Assessing the 5th Generation Competition: Losing A Decade

Posted on | by SysAdmin
08/02/2011

08/02/2011 – The introduction of non-US stealth aircraft into the global competition is a significant development.  The Chinese and Russians have introduced developmental prototypes that signify both capabilities and intentions to enter the stealth aircraft game.  The former Secretary of Defense indicated that this competition was years away; but it has arrived today.

And make no mistake about it, an ability to introduce stealth into the battlespace changes the competition and the air battle management challenge.  To quote one senior retired USAF officer: “If you don’t have a good communication and data link system among the blue 5th generation aircraft, they will not easily distinguish the nature of the adversaries own stealth airframe.  The way to solve this is simply to have a honeycombed 5th generation fleet; but to not do this makes the bandit’s stealth platforms more effective in disrupting air battle management and mission success.”

The Russian T-50 comes as the culmination of a more mature aircraft development production process than does the Chinese.  The T-50 exists and flies and will be available in the global fleet.  And a senior Russian aerospace executive recently emphasized that he saw

good global sales prospects for the Sukhoi T-50 (PKA FA), including those in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and even a few African countries. The Russian Air Force will also continue to purchase these planes through at least the current SAP (2020), and probably beyond, while the Indian Air Force will begin buying the planes around 2015. He also believes that the Russian aircraft industry would further develop the Su-30/34/35 series, which he argued was completely different from the Su-27 sequence. He also stated that these 4th-generation planes would experience strong sales due to the Sukhoi’s commitment to produce 5th-generation craft. Buyers appreciate the company’s commitment to remain a leading developer of aerospace technology and could see how 5th-generation technology could be backfilled into their 4th-generation planes, as Sukhoi was doing in the Russian Air Force.

Flow down from the T-50 to earlier planes in the Russian export inventory as well as existing relationships and prospective relationships in South Korea are key considerations as well.

And an assessment of the aircraft by a key SLD team member has been as follows:

It is difficult to determine the actual capabilities of the PAK-FA T-50 because of conflicting information released by Sukhoi, Russian Air Force members, Putin, and other observers of this project. In addition, there is often a difference between desire and reality when it comes to Russian defense procurement. Russia must overcome several technical and performance obstacles in order for the Russian fighter to compete on a performance basis with the world’s pre-eminent fifth-generation fighter(s).

Despite claims by Russia’s NPO Saturn company, which leads the program to build new engines for the PAK FA, that the T-50 has flown its test flights with “completely new powerplants,” these statements are both unverified and seemingly contradicted by Russian government officials. The super-cruise engines intended for Russia’s fifth-generation fighters may not yet be available. Despite the development of Russian manufacturer NIIP of an active, electronically scanned array (AESA) radar system, similar to the system used by the F/A-22, for the PAK FA, it has not yet been seen on a test flight. This is a significant shortcoming in the development of the PAK FA as a modern stealth fighter, since stealth aircraft rely on their Low Probability of Intercept radar system for survival and their ability to “see and not be seen” gives such aircraft the ability to form a picture of their battlespace and gain air-to-air superiority.

It is unclear if the PAK FA can be completed in under 9 years. Historically, fourth- and fifth- generation fighters normally require 15 years or so to develop. The fact that the PAK FA has gone on several test flights without super-cruise engines or an LPI/AESA radar means that it is unlikely that the production goal of 1,000 operational ready PAK FAs will be ready by the stated 2015 date.

But funding and other support from the Indian government might help accelerate the timetable. India has become largest foreign customer for Russian military aircraft, and would be a logical buyer of this plane. In October 2007, Indian and Russian officials signed a preliminary agreement to collaborate in developing and manufacturing a 5th-generation fighter. The two governments are still negotiating a final contract. India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) wants to modify Sukhoi’s single-seat prototype into the twin-seat fighter.

The Chinese J-20 is a different case in play.  The J-20 represents a step in the evolution of the Chinese aerospace industry as a whole.  China is committed to developing modern civilian and military aerospace capabilities, which includes a significant moon effort.

The overall effort is significant and will clearly yield modern products.  As the former chief scientist for the USAF has put it:

Quantity has a quality in and of itself.  Again, I’ll often hear people say dismissively, “well yes, the Chinese are producing many more engineers, but they are not up to the standards that we have,” (although in many cases, they are). And to that I’ll answer “well, if we’re producing a thousand experts in our field, and they’re producing 10,000 experts in the field, and if 10-percent of their people are as good as the people we’re producing, they’re still doing pretty well.

If you generate a certain volume of expertise in a field; if you invest a certain amount in the field, not only in dollars, but also across the board in the workforce, you’re bound to see benefits.

We’ve seen the ability to leapfrog in technology. My friends in directed energy tell me that they have seen advances in the open literature in what the Chinese are doing that really surprised them, that they were moving at a pace that was much faster than anyone had previously expected. I think a lot of that is just putting in a lot of resources.  We’ve done that in the past in our country, in the Manhattan project: when you think about the investment in the Manhattan project, we were able to realize incredible technological accomplishments with massive investments.

This significant commitment to technological development is being translated into growing capability for the Chinese Air Force.  As retired Lt. General Deptula has underscored:

The ability of the Chinese to accelerate innovation in the air domain is quite impressive.  They now have the ability to make major investments with the monies that are available from their economic growth for continued investment in research and development. That growth in the Chinese economy allows for investment in innovation.  Unfortunately, until recently little concern has been evidenced by senior US defense leadership regarding the strategic challenges posed by the Chinese. How much investment is China making in advanced research and development vis-à-vis what the United States is doing? That will tell you how rapidly China will be able to accelerate in terms of military capability at a period in time where the United States is throttling back in terms of military capability.

A recent article in the Shanghai Daily stated that “CHINA is set to become the world’s most important center for innovation by 2020, overtaking both the United States and Japan…”  That’s another piece that you hit on in the context of: “Look, this isn’t just about the military piece; there’s also another element with respect to aerospace.” The space piece is increasingly important as well. They’re becoming well aware of the importance of being able to dominate an air and space. “The shift is not because the US is doing less science and technology, but because countries like China and India are doing more research.  China is now the second-largest producer of scientific papers after the US, and research and development spending by Asian nations in 2008 was US$387 billion, compared with US$384 billion in the US and US$280 billion in Europe.”

China used to view the United States as the gold standard for which to aspire to in terms of military capability to emulate. Now they’re specifically targeting how to disable or negate what used to be U.S. advantages. From their perspective it’s becoming increasingly easier and easier to do that as the current U.S. Department of Defense leadership has elected to focus on the present to a much greater degree than the future.

(For a briefing on Chinese air power see https://sldinfo.com/?p=14160)

The J-20 is part of the overall Chinese assertion into the global military competition.  It is part of a strategy to expand Chinese exports and to shape perceptions of a significant upsurge in capability, which will confuse platforms with actual combat capability.  Chinese propagandists are playing on the platform centric approach to the US and the West to shape perceptions by demonstrating a new platform.  What they have not demonstrated is an ability to deploy actual combat capability. (https://sldinfo.com/?p=11421)

The underlying problem for the US and its allies is that US leadership for many reasons has frittered away a decade lead in 5th generation aircraft.  Deptula highlighted one aspect of this problem: From their perspective it’s becoming increasingly easier and easier to do that as the current U.S. Department of Defense leadership has elected to focus on the present to a much greater degree than the future.

But the J-20 is part of a chain reaction.

The introduction of a new test aircraft by the PRC has caught the attention of many in Asia and the United States; as it clearly should.  The new aircraft displaying stealth features, demonstrates if such a demonstration was need that the PRC is shaping new military capabilities for the period ahead.  New unmanned aircraft, new missiles, a whole new approach to building civil and military aerospace capabilities, augmenting its Navy, expanding its commercial and global reach, building presence through counter-piracy, etc.

Although some may have been surprised, some were not.

One difficulty with U.S reactions has been to see this largely as a challenge to the United States.  It is not.  The Asian powers understand that this is part of the declared Chinese strategy to expand their presence and power throughout the Pacific and to shape an active export policy globally.  The U.S. could stand in the way if it shapes effective capabilities in the decade ahead to play the crucial lynchpin role for allied forces in Asia to curtail Chinese ambitions.  The Chinese clearly seek to shape the Pacific agenda, up to an including the Arctic.

Another difficulty is that the platform-centric approach dominates in viewing the development.  If this is about an F-22 like aircraft, it is about F-22 like aircraft.  It should be about the Chinese building significant capability across the board while the U.S. is engaged in Afghanistan :  it is about continuing to build last generation aircraft and missiles, while delaying investments in today’s and tomorrow’s challenges which simply are not aligned with the Afghanitis strategy.

It is about continuing to build last generation aircraft and missiles, while delaying investments in today’s and tomorrow’s challenges which simply are not aligned with the Afghanitis strategy. (…) The Afghan engagement is eating up our military resources, which are no longer available to fund air and naval power transition.

Also, Chinese developments are not looked at by themselves, but are used by too many as a foil for their agendas. The anti-F22 community sees this new aircraft as simply a test aircraft, far from being an effective deployed asset.  The transparency community sees this as a deviation from the true path the Chinese should follow, namely to be good bankers without military geopolitical aspirations. What this should be seen as is a manifestation of the tip of the spear of a comprehensive effort to shape a new capability in the Pacific to enhance Chinese influence and power, and to shape perceptions in Asia of a very different century, than the last half of the XXth century…..

The other aspects of the J-20 worthy of note is its impact on Chinese aspirations and capabilities to export arms.  The capabilities which the Chinese are emphasizing – notably air and missile systems – are eminently exportable. By having a first class missile business a decade out, the Chinese can change regional power balances by export policy only incidentally supported by the power projection capability necessary to dominate in far away regions. The J-20 clearly helps in this effort.  It is the Le Mans event, which helps the manufacturer to sell his show room product.

There is a significant global market for combat aircraft over the next 30 years globally.  The Chinese have every intention of being the lead exporter in the second world; having the J-20 is a key driver for success in global export efforts.

The Chinese have every intention of being the lead exporter in the second world; having the J-20 is a key driver for success in global export efforts.

Another element of the global competition is the desire to respond to the Russian-Indian 5th generation aircraft.  The strategic competition with India is significant for China, and they have little desire to see the Indians position themselves ahead of China in air and naval systems.

The J-20 is built on the top of the global shift in manufacturing capability towards China, a significant investment by China in global commodities and the enhanced presence of China on the world stage are all significant developments. When married to a growing investment in the development and fielding of military capabilities, something globally significant is afoot -of the sort which suggests changing epochs. (https://sldinfo.com/?p=14637)

What is clearly required is recognizing the centrality of the 5th generation opportunity for the US and its allies before it is frittered away by folks like Senator McCain who tweet rather than think.

