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2013-09-19 After his presentation to the leadership of the 33rd Fighter Wing, Secretary Wynne was asked to discuss the challenge of what is called concurrency.
The answer by Wynne provided one of the best understandings of the reality of the approach taken in the modern aerospace industry.
There would have concurrency not matter when you started the process.
Concurrency has been used as a club in the F-35 discussion. Secretary Wynne demystifies the term and argues that getting on with it and putting the plane in the hands of the warfighter is real development. Credit: SLD
Because we tend, in industry, to hire to a very tight line; enough to get the job done; but not enough to be accused of introducing an overrun. As a result we do not see the funding to the full up line that industry would like to maximize efficiencies.
And industry will not put people on until they get slightly behind schedule. This is because we’re so worried about people cutting the program back, as the start is usually contentious, and up the line customers threaten to leave us high and dry and having to lay off a bunch of recently hired people.
And the other thing is one does not discover many problems until we get later in the program. The top-level design is roughly perfect; with the devil in the details. This is called integration.
Concurrency tends to sway like a pendulum of a clock from we want to involve the users early because we want the user feedback, and we want the engineers to get beat up and understand that they screwed up in the design. This is called direct feedback.
But you can’t get that if you wait, wait, wait, wait, and then have the tests and all your engineers have gone onto other projects, and they never actually meet the user because we waited so long.
And then the other side of it is, if you waited, would you really have solved that problem?
I don’t know.
It is a question of balance. Every program manager is going to be subject to demands to meet the IOC as quickly as possible versus counter demands that they should’ve waited and fed in changes to airplanes number one through twenty before going operational. Only when top leadership takes overt possession of the Program Manager’s (PM’s) dilemma is it called concurrency.
We will always want to feed in the air changes to airplanes one through twenty.
But doing development without deployment guarantees you will not have a new asset out there reshaping capability.
It also guarantees that the impact on operations will be shaped by testers, and not by operators.
For earlier looks at how to understand concurrency see the following:
9/17/13 The F-16 has unequivocally proven its worth for the armed forces in intervention and stabilization operations.
In the coming decades, we will continue to require fighter aircraft.
After comparing the candidates in 2001 and 2008, and updating the relevant information in 2013, the government has decided, on operational, financial and economic grounds, to select the F 35 as the new fighter aircraft for the Netherlands armed forces.
The F-35 is a well-considered choice for a high-tech, future-oriented air force.
From a military operational perspective, the F-35 offers the greatest number of options. It is also the most future-proof option. The aircraft is best able to deal with the proliferation of mobile air defense systems and offers vastly improved observation capabilities, which are of great value in any type of mission.
In addition, the aircraft offers great potential for follow-on development, particularly in the area of network-enabled operations.
Also important are the possibilities for international cooperation in areas such as training, sustainment and deployment. NATO’s analyses underpin the Netherlands’ decision.
With this decision, which concludes a process of almost fifteen years, the Netherlands is responding to the Alliance ‘s call for investment in quality and, consequently, in the collective security of the Alliance. The decision also consolidates the opportunities for the Dutch industry to gain contracts for high-quality work, both in the production of the F-35 and in the sustainment phase.
The cutbacks in Defence budgets which many NATO member states, including the Netherlands, are facing demand careful consideration and astute choices. Above all, opting for a modest number of the best aircraft attests to a sense of reality.
International cooperation is the ideal way to further optimize operational effectiveness. An important step in this respect is the intention of Belgium and the Netherlands to patrol the Benelux airspace together. These Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) and Renegade tasks currently place heavy demands on the pilots and aircraft of the two separate countries.
Cooperation will therefore significantly benefit both countries. A treaty will be required in order to be able to carry out these tasks in each other’s airspace.
In many areas, the introduction of a next-generation fighter aircraft will lead to new insights and applications. The Royal Netherlands Air Force, research institutes and the commercial sector have the innovative potential to play a leading role internationally in this respect.
The organizational management of the air force will be structured in such a way as to guarantee optimum operational output at all times. With the introduction of the F-35, the possibilities for pilots to maintain their skills after their operational period will be reduced to a minimum. This is to ensure that the available flying hours are primarily used for operational pilots.
