Integrated Deterrence and the China Challenge: The Perspective of General Wilsbach, the PACAF Commander

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Integrated Deterrence and the China Challenge: The Perspective of General Wilsbach, the PACAF Commander
04/06/2023

By Robbin Laird

At the 30 March 2023 Williams Foundation seminar which focused on the way ahead for deterrence, one of the most significant of the presentations was General Wilsbach, the PACAF commander. He has come to Williams seminars since he was the 11th USAF Commander.

And as PACAF Commander, he has attended in person or virtually several.

Panel Including Vice Admiral Barrett and Lt. General Kenneth Wilsbach, Commander of the 11th Air Force, USAF, discusses issues with the seminar participants at March 2018 Williams seminar.

As I noted in my interview with Air Marshal Chipman: “I started by raising the point that the other air force commander who spoke at the seminar was General Wilsbach, the U.S. Pacific Air Force Commander. I noted that General Wilsbach has come to several Williams Foundation Conferences, the first being when he was 11th Air Force Commander. His interest in working with Australia is suggestive of the evolving U.S. relationship with the ADF and in particular the RAAF relationship with PACAF. It is not widely known that General Wilsbach has an Australian Deputy Commander, which reflects the nature of the evolving relationship.

“Air Marshal Chipman: “General Wilsbach has been a fantastic partner for Australia. He has been interested in our evolution and commits a lot of his time and his intellectual firepower to working with us. He has created a position for an Australian Deputy Commander in his headquarters. We are very fortunate to have someone who recognizes the value of our strategic partnership.”

At this seminar, General Wilsbach’s focus was on integrated deterrence. He discussed the concept by first examining at how he looked about both concepts and how they then came together into a single construct.

“First, let’s look at integration. It’s useful to sort integration into three tranches: military, interagency, and across Allies and Partners. The military tranche is likely the best understood as we have made tremendous strides towards joint integration in the past few decades. The key to joint integration is command and control. C2 is what separates a professional fighting force from an armed mob.

“The ability to clearly communicate intent and relevant information undergirds armed conflict, and those who have failed in that task have paid in lives. Within INDOPACOM, we recognize the need to enhance our C2. What worked in Iraq and Afghanistan is not sufficient for this time or this region and we must adjust accordingly. To that end, we are iterating on a Joint Fires Network that leverages current capabilities while we procure new capabilities designed to flatten network architecture and get data where it needs to go, when it needs to be there.

“This network leverages the best practices and equipment on-hand today to link INDOPACOM together and has created an environment more joint than any I have seen in my 37 years of service. Crucially, it leans on starting our planning process with the joint perspective. PACAF Airmen routinely operate with Sailors at sea, Soldiers on the ground, Marines in the air, and Guardians managing orbital assets—often all at once.

“Here in Australia, you have demonstrated your commitment to joint operations through your Joint Training System and collocating your service joint force contributions under the Chief of Joint Operations. This naturally leads to the main benefit of joint integration—joint fires.

“Each service brings unique capabilities to the fight, and that means that F-35s may not be the best shooter for a target. Maybe a submarine would be a better solution, or an island-hopping Marine force with short-range coastal cruise missiles, or an Army hypersonic artillery battalion far back from the front lines. The point is that it doesn’t matter who takes the shot so long as the shot is effective.”

General Wilsbach then turned to what he considered to be the second tranche of integration, namely, interagency capabilities.  “While our militaries are powerful forces, they are still tools. And like any tool, they are best applied to the range of problems they were designed to address. Thankfully, our governments have agencies purpose-built to cover domains in which the military is not built to operate….

“It also gives us the same opportunity that INDOPACOM has capitalized on with our joint planning—integration by design instead of by accident. National governments have a wide range of agencies for a purpose—each has strengths that complement others to support and defend national interests. Aligning those strengths toward a common goal is how that integration best serves its citizenry and is something we as air leaders must be cognizant of how to best utilize our capabilities. All that said, the integration of processes within one country will never be as strong as the integration of those processes across many.”

He argued that integration is a key capability which the liberal democratic nations have compared to the 21st authoritarian powers. “Just as it doesn’t matter which platform engages a target so long as the target is hit, it doesn’t matter who directs what effort supporting the international order so long as it remains stable.

“Our adversaries are incapable of that level of trust, transparency, and integration. Could you imagine a Russian general as a PLAAF deputy commander? I can’t! If I were an adversary planner, seeing a host of Allies and Partners moving in concert across every level of government with joint integration would keep me up at night.”

Generall Wilsbach speaking at the Williams Foundation Seminar, 30 March 2023.

Then General Wilsbach turned to deterrence and more to the point to what he considers to be the essence of integrated deterrence. “To me, it comes down to credibility.  Our credibility is determined by two things: readiness and willingness. Both our nations are answering whether we can respond to destabilizing actors that choose to defy international norms by increasing our readiness.”

He then highlighted the kind of actions which makes deterrence credible. “ We can deny adversaries the expected benefits of their aggressions, impose cost on them that they are not willing to accept, or show that we’re so resilient, we can overcome any impact they might have on us.

“The first message of denial is, in essence, the will to fight. Investment in modernization is one way to convey this message. More capable platforms allow us to respond to Chinese destabilization efforts across the Indo-Pacific more effectively, whether that’s an E-7 providing airborne C2 during an unprofessional intercept by the PLAAF or space assets providing overhead imagery of the PRC gray- zone actors trespassing in a nation’s exclusive economic zone.

“The second message of cost imposition is simple on its surface but has layers to consider. First and foremost, we all understand that no one wins if a conflict with China breaks out in the Indo-Pacific. That would be the worst-case scenario for every nation that calls the region home and is the last thing any of us want.

“So if an aggressor chooses to cross that line, they are already willing to bear considerable cost. That’s why the deterrence must be credible and convincing. You cannot leave room for doubt that the cost could be tolerable. To do that, you need to know who should receive that message. In authoritarian regimes, it must reach the few people at the top who hold all the decision- making authority. They may never bear the cost personally, but their power relies on the fear and submission of those who will.

“The third message is in line with Secretary Pezzullo’s remarks on resilience. Agile Combat Employment is one way we can create a resilience effect in combat. Through dispersal, mobility, and flexible C2, our forces use ACE to create enough targeting  dilemmas for an adversary that we’ll always have forces in the fight to challenge them.

“As another example, Australia has inspired the region by demonstrating resilience to diplomatic and economic coercion. Similar actions of resilience are occurring in fields as varied as air defenses to industry supply chains.”

He concluded with this correlation of integrated deterrence with the kind of global development which liberal democracies favor.

“Denial, cost, resilience. Ideally, our deterrence actions should convey all three messages simultaneously. If I were an adversary planner, seeing capable forces across multiple, like- minded nations committed to action, able to deny my goals at overwhelming cost to me, and resilient enough to weather any of my attacks, that would keep me up at night. Integrated deterrence requires integration, readiness, and willingness, but it also needs one more thing—belief.

“Committing to upholding peace and stability is not an easy path to take. It requires significant investment of both time and resources, constant maintenance, and hard choices by leaders like yourselves. All of that requires a belief that it is worth it. I believe upholding the international order that has led to the most prosperous time in world history is worth it. I believe standing as a shield against authoritarianism is worth it. And I believe preserving our shared values of democracy, human rights, and freedom is worth it.”

See, the following as well:

Shaping a Way Ahead for the Networked Integrated Force: The Perspective of PACAF

ADF and Allied Perspectives on the Way Ahead for Force Modernization

Shaping a Way Ahead for Pacific Defense: The Evolving Role of the USAF

Triton’s Role in Australian Defense and Deterrence

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Triton’s Role in Australian Defense and Deterrence

By Robbin Laird

I have followed the progress of Triton in the coming of the 21st century U.S. Navy kill web enterprise for some time.

The first interview I did focusing on Triton was during a 2011 visit to San Diego.