The F-35 and the recovery of the F-22 into a re-norming of air power is really the key to meeting the 5th generation and evolving air combat or indeed combat challenges posed by the evolution of foreign capabilities.   What is lost on most analysts is that the F-35 is not solely about air combat it is about combat.

The F-35 is the first aircraft in history which can see 360 degrees around itself more than 800 miles and has integrated combat systems to manage that combat space.  It is about a system not a platform.  The F-35 as a combat system is about the central role of maintenance, upgrading, deployment readiness, development synergies provided by common software for upgrades and development. It is a system.

No service has understood this more clearly than the USMC.  The F-35B is a fundamental glue that will allow the USMC and its MAGTF to operate across the spectrum of warfare and to transform how other assets function.  It is a force for significant enhancement of combat efficiencies and effectiveness, rather than just being considered a day one aircraft enabled by stealth.

A senior member of the SLD team has provided a clear statement of the impact of the F-35B both on USN and USMC operations as well as overall joint combat capability:

In the not too distant future the US Navy/Marine and USAF team may have to establish presence from the sea in a potential combat theater. The threat will be great: friendly forces can be intermixed with opponents who will do whatever it takes to win. From placing IEDs, to employing small unit ambushes, to spotting for artillery and Multiple Launch Rockets, the enemy will be unforgiving and aggressive. In addition there is a large land Army with armor and land-based precision weapons nearby to attack.

The opposing forces also have an aviation component of Fighters and Attack Aircraft, along with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and some proficiency in offensive “cyber war” ready to engage. To make it even more difficult the enemy has located and identified potential airfields that could be occupied and has targeted them to be destroyed by terminally guided cruise and intermediate range ballistic missiles.

Finally, the fleet off shore is vulnerable to ship-killing missiles. The problem for US war planners is to secure a beachhead and build to victory from that beginning.

Traditionally, the “beachhead” was just that on a beach–but now it can be seizing territory inland first and attacking from the back door toward the sea to take a port and also grab an airfield.

The USAF flying high cover after being launched from bases far enough away to be safe from attack can establish Air Superiority, and the Navy Fighters can go on CAP (Combat Air Patrol) to protect the Fleet. Both services can launch offensive weapons from their fighters also from B-2s, surface ships and subs. UAVs can go into battle for ISR and offense “cyber” can be engaged. US “smart munitions” can attack enemy offensive rockets and missiles launch sites. There will be significant casualties on both sides.

But the Marines do the unexpected and land where the enemy does not have ease of access –a natural barrier perhaps, mountain range, water barrier, very open desert or even on the back side of urban sprawl—. Once established, logistical re-supply is a battle-tipping requirement.

Once ashore the one asset that can tip the battle and keep combat aviation engaged in conjunction with ground combat operations if runways are cratered is the F-35B, because every hard surface road is a landing strip and resupply can quickly arrive from Navy Amphibious ships by MV-22s and CH-53K.

The F-35B is a 5th Generation airborne stealth fighter with its own distributed intelligence center. Each aircraft has total 360-degree knowledge. If the enemy launches an attack from the air or ground, airborne sensors can instantaneously pick up the launch. The battle information displayed in each F-35B can be linked to UAV drivers as well as ground and airborne command centers to coordinate both offensive and defensive operations.

The sortie rate of the aircraft is more than just rearm and “gas and go”: it is continuity of operations with each aircraft linking in and out as they turn and burn—without losing situational awareness. This can all be done in locations that can come as a complete tactical surprise –the F-35B sortie rate action reaction cycle has an add dimension of unique and unexpected basing thus getting inside an opponent’s OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) loop.

Enemy air is predictable by needing a runway and consequently all the problems of precision weapons cratering their runways come into play for their battle plan—the F-35B does not have that vulnerability.

Now remove the USAF and USN Carrier Battle Group and instead of seeing USMC air and land forces engaged, it is only the Israeli Defense Force fighting for the survival of the free state of Israel. Israel is a nation surrounded by hostile forces.  All of the threats mentioned above instead of being directed against US forces are life and death problems for Israeli defense planners. Consequently is there any surprise that the IAF is considering the F-35B. The Lightning II V/Stol version must be kept in production, because its combat potential is nowhere near fully understood and exploited.

It is a perfect aircraft for the Marines:  think not only Israel, but other contingencies;  think  Korea or Taiwan in a major incident, or USMC being used to  keep the promise with allies that trusted US. American Marines going back in from the sea  to save an Iraqi town of innocents from  being overrun or to stop  the Taliban attacking a village is a debt that cannot be walked away from .

For the citizens of Israel, the IDF is fully capable of making informed and appropriate choices for their Nation’s survival.  It is always up to them to do what they think best.

However, the F-35B maybe a perfect aircraft for their Combat situation as described above.  If Israel has to fight for their very existence, the V/Stol capability may become invaluable — so why even debate not funding such a valuable resource for both the USMC and others — it can tip an entire war effort if employed successfully.

But for the synergies which the American and coalition F-35s can have on the evolution of combat capabilities, policy makers have to take it out of the platform ghetto.  In the new approach to combat, no platform fights alone.  And to quote that senior member of the SLD team:

Since all battlefield tactical technology is relative against a reactive enemy, a new 21st Century way to look at the American way of war is within our National Security grasp–technology, training, tactics and leadership can all come together if we have the political will.

The US military is developing and fielding weapons systems with the ability to fight to win, anywhere anytime.  The future can only be seized by recognizing that 1, 2, 3, 4 “Generation” aviation discussions are platform linear. The concept of 5th Gen war and technology is  “no platform fights alone.”

Consequently, “3 Dimensional” networked situational awareness warfare is the way ahead. This potential revolution, which can insure US military superiority for a generation is not understood with current platform debates that are stovepipes.

 

Sacrificing Sovereignty at Sea

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The Coast Guard Cutter Forward sits moored at Base Support Unit Portsmouth just before sunrise Wednesday, Dec. 30, 2009. Behind the Forward are two other 270-foot Medium Endurance Cutters homeported at the base, the cutters Legare and Bear. In total there are six of these cutters sharing the same responsibilities, allowing their crews to enjoy a two-month inport period and a two-month deployment period. Some of those responsibilities include: Search and Rescue; Enforcement of Laws and Treaties; Maritime Defense; and Protection of the Marine Environment. They most often deploy between the Coasts of Maine and Florida and throughout the Caribbean, but at times cross the Atlantic or visit the Pacific Ocean. (Credit: USCG Atlantic Area, 12/30/09)

By James Jay Carafano

08/02/2011 – America’s Navy and Coast Guard have always partnered to protect the nation’s sovereignty. The navy projects power. The Coast Guard policies the seas. The Coast Guard has served the nation well because the nation always gave it the right ships to do the job.

In the 1930s, despite being in the grips of the Depression, Congress authorized the US Coast Guard to build a new fleet of high-endurance cutters—ships that could sail deep into the open sea and remain there for extended periods in any weather. A strong motivation for creating the “Treasury Class” (named after former secretaries of the treasury) came from the emergence of trans-ocean air travel. Coast Guard cutters were needed to provide floating navigation stations to keep the planes on course, as well as conduct deep search and rescue. When war came the cutters found themselves fulfilling all kinds of roles including dangerous convoy escort duty. The ships proved so adept at handling the many missions assigned that they lasted for 40 years.

The next generation of high-endurance cutters, the “Hamilton Class” emerged to meet another new set of challenges, the international recognition of the exclusive economic zone, the territory that extends from the coast out to 200 nautical miles, an area in which a country enjoys special rights for the use of maritime resources. This was particularly vital for the United States for issues like fisheries. Stocks in the remote Bearing Straits, for example, account for about half of US commercial fishing revenues. Like its predecessors, the Hamilton Class also had to adapt to meet a range of unanticipated missions from the Cuban boat lift to Hurricane Katrina. This generation of ship also served the nation for over forty years—and is still at sea.

Now, it is time for a new class of ships—called the National Security Cutter. The service is following a proven tradition. Build ships that meet today’s needs. Build them to be flexible enough to accomplish many missions. Build them to last.

While the early history of the National Security Cutter was marred in controversy, arguably the Coast Guard has gotten beyond those problems. Three have already been built. The contract for the fourth cutter will be a “fixed” cost.

If the Office of Management and Budget in the White House has its way, however, they’d stop the Coast Guard from buying any more ships as a “cost-savings” measure. That makes no sense and its no option.  The Hamilton class cutters were built for the “Cold War” and are wearing out. At today’s construction costs, outfitting a new Hamilton class would cost as much as a National Security Cutter. Furthermore, there is no other class of ship in the Coast Guard fleet that can handle the deepwater missions.

(Credit: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,376522,00.html)(Credit: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,376522,00.html)

The National Security Cutter also brings new meaning to the term “high-endurance.” It can stay on station longer than any other ship in its class. That means the US can have an enduring presence at sea. Ships can stalk pirates and drug runners. They can stand station against illegal migrant flows. They can act as stand-off headquarters to manage disasters at sea like the Deepwater Horizon platform explosion or a landward catastrophe such as New Orleans after Katrina. Most importantly, they can persistently patrol US maritime resources from fisheries to oil platforms.

The National Security Cutter’s capability really matters. Presence at sea is what ensures the sovereignty of American territory at sea. Sacrificing capability means sacrificing sovereignty.

Abandoning the National Security Cutter as a budget-cutting drill makes about as much sense as dispensing with a security alarm, putting up “no trespassing” sign and telling yourself you are more safe at less cost.

This piece originally appeared in The Washington Examiner August 1, 2011

http://washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columnists/2011/07/sacrificing-americas-sovereignty-sea

For a discussion of the role of the National Security Cutter as a Chaos Management System see https://www.sldinfo.com/?p=10225.

To read “From the bridge of the Berthof,” see https://www.sldinfo.com/?p=20523, and to read about making USCG assets unaffordable, see https://www.sldinfo.com/?p=21079.

The Slippery Slope of SLEP

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Service Life Extension Program (SLEP): Investing in Going Backwards

By Michael W. Wynne, 21st Secretary of the USAF

08/02/2011 – Pressure is growing on the DoD budget. Perhaps 80 billion, 400 billion or whatever on top of the one hundred billion in savings that has been demanded by the outgoing Secretary of Defense. According to published reports, the Air Force share is forty nine billion of the coming carnage. Perhaps it should be called the deficit peace dividend.The other services are posturing as the former Secretary of the Navy together with his era Commanders asked in a Wall Street Journal op ed simply to fund the Navy; and recently the incoming Army Chief of Staff pulled no punches as he transitioned from Joint Forces Command to the Army, testifying that it was Army all the way.

[slidepress gallery=’the-slippery-slope-of-slep’]

Credit: USAF

All of this posturing does sound an alarm; and makes one wonder where is the strategy underpinning the future of America’s Defense?