It has been decided that the replacement will be carried out entirely within the previously reserved investment budget of 4.5 billion euros and the current operating budget for the F-16, which amounts to 270 million euros per year. This will prevent budget displacement effects, which sooner or later would be to the detriment of other capabilities.
As the cost per unit and the operating costs for the F-35 are as yet not definite, there will be a contingency reserve of ten percent for the investments and the operating costs. This can be used to meet any unforeseen rise in the estimated costs, without any direct consequences for the number of aircraft. Opting to maintain tight financial parameters underscores once more that the Defence organization is determined to put and keep its finances in order. Based on the current insights, the available financial room is sufficient for the purchase of 37 aircraft.
The Defence organization will from now on base its plans on that number and will inform its partners in the F-35 program accordingly.
If, within the given financial parameters, room is created in the coming years to purchase more aircraft, the Defence organization will do so. This may be the case if the contingency reserve is not used in full and if the price per unit of the F-35 turns out to be lower than is currently expected. In that case, in addition to the deployment possibilities referred to earlier, the air force would also be able to provide a short-term contribution to a second large-scale operation, as was done recently in Libya.
The order system allows the final number of aircraft to be kept within the available budget. Should any unexpected major changes occur in terms of product, time or money, the project will be reviewed within the given financial parameters, if those changes exceed the margins of the project budget.
Compared with the current fleet of F-16s, the air force will in future be able to deploy fewer F-35s for longer periods of time. In addition to the permanent deployment for the protection of Dutch and Allied airspace, with 37 F-35s the Netherlands will continue to be able to deploy four fighter aircraft, simultaneously and continuously, to support Dutch ground troops as was done in Uruzgan and is still being done in Kunduz.
In 2014, the current number of F-16s will be reduced by 7, to 61. This will reduce the investment costs involved in maintaining the F 16 for a longer period of time. The 7 aircraft will be added to the logistic reserve, to improve the deployability of the remaining 61.
The deployability goals for the period up to the replacement of the F-16 will be adjusted accordingly. The F-16s and pilots stationed in the Netherlands will be divided into three squadrons.
On the basis of the current estimated timescale, the introduction of the F 35 will begin in 2019. The air force will decommission the last F-16s in the mid-2020s.
As the noise regulations in the Netherlands do not permit concentration of all aircraft at one air base, Volkel and Leeuwarden will both remain in operation as the two Dutch fighter air bases.
In 2015, however, the status of Leeuwarden will be changed from a Main Operating Base to a Deployed Operating Base. This means that the functionalities of the base will be limited to the necessary minimum. The overheads will be concentrated at Volkel Air Base.
The common F-35 fleet provides significant opportunities for members of the F-35 collaboration to share costs, operative experience, and maintenance as the fleet rolls out and deploys.
Britain and Norway are working to do just that.
According to a recent UPI story (exercpts):
Britain and Norway are planning to collaborate in areas such as training, operations and sustainment of F-35 fighters.
The decision to explore collaboration, which follows a year of talks on their respective F-35 programs, was jointly announced following a meeting in London between British Minister for Defense Equipment, Support and Technology Phillip Dunne and Norwegian State Secretary Eirik Owre Thorshaug.
“While many decisions have yet to be made which will define the totality of the U.K.’s JSF program, it is clear that coordination and cooperation with like-minded allies such as Norway will offer many advantages in terms of shared knowledge, best practice and efficiencies,” Dunne said. “The U.K. looks forward to exploring possibilities for collaboration on our approach to through life support and capability development with Norway over the coming years.”
Added Thorshaug: “This will be the first time in nearly 60 years that Norway and the U.K. will operate a similar type of fighter aircraft, and this naturally opens up new possibilities for cooperation.”
2013-09-15 In a twist of the South Korean procurement dynamic, the MOD procurement officials are excluding two of the three competitors for the next cycle of acquisition of combat aircraft for the South Korean Air Force.
The Eurofighter and the F-35 are being excluded from consideration because of procedural issues in the first case and cost in the second.
Initially, all three bids were over the budgetary allocation, but with the cost reduction of a plane in development – the next iteration of the F-15 – the MOD considers the “Silent Eagle” as the “winner.”
