft, Sailors then have to check to see that the aircraft can communicate with the weapon, then aircrew have to preflight the aircraft, take off, fly to the range, conduct airborne system checks, fight their way to the target, arm the aircraft, hit the pickle and in most cases guide the weapon to the target.
This is a brief description of the kill chain that ends up in a kinetic effect, or to state clearly, a bomb going high order on the target, and the right target at the right time.
This live fly validation cannot be done in a simulator.
That said, in a simulated environment, I can have aircrew jump in a device, and I can train them at the integrated level across the entire kill chain for various missions.
I can conduct this high end training very quickly, a lot of reps and sets if you will, at reduced cost.
Anticipating and Dealing With the Threat Environment
Question: How do you develop your evolving anticipated threat environment?
Admiral Conn: Future threat assessments are developed collaboratively between Office of Naval Intelligence, Fleet and Combatant Commanders, Naval Air Warfare Resource Sponsors, and Naval Air Systems engineers.
This process includes input from NSAWC’s subject matter experts.
While NSAWC participates in this process, our main focus is to be able to fight and win today with today’s equipment.
Additionally, I need to be clear that NSAWC is one part of the Fleet Response Plan.
Ed Timperlake with Admiral Scott Conn outside of the NSWC building at Fallon after the Second Line of Defense interview.
The training we conduct at Fallon is from the fights on to the knock it off, and is not focused on taking off and landing on an aircraft carrier.
The fact that Naval Forces fight forward from the sea is what makes us unique and provides our Nation with the presence to prevent crisis, and if required, to respond to a crisis quickly and decisively.
The cold hard truth is that launching from a Carrier, or one of our Amphibious Ships for our Marine Corps brethren, is inherently dangerous and unforgiving of mistakes or complacency.
This unique maritime operational aspect is addressed through follow on training by Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 4 and CSG 15 who make recommendations for certification for deployment.
Training Includes Supporting Deployed Carrier Wings
Question: We found it interesting that your strike integration training involves as well regular dialogue with the deployed carriers and apparently you work in support of the deployed fleet as well in shaping TTPs, which they might need in ongoing operations. Could you speak to that process?
Admiral Conn: NSAWC innovates in peacetime while providing the reach back support to adapt in war.
We are in regular communication with the deployed carriers.
We provide technical and tactical reach back support to address observed shortfalls in combat to existing TTPs.
An historical example of how NSAWC provided reach back support to the forward deployed warfighter was in the early stages of Afghanistan operations.
Ground commanders needed aircraft to strafe at night.
To do this strafing mission at night, aircrew needed to put an airplane below mountaintops, perhaps in a valley, provide bullets precisely and then pull off target, and not fly into the terrain.
When NSAWC got this request, in a matter of weeks because it wasn’t overnight, a couple weeks, we came up with the tactics, techniques, and procedures for the fleet to execute that mission.
We then folded those TTPs into our training for follow on deployers.
And the connectivity we have with the fleet through modern communications allows for an ongoing combat learning process between Fallon and the fleet and this flow of information is central to the process of training in the 21st century.
Training is the Crucial Glue
Question: Clearly, shortfalls in flight hours and training is a crucial concern for you.
How do you view the challenge?
Admiral Scott Conn: Naval aviation is very interdependent on how we train aircrew and how we resource to those training requirements.
As competing readiness requirements pressurize the flight hour program, a bow wave is created by pushing training qualifications later on in one’s aviation career.
Naval aviation is looking at this issue hard, to ensure our future forward deployed leaders will have the requisite knowledge, skills and experience to in fact, lead.
What we will not do, let me repeat, not do, is to lower our training and readiness standards.
In the future, the live, virtual and constructive training is envisioned to relieve some of this stress, particularly as aging aircraft and 5th generation aircraft are more expensive to operate.
Bottom line here is that training is the essential glue for operational success.
In combat, you’re not going to rise to your level of technology or the capabilities of your opponent,; you’re going to fall back to your level of training.
Today and in future, with the proliferation of precision across the globe, the difference between winning and losing is/will be measured in seconds, not minutes.
Why Fallon?
Question: Fallon is a tough place to reach, and our sense is that the warriors who come here are clearly very committed to the mission.
