by Robbin Laird

I was fascinated to read an interview with the USCG Pacific Commander which was published by The Wall Street Journal.

In an article by Mike Cherney, we learn that the Biden Administration wants the USCG to expand its footprint amid competition with China.

The only problem with this is that Obama Administration already knew that the USCG could do this (even without competition with China) but simply did not fund the service to do so.

This is yet another example of wasting an opportunity that was obvious in the first decade of the 21st century.

How do we know this?

The USCG leadership tried to fund a fleet to do so in that period of time and simply was ignored.

All you have to do is to compare this interview published in the WSJ with one I did with the same command element in 2011.

According to the article: “The Coast Guard’s mission has traditionally focused on protecting U.S. maritime borders, but its remit has expanded as China’s clout grows. The Coast Guard plans to increase the number of deployments of its 418-foot national-security cutters, its biggest and most capable general-purpose ship, to the western Pacific in the coming year, Vice Adm. Tiongson said.

“Also, the Coast Guard is looking for more locations that can provide “logistics stops,” where its ships can berth, resupply and replenish as they travel around the Pacific, possibly in foreign countries, he said. That would allow its smaller, 154-foot fast-response cutters to spend more time away from their home port and travel farther. Maintenance could be conducted and crews could even be swapped out in those ports, he said.

“The Biden administration, in its Pacific island strategy released last September, called on the Coast Guard to enhance its engagements in the Pacific and expand its presence to support law enforcement. Vice Adm. Tiongson’s comments offer an early look into how the Coast Guard is responding to that directive.”

Now let us go back to the interview I did in 2011 with Vice Admiral Manson Brown.

Admiral Manson Brown: Most people don’t realize that 85 percent of the US exclusive economic zones (EEZs) are in the Pacific, mostly in the Central and Western Pacific.  There are a lot of economies in that region that are driven by the fishing industry.

One of the things that I realized is that even with good enforcement in US EEZ’s, the fish know no boundaries.  So they will shift from our EEZ’s to those of other nations and potentially be overfished there.

We formed partnerships with adjoining countries who are working their EEZs to try to manage the illegal fishing beyond our EEZ. We developed a joint strategy, a ship rider program where essentially we use Coast Guard assets and put enforcement officials from six nations that have signed ship rider agreements.

The Central and Western Pacific is significant distance away from the continental US. Most people don’t know that sovereign American territory is located as well in the Central and Western Pacific.

SLD: How long does it take to go from Alameda, California (the USCG HQ in the Pacific) to these territorial waters?

Admiral Manson Brown: To deploy a Cutter from here to American Samoa requires ten or more days.

SLD: So one way to understand the need for the cutters is their endurance.  If it takes more than a week to go and a week to come back, endurance buys you more time on station.

Admiral Manson Brown: Correct. And the thing you have to realize in the Pacific, you don’t have the infrastructure that you do in the Atlantic.

So in terms of pier space, fuel, engineering support, food and other logistics, you have to take it with you.  When you’re down in a place like American Samoa, you better have most of what you need to operate.

SLD: Endurance from this point is more operational time on station.

Admiral Manson Brown: We also need to be prepared as you alluded to earlier, for the weather conditions in the Pacific, which can be severe, and which can be unpredictable.

And as a former icebreaker sailor, I can tell you that the Pacific storms can whack you pretty heavily. So we need substantial ships to protect our crews, and to promote mission efficiency. And when folks are in Hawaii, they forget that the seas are rough around the islands–this is not the Caribbean.

If you go a mile and a half offshore and to do a SAR case in Hawaii with a 25 foot rigid hull inflatable, you’re doing a SAR case in the middle of the Pacific Ocean.

People think of Hawaii like they think of Florida with the protection of the land mass, but there is no protection out there.  So we need more substantial capability to deal with Mother Nature. You will be operating in seas that will scare you.

SLD: What is the impact of these EEZ’s economically?

Admiral Manson Brown: These areas are some of the richest tuna fisheries on the planet.  Number one, we’ll see a collapse of our fisheries if we don’t protect these regions, which will affect the fishing economies in that region.  Number two, it will affect the fisheries throughout the adjacent regions. There are 22 small nations of Oceania whose economies are driven by fishing licenses, and fish.  If those fisheries collapse, we could potentially see Somalia-like instability conditions closer to our sovereign territory.

SLD: The cutters are crucial to such presence and effectiveness. If you physically are not there, and see one of things I think is also important to understand, the ship is the presence.  You can have all the ISR you want, but that’s not a good deterrent to anybody.  And it doesn’t allow you to prosecute.

Admiral Manson Brown: Yes, indeed. And it’s presence, in a competitive sense, because if we are not there, someone else will be there, whether it’s the illegal fishers or whether it’s Chinese influence in the region.  We need to be very concerned about the balance of power in the neighborhood.