But in an unprecedented action by former Chiefs of Staff of the South Korean Air Force, an open letter to the President of South Korea has been released underscoring their concern that without the acquisition of the F-35, the security of South Korea is in jeopardy.
Clearly, the South Korean Air chiefs understand what the current COS of the USAF has argued and did so in the Pacific:
As Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Welsh visited airmen in Hawaii and at Kadena AB, Japan, this week, he emphasized that the service is committed to seeing the F-35 program to fruition, as the fifth generation fighter’s success has great implications for the Air Force’s role in future conflicts.
“The F-35 is flying, it is a real thing, and progress is real,” he said.
Several countries, including Russia and China, are working on fifth generation fighters, he said, and even if the United States does not go to war with these countries, it will inevitably have to confront the military technology they sell to others.
Extending the service lives of fourth generation aircraft, and even supplanting the force structure with generation “4.5” fighters, does not solve the problem.
“When a fifth generation fighter meets a fourth generation fighter—[the latter] dies,” said Welsh. “We can’t just dress up a fourth generation fighter as a fifth generation fighter; we need to get away from that conversation,” he said.
Air power is the bedrock for the defense of South Korea facing a founding member of the Second Nuclear Age club.
The case being made in public by the former chiefs underscores their analysis of why a 5th generation aircraft is central to the defense of South Korea and a foundation for 21st century deterrence.Credit image: Bigstock
We are publishing the text of their letter here as well as the text from recent TV appearances by the authors of the letter.
Among the key elements presented by the Chiefs are the following:
South Korea lives in a tough neighborhood, and one populated by powers modernizing the naval and air assets;
South Korea needs a 5th generation aircraft in order to “respond to the North Korean threat and potential threats from surrounding countires.”
Fifth generation aircraft are essential because only they “can eliminate the Norh Korean nuclear threat by infiltrating North Korea’s dense air defense network.”
South Korea lives in a neighborhood where allies and adversaries alike are moving down the path towards transitioning to stealth aircraft;
The silent eagle is not a 5th generation aircraft; it is an aircraft built on “a model that was first produced in 1970s and has not been built into an actual tangible figure. Thus, doubts rise on the possibility of remodeling the fuselage.”
And the chiefs argued that even if initial costs of the F-35 might be higher than a “silent eagle” (and they are questioning whether that really will be true” or as the Chiefs put it: “No doubt there is a difference in capabilities and cost between an aircraft that was produced 40 years ago and a plane that applied high-end technology and material.”
The bottom is clear for the chiefs: fifth generation aircraft are not a luxury but a necessity for 21st century South Korean defense and security.
“If the sky is absent against surrounding countries’ threat, the sea is absent as well. To be prepared against the threat made by the surrounding countries that are also arming themselves with stealth fighters, we must acquire stealth fighter as a strategic weapon.”
Text of the Former Chiefs of Staff to the President of South Korea
‘Proposition for National Security’ to President Park, Gune-hye
Dear Honorable President Park, Geun-hye
We here by express our wholehearted respect for your work in establishing economic prosperity, national welfare, and foundation for peace and prosperity.
This is our proposal about the F-X project that also is gaining increasing attention nationwide.
The F-X project is the national business to supplement the combat power gap caused by retiring Air Force aircrafts, deter North Korean provocation, and respond to the potential threat in the surrounding countries.
People are interested in the fighter project because it is the central combat force that will protect our sovereign airspace for the next 40 years in such fast-forwarding security environment, prepare for the unification and the threat from surrounding countries after the unification.
The initial core capability the Air Force proposed was the stealth technology that can respond to North Korean threat and potential threat from the surrounding countries. Only the stealth technology can eliminate North Korean nuclear threat by infiltrating North Korea’s dense air defense network, while prepare for the threat made by the surrounding countries.
Surrounding countries like Russia and China are currently pursuing stealth fighter development and Japan confirmed its order for 42 F-35s. Stealth fighter is the main weapons system that can deter the threat made by North Korea with nuclear power.
However, the project alleviated the stealth technology condition twice in 2011 to induce price competition since there is no contender available if stealth technology is required operation condition. As a result, the competition formed amongst the F-15SE and the Eurofighter, which are 4th-generation fighters, and the F-35 5th-generation fighter with stealth technology.