In an interview with Commander Johansson, the P-3 commander looked towards the future: “I’m not a big fan of calling them unmanned anymore.  I call them remotely-piloted, because it takes a lot of people to operate these systems. We moved to the family of systems (BAMS and P-8) because we felt that we could move some of the persistent ISR capabilities to a more capable platform, BAMS.

“BAMS long dwell time can provide the persistence necessary more efficiently than a rotation of P-8 24/7/365.  Also, if we used P-8 to do that we would have to increase squadron manpower to give them the necessary crews to fly 24/7 MDA in addition to the ASW/ASUW missions.  We hope to have 5 orbits flying 24/7/365 to cover the maritime picture were required. The great thing about BAMS and P-8 is that they can work together to meet the COCOMS requirements.”

That was in 2011 and through visits to Norfolk and to Jax Navy in more recent periods, I have been able to document the standup of this teaming arrangement by the U.S. Navy to create a whole new capability in delivering layered ISR for the fleet. In fact, it is a major part of why the Navy is able to craft a maritime kill web force.

As we wrote in our book on the subject:  “The U.S. Navy is crafting a significant paradigm shift, one which we call the kill web. In some ways, this shift is akin to the famous comment in a play by the 17th-century French playwright Molière that Monsieur Jourdain has been speaking prose for all his life but not knowing that he had. The kill web shift with the current force lays down a foundation from which to incorporate new platforms and technologies over the next phase of maritime force operations and development. No better case in point is the maritime patrol reconnaissance force.

“This is a force which was defined by the P-3 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft flying “alone and unafraid” to its displacement by a “family of systems” which work  together to deliver distributed but integratable kill webs capabilities to the force, both naval and joint. And as this “family of systems” shapes a new ecosystem working with the fleet, that ecosystem shapes key challenges which need to be resolved as part of the expansion of maritime autonomous systems or passive sensors added to platforms throughout the fleet.”[1]

But the U.S. Navy is not doing this alone and as one U.S. Navy Admiral referred to their global partnerships as shaping “kill web matesmanship.” No force in the world is more important in this journey than the ADF. But the ADF, unlike the U.S., does not have a naval air force; they have an air force which operates in an integrated fashion with its Navy.

During one visit to Australia, I went to the base where the ADF is building the operational facility integrating P-8 with Triton. In 2017, I visited RAAF Edinburgh, which is near Adelaide in South Australia and I had a chance to discuss the standup of the base and to look at the facilities being built there.

Now six years later, I was able to get an update on the Triton piece of the effort from Jake Campbell, Triton Program Director, Northrop Grumman Australia. At the recent Williams Foundation on the way ahead for the Australian deterrence effort, Campbell provided an overview on how layered ISR capabilities provide Australia with deterrence capabilities across the spectrum of the deterrence options.

During the presentation, he really did not focus a great deal on Triton specifically, but later we sat down to do an interview where he did precisely that. I asked him to provide an update on the program.

Jake Campbell: “Triton has been supporting USINDOPACOM since 2020 as part of early operating capability. The early operating capability deployment to Guam proved Triton’s invaluable capabilities for the maritime patrol and reconnaissance mission. Meanwhile, Australia’s Triton program is making great progress with the rollout of the first aircraft from Northrop Grumman’s facility in Palmdale California in Sept. of last year.

“The government is committed to three airplanes plus the associated ground systems. The facilities are being built at RAAF Edinburgh where they are building out the ground facilities right now. We will start rolling out the system late this year into next year. The first airplane will arrive in Australia mid-next year and first flight as soon as possible after that.

“The first two Australian airplanes are currently in Palmdale going through the process of evaluation and finalization. The third one will soon join the other two in Palmdale. We will do the final shakedown flights there and then they will go to Pax River Naval Air Station for the process of finalization before being delivered to Australia.”

Australia is tapping into what for the U.S. Navy is a mature production process but the Navy now is adding a new payload to the Triton – the multi-SIGINT package.

The U.S. Navy and Northrop Grumman are fully immersed in delivering the multi-intelligence configuration of Triton, which will provide commanders an unprecedented amount of information to support critical decision making. The multi-intelligence payload includes a Northrop Grumman ZPY-3 Multi-Function Active Sensor (MFAS) electronically scanned surveillance radar under the fuselage; a Raytheon DAS-3 electro-optic, infra-red (EO/IR) sensor under the nose; as well as SIGINT Sensors.

This common configuration on Triton will allow the RAAF and U.S. Navy to share data easily and provide a significant contribution to the ‘kill web’.

Australia is on both the P-8 and Triton as a cooperative partner and that means that they are part of the ongoing development of the systems which allows customization to their needs as well.

As Campbell underscored: “Because Australia is a cooperative partner in the program, Defence here gets to influence requirements for the future evolution of the program. The mission control stations will be at Edinburgh but the Triton will fly out of RAAF Tindal in the Northern Territory”

The fact that the U.S. and Australia will fly the same airplane but into complimentary but different operational areas and environments will have an important impact as well on the future development of the program, in terms of shaping new requirements going forward.

Campbell noted: “Australia has the potential to operate Triton well south to Antarctica, across the Indian Ocean, across the Southwest Pacific as well as North into Asia. This will give Australia unique experience with Triton compared to the U.S. Navy. And both experiences will flow back into the program.”

We then discussed the unique capability which Triton contributes to the layered ISR system which Australia is constructing and which Campbell discussed in his Williams Foundation presentation. Capbell continued:”“In my talk, I emphasized the need to have a layered ISR capability, which is from space to undersurface, and everything in between. There is no one capability that will do everything for you in terms of intelligence collection.

“Space provides some capability, but obviously there’s limitations in the sense that it’s very predictable. Whereas Triton still has the advantage of perspective by operating well above 50,000 feet. It is also persistent, and it has uncertainty in terms of an adversary understanding when it might be in the area of operation, so that’s a significant advantage, the ability to operate at range for an extended period, at the time and choosing of the operator.

“And with the increase in the submarine threat, you want P8 to be focusing on that mission, much more so than then just doing standard ISR missions. Triton frees up the P8 to be able to go and focus on more of the ASW and other high end warfighting missions.”

While Australia and the U.S. have a variety of means to collect information on maritime activities, Triton provides a unique capability for persistent awareness across the vast and complex environment of the APR region.

As Campbell noted, “No other system can provide the range, persistence or coverage area. Satellites are limited and predictable, offering episodic coverage. Manned reconnaissance aircraft only provide limited ISR at the sacrifice of their other missions, such ASW patrols.”

Triton’s high-altitude, long-endurance capabilities make it much more than an ISR & Targeting platform. With an operating altitude greater than 50k feet, and endurance great than 24 hours, Triton can provide continuous communications relay to keep a distributed force connected to ensure commanders are operating off a shared common operational picture.

In addition, Northrop Grumman and the U.S. Navy are continuing to progress advanced capabilities insertion and mission expansion to keep pace with the threat and ensure Triton plays a key role in helping provide a seamlessly connected fleet for information dominance, a critical step as the branch achieves its naval operational architecture to enable distributed maritime operations.

Northrop Grumman is leveraging its Triton Flying Test Bed (a manned Gulfstream IV surrogate as an uncrewed system) to research, develop, integrate, and demonstrate technologies to meet the Navy’s current and future ISR&T requirements. Just this past summer, Northrop Grumman demonstrated JADC2 across distributed platforms showcasing interoperability among F-35, MQ-4C Triton, E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, and surface vessels.

By leveraging MQ-4C Triton’s utility as a gateway node the aircraft showcased the ability to connect fifth-generation platforms with naval assets across a distributed maritime fleet. The first-of-its-kind demonstration was conducted in partnership with Naval Air Systems Command, Office of Naval Research, Naval Information Warfare Center Pacific, and BAE Systems.

[1] Laird, Robbin F.; Timperlake, Edward. A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the 21st Century (p. 194). Kindle Edition.

Featured image: The static display of a replica of the Air Force MQ-4C Triton Remotely Piloted Aircraft System at the 2023 Avalon International Airshow, Credit: Australian Department of Defence.

