By George Galdorisi

The USN’s commitment to a future fleet comprised of as many as 150 unmanned maritime systems did not instantly materialize, and it is worth examining this journey. This is due to the fact that the ADF and RAN will likely have to socialize such a change in the composition of Australia’s Navy over time and in much the same way.

Here is how the U.S. Navy finally arrived at this major decision. The U.S. Navy’s commitment to—and dependence on—unmanned systems was seen several years ago in the Navy’s official Force Structure Assessment, as well as in a series of “Future Fleet Architecture Studies.”  In each of these studies: one by the Chief of Naval Operations Staff, one by the MITRE Corporation, and one by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, the proposed Navy future fleet architecture had large numbers of air, surface, and subsurface unmanned systems as part of the Navy force structure.

Soon thereafter, these goals regarding populating the Navy Fleet with large numbers of unmanned vehicles were described in the Congressional Research Service Report, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, which describes plans for a 355-ship Navy, as well as a “Battle Force 2045,” for achieving a fleet of more than 500 manned and unmanned ships by 2045.

Issued in December 2020, America’s Tri-Service Maritime Strategy, Advantage at Sea was demonstrated a commitment to unmanned systems. The same month that Advantage at Sea was published, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, suggested that a much larger 500-ship U.S. Navy would be necessary to contain Chinese expansionist ambitions. In a direct reference to the importance of unmanned systems in reaching this goal, General Milley noted: “Part of the move to pursue a 500-ship fleet rests upon the hope for as many as 140 to 250 unmanned vessels,” which he called, “Sailorless ships, robots on the water and under the water,” would be part of the U.S. Navy inventory.

It appears that the U.S. Navy is committed to making unmanned systems of various types and capabilities an important part of the Navy Fleet in the near-, mid- and especially long-term. During his Congressional testimony in support of his nomination for the post of Secretary of the Navy, Carlos Del Toro said: “Investments in unmanned naval systems will be key to meeting those threats. It’s important to ensure that they’re fully integrated with all of our existing platforms.”  Subsequently, the Strategic Guidance issued by the Secretary of the Navy in October 2021 calls out unmanned systems as: “A technological breakthroughs that will define future conflict.”

Also that year, the Department of the Navy released its UNMANNED Campaign Framework. In his introductory message introducing this Framework, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday, explained:

“Unmanned Systems have and will continue to play a key part in future Distributed Maritime Operations and there is a clear need to field affordable, lethal, scalable, and connected capabilities. A hybrid fleet will be necessary for the Navy to meet emerging security concerns. We need platforms to deliver lethal and non-lethal effects simultaneously in all domains across multiple axes. UxS will provide added capacity in our Future Fleet—in the air, on the surface, and under the water.”

Most agree that the culminating event in the U.S. Navy’s journey to build a hybrid fleet occurred in July 2022 with the issuance of the Chief of Naval Operations NAVPLAN 2022, and Force Design 2045, which both call for a “hybrid fleet” 373 manned ships, and 150 large unmanned surface and subsurface platforms.  These official U.S. Navy documents provided the clearest indication yet of the Navy’s plans for a future fleet populated by large numbers of unmanned maritime systems.

Admiral Gilday put a stake in the ground and made a huge bet that represented a sea change in Navy force structure plans that is without precedent in recent memory. This new direction promises to have profound implications for the U.S. Navy through at least the middle of the century. Specially regarding unmanned maritime vehicles, Force Design 2045 notes: “Unmanned surface and subsurface platforms to increase the fleet’s capacity for distribution; expand our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance advantage; add depth to our missile magazines; supplement logistics; and enhance fleet survivability. This transition will rebalance the fleet away from exquisite, manpower intensive platforms toward smaller, less-expensive, yet lethal ones.”

To support these goals regarding large numbers of unmanned maritime platforms populating the U.S. Navy established an Unmanned Task Force in August 2021 to provide stewardship for Navy-wide efforts to accelerate efforts regarding unmanned systems. Task Force leader, Michael Stewart, described the focus of this effort:

“With operational needs in mind, the task force uses a venture capital-like method to identify investments that could pay off: the process scans technology across the military and commercial markets; identifies which could be applied to warfighter challenges; hunts for potential barriers to implementation; picks technologies for further experimentation; and, in the end, selects a handful of items to receive small investments.