Clearly it was not adequately expressed in the Quadrennial defense review, as the outgoing Secretary decried further roll-off in the DoD budget using emotional terms, in lieu of foregone strategies. Or simply, if there were a strategy in place it would inform the Afghan withdrawal, the Iraq transition and work with the rebuilding of US power projection capabilities.Instead we see, a platform cut mentality, which does not focus on what tasks will no longer be done, and identify those tasks which are central to the security of the Nation. What Oceans will not see a Navy ship in the future as the Navy degrades; or which Nation will not be invaded in response to a cut in the Army end strength; or what Air Space will not be declared passable due to the lack of Air power to defend it.The “policy” argument appears to be about gross reductions and then having the remnant simply managed “efficiently”.  Since the Defense Budget is annually settled; and now two years estimated; this will require adroit planning; and perhaps the Congress needs to be made aware of the consequences of their actions. They are not simply cutting things; they are significantly reducing US sovereignty.

Although there has been some writings about the consequence to operations of the Coast Guard; and some as to the pressure on the Marine Corps, the stealth US Air Force leadership has been absent.  Whatever the machinations of budget games, eroding air dominance has consequences for US sovereignty.The Air Force leadership has choices in this coming budget constrained environment.  They can leverage new capabilities and build a force for the future, or appear to manage by whittling down all aspects of the force to a point of little strength.  The second path is created by modernizing the past, and creating the illusion of strength, rather than building on the investments made in 5th generation aircraft.

What do we do? As is usual for any large organization, there is no going back, a la the B-1; so unfortunately we must not stare balefully back at the F-22 and wish it would return magically to its efficiency curve as it would cost under one hundred million. Can our Air Force get to where it has one understrength squadron at each base; and claim to be strong?  We have seen such a trend in some of our allied Air Forces, but will the U.S. be able to lead any coalition with such capabilities?A look back at the proud past of the Air Force yields some clues to ways to manage the future.  Following World War II, there was a tremendous drawdown; much savings achieved; and the Air Force chose to center itself on advanced technology; to set itself apart from the other services and to seek a solid future by pushing capabilities and accepting the concept of a smaller but fully capable force.

Here and now the Air Force has the choice to discard the whittling strategy; and discard the concept of creating an illusion of strength.  Instead, the motion needs to be forward, gaining the best from the remnant remaining.  This means leveraging, not offering greater vulnerability; it means a presumption of resilience in net warfare, not a return to semaphore flags (1); and to move boldly beyond the very constraining Link 16. This requires a deliberate assessment of capability and proscribed usage to maximize survivability; and thus the safety of the Nation.  Bold steps are required  to affirm the character of the force as embracing technology and shaping the future.  It is crucial to the viability of the Nation and of its warriors to continue to argue the merits of the ‘Unfair Fight’ with close hold technical advantages over any competitor air system.

With the current description of the deficit and the summation by the outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff about the national crisis level of the deficit, one must envision that national survival is the issue.  Given this position, we can envision a strategy that maximizes resulting capabilities, at a best value for the Nation.Now, by inference, expeditionary warfare and wars where America has a choice in participation will fall precipitously from our National priority. Evidence of this is already in hand with the deferential attitude of the Libyan adventure to French and European Leadership; and the decision to not use American ground forces, but allow National liberation forces, untrained, and almost as badly led as American Patriots in 1776 to muster the courage and win international support, and maybe their country from mercenaries and dictator forces.We’ve seen as much from Egyptian patriots, and are watching carefully in Syria.   Teddy Roosevelt stated loudly, “Speak softly, but carry a big stick”.  It appears that the new trend is to “Speak loudly, but carry a little stick.”

Much of this is in process; and it is noticeably wearing on our Army centric military who wonder about the Air Force pressure on the Libyan Forces; yet getting more and more positive feedback that the time has been spent training a decent national force, accepting crossover fighters and not losing sight of the ultimate objective, succession from the current dictator to a citizen sponsored form of government. Sometimes as a participant it is hard to see the turn in strategy; but it is clear that the incoming Army Leadership does not yet comprehend this fundamental turn.Soon, they will be reminded that as the turn came for Russia, the realization of the expense in defense is people driven; and deterrence and international respect is equipment driven.  Hence the French motto; great nations build Planes, Ships and Tanks.

Let us take a look at the current response of the Air Force to this precipitous turn and deficit driven strategy.  The Air Force can look to Space and to Cyber and see the payback from investment continues to swell.  New technology investment is directionally driven, invented, and lagging by about one to one and a half decades for space; and less than half a decade for cyber.  Each maximizes capabilities, and leverages across domains.Some say cyber is quicker than that, but training, and distribution to be effective constrains the application.  Too fast will waste the resources, but too slow loses the engagement.  There is a great motto here; procurement at the speed of need.This leaves the Air Campaign which is the decisive arm of the Air Force and the ability to enable global operations; both in offense and defense.  The current state of play is force structure degradation; every year the fleet gets older; every year the fleet gets further back from current technology; as forecast this will continue for the foreseeable future as if we are planning our strategic withdrawal from the technology battlefield.

What is worrisome is there comes a time that dramatic leaps forward are feared, and vilified.  We watch once again as the F-35, which is the Allied and US  21st century fighter fleet  and is the current glue for the shaping of US power projection capabilities undergoes what every major platform that the Air Force has introduced in the last 30 years has had to endure; criticism from all sides until performance quiets the critics; and the platform forms the core of the Air Force Future  (e.g.; C-130; C-17; B-1; B-2; F-22; Global Hawk).The net effect is to continue to shrink the fleet, age it, and lose international competitions and their related jobs.  Our technological withdrawal by trying to upgrade 1950′s designs with constrained electronics; and insufficient connectivity does not impress any foreign buyers (India comes to mind); and may not impress future thinking enemies.

Some as well see a withdrawal of manned craft, announcing a withdrawal from the intelligent battlefield; as those forecasters would automatically leave our airfleet with yesterdays training, and yesterday’s engagement strategies. As any swordsman knows, agility comes from the arena; and it will in the future fight for Air Dominance.  Whether real or imagined, claimed losses to Iran and recorded losses in Georgia portend a short lifespan for undefended remotely piloted vehicles.How to best describe the strategic withdrawal from the technology competition; it is called SLEP; or Service Life Extension Program; and is a neatly derogatory term for upgrading older frontline weapons to a lower technology baseline than current 5th generation designs and production.

Sadly, it pretends to expand and modernize the fleet; but most pilots truly do understand the Physics of the Fifth generation versus the Fourth generation; and thus realize that their assignment will be to replace the F-105 Air Defender Mission; as they will desperately need additional protection from land based systems and familiar terrain to be successful. They also know that if their mission entails penetration of defended airspace, survival against current and for sure next generation of Integrated Air Defense could make losses incurred by the Eighth Air Force pale by comparison.  But we don’t have the fleet size that they had to sustain those losses; what to do?

The answer appears to be to hope that we can enter wars of our choosing, and thus engage forces that do not have access to advanced weaponry; but do we not believe that our enemy is a thinking enemy? Pursuit of the best weaponry for both offense and defense is required for global engagement; but this is not the trend we see.Who then are we fooling?  Perhaps only the Nations Leaders, who like the Egyptian leaders of the Mubarak era might want to see large numbers of equipment, even if useless, listed in Jane’s Defense.Sadly, this attitude, whether aimed at vulnerable Navy or Air Force Strategic Assets does not fool the thinking enemy.  Previously, the assessment of the survivability for large ISR and Command and Control aircraft clarified the potential waste of assets and people to continue the investment stream and maintenance for those systems, letting them essentially age out; or be relegated to specialty operations where their safety was assured; and their utility could be magnified in public lobbying.

The Air Force needs to do better than that in this arena.  The current plans are dedicating huge amounts of funding to bring fourth generation aircraft up to standards that will assure their defeat against known competitive air and even friendly avionics suites. In doing this we are promoting current technologies; while ignoring needed interoperable, and leveraging characteristics, as they are claimed too hard; and if achieved, might push our allies to also invest in leveraging advanced equipment.This is a recipe for slowly slipping the technology leadership position and yielding it to friendly or competitor Air Forces.

Why not challenge ourselves and our allies to get to move forward and embrace the new technology WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN BUILT; and continue the formula that has actually kept our world reasonably at peace since 1947.The targeted SLEP programs for the F-16 and the F-15 will take time, and drain precious resources from the needed conversion of Americas Air Forces to Fifth generation across the Board.  SLEP is expensive and puts updated systems on aging air frames.What are you going to do with those new tailor made radars after the 2000 flight hours left in the SLEP air frames? They will be expensive paperweights.

As the Air Force moves from 6000 tactical airplanes to under three thousand, it needs to be clear that our national aspirations, or Sovereign Options will be diminished; it should not pretend that somehow a quantity of older air power is a deterrent.  Better a reality check be handled by the planners with corrective actions be taken now rather than an enemy force enforcing hard lessons.Although we have heard lots of complaining about the cost for the F-35, it should be asked: compared to what? By paying billions for SLEP, the USAF is diverting money from procuring the F-35A. It is a proven manufacturing dictum that articles bought at high volumes will cost less than similar articles bought at low volumes. Let us take the SLEP Program at the forecasted volumes and instead plus up the F-35 by adding those rates of production.  The F-35, at greater capability; will in fact be less expensive than a torn down, retooled, re-engined, zero based F-15 and likely an F-16 as well.

This is really due to the fact that one can marginally cost the units above the current baseline; but for the SLEP line, it is an art form, individually built; and individually delivered.  Can they be estimated less, of course; but let’s look at the current Tanker program, and we can see the future.

(1) The Semaphore flag signaling system is an alphabet signalling system based on the waving of a pair of hand-held flags in a particular pattern. The flags are usually square, red and yellow, divided diagonally with the red portion in the upper hoist.The flags are held, arms extended, in various positions representing each of the letters of the alphabet. The pattern resembles a clock face divided into eight positions: up, down, out, high, low, for each of the left and right hands (LH and RH) six letters require the hand to be brought across the body so that both flags are on the same side.

http://www.anbg.gov.au/flags/semaphore.html

The F-35 Maintenance Approach

Posted on | by SysAdmin
07/31/2011
Airmen 1st Class Ronald Maynor (left) and Ryan Macz (right), both electrician/environmental specialist from the 455th Expeditionary Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, place the "remove before flight" reminders back on the F-16 Fighting Falcon, Dec. 10. These reminders are placed on the aircraft to remind the crew members to inspect the aircraft thoroughly. (Credit: 455th Expeditionary Air Wing 12/10/09)

The Impact of A New Upgrading and Sustainment Approach

An Interview with Scott Ogden

08/01/2011 – A key element in understanding the Cultural Revolution associated with the 5th generation aircraft is the dramatic change in how maintenance and sustainment can be done fleet wide and in terms of global sustainment.  The F-35 will be first aircraft which enables global sustainment across the entire deployed fleet, US and allied.

