Expeditionary Arresting Gear System Lift During WTI-1-24

12/13/2023

U.S. Marines with Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, load a Marine Corps Expeditionary Arresting Gear System inside a KC-130J Hercules during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 1-24 at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, Oct. 2, 2023.

WTI is an advanced, graduate-level course for selected pilots and enlisted aircrew providing standardized advanced tactical training and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.

10.02.2023

Video by Lance Cpl. Emily Hazelbaker

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1

Crafting a Kill Web Force: The Role of Autonomous Systems

12/12/2023

By Robbin Laird

In a visit to Quantico, I had a chance to talk with LtGen Karsten Heckl, who serves as the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration.

I first met him when he was Assistant Deputy Commandant for Aviation, HQMC Aviation Department. I visited him when he was Commander of 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, and I interviewed him when he commanded the First Marine Expeditionary Force.

In this visit, we had a chance to focus on the evolution of the USMC within the broader context of the joint force, and discussed in particular the coming of new generation of autonomous systems and how they fitted in or enabled the kind of force transition which the USMC is engaged in.

We started with force transition and then discussed autonomous systems and their contribution to that transition. In other words, what kind of con-ops do you want to pursue and how do the new autonomous systems support those con-ops?

It was particularly interesting to have this conversation with Heckl at this time for I had just returned from my most recent visit to MAWTS-1 where the focus is upon “the physics of combat” in force transition, to use the words of LtGen (Retired) Steve Rudder.

We started by the focus which I found at MAWTS-1 upon how to enhance the survivability and lethality of the force through signature management. This is what I wrote after my meeting in early November 2023 with Major John Edwards, the Spectrum Warfare Department Head at MAWTS-1.

“In my meetings with PACFLEET this past April, a key aspect of the challenge facing the force is clearly spectrum warfare or signature management and deception.

“My takeaway from discussions at PACFLEET was very clear. Success for distributed maritime operations requires not only assured command and control but the tissue of ISR systems enabling distributed fleet operations and adding the key element of deception through various counter-ISR systems as well.

“In effect, fleet distribution built on a kill web effects infrastructure is being combined with what me be called a wake-a-mole operational capability. You can’t target me, if you can’t find me.

“As one key Navy leader put it to me: ‘Counter-ISR is the number one priority for me, to deny the adversary with to high confidence in his targeting capabilities. I need to deceive them and to make a needle look like a needle in a haystack of needles. It is important to have the capability to look like a black hole in the middle of nothing.’

“MAWTS-1 with its work on FARPs, force distribution, new ways to do C2 such as from systems operating out of the back of Ospreys, signature management and deception is clearly working along the same lines as PACFLEET.

“I had a chance to discuss this approach with Major John Edwards, the Spectrum Warfare Department Head, when visiting MAWTS-1 in November 2023. Edwards highlighted their work in preparing the force for the spectrum management challenges they experience and will experience within a contested electronic warfare environment.

“Their focus is upon ramping up the “red” threat against blue to prepare the force for the experience they have when operating in a contested environment.

“They focus on showing the operational elements of the force the kind of spectrum signature they are creating when they operate to better understand the nature of spectrum warfare and how that affects their lethality and survivability in operations. And by knowing that one can create ways to think about signature deception as well as pointed out by PACFLEET.”

It is not surprising then that LtGen Heckl emphasized the same points as the PACFLEET commander or the Spectrum Warfare Head at MAWTS-1.

LtGen Heckl argued: “It is about survivability and a key to being able to do that is signature management. We are keenly focused on reduced electronic magnetic signature management in how we think about deployment of the force and doing so with an eye to how the deployed force can integrate sensors with strike.

“It really is about a kill web in which the real value proposition is reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance reducing your vulnerabilities and exposing those of the adversary and enabling effective strike.”