“I wanted to make sure that whatever the requirement was, you could trace it right back to the National Defense Strategy, the Joint Warfighting Concept, the CNO Navigation Plan and the Commandant’s Planning Guidance. We wanted to make sure we were solving a problem the warfighter actually cared about.”

From all indications that we have today, it seems that for the U.S. Navy, the intent is to go all-in on unmanned maritime vehicles and field a hybrid force of manned and unmanned systems. Importantly, the intent is to have these unmanned systems work in conjunction with manned platforms and achieve the goal of manned-unmanned teaming. Indeed, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday described this concept of operations (CONOPS) when he noted that he: “Wants to begin to deploy large and medium-sized unmanned vessels as part of carrier strike groups and amphibious ready groups in 2027 or 2028, and earlier if I can.”

What the ADF and RAN Will Likely Be Keen to Learn

While Australia is watching the USN on its journey to introduce more unmanned maritime vehicles into its fleet and ultimately field a hybrid force, it is important to understand that Australia does have its own overarching plan to thoughtfully insert uncrewed systems into the Australian Defence Force. This plan is embodied in two capstone documents: Robotics, Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence (RAS-AI) Strategy 2040 and the Robotics, Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence (RAS-AI) Campaign Plan 2025 which sets out the challenges and opportunities that these technologies present for the ADF and RAN.

While moving forward with the purpose and intent of these documents, the Australian Defence Force can likely glean useful lessons from the U.S. Navy’s journey to populate its fleet with large numbers of unmanned maritime vehicles. Here are some signposts that will likely indicate how this journey is materializing:

(1) Watch how the U.S. Congress reacts to U.S Navy requests for funding for unmanned maritime vehicles. At the moment as a skeptical Congress has challenged the Navy to come up with a concept of operations (CONOPS) for how it intends to use these platforms.

(2) See if the U.S. Navy changes direction on its commitment to unmanned maritime vehicles. The journey of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is instructive. When the LCS program was conceived decades ago the threat landscape was vastly different than it is today, and the number of LCS in the U.S. Navy inventory is but a fraction of what was originally intended.

(3) Watch how industry reacts to the U.S. Navy’s desire to acquire a substantial number of unmanned maritime vehicles. It is one thing for a defense contractor to tool up to produce more of the same class of ship such as the DDG 51, but quite another to build an entire new line of hulls.

(4) See how a CONOPS evolves for the use of unmanned maritime vehicles. Will they sail completely independently or be part of U.S. Navy carrier or expeditionary strike groups. That will be a huge factor in how these platforms ultimately evolve. One evolving CONOPS involves having large USVs serve as a “truck” to transport medium and small USVs into the battle space.

(5) Watch how the CONOPS progresses for how the U.S. Navy actually uses unmanned maritime vehicles. What missions will they perform? How will the mix of large, medium and small USVs work together? These signposts for how the ADF and RAN might employ these platforms.

(6) As the U.S. Navy’s development and fielding of USVs evolves, observe whether these platforms are really uncrewed or not. Given the ongoing maintenance needs of naval vessels operating in harsh ocean environment, technology will likely have to evolve to make these USVs truly uncrewed.

(7) Crewed naval vessels have multiple ways to communicate with each other. It is not a trivial thing to evolve methods to command and control unmanned maritime vehicles. The ADF and RAN will want to watch carefully how the U.S. Navy evolves a command and control methodology for its evolving USV fleet.

(8) Given the long acquisition process common for most naval vessels, watch how the U.S. Navy decides to field unmanned maritime vehicles. There are current initiatives to move to a different paradigm such as contractor-owned, contractor-operated (COCO) in order to speed the fielding of these systems.

Navies Learning Together and Sharing Best Practices

These are only some of the signposts that the ADF and RAN will want to observe as they watch the U.S. Navy begin its journey to evolve a hybrid fleet in the decades ahead. This will likely not be a “linear” journey but will move forward with fits and starts, as is common with any new and emerging technology.