Admiral Scott Conn: The city of Fallon is a great partner in the execution of our mission.
The reason aircrew come here is because of the mission.
They come here because of the passion for the mission.
And they come here because they want to pass their knowledge onto other aviators.
Training for the Joint Environment
Question: The relationship between the deployed CAGs and your command is not one widely realized outside of the Navy.
And we learned that in your strike integration activities you are building in more joint work as well.
Could you give us a sense of that activity?
An Air Force B-2 bomber along with other aircrafts from the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps fly over the Kitty Hawk, Ronald Reagan and Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike groups during the photo portion of Exercise Valiant Shield 2006. Valiant Shield focuses on integrated joint training among U.S. military forces, enabling real-world proficiency in sustaining joint forces and in detecting, locating, tracking and engaging units at sea, in the air, on land and cyberspace in response to a range of mission areas. Credit: Headquarters USMC, 6/18/06
Admiral Scott Conn: We participate in some of the planning for joint exercises.
We participate in those exercises as well.
Our EA-18G Growlers are often requested to support exercises in Nellis.
We need to make sure that folks understand the capabilities of the air wing as well as the Carrier Strike Group.
During our Maritime Employment course, a good portion of the attendees come from various U.S Air Force units.
As another example of Joint integration is that the next air wing will be supported by Air National Guard F-16s from the East Coast.
Question: We also learned that you have surface officers, such as Aegis weapons officers, working strike integration as well.
Could you comment on that aspect?
Admiral Scott Conn: As we build an Aegis-like capability into the training here in Fallon, my subject matter experts will be more effectively working side by side with the surface community subject matter experts, and in the process will learn from each other more effectively as we develop and refine existing CSG TTPs for various missions.
Operating in an Expanded Battlespace
Question: A number of analysts have focused on the Anti-Access Area Denial threat as a serious limiting factor for future USN operations.
How do you view that and focus upon how to best train to deal with those threats?
Admiral Scott Conn: I think it important to emphasize that adversary A2AD capabilities pose a serious threat not only to Navy, but to our entire Joint ability to fight and win.
F-35C breaks away from formation prior to landing at Eglin AFB, June 22, 2013. Credit Photo: 33rd Fighter Wing.
Again, I think of A2AD as the proliferation of precision for potential adversaries and how this proliferation of precision effects joint forces ability to maneuver where we need to be and when we need to be there.
For me, it is about expanding the battlespace and training with regard to how to do this.
We are developing the means to push out the battle space and our ability to find, fix, track, target and engage the threat.
The F-35 will bring enormous capability in this area.
At the same time we are developing means to deny, degrade or delay a potential adversary’s ability to do the same to us.
This is why the EA-18G with Next Generation Jammer is so important to the Air Wing of the future, with its ability to provide operating sanctuaries for our forces through exploitation of the EM spectrum.
That said, the proliferation of precision across the globe compresses engagement timelines, things will happen very fast.
And we have to push those boundaries out to buy freedom of maneuver, decision space and time.
We are adding new capabilities to do so in the period ahead.
With the advent of a live, virtual and constructive training environment we will then integrate those new capabilities to train and fight in this expanded battlespace.
With regard to building out our Virtual Constructive Training, it is a work in progress and one which is central to future of training here at Fallon.
Key Objective Moving Forward
Question: You have been at the command for six months, when you leave the command what do you hope to have achieved?
Admiral Scott Conn: First and foremost is to continue to provide trained and ready aircrew to operate forward.
In looking to the future, in five years we are going to have JSF in the fleet.
In five years we may have UCLASS on our carriers. In five years, the Super Hornet of today is going to be different.
In five years the E-2D capabilities and our networks will have matured.
In five years the threat is going to change and competitors will have more capability.
In working with Naval Aviation Leadership, we are on a journey of discovery of how to best create a training environment that replicates potential adversary’s capabilities.
Before I leave, I would like to hand my relief a destination to drive to in this regard.
Editor’s Note: We have included both a slideshow of the current carrier air wing, and provided a video of the latest entrant into the evolving air wing, the F-35C.
Credit Photos in the Slideshow Above: USN Media Services
In the first photo, MEDITERRANEAN SEA (June 14, 2013), an F/A-18F Super Hornet assigned to the Jolly Rogers of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 103 approaches the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) for an arrested recovery.
