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During our visit to The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, we had a chance to discuss with the new CO of TOPGUN his approach coming into the job.
CDR Edward “Stevie” Smith is the current TOPGUN CO, and a previous TOPGUN Instructor is a key leader in the NSAWC enterprise.
Question: You have just taken over as the CO of TOPGUN.
How do you see your basic challenge?
CDR Smith: I think that all of us that have attended one of the WTI courses at NSAWC or had the opportunity to work here in a previous tour wish to come back in some capacity to be a part of the organization again.
CDR Edward “Stevie” Smith, current TOPGUN CO, previous TOPGUN Instructor. Credit: Second Line of Defense
If we do get that opportunity to come back, we understand our primary job is to support the Admiral’s vision and execute the mission of NSAWC, as a whole, keeping this the center of excellence.
We also realize that it’s important to protect the integrity of the organizations that we’re charged with helping lead.
And maintain all those core missions and core value, and allowing evolution to change, to occur, but making sure they keep it in line with maintaining the fundamentals of those organizations.
Question: We were discussing earlier with regard to rotorcraft training the important role of the ranges for testing integrated EW and other types of training.
How do the instrumented ranges work for today’s Navy?
CDR Smith: In the past we were geographically confined to the instrumented ranges that relied upon ground based receivers to track and record aircraft data.
Now everything is GPS based combined with more modern tracking technology which great expands our ability to train.
Question: We have discussed with others at NSAWC the growing role of virtual training in preparing to fight in an extended battlespace.
How do you look at this development?
CDR Smith: It is an important one.
As we fight in an extended battlespace, we need to tap into various USN or joint assets for the fight.
We clearly cannot bring Aegis ships, or Patriot or THAAD batteries, but in the fight we need to tap into those assets.
We can do that as we build out our capabilities for virtual training.
Question: In your professional judgment, the type of simulation or the threat presentation is pretty good?
An Air Force B-2 bomber along with other aircrafts from the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps fly over the Kitty Hawk, Ronald Reagan and Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike groups during the photo portion of Exercise Valiant Shield 2006. Valiant Shield focuses on integrated joint training among U.S. military forces, enabling real-world proficiency in sustaining joint forces and in detecting, locating, tracking and engaging units at sea, in the air, on land and cyberspace in response to a range of mission areas. Credit: Headquarters USMC, 6/18/06
CDR Smith: It has the potential for getting better.
Replicating rapidly changing threat capabilities is expensive and in this day of constrained budgets we have to prioritize where we spend our limited resources.
Question: The Carrier and its support assets provide for significant organic punch, but clearly going forward to ability to either support or to lead joint airpower and other assets will be of increasing importance.
How do you look at this evolution?
CDR Smith: I think of it as concentric circles.
Like the USMC we are an expeditionary force when it comes to the carrier.
We bring the fight to our adversary’s coast all over the world.
And we cannot always count on our Air Force and Army brother being there for a particular operation.
That forms the first concentric operational circle.
But clearly the ability to work with joint partners, the USMC and the US Air Force, in an expeditionary operation forms the second concentric circle, and where extended land operations are entailed, the US Army as well.
The third concentric circle, which can overlap the second, is the ability to support or to draw upon allied capabilities and assets.
The ability to train to operate in all three environments will be increasingly important over the next twenty years as we deal with the evolving threat environment.
CDR Smith Biography
CDR Edward Smith, a native of Houston, Texas, graduated from Texas A&M University, earning a Bachelor of Science in Industrial Distribution. Upon commissioning he attended flight school in Pensacola, Florida, Meridian, Mississippi, and Kingsville, Texas, where he earned his Wings of Gold in 1997.
Upon being selected to fly the F/A-18C, Commander Smith reported to the “Gladiators” of VFA 106 in Jacksonville, Florida, where he qualified as a fleet replacement pilot prior to his assignment to the “Knighthawks” of VFA 136.
During his first sea tour he deployed aboard USS JOHN C. STENNIS (CVN 74) on her maiden deployment in 1998 and again aboard USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69) for her 2000 cruise. In June of 2001, Commander Smith was selected to attend the Navy Fighter Weapons School, TOPGUN, where he remained as an instructor upon graduation.
While at TOPGUN he served as both instructor, Standardization Officer and the Navy’s Subject Matter Expert for Global Positioning System (GPS) Weapons during both Operation ENDURING and IRAQI FREEDOM.
In June of 2004, Commander Smith reported to the “Bulls” of VFA 37 as the Training Officer and deployed aboard USS HARRY S. TRUMAN (CVN 75) for her 2004-2005 combat deployment. Upon completion of this tour, he then reported to the “Valions” of VFA 15 as a department head serving as both the Maintenance and Operations Officer for the squadron as they prepared for their 2008 to 2009 deployment aboard USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (CVN 71).
In August of 2008, Commander Smith reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to serve in the J-34 Deputy Directorate for Antiterrorism/Homeland Defense. During his tour on the Joint Staff, he was responsible for all aspects of DOD Antiterrorism Training and led the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Level IV Antiterrorism Executive Seminar.
In October of 2009, Commander Smith volunteered as an Individual Augmentee, where he served in Kabul, Afghanistan, from December 2009 to May 2010, as the Liaison for a Joint Special Operations Task Force to the Commander of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF).
While assigned to the Joint Staff, Commander Smith earned his Masters in Business Administration from The Pennsylvania State University and also attended the Joint Forces Staff College for Level II Joint Professional Military Education.
After refresher training in the F/A18C at VFA 106, Commander Smith reported as the Executive Officer of VFA 34 just months before their eight month combat deployment aboard USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (CVN 72) in support of Commander, Fifth Fleet and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
Upon return to Virginia Beach, Commander Smith assumed command of VFA 34 in December of 2012 and has led his squadron as they have achieved the Commander Naval Air Forces Battle Efficiency Award, CNO Safety Award and Captain Michael J. Estocin Award for operational excellence.
CDR Smith has been awarded the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Joint Commendation Medal, Strike Flight Air Medal (three awards), Navy Commendation Medal (two awards), Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal (two awards), and numerous campaign and unit citations.
He has accumulated 600 arrested landings and over 3400 flight hours.
The French Air Force has activated its first 400M squadron.
And it did not take much time for the new plane to be put to operational use.
The A400M in the past months has been involved in various theater missions for Operations Barkhane in the Sahelo-Saharan zone and Chammal against ISIS.
While a lot of tactical capabilities remain in the process of completion, the French Air Force has been able to start using its recently acquired airlifters for logistic missions only a few months after acquiring them.
Behind this ability lies a strong will and a vision to build on solid foundations with across the board fleet and lessons learned in mind, jointness and interoperability as a goal, and MRO set as the first milestone.
Last June, at the Orléans-Bricy Air Base, the French Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Denis Mercier, participated in the 20th anniversary of French Air Force Special Forces (CPA for “Commandos Parachutistes de l’Air “).
In the background was the Atlas (A400M) surrounded on each side – like a pair of old parents – by two 40-something tactical aircrafts: one Transall (C-160) and one Hercules (C-130).
Symbolic of the transition between two generations, the central presence of the A400M marks a new era in the history of the FAF (French Air Force).
“A strategic airlifter with tactical capabilities” is the way Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Creuset, who was at the time in charge of setting up the future A400M squadrons, describes this new bird which France has been acquiring at a steady rate since August 2013.
By the end of 2014, the sixth one will be joining the forces with a delivery schedule of fifty aircraft by 2024.[ref] June 12th, 2014 Interview at Orléans-Bricy FAB 123[/ref]
The A400M is central to the success of French XXIst Century power projection strategy as most of its current fleet acquired since the 60’s is progressively being retired.
France’s stated goal in the 2008 White Paper was already to shift from the previous goal of being able to deploy an autonomous rapid projection force of 1,500 troops in 72 hours at a distance of 5,000 kilometers to the new one of being able to deploy1,500 troops in 5 days at a maximum distance of 8,000 kilometers.[ref]The 2013 White Paper calls for a Joint Rapid Intervention Force of 2,300 men. See : http://www.defense.gouv.fr/portail-defense/enjeux2/politique-de-defense/la-loi-de-programmation-militaire-lpm-2014-2019/la-loi-de-programmation-militaire-lpm-2014-2019[/ref]
To do this requires an ability to airlift up to 5,000 tons of equipment, but according to the French Senate at the time of a report done in 2009, only 20% of that objective was then reachable given the French airlift capability in the fleet and it was noted in the report that it would take 15 years to build up that capability.[ref] See: L’Airbus militaire A400M sur le « chemin critique » de l’Europe de la défense, http://www.senat.fr/rap/r08-205/r08-20547.html[/ref]
It Takes Time
But change takes time.
About the same number of years has been necessary to initiate the ongoing process of transforming into reality the A400M tactical and logistical capabilities defined in the 2003 notification contract between Airbus Military and OCCAr (“Organisation conjointe de coopération en matière d’armement“), the organization representing the nations participating to the program and ensuring the qualification process (i.e. Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom).
“The manufacturer must demonstrate – sometimes with the help of nations committed to supply the necessary equipment for testing such a helicopter or a tanker – that the aircraft “is capable of”: it is its responsibility to find the technical solution allowing a designed capability, whether airdropping, tough airfield landing, resisting to high or extremely temperatures, etc. Once the capability has been demonstrated, it is verified by OCCAr and then, signed and transferred to the nations. Once the aircraft is considered apt, each nation can then start experimenting ”, explains Lieutenant-Colonel Creuset.
Creuset has been in charge of precisely that process of experimentation as the head of the Multinational Entry to Service Team (MEST) set up a few years ago by the FAF on a temporary basis in order to ease and optimize the A400M entry into service.
Notably, on September 17th, in another official ceremony held in presence of the FAF Chief of Staff, General Mercier, at Orléans, which is the mother base of the new transport aircraft, the MEST gave birth to the first A400M operational transport squadron, the ET 1/61 « Touraine » (Escadron de transport).
The most visible aspect of the ceremony was the official standup of the squadron but behind the standup there is a core process which not only has stood up the process but is enabling the full realization of the 400M potential within the French forces.
Attached to the the Mont-de-Marsan-based Center for military air experimentation (CEAM for “Centre d’expérience aérienne militaire”), the MEST has worked and is working along four key lines:
The embryo of the operational Squadron, which had been mothballed for two years while awaiting the arrival of the A400M ;
A Joint Evaluation Team (JET) meant to conduct experimentation with pilots and maintainers, now the EMATT (“Equipe de marque avions de transport tactique”) ;
A training branch now merged with the Air Force Command instruction center for transport personnel (CIET for “Centre d’instruction des équipages de transport”) ;
A unit in charge of digital data recollection dedicated to mission preparedness, the CESAM (“Centre de soutien et d’administration des systems missions”).