Savings are not limited to cost efficiencies on a fleet-wide basis.  By having much more accuracy and transparency in the parts chain and an ability to tap parts locally from various F-35 partners, the demand on the Air Mobility System can be reduced significantly.

In a discussion with Scott Ogden, retired USAF maintainer, now with Lockheed Martin, the shift from legacy aircraft to the F-35 was discussed in terms of the shift from the F-16 to the F-35A.

Scott Ogden was a maintenance officer in the US Air Force for 27 years. He worked on A-10s, F-4s, F-5s, F-16s, F-117s, F-15s, and F-111s. He has been with Lockheed for 15 years and has worked on the F-117 TSPR contract and the F-22 FASTeR contract. He has been working on the F-35 maintenance system for the last two years.

SLD: Could you explain the difference between upgrades on an F-16 and on an F-35 for avionics and related hardware?

Ogden: Whenever you’re going to change a piece of hardware, that’s what they call an “Engineering Change Proposal, an ECP. An ECP requires you to develop and/or procure this new piece of hardware, develop the integration of the software to make the hardware work, flight test the new capability, and then buy the materials and schedule the upgradefleet retrofit.  Then and only then can you put it into a Falcon.

This is a three- or a four-year process to get the upgrade into that specific configuration and total numbers of aircraft  you wish to effect, so you’re looking at a timeline to me that is probably four to five years to field that capability and another three or four years to get it completed in the fleet. You’re looking at a timeline of six to eight years as a conservative estimate to get a new upgrade on capability into an airplane.

SLD: And what about the applicability of the upgrade across the fleet of international F-16s?

Ogden: What I described only applies to an Air Force generated upgrade for the F-16, and it may well not be applicable across the international fleet.  Whether it’s available to all 30 plus variance of F16s is an open question.

SLD: But the point being is that if you spend X amount of dollars, let’s say you spend $500,000 for this upgrade or 1.2 million, whatever it is, it’s being generated by specific budgets specific to a service.

Ogden: Absolutely. Very seldom is there an F-16 fleet-wide capability upgrade. If there’s a fleet-wide upgrade, it’s usually because of a common air frame issue or safety considerations.

"Very seldom is there an F-16 fleet-wide capability upgrade." (Credit: http://defense-update.com/features/du-1-04/f-16-upgrades.htm)
"Very seldom is there an F-16 fleet-wide capability upgrade." (Credit: http://defense-update.com/features/du-1-04/f-16-upgrades.htm)

SLD: This also has yielded a process whereby although the F-16 is probably analogous to the A-320 in terms of numbers of sales, the F-16 has many variants over time. So if I’m taking the Air Force, US Air Force has done a particular upgrade, pay for a particular upgrade, and now the Israelis want it, there’s no guarantee that that upgrade can be just snapped into this Israeli F-16. You’re going to have to do an evaluation as well to make sure that it works with the systems on that Israeli F-16. Is that correct?

Ogden: Yes. There would be some plug-and-play portion of it, but there would always be the testing to ensure that the other integration of the uniqueness of their configuration would plug-and-play also.

SLD: Notionally you’ve described a baseline upgrade.  If we continue down this path, let us assume that I’m taking US Air Force capability that we’ve agreed with Israelis would be great to have an Israeli F16-I. Notionally, and obvious it’s dependent on what we’re actually upgrading, but notionally what kind of cost and process would this take?  Would this be months to do and a significant cost?

Ogden: I’d say 18 to 24 months to get another variant. Unless they’re in a parallel path, but if you’re just looking at their critical path, I would say 18 to 24 months before they can advise what test they need, what risk reduction they would understand and especially with Israel, it would be an independent action of their own.  We wouldn’t be involved in it.

SLD: You’re talking about from a generic point of view of the upgrade process that a significant amount of time, engineering skill, and cost to get a single path upgrade.

And then that single path upgrade is not available fleet-wide and then it could be available to the partners, but in the European case because you have a consortium, it could be upgraded for the consortium so that you get at least some cost savings from that, but it still requires time and extra cost for this upgrade path and so you essentially or still end up with several types of fleets.

And presumably from a maintenance point of view, if you’re deploying say three or four countries’ F-16s on an Italian air base, to state an example, there’s no guarantee just that you’re going to have commonality across those F-16s to manage the upgrade process because each aircraft is significantly different.

You may have 50/60/70/80% commonality, but there’s no guarantee from a maintainers’ perspective that he’s got commonality with that Italian F-16 or Dutch F-16 or whatever it is. They’ll have to discover it working together with those maintainers, so it’ll be craft-driven rather than system-driven.

Ogden: We wouldn’t even think of doing that.  On the flight line, we would just be so segregated from the Israelis, the Dutch, or anybody else. I’d have my own parts. I’d have my own equipment. I’d have my own mission planning. I would do all of that independent of whatever other F-16s I was deployed with.

If I needed a wheel or a tire, I might share. But if it’s a part on an aircraft and it’s not a consumable, I would go back through my supply chain and get that part for my configuration. If I’m deployed, I’m not going to take the chance of borrowing a part that may look the same but have a different internal hardware with a different dashed part number, let alone a different software integration package.

SLD: The historical experience has been that when you collocate or co-deploy with allies, even though you have an airplane described as an F-16 and you all are flying F-16s, you’re not getting the advantages of that commonality that should be inherent in building a common aircraft simply because of the different variants of the aircraft you have and the fact that the supply chain has been fed to the nations separately. Is that correct?

Ogden: Absolutely. You have your own supply chain and even if you deploy with like units from your own country, you still take your own supply kits with you.

Now let’s say Block 50 is deployed with Block 50s, when you get there, you find out that you’re deployed with the team that may have the same aircraft, but you didn’t go in there deploying less of a footprint because you knew that there was going to be somebody there because you’re going to use your parts and they’re going to use their parts.

It’s more or less self-preservation and isolation from it. I even deployed two 117 squadrons and both squadrons took their own kits.

Airmen 1st Class Ronald Maynor (left) and Ryan Macz (right), both electrician/environmental specialist from the 455th Expeditionary Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, place the "remove before flight" reminders back on the F-16 Fighting Falcon, Dec. 10. These reminders are placed on the aircraft to remind the crew members to inspect the aircraft thoroughly. (Credit: 455th Expeditionary Air Wing 12/10/09)Airmen 1st Class Ronald Maynor (left) and Ryan Macz (right), both electrician/environmental specialist from the 455th Expeditionary Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, place the “remove before flight” reminders back on the F-16 Fighting Falcon, Dec. 10. These reminders are placed on the aircraft to remind the crew members to inspect the aircraft thoroughly. (Credit: 455th Expeditionary Air Wing 12/10/09)

SLD: This is all built around a local ownership either by base or deployed squadron, so local ownership is the rule of thumb.

Ogden: Right.  All of your CONOPS and all of your traditional standard operating procedures are that you can operate as an independent unit, you’re staffed that way, and you’re manned that way.

That’s going to be the big cultural thing that will take some time for the synergies that we have and for people to understand that. Some services still today, as you have heard many times, do not want somebody else to have access to a part that they think is theirs.

SLD: This maintenance culture is based on several decades of historical experience.  But this experience is dysfunctional to the strategic environment in which we find ourselves.  We’re in a strategic environment where our allies and we, with probably the exception of Asians, have stringent defense budgets.  So you’re going to have less aircraft. You’re going to more frequently wish to leverage one another’s capabilities.

From an operational tempo point of view, if you continue to have this kind of segregated maintenance legacy, it’s going to ensure that basically the capability of our allies and ourselves collectively goes down if we don’t find a way to take advantage of the cultural revolution inherent in common technology.

Ogden: The challenge is to have the Services accept the cultural change that will afford them the ability to harvest the economies of scale, and the common spares pool.

Let’s say it’s an upgrade to an aircraft that you want to do and your aircraft are deployed into Europe, okay, normally we would never send an aircraft into Italy and contract with Italy to do an upgrade on an F-16. Even if they could, we would not do that.  We would go somewhere that it was US organization or US administered contract to do the upgrade.

Let’s say you land at a an F-16 base in Italy, you got to go back through your base supply to get a part shipped in to you with your crew to come out and take care of that airplane. Now the airplane sits on the ground until you get maintainers out there to take care of the airplane.

In the US Air Force process until an airplane is on your base for seven days, it still belongs to the unit that flew in the airplane. So if I’m flying cross-country, the unit, even if it is another F-16 base, they may help me, but they aren’t responsible for repairing that airplane till after seven days because that’s just the process that they do.

They’re going to say, “Okay, we’ll help you with the part.  We’ll do this.  We’ll give you a mechanic,” but most of the time you end up you take care of the airplane across country.

With the F-35A and the ALIS system, when the airplane drops in, we know what part, kit is available from what nearest base, we know a worldwide warehouse we would ship a part to a location to that tail number for that person to put that part on the aircraft and fix it.

This is because we have no contract limitations.  We know that we’re responsible for aircraft availability and if an aircrafts down, we know and see that immediately with ALIS and we make the determination to send the part right there.

It is not a matter of the base having to decide the prioritization going back to their own, working through their base supply.  And if it’s an Italian F-35 that lands a UK base, from a technological point of view it does not have to make a difference. The part would go right into the UK and be shipped to that tail number.

SLD: With the F-35A, the USAF is provided with a common configuration, a common aircraft. How does that reality potentially change the maintainers’ mental furniture and affect operational rhythms?

Ogden: What happens off the flight line would really be invisible to the user.  The war fighter would not see anything different. He would just know that the parts are there faster, it’s the right part, it will integrate with his aircraft and he doesn’t know where it comes from.

F-35As in Flight (Credit: Lockheed Martin)
F-35As in Flight (Credit: Lockheed Martin)

What does change is the turmoil the war fighter does not see. It changes the business application. It changes the priority of parts.  It changes the way the OEMs refill the consumed part and forecast the repair of the part that just came off the airplane. All of these things are happening in parallel and subsequently much faster.

Now what it does do differently is on an F-16, an avionics’ problem would require maybe three specialists would have to troubleshoot the aircraft to say, “Here’s how many people I need to deploy to fix this airplane.”  With the F-35, you get a multi solution that tells you what part will meet you at the aircraft and you don’t necessarily need a technician, three of them to go troubleshoot the airplane. It’s already done.

So the tempo for the flight line guy, for the war fighter would be: I have better prognostics, more accurate indication of what’s going to happen. And when I get there, the part will be there.  I don’t have to wait for it to be issued from supply, take the part with me, and then try and move it commercially or move it through Air Mobility or whatever, drive it to the other base.

The F-16 becomes a logistics’ challenge from a war fighter perspective when it cannot fly; I need to get technicians there. The pilots probably going to come home until I get the aircraft fixed or he might stay with it.  I’m talking to a maintenance guy at another base to see if he’s got the right equipment that I can even hook up my power and generator and everything else to troubleshoot the aircraft. In addition, I will need equipment for flight line testing.