In the second photo, U.S. Navy aircraft assigned to Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 5 fly over the guided missile destroyer USS Preble (DDG 88), not pictured, in the Pacific Ocean Aug. 20, 2013.
In the third photo, a U.S. Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet aircraft assigned to Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 195 prepares to land aboard the aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73) in the Pacific Ocean Aug. 20, 2013.
In the fourth photo, two U.S. Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet aircraft assigned to Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 195 fly above the guided missile destroyer USS Preble (DDG 88), not pictured, in the Pacific Ocean Aug. 20, 2013.
In the fifth and sixth photos, a U.S. Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet aircraft assigned to Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 27 flies above the guided missile destroyer USS Preble (DDG 88), not pictured, in the Pacific Ocean Aug. 20, 2013.
In the final photo, NORTH ARABIAN SEA (May 12, 2010): an F/A-18F Super Hornet assigned to the “Jolly Rogers” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 103 and an F/A-18E Super Hornet assigned the the “Pukin Dogs” of VFA 143 wait to launch from from the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69).
With the successful “OK-3-wire” landing on the Nimitz on November 3, 2014, the F-35C is moving forward and will be a key player in the evolving Naval air wing, which Admiral Conn needs to plan the training environment for as well; and he clearly is thinking along these lines as well.
The video above highlights the landing of the F-35C aboard the USS Nimitz.
In this Special Report, Second Line of Defense looks at the training for air wing integration and the preparation for the future.
The USN both in its carriers and its amphibious fleet provides a significant expeditionary capability. The USMC-USN team has been reshaping amphibious assault forces under the influence of the Osprey, the coming of the F-35B, the addition of new ships such as the T-AKE and USNS Montford Point, the USS Arlington, and the USS America.
Less visible have been the coming of the USS Ford and the reworking of the strike fleet. The USS Ford is less about operating as a traditional carrier than as a key C2 and strike enabler for an entire sea-base force, surface, subsurface, joint and coalition.
Interviews with senior leaders in USN aviation combined with interviews from the senior officers at the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center at Fallon provide a look at how the USN is preparing and thinking about its operational future.
A key element of the Special Report is combing the two — senior leadership with current training — in our analyses.
Fallon trains the integrated Naval air wing for the carrier; Rear Admiral Mike Manazir, the head of Air Warfare for the Navy, works to enhance its capabilities.
Manazir is a battle hardened carrier admiral.
His perspective in the Pentagon in building out the capabilities of the air wing revolves around the necessity to prevail in 21st century operations. It is not about looking backward; it is about preparing the air wing of the future with a clear eye to its evolving capabilities.
By chance our interview occurred shortly after the initial tests of the F-35C aboard the Nimitz and our trip to Fallon. The Admiral focused on both the impact of fifth generation and the building out of the integrated capabilities of the air wing.
According to the Admiral: “The F-35 is not an A or an E or an F; it is all of those. Earlier we had an F-14, an A-6 and an EA-6B and needed all three to do our job; now one airplane blends those capabilities and we can leverage that as we look at the integration of the other capabilities of the air wing we are developing.
Fifth generation is opening up so many possibilities that how we used to think about our capabilities is changing; how do we wring out the full capabilities of the air wing with the fifth generation as a catalyst for change?
Land wars of the past decade have led the United States to a significant redirection of its military forces.
The key roles played in ground operations and support by the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and the US Navy (USN) to the land forces have been evident and reflected in the decisions and focus of the Department of Defence.
These land-based roles entailed large-scale and expensive logistics operations via land, sea, and ground, along with significant expenditures to support civilian contractors, such as Maersk, for specialized capabilities.
Although charged to military accounts and considered military ops, these are really support to land-based forces more than they are dynamic military operations.
A major centerpiece of this effort has been Counter Insurgency Operations and the training of local forces to support local governance – highlighting a significant role for nation building. Stability operations were prioritized over traditional conventional operations, and the nuclear dimension of the force structure reduced and largely de-emphasized.
However, this bulging towards the traditional land role makes little sense going forward.
It is not about mass and occupation; it is about insertion, sustainment, crisis management and crisis termination with air, ground and sea assets as appropriate.