It is in this context that Heckl discussed autonomous systems. “We are focusing on a broad range of autonomous systems capabilities. They aid significantly in signature management. If they are unmanned, you don’t have the weight or equipment necessary for a man onboard whether it be a ship or an airborne system. It means as well you can get better value out of your manned aviation assets or your ships.

“With regard to our lift assets – C-130s, CH-53s, or Ospreys – they can carry the most essential elements to an EABO but can be supplemented by a variety of autonomous systems which reduces the overall signature of the force and allows for enhanced flexibility of the force.”

Logistics in LtGen Heckl’s view is the pacing function for a distributed force. How to sustain a distributed force? This will be a combination of the air and sea manned assets as well various autonomous systems. He highlighted work being done for the USMC to build unmanned surface vessels to carry logistics to the point of need.

And the logistics challenge will be reduced by various ways to use autonomous systems within the kill web. He cited the opportunity to used UUVs carrying weapons able to operate virtually undetected and gain access to the sensor network to provide weapons support to deployed Marines as an example of reducing the need to deliver weapons directly to those Marines. By reducing the overall logistics burden, the Marines can focus on the use of their manned assets in a more focused manner.

In this context, it is important to realize how amphibious ships can be rethought in terms of a mothership functionality. The extant fleet of amphibious or expeditionary sea bases have flexible flight decks for mix and match rotorcraft, tiltrotor craft, decks from which to lower boats to the water, or well decks to launch from the water level, or flight decks in the case of LHAs combat aircraft.

This mix and match capability to fit the mission is a core quality of these ships. With the coming of maritime autonomous systems, USVs or UUVs can be launched with the payload appropriate to the mission, ISR surveillance, underwater detection, UAVs launched as weapons from USVs, or torpedoes or maritime strike weapons from the USVs or in the case of UUVs, torpedoes.

As such the fleet can act as picket ships preparing the way for the arrival of carrier strike fleet or surface warfare action group and participate with them in providing a combat cluster or matrix of operational depth and reach which the carrier strike fleet or surface warfare action group would not have by itself.

We closed by LtGen Heckl highlighting the importance of building out the global positioning network.

“Our GPN has been an effort now for about a year and a half. One can imagine every EABO being a potential logistics node and our ability to use a Navy 28-foot USV that draws maybe two feet of water is part of the picture. We are thinking in terms of a globally positioned network, which will include maritime pre-positioning, but the days of ships pulling pier side and depositing an iron mountain of supplies ashore are a thing of the past.”

It is in this force transformation process that LtGen Heckl sees autonomous systems playing a key role. We discussed another example which resonated with the challenges facing the Australians, namely, how to provide for enhanced air-enabled striking power without having to rely on fixed bases?

Here LtGen Heckl highlighted the Marine Corps’ work with the XQ-58 Valkyrie. “It is does not need a base. It can be launched from the back of the truck. It has good range and can carry a lot of payload. And its fully autonomous.

“The reason it has decent range and can carry a decent payload is that it is unmanned. Not only does human weight not come into play but also all the equipment which humans require for operating an air asset – environmental control systems for example. I think we are at the boundary or the edge of being able to incorporate autonomous systems into our force transformation.”

Featured Photo: Lt. Gen. Karsten S. Heckl gives remarks during the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory change of command ceremony at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, June 24, 2022. US Marine Corps Photo.

The Enterprise Requirements of an Australian Multi-Domain Strike Capability

On 27 September 2023, the second Williams Foundation seminar for the year was held at the National Gallery in Canberra. The second provided a case study of building blocks for enhanced deterrent capabilities, namely shaping a multi-domain strike enterprise for the ADF and the support structure for so doing.

At the outset of the Seminar, Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown, the Williams Foundation Chairman, underscored the purpose and focus of the seminar: “Simply new weapons like Tomahawk will not by themselves give Australia a credible strike enterprise. All those weapons do not give you a long-range strike capability. We are focused on the requirements to build a multi-domain enterprise beyond the question of the specific weapons.”

This report presents the assessments of the ADF, PACAF, the head of the RAF, a number of Australian analysts and strategists.