“This latter concept comes from commercial airlines best practices, but is also a fundamental lesson learned from the FAF experience with the Rafale fighter,” notes Lieutenant-Colonel Creuset.
Shaping the Way Ahead for the 400M in the FAF: Drawing Upon Lessons Already Learned
The approach chosen by the FAF has been to pull all lessons learned from every single experience possible, whether French of international, as part of the strategy of innovation elaborated by its Chief, General Mercier in a 2013 interview :
“In order to encourage a bright new look and a spirit of innovation, we need to encourage (…) the development of crossed paths: this is what we already do with the A400M, for which the entry in service unit includes technical staff coming from the Transall, the Hercules, the Airbus fleet, but also from Rafale.” [ref]Les nouveaux paradigmes de l’armée de l’Air, entretien avec le Général Mercier, in: Soutien Logistique Défense # 9, Spring 2013, page 9.[/ref]
Cross-fertilization with the Rafale experience makes sense for several reasons:
The technology of the A400M – especially its fly-by-wire system – allows it to perform in terms of acceleration and maneuverability in a similar way to a jet fighter, a capability noted by the A400M the test pilots. Former FAF fighter pilot and now Airbus Chief of testing Eric Isorce says “the A400M conducts itself like a fighter: it is like flying a big fighter![ref]Eric Isorce in: http://www.air-actualites.com/diaporama/09-2013-webdocu-a400M/index.php[/ref]
Also, new tactical innovations can occur with a strategic-tactical aircraft which ought to bring new concepts of operations, something which Orléans is a center of excellence for the FAF.
The human-machine interface and the constant dialogue allowed by computer-assisted breakdown diagnostic is common to these new-generation aircraft with the advantages, but also all the challenges these new tools bring :
“At the MEST, we have been developing processes to reinject post-flight data analysis, so there is an intelligent breakdown management: before, all information would go to the pilot without discrimination. (…)
We now try not to overwhelm the pilot with an overload of minor information and our role is to learn the system and check for its accuracy”, explains Lieutenant-Colonel Baron, who is part of the implementing team at Orléans.[ref] June 12th, 2014 interview, BA 123.[/ref]
Easing the task of the pilot is all the more important these days as, with multirole aircrafts such as the Rafale or the A400M, come multitasking and multimission demand sets.
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The MEST therefore capitalizes on the experience of FAF pilots already accustomed to the Airbus philosophy, whether via the A340 of the Transport Squadron Esterel or via learning on the new simulators which are the same as the A380s, to incorporate new habits in a transport community used to the traditional C160s and C130s, for which flying required the full attention of the pilot.
As Lieutenant-Colonel Baron noted, in an interview: “The A400M will feel vibrations, air masses, solicitations, which it will constantly integrate without being noticed by the pilot so that the structure is the less worn out as possible.”
As the MEST team experimented with the Atlas and pushed its real capabilities to further understand all its potential and/or limits, one of the many questions raised early on has been what kind of crew would fit best and what kind of training might be most appropriate to that crew. In particular the question of the third man added to a two-pilot crew was debated and cross-fertilization in this case has also been done internationally.
Major Christophe Piubeni, MEST’s Head of Training Branch, recalls: “given the increased capabilities available on the A400M, we have been exploring the US concept of tactical system officer, [while] the coming of Link 16 and satellite communications could generate the need for a communication specialist.”[[ref] June 12th, 2014 interview, BA 123.[/ref]
Conceived to be the cornerstone of a joint European transport capability, common ConOps, norms and interoperability with allies have indeed been at the heart of the MEST’s efforts, especially with the UK.
Some of the MEST pilots, such as Lieutenant-Colonel Luneau, have been exchange officers on British C130J considered by a pilot as “half-way between the C130H and the A400M”: “we have a lot to learn from the British, in terms of lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan, but also through their daily MRTT and C17 missions”, he is quoted as saying in the FAF magazine Air Actualités.[ref]See: L’arrivée d’un titan: l’A400M dans les forces, Air Actualités #656, November 2012, pages 38-39..[/ref]
Last June, six British personnel worked in the MEST, but also one German pilot: “This pilot is here to work with us on training, while I formed three French officers now in Germany, as the goal is to have all our French A400M maintainers trained in Germany,” explained Lieutenant-Colonel Creuset at the time.
Orléans is to be the tactical training center and Wunstorf will become the logistic training center.
Wunstorf is initially one of the three German Transall bases, the Transall having been conceived as a replacement for the Nord-Atlas (hence the name Atlas, the grand-son of the former) with a first flight in 1963 and as the “Alliance Transport” aircraft (Transall comes from the name « Transport de l’Alliance »).
As the years went by, France and Germany diverged on the use of the aircraft rendering difficult any common maintenance cooperation.
That is where the coming of the A400M and a tailored evolution of the European Air Transport Command (EATC) come into plays to try to alleviate such a drift among allies and allow a common policy in terms of spares, maintainers training and so on.
Put in other terms, the EATC and the A400M can well become mutually reinforcers of capabilities operationally at both the command and operational levels.
The other major change, which comes with the A400M, concerns precisely the MRO (Maintenance, Repair & Overhaul) side of the story.
The Chief of staff of the FAF wanted to ensure that “activity pulls MRO and not the other way around, MRO being at the heart of activity. (…) It is essential that MRO follows and it will be the case with the A400M.” [ref]2012 Interview, Paris[/ref]
This means not only testing the aircraft, but also all the tools and equipment necessary to maintain it: a complex task as well.
In addition, setting up a robust logistic system for the Atlas has been for the MEST a core objective and foundational goal, as training (both real and with new top of the line simulators), processes and live experimentation on equipment have kept the team rather busy in the run up to standing up the first A400M squadron.
To do this MEST worked closely with Airbus, as the aircraft’s capabilities compared to the C130s and C160s are very different and allow multiple troop-equipment combinations.
Real-life experimentation has been done in connection with the French acquisition agency DGA (“Délégation générale de l’armement), the Army and sometimes other manufacturers. This was, for instance, how the FAF worked the task of learning how best to load and unload the 29 tons armed vehicle VBCI for the first time last year from the aircraft.
Following Airbus Sevilla’s training center’s lead, Orléans has very early on built all the necessary infrastructure to accompany the building of an A400M fleet and to train the future crews thanks to state of the art simulation and e-learning tools.
As Major Piubeni notes, “before, all training was entirely manual ; today we do not have the means, time or resources to go train to load a VBCI [away from the base] and our new loadmaster simulator allows us to get prepared to face all kinds of contingencies.”
In other words, being able to deploy and use the aircraft, is not just about the aircraft but the sytems which enable it as well.
And here the FAF is working hard on shaping the overall airlift system.
The A400M is therefore not perceived by the French military as a “Transall Plus” and the stakes are high to succeed this transition in a new era for the FAF.
“The Atlas is not simply an upgraded Transall ,“ says Lieutenant-Colonel Creuset.
“If fifty years of experience with the C160 and the C130 have allowed us to know each single screw of these planes, we are in an experimental phase with the A400M.”
This “experimental phase” has included rewriting the processes, organization, ConOps on a national basis, but also internationally, in close connection with new navigability requirements and the ongoing complex process of certification and qualification.
Over the past years, the latter has been implemented, and is still being implemented, capability by capability, by the constructor and system integrator, Airbus Defence & Space, the OCCAr countries as well as Malaysia, another customer nation.
But this is just the beginning of setting in motion a new airlift enterprise for the FAF and other A400M users.
Editor’s Note: The photos taken at the 20th anniversary of French Air Force Special Forces as well as the second set of photos in the second slideshow which were shot at the Orleans base are copyrighted by Murielle Delaporte.
This article is in part based on a series of interviews conducted over the past months, which will be published on their own in the coming weeks both in this website and in the French Magazine Opérationnels SLDS
Exercise Bold Alligator 2014 (BA14) represents the Navy and Marine Corps’ further refinement of their core competencies of amphibious operations, focus on readiness, and cooperation with multi-national partners all while strengthening their traditional role as fighters from the sea.
“Bold Alligator 2014 will allow us to strengthen our ability to conduct a full spectrum of crisis response operations coordinated from a combined command element at sea,” said Vice Adm. Nora Tyson, deputy commander, USFF. “This exercise will enhance our ability to work with our Marine Corps and multi-national maritime partners to provide high-level crisis response operations around the globe.”
Previously, Bold Alligator 2012 exercised the ability to conduct a large scale amphibious landing against strong opposition. Bold Alligator 2014 will focus on crisis response operations in a complex setting with coalition partners. The capabilities that allow amphibious forces to conduct a forcible entry against an opposing military force are the same capabilities that make it the first, best choice for crisis response, humanitarian assistance and building partnerships.
Bold Alligator 2014 will showcase American service members and coalition partners training amphibious operations in a real-world environment. Nineteen partner nations will be participating in an exercise scheduled to feature 19 U.S. Navy and coalition ships and U.S. Marines Corps units from the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
“Bold Alligator 2014 provides an opportunity for the training and further development of Marine and Navy amphibious based units and their crisis response capabilities. It also provides a venue to showcase the Blue-Green team as the nation’s ‘insurance policy’ for crisis response and contingency operations,” said Lt. Gen. Robert Neller, commander, MARFORCOM.
And ABC 13 provided an overview on the exercise in a story published on October 27, 2014:
The exercise, held every other year, throws multiple crisis-response scenarios at participants, which include forces from 19 nations and 19 U.S. Navy and coalition ships. Roughly 8,000 U.S. and international Marines participate, led by the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit out of Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. This force will also include Dutch, British, Canadian and Brazilian marines.
The previous exercise centered on large-scale amphibious landings against strong opposition. This year, crisis response and humanitarian assistance is the name of the game. But don’t plan on phoning this one in — organizers have plenty of hostile opposition planned. As such, the exercise includes integrated fire support for forces as they conduct forcible entries into complex and uncertain environments with coalition partners. In fact, a Dutch one-star will lead one of three task groups.
“Bold Alligator 2014 provides an opportunity for the training and further development of Marine and Navy amphibious-based units and their crisis response capabilities,” Lt. Gen. Robert Neller, commander, Marine Corps Forces Command MARFORCOM, said in a release. “It also provides a venue to showcase the Blue-Green team as the nation’s ‘insurance policy’ for crisis response and contingency operations.”