It is worth remembering that Australia and the United States, while bound by a defense treaty as well as cultural, economic and other factors, have substantially different security needs. That said, as both nations and navies seek to leverage the possibilities presented by unmanned maritime systems, “looking over the fence” to see what one’s neighbor is doing can be mutually beneficial for both.

This article was first published by APDR in February 2023 and is republished with the permission of the author.

The featured photo shows MARTAC’s Devil Ray USV autonomous system participating in the 2022 Australian Autonomous Warrior Exercise. 

By Robbin Laird

I first encountered the Osprey in 2007 in a visit to MAG-26 at New River. In that discussion with Marines, we focused on how what was referred to me early on, as the Osprey Nation, was stood up and shaped a core group of combat warriors who brought such an innovative plane into combat and reshaped really how the Marines have operated since then.

For the nascent Osprey Nation, the Osprey functioned largely as an assault aircraft in Iraq and Afghanistan but unique roles which the aircraft would play in providing greater range and speed for the medical mission quickly became appreciated.

But as Marine Corps Aviation moves to incorporate a new function which might be bundled with the Navy’s focus on distributed maritime operations, the flexibility of the aircraft is being demonstrated and a much wider range of payloads being enabled by the aircraft.

In my book with Ed Timperlake on the coming of the maritime kill web, we underscore that a distributed force built around modular task forces highlights the payloads which the task force can deliver in terms of effects, rather than describing that task force in terms of a core platform.

The flexibility which the Osprey provides – with the USMC, the U.S. Navy and the USAF operating the aircraft – opens the aperture significantly on how one configures the aircraft to deliver what payload in which situation for which combat and deterrent effect.

To understand more about this change for the Osprey Nation, I recently talked with Colonel Marvel, the CO of MAG-39, located at Camp Pendleton (see his biography at the end of the article). Col Marvel and his team have worked closely with the CMV-22B team at North Island in the standup of the Navy’s Osprey capability.

In early January 2023, I visited, Captain Sam Bryant, Commander, Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Wing in North Island, and he underscored the Navy’s interest in broadening the CMV-22Bs role beyond the legacy Carrier on Demand function.

As I noted in that interview: “Captain Bryant reported that the U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander, Admiral Paparo, was pleased with the initial deployments, but feels that the Osprey can do much more in its role in evolving fleet concepts of operations. The aircraft provides an important support for, but more than that, stimulant for the shift in con-ops whereby the Navy focus on distributed operations which itself is in an experimental development and growth phase and intersects with the USAF’s approach to agile combat employment. In other words, the reshaping of joint and coalition operations is underway which focuses upon distributed task forces which can deliver enhanced lethality and survivability.”

Col Marvel underscored that expanding the mission set for the Navy’s CMV-22B was certainly possible but was not in his domain of responsibility. But the USMC is clearly expanding the payloads carried by the MV-22B which supports distributed operations, and if the three services which operate the aircraft found ways to expand their ability to cross-service each other’s aircraft, they would be able to enhance such operations.

As Col Marvel put it: “The Osprey provides unique speed and range combinations with an aircraft which can land vertically. It is a very flexible aircraft which could be described as a mission-kitable aircraft. The Osprey has big hollow space in the rear of the aircraft that can hold a variety of mission kits dependent on the mission which you want the aircraft to support.”

He emphasized that with a variety of roll-on roll-off capabilities with different payloads. “We can add the specialists in the use of a particular payload along with the payload itself to operate that payload, whether kinetic or non-kinetic, whether it is a passive or active sensor payload. We need to stop thinking about having to put the command of such payloads under the glass in the cockpit, and control those payloads with a tablet.”

Col Marvel underscored that the Marines when deployed are engaged in presence missions. How then best to use their presence to deliver the desired effect? And given the Marines are operating across the spectrum of warfare, and that spectrum itself is changing, which payloads are most relevant to the mission?  This means that “we need to maximize the payload utility of our platforms.”

