Robbin Laird, Author at Second Line of Defense

The Taiwan-Phillipines-Japan Strategic Triangle

Posted on June 22, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

06/22/2025

While Taiwan tensions are often viewed through a U.S.-China lens, the gravest strategic consequences would fall on Japan and the Philippines. Chinese control of Taiwan would fundamentally alter the regional balance, potentially isolating both nations and forcing them into accommodation with Chinese regional dominance regardless of U.S. positions.

Taiwan’s location at the center of the “First Island Chain” makes it a natural geographic chokepoint. The island sits at the midpoint between Japan’s Southwest Islands to the north and the Philippines’ Luzon archipelago to the south, creating what military strategists call the First Island Chain — a natural barrier that currently contains Chinese naval power within the South and East China Seas. This geographic position gives Taiwan outsized strategic importance far beyond its size.

Located opposite Fujian Province off the Asian continent, Taiwan is nearly the same size as Kyushu, measuring almost 36,000 square kilometers. It sits at the midpoint of the first island chain, the transnational archipelago running south from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines. The loss of this central link would fundamentally reshape regional security dynamics.

Japan’s Critical Vulnerabilities

Japan’s dependence on Taiwan Strait shipping routes creates an acute vulnerability that Chinese control would immediately exploit. CSIS estimates that 32 percent of Japan’s imports and 25 percent of its exports transit the Taiwan Strait, with over 95% of Japan’s crude oil coming from Middle Eastern countries and much of it transported through this route.

About 6 trillion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas, or more than half of global LNG trade, passed through the South China Sea in 2011. Half of this amount continued on to Japan, with the rest going to South Korea, China, Taiwan, and other regional countries. The geographic reality means that for Japan, roughly $13 billion of its imports also pass through the Luzon Strait, yet this is just a fraction of its imports through the Taiwan Strait.

The PRC views the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as part of “Taiwan province” and may seek to take the islands during a conflict. If the PLA Navy were to occupy Taiwan, Japan would struggle to defend its westernmost islands, as well as the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and even Okinawa. This connection transforms Taiwan from a distant concern into an immediate threat to Japanese territory.

The PLA’s shortest passages from China’s mainland to the Pacific Ocean are on the north and south sides of Taiwan. The former is through Japan’s Southwest Islands between Japan’s mainland and Taiwan, and the latter is through the Luzon Strait between Taiwan and the Philippines. Chinese control of Taiwan would breach this natural defensive barrier, fundamentally altering Japan’s strategic environment.

The Philippines’ Dilemma

Any major armed contingency on or around Taiwan would present an economic and humanitarian crisis for the Philippines. As the nearest potential safe harbor, the volume of refugees escaping the conflict would be likely to quickly overwhelm Philippine capacity. The Marcos administration has acknowledged this reality, with the president noting that Taiwan’s proximity to Luzon makes it “hard to imagine” that the country could avoid conflict.

The strategic importance of the Luzon Strait cannot be overstated. Other straits bordering the South China Sea like the Malacca, Sunda and Balabac Straits are too narrow and shallow for submarines to pass through undetected. The Taiwan Strait is adjacent to and heavily monitored by China as well as by Taipei and the US. This makes Luzon Strait critical in all-out war because the nuclear submarines of both China and the US have a better chance of passing through it undetected.

The Luzon Strait is a choke point for access between the South China Sea and the Philippine Sea, and China’s navy uses it to move carrier strike groups and destroyers out to the open Pacific. Access to the strait is necessary for Chinese interests in the event of a Taiwan Strait conflict.

Chinese control of Taiwan would essentially bracket the Philippines between Chinese-dominated waters. The Philippines depends on the strait to transport about one-fifth of its global imports and one-seventh of its exports, but its geography allows it to send much of its trade through the Luzon Strait and Western Pacific Ocean. However, Chinese control of Taiwan would compromise even these alternative routes.

The PRC Perspective

Chinese strategic thinkers explicitly view Taiwan as key to regional domination. Control over Taiwan would transform the Taiwan Strait into China’s “strategic inner lake.” Conversely, so long as the island remained out of China’s hands, it would expose the mainland’s coastal metropolises, seaborne commercial traffic, and the movement of air and naval forces to hostile forces located on Taiwan.

Beijing has long feared that a maritime coalition led by Washington might seek to choke off Chinese access to the seas in a war over Taiwan. Control of the island would thus “shatter the semi-sealed predicament of China’s sea areas” while transforming Taiwan, the central segment of the first island chain, from a barrier into a “portal” to the Pacific.

Chinese forces on the island would be able to radiate power along the first island chain and beyond. From air bases and airports on Taiwan, Chinese aircraft with combat radii of 2,000 kilometers would be able to cover the Yellow and East China Seas, the various straits from Bohai to the north to Bashi to the south, and the Ryukyus, Kyushu, Shikoku, and much of the Philippine archipelago.

Economic and Trade Implications

The Taiwan Strait is the primary route for ships passing from China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to points west, carrying goods from Asian factory hubs to markets in Europe, the US and all points in between. Almost half of the global container fleet and 88% of the world’s largest ships by tonnage passed through the waterway.

If cross-strait tensions become especially dire, cautious shipping companies may avoid routes near Taiwan altogether. That same vessel departing from Singapore may choose to sail south of the Philippines before heading north through the Miyako Strait to reach South Korea. This would extend the journey by roughly 1,000 miles, adding significant costs and delays.