Bold Alligator hosts 22 experiments that range from the command to tactical levels, said Michael “Mort” White, who designs and organizes the training event for Carrier Strike Group 4. The response begins with a relatively new concept, the Forward Integrated Command Element. Comprising flag and general officers from Expeditionary Strike Group 2 and 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade and a cadre of 15 to 20 officers, the FICE lands on the amphibious assault ship Iwo Jima, plants the flag and takes charge of the mission.
A joint high-speed vessel is put to the test as events unfold. The 2nd MEB used USNS Choctaw County, crewed by civilian mariners with Military Sealift Command, to transfer fuel trucks ashore. The catamaran is designed for rapid intra-theater transport of troops and equipment.
“What defines the littorals is being changed because of capabilities we have now, like the V-22 and some of our communications and command-and-control capabilities,” White said. “So Marines will find themselves going a little deeper than the shoreline on some of these missions.”Special operations forces will then use JHSV as a launch platform, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command will use it as an unmanned undersea vehicle support platform and JHSV will support Dutch riverine operations.
The Navy also uses the exercise to evaluate USNS Medgar Evers, a dry cargo/ammunition ship, as an alternate command, control, operational and logistics platform. New radios also were tested at the tactical level.
2014-11-01 During our visit to The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, we were able to discuss the role of rotorcraft on the carriers and the training to that role at NSAWC with CDR Herschel “Hashi” Weinstock, current Department Head for SEAWOLF, NSAWC’s Rotary Wing Weapons School.
CDR Weinstock is a native Virginian with an undergraduate degree from the University of Virginia and a Master of Science degree from the University of San Diego.
Designated a Naval Aviator in 1996, his early flying tours include service with the HS-15 Red Lions in Jacksonville, Florida; the HS-10 Warhawks and HS Weapons and Tactics Unit in San Diego, California; and the HS-14 Chargers in Atusgi, Japan.
He commanded the HSC Fleet Replacement Squadron in San Diego, HSC-3.
His staff tours include duty with Carrier Air Wing Five, the Pacific Command Joint Interagency Coordination Group, and in the Pentagon.
CDR Herschel “Hashi” Weinstock, current SEAWOLF CO. Credit Photo: Second Line of Defense
He has served as a Weapons and Tactics Instructor pilot for over fourteen years, in addition to roles as a Safety Officer, Operations Officer, and others; and has accumulated over 3400 flight hours in fleet aircraft.
In 2013, he reported to Naval Strike Air Warfare Center aboard NAS Fallon, NV as the N8 Department Head, leading the Rotary Wing Weapon School, model manager for the Seahawk Weapons and Tactics Instructor course and the Navy Mountain Flying course.
His personal awards include the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, the Navy Marine Corps Commendation Medal, Navy Marine Corps Achievement Medal, and others.
Question: What is the mission of rotorcraft aboard the strike carrier?
CDR Weinstock: Historically, the helicopter focused primarily on search-and-rescue missions and, especially during the Cold War, anti-submarine warfare.
Currently, we fly two types of helicopters which continue to play those roles but have an expanded mission set.
Among other missions, they play a major role in the defense of the carrier battle group, dealing with various surface threats, including small boats.
Both helicopter variants, the Sikorsky-built MH-60R and MH-60S, are vital to the overall air wing mission.
The Romeo is especially important in providing radar coverage, both for situational awareness and more explicitly, forward deployed threat detection and target acquisition.
It is focused on sea control.
From off the coast, they can provide outstanding coverage of the sea-base and also look inland; they can see EW signals as well as plot contacts on radar; and push all of that information through a link back to the ship so that the decision-makers on the ship have the latest, most detailed information possible to make well-informed, timely decisions.
The Romeo provides a lot of ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), that decision-making feed I spoke of.
The Sierras can provide some of that as well, but don’t have a radar.
Both the Romeo and the Sierra have a MTS, a Multi-Spectral Targeting System, which is essentially a FLIR on steroids.
It’s a good system, providing a lot of detail day or night, much better detail than you can get with your eyes at certain ranges.
Working together, one helicopter’s radar tells the battle group where the contacts are that need to be investigated, and the MTS on both helicopter types allow the aircraft to get the definition necessary to know if those contacts are threats or not.
NSAWC Helo at Fallon. Credit Photo: Second Line of Defense
Both assets provide a protective safety net, cooperating with other assets to provide the anti-surface picture, making sure that all the ships remain safe.
The two helicopter types have complementary systems.
The Romeo, with its radar and associated EW (Electronic Warfare) systems, offers situational awareness outside the visual range.
The Sierra lacks a radar, but has a more diverse weapon suite and a very robust self-defense capability.
So I would say that the Romeo is a better battlefield manager, and the Sierra’s going to have more options in dealing with any given threat environment.
Question: Clearly, the ASW threat is a key one, and with the addition of very capable diesel submarines in the global threat environment, the demand signal must be going up?
CDR Weinstock: It is. The Romeo is the only organic ASW (Anti-submarine Warfare) asset in the battlegroup, and is extremely capable.
It has to be; nuclear submarines are becoming more proliferate and the new diesels out there now are definitely not a low-end threat.
Question: The Army has been doing interesting work on linking up RPAs with their helos. The Navy must be working the same challenge and opportunity as well?
CDR Weinstock: We are.
Primarily, the rotary wing UAV, the MQ-8 Firescout, supports missions for NSW (Naval Special Warfare) forces, but has potential functionality in a lot of other mission sets that we are exploring.
The USN as a whole is working through how to best use UAVs in the years ahead.
There are so many missions where they can bring complementary capabilities, or new ones.
We have subject matter experts in my department and others who work on these issues, and we are paying close attention to the opportunities in that arena.
I can clearly see the day when manned assets operating above the water will work closely with UAVs, managing them and sending them forward as needed for coverage.
The UAV’s would greatly expand the battlespace awareness of the strike group, and if necessary, the manned assets could redirect UAVs to areas of greater interest. They could, and probably will, play in other mission sets as well.
090210-N-6538W-205 PACIFIC OCEAN (Feb. 10, 2009) An MH-60R Sea Hawk from the “Raptors” of Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 71, embarked aboard the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74), hovers while deploying its sonar dipping buoy during an Under Sea Warfare Exercise involving the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group. Credit; USN
Question: Clearly the rotorcraft are not operating alone, so integration with the air wing is a crucial aspect of your operational envelope. What is your approach?
CDR Weinstock: When the air wings come out to NAS Fallon to train with NSAWC, they need to be able to fight as a team.
An integrated, cohesive team.
So the fixed wing assets, both jet and prop, work with the helicopters to accomplish various missions.
For instance, the Romeos work with the Growlers (EA-18G) to locate EW targets and help assess them.
Usually the Romeo is going to be primarily an over-water platform, but it can easily supply information about inland EW systems and threats.
Another example would be CSAR (Combat Search and Rescue), where the Sierras are the primary rescue vehicles for a downed aviator and the air wing assets form a protective umbrella overhead, with strike fighters defending against threats on the ground or in the air, Growlers suppressing missile threats and degrading enemy communications and radar, and the E-2 overhead managing the airspace and providing early warning.
All these different assets are necessary to get the job done, and they all have to train together to be able to accomplish the mission seamlessly when the day comes.
The fixed wing assets and rotary wing assets from the air wings work and train together at other times during a workup cycle, and in other locations, but this is the only place where they can come together to train on an instrumented Navy range.
They brief together, they fly together, they debrief together, and then they do it all again the next day.
Each mission, they get feedback from the various experts here at NSAWC on where to improve.
We have the instrumentation and tools to recreate the missions accurately for highly effective debriefs.
That instrumentation and professional feedback is something that only NSAWC and places like it can provide.
Question: You have instrumented ranges where you can really train to the capabilities, which your “teamed” assets can provide?
CDR Weinstock: Absolutely.
We can create a threat representative environment where F/A-18s, Growlers, E-2’s, and Romeos and Sierras work together in a coordinated manner against a variety of threats.
NSAWC’s range can simulate threat environments ranging from low-end to very high-end.
And by training and operating in these environments, we can practice the tactics we would use in any given theater of operations.
This photo is from the same exercise seen in the earlier photo shot in 2009.
Question: Clearly, the small boat threats are a significant one, notably in operating in high maritime traffic areas. How do you deal with that?
CDR Weinstock: What we are doing right now is training to the specific skill sets needed, all of which apply to that particular mission.
Romeo crews need to be good at battlefield management with their radar and link network, and all of the rotary wing assets need to be proficient at employing ordnance and with their defensive systems and tactics. Defense of the battlegroup against a small boat threat is a mission set where Sierras and Romeos must work together seamlessly.
Here at NSAWC, we can recreate the threat with a collection of vehicles approaching a simulated high-value unit, and the helicopters have to track the targets and practice suppressing the threat.
We often bring F/A-18s and other assets into the problem.
During overwater training, we try and bring P-3s or P-8s into the problem as well by introducing a simultaneous ASW threat.
When we train to a standard where crews can manage multiple threats in a complex battlefield environment, we better ensure we are ready for whatever might happen in theater.
The key point is that we train to integrate the platforms to provide multiple solution sets, complementary sensor and weapon systems, to deal either with an ASW or small boat threat.
It’s incredibly important that we develop those relationships now, as well as the coordination plans, so that we integrate seamlessly on deployment.
Air wing events here at NSAWC are the best opportunity where the crews have the chance to all sit down and brief together, fly together, and debrief together, working out all the kinks and ensuring they are ready for the missions.
Romeos and Sierras are only one part of the overall air wing combat power, but the capabilities they bring are essential to the overall mission.
Battlefield awareness, search and rescue, logistics, anti-surface and submarine warfare, combat search and rescue, and others…
All are important to the overall effort, and all need to be practiced and trained to for proficiency and readiness.
One of the best parts about duty at NSAWC is the chance to work with the other communities – the strike fighters, Growlers, the E-2’s – day in and day out.
No matter what community you’re from, you’re all working towards that same goal, to provide the fleet with the best training in the world.
It makes for a great sense of team-spirit, and makes it easy to go to work every day excited about what you’re doing.
Slideshow
In the first photo of the slideshow above, an MH-60R Sea Hawk from the “Raptors” of Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 71, embarked aboard the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74), hovers while deploying its sonar dipping buoy during an Under Sea Warfare Exercise involving the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group.