Refocusing the Force: MAWTS-1 Works on Ways Ahead

By Robbin Laird

During my visit to MAWTS-1 in November 2023, I had a chance several times to talk with the CO of the command, Col Eric Purcell, about the evolution of the three WTIs he has been in charge of since he took command.

Because I had visited in 2020, when MAWTS began to work on the shift in the USMC associated with the Commandant’s guidance which has been embodied in Force Design 2030, it was quite interesting to see how MAWTS has translated that into a force that has to fight tonight.

It is not about wargaming: it is about training for combat in today’s world. It is not about imaging new weapons that someday the Marines might have or working with a joint force of the future imagined by strategic planners, it is about engaging in conflict anywhere in the world when called upon to do so.

Thinking about a world with multi-polar authoritarian players does tend to focus your mind when you have to train to fight a variety of adversaries. And that is where we started our interview. Col Purcell noted that one of the major changes at the command is focusing attention on the developing capabilities of the kind of adversaries the Marines have to face.

Purcell noted that the Marines who come to the WTIs know learn about three categories of threats: those posed by Chinese forces; those posed by Russian forces; and those posed within the context of contingency operations.

The experience of the land wars and the historical legacy of fighting against Soviet equipment does not prepare today’s Marines for the conflicts in which they are engaged or likely to have to deal with. It is important to re-shape the curriculum to reflect real world dynamic threats, and Purcell noted that they were focused on doing so.

But major challenges face the Marines in doing so, and MAWTS-1 as the core warfighting training center which standardizes operational preparation needs to adapt its training approach to the evolving threat envelope.

One change which Col Purcell underscored was the need to re-focus on tac air and assault support integration. He noted that in the land wars, the two forces tended to operate somewhat in different spheres, but going forward integration was key.

In part, this is due to the range and speed requirements for a Marine Corps insertion force and the opportunity to leverage the advantages which as F-35/Osprey force provides to the USMC along with the arrival of a new generation heavy lift asset, the CH-53K.

But this also due to the changes within the assault force itself, as the Osprey adds new capabilities carried in the back of the aircraft, or its ability to contribute to new missions for the Marines such as ASW support.

A key focus of attention has been moving beyond the training to establish FARP/EABOs, to working on the more important point – what effect are you trying to create through FARP/EABOs.

With current capabilities, the Marines can create EABOs to provide for sensing capabilities, support for the transition of air elements, C2 node creation and support, but until a new generation of weapons show up, limited ability to provide for fires within a transitory EABO.

Col Purcell indicated that a primary focus within FINEX at the end of the course is bringing the different force elements together to test out their capabilities to deal with an integrated scenario.

Two scenarios were notable in our discussion.

The first was working maritime strike and support. Here the Marines would operate from Camp Pendleton with San Clemente being an enemy location which was being reinforced by red combat ships coming from the north. The U.S. Navy has provided ships for this purpose. Tac air provides the main means for interdiction of enemy shipping but simulate longer range strikes from Pendleton is involved as well.

A key capability of fifth generation aircraft is their ability to manage third party targeting which is a capability which the Marines will leverage going forward in terms of tapping into land-based strike, and one might assume this could by Army or Marine Corps ground strike capabilities.

Under the strike force, a TRAP force enabled by Ospreys operates and in FINEX, the Marines operated such a force and exercised it with the Navy and the USCG.

When the interdiction of the surface fleet threat was attenuated, the Marines shifted their attention to provide ASW support to the Navy, largely by providing sonobuoy deployment support.

A second key approach will be emphasized in next year’s spring WTI.

Here the integration of TACAIR  and assault support will be the focus of attention against an appropriate scenario for using such a force. With the evolution of tac air capabilities supplemented with data provided from Reapers and other ISR sources, and the evolution of the payloads carried by the assault force, a variety of scenarios can be tested in the next WTI and future WTIs.