For more details on the Triton program operating with the U.S. Navy see the following:

The CH-53K and USMC Transformation: Preparing for Entry into Service

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on The CH-53K and USMC Transformation: Preparing for Entry into Service
04/05/2023

By Robbin Laird

Recently I visited NAVAIR at Pax River Naval Air Station and met with the H-53 Heavy Lift Helicopters Program Manager (PMA-261), Colonel Kate Fleeger, U.S. Marine Corps. This officer has a very distinguished and interesting background, which intersects well with the coming of the CH-53K to the USMC, which is in the midst of its latest transformation, which highlights force mobility and distributed operations.

Her full biography can be read at the end of the article, but I asked her at the end of the interview that given her background of working with a variety of defense systems, what in her background did she see as being most relevant to the task of working on bringing the CH-53K to the fleet in a time where both the Marines and the Navy are prioritizing distributed operations to provide for both enhanced lethality and survivability.

Col. Fleeger: “What I’ve enjoyed most about my career is making the connections between seemingly disparate concepts and entities and bringing them together into a coherent capability. And what the 53K brings to the Marine Corps is the ability to connect the different nodes of a distributed force.”

I will return to the connectivity and transformation points after reviewing the state of the program as highlighted by Col. Fleeger. The Colonel provided a succinct and comprehensive overview of the program she has managed at NAVAIR since her arrival last year.

Col. Fleeger: “2022 was really a big year for the program! I’m sure you’re tracking that VMX-1 (Marine Operational Test & Evaluation Squadron 1) completed Initial Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E) and the Marine Corps declared Initial Operational Capability in April of last year. That paved the way for a Full Rate Production decision by Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, & Acquisitions in December.

“The decision to move to Full Rate Production, from my perspective, was a vote of confidence both by the Marine Corps, of course, and the US Navy acquisition chain concerning the readiness of the 53K to transition as planned into the Marine Corps.

“The program of record is for 200 aircraft. We are currently in the 10s to low teens per year build rate. After that we will ramp up to the 20s per year capacity. We currently have nine aircraft already out in the fleet in two different squadrons. One squadron is the operational test squadron, VMX-1, at New River.  The second is HMH-461 which is part of MAG-29 at New River, which is the first operational squadron. In addition to the seven aircraft already at HMH-461, we expect them to receive two more aircraft this spring and summer with a total of four to six aircraft by the end of the year.

“The plan is for HMH-461 to be fully transitioned to the CH-53K by the end of next year and be ready for a MEU deployment in 2025. We are focused on this effort.”

Slide from Presentation by Col Fleeger at the International Military Helicopter Conference, 2023

She also discussed the international aspect of the program. “The Israelis are the first international partner in the program. This provides not only cost savings overall for the production run but also provides an an opportunity to share innovative aircraft concepts of operations with the USMC  The Israelis have ordered 12 aircraft to date with an option for another six.”

Col. Fleeger indicated that Lt. Col. (Ret) Lucas Frank, who has been my host during past visits to VMX-1 at New River, has retired from the USMC but is working program’s international team on aircraft training concepts and solutions for the Israelis.. Frank is a very knowledgeable expert on the aircraft, and certainly a key asset not just in working with the Israelis, but understanding the future possibilities of the aircraft.

We discussed how the naming of the helicopter as a CH-53 tends to obscure how different the CH-53K is from the CH-53E. I earlier wrote a piece entitled What if it was called the “CH-55? Transformation in the Vertical Heavy Lift Fleet” to underscore this point. She agreed: “I have argued we shouldn’t have used the numbers 53.”

This is true on two levels. The first level is that of performance and capability for the heavy lift mission as generally understood. The second level is the digital backbone of the CH-53K which makes the platform a key element in the distributed integratable force enabled by the kill web.

The first aspect was well laid out during a visit to VMX-1 in 2020 and a discussion with Lt. Col. Frank. He stated during that visit the following: “I’ve started in the Ch-53D in 2004, they’re my first love. I’ll always love them. They were much harder to fly. And the ease of flying this, the flight control system is probably the biggest game changer for the 53 community.

“We’re not used to anything like this. It’s very intuitive. It can be as hands off as you know, a brand-new Tesla, you can close your eyes, set the autopilot and fly across country. Obviously, you wouldn’t do that in a tactical environment, but it does reduce your workload, reduces your stress. And in precision hover areas, whether it’s night under low light conditions, under NVGs, in the confines of a tight landing zone, we have the ability to hit position hold in the 53 K and have the aircraft maintain pretty much within one foot of its intended hover point, one foot forward, lateral and AFT, and then one foot of vertical elevation change.

“It will maintain that hover until the end of the time if required. that’s very, very stress relieving for us when landing in degraded visual environments. Our goal at VMX-1 is to create tactics that employ that system effectively. Some communities struggle with how they use the automation, do they let the automation do everything? Do they let the pilots do everything? How to work the balance? We’re working on a hybrid where the pilots can most effectively leverage automation.

“If you know you’re coming into a brownout situation or degraded visual environment, you engage the automation at a point right before the dust envelops you. And then in the 53-K, you can continue flying with the automation engaged. You continue flying with the automation engaged, and you can override it, but as soon as you stop moving the controls, it will take your inputs, estimate what you wanted and keep the aircraft in its position.

“It’s a very intuitive flight control system, and it blends very well with the pilot and the computers. It allows you to override the computer. And then the second that you stop overriding it, the computer takes back over without any further pilot input. That’s probably the biggest game changer for our community.”

This graphic was created in Adobe Photoshop to explore the capabilities and roles of the CH-53K King Stallion in the U.S. Marine Corps. (U.S. Marine Corps graphic by Cpl. Lauren Salmon)
02.16.2022 Graphics by Cpl. Lauren Salmon, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing

The second aspect was a key part of the discussion with Col. Fleeger. She emphasized the digital backbone built into the aircraft, and its ability to operate within a distributed force leveraging that force’s digital systems and its ability to contribute to that overall digital capability as well.

And when it comes to connectivity, the CH-53K is a key enabler for distributed logistics capability for the USMC and for the joint force.  This is how she put it: “The CH-53K is a key element in the logistical backbone for the distributed force for the Marine Corps – especially with the increasing emphasis on the importance of operating from a diversity of unimproved landing zones, as opposed to using bases and runways.”

Part of her background has been working in USMC-operated UAVs. And in this effort, she has had the opportunity to work the payload side of the UAV equation. This is especially important in bringing the payload dynamic with what a platform like the CH-53K could handle. It is not just a muscle machine. It can deliver a variety of payloads to the battlespace beyond traditionally what heavy lift has done in the past.

Col. Fleeger closed by emphasizing that such innovation was why it is so necessary to get the CH-53K into the hands of Marines. As she underscored: “The most important ideas are going to come from the employment of the aircraft by the Marines in either operationally relevant or operational situations. The most critical thing that we can do to facilitate the innovation that you’re talking about is to deliver the aircraft to the Marine Corps in accordance with the transition plan and get it in the hands of the operators.”

Colonel Kate Fleeger, U.S. Marine Corps

Colonel Kate Fleeger, a native of Olney, Md., earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in geosciences from Princeton University.  She received her commission in 1999 and was designated a Naval Aviator in 2001. In 2010, she received a Master of Science in business administration and management with a certificate in Project Management from Boston University. In 2011 she graduated from the Naval War College with a Master of Arts in national security and strategic studies.  In 2020, she graduated from the Eisenhower School at National Defense University, earning a Master of Science in national resource strategy.

After designation as a CH-53E pilot, Fleeger completed three deployments in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 465 before transferring to Marine Aviation Training System Site (MATSS) New River, N.C., in 2006.  Here she gained initial acquisitions experience, serving as Contracting Officer’s Representative and subject matter expert for several contracts.