If you take a look at some of the other players that are operating in the neighborhood there is clearly an active power game going on.

SLD: Basically, not being there is its own message, so to speak?

Admiral Manson Brown: That’s exactly right.  When I was in Tonga, I observed large structures built by the Chinese government and am watching others nations expand their influence around the world.

But there is another important reason that we should be there.  It’s another aspect of national security.  If you take a look at the march of terrorism through places such as Indonesia, it’s not too difficult to craft an instability scenario where it could leap to Oceania, allowing our enemy to potentially get closer to reach out and touch us.

I remind people that even though American Samoa is a U.S. territory, once you get to American Samoa, you’re in America. It’s not too difficult to reach out and touch us from there….

SLD: Could you discuss the capabilities, which the USCG brings to a region that is crucial to the security-defense engagement of the United States?

Admiral Manson Brown: There are actually three capabilities that we bring to the table that separate us from DOD.  Number one is the regulatory capability.  The second one is the law enforcement capability, and the third one is the emergency response capability.

And that really gets to our multi-mission nature.  Even though we may out there, we are conducting combined operations with Canada, Korea, Japan, China. We’re also there just in case something goes wrong so that we can intercept the problem and be on scene, and provide the search and rescue capability.

With the vast distances, which we refer to as the tyranny of distance out here,  if you don’t have enduring presence, which cutters bring, then you’re not going to get to where you may be needed in an emergency in time, particularly in a place like the Bering Sea.

SLD: Forward deployed so to speak?

Admiral Manson Brown: Forward deployed. Operations in the Bering Sea allow us to have a positioned emergency response asset, whether it’s search and rescue or pollution response.  There is no significant logistics support up there to enable rapid deployment.  Air only gets you so far.  You need an emergency surface asset to pull it all together.

SLD: So you need to be pre-positioned to be even able to do a number of these missions?

Admiral Manson Brown: That’s correct.  And this is part of our layered strategy.  Many people believe that we need to be a coastal coast guard, focused on the ports, waterways, and coastal environment.

But the reality is that because our national interests extend well beyond our shore, whether it’s our vessels, or our mariners, or our possessions and our territories, we need to have presence well beyond our shores to influence good outcomes.

As the Pacific Area Commander, I’m also the USCG Pacific Fleet Commander.  That’s a powerful synergy.  I’m responsible for the close-in game, and I’m responsible for the away game.  Now the away game has some tangible authorities and capabilities, such as fisheries enforcement and search and rescue presence.

But it’s also got some softer type of capability.  We do a lot of nation building.  We perform a lot of theater security cooperation for PACOM.  We’ll send ships over to Japan.  We’ve got ships going over to China just to exchange ideas, and discuss common objectives and capabilities, and demonstrate American engagement in the region.

As I travel around, I realize that the USCG is respected internationally because of our law enforcement and regulatory capabilities and our history. When people see our response to Katrina, or to Deep Water Horizon, they want a piece of us.

SLD: And because you’re a security and defense entity that allows you to have a larger dialogue than simply a pure military force?

Admiral Manson Brown: It comes down to common interests.  The common interests are those for maritime safety, security, and stewardship.

Other nations understand that we’re also a military service, and we play that security defense interface, but that’s not how the conversation starts.  They’re interested in protecting their shores, protecting their shipping, protecting the ports, and waterways, and protecting the environment.

SLD: The role of the USCG as a Title X or defense agency is crucial to the effectiveness of the USCG role here in the Pacific as well?

Admiral Manson Brown: Part of our framework of respect and credibility is the fact that we wear this uniform. People are intrigued in the international community by us.  Our unique military and law enforcement character, combined with this uniform, makes it work for us.  If I had gone to Beijing in a suit, I would’ve had a very different reaction.

When I was in Iraq in 2004 working for Ambassador Bremer, it was a civilian position. But I took along my Coast Guard uniforms; and it didn’t take too many days for me to figure out that I better wear the uniform because it’s a symbol that commands respect within the international community. That’s something that cannot be lost in the discussion about the future of the USCG and its role in the Pacific.

There is not much different in 2011 than 2023 except perhaps with some policy urgency but we shall see.

The USCG tried to alert the Obama Administration to the national need and had a solution which the Obama Administration chose to slow roll.

To be clear, the USCG was clearly sounding the alarm.

In a 2011 interview I did with the head of USCG Acquisition, Admiral Currier made a clear case for a significant National Security Cutter Fleet.

Admiral Currier: We have a legitimate requirement for persistent presence off the Atlantic Coast, Pacific Coast, Bering Sea, the Eastern Pacific and the Caribbean for the interdiction of migrants, narco-terrorism and the insurance of safety and security at sea.