A major challenge though facing the USMC is the dynamic changes within the joint force itself. How does the USMC support the joint force if the Navy is in the thrust of significant change sorting through what they mean by distributed maritime operations? How does the USMC support the USAF if that force is in the process of sorting out what Agile Combat Employment means in practice?

I would add that the fires challenge is a key one.

Who is the fires authority in a maritime strike scenario? A USAF air wing? A Navy surface action group?

Until this is sorted out land-based weapons whether operated by the Army or the USMC cannot have the desired effect. And having an effective joint force rests on having the fires authority challenge met and managed.

As Col Pursell concluded with this dynamic area of joint force engagement: “Typically, we refer to Target Engagement Authority abbreviated to TEA.

“In land wars between the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) and the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) we typically have this ironed out.

“But it has been such a long time since we have done true Joint Naval engagements that the process for engaging maritime targets and who exactly is the Target Engagement Authority (TEA) or can be the TEA is not as tried and true as it is for land engagements.”

Featured Photo: Col Purcell as seen in the end of course video from WTI-1-24. Credit: USMC

An Update on MAWTS-1: 2023

Opening the Aperture on Force Integration

12/11/2023

By Robbin Laird

The strategic shift from the priority on the land wars to dealing with a world of multi-polar authoritarians and a diversity of contingency operations requires significant operational change in the force.

Because MAWTS-1 is focused on standardized training for the operational force, they have an open aperture to be able to incorporate operational change but not from briefing slides and wargames, with the force that the Marines that is ready to fight tonight.

As the end of course video for WTI-1-24 opens with: “It is not a question of if the Marine Corps will go into combat, it is only a question of when.”

With this perspective the future is now but done with a perspective to be able to add real capabilities wherever the Marines can find them. As one former CO of MAWTS-1 told us: “The Marines are the ultimate scavengers.”

My discussion during the November 2023 visit with Major Green who is a UH-1 Yankee pilot and the Division Head of the Tactical Air Control Party Department. He explained that when he first came to MAWTS, the department was called the Tactical Air Control Department.

But this name did not reflect the reality of the personnel trained by the department. Roughly of the personnel involved are pilots and after training at MAWTS-1, the go back to their squad as pilots. The other half are enlisted Marines who serve as JTACs or Joint Tactical Air Controllers.

As we talked, it was clear that the experience of the land wars whereby JTACS provided Close Air Support, although a key function, was changing as the USMC focused on maritime operations and deep interdiction missions.

How to do this shift successfully is a work in progress, but the role of the ground controllers is changing as historically they have not had access to Link-16 which is a key system for air integration.

The C3 department has access to a variety of means to integrate data, but the challenge now is to push an ability to do similar integration to the ground air controller.

Or put in other words, legacy CAS was the focus of the ground air controller: their role now was to work as an integrative element between the GCE being distributed in the battlespace with the air element which can provide sensing, strike, and communication links for the distributed GCE.

Major Green indicated that there was an increasing focus on new simulation capability for training at MAWTS-1. The legacy systems are too limited to meet the demands for training the force for districted and deep strike operations.

With new prototype simulation capabilities in their hands, Greene saw the future development of LVC as an important tool in shaping a way ahead to train to new concepts of operations as well.

He noted that in his time at MAWTS-1 (nearly three years), there has been enhanced focus of attention on the maritime domain and ways the USMC operates in that domain. He noted that there was “more of a maritime flavor to our training efforts.”

In short, the USMC is working on the “physics” of the execution of actual FARPs/EABOs in the evolving combat environment, to use LtGen (Retired) Rudder’s words.

And this obviously affects the role of the tactical air commander in linking together the air and the ground elements going forward.

Featured graphic: A graphic illustration for Tactical Air Control Party, Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One who assisted in close air support exercises during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 1-24, at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, Oct. 25, 2023. U.S. Marine Corps graphic illustration by Lance Cpl. Emily Hazelbaker.

