Operating in Contested Airspace: Air Commodore Lennon Discusses the Way Ahead for the Lift and Tanking Fleet

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
08/23/2017

2017-08-18 By Robbin Laird

During my current trip to Australia, I had a chance to talk again with the Air Mobility Commander of the Royal Australian Air Force, Air Commodore Richard Lennon.

We last met earlier this year at Amberley Airbase.

During that visit, Air Commodore Richard Lennon, the head of the Air Mobility Group and Group Captain Adam Williams, the officer commanding 86th Wing as well as the CO of the 33rd Squadron (KC-30A), provided an update on the command and its activities.

https://sldinfo.com/building-tanker-2-0-the-aussie-perspective/

In that interview and in earlier interviews with the two airpower leaders we discussed the evolving operational experience of the RAAF in operating the C-17/KC-30A dyad.

During this interview, we focused on the RAAF’s recent participation with the dyad in the latest Air Mobility Command exercise, Mobility Guardian 2017.

With the heightened concern of the necessity to prevail in contested battlespace, there is enhanced training for such operations. 

Mobility Guardian 2017 is part of this strategic shift in learning the skills necessary to operate in a contested battlespace and to prepare for high tempo and higher intensity operations.

Air Commodore Lennon described the focus of Mobility Guardian 2017 as follows:

“The exercise was the first of its type held in a very long time.

“The exercise focused on integrating the efforts of several partner air forces using their air mobility fleets in contested airspace to support force insertion.

“We were required to seize an airfield, establish a point of disembarkation, and through that process we were required to conduct aeromedical evacuations and airdrop missions to support ground forces.”

A key part of the exercise was working tactics and procedures with fighters to provide force protection for the air mobility fleet as it operated to support the force insertion effort.

US F-15s and A-10s accompanied the air mobility fleet in shaping the tactics and procedures for operating the fleet in a contested air environment.

The exercise has been two years in the making. Approximately 50 aircraft were involved with several thousand airmen participating in the exercise.

The Aussies brought their C-17 and KC-30A crews to the exercise as well as air dispatch, aeromedical evacuation, force protection and contingency response personnel.

A key challenge within the exercise was shaping interoperable procedures for operating in a contested air environment as each air force had evolved its own procedures over time.

Clearly with a higher tempo operation getting significant sortie generation rates and air dropped delivery is crucial to combat success.

“Our operations for over a decade in the Middle East have been largely in uncontested airspace where we’ve had control.

“In this exercise, we were really testing the readiness of our forces to rise to the next level and work in a challenging environment, and challenging environment it was.

“The exercise program was ambitious.

“It ran twenty-four hours a day for ten days.

“There was no let up, and everyone in the exercise was working hard.”

In an earlier piece, we noted that the French and British Air Forces had introduced the A400Ms into the exercise.  And Air Commodore Lennon had this to say about the inclusion of the new aircraft in the exercise:

“I was fortunate to have a flight on the French A400. It’s an impressive aircraft.

“The capacity of it’s between the C-130 and the C-17, but it operated quite well in the exercise.”

What were the major lessons learned from the exercise?

“There were a number of key tactical lessons learned.

“Notably, we need to alter procedures across the various Air Forces to ensure more rapid responses and smoother interoperability.

“The exercise highlighted the central importance of the kind of modernization we are doing with the C-17 and the KC-30A to provide for enhanced situational awareness and communications capabilities.

“We learned that we did not have all the information available which we needed and we were not able to process it rapidly enough; we are working with technologies and procedures to change that.”

“A key part of the exercise was working our con-ops with fighters to provide effective counter air.

“We matured our understanding of the procedures required to work effectively with counter air operations in support of the air mobility forces.

“A significant number of command and control and communications networks come into play during the activity once you bring in that counter air support, or escorts for the formation.

“Communications gets very complicated, very quickly and tests capacity.

“This is a major area of work for continued development.”

The Air Commodore emphasized that the results from this exercise and others were being inputted to the new RAAF Air Warfare Centre and the Air Mobility Group was working closely with them in evolving procedures and tactics for working in contested environments.

“The establishment of the Air Warfare Centre provides a great opportunity for us to improve our tactics techniques and procedures.”

https://www.airforce.gov.au/About-us/Structure-of-the-RAAF/Air-Command/Air-Warfare-Centre/?RAAF-6wujD/tHUBRNDsmm3O+YcYlPvAth9Dmq

The Air Warfare Centre exists within Air Command and is critical to establishing the RAAF as a modern and fully integrated combat force that can deliver air and space power effects in the information age. The AWC is supported by an integrated workforce which includes Air Force, Army, Navy, Public Service and Defence Industry personnel.

The vision of AWC is: “Excellence in Integrated Air Warfare for optimal Joint Effects”.

Its mission is to: “Deliver Integrated Air Warfighting solutions for superior combat effectiveness”.

 The goals of the AWC are to provide:

  • A focal point for bottom up innovation at the tactical and operational levels
  • Coordinated and integrated tactics and procedures development across all AF platforms using live, virtual and/or constructed (LVC) environments
  • Coordination of Science and Technology (S&T) and Research and Development (R&D) effort across AF
  • Testing of current and proposed Concepts of Operation (CONOPS) against force structure and higher level Defence plans at the operational and tactical level 
  • Collation of lessons learned through experimentation for inclusion in strategic planning, capability development, doctrine development, and exercise planning
  • Exchange of ideas across the ADF and the Coalition.

The AWC is comprised of the following:

  • HQ AWC – responsible for the coordination and implementation of common and integrated functions across the AWC IOT meet the AWC Mission
  • Test and Evalution Directorate – the ADF service provider to AF and Army for specialised flight T&E, aviation medicine support, aeronautical information products, stores clearance and aviation systems engineering support
  • Information Warfare Directorate – centralises the AF’s tactical information warfare elements and provides the wider RAAF with an integrated and tailorable operational support capability drawn from across the Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Information Operations domains. It enables the coherent development and management of the RAAF’s Information Warfare capabilities
  • AF Ranges Directorate – I the primary provider of Air Force Air Weapon Ranges and Live, Virtual and Constructive (LVC) simulation to enable the testing of war materiel and the training of AF capabilities in order to deliver more effective warfighters
  • Tactics and Training Directorate – focuses on the development of multi-discipline high end integrated tactics and training across the AF through a combination of training, education engagement and integrated exercises.

For earlier interviews with Air Commodore Lennon, see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/working-air-land-integration-from-the-perspective-of-air-mobility-group-air-commodore-lennon-discusses-the-way-ahead

https://sldinfo.com/building-tanker-2-0-the-aussie-perspective/

https://sldinfo.com/the-evolution-of-the-raafs-air-mobility-group-its-contribution-to-plan-jericho/

For earlier articles on Mobility Guardian 2017, see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/raaf-participates-in-mobility-guardian-2017/

https://sldinfo.com/the-a400m-debuts-at-mobility-guardian-2017-the-premier-usaf-global-reach-exercise/

https://sldinfo.com/largest-air-mobility-command-allied-power-projection-exercise-mobility-guardian-2017/

https://sldinfo.com/mobility-guardian-17-building-the-drop-payload-2/

https://sldinfo.com/mobility-guardian-17-aero-medivac-contributions/

https://sldinfo.com/rcaf-at-mg-17/

The slideshow highlights the RAAF at Mobility Guardian 2017 and the photos are credited to the Australian Department of Defense.