He provided a number of examples of different payloads which they are working with from USVs to a variety of passive and active sensors. Kill webs need to be sustained and Ospreys can provide both fuel and ordinance to platforms throughout the extended battlespace. For example, Ospreys can bring fuel and ordinance to a FARP (forward arming and refueling point) and support P-8 operations, for example.

Ospreys can palatize torpedoes and engage them in the battlespace. They can provide key parts of the network of sensors that make a distributed forces’ domain C² and fires control picture. With the proper payload, Ospreys can maintain contact with surface and subsurface forces to help build a common tactical operating picture.

The Navy with the USMC are doing a wide range of mission rehearsal experimentation to determine how best to operate a variety of payloads operating off of various platforms to enable the distributed force to have the kind of effect – kinetic or non-kinetic – which is desired.  The Osprey – with its range, speed, and landing flexibility – can play a key role in this overall effort.

One example of the kind of experimentation which Col Marvel was talking about was highlighted in a 3 January 2023 story released by 3^rd Marine Aircraft Wing.

This story highlighted actions by Marine Air Control Group 38 in Exercise Steel Knight 2023.

“Marines and Sailors with Marine Air Control Group 38 refined tactics for future maritime conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region during Exercise Steel Knight 2023. With units positioned across California and Arizona, MACG-38 tested components of Aviation Command and Control in conjunction with 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing’s “Hub, Spoke and Node” model in preparation for the next fight.

“Acting as the “Hub,” MACG-38 established a Tactical Air Command Center aboard Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, San Diego, California. With the TACC fully operational, MACG-38, in conjunction with 3rd MAW key leaders, facilitated command and control of air assets throughout the battlespace.

“Concurrently, MACG-38 set up a “Spoke” at the Strategic Expeditionary Landing Field at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center located in 29 Palms, Ca in order to facilitate Marine Aircraft Group 16’s Assault Support requirements for Steel Knight 23. From the SELF, Marines from MACG-38 were able to establish Forward Arming and Refueling Points in conjunction with MV-22B Ospreys and CH-53E Super Stallions from MAG-16. From these remote locations, MACG-38 Marines were able to support the refueling of both MAG-16 aircraft and tactical air platforms including the F-35B Lightning II from MAG-13.

“Off the coast of San Diego on San Clemente Island, MACG-38 also imbedded a platoon of Marines from 3d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion with the 11th Marine Regiment in order to earn certification for the upcoming Marine Rotational Force-Darwin deployment to Australia. While on San Clemente Island, LAAD Marines provided critical support for a large-scale Air Assault. During the exercise, LAAD gunners executed over a dozen live-fire shoots and earned their certification for MRF-D.

“Steel Knight 23 also saw the establishment of organic Air Control Companies within 3rd MAW. In order to experiment with and force generate Multifunction Air Operations Centers without impact to global force management tasking, MACG-38 transferred personnel and equipment from MACS-1 Air Defense Company Bravo to MASS-3 in order to reorganize Marine Air Support Squadron 3 into three Air Control Companies and a Headquarters Company. Under this new construct, MASS-3 was both able to support all I Marine Expeditionary Force and 3rd MAW C2 functionalities and requirements over a broader spectrum by capturing MAOC personnel and equipment requirements, techniques, tactics, and procedures, and training requirements. This initiative led to the Initial Operational Capability of MASS-3 Air Control Companies as well as the MAOC force generation event supporting 1st Marine Regiment’s MRF-D deployment.”

In short, as Col Marvel underscored: “there’s a lot of capability that we have now. And our fight is today; today is our last day of peace out in the fleet.”

COLONEL NATHAN S. MARVEL

Col Nathan S. Marvel was born and raised in Northwest Montana.  He enlisted in the Navy in 1992 and attended the Broadened Opportunity Officer Selection Training program (BOOST) in San Diego, California.  In 1994 he accepted an appointment to the United States Naval Academy.  He graduated with a Bachelor of Science in Systems Engineering in 1998 and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps.

After completing The Basic School, he reported for flight training at Naval Air Station (NAS) Pensacola, Florida and NAS Corpus Christi, Texas.  He was designated a Naval Aviator on 20 December 2000 and reported to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Camp Pendleton, CA for instruction as an AH-1W Super Cobra pilot at Marine Helicopter Training Squadron 303 (HMT-303).