Even alternative shipping routes would face Chinese pressure. Many countries would feel the effects of these disruptions, but two key U.S. allies, Japan and South Korea, would be among those most impacted. It would also likely make it infeasible to stop at Chinese ports while en route, which could have significant ripple effects on supply chains given China’s central role in maritime shipping.

Japan’s Evolving Position

Recent remarks from Japanese leaders do not mean Tokyo has pledged to defend Taiwan if China attacks, or that it necessarily commits to supporting the United States militarily if Washington chooses to get involved. Tokyo’s answer would ultimately depend on top-level political judgments about the conflict’s cause, specific nature, and implications for Japan’s peace and security.

However, Current Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has pledged to double Japan’s defense spending in response to the tense security climate, indicating growing recognition of the stakes involved.

Philippines’ Strategic Balancing

The Philippines has a special economic relationship with Taiwan, but acknowledges the People’s Republic of China (PRC), rather than the Republic of China (Taiwan), as the sole political government of China, and has consistently affirmed the “One China Policy”. However, the Philippine government is now paying more attention to developments in the Taiwan Strait. With the Marcos Jr. Administration, a China policy will likely always be two-pronged: with one prong oriented to Beijing, and another toward Taipei.

Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro said that the region is the “spearhead of the Philippines as far as the northern baseline is concerned,” and that its garrison would be strengthened, reflecting growing awareness of the Luzon Strait’s strategic importance.

Both countries are deepening security ties with the United States. U.S. Marine Corps anti-ship missiles will deploy to the Luzon Strait, a strategic first island chain chokepoint between the Philippines and Taiwan, during Balikatan 2025. The 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment’s Medium-Range Missile Battery will send Naval Strike Missile-equipped systems to the Luzon Strait.

The fourth Taiwan Strait crisis also further motivated Washington to strengthen its alliance with regional powers such as Japan, Australia, and the Philippines.

The Multi-Polar Authoritarian World on the March

Beyond the strategic calculations, the fundamental issue is a question of values. Taiwan is a democratic state and has proven that Chinese culture can embrace democratic values. This is an affront to President Xi and his ideology of authoritarian control and global expansion.

Without any question to assault of Putin and Xi would have a similar motivation, namely, to expand their empires and to recover what is “rightfully theirs.” This is of course true if you are working to create a new global order where middle power democratic states like Australia and Brazil are consider merely commodity providers to the expanding Chinese empire.

In short, while U.S.-China competition dominates headlines about Taiwan, the most profound strategic consequences would fall on Japan and the Philippines. Both nations face the prospect of being isolated from each other and from broader alliance networks, potentially forcing accommodation with Chinese regional dominance regardless of US positions.

China is engaged in a geopolitical competition with the United States and a widening array of allies and partners — Japan and the Philippines most of all — who see their national interests directly threatened by Beijing’s choices. The geographic reality of Taiwan’s central position in the First Island Chain means that its fate will determine whether Japan and the Philippines remain sovereign actors in an open regional order or become subordinated to Chinese regional hegemony.

Understanding Taiwan through this regional lens — rather than purely as a U.S.-China issue —reveals why both Japan and the Philippines are quietly but significantly building defensive capabilities and strengthening security partnerships. For them, Taiwan is not just about U.S-Chinese competition; it is about their fundamental security and sovereignty in the decades ahead.

And for some earlier thoughts during Trump’s first term:

https://breakingdefense.com/2016/12/taiwan-trump-a-pacific-defense-grid-towards-deterrence-in-depth/

Taiwan in Pacific Defense: Turning a New Page

And more recently:

Taiwan, U.S. Defense Industry, and the Evolving Strategy for Indo-Pac Defense

Europe’s Critical Infrastructure Under Siege: From Russian Threats to Chinese Investments

Posted on June 21, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

06/21/2025

By Robbin Laird

In late 2020, Murielle Delaporte and I published our book entitled: The Return of Direct Defense in Europe: Meeting the Challenge of XXIst Century Authoritarian Powers. A major emphasis in that book was that the broad challenge was inclusive of European infrastructure and the clear need for the European Union to focus on defense of infrastructure as a core mission rather than being future military force planners.

Recently, The Wall Street Journal published an insightful piece on Europe and the question of their maritime ports in an age when authoritarian powers are engaged and threaten at the same time those ports.

So what would you get if you combined our earlier analysis with this WSJ analysis of the current situation?

I decided to do just that and this is the result of doing a juxtaposition of the two analytical efforts.

How the continent is racing to secure its ports, supply chains, and strategic assets against dual challenges from authoritarian powers

Europe finds itself confronting an unprecedented dual challenge to its critical infrastructure: immediate military threats from Russia requiring urgent port and transportation upgrades, while simultaneously grappling with long-term strategic vulnerabilities created by decades of Chinese and Russian investment in European infrastructure.

The Immediate Crisis: Militarizing Europe’s Ports

The urgency of Europe’s infrastructure challenge became starkly apparent in recent NATO planning discussions. At the upcoming NATO summit, alliance members are targeting a dramatic increase in military spending from 2% to 5% of GDP, with 1.5% specifically allocated to what officials term “nonlethal domains” – cybersecurity, infrastructure, roads, railroads, and critically, ports.

The European Union has proposed an unprecedented €75 billion ($86 billion) investment over five years to upgrade transport infrastructure for military use, representing a massive leap from the current €1.7 billion military mobility budget. This reflects a sobering recognition that Europe’s ports have become potential chokepoints in any future conflict with Russia.

European officials and NATO planners have identified 500 critical locations across the continent requiring immediate upgrades to ensure rapid troop movement to eastern borders. The challenge extends beyond mere logistics – it encompasses the fundamental question of whether Europe’s commercial infrastructure can serve dual civilian and military purposes without compromising either function.