Dealing with Reality Shock: Refocusing on the World We Have Rather than the World We Wish We Would Have

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-08-21 By Robbin Laird

During recent conversations with Ross Babbage in the United States and then Australia, we discussed the dynamics of change in the global environment and the challenges posed to the liberal democracies by the illiberal powers.

Ross is a well-known and well regarded Australian strategist with significant government experience. He is currently CEO of Strategic Forum in Canberra and also a Non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington D.C.

From the Cold War, to the Post-Cold War to the post-9/11, to the post-globalization to the new phase of global development, the liberal democracies face a new set of challenges.

In my own view, the post-Cold War period has seen the rise and growth of a belief in the democracies similar to what we saw in the 1890s in Europe, namely, intensified global interactions leading to globalization which leads to peace and progress.

Even shocks like 9/11 have been put into the globalization mold as the “global terrorism threat” which of course requires the civilized states to band together to provide a global solution which enhances their own close working relationships.

But in the midst of all of these developments something akin to the 1930s has emerged in which a range of illiberal powers, with little in common with one another, are all playing off of the liberal democracies to augment their own power.

And those liberal democracies are looking less like the “we all work together” folks in High School Musical.

As Europe, the United States, Australia and other key liberal democracies sort out how to work together in the world which we have whether than the world we might wish for, how can we generate a more realistic set of policies to deal with the threats and to enhance cooperation among the liberal democracies, even as those democracies develop their own identities in ways where commonality is not a given?

Ross Babbage: “A key issue is that our governments need to be much more frank with their publics and  with one another about the emerging major power threats.

“Our governments and the agencies around government are not talking enough to our local populations.

“And that’s having a big impact, because the media are not forced to lift their game and report in any depth the clear and present dangers the new global challenges pose to the democracies.

“Nor is the public having to face up to some of the big challenges. Our governments and strategists are not doing a great job in basically explaining what’s going on and preparing their publics for the range of actions that may be required.

Babbage went on to discuss the nature of the challenges as he saw them.

“We are not facing one-off problems. The challenges we now face are multi-disciplinary.

“They’re much more complex, and we haven’t prepared our societies to cope with them.

“And if we don’t, we won’t be able to marshal the full range of resources necessary to deal with the challenges we now face, the Western alliance will be further weakened and the democracies will be far more vulnerable in future crises.

“The bottom line is that we need to generate an effective mix of economic, information, geo-strategic, immigration, legal, cyber and counter-leadership measures as well as the more standard diplomatic, military measures to defend ourselves effectively and put these nasty guys back in their place.”

We then discussed the nature of the challenge posed by the illiberal powers.

“If we focus on the Chinese and the Russians, they’ve had a substantial level of success in the last decade because they’re applying many more instruments of national power in a focused way and taking greater risks to achieve strategic success.

“They are applying economic tools, information warfare tools, geo-strategic tools, espionage, cyber as well as diplomatic and military tools, working within the liberal democracies to influence public opinion and coerce governments and they are doing so within integrated strategies.

“And even if they themselves are rivals, they are playing off of each other’s efforts to create a learning curve with regard to how to enhance their power at the expense of the liberal democracies.”

“In contrast, the liberal democracies have yet to recognize neither the true nature of the challenges nor the need to enhance their arsenal of integrated tools to deal with them.

“And notably, governments are not focused on the internal challenge which the penetration of the Chinese and Russian operations into European, American and Australian societies is posing.”

And here there is a clear parallel to what the German government did in the run up to World War II in terms of augmenting their domestic influence in France, Britain and other European societies.

“In spite of leadership differences, the liberal democracies have far more in common than they differ. There is also a generational challenge. Since the end of the Cold War, the stark contrast between democratic and authoritarian values have not been as clear to our publics, especially to our younger people.

“Yet the Chinese, the Russians, the North Koreans and the Iranians, just to mention the most prominent authoritarian powers, have little in common with our values. We are paying a big price for not highlighting the true nature of the illiberal regimes to our publics.

“Recently, the Prime Minister of Australia, despite his difficult initial discussion with President Trump, made it clear that the North Korean threat to the United States and Australia created common cause and the need for a common response.

“The fundamentals of the ANZUS alliance remain as relevant as ever. The PM was very clear that a thuggish regime with nuclear weapons threatened our way of life.

“We need more recognition of this and preparation for the contest and conflict starring us in the face. This is the real world; not the world we wish we were living in.”

“Part of the problem here, in my view, is that we have not done a good job of telling our publics about the appalling track record of the Russians, and the Chinese, and the others.

“There are some notable exceptions.

“For example, a really good series of reports on ABC Australia in June highlighted the Chinese penetration of Australia, their cyber operations, their attempts at bribery and corruption and the threat which these operations pose to Australia.

“This series triggered further press reporting and to government decisions to review policies and legal frameworks to deal with the internal espionage, cyber and broader challenge posed by the Chinese and others.”

“There is, however, a long way to go. We need to focus much more strongly on the global competitors who don’t share our values and who are working actively to damage us seriously or bring us down. We need to make our own public’s aware of what’s going on, but also project information and other operations back into the counties that are dominated by these kinds of regimes.

“We need to be more realistic about the global environment we’re in and more active in developing and implementing powerful countermeasures, so that we don’t end up with a repeat of the 1930’s.”

Babbage closed by arguing that changes within government to shape more multi-disciplinary and well-coordinated tool sets and actions were required.

In many senses we need to recreate twenty-first century versions of the multi-disciplinary defensive and offensive capabilities that the Western democracies built and refined during the cold war.

Effective adaption to deal with the markedly different range of threats we now face is urgent and will require strong national and international leadership. The sooner we see concerted allied action to re-build effective multi-disciplinary and cross-alliance defenses the better.

Preparing for the High End Fight: Preparing for Warfare at Sea

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
08/22/2017

2017-08-20 By Ed Timperlake and Robbin Laird

The past decade prioritized the land wars, and the Navy along with the Air Force have provided key elements of support and engagement in the support of the ground forces.

With the growing threat from competitors who would engage in high tempo and higher end operations, the Navy along with the Air Force is focusing more intently on the high-end fight.

For the US Navy, this means in part ensuring the safety, security and performance of the fleet against threats in the maritime domain to enable the fleet to support multi-domain operations.

During our visit to NAWDC, we had a chance to sit down with officers from two elements of NAWDC which would seem at first blush quite different from one another, but in the evolving high end fight and the return of key concerns for effectiveness in at sea operations, actually are.

We interviewed LT Chris “Cathy” Eckel and LT Alicia “New Girl” Willms from N-8 which is a department focused on rotary wing tactics and employment, LT Kirby “TK” Myers who was wearing  Silent Service “Dolphins” from N20, which is a department which focuses on TLAMs and their integration into air operations.

According to the US Navy, N-8 is described as follows:

Navy’s Rotary Wing Weapons School is composed of a staff of 25 pilots and aircrewmen who instruct the Seahawk Weapons and Tactics Instructor program; provide tactics instructors to fleet squadrons;  maintain and develop the Navy’s helicopter tactics doctrine via the SEAWOLF Manual; instruct the Navy’s Mountain Flying School; provide high-altitude, mountainous flight experience for sea-going squadrons; and provide academic, ground, flight, and opposing-forces instruction for visiting aircrew during Air Wing Fallon detachments.