In the second photo, an MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter from the Golden Falcons of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 12 takes off from the aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73). George Washington and its embarked air wing,
In the third photo, a MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopters assigned to the Sea Knights of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 22 approaches the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) during a vertical replenishment. Harry S. Truman, flagship for the Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group.
In the fourth photo, U.S. Navy MH-60S Seahawk helicopter assigned to Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 7 flies near the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75), not pictured, in the Strait of Gibraltar Aug. 3, 2013.
In the fifth photo, a U.S. Navy MH-60S Seahawk helicopter assigned to Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 7 delivers cargo aboard the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) in the Gulf of Oman Oct. 17, 2013, during a replenishment at sea with the dry cargo and ammunition ship USNS Alan Shepard (T-AKE 3).
In the sixth photo, at PENSACOLA, Fla. (Jan. 14, 2014) Navy search and rescue (SAR) student swimmers ascend up a rescue winch attached to an MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter assigned to the Dragon Masters Aviation Unit at Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama City Division during a SAR training exercise.
In the seventh photo, Seahawks in support of Bold Alligator 2014, are taking off from a landing area near the Naval Air Station in Norfolk, Va.
Credit photos: USN Media Services for 1-6; the 7th photo is credited to Second Line of Defense.
Background:
From the Sikorsky website:
The MH-60R
The MH-60R “Romeo” is the most capable and mature Anti-Submarine (ASW)/Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) multi-mission helicopter available in the world today. Together with its sibling, the MH-60S “Sierra,” the SEAHAWK variants have flown more than 650,000 hours across a 500+ aircraft fleet. The MH-60R is deployed globally with the U.S. Navy fleet and a growing number of allied international navies.
The journey from the start of MH-60R flight testing through the first deployment, in 2009, of 11 MH-60R helicopters aboard the USS Stennis, represents 1,900 flight hours, the equivalent of 500 labor years, and a considerable financial commitment by Lockheed Martin.
In addition, it is capable of conducting stand-alone or joint anti-surface warfare missions with other Romeo or MH-60S “Sierra” aircraft. Secondary missions include electronic support measures, search and rescue, vertical replenishment, and medical evacuation.
The advanced mission sensor suite developed and integrated by Lockheed Martin includes:
Airborne Low Frequency Dipping Sonar (ALFS) subsystem and sonobuoys
Electronic Support Measures with an integrated helo threat warning capability
Forward Looking Infrared Electro-Optical device
Integrated self defense
A weapons suite including torpedoes and anti-ship missiles
Lockheed Martin MST also produces the Common Cockpit™ avionics, fielded on both the MH-60R and MH-60S. The 400th Common Cockpit will be installed on the first Royal Australian Navy MH-60R. In 2012, the Common Cockpit exceeded 600,000 flight hours across an operational fleet of 360 aircraft. The digital, all-glass cockpit features four large, flat-panel, multi-function, night-vision-compatible, color displays. The suite processes and manages communications and sensor data streaming into MH-60 multi-mission helicopters, presenting to the crew of three actionable information that significantly reduces workload while increasing situational awareness.
The U.S. Navy is committed to a long-term preplanned product improvement program, also known as P3I, to keep the MH-60R current throughout its life. Recent upgrades have included vital software and mission management systems in the Situational Awareness Technology Insertion (SATI) package as well as design upgrades to the Identification Friend-or-Foe Interrogator Subsystem. Combined with the aircraft’s Automatic Radar Periscope Detection and Discrimination system, the MH-60R’s range of detection will expand — enhancing situational awareness and advanced threat detection — while interference with civil air traffic control systems will diminish.
The MH-60R Electronic Surveillance Measures (ESM) system, which provides aircrew with valuable threat-warning capabilities, has benefited from the installation and maintenance of an ESM autoloader, and the development of Mission Data Loads, which comprise a database of possible threats within a specific region of operations.
Smaller elements are included as well, including the integration of a new multi-function radio called the ARC210 Gen 5 (which sister-aircraft MH-60S will also receive), crucial spare assemblies and integration of other core technologies. The Gen 5 radio will provide MH-60R aircrew with flexible and secure communication.
The MH-60S “Sierra” is the U.S. Navy’s maritime workhorse, and safely and reliably performs missions from vertical replenishment to Medevac.
The MH-60S deploys today in support of modern maritime security missions like earthquake relief in Haiti, and the first deployment aboard the USS Freedom (LCS-1) to conduct regional security and counter-drug operations.
The multimission Sikorsky MH-60S Knighthawk helicopter entered service in February 2002. The US Navy is expected to acquire a total of 237 of the MH-60S helicopters, to carry out missions such as vertical replenishment, combat search and rescue, special warfare support and airborne mine countermeasures.
The helicopter began full-rate production in August 2002. As of January 2011 52 MH-60R and 154 MH-60S helicopters were in the service with the US Navy. First deployment of the new helicopter took place on board USS Essex, Wasp Class amphibious assault ship, in January 2003 and a number of MH-60S helicopters were deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The helicopter was originally designated CH-60S, as a replacement for the US Navy’s Boeing CH-46D Sea Knight heavy-lift helicopters in the vertical replenishment role. The helicopter was redesignated MH-60S as a result of an expansion in mission requirements to include a range of additional combat support capabilities. Retirement of the US Navy Sea Knights concluded in September 2004.
When we started the website one of the first interviews we did was with the recently retired Air Combat Command Commander, John Corley. Corley provided us with a comprehensive overview on the core foundations of an air combat force, and the challenges facing the USAF in shaping its future force.
And more recently, the current commander of Air Combat Command, General Mike Hostage provided us further insight on the evolution of airpower in an interview on October 15, 2014. This interview builds on an earlier interview with the General where he highlighted the importance on building out the fifth generation fleet and reworking the relationships of the legacy fleet with the new one.
And in that interview he highlighted the importance of crafting, shaping and building what he called the “air combat cloud.”
SLD: Historically, the evolution of aircraft has been described in terms of change in the form factor. This is really changing with the F-35. What is your thinking on the impact of this change and the introduction of software upgradeable aircraft?
Hostage: The fifth generation aircraft will enable the air combat cloud and allow me to use my legacy assets more effectively.
Many of my 4th Generation fighters can be used to extend the network of linked systems providing reinforcing fires, and I can focus on the fifth generation assets as the core nodes shaping distributed joint capabilities.
And when we come to the evolution of “next” generation systems, the form factor could stay quite similar as we evolve the capabilities within the planes or in terms of how the flying systems can interact and operate together.
Rather than thinking of 6th generation aircraft in form factor terms, we can operate the new air combat cloud and leverage that moving forward.
In the latest interview, we had a chance to talk with the General prior to the early November change of command where General “Hawk” Carlisle will take over the position. It is important to remember the core role of the command, which, in effect, is training for the future fight in the present.
The mission is as follows:
To support global implementation of national security strategy, ACC operates fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, battle-management and electronic-combat aircraft.
It also provides command, control, communications and intelligence systems, and conducts global information operations.
As a force provider and Combat Air Forces lead agent, ACC organizes, trains, equips and maintains combat-ready forces for rapid deployment and employment while ensuring strategic air defense forces are ready to meet the challenges of peacetime air sovereignty and wartime air defense.
ACC numbered air forces provide the air component to U.S. Central, Southern and Northern Commands, with Headquarters ACC serving as the air component to Joint Forces Commands. ACC also augments forces to U.S. European, Pacific and Strategic Commands.
During his time as Commander, General Hostage has seen many challenges to deal with, including the reworking of the F-22 fleet and its further integration into the force, various operational situations, such as Odyssey Dawn, and the pressure from the budget associated with sequestration on training, the core mission of ACC.
Question: The F-22s have seen their first combat mission in the form of the fight against ISIS in the Middle East. They could have been used before but have not. We have been asked by a number of analysts and journalists, was the F-22 operating a separate asset or was it integrated with the force?
General Hostage: Any platform that we operate today is integrated with the force.
We don’t operate very many single mission combat aircraft, other than maybe close air support. Even that today is a highly orchestrated affair.
I think it is kind of ludicrous for someone to think that we have a platform that doesn’t integrate with anything else.
Clearly, on a machine-to-machine basis, the F-22s can not communicate with everybody else at the level they communicate with each other.
Gen. Mike Hostage, commander of Air Combat Command, speaks to the audience on the importance of maintaining combat capabilities with minimal resources during the Air Force Association’s 2014 Air and Space Conference at the Gaylord National Convention Center in Washington, D.C., Sept. 16, 2014. Hostage is responsible for organizing, training and equipping combat-ready Airmen for peacetime and wartime defense. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Matt Davis)
But in terms of integrating the platform with other assets, that was ongoing from day one. This is largely true in terms of TTP or tactics, techniques and procedures.
With regard to the current operation, they were part of a force package.
It wasn’t like they were operating alone and by themselves, without anything else. They were part of the force package. They had a role to fill in that force mix.
They had targets to hit, but they had other roles before delivering airstrikes. Clearly, their level of situational awareness, and their ability to protect the fleet was a significant part of their mission set but they had targets just like everybody else.
I don’t see how you can be any more integrated than that.
Question: Airpower has become more important over time in terms of the range of missions, which it can conduct or enable. Yet there continues to be a public debate, which posits boots on the ground versus airpower, a distinction, which is not as sharp as folks tend to try to make it. We see airpower as both a shaper of the battlespace and a key enabler of a variety of other operations.
How do you see it?
General Hostage: The boots on the ground debate is a political, not a military debate. Nobody argues that putting boots on the ground will not give you better fidelity, better opportunities to identify the good guys and the bad guys, and put weapons on the forehead of the correct bad guy.
But it’s not a military decision whether to do that or not, it’s a political decision. I think it’s a legitimate political consideration that our national leaderships deal with. They choose whatever path they choose, you could like or dislike it, but it’s not a military choice, it’s a political choice.
We have significant and intensive ISR in the fight and am not sure it could get much more intense than we have, other than just putting more aircraft up there.
But there’s a limit to what you can do from the air just because of range and the fidelity of your sensors. You can’t see through buildings, you can’t hear whispered conversations. There’s clearly a limit to what airborne ISR can produce.
It’s pretty spectacular what it can do, and we’re doing some pretty quality work up there as we speak. We’re doing everything we can do to maximize our effect within the context in which we are operating.
If you compare the current situation with what we have done in Afghanistan one can see a difference.