As Apostolos Tzitzikostas, the EU’s transportation commissioner, explains: “The ability to move troops and military equipment quickly across Europe is a military priority, but it is not just that. It is also essential for crisis response but also for making our transport systems smarter and stronger.”

The Convergence Challenge

The infrastructure crisis reveals what defense analysts call the convergence of cyber and physical vulnerabilities. As one expert noted, “Critical infrastructure is an area where the cyber and physical worlds are converging – the operation of digital systems affects our physical world, and so a cyber incident can have direct and serious physical impacts on property and people.”

This convergence is evident in Europe’s current port security initiatives. The European Maritime Safety Agency is working to identify cyber vulnerabilities in port systems, while the Nordic Maritime Cyber Resilience Center has specifically identified Russian hackers as a significant threat to European infrastructure and defense capabilities.

European officials suspect Russia is behind multiple incidents involving damaged or severed cables and pipelines under the Baltic Sea, part of what they see as a broader campaign to test and potentially compromise European infrastructure resilience.

The Long-Term Vulnerability: Foreign Investment in Strategic Assets

While Europe races to address immediate military infrastructure needs, a parallel challenge has been building for over a decade through Chinese and Russian exploitation of European free market mechanisms. Authoritarian states have systematically invested in and gained control over key European infrastructure, creating dependencies that could be leveraged during future crises.

The scope of this challenge is staggering. Chinese companies now control 29 ports and 47 terminals across more than a dozen European countries, including a 67% stake in Greece’s strategically crucial Port of Piraeus. In France, a Chinese consortium owns nearly 50% of Toulouse airport, located at the heart of the country’s aerospace industry.

The European Union’s belated recognition of this vulnerability led to the adoption in March 2019 of a new “framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union.” This mechanism, comparable to the US CFIUS system, aims to monitor foreign investments that could affect security or public order.

The Nordic Model: Hardened Infrastructure as Standard

Some European nations are pioneering approaches that address both immediate military needs and long-term infrastructure security. Norway’s reconstruction of its F-35 air base at Ørland provides a template for how infrastructure development can prioritize security from the ground up.

The Norwegian approach emphasizes hardened facilities, secure supply chains, and workforce security. As Lt. Col. Eirik Guldvog explains: “The Armed Forces Estate Agency has built camps on the base to house workers to work on the base. Because of classifications, only Norwegian workers are being used.”

This model of “security by design” in infrastructure development contrasts sharply with the ad hoc approach of retrofitting existing commercial infrastructure for military use – the challenge now facing most European ports.

Balancing Security and Competitiveness

The tension between security requirements and commercial viability remains acute. Shipping executives fear that militarizing ports could undermine their competitiveness and deter private investment, particularly in facilities that might become targets during any future conflict.

As Katarzyna Gruszecka-Spychala, vice president of finance at Poland’s Port of Gdynia, notes: “We understand it’s needed, but still, we need to achieve competitiveness. Private investors could hesitate to put money into businesses that may be targeted by Russia.”

This concern reflects a broader European challenge: how to maintain the open, competitive markets that have driven European prosperity while protecting against authoritarian exploitation of those same market mechanisms.

The Path Forward: Integration of Security and Commerce

European officials argue that security and commercial interests can be complementary rather than competing priorities. NATO and EU planners believe that infrastructure upgrades designed for military logistics can simultaneously improve civilian traffic flows and economic efficiency.

The key lies in recognizing that robust, secure infrastructure has become a prerequisite for sustained economic competitiveness, not an obstacle to it. As the EU’s Tzitzikostas emphasizes: “These assets need to be competitive in peacetime and ready to defend European citizens when it matters most.”

A Continental Awakening

Europe’s current infrastructure crisis represents more than a response to immediate military threats – it reflects a fundamental awakening to the intersection of economic openness and national security. The continent that pioneered free trade and open markets is learning to defend these achievements against authoritarian powers that view economic integration as a vulnerability to exploit rather than a mutual benefit to preserve.

The success of Europe’s infrastructure security initiative will depend on its ability to maintain the delicate balance between openness and security, competitiveness and resilience. The stakes extend far beyond military logistics – they encompass the fundamental question of whether democratic societies can maintain their openness while defending against authoritarian manipulation.

As European leaders prepare for the NATO summit and finalize their massive infrastructure investments, they are essentially placing a bet on the possibility of “secure openness” – the idea that democratic values and market principles can coexist with the hard realities of 21st-century strategic competition.

VMM-364 Operating in the Philippines

Posted on June 20, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

06/20/2025

U.S. Marines with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 364, Marine Aircraft Group 39, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, extract U.S. Marines with 3d Littoral Combat Team, 3d Littoral Regiment, 3rd Marine Division from Calayan, Babuyan Islands, Philippines, during KAMANDAG 9, June 1, 2025.

KAMANDAG is an annual Philippine Marine Corps and U.S. Marine Corps-led exercise aimed at enhancing the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ defense and humanitarian capabilities by providing valuable training in combined operations with foreign militaries in the advancement of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

CALAYAN ISLAND, PHILIPPINES

06.01.2025

Video by Lance Cpl. Nan Yang

3rd Marine Aircraft Wing

Midnight on the Roof of the American Embassy: April 30, 1975

Posted on June 19, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

06/19/2025

Ambassador Kenneth Moorefield’s offers a first-person account of his experiences during the Vietnam War as both a soldier and a diplomat, culminating in his evacuation from the Saigon Embassy in 1975.