In the past, our formula has been 12 major cutters at 185 days a year away from homeport. And that’s based on over 40 years of operation with the 378-foot high endurance cutter.

Currently, we are looking to replace those twelve antiquated high endurance cutters with a minimum of 8 National Security Cutters.  Given a unique manning concept called crew rotation, we have modeled the ability to do 230 days a year at sea, rather than 185, which we did with the previous class of high endurance cutters. In effect, the days at sea, or the days engaged in mission execution, will be roughly the same between the National Security Cutter with 8 hulls and the Hamilton class with 12 hulls.

But it’s even better because of the enhanced capabilities of the National Security Cutter.  The ship can loiter, sprint, carry aircraft, and deploy small armed interdiction boats. Eventually it will carry unmanned aerial vehicles. Currently, the NSC can process intelligence information operating as a deployed system, not just a hull yielding so many days at sea.

It’s a much more capable platform than anything we’ve had in the past.  Even though our top-line metric is days away from homeport, the effectiveness of the platform in- theater will be an order of magnitude greater.  And that’s been proven in deployment of the first two ships.

When we published our book on rebuilding American military power in the Pacific we started by emphasizing the key role of the USCG.

A role not recognized.

I hope Obama III really seizes the opportunity this time around.

Featured Photo: Vice Admiral Manson Brown during the SLD interview (Credit: SLD)

By Robbin Laird

During the first week of January 2023, I had the chance to travel to San Diego to visit Camp Pendleton and various U.S. Naval commands.

The visit to Pendleton was to MAG-39. The history of MAG-39 can be found at the end of the article.

I had a chance to talk with LtCol Nelson, the MAG-39 XO who is an experienced Osprey operator. He started as a CH-46 aviator but has flown the Osprey for more than a decade and has about 2100 flight hours on the aircraft to date.

Interestingly, his Osprey experience is largely aboard MEUs. He is not a desert rat but has extensive experience in expeditionary operations from the sea.

The next day I was going to visit the CMV-22B team at North Island and talked to him about the MAG’s role in helping the CMV-22B team standup. It has been significant in the standup process as Marine maintainers and operators have worked closely with the Navy team standing up the aircraft. That standup period has ended, but as the Navy works the con-ops of an Osprey focused on logistics in the distributed battlespace and as the Marines work their expeditionary basing, there will be significant cross-learning through the operational lens.

The Navy is focusing on the key role which the CMV-22B can provide in terms of contested logistics.

But as LtCol Nelson pointed out: “The Marines have from the beginning in their use of the Osprey experienced the challenge of contested logistics. That is our bread and butter. The Navy is focused on a different architecture in terms of the distributed maritime battlespace but contested logistics support by the Osprey has been part of our bread and butter operational experience for some time now.”

LtCol Nelson emphasized that the Navy and USMC working together on logistics in a common enterprise was a clear possibility.

As he noted: “I do see a distributed maritime logistics network being used interchangeably for the benefit of the whole in a naval aviation enterprise. That’s logical and attainable.”

When I visited 2^nd MAW in 2020, I had a chance to discuss the Deep Water exercise, in which the Osprey played a very interesting role, one which I discussed with LtCol Nelson. In that exercise, the Osprey played the C2 role.

As I noted in assessing the event: “The planning and execution focused on bringing a disaggregated force into an objective area that required integrated C2 with Ground, Aviation and Logistics Combat Elements. This C2 functionality was delivered in part by an Osprey operating as an airborne command post with a capability delivered by a “roll-on/roll-off” C2 suite.

“The use of MAGTF Tablets (MAGTAB) provided a key means of digital interoperability that allowed for real-time information sharing to ground elements and aviators. The MAGTAB provided the visual representation of the integrated effects and outcomes to the command element. ISR was provided by USMC assets and by a USAF JSTARS aircraft. They used their Network-on-the-Move Airborne (NOTM-A) system to provide interoperability for the commander and assault force.

“As Major Rew put it, “I think having the NOTM-A kit on the Osprey is a big win because it provides so much situational awareness. With the Osprey as a C2 aircraft, there is added flexibility to land the aircraft close to whatever operational area the commander requires. There are many capable C2 platforms across the DoD but not all of them also have the ability to immediately land adjacent to the battlefield like the Osprey does.”[1]

What LtCol Nelson suggested that when focusing on the Osprey in its logistics role not only could you encompass a C2 role but think of it as a platform which can do “information logistics.”

As he put it: “We are not just moving things around the battlespace but information as well.”

This role could be of increasing importance as the naval forces use unmanned surface vessels as a key element for deployed ISR.

Not only could the Osprey drop USVs out of the aircraft and deploy them, but could have ISR/C2 teams to work the data.