For example, rather than setting up long-term facilities (and providing advisors as targets), the U.S. insertion forces are able to speedily engage and withdraw – and several core allies are shaping similar forces.
The ability to establish air dominance to empower multi-mission insertion forces that are able to operate rapidly, effectively, and then withdraw, is a core effort that now exists and is emerging as a more efficient way of war for 21st century conflicts.
The long-standing debate over ‘boots on the ground’ versus ‘airpower’ really does not capture the evolving capabilities each group has to offer as they capitalize on new technologies to provide for more effective and more lethal insertion forces.
Indeed, as General Hostage, the recently retired ACC Commander, put it:
The boots on the ground debate is a political, not a military debate. Nobody argues that putting boots on the ground will not give you better fidelity, better opportunities to identify the good guys and the bad guys, and put weapons on the forehead of the correct bad guy.
But it’s not a military decision whether to do that or not, it’s a political decision. I think it’s a legitimate political consideration that our national leaderships deal with. They choose whatever path they choose, you could like or dislike it, but it’s not a military choice, it’s a political choice.
Sea-basing clearly provides an important capability to insert and withdraw forces for military operations, and to help modulate crisis response.
As the Commander in charge of the USS Arlington put it during the Bold Alligator 2014 exercise:
“We are part of the sea-basing initiative. The focus of which is: how do you build mass ashore without a huge logistical tail ashore? We get those land forces ashore and then we sustain them.”
Bold Alligator 2014 is a crisis response exercise and continues the work of BA 2012 and BA 2013.
It is about calibrating insertion forces against various threats.
The forces are American and coalition with several nations contributing ships, and combat personnel to both the planning and execution of the missions.
A key aspect being tested in the operation is C2 to support operations against multiple objective areas and to shape a more flexible C2 system.
The command deck of the HNLMS Johan de Witt during the Bold Alligator 2014 exercise. Credit: Second Line of Defense
This ranges from inserting a Osprey-enabled force more than a 1,000 miles from the launch point and supporting that force with airborne C2 and ISR, to the operation of a Dutch ship as the key C2 center for the coalition operation, including launching an airborne and other assets against Fort Story, to the Expeditionary Strike Commanders working airborne and then on ships to direct the operation.
Shaping more flexible coalition C2 is clearly a key element of the BA 2014 exercise, and, of course, in mission success in real world operations.
Interviews conducted about the Dutch command ship the HNLMS Johan de Witt highlighted the C2 role of the ship.
These interviews were followed up with an interview with the Captain of the USS Arlington who highlighted the significance of enhancing the capabilities of C2 aboard the new generation of amphibious ships, precisely because of the expanded role which the sea base is being asked to play and can play.
Captain Rene Luyckx, CO of HNLMS Johan de Witt
Captain Rene Luyckx:
The ship was built in 2006.
It is built more or less along commercial standards; there is a lot of room for operations.
It is a small village.
There is an airport, a garage, a hotel, and a port in effect involved with the ship.
The difference with our ship compared to most ships of its class is that we have a large C2 area.
Captain Rene Luyckx: on the bridge of his ship during Bold Alligator 2014. Credit: Second Line of Defense
Question: Where have you operated the ship?
Captain Rene Luyckx : We have been on Exercise African Winds; twice we have operated as the command ship for anti-piracy operations off of Africa; and in the Caribbean as well.
Question: The kind of operations we need to do now require flexible C2.
How have you used it so far?
Captain Rene Luyckx:
This ship was the flagship for the EU task force off of Africa.
We will go again in January where Sweden will be in charge but they will operate off of our ship because of our C2 capabilities.
We intend to use the ship for a larger national force but it has become a very effective coalition asset.
And sea basing is crucial for you can operate independently, and provide support logistics aboard the ship rather than having to push them ashore. And we can do C2 for the entire force we might support ashore as well.
Question: The Osprey is part of BA-2014. How does it affect your thinking about operating as a coalition partner with the USN-USMC?
Captain Rene Luyckx:
We can land the Osprey aboard our ship.
And the Ospreys can go deep against an objective area.
And we can do other operations with our helos and landing craft.
And we can Command and Control all of this from the ship if we wish rather than having to put C2 ashore in a potentially hostile environment.