No doubt there is a difference in capabilities and cost between an aircraft that was produced 40 years ago and a plane that applied high-end technology and material.
Thus, DAPA established a rule to select a fighter through comprehensive evaluation based on the evaluation factors such as life-cycle cost, which accounts for 30%, mission execution capability for 33.61%, military operation adequacy for 17.98%, and economic and technological benefits for 18.41%. The Air Force, national defense researchers, and DAPA conducted the evaluation for each category.
Unfortunately, even before DAPA started the comprehensive evaluation, the F-35 and the Eurofighter out of three contenders were viewed as ‘inadequate’ as it exceeded the KRW 8.3 trillion budget. DAPA announced that only the F-15SE will be evaluated for the final project fighter selection process.
Meanwhile, the F-15SE is based on a model that was first produced in 1970s and has not been built into an actual tangible figure. Thus, doubts rise on the possibility of remodeling the fuselage.
Dear Honorable President Park, Geun-hye
Stealth fighter is known to have deterrence feared by enemy as it can secretly infiltrate enemy territory. Many people still remember the time when the US calmed the provocation threat made by North Korea with nuclear experiment and long-range missile launch with the B-2 and F-22 stealth fighter.
However, it is not guaranteed that the US will support us when there is a weapon conflict with the surrounding countries. Especially with Japan turning rightist and increasing its military force by founding Marine Corps, and reinforcing its dominium on Dokdo.
If the sky is absent against surrounding countries’ threat, the sea is absent as well. To be prepared against the threat made by the surrounding countries that are also arming themselves with stealth fighters, we must acquire stealth fighter as a strategic weapon.
President Park, Jung-hee established the foundation for independent national defense capability and in 1969 when per capita income was USD 210, he introduced the Phantom F-4D, the high-end all-weather fighter-bomber at that time, as the 3rd country in the world after the US and England.
We spent 64million dollars to procure these aircraft, which is 64 % of the 100 million dollars that we received as a special military aid from sending third troops to Vietnam War.
Until then, North Korea Air Force had more advanced air assets, both in terms of quality and quantity. North Korea frequently threatened us with aerial provocation, but such behavior was put to stop after we introduced phantoms to our air force.
In 1974 citizens made donations to the national defense fund and we procured additional F-4D. These fighters guarded our sky for 41 years and retired honorably in 2010. Considering economic hardship, such political decision was a groundbreaking and strategically farsighted.
Dear Honorable President Park, Geun-hye
If the F-X project proceeds as is, we will be getting a fighter with weak stealth capabilities. It is difficult for our citizens to understand the rationale behind spending KRW 8.3 trillion of budget to buy 4th generation fighters that does not really exist yet. They will not tolerate it well knowing that its capabilities are not adequate to guard our national security.
As you are well aware, air power is critical for war deterrence and victory. Our Air Force who wished for stealth fighter for strategic weapon is in dilemma.
The reasons are that force vacuum is expected for significant period of time and it will be difficult to secure budget if the project is to be reevaluated from the beginning.
However, we have faith, that our brilliant president can implement special measurements to modify other defense project budgets in the total defense budget which will allocate enough fund for our nation can obtain stealthy fighter in scheduled time.
We, as a former Air Force Chief of Staffs, who have dedicated the entire life to guard our skies, are asking earnestly that the decision is made based on the long-range national security plan. The fighter should be able to defend our nation against North Korea’s nuclear threat and potential threats from other surrounding nations. Please do not base the decision solely on the price factor, but consider the results of the comprehensive evaluation of the three models, which will include the life-cycle cost, operational capability, operational suitability, technological/economic benefits. Even if this means to go over the budget, we sincerely ask you to make the adequate arrangements.
We wish for the eternal growth and victory of our proud Nation
August 27, 2013
Former Air Force Chief of Staffs
KIM Chang-gyu, PARK Won-seok, KIM Shin,
KIM Du-man, YOON Ja-jung, KIM, Sang-tae,
SEO Dong-yul, HAN Ju-seok, KIM, Hong-rae,
LEE Kwang-hak, PARK Chun-taek, LEE Uk-su,
LEE Han-ho, LEE Gye-hoon, PARK Jong-hun
YTN Interview with former AF Chief of Staff Lee, Han-ho
Q: Why did you and the other Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force decide to step forward on the FX program?