According to the US Navy, N-20 is described as follows:

The Tomahawk Landing Attack Missile (TLAM) Department provides direct support to U.S. Fleet Forces Command (USFFC) in the development and standardization of tactics, techniques and procedures for the employment of the Tomahawk weapon system.  

In addition, TLAM provides training to the CVW, fleet, and joint commands on TLAM capabilities and strike integration

https://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/cnrsw/installations/nas_fallon/about/nawdc.html

The role of the rotary wing for the CAG is pretty clear-cut – it is primarily focused on ship defense.

And to do so, the Navy operates two helos, the Romeo and the Sierra to combine between them the sensors and missile payloads necessary to provide for close in and medium range carrier defense.

The dyad is worked with Romeo as the sensor rich aircraft and Sierra the weapons heavy strike asset and the interactions between them are designed to provide seamless ship protection and with the sensors and coms onboard links to other assets, which can provide for ship defense as well.

“Both are H-60 helicopters. But the 60 Romeo is a sensor rich aircraft.

“The Romeo has ESM, RADAR, interrogators, all things that make it a very, very good coordination and reconnaissance type platform.

“In contrast, the Sierra carries guns, equipment, and various missiles to provide the strike punch for the dyad.”

ATLANTIC OCEAN (July 25, 2017) An MH-60S Sea Hawk helicopter, assigned to the “Nightdippers” of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron (HSC) 5, transfers a harbor pilot on the flight deck aboard USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) prior to pulling into Naval Station Norfolk. Truman returned to Naval Station Norfolk following the successful completion of a 4-day sea trials evolution. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Rebekah Watkins/Released)

“The advantage of the Romeo is that the crew can actually manage the maritime picture, and direct aircraft in different places and different sectors, and provide a significant amount of SA to the strike group, particularly the high value unit like the aircraft carrier.

“The Sierra can do that to a much, much lower extent.

“But the advantage of the Sierra is that it is a significantly lighter helicopter, so there can be a lot more weapons/equipment in the air to be used by one of these platforms.

“The way the helicopters work together now is relatively efficient.

“I would like to have two or three Romeos in the fight, somewhere, with all of their sensors turned on, and providing all that SA, but have several Sierras that have lot of weapons in the air, if I need them.”

“The Romeo is a heavier airframe.

“So if I can have one or two helicopters configured for anti-submarine warfare, and then one that is just a sensor platform, I can have multiple Sierras that carry a lot of weapons because they have the extra weight to do that, the extra power to do that.

“Then, I have a lot of assets in the air to direct and coordinate depending on the strike mission.”

As the Fire Scout is currently being worked with the S-60 into a composite detachment onboard the LCS, it is anticipated that Fire Scout or a UAS capability will become part of the rotor wing providing for ship defense at some point in the future.

https://sldinfo.com/shaping-a-manned-unmanned-isrstrike-capability-at-sea-the-case-of-the-fire-scout-and-the-mh-60s/

And as off boarding of weapons strike grows in significance and capability sensors onboard the rotorcraft can be leveraged by other elements of the strike force for the ship defense or perhaps other missions.

With regard to TLAMS, their role has been significant in providing for a land attack capability.

And as a submariner, Lt. Myers is working integration with the CAG as part of the extended reach of the airwing.

Indeed, a key function of TLAMS for the aviation community has been the destruction of enemy capabilities threatening the ability of the air wing to operate in contested environments.

MEDITERRANEAN SEA (April 7, 2017) The guided-missile destroyer USS Ross (DDG 71) fires a Tomahawk land attack missile April 7, 2017. Ross is forward-deployed to Rota, Spain, and is conducting naval operations in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations in support of U.S. national security interests in Europe and Africa. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Robert S. Price/Released)

“Tomahawk is a very integral part of strike warfare.

“I need to essentially be the day zero weapon that allows for attack air to dominate the air.

“Before that, we need to get rid of certain things in the way.

“Attack air is not going to be able to fly through certain surface to air missile sites without serious investment.

“My job, I feel, is to protect people.

“I want to set the battle space so that all of the aviators out there can fly safely.”

The current TLAMS are GPS enabled and largely focused on fixed targets but the evolution of the systems onboard the TLAM will allow for greater in flight repositioning and significant improvements against electronic magnetic threats.

The TLAMs and follow on weapons will form a key part of the enhanced capability of the fleet afloat to fit and win conflict at sea.

Put in other terms, TLAMS have been about land operations; now with the shift to higher intensity operations the ability to defeat adversaries at sea is a key part of the way ahead, within which the weapons revolution needs to evolve to provide enhanced capabilities to the fleet to defeat an adversary afloat or using land and air assets to threaten the fleet.

Both officers emphasized the need to build up the inventory of weapons in the arsenal and viewed this as even more important than building new ones. 

Building new ones will take time, and although clearly important, the focus on fighting with the fleet you have now prioritizes an inventory build up for the current operating force.

The officers both highlighted as well that as you add new weapons, there is a time lag as well as the crews learn the capabilities and would like to see enhanced training capabilities and accelerated acquisition as well to ensure that new weapons can enter the force more rapidly.

But if presented with a choice between ramping up current weapons or waiting for new ones, the officers clearly weighed in on the former.

The officers discussed being able to support the fleet at sea if needed with the TTP capabilities at NAWDC.

“We have a fly away team.

“And a flyaway kit, so in the event in which they need subject matter experts to go to a CAOC and say, “Hey, what is the way that we can integrate TLAM into this fight?” We’re ready to go to provide that support.”

U.S. Navy Sailors assigned to the amphibious assault ship Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) practice vertical replenishment with a SH-60 Sea Hawk helicopter during the Landing Signalman Enlisted course aboard Marine Corps Base Hawaii, May 10, 2017. The course provides the Sailors the skills they need to perform the tasks essential to flight deck operations. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Gunnery Sgt Ezekiel R. Kitandwe)

We concluded by discussing the dynamics of change in providing authorities at sea to deal with the new threat environment.

Notably, in the world of the past decade TLAMS are launched by a very high level of a command authority.

As weapons like TLAMS become important to providing dynamic protection to a fleet at sea, there clearly needs to be authority at sea to use weapons to ensure the security of the fleet.

If you are going to have distributed lethality, you certainly need organic defense to ensure the safety and performance of the engaged fleet.

Admiral Swift, Commander of the Pacific Fleet, and his team were working hard on the rethink on decision-making authorities.

According to Admiral “Hi Fi” Harris: “What authorities should reside where and when? They are driving towards mission command which is crucial to deal with evolving threats.”

In short, the refocus on high end warfare and the probability of confronting an adversary at sea is reflected in the thinking and training at NAWDC.

Editors Note: 

First, as always inventory levels and the ability to surge weapon production is becoming much more important in the National Command Authority shift focus from “slo-mo” war to preparing for high intensity combat. Mobilization becomes even more important in the recrafting of the US military for the decade ahead.

Second, the current visit to Australia also highlighted the key role which Admiral Swift played in the command post exercise part of Tailsman Sabre 2017 which involved shaping effective C2 and distribution of authorities in a contested battlespace as well.