Commodore R.A. Kramer, Commander, Netherlands Maritime Force
Commodore R.A. Kramer, Commander, Netherlands Maritime Force during Bold Alligator 2014: Credit: Second Line of Defense
In a discussion with Commodore Kramer in the C2 deck of the ship, the Commander talked about the approach:The coordination going on here involves the forces landside as well as the movement of the vessels.
The crew is multi-national and from various services as well.
There are 12 countries involved in working on the exercise as well.
The NATO procedures are crucial to being able to bring such a group together to do such an operation.
You cannot do it at the same level or same speed without NATO procedures and training.
We have been out here only a couple of days but we are functioning well after such a short time because of those common procedures and training.
Commander Gregory Baker
The discussions aboard the Dutch ship, naturally turned to C2 because of its role in the exercise.
But it is clear from Odyssey Dawn and the role of the USS Kearsarge and its role in that operation, that C2 enhancements are crucial for the amphibious fleet.
With a large deck amphib, like the USS America entering the fleet, and ships like the USS Arlington operating at much greater distances from other ships in the ARG-MEU, C2 is more importance now for the Gator Navy as that force transforms into an amphibious task force.
Commander Baker, CO of the USS Arlington. Photo: Second Line of Defense
Commodore Baker was asked about this growing demand signal for enhanced C2:
We have a much more robust C2 suite than a traditional LPDs.
What does constrain me is the actually sailors we billet on board.
We have the capability to do the LHD or LHA can do, and we are prone to deploy more independently over time as we do disaggregated ops.
Question: C2 limits for the amphibious ships is butting up against the demand to use the sea base differently in doing insertion operations
How are you addressing this?
Commodore Baker:
The sky is the limit.
There are initiatives we are doing to upgrade skill sets.
We have sent to schools to get skill sets to increase our capability.
We have not tapped fully the capabilities of the ship expanding the C2 capabilities of the ship.
In short, the exercise involves working with an evolving C2 capability to manage forces operating throughout key objective areas.
The presence of the Osprey allows the US and its allies to operate against longer range objective areas as well as other objective areas reachable by rotorcraft and reinforced by landing forces.
The sea base is characterized by logistical integrity meaning the insertion forces can be supported by the sea base, and it is not necessary to build forward operating bases or to land significant supplies ashore in order to prosecute missions.
The ISIS threat reminds us that leaving equipment behind — which is required for land-centric forces — can lead to the arming of one’s next adversaries.
It is a force tailored to crisis management, as opposed to having to rely on bringing significant forces ashore along with their gear in order to mount operations.
The first 15 photos are credited to Second Line of Defense.
The final photos are credited to the USN.
The first five photos are of the USS Arlington. The first was shot from the shore near Fort Story. The next three were shot from a Seahawk helicopter. And the fifth was shot from the bridge of the HNLMS Johan de Witt.
The next five photos are of the Dutch ship the HNLMS Johan de Witt. The 5th photo was shot from the shore near Fort Story. The 6th and 7th photos were shot from a Seahawk helicopter. The 9th photo is of the well deck inside the Dutch ship. The 19th photo shows two Seahawks on the flight deck.
The 11th photo is of a Dutch landing ship.
The 12th and 13th photos show other landing ships involved in the exercise.
The 14th photo shows the USNS Apache, a sea tug used by MSC. She is designed to provide the Navy with towing service, and when augmented by Navy divers, assist in the recovery of downed aircraft and ships.
In the 15th photo, a small boat used for riverine operations is seen near the Dutch ship.
In the 16th photo, a submarine passes by the USS Arlington (LPD-24) and a LCAC during Bold Alligator 2014 at Fort Story, Va., Oct. 31, 2014.
In the 17th and 18th photos, a Special Boat Team 20 (SBT-20) crew member guides an 11-Meter Naval Special Warfare Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (11M NSW RIB) onto the USNS Choctaw County (JHSV-20) during exercise Bold Alligator 2014 (BA14).
For additional Bold Alligator 2014 stories see the following:
2014-11-11 Murielle Delaporte is visiting the French base in Djibouti.
Djibouti is at the crossroads of Asia and Africa and a very important transit route.
France has a long history in Djibouti.
Djibouti was obtained as a colony by France in 1862 and officially controlled Djibouti until it received independence in 1977.