In June 2001, Col Marvel reported to the “Gunfighters” of Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 (HMLA-369) where he served as the ground training officer, operations schedule writer, current operations officer, adjutant, future operations officer, logistics officer, tactics officer, and squadron Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI).

Col Marvel deployed in June 2002 to Okinawa, Japan as part of the Unit Deployment Program (UDP).  Traveling from Okinawa on the High-Speed Vessel (HSV), he supported operations in the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of the Philippines, and the Kingdom of Thailand.

In April of 2003, Col Marvel deployed to Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

Shortly after his return he was deployed a second time to Okinawa Japan in 2004 where he participated in operations in the Republic of South Korea and Thailand.  Col Marvel attended the Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) Course in March of 2005.  In July 2005 he deployed with Medium Marine Helicopter 163 (reinforced) (HMM-163(REIN)) “Evil Eyes”, 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) ((MEU)(SOC)), Expeditionary Strike Group One (ESG-1) in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.  Upon return, he joined the “Stingers” of HMLA-267 where he served as the Aviation Safety Officer.

Col Marvel then reported to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1) where he served as an AH-1W Instructor, USMC Assault Support Survivability Subject Matter Expert, AH-1W/Z Course Catalog Manager, AH-1W/Z T&R Program Manager and the Academic Department Head.  After completing his tour in June 2010 Col Marvel reported to Command and Staff College, MCU, Quantico, Virginia and received a Master’s degree in Military Studies.

In June of 2011, Col Marvel reported to Marine Air Group 39 (MAG-39) and was assigned to HMLA-469 as the Tactics Officer and subsequently the Assistant Operations Officer.  In February of 2012, he became the Operations Officer and in April deployed to Camp Leatherneck Afghanistan in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 12.1 & 12.2.  Col Marvel completed his tour in HMLA-469 “Vengeance” as the Executive Officer.

Col Marvel reported to HQMC Aviation, Pentagon, Washington D.C. in the Summer of 2014 and served as the Requirements Officer (RO), Aviation Programs and Weapons (APW-74) for Digital Interoperability (DI), Electronic Kneeboard (EKB) and Joint Mission Planning Software (JMPS).  In the summer of 2015, he returned to MAG-39 and began his conversion to the AH-1Z Viper.

In December of 2015, Col Marvel assumed Command of HMLA-369 the “Gunfighters”.

Upon completion of command, Col Marvel reported to the National War College in June of 2017 and received a Master’s degree in National Security Strategy.  From June 2018 until December 2020 Col Marvel served as a Special Assistant to the Director and Marine Corps Operational Liaison at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in Arlington Virginia.

Featured Photo: U.S. Marines with Marine Aircraft Group 39, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), guide the arrival of a MV-22B Osprey over radio during flight operations as part of Steel Knight 23 on Fort Hunter Liggett, Dec. 7, 2022. Exercise Steel Knight 23 provides 3d MAW an opportunity to refine Wing-level warfighting in support of I Marine Expeditionary Force and fleet maneuver. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Shannon Gibson).

By Robbin Laird

To deal with the challenges in the Pacific, the United States has and will continue to have a significant shortfall in core platforms to implement a classic warfighting strategy. That is why I wrote a book with my colleagues published in 2013 entitled, Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific.  At the heart of our argument was the need to reinvent the way forces were deployed, connected and empowered.

Nothing that has occurred since we wrote that book has changed the essential argument. Only the technology which we highlighted in the book has now arrived in part, and new capabilities are within reach now.

Underlying our argument was our characterization of the new approach as an adaptation of the World War II big blue blanket approach.

As we explained it at the outset of the argument in the book:

“We look at the geographical context, the role of allies, and the need to shape an effective defense approach, which we identify as shaping an attack defense enterprise, or an interactive “big blue blanket” over the Pacific. In World War II, the USN shaped what became called the big blue blanket of ships to cover the Pacific operations. Obviously, this is beyond the ken of current realities, but shaping a connected set of U.S. and allied forces able to work together to shape defense and security in the Pacific is not.”[1]

A technological development which we mention in the book is creating new opportunities for force development, namely, the arrival of unmanned surface systems which can operate as an integratable partner with a new generation of unmanned air vehicles.