With the F-35A, the ability to diagnose and test are built into the plane and provides the problem identification information up front.  You can determine what you need without deploying a slew of technicians just to find out what you need to do.

SLD: Could you give us an example of the impact of the shift from the old to the new?

Ogden: OK. I will lay out a baseline code three scenario.  Code Three is when the plane is broken and can’t fly again until it is fixed.

I’ll lay out the timeline and describe the numbers of people that are involved in that process of fixing and turning that aircraft, then we’ll lay down a code three timeline as we see it for an F-35 with the numbers of people involved in getting the plane flying again. I’ll be conservative in the code three numbers that I would send out is that we’re going to fix it the first time we look at it.

For the sake of this example, let us assume that you have a flight control problem. It could be that it is a hydraulic problem or an electrical problem. When the pilot lands, he says “I’m code three for flight controls,” which he has to do at that point in time is he goes through debrief. At the same time that he’s going through debrief with whoever’s in there, whether it’s a pro super or a crew chief, usually it’s going to be a pro super or an expeditor, somebody that’s going to go listen to him and then the crew chiefs going to get ready to refuel or get ready with the equipment.

We’re going to deploy the equipment out there with probably a flight control specialist and hydraulics’ guy to make sure that we know what’s going on along with the crew chief. They’re going to run the system to see if they can duplicate the flight control problem on the ground. At that point in time, they’ll make a determination that it’s either hydraulic or it is electronic or an avionics’ problem.

Then they’ll order the part and/or do another check to make sure they’ve isolated it correctly.  At that point in time usually the pro super or the expeditor gets involved and they go and make sure that the right order of the part, go to supply and give him the permission to order the part and then begin to bring the equipment in and the technicians to actually do the repair may or may not be the same guy that troubleshot the aircraft.

At that point in time, they’ll do the repair of the aircraft and they’ll either run the aircraft or hook up hydraulics and/or electrical power to the aircraft to see that they’ve fixed the aircraft. That typically takes I would say two to two and a half hours, maybe even three hours to get to the point where you know what the problem is and you’ve made the determination that you’re going to order this part or fix this avionics’ part.

For the F-35, the diagnostics are done even before he even lands; I know whether it is an electrical problem or a hydraulic problem. So right there I am saving two to two and half hours of several people’s time.

The assessment phase is done automatically through the PHM (Prognostics Health Management). Now when that occurs, at the same time, ALIS has already go into the supply chain and told you whether or not you have the part, so you don’t have to wait.  The part may even be issued to you before the airplane gets in the chocks.

When the pilot lands, there’s no need for him to really debrief, you’ve got default isolation, you’ve got it loaded into your PMA or your laptop, now you could in-turn when he goes in to debrief and does the physical debrief, you’re already out there fixing the airplane. If it’s a card, if it’s a hydraulic component, it’s going to take you more time.  You’re going to do some physical work.

But the fixed phase is already begun while the pilot and you are going into debrief.  You’ve already got someone out there.

SLD: So you’re saving time on the assessment phase and secondly you’re saving time in terms of the machine is scanning the database to determine availability of the part.  The machine has the role of automating the knowledge of what’s wrong and also has an ability to scan into the system to determine parts availability, so I save manpower simply by delegating this capability to the machine.

Ogden: Now remember, on the F-16, I had to deploy test equipment and our support equipment to go run the airplane to validate the equipment. I have to have a supporting cast that I’ve got running behind the background here too.

Before I can even order the part, I don’t know what’s wrong the aircraft so I have got a supporting cast of flight line guys making decisions on how to prioritize the equipment that’s on the flight line.  On a F35, my test is usually the aircraft. I don’t need several unique pieces test equipment. It has already told me when it hits the ground what is the problem.

SLD: So another cost savings is the equipment is built into the aircraft rather than a whole different team to maintain, move about, repair, test equipment external to the aircraft.

Ogden: Plus, when I send out my initial guys, they’ve got to go to the tool crib and get paper tech orders to go troubleshoot the aircraft of which they don’t know what the problem is yet. While I’ve got the hydraulic guy, the avionics’ guy, and maybe the electrician all in there getting their tech orders to go out and troubleshoot the aircraft. Guess what, the PMA already has told me it’s this particular card or it’s this component and the probability of that component is where we are focusing our dollars to make sure that we’re making quick and accurate decisions.

This means now I don’t need all these folks. I don’t need to stand in a cue.  I don’t have all the wait times for people to either have eliminated the problem or decide it was a problem and then go back into the supply chain and see if I have it, have these folks stand down while we’re waiting on the part.

As a flight line maintenance guy, I love it that I’m going to be able to tell the aircraft when it lands whether I can turn it next time, prioritize the right kind of people to get over there and fix the aircraft with the parts and their tech orders are already with them.

It’s electronic.  All this digital backbone becomes a very big leverage to the sustainment guy on the flight line.  It’s our processes that we’re going to have a difficult time changing.

Let’s just say I shorten the queue time 35/40%, which is easy in my mind to achieve.  This has a significant impact on how I manage my maintenance process.

Currently, we have four-hour, eight-hour, and 12-hour turns, right, or fixed rates.  We’re going to measure that in half hours and hours and two hours, not the typical four/six/eight/12 fixed rates with the new systems.

The guy on the line can say to the ops commander: Hey look, I fixed 25% of my aircraft at landing a code three, I can finish the fix in less two hours. That means if I typically I’m having 40% of my aircraft are landing code three and 10% of those I can fix in two hours, and that’s how you build your schedule from how many airplanes do I commit to make the first go: What number of spares do I need for a second go? And if there is a third go, what’s that descending number of aircraft I should plan on flying?  A 12 turn ten, turn eight or how do you want to do that?

With the F-35, I’m predicting that you’re going to be able to come up with a much more predictable flight rhythm. I will know I’m going to fly and how I’m going to fly that.

SLD: Reducing the numbers of parts needed, and providing an ability to use parts locally will lead to significant reductions in demand on the Air Mobility System to support forward deployed operations.  A shift in how the combat air force is supported will in turn lead to significant savings or shift in demand for the Air Mobility System which of course includes both tankers and lifters.

I think there’s a very significant savings to be had in having a more transparent and fungible supply chain where I could have at least intellectual possibility if I’m in Italy having the Italians give me the parts.

Ogden: There is an avalanche of savings to be had from a new maintenance regime and approach enabled by the technology of the F-35A for the USAF. What you’re just describing here is just that. How does the new maintenance capabilities, in turn, offer you more savings because you’re reducing air lift, volume, weight, cubes, warehouse space.  Sometimes in the US Air Force, we fly parts right past each other going from one unit to the next when it could’ve been much more efficiently managed through a worldwide distribution. I think you’ve hit on a very big point.

F-35 and Cost Effective Performance

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The Missing Element from the “Sustainment” Debate

By Dr. Robbin Laird

08/01/2011 – In the wake of the headlines about the trillion-dollar airplane, F-35 sustainment costs have been tossed into the political fray.  According to a single line in an unreleased SAR report, the F-35 fleet is projected to cost more than a trillion dollars to operate over the span of the life of the entire fleet for more than 30 years.

Less amazing than the number is the assumption about the assumption – that it reflects anything remotely relevant to reality.  But in the current political climate of financial populism, the F-35 has become the poster child of the desire of many to withdraw from global engagement or more to the point from the modernization of the power projection force.

The F-35 B has been put on probation rather than lionized as a system which doubles the number of capital ships available to the USN from the Gator navy.  Rather than emphasizing how the F-35B and the newly enabled ARG provide strategic relevance to the Littoral Combat Ship, the Administration and the Congress pursue every platform fights alone strategy and highlights IOC costs of platforms versus their operation as a fleet and their synergy with the force.

It is particularly ironic that the sustainment costs of the F-35 have entered a policy debate, hitherto never informed by logistics or sustainment issues.  The Afghan war is the logistics and sustainment war par excellence, and can any of the “new” experts on aircraft sustainment, tell us the cost per year of logs and sustainment in the far away to reach war?

This is clearly simply a new tactic to eviscerate Air Force, USN, and USMC modernization, rather than a serious debate.  As Adam Hebert, Editor in Chief of Air Force Magazine has recently argued:

Take a deep breath, everybody. The trillion-dollar operation and maintenance cost everyone is hyperventilating about is hardly worth the paper it is printed on. It counts every possible cost to operate and modernize the F-35 during a 25-year production run, followed by a 30-year operational life. It represents a half-century’s worth of fuel, parts, upgrades, and even related construction costs.

This time horizon extends until 2065. What makes the estimate particularly worthless is that it is computed in “then-year” dollars—an estimate that measures cost not by 2011 standards, but by what they will cost in the year they are spent. This includes 55 years of inflation at the tail end of the computation, an enormous multiplier that is especially damaging because all of these costs are still, psychologically, perceived as 2011 dollars.

All one has to do is think about the references to what a gallon of gas or a loaf of bread cost in some long-past year to appreciate the effect of decades’ worth of inflation. Just as 2065 is 54 years in the future, 1957 is 54 years in the past. The iconic 1957 Chevrolet cost roughly $2,500 at the time, while the average paid for a new car today is more than $28,000. Decades of compound inflation do amazing things, and anyone who claims to know what inflation rates or fuel prices will be 25 and 50 years hence is a fool.

And one could add that the current obsession with projected life cycle costs rather than real analysis is also part of the problem.  Trying to predict the costs of future parts and of fuel and other variables is difficult because precisely they are variables.  Using such indicators confuse decision making; they do not inform it.

Closer at hand are ways to understand how new platforms provide ways for enhanced maintainability. New platforms are built with a significant amount of attention to how to enhance their ability to be maintained over time.  When platforms were built thirty years ago, logistics support was an afterthought.  No it is a core element of determining successful outcomes to the manufacturing process.

Additionally, one needs to buy Fleetwide.  Savings will come from pooling resources, something that cannot happen if you buy a gaggle of aircraft, rather than operating a common fleet.  Just ask Fed Ex what commonality for their fleet delivers in terms of performance and savings.

The F-35 is strong on both points.  The plane has been designed to optimize maintainability and to reduce the amount of touch labor on the plane by at least 30%.  And the fleet commonality will lead to significant ability to operate, deploy and sustain fleets of aircraft.

Recently retired head of Marine Corps Aviation General Trautman hammered the first point home.

Affordability is the balance of cost and capabilities required to accomplish assigned missions. For over a decade the Marine Corps has avoided the cost of new procurement during a time when the service lives of our legacy aircraft were sufficient to meet the missions assigned. However, in the near future, our investment in the capabilities of the F-35B will outweigh the unavoidable legacy aircraft operations and sustainment (O&S) cost increases we will incur with the F/A-18, AV-8B, and EA-6B.