In Afghanistan, we have been able to work with the rebuilt Afghan forces, the Afghan police and US and coalition forces on the ground. We overlaid that with a very intensive ISR blanket of a variety of different platforms, electronic and FMV (full motion video). We cannot do the same in the current Iraqi situation, but the Iraqi forces are in disarray.
We’re doing what we can do given the constraints of the situation.
Question: As you come to the end of tenure at ACC, what do you look back on as your key achievement with the Command?
General Hostage: Well, I’m proudest that I have an F-22 fleet that is the most capable combat platform on the battlefield. Clearly using it in Syria is not necessarily the most stringent or rigorous test. But the fact it did exactly what we needed it to do, it was flawless in what it did.
It vindicated all the effort of getting it back on track, you know, when I took over the platform that had been grounded for six months, the pilots were afraid to fly it, the maintainers were afraid to fix it. I mean, it was in a shambles. We were at risk of losing our crown jewel.
We have just about completed putting 3.1 software into the plane, which gives it a very, very significant air-to-ground capability in an Anti-Access Area Denial environment.
And it is a game changer for us.
I wish I had the numbers we should’ve had. But even 184, it is an absolutely compelling force. And I’m very happy as well with the technical capability that the F-35 has today, and that it promises to have in the future. As long as we don’t fail to deliver the right numbers of aircraft, that’s going to be an equally compelling capability when we deploy that fleet of 1,763 airplanes.
U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Joshua Bard, a crew chief with the 43rd Aircraft Maintenance Unit, straps in Gen. Mike Hostage, commander of Air Combat Command, into an F-22 Raptor for his qualification flight at Tyndall Air Force Base, Fla. (U.S. Air Force photo by Christopher Cokeing/Released)
Question: The last time we met, we learned that you had become the first ACC Commander to actually fly the F-22. We were impressed. From your perspective, how will the challenge of working the F-22s and the F-35s be worked with the legacy fleet?
Well, I was fortunate to fly the airplane, I learned what I didn’t know.
I was writing war plans in my previous job as a three star using the F-22s in a manner that was not going to get the most out of them that I could’ve because I didn’t truly understand the radical difference that the fifth gen could bring.
People focus on stealth as the determining factor or delineator of the fifth generation, it isn’t, it’s fusion. Fusion is what makes that platform so fundamentally different than anything else. And that’s why if anybody tries to tell you hey, I got a 4.5 airplane, a 4.8 airplane, don’t believe them. All that they’re talking about is RCS (Radar Cross Section).
And you’re not going to put fusion into a fourth gen airplane because their avionic suites are not set up to be a fused platform. And fusion changes how you use the platform.
What I figured out is I would tell my Raptors, I don’t want a single airplane firing a single piece of ordinance until every other fourth gen airplane is Winchester. Because the SA right now that the fifth gen has is such a leveraging capability that I want my tactics set up to where my fourth gen expend their ordinance using the SA that the fifth gen provides, the fifth gen could then mop up, and then protect everybody coming in the next wave.
It’s radically changing how we fight on the battlefield.
We are fundamentally changing the tactical battlefield. How a tactical platform operates with the fusion of fifth gen.
What the aviators do is fundamentally different in a fifth gen platform versus fourth gen in the tactical fight.
From an operational standpoint, there are some changes because there are now some things that we can do with fifth gen that I might not have been able to do before.
But the fundamental mechanism of producing air superiority, to enable ground operations, to enable deep strike, to enable all these other things; those fundamental things, those tasks are the same.
I have got the command embarked on a full-court press to get a fourth to fifth, fifth to fourth capability that will need a combat cloud to be fully empowered, but it will then allow us to fundamentally change how the fourth generation platforms fight in addition to the fifth gen.
Without that back and forth communication, machine-to-machine, the fourth gen’s going to have to do what they already do, they’ll just leverage some of the capability that fifth gen — the SA the fifth gen can provide.
If I can get that machine-to-machine, now the fourth gen platform will begin to realize some of the benefits inherently at the tactical level that the fusion engines of the fifth generation aircraft provide.
Question: It has been pointed out by analysts such as the former chief scientist of the USAF, Mark Lewis, that the weapons revolution to exploit the full capabilities of the fifth generation aircraft needs to be unleashed. How do you view the evolution of weapons working with the fleet, and where we need to go in that domain?
General Hostage: I don’t think we’re necessarily producing fifth generation weapons in addition to our fifth generation platforms. But I would say it’s more in that sequential linear fashion than leaping ahead.
In the end, it’s the effect you want to achieve; the platforms that we have now coupled with the linear growth of the weapons capability are giving us the ability to produce the effects we need to produce.
As we start to deal with an intense anti access and area denial environment, the need to do deep strikes into an area that is just totally denied, that’s going to cause us to stretch our level of effort to develop weapons that are truly new and game changing.
Question: One of the concepts we’ve played with was what we called the S Cubed, which is the tradeoffs between sensors, stealth, and speed. And how you played them off against one another. Does that make sense?
General Hostage: It does. I think an excellent portrayal of the value of looking at the interaction of those parameters is to examine Raptor versus the Lightning. A Raptor at 50-plus thousand feet at Mach 2 with its RCS has a different level of invulnerability than a Lightning at 35,000 at Mach .9 and it’s RCS.
The altitude, speed, and stealth combined in the two platforms, they give the airplanes two completely different levels of capability. The plan is to normalize the Lightning’s capability relative to the Raptor by marrying it up with six, or seven, or eight other Lightnings.
The advanced fusion of the F-35 versus the F-22 means those airplanes have an equal level or better level of invulnerability than the Raptors have, but it takes multiple airplanes to do it because of the synergistic fused attacks of their weapon systems.
And that’s the magic of the fifth gen F-35, but it takes numbers of F-35s to get that effect, that’s why I’ve been so strident on getting the full buy. Because if they whittle it down to a little tiny fleet like the Raptor, it’s not going to be compelling.
Question: The allies and partners from this standpoint are key enablers of a global F-35 fleet. And another key aspect of what you are talking about is changing the concepts of operations of airpower with the fifth generation, and to build and to design to a 21st century battlefield, not the battlefield that we had 30 years ago. For example, Mike Wynne talks about fifth gen performing a function as scouts, much like you were describing using their SA to enable the other strike aircraft.
General Hostage: Absolutely. But again, in order to have those forward scouts picking up targets, and then having fourth gens and standoff hit it, you got to have that combat cloud, that ability to move the data back and forth, and that is why we’re working so hard on that effort.
It is also important to rework how we do C2. What happens in Afghanistan happens now because the CAOC operates 1,500 miles away is able to orchestrate, integrate, and get the synergies of the different platforms out there to achieve the effects that they achieve in an uncontested battlefield.
You start to deal with airspace over Syria, airspace in the Straits of Taiwan or something where you’re significantly challenged; they’re going to go after that link if you’re relying on long-range prompts from a centralized command-and-control element.
The concept of having distributed control out there utilizing the cloud that’s populated by your fleet in place, but then the ability to continue to orchestrate is what we are after. We’re not talking about platforms that operate by themselves to execute a mission, we’re talking about air platforms that operate in synergy with others to achieve the effect, and to survive the adversary.
If you’re going to operate with other platforms and operate in synchronization, you got to have a synchronizer, that’s the distributed control element. That could be a BMC2 (Battle Management, Command and Control) platform, like a JSARS, it could be an AWACS, it could be an E2C, it could be a wing command post, it could be a ship at sea, it could be a variety of different things operating to help provide that forward distributed control capability to organize airpower in a forward battlefield and a contested battlefield.
Question: The US has had air superiority within which airpower can shift to other roles enabling sea and ground forces. This ubiquities of airpower tends to be assumed and also forgotten. How do you see this challenge?
General Hostage: Air operates way up there where nobody can see it, and I have told my Army brothers that for 60 years now they have never worried about the sound of noise overhead. You never look up, you don’t have to; you know it’s us.
U.S. Air Force Gen. Mike Hostage, commander of Air Combat Command, speaks with tactical air control party Airmen at Fort Polk, La., Jan. 24. TACP Airmen showcased their equipment they use for daily operations and when dropping bombs. (U.S. Air Force photo/Airman 1st Class Joseph A. Pagán Jr./Released)
You can’t always assume that’s going to be the case.
That has been the case for sixty years because we have made sure that it was so.
If we don’t, the battlefield changes dramatically.
The guys on the ground are going to have to start looking over their shoulders, and wondering if that noise is going to beat on them or not.
Question: One of the changes in front of us is the almost certain return of air-to-air combat. We recently published an interview with Chuck Debellevue to remind folks of what is entailed in such combat, including dealing with the threat from the ground to air insertion forces. How prepared are we for this transition from air to ground to air to air?
General Hostage: What we’re asking a young lieutenant to do in her first two or three years as a fighter pilot is so far beyond what they asked me to do in my first two to three years, it’s almost embarrassing.
The things we require of her, the things she has to be able to do, the complexity of the system that she operates are so much more taxing, and yet, they make it look easy. They’re really, really good.
I have no question that they’re going to triumph when it finally happens. I really think the Shock and Awe will be back the day that we clash with somebody in the air because our systems, and our airmen are so capable, I think they’re going to do really well.
I watch what we do at our U.S.-only Red Flags, and it is frighteningly capable. So I’m very confident. I have no doubt that they’ll triumph, if we can keep from crushing the defense mechanism that supports them with our current fiscal path.
Question: How important is the ready room and the pilot learning culture to the evolution of airpower, notably with the new airplanes coming on line?
General Hostage: Any time you put your magic piece of hardware in the hands of a young lieutenant, they’re going to figure out something new that you never thought of. And they’ll use it in ways that you never considered. And ultimately, we’ll rewrite the tactical manuals.
But that’s expected.
You want it to be a disciplined process, which is why we look for them out there at the squadron level to come up with ideas, but we do a very disciplined weapons and tactics review every year where we have the weapons officers from every tactical squadron show up at Nellis for two weeks, we have them hammer out every new thing that the people thought of, but all the experts feed on it, and pull it six ways to Sunday.
If it survives that test, then we document it, and we write it down, and we start training everybody how to do these things.
That’s how we propagate these great ideas across the force.
Because you’re right, the engine is out there in the mind of the lieutenant who has just figured out something new to do with their fancy piece of machinery drives change.
An earlier version of this article appeared on Breaking Defense.
The United States and South Korea just completed their most important series of national security meetings this year.
On October 24, the South Korean and U.S. foreign and defense ministers held their third so-called “2+2 meeting,” which was the first such ministerial since Park Geun-hye became South Korea’s president in late 2012.
