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2016-11-27 DTIII Testing for F-35B: Working an Integrated MAGTF at Sea
The F-35B short takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) variant is the world’s first supersonic STOVL stealth aircraft.
USS America, with VMX-1, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 211 (VMFA-211) and Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 23 (VX-23) embarked, are underway conducting operational testing and the third phase of developmental testing for the F-35B Lightning II aircraft, respectively.
The fourth ship to carry the name, the USS America (LHA-6) serves as the flagship for a new class of amphibious assault ships that is built specifically to support “aerial assault.”
The LHA class utilizes the area on assault ships typically occupied by the “well deck” to provide additional hangar space, increased are for shipborne aviation maintenance, and additional aviation fuel and weapons stores.
It was fitting that the F-35B would complete its Development Testing (DT-III) on an advanced US Navy (USN) platform named “America.”
The two platforms (United States Marine Corps (USMC) F-35B Lightning II and USN USS America) represent a quantum leap in Marine aviation capability, particularly when considered in combination with the MV-22B Osprey, AH-1Z, UH-1Y and incoming CH-53K.
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Pilots, engineers, maintainers and personnel from VX-23 (Air Test and Evaluation Squadron) of NAS Patuxent River, MD flew across the country with their two heavily instrumented F-35Bs for the shipboard DT-III late October through November 17, 2016.
They were joined by aircraft and personnel from VMX-1 (Marine Operational Test and Evaluation squadron) to support the maintenance phase of DT-III.
VMX-1 also participated in operational activity in preparation for the F-35Bs first shipborne deployment in about a year.
DT-III evaluated and validated the Short Take-off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) performance of the F-35B in high sea states, with full weapons loads (external & internal), with asymmetric loading (including taking off with a full load of externals, jettisoning one side and landing), live weapons and night operations.
Onboard maintenance activities involved the entire replacement of an engine, driveshaft and lift fan on one of the VMX-1 aircraft.
After replacement, the VMX-1 aircraft was flown off the deck.
USMC VMX-1 Commanding Officer, Col. George “Sack” Rowell, noted that the F-35B will equal or exceed the shipborne operational capabilities of the AV-8B Harrier in high sea states. Flight operations took place in winds of up to 47 knots from various angles, a deck roll of 5° and deck pitch of 3°. Maintenance work was accomplished (albeit with challenges) while the ship was rolling 9°!
DT-III was a great success achieving primary DT-III flight test points as well as numerous additional milestones for the F-35B;
Shipborne integration of Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) V.2
Engine, driveshaft and lift fan removal and replacement aboard a L-Class ship
Live ordnance operations with the F-35B aboard a ship (from ship to MCAS Yuma Range)
F-35B integration with USN AEGIS validated
Operational Test aircraft flew Block 3F software at-sea
1st Royal Navy pilot F-35B carrier qualified
Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS) utilized for shipborne landing
Use of night vision goggles (NVG) for landing
Link-16 Integration with a variety of aircraft
The success of the tests validates the Marine Corps experience with the aircraft to date.
USMC Lt. General Jon Davis, Deputy Commandant for Aviation Marine Corps captured that experience,
I’d deploy tomorrow.
Tomorrow.
The commanding officer (CO) of VFMA-211 is chomping at the bit, he would deploy them.
So would the CO of VFMA 121.
They are ready.
These airplanes are highly capable and ready to go.”
The potent USMC/USN amphibious assault platform of F-35Bs, MV-22Bs, AH-1Z, UH-1Y and in years to come CH-53K will soon be sailing the seas.
It is natural to recognize the platforms support of a broad spectrum of military operations and missions.
However, it is important not to overlook the role the assault carriers (LHD) platforms have historically played and will continue to play; keeping sea lanes free and open for movement of global commerce, and supporting delivery around the globe of humanitarian aid following natural disasters.
The ongoing success of the USMC introduction of the F-35B fleet speaks to a certain reality.
In short order, the USS America (and companion ships) will be a foreboding presence to some and a welcome friend to others!
The Second Line of Defense team wishes to thank Sylvia Pierson, and Brandi Schiff, JSF/JPO PA; Capt. Sarah Burns & 1st Lt. Maida Zheng, USMC PAOs; Captain Joseph R. Olson, Commanding Officer of the USS America and entire crew; Lt. General Jon M. Davis, USMC Deputy Commandant for Aviation; and USMC VMX-1 Commanding Officer, Col. George “Sack” Rowell.
The photos and video were provided by the USN-USMC team.
For the companion piece by Todd Miller on his time on the USS America, see the following:
2016-11-20 By Michael W. Wynne, 21st Secretary of the Air Force
Summary:
Academics have known since 1934 that Turing computers were and remain inherently vulnerable to hacking as Godel and Keene Mathematically proved, and confidently expressed that proof in the years following.
The times were different; and computers were just aborning, and abandoning a rule of circuit design to firmly comprehend the relationship of every input to every output seemed acceptable when operating in isolation.
As society wallows in the deceit that a software patch can save the Turing Computing Machines that underlay the present Internet, we find even senior security officials such as the Chair and Co-Chair of the Intelligence Committee espousing the thought that protection is simply unavailable.
This is not fact based, but has grown to be the popular myth.
Returning to complex circuit design to mimic the intended digital circuit can and should underpin the ‘Designed in Security’ our society seeks, a proper defense.
Background:
The Internet was developed many years after the underlying flaw of the Turing Computing Machine was both invented and reviled during the 1930’s.