The O&S costs of legacy aircraft across DoD have been increasing at an average rate of 7.8% per year since 2000. The operational lifetimes of legacy aircraft are being extended well beyond their original design limits. As a result, we have been continually engaged in a struggle to maintain operational readiness of our legacy aircraft due largely to the increasing age of the aircraft fleet. Early in an aircraft’s life cycle, the principal challenge is primarily attributed to the aging proprietary avionics systems upon which the user depends for warfighting relevance; later it is maintenance of the airframe and hardware components that are become the O&S cost drivers.

The Marine Corps strategy for the last eleven years has been to forego the procurement new variants of legacy aircraft and continuing a process of trying to sustain old designs that inherit the obsolescence and fatigue life issues of their predecessors. Instead, we opted to transition to a new 5th generation aircraft that takes advantage of technology improvements which generate substantial savings in ownership cost. The capabilities of the F-35B enable the Marine Corps to replace three legacy aircraft types and retain the capability of executing all our missions. This results in tangible O&S cost savings.

A common platform produces a common support and sustainment base. By necking down to one type of aircraft we eliminate a threefold redundancy in manpower, operating materiel, support services, training, maintenance competencies, technical systems management, tools, and aircraft upgrades. For example:

  • Direct military manpower will be reduced by 30%; approximately 340 officers and 2600 enlisted.
  • Within the Naval Aviation Enterprise we will reduce the technical management requirements the systems requiring support by 60%.
  • Peculiar Support Equipment will be reduced by 60%; down from 1,400 to 400 line items.
  • Simulators and training support systems will be reduced by 80%; five different training systems will neck down to one.
  • Electronic Attack WRA’s will be reduced by 40% and replaced with easier to support state of the art digital electronics.
  • The Performance Based Logistics construct will nearly eliminate macro and micro avionics repair, and intermediate propulsion support functions.
  • Airborne Armament Equipment (AAE) will be reduced by over 80% with the incorporation of a multi-use bomb rack.
  • Compared to historical parametrics we expect our overall O&S costs to decrease by 30%.

The key to enabling these reductions is to evolve our supportability concepts, processes and procedures instead of shackling ourselves to a support infrastructure built for legacy aircraft. We need to be innovative and ensure our sustainment posture keeps pace with technology advancements and global partnering synergies. Working together with industry, the Marine Corps is intently focused on the future as we seek innovative cost effective sustainment strategies that match the game changing operational capabilities resident in the F-35 Lightning II.

The impact of fleet operations was highlighted by retired General Cameron, now working on the F-35 program with Lockheed Martin. Cameron as a retired USAF general in charge of maintenance highlighted the fleet consequences of shifting form F-16s to F-35As for the USAF.

The real beauty of the F-35 program is the fact that you can look out across the entire fleet, all the international partners, all the domestic partners, and tell immediately if there are systemic fleet wide issues.  The program can share assets to ensure a surge capability to wherever it’s needed and can share the robust supply chain that’s already established on the F-35 production line. Our experiences with the F-16 highlight another major advantage of the F-35 approach.   The F-16 has been a highly successful program.  However, configuration management has been a challenge because it has been handled at the individual service level. Therefore, there are roughly 130 configurations of the F-16.  The operators, when prosecuting the air battle, have to know the precise configuration of each F-16 in order to know what capabilities it brings to the fight.  The sustainment of the F-16 is even more challenging with spares not being interchangeable among F-16 variants. The F-35 is a common configuration so interoperability is the key in both operations and sustainment.

One could simply note that the views of such warfighters are simply bypassed in making wild assumptions about future life-cycle costs.  An alternative approach would be to examine how the F-35 as manufactured leads to significant REDUCTIONS in touch labor time and to ENHANCED operational tempo which in turn lead to COMBINED reduction in maintenance costs with enhanced combat efficiencies.

(Credit: SLD)(Credit: SLD)

There are several key elements of the game-changing approach to maintenance and sustainability literally built into the aircraft.

First, there is a common configuration for avionics and mission systems across the fleet.  Rather than having to train and supply maintainers for multiple configurations of F-16s training and supply can focus on the common F-35A configuration.  This is true of the other variants of the F-35 as well.

Second, the aircraft will provide real time operational data, which will allow maintenance to need rather than maintenance, based on paper determined schedules.  The real time operational data will be used as well to determine parts reliability, which in turn can lead to improved design and production of parts, which is another cost reducer.

Third, rather than constantly rewriting and reprinting of manuals, digital systems resident in the computer can be upgraded in real time.  Retraining of staff is reduced by the software upgrades in the maintenance systems and data upgrades.  One can leverage software upgrades and use the computer’s capabilities rather than constant re-training of maintenance staff.

Fourth, parts ownership is local in the current system.  There is a very difficult and arduous process to move parts from locale A to locale B as aircraft need parts.  A global sustainability approach is inherent in the technology built into parts management in the F-35 program whereby transparency of parts can facilitate system ownership of parts rather than local ownership.  This leads to reduce time to replace parts, which is another cost savings.

(Credit: SLD)(Credit: SLD)

Fifth, the aircraft as a system, it is not simply a platform, provides for significant enhanced ops time versus training time.  This means there are cost savings as measured in terms of real time on station for each platform.  A classic example is the shift from the Harrier to the F-35B.  The Harrier is a difficult plane to fly and requires significant requalification time for its pilots; much of this time is replaced by the ease of flight of the F-35B, which means more time on mission.

Sixth, significant savings come from how the mission systems are to be upgraded.  Rather than a piece by piece upgrade and much time spent on aircraft reconfiguration, the missions systems architecture permits rapid swap out of new sensors and systems.

Seventh, the aircraft as a system has eliminated many parts that simply no longer need to be maintained.  For example, with regard to hydraulic systems, 80% of the systems have been eliminated, and the use of actuators will facilitate the speed of maintaining what remains.

Eighth, the F-35 is the first field reparable stealth aircraft ever built.  The advantages of stealth built into the aircraft will be sustainable in the field, and costly returns to the plant for touch labor repairs will be significantly reduced.

Not only will one gain significant savings from manpower touch labor time on the aircraft, but also the operational tempo will be enhanced.  The result will be a significant shift in the use of manpower from rear touch labor support to tip of the spear operations.

All of this is bypassed by the trillion-dollar sustainability assertion.  Reality may be harsh, but no need to make it harder by making up analytical numbers and using hypothetical 2065 costs as a basis for 2011 decisions.  This reminds one of John Stuart Mill’s wonderful characterizations of Bentham’s philosophy: “Nonsense on Stilts.”

Emerging Alliances for the 21st Century, Part VII

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07/31/2011 Terrorist-Criminal Pipelines and Criminalized States

By Douglas Farah

Conclusions

07/  /2011 – The trend toward the merging of terrorist and criminal groups to mutually exploit new markets is unlikely to diminish. Both will continue to need the same facilitators, and both can leverage the relationship with the other to mutual benefit. This gives these groups an asymmetrical advantage over state actors, which are inherently more bureaucratic and less adaptable than non-state actors.

Given the fragile or non-existent judicial and law enforcement institutions in West Africa; the state tolerance or sponsorship of the drug trade by Venezuela and quiescent African states; and the enormous revenue stream that cocaine represents, it is likely such loose alliances will continue to grow. The human cost in West Africa, as recent past spasms of violence have shown, will be extraordinarily high, as will the impact on what little governance capability currently exists.

(Credit: Bigstock)
(Credit: Bigstock)

Europe and the United States will face a growing threat from the region, particularly from radical Islamist groups, both those affiliated with al Qaeda and those, like Hezbollah, allied with Iran. Yet, given the current budget constraints and economic situation it is highly unlikely that additional resources from either continent will be allocated to the threat.

There are few options for putting the genie back in the bottle. Transnational criminal organizations and terrorist networks have proven themselves to be resilient and highly adaptable, while governments remain far less so. Governments have also consistently underestimated the capacity of these disparate and non-hierarchical organizations.

Human intelligence, perhaps the most difficult type of intelligence to acquire, is vital to understanding the threat, how the different groups work together and what their vulnerabilities are. One major vulnerability is the dependence of the Latin American drug traffickers on local African networks. In order to make the necessary alliances, the cartels operatives are forced to operate in unfamiliar terrain and in languages and cultures they do not know or understand. This creates significant opportunities for penetration of the operations, as the Liberian case shows.

Another element that is essential is the creation of functioning institutions in the most affected states that can both investigate and judicially prosecute transnational criminal organizations. The most efficient way to do this is through the creation of vetted police and military units and judicial corps that are specially trained and who can be protected from reprisals.

This almost universal mantra of judicial and police reform is valid, but it can only be realistically done in small groups that can then be expanded as time and resources permit. Most efforts are diluted to the point of uselessness by attempting to do everything at once. The Colombian experience in fighting drug trafficking organizations and the FARC is illustrative of this. After years of futility, the police, military and judiciary all were able to form small vetted units that have grown over time, and, just as importantly, were able to work together.

Vetted units that are able to collect intelligence, to operate in a relatively controlled environment, and which can be monitored for corruption, are also vital and far more achievable than macro level police reform.  These are small steps, but ones that have a chance of actually working in a sustainable way. They do not require the tens of millions of dollars and large-scale human resources commitments that broader efforts do. And they can be easily expanded as conditions permit.

(Credit: Bigstock)
(Credit: Bigstock)

But human intelligence and institution building, operating in a vacuum, will have limited impact absent the will and ability to match the trans-nationalization of enforcement to the trans-nationalization of crime and terror. These groups thrive in the seams of the global system, while the global response has been a state centric approach that matches the 20th century, not this one.

Without this type of human intelligence and transnational entities — able to operate in relative safety through vetted units — the criminal and terrorist pipelines will continue not only to grow but also to develop the capacity to recombine more quickly and in ever more dangerous ways.

USN Mines and Mining in the AirSea Battle Concept

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07/30/2011
The Australian navy minesweeper HMAS Towoomba (FFH-156) is underway alongside the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68). (Credit: USS Nimitz 10/28/09)

What Weapons that Wait?

By Dr. Scott C. Truver

07/30/2011 – “I have always deemed it unworthy of a chivalrous nation,” Adm. David G. Farragut wrote in 1864, after he “damned the torpedoes” at Mobile Bay. “But, it does not do to give your enemy such a decided superiority over you.”

Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship USS Ardent (MCM 12) conducts training with its mine neutralization vehicle and members of Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit 1. (Credit: USN Visual Service 07/08/08)Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship USS Ardent (MCM 12) conducts training with its mine neutralization vehicle and members of Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit 1. (Credit: USN Visual Service 07/08/08)

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review called for the Air Force and Navy to develop a new concept for defeating potential adversaries — principally China, Iran and North Korea — that possess sophisticated anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities.  In response, the AirSea Battle Concept (ASBC) captured the imagination of former Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, outgoing Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead, and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton A. Schwartz.

