By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

In January 2024, we had a chance to do our final interview for our forthcoming MAWTS-1 book, namely with LtGen Davis. He was the CO of MAWTS-1 from 19 November 2004-7 July 2006 and had served as the XO for Col later MajGen Raymond Fox, his immediate predecessor.

Fox had become the CO of MAWTS-1 just prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 and he along with most of MAWTS-1 went to that operation. After the war, they set up the first Desert Talon exercise which was focused on the integration of the Marine Corps force going to Iraq.

MajGen Fox underscored the key role which MAWTS-1 plays in training the trainers and driving innovation for an integrated USMC.

“The CO of MAWTS controls, the red, the blue and the white – the whole battlefield. This allows for very innovative scenarios and training for the students. And the WTI instructors and the students in the FINEX get to experience first-hand what combat integration and adversary efforts to break up an integrated force is all about.”

LtGen Davis built upon this perspective and underscored how MAWTS-1 was pushing the envelope of innovation as a core function of its approach to training. And because through the WTIs they were training the squadron trainers they were diffusing the drive for innovation forward.

Of course, Davis brought his own background and experience to the command. He was a Harrier pilot and had served with the Brits in West Germany and had learned their way of operating Harriers in a high-end Cold War threat environment every day. He also had written his Master’s Thesis in 1994 on the challenges of operating in an urban environment which became very relevant in the years to come in Iraq.

In his discussion with us, a major theme was how to work effective ways to weaponize the force. Force integration was key, but which weapons, for which missions and how to make sure that the force was effective as an integrated force capable of delivering the desired effects. The approach here was to provide flexibility to the force but to ensure that the force worked to deliver the desired effects which is a way of describing effective weaponization of the force.

Another key theme was operational effectiveness and operational excellence. On the effectiveness side, the transition to a predominance of precision guided munitions (PGMs) for the MAGTF and ACE and meant they adjusted the WTI course focus to emphasize the use of and optimization of that ordnance for throughout every sortie in the course.

On the operational excellence side of the ledger, Davis was tasked to operationalize safety at WTI and to reduce the mishap rate associated with WTIs in the fleet. Davis asked for an additional three days to be added to the WTI course academics and built a Tactical Risk Mitigation syllabus that helped WTIs fully understand risk, and develop strategies to help their units avoid the Blue Threat and focus more on mitigating the Red Threat to more effectively support the MAGTF.

While he was at MAWTS-1, they were anticipating the arrival of the Osprey and after that the F-35. This has been a virtual revolution in USMC operations and thinking. But “Dog” felt strongly that the Marines needed fifth gen to operate in the kind of environments which were clearly emerging with higher-end competitors.

They had done exercises which demonstrated that against a high end nation versus nation threat (no counter insurgency) only using 4th gen and lower legacy aircraft, the Marines would lose significant numbers of aircraft and not  have the desired results against the target (mission fail).

As Davis noted: “In one strike we put 34 strikers against an integrated air defense system (air and ground threats) and we lost 1/2 the FA-18, Harrier and Prowler strike force and no one hit the target.  Mission Fail. Therefore, I asked the USAF commander at Nellis to lend the WTI strike package 6-8 F-22s to run the same scenario next course – to expose the WTI students and MAWTS-1 staff to 5th generation capabilities and to understand how they could enhance the survival and lethality of the MAGTF in the near future.

“The next class’s strike had identical strikers and scenario with the addition of 8 F-22s.  We killed all the bad guy fighters, destroyed or degraded the SAMS, achieved 100% mission success 8n the target and lost zero aircraft. It was an epiphany for the MAWTS-1 staff.  After working with the F-22, it was obvious that fifth gen capabilities were necessary for the Marines to win in the nation state versus nation state threat environment.”

Lastly, Davis revamped the MAWTS-1 Air Officer Course to focus it on building MEU and Regimental Air Officers with the knowledge and skills needed to ensure that those units received the very best from their Air Officers, ultimately leading to a new MOS for MAWTS-1 certified Air Officers and making a pre-requisite to hold that billet.

The focus of MAWTS-1 on driving a way ahead for innovation for the Marines operating as an integrated force but incorporating new systems, new capabilities, standards and new con-ops was underscored by LtGen Davis as a key element in generating the kind of MAGTF needed to win the battles that loomed on the nation’s bow.

Featured Photo: LtGen “Dog” Davis during our 2017 interview in his office in Cherry Point when he was the head of Second Marine Air Wing.

Later this year, we are publishing a book providing our comprehensive look at MAWTS-1. The book is entitled: MAWTS-1: An Incubator for Military Transformation.

Until then our readers can purchase a book which brings together the 2023 interactions with MAWTS-1:

By Robbin Laird

Sarah White published a thoughtful piece on Real Clear Defense on 10 January 2024. Currently, I am in Europe where the NATO-Russian campaign in Ukraine is ongoing. She made a core strategic point that the overall effects from the war have a direct impact on the European states bordering Russia — Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania – and thereby on U.S. and its NATO strategy.

This is an amazingly missing part of the public discussion of the Ukrainian situation in the United States, but deserves full consideration as she suggests in her article. But my take on this problem is a bit different from hers but in no way takes away from the poignancy of her article and its warning.

In many ways, Putin has already lost his gambit in Ukraine. But he plays for the long game – even though his strategy of invading Ukraine was a major strategic failure which has changed the direction of his strategy. He no longer can play a European strategy against the United States. He has exposed himself for what he is – a Russian nationalist seeking to reverse the collapse of Russian power associated with the end of the Soviet Union. He now is a captive of his relationships with the various muti-power authoritarian powers with whom he works.

I refer to the current conflict as a campaign for it is part of ongoing conflict for the future of Europe and of the West. Even if one would be able to have a cease-fire and Russia gained two provinces, the question of Ukraine’s future in Europe and the West would remain, and we would collectively need to address the problem of how to aid Ukraine in its defense and its ability to deter Russia from future incursions onto their territory.

This is where it gets to the question of the border states with Russia. After watching what the Russians have done to the Ukrainians, no border state wants to trade territory for time as part of a wider NATO strategy. That means their interest is in their ability to attack Russia in case of a Russian incursion.

Throughout the 1980s, the United States was very concerned with not arming states on the Soviet Union’s borders with weapons which could directly attack the Soviet Union in depth. And we pursed the CFE agreements to work the Soviets on reducing the nature of the forces in Western Russia and in the Eastern part of Western Europe to precisely reduce the risk of war.

Putin’s misguided invasion of Ukraine is solely responsible for this effort need to be dealt with again, and for putting that need on the agenda for the new period of history. He is hardly the new Peter the Great.

But we are now in a new phase were arms build ups on both sides – Russia and NATO – are inevitable, but the question posed for the United States is rather direct: what is OUR strategy with regard to allies and to what forces we want to keep in Europe?

This is not the Cold War, and we do not need to keep vast U.S. forces in Europe but we clearly are intertwined with what our allies do and are prepared to do. The mere fact of having a significant F-35 force throughout Europe with the possibilities of integrating it is an example of new opportunities and new challenges.

So where is the strategy?

Credit Graphic: Photo 151366060 | Ukraine Map © Chernetskaya | Dreamstime.com