Third, Raytheon and the Navy are closing on a deal to reshape the TLAMS for the maritime battle.

According to an article by USNI, published on August 16, 2017:

The Navy and Raytheon are close to signing a deal to integrate a new sensor into the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile to allow the missile to attack moving targets at sea, the head of the Navy’s Tomahawk program told USNI News on Tuesday.

Once the deal is complete, Raytheon will start work to craft and install a sensor to convert a yet-to-be-determined number of Block IV TLAMs into a Maritime Strike Tomahawk variant, said Capt. Mark Johnson, Naval Air Systems Command PMA-280 program manager.

“We’re signing the contract now, there will be a couple of year development effort to determine the configuration of the seeker to go into the missile and a couple of years to take it out and test it to accurately know what the performance is so the fleet will have confidence in the system,” Johnson said following a ceremony celebrating Raytheon’s delivery of the 4000th TLAM to the Navy.

“When maritime is ready to be cut into the Tomahawk, we’ll work with the resource sponsor to find out what the right number is.”

Navy, Raytheon Close to Finalizing Maritime Strike Tomahawk Missile Deal

 

Auf Wiedersehen to New Mexico for the German Air Force

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
08/21/2017

2017-08-19 With the declining numbers of Tornados (the RAF is already on a clear sunset schedule) the German Air Force is closing its training facility in New Mexico.

The German air force has entered its final stage of departure, however they are not expected to complete their departure from Holloman AFB until mid 2019.

According to 2016 article by Jacqueline Devine published by the Alamogordo Daily News, the process of departure of the German Air Force from their training facility in New Mexico.

HOLLOMAN AIR FORCE BASE — The German Air Force is terminating its contract to train its pilots at Holloman Air Force Base, a potentially major economic blow to the Alamogordo region.

The Luftwaffe has had a presence at Holloman since 1992, but the cancellation of the contract to train German pilots in Tornado aircraft means the mission will end by 2019.

The German defense ministry said the decision affects approximately 450 military staff and their families as well as the 14 Tornado weapon systems stationed at Holloman.

The decision had been expected, though political and business leaders in New Mexico had been lobbying the Germans to continue the mission.

Col. Heinz-Josef Ferkinghoff, commander of German forces in the United States, said it is a sad development. He said the German Air Force Flying Training Center has appreciated the American hospitality they have received over the years.

Germany, a key NATO ally of the United States, has had a presence in the American Southwest since shortly after World War II.

The German military has had a presence at Fort Bliss since 1956. The German air force closed down its North American Command at Fort Bliss in September 2013 and moved it to Holloman as part of what was described as an eventual staggered pullout from the El Paso installation. The German Air Force still operates its Air Defense Center at Fort Bliss.

The Germans will continue to have a presence at Fort Bliss until at least 2020, officials said.

According to the German defense ministry, the remaining elements of the Tornado weapon system will operate at their German air bases of Schleswig and Buechel.

Ferkinghoff said the main reason why the ministry is terminating their training at Holloman is due to tactical and logistical reasons more so than finances.

“The main reason why the GAF is terminating their training here is due to a reduced Tornado fleet that is operating in the German air force. We have two bases in Germany and the flying training center here at Holloman. We have to consolidate our Tornado operation in those two locations,” Ferkinghoff said.

“There’s a certain logistical challenge to operate a fast jet like the Tornado in a foreign country as far as bringing all the spare parts to maintain the technical high level we try to achieve with our aircraft. Sometimes we wait weeks for spare parts, but in Germany they’re more or less immediately available.”

At the moment, 85 Tornados are distributed between the two airbases in Germany and at Holloman.

“A lot of factors come together. Shortage of personnel, material and a different spectrum that we now have in our portfolio with the Tornado also contributes to this decision. The finances are also an influence,” Ferkinghoff said. “In my judgment, the main drivers were not the financial side but the operational requirements at the end.”

http://www.alamogordonews.com/story/news/local/2016/04/14/german-air-force-leaving-holloman-2019/83046286/

The photos in the slideshow showing the last flights is credited to the USAF.

Editor’s Note: The German Air Force is looking to replace its Tornado force.

According to a piece by Tim Robinson published July 5, 2016, an alternative approach is being developed by Airbus Defence and Space.

With a growing realisation that it needs to think about modernising parts of its aging front-line force, in January, the German Bundeswehr released a White Paper on future plans and proposals.

One of these, the Next Generation Weapon System (NGWS) is intended to replace the Tornado which the Luftwaffe may keep in service until 2040 – some 20 years after the RAF will have retired its last GR4. 

Among the many and varied presentations covering A400M, MRTT, and light and medium products at the annual Airbus Defence and Space (AirbusDS) TMB (Trade Media Briefing) in Munich (2016) also saw the company unveil its concept for a FCAS (Future Combat Air System) to meet the Luftwaffe‘s evolving requirement for the 2030-40 timeframe. 

Though it is still early days and the concept is still notional, it did reveal some of the company’s thinking around its FCAS.

Interestingly the twin-engine, twin-tail stealth design would be a twin-seat design, according to Alberto Gutierrez, Head of Eurofighter Programme, Airbus DS.

The second crewmember may be especially important for the FCAS concept of operations, which would see it operate in a wider battle network, potentially as a command and control asset or UCAV/UAV mission commander. 

Another presentation on UAVs during TMB16, also shed light on the FCAS concept of operations. AirbusDS foresee it is not a strike aircraft in itself – but rather part of a ‘system of systems’ – with this manned strike platform networked with Eurofighters, unmanned bomb or missile ‘mules’ and even UAV swarms. FCAS, says AirbuDS, is conceptualised to be a platform able to slot into a scalable system.

This vision closely aligns with the latest US Pentagon predictions on future air combat – where manned platforms such as F-35 and B-21 would operate as networked nodes, controlling missile ‘truck’ UCAVs and drone swarms in contested airspace….

Fernando Alonso, Head of Military Aircraft last year instituted a strategic review of what air combat would look like in the future and how it needs to evolve its business and offerings.

Though the future strategy has yet to be completed, the FCAS systems of systems provides a clue to AirbusDS’s vision.

“Connectivity not platforms” says Alonso, will be the way forward, arguing that the challenge and opportunity for the company will be “how to connect those platforms together“. 

Other presentations during the two days of TMB supported this vision of legacy platforms being enhanced with networks. For instance, a JRE (Joint Range Extension) Link 16 capability is now set to be added to French A330MRTTs currently on order.

This will turn tankers into Link 16 data relay nodes – boosting situational awareness for platforms operating beyond line-of-sight. Australia, too, is reported to be interested in this capability for its MRTTs. 

AirbusDS is also set to take high-speed data transfer even further with a high-speed optical communications test later this year. This will see the European Data Relay Satellite (EDRS-A) use a laser to connect with a modified A310 test aircraft equipped with a prototype laser terminal.

Optical laser communication promises a 1-2 orders of magnitude increase in air-to-sat data speeds, compared to normal satcom links. Laser communications then could offer ultra-high speed, secure communications – especially suitable for the vast amounts of video, imagery and data that now need to flow around the battlefield. 