The ASBC is to help guide the development of future capabilities for effective power-projection operations.  Surprisingly, this seems to include innovative ideas for using naval mines to defeat adversaries’ naval forces and strategies. While still not formally approved as of mid-2011, several observers noted the ASBC seems to address future naval mining capabilities:

  • Offensive mining appears particularly attractive, given its comparatively low cost and the difficulty and time-consuming nature of countermine operations. Mining will generally be effective only in areas close to hostile territory, near the approaches to ports and naval bases, and in chokepoints.
  • Significant numbers of smart, mobile mines capable of autonomous movement to programmed locations over extended distances will enable offensive mining.
  • Stealthy mine-laying platforms capable of penetrating A2/AD systems are preferred for conducting this mission, primarily submarines and stealthy Navy and Air Force bombers.

These AirSea Battle naval mining initiatives are years, if not decades, away from bearing fruit and depend upon a commitment to design, engineer and acquire modern mines, which is problematic at best.  Indeed, there’s great doubt that these ideas will ever see the light of day –– and there’s “history” behind this statement.

From the earliest years of the Republic the U.S. Navy has had a “love-hate” relationship with mines… long known as the “weapons that wait.”  During the Civil War, the South was much more innovative in using a variety of “torpedoes” than President Lincoln’s Navy.  Despite massive employment of mines during World War I and II, the Navy used mines offensively on only two occasions during the Cold War — the 1972 mining of North Vietnamese ports, which brought the North back to the Paris Peace Talks, and mining the northern Persian Gulf in 1991 to prevent Iraqi naval craft from leaving their bases.  The Navy also laid more than 11,000 general-purpose bomb-converted Mk 36 “Destructor” mines fitted with magnetic and acoustic sensors along jungle trails during the Vietnam War, something that was duplicated against Iraqi bridges and runways during Desert Storm.

Until recently, the Navy maintained a large stock of mines, including the Destructors, the Mk 67 submarine-launched mobile mine (SLMM), and the Mk 60 CAPTOR (enCAPsulated TORpedo) anti-submarine mine. But with the end of the Cold War, the Navy’s mine capabilities have atrophied.

Today the United States lacks modern mines, and the U.S. stockpile is significantly smaller than North Korea’s estimated 50,000 mines, while the Chinese Navy might have on the order of 100,000, and Russia has been estimated to have 250,000.

The CAPTORs are gone, and only the obsolescent SLMMs and three “Quickstrike” mine variants, which have limited effectiveness in deeper waters against surface targets, are in the Navy’s inventory.  But, the SLMMs will be phased out in 2012. At that point, the Navy will have no mines capable of being launched from submarines.

Worryingly, should the Navy actually have to deploy its weapons, there are only a few trained mine specialists on staff.   In mid-2011 there were only two minefield planners in the U.S. Navy—a retired USCG captain and a USN Limited Duty/Surface Ordnance Officer assigned to the Naval Mine and Antisubmarine Warfare Command in San Diego—in addition to a handful of enlisted Minemen (none having formal training).

The “workhorses” of the Navy’s mining capabilities are the Quickstrike weapons –– 500-pound (Mk 62) and 1,000-pound (Mk 63) bomb-conversions that are fitted with multiple-influence target detection devices (TDDs) plus the 2,000-pound, “thin-wall” Mark 65 dedicated Quickstrike mine.  (The Mk 62/63 mines replaced the Mk 36 Destructors.)  All are bottom mines and are deployed from tactical and strategic aircraft.

There is no surface mine-laying capability, although the U.S. Navy might investigate rolling Quickstrike mines off virtually any available ships and craft — something Libya, using Russian/East German “export” mines, did from a ferryboat in the Red Sea during the summer of 1984 — but that doesn’t seem to support ASBC stealthy mine-laying ideas.

Once the SLMMs are phased out, the nation’s sole mine-laying capabilities will reside in naval aviation and the Air Force. The Navy’s P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft and F/A-18 Hornet/Super Hornet can drop Quickstrike mines, but the P-3Cs start leaving service in 2013. They will be replaced by the P-8 Poseidon Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft, which also will have a modest mining capability, but the ability to do so in meaningful numbers is years away.

The Air Force’s B-52H Stratofortress, B-1B Lancer and B-2A Spirit strategic bombers compose the nation’s only high-volume mining capability.  The seemingly ageless (expected to remain in operation through 2040, the first B-52H entered service in 1961) 77 active B-52s each can carry about 45 Mk 62 Quickstrike mines, 18 Mk 63 mines, or 28 Mk 65 mines; the 66 B-1s can carry 84 Mk 62, 24 Mk 62, or eight Mk 65 mines; and the 20 B-2s carry eight Mk 62s. The B-52s and B-1s — but not the stealthy B-2s — train and practice this mission.

The Australian navy minesweeper HMAS Towoomba (FFH-156) is underway alongside the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68). (Credit: USS Nimitz 10/28/09)
The Australian navy minesweeper HMAS Towoomba (FFH-156) is underway alongside the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68). (Credit: USS Nimitz 10/28/09)

However, in wartime, high-volume mining will be only one of several missions demanded of Air Force bombers and, if the minefields are at great distances, their supporting fleet of aerial tankers.

And, aircraft are increasingly at risk from sophisticated integrated air defense systems, as explained in the 2011 USAF Strategic Environmental Assessment.

There were a few, half-hearted post-Cold War efforts to develop new mines: An improved submarine-launched mobile mine based on the Mk 48 torpedo was initiated, but died in 2002; the U.S. Navy-U.K. Royal Navy joint concept for a Littoral Sea Mine was pursued, then dropped; and there was the “2010 Mine” to complement the Quickstrike mines. That program was to provide the fleet with a modern air-dropped mine by 2010. But that, too, was canceled, as was another offensive “networked” mine concept, the Sea Predator 2020 Mine.  The denouement is that there is no robust U.S. technological/industrial base in this field.

Some observers have suggested adapting a foreign mine to Navy service.  A good idea as several allied navies have modern mine development programs.  The U.S. Navy has had some success with foreign weapons and systems, among them the Mk 92 fire control system, the OTO Melara 76-mm guns, the AV-8 Harrier series aircraft, Martin Baker ejection seats, etc.

Suggestions that the Navy acquire modern foreign mines, however, have been met with “not invented here” indifference.  As early as 2005 the Secretary of the Navy’s Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) examined the issue and concluded, “The U.S. Navy should consider employing mines in offensive operations, to create barriers to deny areas of interest/operations to hostile submarines, UUVs, and SDVs. The current U.S. mine capability is limited and rapidly dying. It is unlikely that the planned 2020 Mine will be developed on time, at cost, and with the capabilities originally expected. Accordingly, the Panel recommends the use of existing and in-development foreign-built mines that could be fitted with advanced sensors to meet the use described above.”

Cassandras note that foreign-made mines could be difficult to integrate because of weapon safety, delivery vehicle interface, delivery methods, and other technical-operational concerns.  Information assurance issues with software-driven technologies are huge, generally, and the Navy would have to ensure there are no embedded “Trojan Horse” or viral codes in the foreign mines.  That said, as this was written the Navy was considering a “drill-down” study to get to the “ground truth” about acquiring and employing foreign mines. This nascent interest has not yet translated into funding, and given increasing pressures on Department of Defense and Navy budgets, the situation could likely become “business as usual” with interminable delays in the effort.

Today, there is no U.S. Navy mine program, other than the Quickstrike TDDs. The inability to invest in an advanced new mine looks to be held hostage to resource competition. The Navy’s mine warfare resource sponsor has a difficult challenge: balancing mines/mining with mine countermeasures (MCM), while having to fund legacy and future MCM systems as new systems are being brought on line, with no growth in total funding.  Indeed, challenges with the mine warfare module for the littoral combat ships (LCS) recently dictated a redesign of that “mission package,” including additional costs and delays in the future MCM program.

That underscores the fiscal truth of U.S. Navy mine warfare: mines and mine countermeasures — from the labs and industry, and from the Pentagon to deployed forces — usually accounts for less than 1 percent of the Navy’s annual budget.

Nevertheless, several senior Navy officials, including the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commanders, U.S. Third and Fifth Fleets, are warming to the idea of “offensive” mine warfare.  Without mines the U.S. Navy essentially gives adversaries a “free pass.”  In the fall of 2010, Captain John Hardison, then-deputy program manager of the Navy’s Mine Warfare Programs Office (PMS-495), identified remote control and improved targeting for “offensive mining” as among his “top items of interest.” He essentially echoed Admiral John C. Harvey, Jr., Commander Fleet Forces Command, who earlier said the Navy needs to avoid losing its naval mining capabilities, although the Admiral acknowledged that funding offensive mine research and development is not at the top of his list of priorities.

But specific efforts that could lead to a realistic offensive mining capability are difficult to identify. A new target detection device, the Mk 71 TDD for the Mk 65 Quickstrike has been developed and fielded.  The Mk 71 program dates to the early 1990s, with acquisition beginning in fiscal year 2005, but has been delayed by low-level funding, changing priorities, and a “tech-refresh” to make it more producible.  The development of a new Mk 75 fuse for other bomb-conversions has also taken longer than anticipated, but should available in a few years.  As an example of the fragility of the U.S. mine industrial base, the sole company that has provided a critical component of the TDD has ceased production, spurring the Navy to look for alternative sources—including foreign.

The Quickstrike mines—available and planned—pale in comparison with advanced mine technologies.  Captain Mark Rios, Resource Sponsor for Mine Warfare (N852) in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, said that the Navy has the ability to lay indiscriminate mines, but could create mines that would more effectively target enemy ships and could be turned off by remote control after a conflict ends. “I think we want there to be a discussion about how we can use mines,” Rios noted at the 2010 Expeditionary Warfare Conference. “Clearly some of our adversaries or potential adversaries have submarines, have patrol craft that are very nimble and fast.  Early on in the conflict, mining their harbors or their approaches to come in and out of port would reduce the number of ships and submarines that could come out to attack us and this reduces the threat.”  He has also spoken of “glide mines” with global positioning system targeting, which can be launched from tactical aircraft outside the range of adversary anti-aircraft weapons, and mine-laying unmanned undersea vehicle “trucks” that can be deployed from the Navy’s special-forces-configured cruise missile submarines (SSGNs).