The day before, visiting South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-koo and U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel held the 46th United States-Republic of Korea (U.S.-ROK) Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), while on October 22, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin E. Dempsey, and the ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Choi Yoon-hee, led the 39th U.S.-ROK Military Committee Meeting (MCM).
These meetings made several major decisions, such as deciding to maintain the current ROK-U.S. Combined Command arrangement under U.S. wartime leadership for at least the next decade as well as to expand their security partnership to address a wider range of functional and geographic issues.
However, they still need to take additional measures to counter North Korea’s aggressive posturing and its new asymmetric capabilities, including the DPRK’s possible development of a mobile nuclear-armed ICBMs.
The South Korean and U.S. ministers stressed their intent to keep their forces ready and strong.
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, who had said a few weeks earlier that the United States was prepared to reduce its military presence in South Korea if the North behaved less threatening, made sure to balance his previous remarks by emphasizing the converse—that the United States would continue its present force posture in Asia until North Korea “demonstrate[d] that it is serious about denuclearization, and we need to be certain that it is prepared to live up to its international obligations and abide by international norms of behavior.”
Hagel said that the United States would not make major reductions in the number and kind of forces stationed in South Korea.
U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, right, and South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-koo stand as a military band plays the national anthems of both countries at the Pentagon, Oct., 23, 2014. Hagel welcomed his counterpart for a meeting to discuss matters of mutual importance. DoD photo by Glenn Fawcett
In a separate Pentagon briefing on October 23, General Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander of U.S. Forces Korea, elaborated more on the North Korean threat.
After describing the DPRK regime’s main goals as securing its survival by obtaining recognition as a nuclear weapons state, Scaparrotti highlighted how the regime emphasizes the acquisition of “asymmetric capabilities” such as “several hundred ballistic missiles, one of the world’s largest chemical weapons stockpiles, a biological weapons research program, and the world’s largest special operations force, as well as an active cyber-warfare capability.”
Scaparrotti unexpectedly told one questioner that he believed that North Korea had achieved its long-sought goal of developing a miniaturized nuclear warhead to place on a long-range missile using a mobile missile launcher.
Such a weapons system is difficult to find and destroy due to its mobility but can inflict a devastating blow on whatever target is in range.
The question of whether North Korea has a long-range, nuclear-armed, mobile missile has been hotly debated within the U.S. intelligence community and among independent observers for at least a year.
Scaparrotti acknowledged that the DPRK has never displayed or tested such a system, though he noted that the Iranians and Pakistanis might have told the North Koreans how to do this.
The DPRK have surprised many observers by its rapid progress in launching a successful space satellite in December 2012 so soon after its previous launch in April of that year failed so spectacularly.
To counter these threats, Scaparrotti said that the ROK and U.S. forces have “enhanced our readiness in the areas of combined and joint command, control, communications, computers and intelligence, an alliance counter missile defense strategy, and the procurement of precision-guided munitions, ballistic missile defense systems, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms.”
The two governments have also endorsed the Obama administration’s general strategy of allocating more U.S. resources to Asia as well as the U.S. Army’s new Pacific Pathways” concept of rotating combat units to South Korea and other U.S. Asian allies and partners.
According to the SCM Communique, “the Secretary and the Minister reaffirmed that the rotational deployments of the U.S. forces with complete combat capabilities demonstrate the U.S. defense commitment to the security of the Republic of Korea and also contribute to enhancing the U.S.-ROK combined defense posture on the Peninsula.”
The Army believes that sending whole formations rather than individual soldiers enhances overall unit readiness and training.
The Army started rotating forces into South Korea in 2013, when it deployed the 4th Squadron, 6th Cavalry Regiment, based at Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington state, to South Korea nine months.
In February and then October 2014, the Army sent the 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, and later the 800-man 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, both based at from Fort Hood, Texas. The Army is planning to begin rotating brigade combat teams to the ROK in 2015.
In their October 23 SCM session, the two defense ministries, finally agreed after years of debate that conditions were not ripe to execute the planned 2015 transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the U.S.-led Combined Forces Command (CFC) to a new ROK forces-led combined defense command, yet to be named, which would still have a combined ROK-U.S. staff, a U.S. Deputy Commander, and a U.S. general officers heading the main U.S. military sub-commands.
The transfer would also return wartime OPCON of South Korean forces to ROK rather than U.S. command authority.
In May 2013, the Park administration formally requested a delay, citing the deteriorating security conditions caused by the North’s more aggressive behavior in recent years.
Although there are many examples, one need only cite the DPRK’s torpedoing of the ROK warship CHEONAN in 2010, its unprovoked cross-border artillery shelling of Yeon-pyeong Island later that year, its long-range missile launches in April and December 2012, and its third nuclear explosive test in February 2013, which was followed by months of threatening rhetoric against the United States and other countries.
Instead of setting a new date for a transfer, the two governments agreed “that the ROK will assume wartime OPCON when critical ROK and Alliance military capabilities are secured and the security environment on the Korean Peninsula and in the region is conducive to a stable OPCON transition.”
The ROK government later explained that this required meeting three core conditions:
An improvement of the regional security environment,
A strengthening of the South’s “critical” military capabilities to lead a combined defense,
And the deployment of an effective ROK system for countering DPRK missile and nuclear attacks early in a conflict.
These critical capabilities include enhancing South Korea’s command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities; acquiring precision-guided munitions and their associated delivery systems; and improving South Korea’s capabilities for maneuver and network-centered warfare.
Han said that South Korea would aim to “secure the core military capabilities” for OPCON transition by the mid-2020s, when the missile defense and preemption systems would be deployed.
Although Han later acknowledged that any transfer would probably not occur before then, he denied that his government aimed to postpone it “indefinitely.”
The high costs of the needed capabilities–estimated at 50 trillion won, or almost US$50 billion–could present a major barrier.
The KAMD and the Kill Chain would cost an estimated 17 trillion won;
The project to develop a new ROK-made next-generation KF-X fighter plane could cost approximately 18 trillion won;
Some 6 trillion won would be needed for building more warships such as Aegis destroyers and submarines;
While buying more mid- to long-term ground-to-air missiles, multiple rocket launchers, and F-35A stealth fighters would account for the remaining costs.
In the interim, the ROK and U.S. armed forces are creating a new U.S.-ROK Combined Division whose peacetime combined staff would activate it in wartime.
As a deterrent and to enhance readiness, they also decided to keep various CPC headquarters elements in the Yongsan Garrison until OPCON transition occurs and the 210 Fire Brigade in its current location north of the Han River until South Korea had completed its counter-fire reinforcement plan designed to ensure a robust ROK artillery barrage during the early phases of any conflict.
As a result, they announced they would aim to replace the current Strategic Alliance 2015 Base Plan with a new base plan at next year’s SCM meeting.
But they remained committed to the Yongsan Relocation Plan and the Land Partnership Plan as well as the associated Joint Environmental Assessment Procedure.
2014-10-27 We have travelled to Eglin, MAWTS, Fallon and elsewhere to learn from the operators and maintainers how they are working the introduction of the F-35 into combat operations.
The commander designate of the Beaufort F-35 squadron made a clear statement of the approach being taken during our visit to MAWTS, where he was the XO of the first operational F-35 squadron, Lt. Col. Greg Summa.
Question: How do you externalize your learning outside of the squadron?
Major Summa: One way is working with the USAF at the 422 Test and Evaluation squadron at Nellis.
We tend to busy here, so we send operators from the training department or former patch wearers (MAWTS-1 and TOPGUN) to work with SMEs from the Navy and USAF at conferences or simulator events.
The young senior company grade who are coming off of a tour with a Hornet or a Harrier and now wearing a Green Knights patch go into the room with the aviators at Nellis with F-16 and F-15 pilots and work through the process.
In effect, an F-35 enterprise is emerging built around a group of individuals in the profession of arms who want to make this airplane as lethal as possible.
U.S. Air Force photo by Samuel King Jr,
People come in from different backgrounds – Raptor, Eagle, Viper, Hornet or Harrier – and are focusing on the common airplane and ways to make it work more effectively in a tactical setting.
And talking to the experience of a common plane is a crucial piece of the effort.
When an F-35 pilot sits down regardless of what service he is in, he’s talking with an individual from another service on the same data point.
Let me explain what I mean.
If I sat down as an F-18 pilot, and I wanted to talk about AMRAAM performance, I was talking about it relative to how it integrated with an F-18.
The F-18 is a Boeing product, a McDonald Douglas product, totally different than F-16, which is a Lockheed product.
When I talk AMRAAM with an F-35 pilot from the Air Force, maybe one of the squadrons at Luke.
I am talking about the same exact radar, I’m talking about the same exact software — everything’s the same.
If we differ in training, it doesn’t have to do with hardware, it doesn’t have to do with software; it has to do with service approaches or carry-over from previous doctrinal employment.
Major General Silveria preparing to fly the F-35. U.S. Air Force photo by Samuel King Jr,
When an F-35A pilot talks with an F-35B pilot and they discuss what they would to see with the evolution of the aircraft they are discussing essentially the same airplane and its evolution.
It is two operators of the same airplane focused on what they want to see evolve even though they are in different services.
And the commonality point is really lost in the broader discussion of the F-35.
And when it comes to strategic impact it is the commonality associated with logistics, which will have a really significant operational impact.
The interoperability at the supply level, the logistics level, the procurement level or the maintenance training level is a key foundation for joint and coalition airpower going forward leveraging the F-35.
(Note the 422 USAF squadron has 2 F-16, 1 F-15E, 1 F-15C and 2 A-10 pilots flying the F-35A. This Fall they will get a USMC FA-18 pilot (former MAWTS Instructor) to serve on the staff.)
It is not surprising therefore that the head of the commander of the U.S. Air ForceWarfare Center at Nellis AFB would want to understand on a personal basis what the new aircraft brings to the combat mix.
General Mike Hostage, the ACC Commander, also felt the need to understand much better what the F-22 brought to the party, by learning how to fly the plane and his honesty about learning what he did not know and how that affected his thinking was underscored on our recent interview with him.
I was writing war plans in my previous job as a three star using the F-22s in a manner that was not going to get the most out of them that I could have because I did not truly understand the radical difference that the fifth gen could bring.
A recent story released by the training command at Eglin provided a good sense of the learning curve for Major General Jay Silveria, the commander of the USAF Warfare Center.