Fleeger transferred to Naval Air Station (NAS) Patuxent River, Md., in 2011, serving as the H-53 Assistant Program Manager for Training Systems for the Heavy Lift Helicopters Program Office, (PMA-261), and in 2013, she took over as the Strategic Operations Lead. In 2014, she became the H-53E In-Service Sustainment Lead and led the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit Digital Interoperability effort for CH-53E and MV-22B.  She became the CH-53K engineering class desk in 2015 and led the development and execution of an innovative plan to accelerate first flight.

Col. Fleeger speaking at the International Military Helicopter Conference, 2023

In 2016, Fleeger transitioned to the Navy and Marine Corps Small Tactical Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Program Office (PMA-263) as the Advanced Development Integrated Product Team (IPT) lead responsible for development and fielding of Signals Intelligence, Synthetic Aperture Radar, and Wide Area Surveillance payloads.  She subsequently transitioned to the Medium UAS IPT where she oversaw both RQ-21 and MQ-27 programs.

In 2018, she was selected as the VH-92A IPT lead in the Presidential Helicopter Program Office (PMA-274) and in 2020, she became the CH-53K IPT lead, in the Heavy Lift Helicopters Program Office, (PMA-261).

She served as the Chief of Staff for Program Executive Officer, Air Anti-Submarine Warfare, Assault, and Special Mission Programs from August 2021 – May 2022. In May 2022, Fleeger assumed command of PMA-261 as program manager.

See the following:

What if it was called the CH-55? Transformation in the Vertical Heavy Lift Fleet

https://defense.info/system-type/rotor-and-tiltrotor-systems/ch-53k/

Sailors assigned to the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Arlington (LPD 24) direct a Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion helicopter to land aboard Arlington, Feb. 7, 2023. The King Stallion is a heavy-lift cargo helicopter undergoing sea trials as the next evolution of the CH-53 series helicopters that have been in service since 1966. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class John Bellino)
Sailors assigned to the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Arlington (LPD 24) direct a Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion helicopter aboard Arlington, Feb. 7, 2023. The King Stallion is a heavy-lift cargo helicopter undergoing sea trials as the next evolution of the CH-53 series helicopters that have been in service since 1966. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class John Bellino)
Sailors assigned to the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Arlington (LPD 24) refuel a Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion helicopter aboard Arlington, Feb. 7, 2023. The King Stallion is a heavy-lift cargo helicopter undergoing sea trials as the next evolution of the CH-53 series helicopters that have been in service since 1966. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class John Bellino)
A U.S. Marine Corps aircrewman stands by during a refueling evolution on a Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion helicopter operating aboard the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Arlington (LPD 24), Feb. 7, 2023. The King Stallion is a heavy-lift cargo helicopter undergoing sea trials as the next evolution of the CH-53 series helicopters that have been in service since 1966. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class John Bellino) (This photo has been converted from color to black and white for creative purposes.)
A Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion helicopter is seen flying over the Atlantic Ocean as Aviation Boatswain’s Mate (Handling) 1st Class Duon Rucker, left, and Chief Aviation Boatswain’s Mate (Fuels), both assigned to the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Arlington (LPD 24) discuss flight operations aboard Arlington, Feb. 7, 2023. The King Stallion is a heavy-lift cargo helicopter undergoing sea trials as the next evolution of the CH-53 series helicopters that have been in service since 1966. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class John Bellino)
A Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion helicopter flys over the Atlantic Ocean during flight operation aboard the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Arlington (LPD 24), Feb. 7, 2023. The King Stallion is a heavy-lift cargo helicopter undergoing sea trials as the next evolution of the CH-53 series helicopters that have been in service since 1966. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class John Bellino)
U.S. Navy Sailors assigned to the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Arlington (LPD 24) prepare to launch a Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion helicopter from Arlington’s flight deck, Feb. 9, 2023. The King Stallion is a heavy-lift cargo helicopter undergoing sea trials as the next evolution of the CH-53 series helicopters that have been in service since 1966. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class John Bellino)
Aviation Boatswain’s Mate (Handling) 3rd Class Inam Ulhaq, assigned to the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Arlington (LPD 24), observes a Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion helicopter landing aboard Arlington, Feb. 14, 2023. The King Stallion is a heavy-lift cargo helicopter undergoing sea trials as the next evolution of the CH-53 series helicopters that have been in service since 1966. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class John Bellino)
Aviation Boatswain’s Mate (Handling) Airman Victor Vazquez Ramos, assigned to the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Arlington (LPD 24), launches a Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion helicopter from Arlington’s flight deck, Feb. 14, 2023. The King Stallion is a heavy-lift cargo helicopter undergoing sea trials as the next evolution of the CH-53 series helicopters that have been in service since 1966. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class John Bellino)
A Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion helicopter lands aboard the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Arlington (LPD 24), Feb. 14, 2023. The King Stallion is a heavy-lift cargo helicopter undergoing sea trials as the next evolution of the CH-53 series helicopters that have been in service since 1966. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class John Bellino)
Aviation Support Equipment Technician 2nd Class Luis Soto, assigned to the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Arlington (LPD 24), directs a Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion helicopter to land aboard Arlington, Feb. 14, 2023. The King Stallion is a heavy-lift cargo helicopter undergoing sea trials as the next evolution of the CH-53 series helicopters that have been in service since 1966. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class John Bellino) (This photo was converted from color to black and white for creative purposes.)
U.S. Marine Corps test pilots prepare to takeoff from the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Arlington (LPD 24) in a Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion helicopter, Feb. 14, 2023. The King Stallion is a heavy-lift cargo helicopter undergoing sea trials as the next evolution of the CH-53 series helicopters that have been in service since 1966. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class John Bellino) (This photo was converted from color to black and white for creative purposes.)
U.S. Navy Sailors assigned to the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Arlington (LPD 24) remove chocks and chains from a Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion helicopter during flight operations aboard Arlington, Feb. 14, 2023. The King Stallion is a heavy-lift cargo helicopter undergoing sea trials as the next evolution of the CH-53 series helicopters that have been in service since 1966. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class John Bellino)
A Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion helicopter takes off from the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Arlington (LPD 24), Feb. 14, 2023. The King Stallion is a heavy-lift cargo helicopter undergoing sea trials as the next evolution of the CH-53 series helicopters that have been in service since 1966. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class John Bellino)

The Perspective of Air Marshal Chipman: Shaping a Way Ahead for the RAAF

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on The Perspective of Air Marshal Chipman: Shaping a Way Ahead for the RAAF
04/04/2023

By Robbin Laird

I have known Air Marshal Chipman since he was the first co-chair of Plan Jericho. My first interview with him was with his co-chair Jake Campbell, now of Northrop Grumman. In that first interview conducted in their offices in 2015, the emphasis was taking the coming of the F-35 as a forcing function of the joint force to create what was identified in later seminars as a fifth generation enabled force.

“In effect, the blending of strike with situational awareness within a distributed C2 environment is one of the key targets of the Plan Jericho effort. And reshaping the template for operations in light of the coming of the F-35 makes sense as a C2/ISR fighter comes into the force, playing a catalytic role for further change, notably in a force which is being reconfigured to a more effective 21st century combat force.”

Now as Chief of the RAAF, the challenge is to reap the advantages of that transition to deal with new strategic situation facing Australia and its allies and to build effective short to midterm change for the ADF with its allies but in way that would lead to successful deterrence in the long term. Much like the original focus of Plan Jericho was to work on the foundation of change, that challenge remains central for the RAAF.

After his participation in the Williams seminar on the future paths of deterrence, I had a chance to sit down with Air Marshal Chipman in his office to expand on his views about the challenges and the way ahead for his air force and the ADF.

I started by raising the point that the other air force commander who spoke at the seminar was General Wilsbach, the U.S. Pacific Air Force Commander. I noted that General Wilsbach has come to several Williams Foundation Conferences, the first being when he was 11th Air Force Commander. His interest in working with Australia is suggestive of the evolving U.S. relationship with the ADF and in particular the RAAF relationship with PACAF. It is not widely known that General Wilsbach has an Australian Deputy Commander, which reflects the nature of the evolving relationship.