Djibouti maintains military and economic agreements with France which provide continued security and economic assistance. The largest French military base in Africa is located in Djibouti’s territorial waters in the Red Sea.
Military facilities are in transition in the region as coalition forces operate there now as well.
And during the November 11th ceremony on the French base, US Marines and military representatives from Germany, Japan, Italy and Spain attended.
In a telephone interview, she highlighted that the ceremony was a very powerful reminder of the transitions underway, from the older French role to a multi-national one.
“The War to end all wars was very clearly remembered; yet the wars being fought now against terrorism in the region is ever present. But there is a very good esprit de corps among the allies working together in Djibouti toward common objectives and goals in reducing the threat of terrorism in the region and beyond.”
A ceremony was held on the base of the 5e Régiment Interarmes d’Outre-Mer (5e RIAOM).
The ceremony wasattended by theGeneralMontocchio, commander FFDJ(COMFOR) and the Ambassador ofFranceinDjiboutiand variousFrench and foreignas well as formerDjiboutian soldiers who had foughtforFrance.
General Philippe Montocchio made a powerful statement about the meaning of the day and the significance for the French and allied soldiers now operating from Djibouti.
For us French, the Great War has always held a special place in our history.
It is the most terrible test ever known in France on its own soil.
It conjures up images of trenches, mud, terror and pain. (…)
We are here today to honor those ” friends and allies, who have sacrificed their lives to save France and a conception of the world that was seriously threatened. (…)
One hundred years after the Great War, we are fighting a similar battle that now lead our women and men, engaged with our allies overseas to theaters of operations at the service of peace, freedom and stability in the world.
These interventions take a very different form than the mass battles of yesteryear.
Their purpose is less easy to discern.
But their effects are long reaching.
But make no mistake, threats, perhaps less visible, we are facing today are just as dangerous because they carry the hatred of the other, intolerance, and barbarism.
The fight against extremism that is now ours is a noble fight that deserves our commitment.
In a society that is strongly individualistic, I encourage you, soldiers, sailors, airmen, civilian personnel of defence, to draw upon the values that motivated our ancestors: the values of courage, fraternity, solidarity, self-denial and self-transcendence, to carry out individually, but also collectively, the assignments at the beginning of XXI century facing the French armed forces.
At the ceremony, ten French soldiers were provided medals for their courage in an operation.
A French soldier was awarded the Legion of Honor and five of the National Order of Merit.
Three French soldiers received a gold medal from the National Defence for their involvement in Operation Sangaris in Central Africa.
The tenth was awarded the Cross of Military Valour with bronze palm for his success in firing on enemy positions during an operation also part of the Sangaris operation.
The 11th MEU has been training at the Djibouti facility over the past few days.
In the first photo, U.S. Marines with Combat Logistics Battalion 11, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), fire a 240B medium machine gun from the turret of a Humvee during a live-fire static crew-served weapons range as part of sustainment training at D’Arta Plage, Djibouti, Nov. 5.
The 11th MEU is deployed as a theater reserve and crisis response force throughout U.S. Central Command and the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility.
In the second photo, U.S. Marine Corps Sgt. Dylan S. Large with Charlie Company, 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance detachment, Battalion Landing Team 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), aims a French FAMAS assault rifle alongside French armed forces from the 1st Spahis Regiment during sustainment training in D’Arta Plage, Djibouti, Nov. 5.
In the third photo, the Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) heavy team comprised of Lt. Shannon A. Meyer, left, an emergency nurse and native of Seaford, N.Y., and Lt. Cmdr. Anthony M. Bielawski, second left, an emergency medicine physician and native of Bay City, Michigan, both with Combat Logistics Battalion 11, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).
In the fourth photo, Lt. Shannon A. Meyer, an emergency nurse and native of Seaford, New York, with Combat Logistics Battalion 11, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), speaks with an MV-22B Osprey crew chief from Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron, 11th MEU, during a response drill as part of Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) sustainment training at D’Arta Plage, Djibouti, Nov. 5.
In the fifth photo, U.S. Marine Corps Sgt. Robert J. Scarpello, left, an explosive ordnance disposal technician with Combat Logistics Battalion 11, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and native of Sellersville, Pa., gives a period of instruction on the compact metal detector during a counter-improvised explosive device exercise as part of sustainment training at D’Arta Plage, Djibouti, Nov. 6.