The story highlighted both how easy the aircraft is to fly and the maturity of the training process (entry and flight within 7 weeks) and the impact of the aircraft will have on combat and upon Silveria’s thinking about shaping evolving tactics and training for the USAF at Nellis, and through Nellis with Fallon and MAWTS.
The story written by Samuel King, Jr. and published on October 1, 2014 described the events involved.
Silveria, the commander of the U.S. Air ForceWarfare Center at Nellis AFB, Nevada, wrapped up his seven-week training filling approximately five hours of F-35 seat time with back-to-back sorties and a hot pit refuel.
“His qualification training was seamless. He met all his requirements on the ground and in the air to be a newly qualified F-35 pilot,” said Lt. Col. Matt Renbarger, the 58th Fighter Squadron commander and Silveria’s trainer.
Maj. Gen. Jay Silveria, U. S. Air Force Warfare Center commander, has a laugh with Airman 1st Class John Patterson, 33rd Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, after completing his final qualifying flight in the F-35A Lightning II Sept. 26 at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. Silveria became the first general officer in the Department of Defense to qualify in the fifth generation fighter. He completed his training with back-to-back flights and hot pit refueling. (U.S. Air Force photo/Samuel King Jr.)
The general was chosen to become qualified based on his leadership position at the USAFWC and pilot experience. The center he leads is responsible for current and future F-35A operational testing, tactics development and eventual advanced training exercises and weapons school.
“The Warfare Center is so involved with the development and future of this aircraft that it was important for me to see and experience this new program at the lowest tactical level and bring that knowledge base back to the higher level strategic discussions with groups like F-35 program office and Air Combat Command,” said Silveria, a 29-year veteran and F-15 pilot. “The training provides me insight into the entire spectrum of the F-35 program.”
Based on his interaction with the F-35 integrated training center and the 33rd Fighter Wing, he said the Air Force is on the right path forward.
“It is everything we want it to be as far as training our F-35 pilots and maintainers,” he said. “It’s only the beginning, but it is easy to see the wing and other services are ready to handle the increase in students as this program begins to grow quickly.” The general said while he was surprised at how easy the aircraft was to fly, the most impressive part of the F-35 is the fifth generation fusion features that will ultimately benefit the warfighter.
“The real upgrade is the integration,” said Silveria. “The fusion of all those flight components in sync with each other was the most impressive. The communication and navigation work with the flight controls which connect to the radar. They all come together to make the aircraft that much more capable.”
The data and information passing through those integrated systems is constantly being updated. Many of those updates are built at Eglin in the 513th Electronic Warfare Squadron’s F-35 reprogramming lab. The lab is managed by the 53rd Wing, which reports to the USAFWC.
“The 513th is vital to this program,” he said. “They are not only providing mission data to the Air Force, but for the other services and our allied partners. They are making world-wide impacts in that little building.”
After completing his qualifying flight, Silveria took a moment to reflect on what it was like to fly DoD’s newest fighter aircraft.
“It’s like seeing into the future,” said ACC’s former Inspector General.
“We’re still at the beginning on so many levels with the flight and employment of this aircraft and we’ll continue to improve, but even now what we’re seeing is amazing.
After flying it, I just foresee what a powerful weapon it will be.”
“I’m confident this program will develop to reach and even go beyond our high expectations. There’s an immense capability here that’s going to be amazing.”
As a final note one should reflect on this factoid:
The data and information passing through those integrated systems is constantly being updated.
Many of those updates are built at Eglin in the 513th Electronic Warfare Squadron’s F-35 reprogramming lab.
The lab is managed by the 53rd Wing, which reports to the USAFWC.
In other words, software upgradeability, fusion and the evolution of spectrum warfare are all linked in the standup of the F-35.
Recently, the German press has underscored the perilous condition of the Bundeswehr.
In part due of the Euro crisis, the government has made economies on the supply chain and spare parts with, for result, the currently atrophy of German capabilities.
Indeed, between 2008 and 2014, the defense budget has been cut around $5 billion on their budget line with the military facing a significant downward trajectory already.
As mentioned by Defense Analysis, “It is clear that a procurement budget that is sub-20% of all defense spending is pretty poor” and to do the comparison with the UK (35%) and France (30-35%)’s figures. Consequences of this long-term under-spending have been gradual but results in dropping in equipment availability. Today, moreover, support systems are not efficient.
According to a report, “out of Germany’s 109 Eurofighters, 35 aircrafts are currently undergoing external maintenance, leaving 74 aircrafts in service. However of these 74, only 42 aircrafts are currently available for missions, training, and exercises.”
Massive change is going to sweep German arms makers when big ticket weapons projects like the A400M Military Airbus will have expired. Credit: DW
These problems were recently exposed by delay supported in the deliveries of aid to the Ebola patients in West Africa, and arms and instructors in Iraqi Kurdistan, caused by serial breakdown on the C-160 transport plane fleet
Indeed, just over half C-160 Transall are in service (24 of 43), while the maintenance cost is high for this 45-years-old-plane.
More generally, a KPMG audit shed a harsh light on major Bundeswehr projects.
A list of 140 problems and risks are match in projects aimed at better equipping the German forces.
Nine projects worth $72 billion were either running late (between two-and-a-half and 10 years behind), or were delivered faulty, or over-budget.
The most emblematical failure was the cancelation of the “Euro Hawk” drone project by the former Minister of Defense Thomas de Maiziere (CDU), with a price overrun of more than $860 million.
There is nothing wrong with the unmanned aircraft; it is simply that the European Union really has no policy for the inclusion of UAVs in its airspace.
Hence, they can be no surprise that the project was in difficulty — a defense project can not be expected by itself to change European Union flight clearance policies!
The parliamentary inquiry revealed that concerns were already put into writing by the Air force in 1999.
In the end, although the German forces are not widely deployed, across the world, the Bundeswehr is currently not capable of fulfilling its NATO requirements in the event of an attack triggering the article-5-self-defense-mechanism.
“With our airborne systems we are currently below the target figures announced one year ago, defining what we would want to make available to NATO within 180 days in the case of an emergency” Defense Minister von der Leyen told. “Delay for replacement parts for our planes and the missing helicopters are the reason for this.”
These shortfalls, some of which known in the forces since a couple of months, appear at the less opportune moment, when Germany is willing to increase his role on the world stage. Indeed, Foreign Minister Walter Steinmeier stated before the UN’s annual session in this Fall, that Germany remained ready to take more responsibilities, to expand its international role.
As stated by Chancellor Angela Merkel, about this topic, “I’m the last person who does not call problems – even those of the Bundeswehr and its supplies – by their names.”
Yet the disconnect between a desire to play a broader role and the reality of the downward spiral for the tools to play that role is fundamental.
And it is clearly rooted in the dynamics of the Grand Coalition governing Germany and the role of SPD Party Chairman Sigmar Gabriel, who garnered a Super Ministry for himself in the Coalition government.
He heads a new ‘super’ ministry which combines economy and energy and will help oversee Germany’s transition to renewable energy sources.
And from this post and preparing for the next election, Gabriel has identified the defense industry and defense as a good target to build up his support on the left.
Unfortunately for the German defense industry and German defense, the forecast of the SPD being able to leverage issues to the disadvantage of the Chancellor is proving true.
As forecast in an article published in January 2014, Michael Miebech noted:
The chances are good that it will be social democrats shaping the relevant issues in the coalition.
Let´s wait and see if the new female conservative minister for defense Ursula von der Leyen is really able to implement the necessary reforms of the German military.
Let´s see how far the minister of transport Alexander Dobrindt (CSU) proceeds with his crazy idea of a car toll for foreigners.
In the meantime, the SPD can set about modernising the country:
with the 39-year-old Manuela Schwesig as minister for family affairs;
with the first state minister of Turkish origin Aydan Özuguz, responsible for integration and migration;
with the young minister for consumer protection Heiko Maas;
with Frank-Walter Steinmeier, a “real foreign minister” at last, as they say in the ministry for foreign affairs;
and, of course, with Sigmar Gabriel as the new minister for economy and energy, a position which gives him the opportunity to take centre stage and demonstrate the SPD’s economic competence.
Gabriel had linked his political destiny to this membership vote.
He took a risk Angela Merkel would have never taken.
And it paid off. Never before in his political career was he as respected and powerful. T
he party chairman now holds the uncontested strategic centre of the SPD.
From today, he looks like the natural social democratic frontrunner for the 2017 elections.
Going After German Arms Exports: A Political Strategy
Since the reunification’s 2+4 Treaty, the purchase of military hardware was dramatically reduced. Major military projects have been reduced in a number of areas: the end of the development of the MBT Leopard 2E in 1995, of the Boxer multirole armored fighting vehicle in 2006, or the Eurofighters, NH90 and Tiger helicopters’ programs.
With German defense being one of the bill payers for German reunification, German industry sought other ways to stay alive.
Facing up the fall of Bundeswehr’s orders, German industry developed an export strategy in support of their sales.
In theory, Germany’s political principles governing exports of armaments and other military equipments, since 2000 stated that weapons are not supplied to crisis areas.
A tacit agreement occurred between the government and the industry, relaxing these export rules.
This decision allowing German firms to compensate their national losses through an export strategy, bringing Germany in the 3rd -5th largest arms exporter in the world.
This move was especially applicable this last 12 years under Chancellor Angela Merkel.
Indeed, in 2010, the Chancellor approved a turnover of $2.9 billion, a tenfold increase on 2000.
In 2011, the firm Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW), producing the highly protected wheeled and tracked vehicles, e.g. Boxer, PzH 2000, Dingo, thus realized 80% of its turnover with the export.
“I am convinced that arms exports can only be an instrument of security policy, and not one of economic policy,” “employment policy reasons may not play a decisive role.” Sigmar Gabriel, credit photo Wikepedia.
And statistics show that a larger proportion of those weapons went to countries outside the European Union (EU) and NATO, with western nations cutting their military budgets in order to managing the Euro crisis, or simply by incongruous thinking that their security will be granted for the coming decades.
Conversely, other international markets continued to grow, especially in the Middle East and the Maghreb.
Eventually in 2013, the German Federal government has authorized exports in an amount of $7.3 billion, with 62% outside EU-NATO, especially toward Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Algeria.
For example. Algeria has ordered in these recent years, around $12.5 billion for military equipment like two Meko A200 frigates, SUVs, trucks. Rheinmetall was thus recently allowed to deliver an armored vehicle assembly plant for Fuchs 2 armored vehicles. Last year Algeria purchased about $1 billion worth of gears from Germany
With Sigmar Gabriel as the Energy and Economy Minister, the authorizations for arms exports now become a political football.