Although certainly not a new concept (network centric warfare was championed in the US in the late 1990s), AirbusDS’s vision of connectivity is particularly important today – given the continued budget pressures and legacy fleets that many air forces are faced with.

Today, thanks to smaller, cheaper and more capable computers, the ability of networks to adapt and reconfigure on the fly (think smartphone‘s WiFi), is much more advanced and opens up new possibilities for air combat.

Could tactical transports become ISR nodes?

Or tankers become ELINT spy planes to help triangulate hostile emitters? 

https://www.aerosociety.com/news/airbus-reveals-tornado-successor-concept-for-2040s/

For a look at the RAF Tornado transition, see the following:

Leveraging the Legacy of the Tornado: The Perspective of Wing Commander Paul Froome

 

New Underwater Effectiveness: The SAMDIS Solution (Updated)

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-08-21 By Robbin Laird and Norman Polmar

Undersea warfare is becoming more complex as an increasing number of nations are operating submarines, advanced submarines and seafloor mines are being proliferated, and there are an increasing number of seafloor military and commercial activities world wide. Thus, there are increasing demands for navies to have enhanced capabilities to carry out surveillance to support anti-submarine warfare, mine countermeasures, general surveillance, and “special missions” in the depths.

Further, because of the need for rapid-reaction to crises and the varied ocean operating environments, these surveillance capabilities must be deployable by surface ships and small craft, submarines, and aircraft, especially helicopters. This situation must be met by advanced, flexible, and highly capable sensor platforms.

Lethal Threats

Mines are major threats to warships as well as commercial shipping. According to mine warfare analyst Dr. Scott Truver. “Enemy mines caused  massive numbers of U.S. ship losses in the last century, during both wars and crises,” he explained. “During the late 1980s and early 1990s a U.S. guided missile cruiser, a large helicopter assault ship, and a frigate were heavily damaged by mines in the Arabian Gulf­­,” Truver recalled. “

And many more vessels were mine victims during the ‘tanker war’ in the Gulf .” While potential enemies also have anti-ship missiles and torpedoes to threaten ships, “mines can be quickly and surreptitiously laid by surface ships—including simple junks, fishing boats, and other coastal craft—submarines and aircraft.”

“Indeed,” Truver underscored, “the U.S. Navy’s experience underscores the lethality of the threat. Of the 19 U.S. Navy ships that have been seriously damaged or sunk by enemy action since the end of World War II, 15–nearly 80 percent––were mine victims.”

Potential American adversaries are estimated to have on the order of 236,000 naval mines––China has upwards of 80,000, Iran 6,000, North Korea about 25,000, and Russia more than 125,000. The global mine order of battles in 2017 totals about a million sea mines of more than 400 types in the inventories of more than 50 navies (including the U.S. Navy) worldwide.

This array of threats coupled with other beneath-the-surface missions demand advanced underwater surveillance and detection systems. Potential non-military missions include monitoring and surveying seafloor areas for underwater structures, pipelines, etc.

The SAMDIS Solution

Advanced Acoustic Concepts, a DRS/Thales joint venture based in the United States, has devised SAMDIS––Synthetic Aperture and Mine Detection Imagery Sonar––a system with multiple capabilities that can be rapidly deployed to provide the underwater “big picture.”

Having also developed shipboard hull-mounted sonars, variable-depth sonars, and a fully automated drone launch and retrieval system, the firm has devised SAMDIS primarily to be deployed from unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), i.e., the so-called “ghost fleet.”

However, the system in a towed configuration with a different form factor called T-SAM (Towed-SAMDIS) can be deployed from unmanned surface vessels, and it can be deployed and towed in seas up to sea state four.

The SAMDIS multi-aspect AN/ASQ-series sonar currently provides the only technology that can detect and classify sonar echoes in a single sweep and can collect bathymetry and seafloor imagery simultaneously.

With respect to mine countermeasures, the operational benefit is considerable, particularly when the goal also is to define the type of device required to destroy the mine. The SAMDIS system provides a unique capability for multi-aspect processing of ultra-high-resolution synthetic aperture sonar capability. This multi-aspect photography capability enables it to simultaneously examine an object on the seabed from three different viewing angles, hence greatly increasing the search rate.

It also is able to provide for single-sweep detection and determination for on-the-fly, real-time intelligence of the seabed. And, SAMDIS can produce images with far better resolution and contrast than the previous generation of sonar imaging technology currently in use today by many Navies.

This maximizes detection and classification effectiveness, minimizing the number of false alarms—one of the major challenges of mine-detection systems—SADMIS users will be able detect and, if necessary, clear mines more rapidly than with older methods.

While mine countermeasures is a concern of many allied nations, SADMIS also has direct value in several other areas of undersea warfare and surveillance operations such as “intelligence preparation” of the environment.

Real-World Experience

SAMDIS has been in production for four years and is in operational service with several allied nations. In particular, Britain and France employ SADMIS in their joint mine countermeasures program. The system is software upgradable, which means that experience with the now deployed and operational systems can easily provide data for software upgrades of contemporary as well as future versions.

Also, because SAMDIS is platform agnostic and scalable, it can be deployed on a variety of current and future platforms. Although especially configured for deployment from unmanned underwater vehicles, it can be deployed from unmanned surface vehicles. These could be hosted by the U.S. Navy’s littoral combat ships (LCS) or other naval or commercial ships of opportunity.

In October 2016, GPS World reported on the results the multinational Unmanned Warrior exercise. “These systems can help protect our Sailors and Marines from some of the Navy’s dull, dirty and dangerous missions, like mine countermeasures,” according to the U.S. Chief of Naval Research Rear Admiral Mat Winter. “Additionally, these systems can increase our capabilities at a more affordable cost of the conventional systems we currently employ.”

The “Ghost Fleet”

In February 2017, Defense News reported that the Navy was working to develop quickly a “ghost fleet” of numerous surface, air and undersea drones that would synchronize a wide-range of combat missions without placing sailors and Marines at risk. Captain Jon Rucker, program manager for unmanned maritime systems in the LCS program outlined top-level requirements: “We want to have multiple systems teaming and working together, surface, air and undersea.”

Rucker explained that the Pentagon and the Navy are advancing this drone-fleet concept to search and destroy mines, swarm and attack enemies, deliver supplies and conduct, reconnaissance and surveillance missions, among other tasks. These capabilities could operate in a combat environment with little or no human intervention after being programmed for the specific role.

Defense News noted that the Navy’s Office of Naval Research has been working closely with the Defense Department’s Strategic Capabilities Office to fast track this technology into an operational service.

Dr. William Roper, the DOD capabilities director, explained that much of this effort involves merging new platforms, weapons, and technologies with existing systems in a way improves capability while circumventing a lengthy and often bureaucratic formal acquisition process.

For example, USVs and UUVs configured for MCM search, detect, localize, classify, identify, and neutralize/exploit tasks could take advantage of the “off-the-shelf” SAMDIS system, which already has been demonstrated in Navy tests. In addition to autonomous operations by a UUV with SAMDIS, a tow-configured SAMDIS could deploy from the in-development Common Unmanned Surface Vehicle (CUSV).