In the sixth and seventh photos, a UH-1Y Super Huey with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 163 (Reinforced), 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), takes off after delivering supplies to Marines conducting sustainment training at D’Arta Plage, Djibouti, Nov. 7.
In the final photo, U.S. Marine Corps Cpl. David S. Chandler, a light armored vehicle crewman with Charlie Company, 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance detachment, Battalion Landing Team 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and native of Dublin, California, leaves a forward operating base during a security patrol as part of sustainment training in D’Arta Plage, Djibouti, Nov. 6.
During our visit to the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center in October 2014, we had a chance to discuss the importance of training and the way ahead with CDR Charles “Chunks” Smith.
Question; You are currently at Top Gun but what is your background in Naval Aviation?
CDR Smith:
My background is primarily as a weapons school instructor, which I have done for about half of my career.
I have had two tours at Top Gun and most recently as an exchange officer with Nellis in the F-16 division of the Air Force Weapons School.
I was at Nellis for two and half years and have come back to Top Gun and can bring back that experience to the Top Gun program.
Question: We have discussed with other members of NSAWC the role of virtual training in preparing to operate in the extended battlespace. What is your perspective on this trend?
CDR Charles “Chunks” Smith. Credit: Second Line of Defense
CDR Smith:
There are two important aspects.
One is cost, where virtual training is designed to drive down the cost of actual flight hours.
But it is important to remember how important flight hours really are to basic proficiencies.
The second is as you say about shaping capability to operate in the battlespace.
If you want to train to concepts like Aegis is my wingman, you are going to do that in a virtual training space.
I can take that pilot in the cockpit and broaden the threats and extend his capability to draw upon blue assets through virtual training.
Question: How would you contrast Top Gun with Nellis?
CDR Smith:
At Top Gun we fly the F-18 so our focus is on proficiency in flying that aircraft.
At Nellis you have a variety of airplanes and the focus is first of all on proficiencies and advanced tactics for that airplane and then with the integration of those aircraft across the air wing.
A key part of Nellis training is clearly upon airpower integration.
Our focus after Top Gun within NSAWC is upon integration of the carrier strike group, which is our functional equivalent of Nellis doing its integration processes.
Question: How do you view the role of training –notably advanced weapons shool training – in terms of preparing for combat?
CDR Smith:
We are demanding significant effectiveness and complexity out of our carrier air wings in today’s environment.
But I cannot run a Peyton Manning style offense if I don’t know how to block and operate downfield effectively.
I have to train those basic competencies to then operate effectively in a complex system.
That is what we do in the advanced weapons schools.
You need to ensure that the basic air service mechanics are solid; otherwise integration is really ineffective.
I would argue that training is the essential piece, which is necessary to drive combat competence and the ability to get full value out of our platforms.
I’m not a famous admiral in the Pacific, but if you want the Chunk sound bite, I’ll tell you that it is a waste of taxpayer money if you buy a capability that has not been trained to by its aircrew, it’s a waste of tax payers money.
Question: As a new platform, like the F-35, is introduced into the fleet and then the TTPs shaped for the aircraft and then integrated into the air wing, what are the challenges?
CDR Smith:
A key challenge can be to simply apply the older thinking to the newer platform.
The danger, in my own opinion, is the fleet developing TTPs for a new platform based on the tactics for which they’re familiar from their own legacy platform.
For example, the USAF flew the F-22 as if was an F-15; when they finally shifted the tactics to the new platform’s capabilities, change really took hold.
Question: We have lived through this before when the air to air and air to ground communities in the Navy were confronted with the challenge of coalescing their two cultures into the F-18.
The F-4 and A7 communities are now confronted with the need to blend their culture.
And that kind of transition will occur as the F-35 enters the fleet.
CDR Smith:
That makes sense and we can draw upon historical analogies in other ways as well.
For example, for me the F-35 SEAD mission is quite similar to how the Wild Weasels used their F-16s.
There are distinct parallels to the F-16 SEAD mission.
And the way I would look forward to F-35s working with Growlers is that the two aircraft have different missions and provided a combined arms type of approach to dealing with spectrum warfare.