Air Marshal Chipman: “General Wilsbach has been a fantastic partner for Australia. He has been interested in our evolution and commits a lot of his time and his intellectual firepower to working with us. He has created a position for an Australian Deputy Commander in his headquarters. We are very fortunate to have someone who recognizes the value of our strategic partnership.”

It also important to respect differences in terms of allied cultures and objectives in crisis situations. I wrote an essay in my new book Defense XII precisely on the question of recognizing differences and working relationships among the AUKUS partners, for example.

Air Marshal Chipman prior to becoming air chief had some experience in Europe working with various allies and organizations and brings that experience to his current job.  He noted: “In terms of our relationship with PACAF, for example, we need to understand what his ambitions are, what his needs are and how we partner to support him. At the same, we need to both understand and convey our requirements for independent operations as well. We need to be clear what part of our defense effort is focused on supporting the alliance and what part is prioritizing sovereign capability.”

Alliance relationships are best understood as overlapping circles in a Venn diagram dynamically evolving in shaping capabilities and commitments, rather than being cast simply in historical terms.

I then turned to the F-35 and the question of moving beyond simple interoperability. The promise of the F-35 as an international program has been to operate as a forcing function for a kind of interoperability which we have not seen before. But this promise has not been fully realized. I asked the Air Marshal for his thoughts on this challenge.

Air Marshal Chipman: “The F-35 enterprise has the potential to be a forcing function for working together much more closely and effectively. The common threats we are facing are driving us to work more closely together. We will be incrementally disadvantaged over time if we are not. If the F-35 does play a forcing function, we will see this in our ability to provide collective logistics support and operate the aircraft as a common fleet.”

I reminded him of what General Carlyle when he was PACAF hoped to see in the future. In a 2015 interview I did with Carlisle, this is what he hoped would happen: “General Carlisle was asked what would be the impact of a fleet of F-35s (allied and US) upon a Commander of PACAF a decade out. “It will be significant. Instead of thinking of an AOC, I can begin to think of an American and allied CAOC (Combined Air Operations Center). By sharing a common operating picture, we can become more effective tactically and strategically throughout the area of operations.”

The coalition aspect is crucial for the ADF. But Chipman emphasized that such cooperation was crucial in deterring the big conflict but will not eliminate the need to manage the spectrum of conflict. To operate across the spectrum of conflict requires capabilities across that spectrum to deal with different conflict or crisis situations.

This is how Air Marshal Chipman put it: “As I highlighted in my presentation last week at the Williams Foundation Seminar, there is strength in numbers to deter the worst possible outcomes but such an approach will not by itself prevent smaller scale coercion. We have to be prepared as a middle power to deal with actions from the adversary that will not trigger a broader alliance response, but nonetheless are important to us.”

I then turned to the question of what are his priorities for the short to mid-term.

Air Marshal Chipman: “My three key priorities are readiness, resilience and resourcefulness. We are shifting our focus from delivering new capabilities through a 10-year acquisition cycle, to integrating the capability we have in service today, to deter actions here and now.

“I have to fight with what I have, and that is as much about tactics, techniques and procedures that we employ as it is about the equipment we buy now. Air Force is in a relatively good position. We have bought good equipment for 20 years, so it is not as if we starting at a position of significant disadvantage. We now have to make sure we can employ what have, and what we might add, optimally at any moment.”

A key aspect of the evolving alliance situation in facing the China challenge is how the core allies Japan, Australia and the United States actually will craft more effective use of the air, maritime and land baes they use over the Pacific thought of as an extended operational space.

If the three countries can work creatively land basing, with seabasing, with air basing with the use of new autonomous systems they can field and evolve an effective force for the long game of competition with China. Certainly, from this perspective, I would view Australia is the strategic reserve of the broader alliance.

As Chipman commented: “I haven’t heard it described that way. But I think that’s what we are working towards. I think that’s the mindset that we have. The idea that Australia provides strategic depth for forces moving forward, is absolutely part of our thinking.”

He underscored that an alliance that could take advantage of the multiple basing solutions which I highlighted, noting that would take “distributed logistics to the next level, where we need to be.”

The featured photo: Air Marshal Chipman attending the Williams Foundation Conference on March 30, 2023 sitting next to the Chief of Army LTGEN Simon Stuart and Air Vice Marshal Darren Goldie, Air Commander Australia.

The Shift to Distributed Maritime Operations: The CMV-22B Empowers the Concept

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on The Shift to Distributed Maritime Operations: The CMV-22B Empowers the Concept
04/03/2023

By Robbin Laird

In an interview I did earlier this year with Vice Admiral Whitesell, the U.S. Navy air boss, he underscored that the shift to distributed maritime operations was a work in progress.

As he noted: “We are in an experimentation phase. We are working force distribution and integration. We are experimenting like Nimitz did in the inter-war years. We are working from seabed to space with regard to force integration. It is a work in progress but being successful operating in an environment where logistics are contested, where getting weapons to the fleet in conflict, is not just a nice to have capability — it’s a necessary one.”

What he was referring to in terms of contested logistics was the expanded role for the CMV-22B from being a one-for-one legacy replacement for the carrier-onboard-delivery (COD) mission for large deck aircraft carriers to becoming a distributed maritime fleet operations asset.

The Osprey provides an important stimulant for the shift in con-ops whereby the Navy‘s experimentation with distributed operations intersects with the U.S. Air Force’s approach to agile combat employment and the Marine Corps’ renewed interest in Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO).

In other words, the reshaping of joint and coalition maritime combat operations is underway which focuses upon distributed task forces capable of delivering enhanced lethality and survivability.

Captain Sam Bryant, Commander, Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Wing, highlighted in an interview I did with him this past January in North Island that the CMV-22B compared to a legacy Osprey has much more capability. The Osprey is a revolutionary aircraft which far exceeds any rotorcraft’s performance limits on range and speed.

But Bryant noted about the Navy’s CMV-22B goes even further when compared with the USMC MV-22: “We have better range. We have much better avionics. We have better communications which allows us to connect with the strike groups more securely. We are better suited for long-range navigation operations, and the flexibility required to support a high-end fight in the Pacific.” In other words, the CMV-22B, unlike its COD predecessor, the C-2A, can operate as a fleetwide support asset, not simply a large deck carrier logistics asset.

The U. S. Navy’s deployed fleet — seen as the mobile sea bases they are – faces a significantly different future as part of a distributed joint force capable of shaping a congruent strike capability for enhanced lethality.

This means not only does the fleet need to operate differently in terms of its own distributed operations, but also as part of modular task forces that include air and ground elements in providing for the offensive-defensive enterprise which can hold adversaries at risk and prevail in conflict.

The CMV-22B is ideally suited to operate across this highly complex distributed combat chessboard. And, because the Marines have deployed the MV-22B for decades, there is a very robust operational and sustainment expertise already in the fleet. This means the CMV-22B can deliver core carrier logistics needs while also providing logistics support across the entire fleet – including the vital Military Sealift Command that will play an essential role.

As the fleet looks to enhance its lethality and survivability in a distributed maritime environment, there is no more critical capability than sustained logistics support in the contested battlespace. T

his is how Rear Admiral Meyer, Commander, Naval Air Force Atlantic, put it with regard to how the Navy was reworking carrier operations in a way that highlighted this key logistics requirement: “The fact that our carrier strike groups can move 700-plus miles in a 24-hour period, the increasing range and lethality of our ever-advancing air wing and the weapons that those aircraft carry can hold huge areas of the surface at risk.

“Over the course of a three-day period, it would mean just a staggering volume of real estate, roughly the entire Pacific AOR over a 72-hour period. But it is that logistics support train that is really a key part that makes that happen.”

The CMV-22B can do this for the carrier-enabled distributed maritime force.

We just need more of them.

The photos of the CMV-22B is credited to Raymond Rivard, San Diego, CA.