And in that regards the Arctic is an area of growing interest. UUVs equipped with SAMDIS can have a key role in helping the U.S. Coast Guard to conduct its missions in this vital economic, security and defense area of interest. As Admiral Paul Zukunft, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant, explained: “It would make sense for UUVs to be part of the Coast Guard’s future, and we would start with the Arctic as a key area for such operations, to gain enhanced situational awareness in the region.”

A True Breakthrough

SAMDIS represents a true breakthrough in mine countermeasures, a sector that previously was the exclusive preserve of specialized minecraft with hull-mounted sonars and dedicated mine-hunting helicopters.  The system provides a new approach to undersea warfare, particularly MCM, permitting a variety of platforms to employ SAMDIS to give an almost holistic picture of the seabed area.

This could be particularly significant in coastal areas, where there are seafloor wrecks and other objects that could confuse other acoustic systems.

The Advanced Acoustics/Thales team looks to have an affordable, effective solution for defeating our adversaries’ mines in some future crisis or conflict. U.S. Navy demonstrations and tests have confirmed SAMDIS operational capabilities, while four allied navies have also reported meeting operational requirements.

“A mine is a terrible thing that waits,” Dr. Truver reminds us. With SAMDIS the U.S. Navy needs to wait no longer for cost-effective and proven underwater sensors for mine countermeasures and other important undersea warfare tasks.

 

Air Wing Fallon: The Challenges Facing Predeployment Training for the Carrier Air Wing

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-08-17 By Edward Timperlake and Robbin Laird

When we were last at Fallon in 2014, we had a chance to talk to the officers involved in the last phase of training prior to going to the Carrier, namely what they call Air Wing Fallon. Naval Air Station Fallon is known as the “carrier in the desert” and Air Wing Fallon is the final or pre-deployment phase of training down on the Carrier to the desert as the CAG deploys to the carrier at sea.

During that visit we discussed Air Wing Fallon with CDR (S) Jayson “Plato” Eurick, Air Wing Training Officer, at Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, Fallon Naval Air Station.

Training is about getting ready for deployment and supporting deployment, which is certainly a broad concept of training.

“We ensure that they (the air wing) get up to speed on all of the information that is currently taking place in theater.

“We don’t train Air Wing Fallon for a specific theater or country, we give them a broad brushed training, but we ensure that they get the information that is coming directly back from the guys overseas, in this case, the USS Bush.

“And then we train them.”

https://sldinfo.com/the-usn-combat-learning-cycle-prepare-an-air-wing-for-deployment-while-supporting-one-deployed/

During this visit we discussed the Air Wing Fallon phase of training with Commander “Humble” Pritchard, Lt. Chris “Reek” Neidemeyer and Lt. Neal “Shaky” Dunn.

The officers represent a cluster of experience with CDR Pritchard having more than 830 “cats and traps,” Neidemeyer just back from his first fleet tour and Lt. Dunn just back from deployment with VFA-103 “the Jolly Rogers” based at Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia.

The responsibility of N-5 which these officers represented is identified as follows by the US Navy.

N5:  Responsible for training Naval aviation in advanced Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) across assigned combat mission areas at the individual, unit, integrated and joint levels, ensuring alignment of the training continuum; to set and enforce combat proficiency standards; to develop, validate, standarize, publish and revise TTPs. 

Also provides subject matter expertise support to strike group commanders, numbered fleet commanders, Navy component commanders and combatant commanders; to lead training and warfighting effectiveness assessments and identify and mitigate gaps across all platforms and staffs for assigned mission areas as the supported WDC; and collaborates with other WDCs to ensure cross-platform intergration and alignment.

 https://www.cnic.navy.mil/regions/cnrsw/installations/nas_fallon/about/nawdc.html

During our last visit to Fallon, the readiness challenged was highlighted as a growing problem.

This visit to Fallon highlighted the reality of what readiness shortfalls meant.

And the importance of this challenge is heightened as potential adversaries ramp up their capabilities and training time as well.

“You would read about potential adversaries and they’re flying 120 hours a year.

“You’d sit there and go that’s ridiculous.

“Who survives on 120 hours a year?

“We do that now.

“I don’t think anybody trains like us, and I think in a high end fight, they will not be able to keep up with the level of professionalism and the quality of people we’ve got, but I’m going to assume they can until proven otherwise.”

Put in simple terms, the Navy goes through a series of training cycles.

If fully equipped and funded for each phase of the training cycle, then all the training tasks can be accomplished and when the aviator moves to the next phase they do not need to learn tasks which they should have learned earlier.

But because of readiness shortfalls, the catch up in each phase of training has become a regular challenge.

This means that at Air Wing Fallon, some of the skills which should have been learned earlier need to be caught up in the pre-deployment phase of training.

It is obviously important that this challenge be met and rectified.

Air Wing Fallon prepares as the earlier quote indicates the CAG for a variety of settings and scenarios, not just what currently deployed CAGs are facing and doing.

And to do this they involve external assets with which the CAG will operate as well.

MEDITERRANEAN SEA (June 14, 2013), an F/A-18F Super Hornet assigned to the Jolly Rogers of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 103 approaches the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) for an arrested recovery

For the non-naval aviator, the way to think about is that the CAG works its relationship with organic carriers assets, such as with the strike aircraft, Growlers onboard and Hawkeyes.

This part of the concentrate circle expands as the reach of the air wing is extended by its ability to work with assets external to the carrier.

Air Wing Fallon provides training for working with non-organic assets which will vary in terms of what is available and present at Fallon during Air Wing Fallon training.

But obviously as technology evolves and new platforms being added such as P-8s, Tritons, F-35s, etc. the external reach of the carrier is expanded as well.

“The concern that we have is making sure that the CAG is prepared for all contingencies, which is why we have a wide scope when it comes to what we put them through, and in addition, we’ve incorporated realistic scenarios, so they know how painful the real world is going to be.

“They need to learn to use off board and on board systems.

“They need to learn how to work with the E2 or the AWACS to be able to put the puzzle together to figure out if the ROE is met and staying within the allowable threat level or risk level.”

With the evolution of the threat, training needs to evolve as well.

There clearly is a need to work in a “dark environment” where jamming is a key threat and challenge.

There is a need to leverage the digital battlefield and to change procedures allowing for faster upgrades to the data in the strike force to ensure that stovepiped security arrangements block the combat aviators from having the data they need to prevail in the digitally informed battlespace.

This is a particular challenge onboard the carrier, as the crews need to build their own data and crypto loads.

The coming of the F-35 will accentuate this challenge and will need to be solved to ensure that the CAG gets full value out of an information superiority strike asset.

In short, there is a clear need to align security, data flows and sustainment approaches with the evolving CAG and its ability to work with external assets.

“How we acquire, how we sustain, and how we secure our forces needs to work and be aligned for an integrated, high intensity warfare enabled force.

“This is a key challenge which must be met to prevail in combat”

Editor’s Note:

One of the critical advances in the coming together of many 21st Century technological advances is the exponential growth in ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) is a critical component of a countries military battle planning and execution, and that can be a very good thing.

However, what we picked up at Fallon builds on some of the comments we heard in our visit to the Navy Jax, P-8, Triton community.

To put it in our words the “mechanics” of getting actionable timely intelligence to the aircrews and Fleet commanders is often a weak link. The “Intel” can be there but the process is often not helpful. It can be both a macro issue and a micro issue.