The article then describes his post-war efforts to aid Vietnamese refugees and American veterans, followed by his return to Vietnam in 1995 to establish diplomatic and economic ties.

Ambassador Moorfield on the Vietnam War

For a podcast discussing this piece by Ambassador Moorefield, see the following:

Midnight on the Roof of the American Embassy: April 30, 1975

Featured image: The image is set at midnight on the roof of the American Embassy on April 30, 1975. It captures the intense and tense atmosphere during the Fall of Saigon, with a silhouette of a helicopter against the night sky. Evacuees are gathered with their emergency bags, showing anxious and tense expressions, under dim lighting that adds to the dramatic scene. The image was generated by an AI program.

U.S. Marines in Iron Fist 2025: Strengthening Pacific Partnerships Through Bilateral Amphibious Operations

Posted on June 19, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

The 2025 iteration of Exercise Iron Fist represents a significant milestone in U.S.-Japan military cooperation, with American Marines and Japanese forces conducting their largest bilateral amphibious training exercise in Japan’s strategically vital southwest islands region.

Running from February 19 through March 7, 2025, this exercise showcased the evolving partnership between the two nations amid growing regional security challenges.

At the heart of Iron Fist 2025 stands the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), serving as the primary American force in the exercise.

The 31st MEU holds a unique position as the Marine Corps’ only permanently forward-deployed MEU, maintaining a continuous presence in the Indo-Pacific region.

Based at Camp Hansen on Okinawa, this force of approximately 2,200 Marines and sailors serves as America’s premier crisis response capability in one of the world’s most strategically important regions³.

The 31st MEU’s current ground combat element centers on Battalion Landing Team 2/4 (BLT 2/4), built around the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines. This reinforced infantry battalion brings substantial amphibious assault capabilities to the exercise, supported by Combat Logistics Battalion 31, which provides essential sustainment and logistics operations.

The integration of these elements creates a complete Marine Air-Ground Task Force capable of rapid deployment and sustained operations across the diverse terrain of Japan’s southwest islands.

A notable component of the Marine participation involved aviation assets from Marine Aircraft Group 36 (MAG-36), based at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma on Okinawa. Four MV-22B Osprey tiltrotor aircraft from MAG-36 relocated to Camp Ainoura on Kyushu for the duration of the exercise. This movement represented part of a broader 2016 U.S.-Japan agreement designed to reduce training activities around Okinawa while maintaining operational readiness.

MAG-36’s participation underscored the critical role of aviation in modern amphibious operations.

The unit, which forms part of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and III Marine Expeditionary Force, specializes in providing assault support aircraft for Marine Air-Ground Task Force operations.

The Osprey’s unique capabilities — combining the vertical lift of a helicopter with the speed and range of a fixed-wing aircraft — make it particularly valuable for operations across the scattered islands of Japan’s southwest region.

Iron Fist 2025 emphasized practical, realistic training scenarios designed to enhance interoperability between American and Japanese forces. The exercise focused specifically on amphibious operations while working to improve the working relationship between U.S. and Japanese ground forces. Training activities spaned multiple domains, including advanced marksmanship, amphibious reconnaissance, fire and maneuver assaults, bilateral logistics coordination, medical support operations, and comprehensive fire support including mortars, artillery, and close-air support.

Recent training events have demonstrated the exercise’s hands-on approach to building partnership capabilities. Marines from BLT 2/4 have conducted live-fire exercises alongside soldiers from Japan’s 1st Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment. These bilateral marksmanship sessions enable forces from both nations to improve their lethality and readiness while learning from each other’s techniques and procedures.

Logistics cooperation represents another crucial element of the training. U.S. Marines from Combat Logistics Battalion 31 have worked directly with Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force personnel on helicopter support team operations, including complex external lift procedures.

In a significant milestone, American Marines successfully conducted the first-ever external lift of a Japanese tactical vehicle, demonstrating growing interoperability in logistics support operations.

The shift of Iron Fist from its traditional California location to Japan’s southwest islands reflects the changing strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region. Until 2023, the exercise was conducted at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton in California before moving to its current location in response to regional security concerns.

Japan’s southwest islands have become increasingly important due to China’s territorial claims on the disputed Senkaku Islands and Beijing’s focus on conducting military exercises simulating a blockade of Taiwan. Chinese military forces, including People’s Liberation Army Navy ships and aircraft, routinely transit through international waters and airspace around Japan’s southwest region, highlighting the strategic significance of this area.

The exercise locations themselves tell the story of this strategic focus. Training areas include multiple sites across the region: Camp Hansen and Kin Blue Beach Training Area on Okinawa, Camp Ainoura in Sasebo and Camp Takayubaru in Kumamoto on Kyushu, and the southwest island of Okinoerabu. This geographic spread allows forces to train across the diverse terrain types they might encounter in real-world operations while demonstrating allied commitment to regional security.

The exercise benefited from significant naval support, with multiple U.S. Navy vessels providing the maritime foundation for amphibious operations. The amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA-6) served as the primary platform, supported by the amphibious dock landing ship USS Rushmore (LSD-47) and amphibious transport dock USS San Diego (LPD-22). This naval component provided the Marines with realistic ship-to-shore movement capabilities essential for amphibious operations.

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force contributed its own vessels, including the tank landing ship JS Kunisaki (LST-4003) and minesweepers JS Awaji (MSO-304) and JS Chichijima (MSC-605). This combined fleet provided a comprehensive maritime training environment that mirrors the complex, multi-national nature of potential real-world operations in the region.