General Lee, Han-ho: We were reluctant to speak out. However, we observed how performance of the aircraft was disregarded and price became the only relevant issue for the FX program. I felt that this was a serious problem.
Q: Is DAPA’s current plan to procure 60 4th gen fighters for KRW 8.3 trillion?
LHH: Yes.
Q: DAPA is being focused on price.
LHH: Yes, and they are insisting that it does not go over the budget.
Q: Strategically, you believe that F-15SE is not the right choice, but rather stealth is required.
LHH: In consideration of the situations we have with North Korea and the surrounding regions, stealth is the only option. However, a competitive selection program was needed to promote lower price of the aircraft. We don’t have a problem with a competitive procurement program. We simply believe that all the relevant elements should be taken into consideration for the source selection, and are pointing out that price deciding the selection is a problem.
Q: F-15SE is looking very likely for the selection, but you appear to support the F-35. What are the F-35’s advantages?
LHH: We do not have any particular favored platform, and we do not intend to promote or denigrate a particular platform. We have no desire to become involved in that.
Q: Are F-35’s stealth capabilities better?
LHH: Eurofighter and F-15 are not designed with stealth from the beginning. F-35 is the only platform which was designed for stealth from the inception.
Q: F-35’s price is known to be high, and MND is saying that any delays would be problematic, so at this point they need to select 4th gen fighters. What do you think should happen?
LHH: I understand that the price difference between the F-35 and the total program cost is about KRW 1-2 trillion. I think that this is well within the range for budget adjustment, bearing in mind the total defense budget of KRW 34 trillion, of which KRW 10 or 11 trillion is allocated for improvement of defense capabilities. Plus, the budget will be expended over a ten-year period. This means a yearly addition of KRW 0.1 trillion, which is well within the range for adjustment.
Q (surprised): Is the cost difference that small?
LHH: Nothing’s been clearly disclosed, so I don’t know exactly. But I believe that it is roughly around that range.
Q: We heard that F-35 was twice as expensive.
LHH: That is not quite the case.
Q: What are the criteria for source selection?
LHH: Provides an overview of the source selection criteria
Q: Was there a problem with how the total program cost was estimated?
LHH: Yes. The total program cost was estimated back in 2009-10, and it does not take into consideration the fact that the price has decreased since then.
Q: Some are advocating the acquisition of the F-15SE for the current FX program, and then procuring F-35s as additions down the line.
LHH: Again, why are we making a decision based on price alone? The results of a comprehensive evaluation should be the basis for selection.
Q: But would it not necessitate additional cost?
LHH: Yes, but that’s why I said that the budget can be adjusted.
Q: Korea’s neighboring countries have plans with stealth fighters. Japan has signed a contract for F-35s, Russia and China are developing stealth fighters of their own. So is this why you believe that we also need to have stealth fighters?
LHH: Yes. The Air Force needs to have stealth fighters not just for itself to protect the airspace, but also to allow the Korean Navy to operate properly in the sea.
Q: There is a line of argument which believes that F-35 with its stealth capabilities will be useful for infiltrating and striking enemy targets, but that F-15 with its greater munitions carriage is more suitable for the Korean theatre and terrain.
LHH: That argument lacks understanding of Air Force strategy. Ever since the Korean War North Korea has constructed the most densely defended air defense system in the world. F-15 with all its armament will be easily caught out by NK radar and will be destroyed. Stealth is necessary in this situation.
Q: Why did you not come forward and speak about this earlier in the FX program? Why are you saying this so late in the program schedule?
LHH: The need for stealth is felt not just by us Air Force chiefs, but also by active Air Force pilots and defense staff. Like I mentioned earlier, I don’t have a problem with the fact that a competitive acquisition program is being conducted. I believed that the competition would lead to a comprehensive evaluation in which all relevant factors are considered. However, now I see that price is the only thing that seems to matter – this is why I have come forward at this time.
Q: MND and DAPA are mainly composed of ROK Army personnel. Perhaps the Army is driving the decision for the F-15SE?