The mine warfare countermeasure ship USS Devastator conducts sea trials with advanced minesweeping gear off the coast of Texas. The new rigging will enable minesweepers to clear larger lanes in the ocean. (Credit: USN Visual Service 07/08/08)
The mine warfare countermeasure ship USS Devastator conducts sea trials with advanced minesweeping gear off the coast of Texas. The new rigging will enable minesweepers to clear larger lanes in the ocean. (Credit: USN Visual Service 07/08/08)

Captain Rios is an optimist.   The Sea Predator or 2020 Mine concept called for a remote-controlled, mobile mine that would take advantage of the basic mine characteristics––high-lethality, long-endurance, man-out-of-the-loop, strong psychological impact, and force-multiplying features that free manned platforms for other duties. Sea Predator was also to have autonomous mobility and remote control.  It was envisioned to be both submarine- and surface-ship deployable, with the LCS identified as a candidate platform.  But, that seems to have dropped out of favor, now.

Thus, while the technologies for improving mines are mature, the Navy’s will to develop, acquire and deploy them remains uncertain—at best.  But increasingly, as smaller navies obtain advanced coastal and midget submarines and swimmer delivery vehicles, the potential role of offensive mines increases.

In light of the reality lurking behind the rhetoric of the AirSea Battle naval mining concepts, then, it looks like our A2/AD adversaries will continue to enjoy a “decided superiority” over us.

Scott Truver is director, National Security Programs, at Gryphon Technologies LC. He has supported the U.S. Navy mine warfare community since 1979 and is the co-author of the Naval Institute Press book, Weapons that Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy (1991 update), and numerous mine warfare strategy, policy, programmatic and operational studies, reports and articles. He thanks Norman Polmar and several Navy uniformed and civilian mine experts for their insight that helped shaped this commentary.  Earlier versions of this essay were published in the June 2011 issues of Seapower magazine and the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.

Emerging Alliances, Part VI

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on Emerging Alliances, Part VI
07/26/2011

Criminalized States and Terrorist-Criminal Pipelines

By Douglas Farah

The FARC, Venezuela and Iran

07/26/2011 – While the transnational trafficking and financial operations of the Sinaloa cartel are important, the FARC alliances and actions offer an important look at the use of non-state criminal/terrorist armed groups by a criminalized state.

The Super Tucano FARC Killer Landing in Difficult Terrain (Credit: https://www.sldinfo.com/?p=11834)The Super Tucano FARC Killer Landing in Difficult Terrain (Credit: https://www.sldinfo.com/?p=11834)

The well documented links of Venezuela’s “Bolivarian Revolution,” led by President Hugo Chávez, to both Iran and to the FARC—as well as the criminalization of the Venezuelan state under Chávez—point to the evolution of the model described above where a criminalized state franchises out part of its criminal enterprises to non-state actors.[1]

More worrisome from the U.S. perspective is the growing evidence of Chávez’s direct support for Hezbollah, along with his ties to the FARC.

These indicators include the June 18, 2008 designations by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of two Venezuelan citizens, including a senior diplomat, as terrorist supporters for working with the FARC  Several businesses also were sanctioned.  Among the things the two are alleged to have been conducting on behalf of Hezbollah were coordinating possible terrorist attacks and building Hezbollah-sponsored community centers in Venezuela.[2]

OFAC has also designated numerous senior Venezuelan officials, including the heads of two national intelligence services, as terrorist supporters for direct support of the FARC in the acquisition of weapons and drug trafficking.[3]

The Chávez model of allying with both state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran while sponsoring violent non-state terrorist organizations involved in criminal activities and terrorism strongly resembles the template pioneered by Hezbollah, a radical Shite Muslim terrorist organization that enjoys the state sponsorship of Iran and Syria. In fact, the military doctrine of the “Bolivarian Revolution,” officially adopted in Venezuela and rapidly spreading to Chávez’s allies in Bolivia and Nicaragua, explicitly embraces the radical Islamist model of asymmetrical or “fourth generation warfare,” and its heavy reliance on suicide bombings and different types of terrorism, including the use of nuclear weapons. This is occurring at a time when Hezbollah’s presence in Latin America is growing and becoming more identifiable.[4]

(Credit: Bigstock)
(Credit: Bigstock)

The main book Chávez has adopted as his military doctrine is Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary Islam: Origins, Rules and Ethics of Asymmetrical Warfare (Guerra Periférica y el Islam Revolucionario: Orígenes, Reglas y Ética de la Guerra Asimétrica ) by the Spanish politician and ideologue Jorge Verstrynge.[5] Although he is not a Muslim and the book was not written directly in relation to the Venezuelan experience, Verstrynge’s book lauds radical Islam (as well as past terrorists like Ilich Ramírez Sánchez, better known as Carlos the Jackal)[6] for helping to expand the parameters of what irregular warfare should encompass, including the use of biological and nuclear weapons, along with the correlated civilian casualties among the enemy. Chávez has openly admitted his admiration for Ramírez Sánchez, who is serving a life sentence in France for murder and terrorist acts.[7]

Central to Verstrynge’s idealized view of terrorists is his regard for the willingness of the fighters to sacrifice their lives in pursuit of their goals as sacred. Before writing extensively on how to make chemical weapons and listing helpful places to find information on the manufacture of rudimentary nuclear bombs that “someone with a high school education could make,” Verstrynge writes:

We already know it is incorrect to limit asymmetrical warfare to guerrilla warfare, although it is important. However, it is not a mistake to also use things that are classified as terrorism and use them in asymmetrical warfare. And we have super terrorism, divided into chemical terrorism, bioterrorism (which uses biological and bacteriological methods), and nuclear terrorism, which means “the type of terrorism uses the threat of nuclear attack to achieve its goals.”[8]

In a December 12, 2008 interview with Venezuelan state television, Verstrynge lauded Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda for creating a new type of warfare that is “de-territorialized, de-stateized and de-nationalized,” a war where suicide bombers act as “atomic bombs for the poor.”[9]

Chávez liked the book so well he had a special pocket-sized edition printed and distributed to the officer corps with express orders that it be read cover to cover.

While there is only anecdotal evidence to date of the merging of the Bolivarian Revolution’s criminal-terrorist pipeline and the criminal-terrorist pipeline of radical Islamist groups (Hezbollah in particular) supported by the Iranian regime, the possibility opens a series of new security challenges for the United States and its allies in Latin America.

What is clear is that Iran has greatly increased its diplomatic, economic and intelligence presence in Latin America, an area where it has virtually no trade, no historic or cultural ties and no obvious strategic interests. The sole points of convergence of the radical and reactionary theocratic Iranian government and the self-proclaimed socialist and progressive Bolivarian revolution are: 1) an overt and often stated hatred for the United States and 2) a shared view of an authoritarian state that tolerates little dissent and encroaches on all aspects of a citizen’s life.[10]

Such a relationship between non-state and state actors provides numerous benefits to both. In Latin America, for example, the FARC gains access to Venezuelan territory without fear of reprisals, gains access to Venezuelan identification documents, and, perhaps most importantly, gains access to routes for exporting cocaine to Europe and the United States while using the same routes to import quantities of sophisticated weapons and communications equipment. In return, the Chávez government can keep up military pressure on its most vocal opponent in the region, the Colombian government, a staunch U.S. ally that has been the recipient of significant amounts of military and humanitarian aid from the United States.

In addition, Chávez maintains his revolutionary credentials in the radical axis comprised of leftist populists and Islamic fundamentalists, primarily Iran. Perhaps equally important, his government is able to profit from the transit of cocaine and weapons through the national territory at a time when oil revenues are low and the budget is under significant stress.

 

[1] For a closer examination of the relationship of the FARC to the Venezuelan government for support in drug trafficking activities, training and political support see the four-part series by the author, based on field work in Colombia and access to a portion of the FARC documents acquired by the Colombian military following the March 1, 2008 attack on La Angostura in Ecuador, where the FARC’s deputy commander Raúl Reyes was killed:

http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefafarc0408.pdf

http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefafarc0708.pdf

http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefafarcirnetworkdeception0908.pdf

http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefafarclessonslearned1108.pdf

For a further examination of Iran’s ties to the Bolivarian states, see: Douglas Farah, “Iran in Latin America: An Overview,” Iran in Latin America: Threat or Axis of Annoyance,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cynthia J. Arnson et al, editors, June 2009, accessed January 21, 2011, at: http://www.douglasfarah.com/pdfs/20090620_DFIraninLatAmJune2009-1.pdf

[2] One of those designated, Ghazi Nasr al Din, served as the charge d’affaires of Venezuelan embassy in Damascus, and then served in the Venezuelan embassy in London. The OFAC statement said that in late January 2006, al Din facilitated the travel of two Hezbollah representatives of the Lebanese parliament to solicit donation and announce the opening of a Hezbollah-sponsored community center and office in Venezuela. The second individual, Fawzi Kan’an is described as a Venezuela-based Hezbollah supporter and a “significant provider of financial support to Hizbollah.” He met with senior Hezbollah officials in Lebanon to discuss operational issues, including possible kidnapping and terrorist attacks. The OFAC statement can be accessed at: http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1036.htm

[3] Among those designated were Hugo Armando Carvajal, director of Venezuela’s Military Intelligence Directorate for his “assistance to the FARC, (including) protecting drug shipments from seizure”; Henry de Jesus Rangel Silva, director of Venezuela’s Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services for “materially assisting the narcotics activities of the FARC”; and Ramón Emilio Rodriguez Chacín, at the time Venezuela’s minister of interior and justice, described as “the Venezuelan government’s main weapons contact for the FARC.” See the full designation at: http://treas.tpaq.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp1132.htm

[4] In addition to Operation Titan, there have been numerous incidents in the past 18 months of operatives being directly linked to Hezbollah who have been identified or arrested in Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Aruba and elsewhere in Latin America.

[5] Verstrynge, born in Morocco to Belgian and Spanish parents, began his political career on the far right of the Spanish political spectrum as a disciple of  Manuel Fraga, and served as a national and several senior party posts with the Alianza Popular. By his own admission he then migrated to the Socialist Party, but never rose through the ranks. He is widely associated with radical anti-globalization views and anti-U.S. rhetoric, repeatedly stating that the United States is creating a new global empire and must be defeated. Although he has no military training or experience, he has written extensively on asymmetrical warfare.

[6] It is worth noting that Chávez wrote to Ramírez Sánchez in 1999, expressing his admiration for the terrorist, signing off, “with profound faith in the cause and in the mission — now and forever.” The letter set of in international furor. See: “Troops Get Provocative Book,” Miami Herald, Nov. 11, 2005.

[7] Ian James, “Chavez Praises Carlos the Jackal,” Associated Press, November 21, 2009, accessed January 24, 2011, at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/chavez-praises-carlos-the-jackal-1825135.html

[8] Verstrynge, op cit., pp. 56-57.

[9] Bartolomé, op cit. See also: John Sweeny, “Jorge Verstrynge: The Guru of Bolivarian Asymmetric Warfare,” www.vcrisis.com, Sept. 9, 2005; and “Troops Get Provocative Book,” Miami Herald, Nov. 11, 2005.

[10] Farah, “Iran in Latin America: An Overview,” op  cit.