See also, the following:

Distributed Operations and Logistics in the Pacific: How to Shape a Way Ahead for the Fleet

The Strategic Shift and Australia Recasts Its Defense Policy: The March Williams Foundation March 2023 Seminar

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on The Strategic Shift and Australia Recasts Its Defense Policy: The March Williams Foundation March 2023 Seminar
03/31/2023

By Robbin Laird

The latest Williams Foundation Seminar was held on March 30, 2023 in Canberra.

It was entitled “Sharpening the Edge of Australia’s National Deterrence Capability” and focused on the strategic transition of Australia and the ADF in meeting the challenges of the decade ahead.

I asked one of the young officers who attended the seminar what they got out of the seminar: “We are facing a significant strategic shift and those of us just now in service need to understand what the focus of the defense of our country is and will need to be as we work to defend our country.”

Another young officer said: “The last generation fought abroad; now we are defending our country and in our region. How are we going to do so effectively?”

That rathe put it succinctly what the distinguished group of speakers was needed focused on doing.

The seminar itself was placed midway between two major government announcements about the changing approach to defense. The first was the announcement with regard to the way ahead with the generation of a new nuclear submarine capability for Australia and the second is the forthcoming release of the Defence Strategic Review, expected in late April.

For me, this session reminded me of my first engagement with the Williams Foundation in 2014 which led to my first seminar report. “On Tuesday, 11 March 2014, the Sir Richard Williams Foundation conducted its biannual seminar on ‘Air Combat Operations, 2025 and Beyond.’ The seminar explored the challenges and opportunities afforded by the introduction of fifth-generation air combat capabilities.”

Well, we have almost reached 2025, and the focus of the 2014 seminar was indeed on introducing the F-35 into the ADF and the transformation which could be created to evolve the capabilities of the ADF as an integrated force able to operate across the spectrum of warfare.

For the next decade, the seminars held by the Foundation provided detailed looks at that transformation through the presentations of senior ADF leaders and analysts about the evolving strategic environment and the evolving ADF capabilities and concepts of operations.

I have detailed that decade in my book, Joint By Design: The Evolution of Australian Defence Strategy which was published in late 2020.

As Vice Admiral (Retired) Barrett noted in his wrap up comments at the end of the seminar on March 30th: “As the Chairman of Williams, Geoff Brown, indicated at the beginning of the day we are taking a different take with this seminar and the one to follow later in the year. The subject that we discussed over the last couple of hours has been around deterrence where previously at these conferences, we’ve been talking very specifically around fifth generation capability throughout the ADF.

“So the idea that we would gather, and we would have an array of esteemed speakers who would inform us, educate us, but also challenge us, but assist us in being able to formulate what our thinking about the way ahead made a great deal of sense.”

Vice Admiral (Retired) Barrett closing the Williams Foundation Seminar on March 30, 20223

What Barrett said was very much in line with what the younger generation of officers wanted to discuss and learn about.

But I must add that I have been working defense issues for a long time, in Europe and in the United States as well as in the Pacific.

And for one who worked through the 1980s on the Euro-missile crisis, the Soviet confrontation with a Europe in transformation and certainly about nuclear weapons, the discussion of deterrence at the seminar took me back to work with Herman Kahn and Zbig Brzezinski which I did in the past.

What is deterrence in this period of the 21st century?

And what can we learn from a past which has been forgotten as we fought the land wars?

The forthcoming report on the seminar will highlight the presentations at the seminar and the insights from additional interviews with senior ADF personnel and analysts.

But I can note that the seminar took a broad view of the challenge of deterrence, that deterrent effects are not simply a result of the ADF can do with its allies and partners but what the Australian polity, economy, culture and society can deliver in competing with the 21st century authoritarian powers and cooperate with allies going through a very fluid situation in their domestic polities, societies, cultures and economies.

The concluding presentation of the seminar by the head of the RAAF, Air Marshal Chipman, provided a comprehensive look at deterrence from the standpoint of a middle power, and drew together a number of the insights of other speakers as well.

Air Marshal Chipman addressing the Williams Foundation Seminar March 30, 2023

“I mentioned earlier that deterrence works on the threat of escalation.

“But we must be clear, as a Middle Power, this must stop short of actually provoking conflict.

“Deterrence fails at the point conflict begins.

“Strategic competition is dynamic and unstable: peripheral interests might become core over time.

“For a deterrence strategy to succeed through a prolonged period of strategic competition, we must also build pathways for de-escalation.

“This is as important in force design and force posture as it is to campaign design.

“The capabilities we invest in, where we stage them and how we intend to use them.

“De-escalation pathways restore the pre-crisis or pre-conflict balance of power. Seizing a diplomatic off-ramp too early may cede advantage; too late will cause unnecessary attrition.

“Our successful deterrence strategy will need to consider escalation and de-escalation in equal measure.”

Building capabilities to do so, having a society resilient enough to deal with a wide-range of threats, to have allied cohesion significant to be credible, and learn how to combine military capabilities with the art of statecraft which understands the minds of our authoritarian competitors is a work in progress.

And in future seminars we will see the learning process playing out.

The featured photo: Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead addressing the Williams seminar, March 30, 2022. VADM Mead is the Chief Nuclear Powered Submarine Task Force. At the seminar, he provided a succinct and powerful overview on the way ahead for the program. It is the analogy to the F-35 program which the 2014 seminar of Williams highlighted as an anchor program for ADF development.

The seminar program:

 

 

 

Evolving European Fighter Programs: A March 2023 Update

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Evolving European Fighter Programs: A March 2023 Update
03/29/2023

By Pierre Tran

Paris – It is still early days in the studies for a European New Generation Fighter (NGF) and a target weight has yet to be decided, but it is clear 20 tonnes is excessive for the planned fighter jet, a source working on the project said.

Weight is a key design factor in determining the cost and speed of the fighter, the key element in the European Future Combat Air System, backed by France, Germany, and Spain.

The fighter, remote carrier drones and an extensive combat cloud of command and control are the three elements of a Next Generation Weapon System (NGWS) at the heart of FCAS.

There is “constant attention in reducing the weight because of the affordability,” the source said. “The less heavy it is, the less expensive it will be. This is why we believe 20 tonnes is too heavy.

“The philosophy is to make it fast. But we have no clue on where it will land: 18, 17, 15 tonnes…,” the source said. That would be empty weight, without weapons.

The studies show a range of “mission vignettes,” which will set the weight and speed for the fighter.

By way of comparison, the twin-engined F-22 Raptor fighter jet weighs around 20 tonnes, the single-engine F-35 Joint Strike Fighter around 13.5 tonnes, while the twin-engine Rafale some nine-10 tonnes.

Two key French requirements play a large role in the design of the European fighter, namely the fighter will carry a planned fourth-generation, hypersonic nuclear-tipped missile, project name ASN4G, and fly from a planned next generation, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, which will replace the French navy flagship, Charles de Gaulle.

The partner nations, Germany and Spain, agree the fighter will meet those French specific requirements, the source said.

The then French navy chief of staff, admiral Christophe Prazuck told Oct. 23 2019 the French senate a new fighter jet weighing some 30 tonnes and carrying a heavier payload than the Rafale implied a new aircraft carrier would weigh around 70,000 tonnes and be 280-300 meters long. That compared to the Charles de Gaulle’s 42,000 tonnes and 261 meters.

Seven Pillars of Combat

The new European fighter is the first pillar of seven project pillars, the core element of the Future Combat Air System. The other pillars are a new engine, remote carriers, combat cloud, simulation lab, stealth, and sensors.

Dassault Aviation is the French prime contractor on the fighter, with German-based Airbus Defence and Space as the industrial partner in Germany and Spain.

The planned European fighter will be a twin-engined, stealthy jet, and the stealth requirement calls for an internal weapons bay, which will result in a large overall surface in the design architecture, the source said.

The fighter/FCAS project is entering phase 1B, on a budget of €3 billion ($3.3 billion), with results of the studies to be delivered in 2025. Phase 1B studies seek to decide just what kind of fighter it will be, its capabilities, shape, and size. There is also research and technology to prepare the ground for demonstrating technology in phase 2.