Beyond its immediate training value, Iron Fist 2025 serves as a cornerstone of the broader U.S.-Japan security relationship. The exercise, now in its 19th iteration, has evolved from its origins as a California-based training event to become a symbol of alliance cooperation in the face of regional challenges. The annual nature of the exercise allows both forces to build institutional knowledge and develop lasting professional relationships that extend far beyond the formal training period.

The participation of Japan’s Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB), 1st Helicopter Brigade, and units from the Western Army alongside their American counterparts demonstrates Japan’s commitment to developing its own amphibious capabilities.

This parallel development of capabilities on both sides strengthens the overall alliance while ensuring that both nations can contribute meaningfully to regional security.

Iron Fist 2025 represented more than a training exercise — it serves as a demonstration of allied resolve and capability in one of the world’s most strategically contested regions. The Marines of the 31st MEU, working alongside their Japanese counterparts, are developing the skills, relationships, and interoperability necessary to respond to future challenges in the Indo-Pacific.

As regional tensions continue to evolve, exercises like Iron Fist become increasingly important for maintaining the delicate balance of power that has ensured stability in the region for decades.

The professional relationships built during these training events, the tactical and operational lessons learned, and the demonstrated commitment to partnership serve as powerful deterrents to potential aggression while reassuring allies and partners throughout the region.

The success of Iron Fist 2025 will likely influence future iterations of the exercise and similar bilateral training events.

As both nations continue to adapt their forces to meet emerging challenges, the lessons learned from this exercise will inform military planning, force structure decisions, and alliance coordination for the evolving “fight tonight” force.

Sources:

DVIDS notes associated with the photos used in this article.

https://news.usni.org/2025/01/24/u-s-marines-japanese-forces-to-drill-in-southwestern-japan-in-iron-fist-exercise

https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2025-01-27/amphibious-okinawa-japan-china-16620493.html

https://www.iiimef.marines.mil/Media-Room/News/Article/Article/4071402/iron-fist-25-strengthening-us-marine-and-japan-forces-combined-amphibious-capab/

A Tiltrotor Enterprise: From Iraq to the Future

U.S. Marines with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 262 (Rein.), 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, taxi the runway in U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Ospreys assigned to VMM-262 (Rein.), during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Vice-Camp Takayubaru, Kumamoto, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

U.S. Marines with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 262 (Rein.), 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, takeoff in U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Ospreys assigned to VMM-262 (Rein.), during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Vice-Camp Takayubaru, Kumamoto, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

U.S. Marines with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 262 (Rein.), 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, transport in U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Ospreys assigned to VMM-262 (Rein.), during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, above Kumamoto, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

U.S. Marines with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 262 (Rein.), 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, transport in a U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey assigned to VMM-262 (Rein.), during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, off the coast of Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

U.S. Marines with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 262 (Rein.), 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, stage U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Ospreys assigned to VMM-262 (Rein.), during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

U.S. Marine Corps Staff Sgt. Quentin Kennell, a tiltrotor crew chief, MV-22, with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 262 (Rein.), 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, center, briefs Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members with 1st Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, prior to embark of U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Ospreys assigned to VMM-262 (Rein.), during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at JGSDF Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. Kennell is a native of California. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

U.S. Marine Corps Staff Sgt. Quentin Kennell, a tiltrotor crew chief, MV-22, with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 262 (Rein.), 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, center, and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members with 1st Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, prepare to embark U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Ospreys assigned to VMM-262 (Rein.), during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at JGSDF Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. Kennell is a native of California. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

U.S. Marine Corps Cpl. Cole Goodrich, a tiltrotor crew chief, MV-22, with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 262 (Rein.), 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, right, and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members with 1st Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, prepare to embark U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Ospreys assigned to VMM-262 (Rein.), during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at JGSDF Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. Goodrich is a native of Indiana. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members with 1st Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, prepare to embark a U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 262 (Rein.), 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at JGSDF Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

U.S. Marine Corps Staff Sgt. Quentin Kennell, a tiltrotor crew chief, MV-22, with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 262 (Rein.), 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, right, and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members with 1st Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, prepare to embark U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Ospreys assigned to VMM-262 (Rein.), during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at JGSDF Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. Kennell is a native of California. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members with 1st Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, embark a U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 262 (Rein.), 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at JGSDF Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

U.S. Marines with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 262 (Rein.), 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members with 1st Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, takeoff in a U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey assigned to VMM-262 (Rein.), during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members with 1st Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, prepare to land in V-22 Ospreys assigned to 108th Aviation, Transport Aviation Group, during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at JGSDF Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members prepare to land in V-22 Ospreys assigned to 108th Aviation, Transport Aviation Group, during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at JGSDF Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members stage V-22 Ospreys assigned to 108th Aviation, Transport Aviation Group, during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at JGSDF Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members with 1st Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, prepare to embark V-22 Ospreys assigned to 108th Aviation, Transport Aviation Group, during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at JGSDF Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members observe the takeoff of V-22 Ospreys assigned to 108th Aviation, Transport Aviation Group, during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at JGSDF Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members prepare to land in a V-22 Osprey assigned to 108th Aviation, Transport Aviation Group, during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at JGSDF Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members with 108th Aviation, Transport Aviation Group, stage a V-22 Osprey assigned to 108th Aviation, Transport Aviation Group, during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at JGSDF Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members prepare to land in a CH-47 Chinook helicopter assigned to 1st Helicopter Brigade, during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at JGSDF Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members prepare to land in CH-47 Chinook helicopters assigned to 1st Helicopter Brigade, during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at JGSDF Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members with 1st Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, embark a high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle onto a CH-47 Chinook helicopters assigned to 1st Helicopter Brigade, during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at JGSDF Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members with 1st Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, observe the embark of a high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle onto a CH-47 Chinook helicopter assigned to 1st Helicopter Brigade, during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at JGSDF Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