Chairman of the SPD and coalition’s partner to Chancellor Merkel’s CDU/CSU as Vice-Chancellor, Sigmar Gabriel aims to win 2017 federal elections. For this purpose he should gather a strong coalition, especially with the Green party, for hoping to defeat the CDU/CSU, like in 1998.
His political desire to strengthens his support from the Left, could explain his currently stance about German armament export.
“Gabriel and the SPD expressed their position so clearly against the Leopard tank exports in 2011 and 2012, that they could no longer withdraw themselves from that position,” said Jürgen Grässlin, chairman of an anti-weapons association.
“If they did, they’d face serious criticism from our campaign ‘Stop the Weapons Trade’ – the accusation: deceiving the voters!”
Gabriel has announced he would tighten rules on arms exports, rejecting requests for the export of defense hardware to countries outside EU and NATO.
Explaining that the government must ensure the 2000’s law whose prevent that German weapons don’t end up in conflicts around the world.
As an advocate of a strict interpretation of the law which will have the clear effect of significantly reducing German arms exports, Gabriel did not want “new debates, new instructions, no round table or clarification”, just the respect of the letter of the law in this matter.
“I agree with Helmut Schmitt: it’s a shame that Germany was among the most largest arms exporter in the world.”
These declarations and stance directly defy the Chancellor Merkel who, in the previous years, championed arms exports, but also made a major evolution in the German foreign policy by supplying arms to Kurds, a “sea change” as analyzed by a German defense industrialist.
Indeed, arms exports are clearly part of comprehensive foreign policy.
They are part of working with countries which are allies and who are not, where the national interest is and where it could be endangered.
For CDU parliamentary Joachim Pfeiffer, “Weapons exports are a legitimate and necessary instrument of foreign and security policy,” he told the parliament, adding that a radical change of course, as proposed by the Greens and the Left, would endanger Germany’s combat capabilities and lead to dependence on foreign military technology.
Yet earlier this month, the German magazine Der Spiegel indicated that even this policy does not appease the left who seek more reductions from German arms industry.
According to the article Gabriel approved $1.6 billion worth of arms exports at the beginning of his term, from January to the end of April.
Although the number of permits decreased in comparison to the same period last year by around a quarter, authorizations for exports to countries outside EU/NATO jumped from $164 million to $822 million (51 to 63.5 percent of the total). The top ten buyers of German weapons included Singapore, Brunei, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria, all of which have been accused of major rights violations by human rights organizations.
In the aftermath of this article, Left Party parliamentarian, Jan van Aken, criticized Gabriel saying, “In public Gabriel is always playing the critic of military exports, but in actuality he does exactly the opposite.”
The Greens’ co-leader Anton Hofreiter also noted that the policy shift did not go far enough.
“The much heralded change of course by Gabriel is nothing more than hot air,” while Mathias John, an armaments expert for Amnesty International, told “that human rights are not the German government’s decisive criterion for the export of military equipment.”
From Minister of Employment to Eliminating Critical Jobs: A Super Ministry in Operation
Beyond the foreign policy issues, a more restrictive policy jeopardizes the existence of the armament industry in Germany, a strategic and economic asset for the country.
Given the downturn in Germany buying weapons for its own forces, exports are vital.
Indeed, for Henrik Heidenkamp, research fellow for the defense industries program at the Royal United Services Institute, “It is crucial because only a commercially viable defense industry can deliver functioning equipment to the armed forces in order to sustain the national security effort. That’s an argument that is rarely made in the German debate – in the UK for example it’s the dominating narrative.”
The Federation of German Security & Defense Industries, representing the interests of 40 German companies, argued that every delay to provide components to their clients risked discrediting the Germany as reliable partner.
Germany is the world’s third-largest exporter of arms, like this bazooka destined for northern Iraq, being packed up at a German military base on Thursday. The country’s economy minister has held up hundreds of weapons exports since he took office in December, angering many in the defense industry. Credit: NPR
For the manufacturers, the minister’s plan aims to ruin an entire industry and a profitable business model.
“If it reduces or freezes its defense budget continuously while at the same time limiting export opportunities, the result for the industry will be death from starvation,” because orders from the Bundeswehr are not enough to keep the industry afloat.
For the CDU’s deputy Michael Fuchs, the decision of Gabriel is catastrophic.
As he declared in the Bild am Sonntag, “We have to be clear what this means for the German arms industry, if the German arms firms can no longer export outside the NATO alliance, there will be no arms industry in Germany anymore.
There is a big danger.”
But those arguments, together with the question of job loss, seem not to be relevant for the Minister.
Indeed, while the unionists explained in a letter that the minister’s decisions put directly 100,000 jobs at risk, 320,000 jobs with suppliers and various service providers the Minister answered, “I am convinced that arms exports can only be an instrument of security policy, and not one of economic policy,” “employment policy reasons may not play a decisive role.”
Then one could ask a simple question: Why is the Super Minister weighing in at all on arms exports, because by his own statement it is a security policy over which he has no formal authority?
The arguments of Gabriel joined with those of the Jan van Aken when he stated that jobs shouldn’t play in the equation, “
As a worker, you should consider if you really want to work at building instruments of murder.”
Adding, “You can’t put jobs over the lives of people, that is not okay.”
It is atypical to see a Minister of Industry fighting not for preserving and creating jobs, but for destroying them and becoming the Ministry of De-Industrialization.
This is more so given he clearly stated before the last election that the stable economic situation was more important for German people than the social democratic ideal of justice.
And this controversy is unfolding when the economics forecast for German growth are turning pessimistic, the country might be in a shallow recession in 2015.
From Swords to Plowshares and Europeanization as Alternatives for German Industry?
But not to worry: Sigmar Gabriel has two solutions to the challenge — the conversion of defense industry to civilian sector and a pan-European defense industry.
One could ask whether the Minister has noted changes in the neighborhood this summer?
The first solution will be “the promotion of diversification strategies in the civilian sector” by altering the range and the scope of their products.
“We will have to discuss about what and how we can contribute to promote the creation of highly advanced spin-offs in civil sector from the classic defense industry, in order to increase the scope of the companies,” Gabriel said.
But go from main battle tank to wind turbine production is not just a question of state forms or political goodwill.
Is building wind turbines instead of battle tanks really a viable alternative? Credit: DW
It is unclear, and the Minister doesn’t provide details, how to convert weapon production units to make products for the civil market in a short while.
“To manufacture tractors instead of armored vehicles in a market where tractors are already being produced is not easy,” said Hans-Peter Bartels, chairman of the defense committee in the German parliament.
Conversion does not secure defense technology jobs, Bartels told, pointing out that there haven’t been any major instances of successful defense conversion over the past 25 years.
The second prospect is related to the European cooperation, Sigmar Gabriel calling in August “to perform now what the industry should have done 15 years ago”
Indeed, Europeanization cannot be done to the detriment of the German “high restrictive standards”
One could remind the Minister that was a core reason, EADS emerged and in the time frame he mentioned, and his plan for supporting the new European products coming out of the pipeline?
The Government has on its plate a core example – the A400M which there are clear forces hoping to slow down this buy.
In effect, accelerating the A400M buy could demonstrate Gabriel’s commitment to Europeanization of arms buys.
And the reality is that French-German cooperation, except for Airbus Group – ex-EADS Group – often suffered major setbacks for political reasons:
Thales with Atlas Elektronik (sonars, sensors, and maritime command system), MBDA with BGT (missiles);
EADS with Thales in 2004 and 2006;
or the constantly postponed “Naval Airbus” between DCNS and TKMS.
Does Europeanization Include France?
An ongoing example of these difficulties is the KMW-Nexter initiative to create a 50-50 joint holding company, temporary named “Newco”.
According to Defense News, the company would have annual sales of almost $2.68 billion, and more than 6,000 employees.
Headquartered in the Netherlands, the company would have two CEOs, elected by the board of directors.
But beyond legal and customary regulation approvals and the privatization of Nexter, currently a French state-owned firm, the real problems could be directly or indirectly… Sigmar Gabriel.
Indeed, the German Minister clearly took a stand for the Germans option, arguing for a cooperation between KMW and Rheinmetall rather than Nexter.
And through the exports authorizations, Sigmar Gabriel owns a powerful lever to slow the merger of a French and German firm.
Already, the exports of KMW to Qatar (62 MBT Leopard 2 and 24 self-propelled howitzer PzH 2000 for $2.4 billion) are in the limbo, under review in the Ministry of Industry.
And a rejection of the authorization will degrade the value of the group and in fine the share price, decisive element in the future joint company.
The more restrictive the restrictions are, the lower the incentives will be for the merger.
Indirectly, the new orientation of the German political impacts French military industry.
It is the case for MBDA in Qatar for a sale of the Milan ER anti-tank missile, the firing posts are produced in Germany;
in Lebanon, where the French Renault Truck Defense is currently blocked in the completion of the contract for the VAB Mark 3;
and soon, Airbus Helicopter could be suffer the same situation, Berlin is thinking about the sale of 16 helicopters (10 Fennec and 6 Cougar) to Uzbekistan for $230 million.
This is a Europeanization when it is convenient policy rather than a European defense industry able to operate normally policy.
Beyond weakening the economical link between the two countries, these measures are against the Debre-Schmidt agreement (1971-72).
Still in force, the treaty is intended to define the rules for exporting weapons built in cooperation.
Article 2 states that “neither of the two governments will stop the other to export […] armament resulting from the cooperation. Each of the two governments plight to deliver with no delay […] exports authorizations necessary for the provision of the components.”
Refusals are framed, an export vetoed by one of the country, obligates this state who must let his partner to produce by his own the missing device.
But rather than put its veto, and hence transfers technologies to French industry, Germany lets time running, as described above.
And again if a “European” option is seen as an alternative, all of these developments provide a clear counter to the claim of the commitment to go down the European route.
This pattern damages the France-Germany relationship relation in this domain, whereas it must be the driving force between the two states.
As Thomas Enders, CEO of Airbus Group deplored, “While there is continual talk about more cooperation and consolidation in the military European industry, decades of Franco-German’s cooperation are under attack.”
Julien Canin has received a French law degree and a master’s degree from the Universite Libre de Bruxelles (Belgium).
He has worked with both the French Political Party UMP on foreign and defense issues and with the Ministry of Defense recently at the Eurosatory conference.