Devil Ray and Switchblade Combine to Create New Strike Capability at Sea

12/08/2023

In an article by John Trevithick published on November 2, 2023, the author highlighted the weapons/platform combination represented by the Devil Ray USV with the Switchblade UAV:

“The U.S. Navy drone speedboat armed with Switchblade 300 loitering munitions was able to successfully destroy multiple mock targets at sea during a recent test. A combination like this could be useful in various contexts, including providing close-in protection against swarms of small crewed and uncrewed boats. This also underscores the Navy’s interest, as well as that of the U.S. Marine Corps, in various tiers of armed drone boats capable of carrying out defensive and offensive missions.

“The test involving the Switchblade-armed MARTAC Devil Ray T38 uncrewed surface vessel (USV) took place in the Persian Gulf last week. This was part of a large exercise, nicknamed Digital Talon, led by the Navy’s Task Force 59. Established in 2021, Task Force 59 is a testbed unit that is tasked with experimenting with the integration of new uncrewed and artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities into day-to-day naval operations across the Middle East. It also offers the Navy a means to explore how it might operationalize those technologies more broadly.”

Further details were highlighted by an article published by NREF on November 7, 2023:

“Special Operations Forces Central Command, the U.S. military’s top special operations command in the Middle East, also helped coordinate this test. The Switchblade 300 has been in active use by American special operators for years now. For this particular test, the T38 was equipped with a small, portable six-round launcher loaded with Switchblade 300s, which the U.S. military officially calls the Lethal Miniature Aerial Missile System (LMAMS). Pictures and video from the test do show that the USV was equipped with what appears to be a SpaceX Starlink satellite communications antenna, as well as a small commercial navigation radar and electro-optical/infrared camera turrets.”

And in a story by Petty Officer 2nd Class Jacob Vernier, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command / U.S. 5th Fleet, published on November 29, 2023, the pairing of the Devil Ray with Switchblade was highlighted as follows:

“U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) continues advancing lethality at sea, utilizing the Freedom-class littoral combat ship USS Indianapolis (LCS 17) as a staging base and command center for a host of unmanned systems during live weapons firing exercises in the international waters of the central Arabian Gulf, Nov. 27.

“Digital Talon 2.0, the second exercise of its type in as many months, showcased “manned-unmanned teaming” by meshing together Indianapolis, three unmanned surface vehicles, and an unmanned aerial vehicle to create a single common operating picture and what is known as a “mesh network” providing targeting data to all stations taking part in the exercise.

“NAVCENT’s Task Force 59 – the Navy’s first Unmanned and Artificial Intelligence Task Force – partnered with Indianapolis to demonstrate the ability of unmanned platforms to pair with traditionally crewed ships. The manned and unmanned teams identified, targeted, engaged and then destroyed simulated hostile forces at sea, represented through the use of a target boat.

“This second iteration of Digital Talon continues building on our earlier successes,” said Capt. Colin Corridan, TF-59 commodore. “We keep progressing toward fulfilling NAVCENT’s priorities of deterrence and de-escalation by demonstrating live firing from a tight ‘manned-unmanned teaming’ model.”

“In multiple firing events, a T-38 Devil Ray unmanned surface vessel (USV), equipped with a Lethal Miniature Aerial Missile System, and successfully scored direct hits on the target boat each time. As with the previous Digital Talon exercise, a human operator ashore at TF-59’s Robotics Operations Center made the engagement decisions.

“The unmanned vehicles taking part in the exercise included a Flexrotor unmanned aerial vehicle; an Arabian Fox MAST-13 USV; and an additional T-38 Devil Ray USV.

“Digital Talon 2.0 took a significant step forward, Corridan said, noting the results from this event, “have proven these unmanned platforms paired with our manned combat ships can enhance fleet lethality. In doing so, we are strengthening regional maritime security and enhancing deterrence against malign activity.”