U.S. Marines with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 262 (Rein.), 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members with 1st Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, approach a landing zone in U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Ospreys assigned to VMM-262 (Rein.), during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at JGSDF Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

U.S. Marines with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 262 (Rein.), 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members with 1st Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, prepare to land U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Ospreys assigned to VMM-262 (Rein.), during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at JGSDF Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members with 1st Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, disembark an U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey assigned to VMM-262 (Rein.), during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at JGSDF Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members with 1st Amphibious Rapid Deployment Regiment, post security during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at JGSDF Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

U.S. Marines with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 262 (Rein.), 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, takeoff in U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Ospreys assigned to VMM-262 (Rein.), during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, above Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Camp Ainoura, Sasebo, Nagasaki, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force members prepare to land in V-22 Ospreys assigned to 108th Aviation, Transport Aviation Group, during a bilateral insert exercise in support of Iron Fist 25, at JGSDF Vice-Camp Takayubaru, Kumamoto, Japan, Feb. 23, 2025. Iron Fist is an annual bilateral exercise designed to increase interoperability and strengthen the relationships between the U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps’ only continuously forward deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force, ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premiere crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tyler Andrews)

Operation Spider Web: Ukraine’s Drone Warfare Evolution

Posted on June 18, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

06/18/2025

Operation Spider Web stands as the most sophisticated drone warfare operation in modern military history, representing the culmination of Ukraine’s remarkable transformation from drone technology importer to global innovator.

On June 1, 2025, Ukraine’s Security Service executed a coordinated strike using 117 drones across five Russian airbases spanning 4,300 kilometers, destroying 41 aircraft worth $7 billion and demonstrating how asymmetric warfare can achieve strategic effects at unprecedented cost ratios.

This operation emerged from a three-year evolution that saw Ukraine scale from producing 1,000 drones annually to 4.5 million, develop indigenous AI-targeting systems, and create the world’s first drone-centric military doctrine.

The success reflects not just technological advancement, but a fundamental reimagining of how smaller nations can project power against conventional military superpowers.

Ukraine’s drone warfare journey began with severe limitations in early 2022.

The military possessed just 36 Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones costing $5.37 million each, effective initially against disorganized Russian forces but quickly neutralized by improved Russian air defenses.

By the summer of 2022, these expensive platforms became largely obsolete, forcing Ukraine toward a revolutionary pivot that would reshape modern warfare.

The transition occurred in three distinct phases.

Phase One (2022) saw desperate adaptation of commercial DJI Mavic quadcopters and Chinese racing drones for military use, marking the beginning of Ukraine’s shift from conventional military procurement to entrepreneurial innovation.
Phase Two (2023-2024) witnessed explosive scaling from 20,000 to 200,000 monthly drone production alongside development of indigenous long-range platforms like the UJ-22 Airborne.
Phase Three (2025) achieved complete technological independence with 100% Ukrainian-made components and AI-integrated systems capable of autonomous targeting.

This evolution produced staggering results.

Ukraine transformed from 100% import dependence to 96% domestic component sourcing within three years.

Production capacity increased 4,500-fold from 2022 levels, while unit costs plummeted from millions to under $1,000 per drone.

More significantly, Ukraine created an integrated ecosystem spanning 500+ manufacturers, from major defense contractors to garage workshops, supported by comprehensive training programs that graduated over 100,000 drone operators.

Operation Spider Web required 18 months and 9 days of meticulous planning directly overseen by President Zelensky and executed by Security Service Chief Vasyl Maliuk.

The operation’s audacity lay not just in its geographic scope — spanning five time zones from Murmansk to Siberia — but in its sophisticated integration of deception, technology, and strategic patience.

Ukrainian operatives established a command center directly adjacent to an FSB regional headquarters in Russia, working undetected for months while positioning assets across the continent.

The “Trojan horse” strategy concealed 117 Ukrainian-made Osa quadcopters inside wooden cabins mounted on commercial trucks, with remotely-operated roofs that deployed the drones on command.

Unwitting Russian drivers transported these systems to positions near five strategic airbases, never knowing they carried Ukraine’s most sophisticated weapons.

The execution demonstrated unprecedented technical sophistication. Each drone carried a 3.2-kilogram payload and operated through Russian 4G/LTE mobile networks, controlled by individual operators working from Ukraine thousands of kilometers away.

AI-assisted targeting systems trained on Soviet aircraft displayed in Ukraine’s Poltava Museum enabled drones to identify vulnerable points on aircraft with 90-centimeter precision.

The system combined ArduPilot open-source autopilot software with autonomous navigation capabilities, allowing drones to complete missions even when communication links were severed.

The targeted airbases housed Russia’s most strategic assets: Tu-95MS strategic bombers carrying cruise missiles used to strike Ukrainian cities, Tu-22M3 supersonic bombers, and A-50 airborne early warning aircraft. These Soviet-era platforms, no longer in production, represented critical nodes in Russia’s nuclear triad and conventional strike capabilities.

Ukraine’s technical achievements culminating in Spider Web reflect systematic innovation across multiple domains. The Osa drone platform manufactured by First Contact represents the pinnacle of Ukrainian engineering — purpose-built for deep-strike missions with thick enclosed frames enabling transport concealment, optimized payload capacity, and 150 km/h speed capability for all-weather operations.