Rather than having UAVs as a strategic asset supporting a strategic level directed tactical operation, more transient UAVs operating off USVs or working in tandem with forces at the tactical edge are now possible.

This then enhances significantly the capability of operating task forces with modular flexibility and with enhanced understanding of their battlespace to deliver the desired effects within that battlespace.

Rather than operating with top down ISR, distributed modular task forces can create ISR clusters which can push data back towards higher level command elements, and at the same time operate more effectively in their local operating area.

Recently, I discussed these developments with Lt. General (Retired) Steve Rudder. I last met with him in Honolulu in a visit in 2021 when he was MARFORPAC.

Now recently retired, he continues to focus on the evolution of concepts of operations for the maritime forces.

He started our conversation by highlighting the changing strategic environment, which demands speed in accurate decision-making.

And to do so, raises an inherent challenge of centralized control and decentralized execution.

“As the operational forces have enhanced ISR capabilities at the tactical edge, there is a natural friction point between them and decision making with regard to how much authority is released to those forces to act on their own. In a conflict situation, this becomes an authority’s dilemma for in stride targeting.  The tactical forces are increasingly becoming connected to more capable operational and tactical ISR creating a need for higher-level command authorities to be pushed down.”

Rudder then explained that the evolution of UAVs and USVs and their ability to work within an edge mesh network, gives forces at the tactical edge new capabilities, necessary for them to execute their missions. As he underscored: “Solving the question of how to best use such capabilities should not hinder or delay necessary innovation and implementation. As TF59 proves each day with their unmanned experimentation, the technology is available today.”

With regard to USVs, the U..S Navy faces a major problem of coming to terms with how to use small boats. The shipbuilding plan is not one which highlights the kind of small boats which USVs require, and which operate differently carrying ISR payloads, naturally operating more like wolfpacks than being mere footnotes to a classic naval task force.

The Navy needs such wolfpacks of UAVs and USVs to deal with a number of operational threats and challenges. 

One challenge which Rudder highlighted was the threat from long range low flying cruise missiles. Such wolfpacks can clearly provide timely over the horizon visibility to such a threat. And as technology develops these in no reason payloads could not be placed on UAVs or USVs to defeat such missiles.

The Navy has UAVs and USVs in different stove piped program channels which also makes it difficult to think in wolfpack terms.

How to build in synergy between UAV and USV development?

How to accelerate their contribution to distributed maritime operations?

Another consideration is working with allies.

Shared data is crucial to have common decision making. Exquisite data which is provided by high value strategic assets are shared with very few allies. This is not enough to work with the patchwork of partners in the Pacific which the PLA are contesting with the liberal democracies.

We heed to build shared networks to cover the patchwork of the Pacific in terms of partners.

By creating a network of USVs and UAVs whose function is to generate such data, deterrence is enhanced.

It is about the spectrum of operations not just the question of deployments simply for the highest end of operations. Capabilities already exist to build such a network, which is a low hanging fruit for the build out of UAV-USV collaboration.

And for the United States, such an approach builds a “big blue blanket” with partners which competes with the Chinese version of this already in place. The Chinese fishing fleet empowered by mobile phone technology has built their vision of the network.

As Rudder notes: “There are areas were simply do not have the kind of persistent domain awareness we need. We don’t have the capacity to put capital assets in place to provide for that gap. UAVs and USVs, notably working together, can fill such a gap cost effectively and are available now.”

[1] Laird, Robbin; Timperlake, Edward; Weitz, Richard. Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st-Century Strategy (Praeger Security International) (p. 7). ABC-CLIO. Kindle Edition.)

The featured photo: The MATAS Devil Ray UAS making a high speed run. Credit Photo: MARTAC

For a look at the U.S. Navy and the work of Task Force 59, see the following:

Digital Horizon Wraps Up: Task Force 59 Perspective

Unmanned Integration at Sea: A Perspective on Task Force 59

Task Force 59: Another Perspective

Task Force 59 and Unmanned Maritime Assets