The approach is to simulate and evaluate the various technical factors, working on a virtual “spider web” of elements, and arriving at the “best compromise,” the source said.

Lessons were learnt on the importance of intellectual property rights in industrial negotiations between Airbus DS and Dassault for phase 1B, the source said, and it remains to be seen how IPR will be respected in phase 2. Airbus DS is determined to learn as much as possible on building a fighter jet, seeking to be in the leading position in the coming years.

The plan is to power the fighter with a new compact engine, producing greater power and working at higher temperature, requiring breakthrough in materials and components. The U.S. and France are each working on a range of technologies such as a variable cycle engine, capable of flying at supersonic and subsonic speeds.

“This is very complex to master,” the source said. A technology demonstrator of the fighter is due to fly in 2029, but will not be powered by the new engine.

Safran Aircraft Engines is the prime contractor in the Franco-German aero-engine joint venture dubbed Eumet, and the French company will work on the combustion chamber at the heart of the motor. MTU, its German JV partner, is working on the front section of the motor, and the Spanish partner, ITP, on the back part.

Phase 2, comprising research and technology, and building a fighter demonstrator, is due to start in 2026 and take the fighter project to 2029. The maiden flight in 2029 was delayed a couple of years due to tough talks between Airbus DS and Dassault on the phase 1B contract.

A total budget of some €8 billion has been earmarked for work between now and 2030, including an option for phase 2, the armed forces ministry said Dec. 15.

Phase 3, with development and production of the fighter, is due in the 2030 decade, with delivery of the fighter and related systems in 2040. The total budget for the FCAS program has been estimated at €50 billion-€80 billion, a French senate report said July 15 2020.

Anglo-French Cooperation

An announced industrial cooperation between France and the U.K. on a future anti-ship and future cruise missiles is “much more concrete” than the Paris-Berlin partnership on FCAS and a future main battle tank, said Jean-Paul Palomeros, ex-chief of staff of the French air force and former supreme allied commander of the Nato transformation command in Norfolk, Virginia.

A recent summit between Britain and France was “positive” and pointed up “relaunched cooperation” between the two allies, Palomeros told March 14 the Anglo-American Press Association.

That summit showed London and Paris had renewed ties after an “awful” time after Brexit, he said, and the conversation on their joint missile capability was “concrete.”

That missile cooperation was underscored by the British Storm Shadow and French Scalp cruise missile, and Meteor long-range missile, with the latter a “great success” for European nations, he said.

French president Emmanuel Macron and U.K. prime minister Rishi Sunak held the bilateral summit March 10 at the Elysée Palace presidential office, and their joint statement referred to  industrial cooperation on new anti-ship and cruise missiles.

It was “nonsense” that there should be two fighter jet programs in Europe, in view of the vast production cost, said Peter Ricketts, former British ambassador to France and ex-U.K. national security adviser.

“My own feeling is that it is nonsense for Europe to be trying to produce two different fast jet fighters over the next 20 years,” he told March 20 the Anglo-American Press Association.  There has been competition for many years between British and French aircraft industry, with the Typhoon and Rafale, he said.

“I don’t think there is room any more,” he said, pointing to the vast cost of U.S. manufacture of the F-35 fighter.

“My feeling is these two programs will come together at some point in the next decade, and there will be one European product with each country taking a share,” he said. But for now, there will be two types of fighters with interoperability, allowing the jets to fly from each other’s airfields, he added.

The summit referred to the scope for cooperation for the future fighters to carry the same weapons, communicate with each other, and be interoperable, he said.

“They commit to concrete steps forward regarding the further advancement of the Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Weapon (FCAS/W) programme to avoid capability gaps. In particular, they commit to deliver a future cruise capability in 2030,” the U.K. and France said in a joint statement on the summit.

That bilateral cooperation would extend beyond missiles to include communications and weapons on the respective FCAS programs pursued separately by Britain and France.

“France and the United Kingdom will seek for commonalities in their respective roadmaps in the missiles domain, notably addressing the needs for the future air platforms. France and the UK will work together on ensuring interoperability of their respective Future Combat Air Systems, including on communication and on armament systems,” the joint statement said.

The joint statement after the summit referred to One MBDA, the joint venture missile maker, whose partners are based in Britain, France and Italy.

The U.K. Goes Global With Japan

The U.K. has added Japan as national partner to its Tempest new fighter jet project with Italy, branding the new industrial alliance, Global Combat Air Programme.

The U.K. and Japan will each fund some 40 percent of development of GCAP, with Italy to finance the remaining 20 percent, Reuters reported March 15, adding that British and Italian defense ministries said respectively they did not recognize those reported remarks and the assessments were speculative.

Besides allied fighters in the GCAP/Tempest project, there are also communications to the U.S. Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter and links to the Australian loyal wingmen drones to be considered, the source said.

Meanwhile, Berlin’s support for FCAS and a Franco-German project for a Main Ground Combat System showed Germany’s willingness for change and ready to “invest in defense,” Palomeros said.

“It looks like they are ready,” he said, pointing out that Germany’s announced €100 billion military budget would accommodate both the FCAS and procurement of the F-35 fighter to allow the German air force to continue its Nato nuclear air component.

“Let’s see,” he said.

Upgrade of Rafale and Nuclear Missile

Meanwhile, the Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office qualified March 13 the Rafale to F4.1, the first step in the F4 standard, ushering in an “era of collaborative air combat,” the armed forces ministry said in a statement.

The F4 standard, part of the move toward the new generation fighter, will be retrofitted to the Rafale F3-R, plugging the fighter into networks with satellite and software defined radio links for data exchange and communications with other pilots and protection against cyber threats.

The upgrade includes a Scorpion pilot’s helmet with head mounted display for targeting weapons, and upgrades to the active electronically scanned array radar, front sector opto-electronics, and Talios targeting pod.

The fighter will carry new weapons, namely Mica NG air-to-air missile and 1,000 kg armement air-sol modulaire (AASM), a powered smart bomb with GPS and laser guidance. The network upgrade will also allow a Rafale pilot to guide a Meteor missile fired by a fellow pilot to hit the target.

This “incremental development” is intended to meet evolving national and export requirements for the Rafale, the ministry said.

The United Arab Emirates has ordered 80 Rafales at the F4 standard, with first delivery due in 2026 and continuing to 2031. That export deal is worth some €14 billion.

Dassault will work on the F5 version this year, Eric Trappier, executive chairman of the aircraft company, said March 9 at a news conference on the 2022 financial results.

The Rafale carries the supersonic, ramjet-powered, nuclear-armed missile, dubbed  air-sol moyen portée améliorée (ASMPA), which is undergoing a midlife upgrade with the ASMPA-R version, and will later be replaced by the hypersonic ASN4G missile.

The DGA said March 22 2022 the procurement office had conducted the second successful test firing of an ASMP-R, which marked certification of the weapon and allowed launch of production by MBDA. The weapon in that test fire was unarmed.

Editor’s Note: on 16 March 2023, the UK Ministry of Defence published their look at their UK-led global combat program:

The UK, Japan and Italy joined forces at DSEI Japan to showcase the new Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) publicly for the first time since it was announced late last year.

Defence Secretary, Ben Wallace, has been in Tokyo to view some of the ground-breaking technology that is driving this unique programme and meeting with his Italian and Japanese counterparts.

On display at DSEI Japan was the high-tech GCAP stand, staffed by personnel from the three partnering countries. Attendees were able to see a new 3-metre model of the latest aircraft design and industry partners brought GCAP to life with a cockpit demonstrator and immersive simulators.

Following a joint announcement made by the Prime Ministers of the UK, Italy and Japan in December 2022, GCAP is aiming to deliver a next-generation combat aircraft by 2035. By combining forces the UK and our partners will deliver the military capability we need to overcome fast evolving threats, share costs and ensure the RAF remains interoperable with some of our closest partners.

The project is also expected to drive economic growth and create high-skill jobs. Last year, a report by PWC suggested the UK taking a core role in a combat air system could support an average of 21,000 jobs a year and contribute an estimated £26.2bn to the economy by 2050.