LHH: Like in any sphere where the three services work together, there is friendly competition among them when it comes to the weapons systems being procured and used. However, in this case the need for asymmetric power is clear, and is understood by all services.
Q: If the decision is indeed made on price alone, and the F-15SE ends up being selected, what will you do?
LHH: If the government makes the decision, what can anybody do? However, if it happens, I think that a procurement process for at least 20 stealth fighters must be initiated immediately afterwards.
Q: Have you received any response from the Blue House and the National Assembly to your letter?
LHH: I think that the letter is still being reviewed.
Channel A telephone interview with former AF Chief of Staff Park, Chun-taek
Q: Could you summarize your views on the F-15SE?General Park, Chun-taek: F-15SE is an F-15K that has been partially modified to fit some external weapons in internal bays, and to apparently offer limited stealth capabilities.
Q: So it is similar to what the Air Force is already operating.
PCT: Yes, it is claimed that F-15SE has limited stealth capabilities, but the aircraft currently does not exist.
Q: The former Air Force Chiefs have all said that F-15SE is not the right choice. Why?
PCT: The core capability which was the goal of the FX next gen fighter was stealth. Stealth fighters are not caught on radar, and can strike enemy targets without being detected.
Q: And the F-15SE doesn’t have it (stealth capability)?
PCT: They say that it has limited stealth, but the aircraft doesn’t actually exist, so we can’t rely on such claims.
Q: What do you think we should do? Should we restart the whole program?
PCT: We need stealth. If we don’t have this capability, and with other countries getting stealth, we will not be able to protect our airspace. If we don’t have stealth our pilots will not be able to safely return to base from missions.
Q: One candidate platform is very expensive, while another platform we were not able to test by actually flying it. What should we do?
PCT: The insistence on KRW 8.3 trillion restricts our ability to make a choice. DAPA’s such insistence is not acceptable. We can’t simply keep doing these programs, because the budget is a lot of money.
We need to make the right choice here.
We need to have the stealth capability, either by reducing the quantity of aircraft, or adding more budget. We have to have stealth capability. I am deeply concerned about Korea’s security. Stealth is very important and necessary for this.
The slideshow below highlights a visit by the South Koreans to Eglin AFB to gain deeper understanding of the roll out of the F-35 at the Eglin training facility:
In the oft debated and discussed arms transfer export reforms, slow is an understatement.
Irrelevance to this century might be another one.
The nature of the arms business has changed so much from the late 20th century in response to global manufacturing, that debating which widgets should be on a munitions list (even this nomenclature suggests the problem) is really out of phase with structural shifts in evolving global arms production.
A key problem in the United States is that the period since the collapse of the Soviet Union really created an anomaly: the US’s core peer competitor had collapsed leaving the U.S. with a significant cold war arsenal which it could leverage for its own use and for exports. Even though the legacy of 20th century approaches remains dominant – platforms are the focus not capabilities – the stockpiles have dwindled and are not going to be replaced any time soon.
And as the U.S. draws down its defense investments, and in the presence of a strategy of sequestration fails to prioritize investments, the major US companies are looking to global exports as a key way ahead. One can not go to a major air show without claims of significant growth in the international market as on offer for U.S. firms to allow them to deal with the uncertainties of DOD investments and the absence of strategy.
But such hopes are not founded on 21st century realities.
Foreign customers are not looking for the sale of U.S. equipment as end items – and the necessity to deal with ITAR and other regulations breaking down every component inside those end items. The kinds of allies, who are working with the United States, whether in Europe, Asia, the Middle East or Latin America, expect to participate in the production process and to part of the overall evolution of the product. They expect to be part of the production cycle and to benefit industrially from buying any U.S. products.
It is no longer about things as end products; it is about participation in processes, which advance military and industrial capabilities.
Arms importers have such expectations for several reasons.
First, American companies simply do not dominate the global landscape the way they did 30 years ago or even 10 years ago. There are significant global players in Europe and Asia, which have emerged or are emerging to shape new products and processes.
Second, there are global competitors, such as the PRC, which are generating technology and global reach and see the global market as a key area within which to shape partnerships for the long term.
Third, new industrial players such as Embraer and companies in India will over time become more significant players in shaping the production processes and products for global exports.