The breakthrough AI targeting system exemplifies Ukrainian innovation philosophy. Rather than developing expensive military-specific software, Ukrainian engineers trained artificial intelligence using museum aircraft from their own Poltava Museum of Long-Range Aviation. This approach created precise targeting algorithms capable of identifying critical components — fuel tanks, missile pylons, wing roots — while costing orders of magnitude less than traditional military systems.

Manufacturing evolution proved equally remarkable. Companies like Vyriy Drone achieved 100% localization using Ukrainian suppliers for motors, transmitters, and thermal cameras, while TAF scaled to 40,000 monthly production with $1 billion annual output. This transition from Chinese component dependence to complete domestic supply chains occurred in under three years, demonstrating industrial mobilization under wartime conditions.

The technical infrastructure supporting Spider Web involved sophisticated command and control systems enabling multi-time zone coordination, individual operator assignments for each of 117 drones, and real-time intelligence gathering through live video feeds. The integration of commercial telecommunications networks for military command demonstrates Ukraine’s mastery of dual-use technology exploitation.

Ukraine’s drone warfare success stems from fundamental strategic innovations that challenge conventional military thinking. The creation of the world’s first Unmanned Systems Forces as a dedicated military branch institutionalized drone warfare, while maintaining contact with 90% of domestic manufacturers to enable rapid capability integration.

Doctrinal flexibility proved crucial — Ukraine abandoned hierarchical military structures in favor of decentralized “islands of forces” that encouraged rapid adaptation and innovation. This approach contrasted sharply with Russian conventional doctrine, enabling Ukrainian forces to exploit vulnerabilities through creative asymmetric approaches.

The cost-effectiveness revolution achieved through Ukrainian drone warfare cannot be overstated. Spider Web demonstrated $600-1,000 FPV drones destroying $250 million bombers, creating unsustainable exchange ratios for defenders. Ukrainian drones became responsible for 60-70% of Russian equipment destruction by 2025, accounting for 65% of destroyed Russian tanks according to NATO estimates.

International cooperation evolved from Ukraine as aid recipient to knowledge provider, with NATO members now receiving Ukrainian training on drone warfare tactics. Estonian company KrattWorks established operations in Ukraine, while Swiss microcomputer manufacturer Auterion provided $15 components enabling autonomous guidance systems at scale.

Operational security maintained over 18 months demonstrates institutional discipline rarely seen in wartime conditions. Only five people initially knew of Spider Web’s existence, with compartmentalized planning enabling complex logistics while maintaining operational surprise against sophisticated Russian intelligence services.

The path to Spider Web involved several critical turning points that enabled increasingly sophisticated capabilities. Russian electronic warfare adaptation in mid-2022 paradoxically accelerated Ukrainian innovation by forcing abandonment of GPS-dependent systems in favor of more robust alternatives like fiber-optic control and frequency-hopping communications.

Production scaling breakthroughs in 2023 enabled transition from thousands to hundreds of thousands of monthly drone production, while the AI integration decision in 2024 improved success rates from 10-20% to 70-80% through autonomous targeting capabilities. The establishment of covert networks enabling deep-penetration operations represented the final capability required for transcontinental strikes.

The strategic doctrine evolution occurred in parallel with technical development. Ukraine progressed from using drones as conventional military support systems to embracing “robots lead the fight” doctrine, eventually achieving fully unmanned operations by late 2024. This transformation reflected not just technological capability but fundamental reimagining of how warfare could be conducted.

Key technological milestones included the transition from commercial drone modification to indigenous military platform development, integration of AI-assisted targeting reducing operator training requirements, and development of swarm coordination enabling multi-platform operations across vast distances.

Operation Spider Web represents the synthesis of Ukraine’s drone warfare evolution across technological, operational, and strategic dimensions. The operation demonstrated capabilities that military analysts had considered theoretical: 4,000-kilometer operational reach, AI-guided precision targeting, continental-scale logistics, and strategic effect achievement through asymmetric means.

The operation’s strategic impact extended far beyond physical damage. By destroying approximately one-third of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet, Ukraine eliminated platforms responsible for cruise missile attacks on Ukrainian cities while demonstrating that geographic distance no longer provided security for strategic assets. The psychological warfare component—including deliberate disclosure of operational methods—weaponized Russian paranoia by making every truck a potential threat.

Technical maturation evident in Spider Web included seamless integration of human creativity with AI precision, autonomous navigation immune to GPS jamming, and exploitation of enemy infrastructure (mobile networks) for command and control. The operation validated Ukraine’s technological independence while demonstrating the military potential of commercial technology integration.

The strategic communication aspects proved equally sophisticated. Timing the operation on Russian Military Transport Aviation Day maximized symbolic impact, while releasing operational details created sustained psychological pressure on Russian leadership and public. This approach exemplifies Ukraine’s understanding that modern warfare encompasses information and psychological domains alongside kinetic operations.

Operation Spider Web fundamentally altered military thinking about asymmetric warfare, technological accessibility, and strategic vulnerability. The operation proved that determined adversaries can achieve strategic effects previously requiring conventional military superiority through innovation, patience, and creative application of available technology.

The democratization of precision strike capabilities demonstrated by Spider Web has implications extending far beyond the current conflict. The operation showed how commercially available components, open-source software, and human ingenuity can create capabilities rivaling those of major military powers, potentially reshaping global security calculations.

Cost-effectiveness ratios achieved through Ukrainian drone warfare — $120,000 in equipment destroying $7 billion in assets — create new models for military investment and strategic planning. Traditional assumptions about force protection, strategic depth, and defensive investment may require fundamental revision in light of these demonstrated capabilities.