If one looks at the Navy’s Resolute Hunter exercises, one sees the shift from ISR operators collecting data to becoming C2 decision makers with the ISR data that they collect onboard the aircraft.[2]

This could well the information logistics role which LtCol Nelson was underlining.

In short, as the Osprey looks towards the next decade of innovation, the interactive efforts of the Navy and the USMC open up new vistas.

The land wars constrained the innovative tiltrotor aircraft.

Now looking at the Pacific with its vast areas in which to operate and to sustain those operations, the Osprey becomes the indispensable aircraft, and a driver for further change in shaping the capabilities of the distributed kill web force.

The History of MAG-39

The 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (3rd MAW) was commissioned on the 167th anniversary of the Marine Corps, November 10, 1942, at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Cherry Point, North Carolina with a personnel roster of 13 officers, 25 enlisted men and one aircraft-a trainer.

The Wing’s combat history began with the World War II deployment of a bomber squadron on December 3, 1943.  A little more than a year later, the Wing deployed a night fighter squadron in support of the war effort.

On April 21, 1944, the Wing boarded three carriers for a voyage to Hawaii and arrived May 8, where it assumed the functions of Marine Air, Hawaii Area.  When the Japanese surrendered, 3rd MAW was decommissioned and its personnel were assigned to other units.  The Wing had played an important, but behind-the-scenes, role in defeating the Japanese by giving the best training available to Marine pilots and support personnel.

In 1952, as the Corps again fought in the Far East, the Wing was reactivated at Cherry Point for the Korean War.  The main portion of the Wing began moving to the new MCAS Miami, Florida- the Marine Corps’ first “flying field.”

In September 1955, the Wing left Miami for MCAS El Toro, California.  3d MAW was rebuilt again, with the addition of Marine Aircraft Groups (MAG) 15, followed by MAG-36 with its helicopter squadrons at a nearby Air Station in Santa Ana, California.  Wing squadrons were detached and deployed to Vietnam as combat action in Southeast Asia flared.  At the end of the Vietnam War several units were brought back to the United States and deactivated or re-designated, creating the 3rd MAW of today.

The Wing saw action again as part of I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), conducting operations in Iraq and Kuwait during Operation DESERT SHIELD, Operation DESERT STORM, and Operation SABER. After the end of hostilities, 3rd MAW aircraft provided support in Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and Operation SOUTHERN WATCH over Iraq.  The Wing was once more called into service in Somalia for Operation RESTORE HOPE.

The fall of 2001 would reveal a new type of challenge, the Global War on Terror, and 3d MAW answered the call again by deploying units in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM both in Afghanistan and neighboring countries.  Beginning in the fall of 2002, 3rd MAW deployed forces to Kuwait in preparation for combat operations in Iraq.  3rd MAW provided decisive aviation fires for I MEF and coalition forces in liberation of Iraq during Operation IRAQI FREEDON and subsequent stability operations.  3d MAW continued to deploy in support of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to include the 3rd MAW (Forward) Aviation Combat Element

Headquarters at Camp Leatherneck, Regional Command Southwest, Afghanistan in 2010, 2012, and 2014, the latter of which planned and executed the withdrawal of Marine Aviation Forces from the Helmand Province and subsequent end to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

Marines and Sailors of 3rd MAW deployed and conducted combat operations in support of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE in Iraq and Syria and Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT in Afghanistan.

3rd MAW Marines and Sailors are forward deployed in special purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces and Marine Expeditionary Units alongside joint U.S. forces, Allies and partners, ready to respond to any ongoing or emerging crisis or contingency.  The 3rd MAW has a well-proven, colorful battle history.  As part of the nation’s force in readiness, the Marines and Sailors of 3rd MAW stand prepared to meet any and all challenges the future may bring.  PREPARED IN PEACE AND WAR- SEMPER FIDELIS.

https://www.3rdmaw.marines.mil/About/History/

Featured Photo: Four MV-22B Osprey’s with 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) are staged in preparation for the loading of Marines from 1st Marine Division during exercise Steel Knight on Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, Calif., Dec. 10, 2019.

12.10.2019

Photo by Warrant Officer Justin Pack 

3rd Marine Aircraft Wing

[1] Robbin Laird, The U.S. Marine Corps Transformation Path: Preparing for the High-End Fight (pp. 215-216). Kindle Edition.

[2] “At Naval Air Station, Fallon, in November 2020, the U.S. Navy hosted the third iteration of a relatively new exercise called Resolute Hunter. This exercise is about how to shape a new paradigm for 21st century so that Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities can be worked to provide enhanced mission execution. Much like how NAWDC has added two new warfighting competencies to its program, namely, dynamic targeting and Maritime ISR.” Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake, A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the 21st Century (p. 194). Kindle Edition.