The U.S. is not unique in the way it once was in terms of production or capabilities. What is unique is the nature of the U.S. military and its global experience and reach. This key asset is fundamental if the U.S. hopes to play a key role in working with allies in shaping new military capabilities, and amortizing the costs of defense production.
But this will be done so in the face of 21st century production processes, in which prime contactors are responsible for the development and delivery of final product, but do so by sitting on top of global supply chains. The global suppliers are just that and are found in commercial as well as military domains and produce parts, which are inherently dual use.
F-35C breaks away from formation prior to landing at Eglin AFB, June 22, 2013. The F-35 also breaks away from traditional arms export thinking as well and could be leveraged for a process of change. Credit Photo: 33rd Fighter Wing
The cases of the 787, the A350 and the F-35 are quite similar in terms of the primes being the focal point of a significant global effort to shape supply chains which enable the delivery of new and capable products.
But the global nature of the supply chain is conceptualized differently from controls provided by a munitions list.
The F-35 program has been built on a number of de facto reforms shaping a global approach and could be leveraged as an important element of shaping further reforms. But what is interesting in the debate about the F-35 in the U.S. is how rarely the global production aspect even shows up in that debate.
It is as if the U.S. can debate its own defense future regardless of the allied commitments and engagement in the production of the F-35, which is underway.
There are a number of new products on the market, which are as good or better than US products, A330 tankers and A400MS or FREMM frigates come quickly to mind. But the real point is not simply that there are alternatives, but that the production processes themselves are changing.
A key example of the change involves South Korea. South Korea is an important partner of the United States and Europe in shaping new defense capabilities moving forward.
Two dramatically differently examples involve ships and helicopters.
With regard to ships, South Korean technology has been significant in allowing the U.S. to build a more cost effective and capable logistics support ship.
When we visited the USNS Montford Point, we had a chance to talk with the CEO of the NASSCO shipyard building the ship. Harris highlighted the processes followed by the Asian yards, and their commitment to a tight planning and design process prior to building any ship.
He told a story about a meeting which he had in South Korea with a US Congressman in attendance. The shipbuilder was asked how many ships he had built that year and his answer was something on the order of more than 270. The Congressman asked the shipbuilder: How did you get that good?
The South Korean shipbuilder paused and then answered: “We learned from the US during World War II in building the Liberty Ships as manufactured products. We started there and have been working to improve on that model.”
According to Harris, South Korean yards have contributed significantly to the design and production of the ship. One key example he gave was with regard to a technology transfer from South Korea to the US.
The deck is 1 ¾ inches of steel. Relying on US methods, we would need multiple passes to build this steel plate on the deck. We called Hyundai on the phone and said: what do you do? One pass. Will you share that with us? Yes. We’ll share it with you.
They shared it all with us, and it’s a process that we have here where you put powdered metal in the joint, it’s actually broken up pieces of weld material. And you autonomously weld, and you fuse all that together. And you build a crown when you put that material in. And it really is fantastic.
The process lead to very little, if any, weld rejects. The issue with one pass for us was we were seeing some weld reject. And we don’t want weld reject. But the Koreans, used a two-pass system. And their joint design was very different than our joint design. We quickly qualified the joint design to the USN spec requirements.
Harris highlighted throughout the interview the importance of the partnership for improving the design and manufacturing process and making it a more exacting effort to drive out cost and to enhance manufacturing performance.
A second example is the partnership between Eurocopter and South Korea in building a new version of the Super Puma being built in South Korea and available for global export. According to Norbert Duclot, the head of Eurocopter in Asia:
In 2006 we signed an agreement with KAI which has led to the development of the Surion helicopter for the Republic of Korea Army Aviation (ROKAA). The helicopter first went into service this year.The South Koreans are planning to acquire 245 of these helicopters and to derive several versions of the helicopter.
It really is a Korean helicopter. One needs to realize that about 80% of the helicopter has been redesigned by the South Koreans; it is not simply license production for it is a newly designed helicopter.
And we have an agreement to export this helicopter with them to selected markets. This is not a problem for us for the helicopter has no equivalent in the Eurocopter line. It is a new build 8.5-ton helicopter.