Expanding the Assault Support Mission to a Broader Mission Set

By Robbin Laird

During my November 2023 visit to MAWTS-1, I had a chance to meet with Maj Nicholas Peters to discuss the activities of the assault mission training part of MAWTS-1. Maj Peters is the Assault Support Department Head.

While the traditional image of assault support remains a key one – transporting Marines to a place of embarkation and ready to fight – there is growing emphasis on longer range missions and on broadening the mission set.

The Osprey and KC-130 in SP-MAGTF operated at distance. This experience is being folded into training for long range missions in the Pacific. The other members of the assault force – the rotorcraft including heavy lift – are not built for the range and speed of a combined KC-130J-Osprey mission set.

But working the broader assault package in areas of interest remains a key bread and butter capability of the USMC, and continued press of events such as the Middle East certainly reminds one of the necessities of ensuring that the Marines are range for a spectrum of operations, not just somebody’s pet rock.

Earlier this year, I interviewed Col Marvel who identified a range of adaptations which the Osprey is currently going through to support the joint force.

Col Marvel underscored that expanding the mission set for the Navy’s CMV-22B was certainly possible but was not in his domain of responsibility. But the USMC is clearly expanding the payloads carried by the MV-22B which supports distributed operations, and if the three services which operate the aircraft found ways to expand their ability to cross-service each other’s aircraft, they would be able to enhance such operations.

As Col Marvel put it: “The Osprey provides unique speed and range combinations with an aircraft which can land vertically. It is a very flexible aircraft which could be described as a mission-kitable aircraft. The Osprey has big hollow space in the rear of the aircraft that can hold a variety of mission kits dependent on the mission which you want the aircraft to support.”

He emphasized that with a variety of roll-on roll-off capabilities with different payloads.

“We can add the specialists in the use of a particular payload along with the payload itself to operate that payload, whether kinetic or non-kinetic, whether it is a passive or active sensor payload. We need to stop thinking about having to put the command of such payloads under the glass in the cockpit and control those payloads with a tablet.”

Maj Peters indicated that at MAWTS-1 they have expanded the mission sets for their Ospreys to embrace C2 and ASW efforts. With regard to the C2, roll on roll of capability can provide for a variety of joint force enablement and support missions. With regard to ASW, the Osprey can deploy sonobuoys in support of the Navy’s ASW mission as well, and they have exercised such capability at MAWTS-1.

A key aspect of the new emphasis for Osprey training being performed at MAWTS-1 is the TRAP mission for the Navy. Obviously, there have events in the past such as the pilot rescue in Libya which highlighted how the speed and range of the Osprey provides unique TRAP mission capabilities.

But now with the focus on Indo-PACOM and the concern for loss of aircraft in a contested operation, it is important for the U.S. Navy to rely on the speed and range of the Osprey to support the TRAP mission. Here the Osprey community is working hoisting methods to provide for the mission, and this has become part of the training conducted by the Assault Support Department.

The Osprey is flown by the USAF and Navy as well, which leads to a kind of built in joint integration in terms of a common operator pool across the services. Peters indicated that a USAF Osprey pilot was an instructor in his department and taught the students how the USAF using its Ospreys and operated them differently from the USMC.

And my visits to North Island with the CMV-22B squadrons certainly underscores that with the Navy operating their version of the Osprey, there are significant opportunities for working maritime integration at a very fundamental support and assault level as well.

The photos are from Maj Peters time at VMM-265.

The Replicator Project: In Search of a Con-Ops and a Manufacturing Base

12/06/2023

By Robbin Laird

In August 2023, Deputy Secretary of Defense Hicks announced a new “replicator” project or initiative.

As she said in her speech:

“At DoD, we’ve already been investing in attritable autonomous systems — across the military services, DIU, the Strategic Capabilities Office, and the combatant commands themselves — and in multiple domains: self-piloting ships, uncrewed aircraft, and more.

“It’s clear they aren’t just lower-cost. They can be produced closer to the tactical edge. They can be used consistent with our principles of mission command, where we empower the lowest-possible echelons to innovate and succeed in battle. And they can serve as resilient, distributed systems, even if bandwidth is limited, intermittent, degraded or denied.