Defence Secretary, Ben Wallace, said:

“The Global Combat Air Programme is an enduring, strategic, partnership that will see the creation of a sixth generation fighter, to protect our skies for decades to come and bring together an alliance of nations, bridging Europe and the Pacific. 

“It’s exciting to be working alongside Japan and Italy and see this project fuse the best of all our technologies, locking in a partnership of liberal and open democracies who believe in the rule of law.”

During the conference, industry partners made several collaboration agreements furthering the work of the Global Combat Air programme. They include:

  • BAE Systems, MHI and Leonardo continue to work closely together on the next steps in the Global Combat Air Programme with a shared ambition for a joint industrial arrangement.
  • Rolls-Royce, IHI and Avio Aero setting out the terms under which they will pool their expertise to design, manufacture and test a full-scale future combat engine demonstrator.
  • Mitsubishi Electric (Japan) & Leonardo UK; & Leonardo and Elettronica (Italy) agreeing to form a special domain to develop advanced on-board electronics which will provide aircrew with information advantage and advanced self-protection capabilities.

A new visual identity and logo has also been revealed for the GCAP programme, depicting a future combat aircraft.

During his visit, the Defence Secretary had a trilateral ministerial meeting with Japanese Defence Minister Yasukazu Hamada and Italian Defence Minister Guido Crosetto. The meeting was attended by Sir Mike Wigston, UK Chief of the Air Staff, the two Air Chiefs from Japan and Italy, and industry leadership.

The Defence Secretary also met separately with Japanese Defence Minister Hamada to reaffirm the UK and Japan’s shared values and close defence and security partnership.

They reflected on the importance of our landmark defence treaty, the Reciprocal Access Agreement, signed by the UK and Japanese Prime Ministers in January 2023, and discussed the UK’s recent defence activity with Japan’s Self Defence Forces, including Exercise VIGILANT ISLES and Exercise KEEN SWORD.

The UK Defence Secretary also visited the 1st Airborne Brigade; the unit who hosted British Army personnel for Exercise VIGILANT ISLES in 2022, meeting and observing training by those engaging with our personnel and reiterating the importance the UK places on strengthening the UK and Japan defence relationship.

Featured Photo: UK officials at DESI Japan.

 

Putting the 2023 Australian Strategic Review in Context: An Assessment by John Blaxland

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Putting the 2023 Australian Strategic Review in Context: An Assessment by John Blaxland
03/28/2023

By Robbin Laird

Currently I am in Canberra, Australia to participate in the latest Williams Foundation Seminar for which I write the reports. While visiting, I have the opportunity to discuss strategic issues with a number of analysts and officials while here.

This year is noticeable for the coming defence review of the Labor government and the recent announcement of the new nuclear submarine program which has been announced as part of a broader initiative of cooperation with Britain and the United States which has been christened AUKUS.

What this will amount to really in the years ahead is unknowable, but will depend on how seriously Australia builds it own defense capability and how the United States and its Pacific allies reshape how they deal with the various threats in the region and beyond. The United Kingdom can only be an ancillary player, and clearly, the relationship of Australia to Japan will be much more determinate about how Australia defends itself in the years to come.

Hence, no matter what is delivered in the final public report on defense in April, the Strategic Defence Review needs to be placed in context.

And in a conversation with Professor John Blaxland, the noted Australian defense analyst, John did so.

Appropriately we had this conversation in a local Canberra pub near Blaxland Park. Blaxland started by focusing on core questions which will be raised quickly in the public debate.

“Whatever the recommendations, how will changes be resourced and implemented?”

He warned that there could be a propensity to have an ongoing bureaucratic focus on the review, more interested in process and the broader question of rethink, than upon actually improving the capability for Australian defense.

Blaxland quoted the late Jim Molan to the point that Australia needed a broad national strategic review and policy within which a defense review would occur. A defense review is simply too narrow given the nature of the challenges posed by China to Australia.

In my own work, I have emphasized the importance of dealing with the Chinese approach to globalization which has put the liberal democracies in a subordinate position as a key part of any credible rethink of Pacific defense. Blaxland agreed with this point.

Blaxland underscored that the current government has rejected language used by the Morrison government as being too militaristic and too critical of China. Having avoided the question of why you are doing a defense review and focusing on what you need to do in the changed situation makes it difficult to have the kind of public narrative Australia will need to persuade the public and Australia’s partners in the region.

So how will the delivery of the defense review be accompanied by a credible and effective public narrative?

With regard to shaping a credible and cohesive national narrative, Blaxland raised concerns with regard to the energy initiative of the government and the deal they cut with the Greens as one element of the context.

The Greens are the most anti-military and anti-AUKUS political group of influence in Australian politics. What impact does this agreement on energy and Labor’s elevating the importance of the Greens have on the broader defense debate, discussion and narrative?

AUKUS will be embedded in the broader defense review, so that criticism which has already emerged within the Labor Party about AUKUS will be carried forward into the Strategic Defence Review itself.

Blaxland underscored that there is a clear need for more effective strategic messaging in an era of unrestricted competition or what some have called the weaponization of everything.

That is sure why there is a need for a broader national strategy for Australia to compete effectively in a world of 21st century authoritarian conflict with the liberal democracies.

Blaxland described the period we have entered as being one of three intersecting circles of a Venn diagram. One circle might be labelled great power contestation; the second circle might be labelled looming environmental catastrophe; and the third might be labelled governance challenges in the liberal democracies.

How does AUKUS and the Strategic Defence Review fit into this world?

In short, the about-to-be-released Strategic Defence Review is not the end of the discussion but simply part of the discussion of what realistically is the way ahead for Australian defense, and a good part of answering that question will not even be about the ADF.

John Blaxland is Professor of International Security and Intelligence Studies in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC), Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University (ANU).

He is a Senior Fellow of the Higher Education Academy and a Fellow of the Royal Society of New South Wales. He has previously been a Chief Intelligence Staff Officer (J2) at HQ Joint Operations Command, defence attaché to Thailand and Myanmar, Head of SDSC and Director of the ANU Southeast Asia Institute. At ANU, he teaches “Honeypots and Overcoats: Australian Intelligence in the World” and supervises several PhD students.

He lectures regularly at the ANU National Security College (on the Geostrategic SWOT Analysis for Australia) and Australian Defence College (including the Defence and Strategic Studies Course, Command and Staff Course, Australian Defence Force Academy and Royal Military College, Duntroon).

He also addresses conferences and workshops on security in Australia (RUSI, U3A, Army Research Centre, Seapower Conference, etc) Malaysia, Korea, Thailand (Thammasat, Chulalongkorn and military academies), the Philippines, Taiwan, UK (Kings College London), the USA (Minerva, CSIS, East West Centre, etc) and Canada and offers commentary with The Australian Institute of International Affairs, The Guardian, The Age & Sydney Morning Herald, Canberra Times, The Australian, The New York Times, Bangkok Post, The Straits Times, The Jakarta Post, Asia Times, Australian Foreign Affairs, The Conversation, The Saturday Paper, Lowy Interpreter, The Mandarin, East Asia Forum, SCMP, World Politics Review, The Diplomat, Policy Forum, The RAND Blog, Voices of War, Security Challenges, The Australian Army Journal, Defence Connect and the Journal of Global Strategic Studies.

He also occasionally offers comments on television and radio including on the ABC, BBC, CNN, SkyNews, TRT World, Arirang, WION, France24 and CNA.

Featured Image: Australian Deputy Prime Minister, the Hon. Richard Marles MP speaks to the media during a visit to HMAS Stirling, Western Australia.

On 14 March 2023, the Government announced the first initiative under an enhanced trilateral security partnership with the United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS) that will identify the optimal pathway for the acquisition of at least eight nuclear-powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy. The Deputy Prime Minister, the Hon. Richard Marles held a press conference at HMAS Stirling on Thursday 16 March to outline the Government’s plan for the acquisition of Nuclear Submarines.

Credit: Australian Department of Defence