The South Koreans and Japanese are really at the top of the game globally in terms of production technologies and techniques. We have advantages currently in design and having mature technologies available to the market place; but really the South Koreans and Japanese have much to teach the world in terms of production technologies and approaches.
These two examples highlight how production and development processes are becoming global in ways that do not prioritize U.S. capabilities.
To succeed, U.S. firms need to be part of these processes and not managed by munitions lists.
In shaping a new regime for the control of defense exports, the reality of working with allies in a global supply chain needs to be prioritized, rather than debating which widgets they are “allowed” to get, which probably came from them in the first place.
And new regulations by allies require such a shift. For example, the EU requires direct offsets in defense, not indirect offsets in defense as part of any arms deal going forward. This means that if the old F-16 model were being relied on rather than the new global production F-35 model, the U.S. generated aircraft would not be in play.
The new approach is going to generate changes for which a backward looking arms control process simply is not prepared. Take the example of weapons for the F-35 fleet going forward.
With the F-35 fleet coming to the Pacific, a little noticed aspect of the program is how it augments the market for those weapons manufacturers whose weapons are on the platform. An entire weapons revolution is enabled by the F-35 in which key developments such as off-boarding of weapons are enabled. What this means is that weapons can be fired by other platforms, whether air, sea or land based, while the aircraft is determining target sets.
Even though the U.S. has been the core architect for the aircraft, the implementation of the fleet will not be solely and perhaps primarily American. The diversity of global weapon suppliers – European, Israeli, and Asian – will seek to integrate their products onto the F-35.
There are two examples already in play of how allies can work with the F-35 to weaponize the aircraft to the benefit of the entire fleet. The first example is the inclusion of a Norwegian missile on the F-35. Indeed, for Norway, a key element of the F-35 decision by Norway was the acceptance of the integration of a new Kongsberg missile onto the F-35 itself.
Through the development of the Naval Strike Missile (NSM), the Norwegian Armed Forces has established KONGSBERG and other Norwegian industry in the top tier as a supplier of long-range, precision strike missiles that will meet military requirements in a 20 to 30-year perspective.
Historically, a Norwegian selection of an aircraft and a decision to integrate a missile on that aircraft would be largely for Norway or whoever else chose that aircraft and the series variant of that aircraft. This would not likely be a large natural market.
With the F-35 the situation is totally different.
The F-35A to be purchased by Norway has the same software as every other global F-35, and so integration on the Norwegian F-35 provides an instant global marketplace for Kongsberg. And the international team marketing the aircraft – is de facto – working for Kongsberg as well.
It is very likely, for example, that Asian partners in the F-35 will find this capability to be extremely interesting and important. And so Kongsberg’s global reach is embedded in the global reach of the F-35 itself.
The second example is the development of the Meteor missile by the European consortium MBDA Systems. The new Meteor missile developed by MBDA is a representative of a new generation of air combat missiles for a wide gamut of new air systems. It can be fitted on the F-35, the Eurofighter, Rafale, Gripen and other 21st century aircraft.
In short, the 21st century development and production processes are not the 20th.
Putting in place policy processes which are in this century not the last are crucial if the U.S .is to cope with fiscal stringencies and yet work more effectively with global allies who expect to part of the evolution of capabilities, not the receivers of an end product.
It would also be helpful if the continual attacks on “foreign” suppliers would stop from the Congress. The tanker offered by Northrop and then EADS was an imported airframe, full stop. It also has been delivered to many of the world’s air forces while the USAF is waiting for the “American” tanker. The full out attack on the Super Tucano for daring to enter the US marketplace as a “foreign” product even though to be build in the United States and thereby become part of the Embraer global supply chain is another.
These kind of rear guard actions simply worsen the ability of U.S. firms to work abroad and to be part of the reality of 21st century global supply chains.
For a look at the challenge of buying 21st century systems in the Canadian context see the following comment on the Jenkins report:
09/08/2013: This past May, the Marines practiced hot pit refueling at Eglin.
This is a technique to generate more combat capability through a ramp up of sortie generation rates.
One might note the seamless engagement of a UK pilot in the exercise.
Hot pit refueling is a procedure usually performed in a combat situation to rapidly refuel aircraft while their engines are running resulting in a speedy refuel to thrust pilots right back into the fight.