On a “macro” level there is a move to send “Intel” up first to higher command then back down. This challenge was discussed at Jax Navy in the context of declaring Triton ocean surveillance information part of a national strategic collection effort. Of course it is an easy solution to let the Intel flow both up and down concurrently.

Hopefully this is in work toward a successful resolution.

On a “micro” level with the advent of much more advanced classified com/crypto links the combat aircrew must have the latest way to receive the Intel during the battle. This can take effort pre-take off.

It is a potential leadership issue to ensure the correct balance is struck between preparing the air wing for combat and the actual warriors who are flying into harms way.

In the Vietnam War and also Cold War “hot scrambles” the fear of the Intel community was to not release all electronic signal counter measures because they thought it important to keep some capabilities in reserve for the possibility of a US/USSR strategic engagement.

Often times that attitude in those years was sarcastically discussed as the activity of having a “squirrel mentality” in burying Intel. It required leadership at all times to keep the appropriate balance between the combat warriors and support functions.

When missiles are flying and people and platforms are dying, the function of all the shooters in the Fleet to bring weapons on is the difference between winning and losing and life and death.

Getting the most significant information to the combat crews in a timely manner is everything.

Everything else is, to paraphrase the “Red Barron,” Manfred Von Richthofen, “rubbish.”

 

General Dunford Visits China: A More Realistic Exchange with the Chinese Military Takes Place

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-08-20 By Richard Weitz

The latest Chinese-U.S. military meeting was refreshingly frank—the two sides made clear their areas of disagreement, which will place Sino-U.S. defense relations on a much firmer footing.

This past week, Marine Corps Gen. Joe Dunford undertook his first visit to China as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

According to Dunford, “The visit underscores U.S. interest in further developing military-to-military relationships between the United States and China.”

Gen. Fang Fenghui, chief of the Joint Staff Department of the PLA Central Military Commission (CMC), hosted the visit.

Gen. Dunford also met with Fan Changlong, CMC vice chairman, and PRC State Councilor Yang Jiechi. Dunford also observed a PLA infantry unit carry out maneuvers at the Northern Theater Command, the PLA unified command closest to North Korea.

The discussions focused on Korea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea.

Dunford pointedly told the Chinese that the Pentagon, while hoping for a peaceful solution to the Korean crisis, was “developing military options in the event that the diplomatic and economic pressure failed.”

Therefore, both defense communities “needed to seriously have a conversation about what might happen if there was military action.”

The Pentagon clearly hopes that the fear of military action will induce Beijing to place more pressure on Pyongyang to curtail its missile and nuclear weapons testing.

Chinese complaints focused on U.S. defense ties with Taiwan, the recently deployed Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile defense system in South Korea, and the continuing U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) in the South China Sea.

Fan said that the “wrong actions on the Taiwan issue, the United States deploying the THAAD system around China, U.S. ships and aircraft’s activities in the South China Sea, the United States close-in surveillance in the sea and air near China have had a large, negative influence on bilateral military ties and mutual trust.”

Still, he added that, “China was willing to work with the United States to find more potential for cooperation, handle disputes and sensitive issues appropriately and ensure military cooperation becomes a positive force in relations.”

Building on the Trump-Xi presidential summit earlier this year, the two defense communities agreed during Dunford’s visit to establish a joint operational communications mechanism between their joint staffs, at the three-star level, to prevent any Korean conflict from leading to an inadvertent Sino-U.S. military clash.

Dunford explained that, “It would also be helpful for us to have effective communications mechanisms in place, so in the event of a crisis, we can immediately speak to each other and avoid miscalculation and a deepening crisis.”

Upon meeting Dunford, PRC President Xi Jinping said that Sino-U.S. defense relations have become a major stabilizing force in bilateral ties. His session with Dunford at the Great Hall of the People represented Xi’s first meeting with a senior U.S. military official since Trump became president.

According to the Chinese media, Xi “applauded the new progress made in relations between the two armed forces, such as enhanced dialogue at all levels and improved military confidence-building mechanisms as well as deepened cooperation.”

He said that, “President Trump and I have attached great importance to Sino-U.S. relations and are willing to actively promote the continuous development of bilateral ties.”

“As major influential countries in the region and the world as well as world’s top two economies,” Xi added, “China and the United States shoulder important responsibility to safeguard world peace and stability and to promote global development and prosperity.”

Further, Xi expressed hope “that the two sides could show sincerity and good-will to each other, maintain close communications, properly handle disputes, and work together on building a better future.”

In addition to inviting President Trump to visit China this year, Xi poetically concluded by observing that, “Despite some ups and downs in the development of bilateral relations, a rainbow comes after wind and rain.”

 Still, Dunford acknowledged that, “having the framework for dealing with these difficult issues is different than making progress on them… I think our collective challenge is to sincerely and with candor attack these issues that we have to address.”

He explained that, while decreasing miscalculation is “the minimum standard” for defense contacts, “We should also try to see areas to cooperate.”

Even so, what is most interesting is that, unlike in the past, the Chinese government has not responded to these Sino-American differences by suspending defense cooperation between the militaries.

In the 1990s and the 2000s, little sustained progress was achieved in this area due to such suspensions.

The two militaries and defense departments negotiated several security and confidence-building measures designed to moderate tensions. Though these mechanisms may promoted understanding of their opposing security concerns, they proved highly vulnerable to external shocks.

For Beijing, curtailing Sino-American defense dialogues have been a favored way of signaling displeasure with some development in the overall PRC-U.S. relationship. Whenever a U.S. policy decision seriously angered t political leadership, Beijing ordered the PLA to suspend defense ties with the Pentagon.

The various incidents between the PLA and U.S. military units operating in the international waters and airspace near China repeatedly upended relations. China also regularly suspended defense collaboration following announcements of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and other disputes.

The suspensions made evident how little China valued the relationship between the PLA and the Pentagon, reflecting deep Sino-American strategic suspicion, their competition for influence in East Asia, and other major differences.

The conflicts and mutual suspicions have provided an unfavorable environment for flourishing defense relations.

Meanwhile, PLA leaders feared that excessive defense transparency could give the United States deep insights into Chinese military vulnerabilities.

Influenced by a strategic tradition that emphasizes deception, moreover, many PLA strategists believe that opaqueness assists in deterring potential adversaries by complicating their defense planning.

As a rising military power, moreover, Beijing did not want to codify the disparities in Sino-American force capacities or military operating patterns that favored the Pentagon.

Furthermore, PRC policymakers strived to obscure the extent of their military buildup.

A more robust relationship between the Chinese and U.S. militaries is useful since the PLA has expanded its forward deployments considerably in recent years.

As a result, Chinese and U.S. forces are operating more in close proximity.

There is a need to avoid and manage PLA-Pentagon accidents, miscalculations, or other incidents, such as the April 2001 collision between a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese warplane near China’s Hainan Island.

The Rationale Behind the USAF OA-X Experiment

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
08/20/2017

2017-08-15 By Todd Miller

The desert skies of southern New Mexico currently host the USAF Light Attack Experiment (OA-X).

During the experiment the three turboprops (Sierra Nevada Corp./Embraer A-29 Super Tucano, Air Tractor Inc./L3 Platform Integration AT-802L Longsword, Textron Aviation’s AT-6 Wolverine) and single jet (Textron Scorpion) are piloted by Air Force personnel and measured on several performance parameters.