“So now is the time to take all-domain, attritable autonomy to the next level: to produce and deliver capabilities to warfighters at the volume and velocity required to deter aggression, or win if we’re forced to fight.

“Since we need to break through barriers and catalyze change with urgency, we’ve set a big goal for Replicator: to field attritable autonomous systems at scale of multiple thousands, in multiple domains, within the next 18-to-24 months.

“And the ‘replication’ won’t just be happening from a production standpoint. We’ll also aim to replicate and inculcate how we will achieve this goal, so we can scale what’s relevant in the future again and again and again.

“Easier said than done? You bet. But we’re gonna to do it.”

But to “do it,” and provide a credible military capability, one needs to evolve con-ops, not just buy stuff.

And this is a major question: how does the military operate across the spectrum of warfare using new autonomous systems?

Remember, the UAVs used largely to date are remotely piloted systems and the U.S. Navy has experimented but not deployed such systems.

As I wrote earlier: “The new generation autonomous UAVs or the new smaller maritime autonomous systems do not have to be designed to be integrated with the combat systems of the extant manned fleet. That misses the point.

“As Commodore Kavanagh of the Royal Australian Navy has put it: “They don’t replace platforms; they complement the integrated force. They are complimentary to that force in that they interface rather than being fully integrated with the current force elements.”

“Second, they are part of a kill web, not an integrated kill chain. They can create a combat cluster rather than part of an integrated task force. You give them specific missions and they perform what that limited mission might be. Their job is fully focused on a specific mission thread not replacing a multi-mission manned system.

“Put another way, you change the con-ops of the fleet from a task force manned scoped fleet designed for multi-mission operations to one in which manned fleet assets have at their disposal clusters of autonomous systems to which one can delegate a specific mission which the manned assets does now not have to perform.

“This is not manned-unmanned teaming – this is delegation of a mission to a wolfpack of smaller autonomous vessels.”

It is not simply buying a lot of cool stuff, it is buying systems available now that the military uses now to support an evolving concept of operations.

And added to this challenge is the absence of a credible manufacturing model.

The “last supper” of Secretary Perry left a small number of primes in control of the defense industrial base.

Added to this, the supply chain atrophied during COVID and now is under pressure to provide for foreign allies, not just the U.S. military.

Se where is a credible manufacturing model that would empower a much wider production base to provide for the U.S. military without going through the archaic Pentagon acquisition system?

To be clear: it is not about simply having a vision — it is about significant change in military con-ops and the so-called defense industrial base. I say so-called because much of the production base relevant to a replicator initiative isn’t in the defense sector at all.

Featured Photo: Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks participates in a fireside chat with Editor of Defense News Marjorie Censer during the 7th annual Defense News Conference at the Ritz-Carlton, Pentagon City, Va., Sept. 5, 2023. (DoD photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Alexander Kubitza)

Note: A crucial question facing the U.S. is the defense industrial base and its limitations..

In an article by Greg Ip published in The Wall Street Journal on December 6, 2023, the author highlighted the challenge as follows:

“It isn’t just defense; the entire U.S. manufacturing base shrank as labor-intensive production migrated to East Asia. There are fewer suppliers, factories, shipyards and, most important, workers available to meet the rising demand.

“True, civilian and military capacity aren’t perfect substitutes; defense products often require specialized systems and skills. That makes the shortfall even more severe. It could take three to five years to train a welder to work on a submarine, said Ronald O’Rourke, an analyst at the Congressional Research Service.

“Echoing the quality problems U.S. manufacturers of semiconductors, autos and airliners have experienced, defense manufacturers suffer from endemic cost overruns and delays. On average, a new lead ship costs 40% more than the Navy first estimates, the CBO says. Delivery times for submarines have grown to nine years from six.”

And the WSJ recently posted a video which highlights the autonomous system build problem.