The integration model developed by Ukraine — combining civilian technology, military application, artificial intelligence, and strategic communication — provides a blueprint for modern asymmetric warfare that challenges conventional military thinking. NATO recognition of Ukraine as a knowledge provider rather than aid recipient reflects this paradigm shift.

Operation Spider Web stands as the culmination of Ukraine’s drone warfare evolution, demonstrating how a nation under existential threat can leverage innovation, strategic patience, and asymmetric thinking to achieve effects that reshape the strategic balance. The operation validates Ukraine’s transformation from technology importer to global military innovator, while providing lessons that will influence military doctrine for decades to come.

The success of Spider Web proves that in an era of accessible technology and global connectivity, strategic advantage increasingly derives from innovation and adaptation rather than traditional measures of military power. Ukraine’s drone warfare evolution represents not just a tactical achievement, but a fundamental reimagining of how conflicts can be fought and won in the 21st century.

The featured image was appropriately enough generated by an AI program.

ARGMEUEX

Posted on June 18, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group conducts a strait transit in support of Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group Marine Expeditionary Unit Exercise while underway in the Atlantic Ocean, May 27, 2025. During ARGMEUEX, the 22nd MEU, aboard IWO ARG shipping, conducts various mission essential tasks that enhance operational readiness as a unified IWOARG/22 MEU team.

05.27.2025

Video by Sgt. Tanner Bernat

22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit

Shaping a Way Ahead for Autonomous Defence Capabilities for the ADF

Posted on June 17, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

06/17/2025

By Robbin Laird

On June 5, 2025, I had a chance to talk with Air Vice-Marshal Nick Hogan, the Head of Air Force Capability within the RAAF about the challenges and opportunities of incorporating autonomous systems within the Australian Defence Force and the impact this will have on the force.

Australia stands at the threshold of a strategic opportunity that could fundamentally reshape its defense capabilities. Australia faces a paradigm shift that could multiply Australia’s defensive capacity while creating new opportunities for domestic industry.

Autonomous systems are not simply unmanned versions of traditional platforms. They are essentially payload carriers that perform specific tasks for operational forces rather than replacing them. They are not multi-mission platforms which is the focus of traditional manned systems.

Rather than designing systems to perform multiple roles over 30-year lifespans — like the F-35 fighter jet — autonomous systems are conceived as single-purpose, task-specific tools that can be rapidly developed, deployed, and evolved. This shift requires new concepts of operations and, crucially, different relationships with industry partners.

Australia’s investment in the MQ-28A Ghost Bat provides the foundation for this transformation. Hogan sees this not as an end product but as a stepping stone toward a sovereign capability built on open systems architectures. By collaborating with partners and using government reference architectures, Australia can create platforms that allow for rapid digital design and testing with minimal flight-testing requirements that integrate with allies and partners.

The key is moving toward what Hogan calls “containerized software” approaches — plug-and-play payloads that work across different platforms, avoiding vendor lock and enabling smaller companies to compete based on payload effectiveness rather than platform integration capabilities.

This vision demands a radically different relationship with industry partners. Instead of the traditional vendor-locked arrangements exemplified by programs like the F-35, Hogan advocates for what he calls “intimate relationships” with industry — sharing cost constraints and fiscal targets to enable collaborative solutions.

“Opening up the books on both sides, so you can both see the constraints that you’ve got, you can work together to get a common solution,” Hogan explains. This approach has already shown promise in Australia’s work with Boeing Defense Australia, providing insights into what works well and what doesn’t in industry partnerships.

This model enables small and medium enterprises to compete on equal footing with large primes, focusing on payload effectiveness rather than platform integration. The result is a more dynamic, competitive environment that can drive rapid innovation and cost-effective solutions.

In my view, another key requirement of this approach is to get these systems into operators’ hands quickly for operational evolution rather than being captured by lengthy acquisition processes. My view is that it’s a question of the fighting force being able to get priority to provide operational evolution of these kinds of systems, rather than leaving them captured by the acquisition bureaucracy.

The ultimate vision is to shape a mosaic of capability —commanders having access to flexible, changeable, and dynamic combinations of manned and unmanned systems across air, maritime, and ground domains. This approach moves away from relying on single-purpose platforms for decades toward a more adaptive, responsive capability mix.

This mosaic approach will enable area commanders to look at specific operational requirements and determine the optimal mix of assets to achieve desired effects. It’s about maximizing effects rather than maximizing platform capabilities.

The technology exists, the operational concepts are being proven, and the industrial base is ready to respond. But the path forward requires several key elements:

Institutional Reform: Acquisition processes need to prioritize operational evolution over traditional platform procurement approaches. This means getting systems into operators’ hands quickly and allowing them to drive further development.
Industry Partnership: New models of collaboration that share constraints and targets while enabling competition based on effectiveness rather than integration capabilities.
Cultural Change: Training and organizational development that helps personnel conceptualize and employ these new capabilities effectively.
Standards and Architectures: Government-maintained standards that enable interoperability while avoiding the fragmentation that would come from multiple incompatible systems.

There is the tremendous potential and the significant challenges inherent in this transformation. Success could multiply Australia’s defensive capacity while creating new opportunities for domestic industry. There is a generational opportunity to reshape defense capabilities for the challenges ahead.

Featured photo: Australian Army Drone Racing Team pilots were presented the Inter-Service Championship Team award by Air Vice-Marshal Nicholas Hogan, CSC – Head of Air Capability, during a drone racing event at the Australian International Airshow 2025 at Avalon Airport. March 3, 2025. Credit: Australian Department of Defence