The Air Force indicated that each aircraft would be evaluated on the following missions;

  • Basic Surface Attack
  • Close Air Support
  • Daytime Ground Assault Force
  • Rescue Escort
  • Night Basic Surface Attack
  • Might Close Air Support

Lt. Col Robert Odom, Deputy Commander of the 704th Test Group noted that through the mission exercises the participating aircraft will be assessed by criteria such as; pilot workload to find and track a target, range scores, assessments of displays, capability in austere environments, cockpit visibility, loiter capability, communications, target tracking, lines of sight, sensor tracking, takeoff distance, acoustic signatures and more.

General Mike Holmes, Commander of Air Combat Command (COMACC) commented on the experiment and associated aircraft requirements, “If you want to invest in things that are already available, if you want to go with commercially off the shelf capabilities then you have to live with commercially off the shelf capabilities for the most part.

So what we want to do is let our [Air Force] personnel go fly, let our personnel participate in the maintenance and get data.

Part of this that is really important that we talked about briefly was the signature measurements because I want to send our young Americans out in a platform they can survive in doing this job.”

Holmes continued, “…after the experiment is complete, we’ll take all that data, we’ll come together and bring to the Chief of Staff and the SecAF the option to go with a combat demo next year.

If they say yes, Air Combat Command (ACC) will take the lead from Air Force Material Command (AFMC) who ran this experiment and [ACC will] run the combat demo.”

However, it was made very clear that the experiment was not a fly-off or competitive evaluation and there is no certainty that procurement of one of the aircraft will follow.

As Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson explained, “This is an experiment, we are gathering data on these four different airplanes.

The data is intended to inform strategic decisions and tell us whether we take this to the next stage to what we call a combat experiment, whether any of these airframes are ready for that.”

Invaluable insight was provided by Col. Michael “Starbaby” Pietrucha, pilot and ACC staff lead for light attack.

Pietrucha served as an instructorelectronic warfare officer in the F-4G Wild Weasel and the F-15E Strike Eagle completing 156 combat missions.

Pietrucha took part in 2.5 SAM kills over 10 combat deployments.

Pietrucha stated, “Over the past few years our readiness is hurting.

We are flying the wings off our aircraft to do things that those aircraft are vastly overqualified to do.

If we have a light attack aircraft we can take some of that burden [off our 4th and 5th Gen fighter].

We can take our 4th and 5th Gen force and go back to training for major [high intensity] combat operations.

If we deploy our 4th and 5th Gen aircraft less we can restore our readiness to acceptable levels.”

Pietrucha continued, “Right now today, we have more missions than we have Air Force.

The Chief of Staff has been pretty clear that if we do not have additional money and personnel we cannot pursue the light attack program.

The best we can do is move a hole from one place to another, and we already have too many holes.”

Aside from the lower cost of the aircraft, one of the clear operational savings would be the reduced fuel consumption.

Pietrucha noted, “the amount of fuel it takes to keep a turboprop in the air for an hour with weapons aboard is the amount the F-15E Strike Eagle uses taxiing down the runway in 6-9 minutes.”

Pietrucha referenced an article he had authored that the logistics of moving all that fuel to an operational area amounted to ‘logistical fratricide’.

Fuel consumption vs fuel conservation clearly demonstrates a variety of exponential costs vs savings in the combat environment.

The introduction of a light attack aircraft will offer low procurement costs, efficient operations (in the appropriate threat environment) and an improvement in readiness of the 4th & 5th Gen fleet.

The introduction of an appropriate number of light attack aircraft would also assist in addressing the pilot shortage in the USAF. A variety of sources indicate the USAF is currently 750 – 1000 pilots short.

The Air Force is executing an aggressive program of pilot retention and the addition of a light attack aircraft would make a positive impact.

Pietrucha explains, “People say, ‘you don’t have enough pilots, why do you need more aircraft?’ Good question. We need to absorb pilots. The Air Force takes a pilot out of pilot training and then to make him or her an experienced aviator that individual goes into a fighter squadron to get 500 flight hours, and then they are an experienced fighter pilot. The Air Force does not have enough airplanes to achieve that. It does not matter how many pilots the Air Force produces, they cannot absorb them.”

General Holmes commented on the same dynamic, “Part of the benefit of this airplane is that I can season and produce fighter pilots fast. I can fly a lot of hours on it pretty cheap so I can make an experienced fighter pilot (which is what I am short) fast. So as ACC Commander I would season pilots in this aircraft fast then bring them back for a short course to move them into a 4th or 5th Gen fighter.”

“[Considering the light attack aircraft], I can use them in combat (I think, we’ll find out). I can use them to season young fighter pilots fast. When they are in the US, I can use them to train tactical air control parties at a much lower cost per flying hour. I can use them to support my maneuver unit training with the Army at a much lower cost per flying hour and still work through all the close air support procedures. It is a capability we think (we’re going to do these experiments and see) that would let us continue to do another multi-year approach to fighting violent extremist organizations at a cheaper cost in a fiscal environment where every dollar counts. When preparing for the higher end fight – the 5th gen fight, every dollar counts.”

It was noted that the Super Tucano and Wolverine were the two aircraft that met the Air Force’s defined requirements for the light attack platform. The Scorpion and Longsword were also embraced in the experiment to see what could be learned by the Air Force and the industry partners. No specifics were provided as to how the Longsword and Scorpion did not currently meet the requirements. However, they are technically both experimental platforms (and the Longsword lacks ejection seats) while the Wolverine and Super Tucano are in production.

The Scorpion while perhaps a little more aircraft than the Air Force had in mind, looks to be a very interesting option. The platform demonstrated excellent maturity and reliability this past summer when the small fleet of 4 Scorpions was successfully deployed to four locations worldwide (Paris Air Show, Royal International Air Tattoo [RIAT], NAS Patuxent River, MD and its home base, Wichita, KS).

The Scorpion realized a 100% mission completion rate during weapons testing at NAS Pax River this summer. The Testing utilized the GBU-12, LAU-131, and HMP-400 weapons in 5 different configurations over 5 consecutive days. The weapons testing went so smoothly it wrapped up 4 days early. The aircrafts economy, capability in austere environments, design for modular payloads and advanced ISR capabilities make it a compelling option.

Regardless of the apparent value of introducing a low cost and capable light attack aircraft, it will require budget. Pietrucha summarized the current situation, “Bottom line – right now today, we have more missions than we have Air Force. The Chief of Staff has been pretty clear that if we do not have additional money and personnel we cannot pursue the light attack program. The best we can do is move a hole from one place to another, and we already have too many holes.”

The rationale of the light attack experiment and potential adoption of such aircraft within the USAF appears sound.

It will be up to the Air Force to identify the platform that offers the greatest value to address the identified needs, as well as pair with the fleet wide capabilities that the Air Force is introducing.

The Second Line of Defense extends thanks and appreciation to Arlan Ponder and the entire Public Affairs team and personnel of 49th Wing Holloman AFB, as well as all the leaders of the USAF that granted time, availability and expertise to our group.

You were all gracious and professional hosts.

The OA-X Experiment: A New Way Ahead for USAF Acquisition?