Turing is celebrated for his major contribution of code breaking, and as well the breakthrough in speed, using the phraseology in his topology of ‘this sentence is false’ leading to an acceptance of intent over precision in his computational mathematics.
Later as other mathematicians examined his processes, the fact of the endless recursive nature of the process allowed others to implant errors in this process, which essentially derailed the machine output. This has leading partially to the phrase “Garbage in Garbage out” as students who followed Turing grappled with the flaw.
My first encounter with computational mathematics was in an analog laboratory in junior high school where we were asked by the instructor to construct a difficult equation using classic ‘AND’ and ‘NAND’ logic based systems.
Looking back on that equation, there is no way to alter the setup without invading the circuit design. As well a bad answer would lead immediately to first a low grade, and second to a re-examination of the circuit for correction.
Thus every output had a known input.
Later, as a part of the autopilot design for the AC-130 gunship, which I and fellow Air Force Academy Instructors had compiled into an on board computer, testing at the Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory revealed a terrible anomaly was occurring.
Reflecting that they were in the analog world, and tested analog flight control systems, they took many hours of data illustrating a random control output that flapped the flaps, misguided the rudder, and generally was a disaster waiting to happen. With this information, from the digital perspective we were able to immediately discern that a flaw had been introduced into the program, and found a pointer looking at a random number generator, instead of the control table that we had carefully constructed. Thus, the anomaly was discoverd.
Looking back, there was a lesson, and that was that we had non-maliciously introduced this flaw in the digital domain, and it was detected by the rigor from the analog domain.
Thorough testing using solid circuit design requirements was the key to dealing with the anaomaly.
A shift from software patches to analog circuit design provides a way ahead. Source: Getty Images
Later still, my daughter was typing away in the college library, when an old fashioned image of a bomb appeared, counted down, and destroyed all of her unsaved work. This prank was a precursor to the current malicious code that can be introduced from distant locations, though it was local at the time.
As this was not the intent of the university Computer Center, it was an indicator that symptoms of our current problems were evident before the Internet was expanded to a universal norm.
Naturally, a software fix, searching for this particular ‘bug’, was introduced. This was also a precursor to our current fixation to software patches that even come to my home computer (windows based) many times a month.
Years later, as the then National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, advised that the Internet was becoming the wild west; and images from the other side of our placid computer screen were shown to be violent, society began to realize we had a problem.
When I became Secretary of the Air Force, I introduced Cyber into the mission of the Air Force to mobilize for the defense of this new domain; where rested much of our Command and Control.
When the Air Force recruiting headlines for Cyber professionals began to emerge, the Air Force was excoriated by the legislature for being overzealous, and mis-judging the problem with the Internet.
All have since been validated; but the problem of defending the domain remains.
It is time for a serious conversation and shaping a new approach, notably because the President-elect has set a key goal as shaping new civilian infrastructure and strengthening the US military.
Current Situation:
It is often said that doing the same thing, but expecting a different answer to emerge is a sign of insanity, though we are all guilty of this flawed thinking.
Putting a software patch on top of a flawed hardware system to counter punch an invader may be fulfilling, but it is been proven over and over to be fruitless.
None-the-less, as an Eighteen billion dollar industry, not unfulfilling. Even now the National Institute of Standards has essentially declared out loud the futility of the many solutions it has encountered, citing the patience of the Advanced Persistent Threat in many papers. It as well stipulates that many penetrants never realize for many months or years that a penetration has occurred, until it becomes advantageous for the agent to disclose the information, or a separate patch unwittingly discovers the loss of data.
Many times the victim has no idea there was an issue. Corporate Boards are leery of liability, and thus in denial; or becoming part of the herd of software patch payers.
But society is slowly becoming aware that this is a scam, that they are riding an unending strife curve; and the alarms are beginning to sound as if the end of life as we know it is nigh again.
It is seeping into engineering and into design that those that have stayed with Analog are immune to this Internet, distant and malicious, threat. Whether aircraft safety systems, or in some of the most carefully protected areas; suddenly what is old is new again.
I would like to beat the drum for a ‘blast from the past’ and celebrate the re-emergence of computational analog circuit design.
As well; I would raise a ceremonial toast to a systems engineering rule for thoroughly understanding every input and output response before the system goes on line.
This is a marked departure than ‘crowd sourcing’ corrections to flawed software, which by its very nature invites malicious activity, while waving the flag of cooperation and collaboration.
When it comes to National Security; or to Public Infrastructure, this is flawed policy and needs to change dramatically.
Even the Internet of Things (IoT), now popular, requires re-evaluation when public safety in the form of vehicle control, or Grid, or Pipe, or Dam, is at risk.
Forward Look:
I recently gave a presentation in China at a University there, citing the Systems Engineering principles, and identifying the fatal flaw which has been like a virus that has never been extinguished, but instead tolerated for its good parts; but is now becoming a civil defense issue that should be addressed.
I would say for our National purposes, it is time that we followed some prescriptive advice and agree upon a path that will settle down the current rhetoric; and may create a level playing field, where Intellectual Property can easily be protected if desired; and our National Interests can be logically addressed.
For sure, the cited eighteen billion dollar industry is not going away; but can slowly morph into creating useful paths to a safer Internet.
Society is ready; and now the professionals have to decide on priorities, and action.
I would suggest that we should prioritize the goal that USG Web sites immediately be protected using frozen (e.g.; non reprogrammable) complex analog circuitry mimicking and replacing currently installed internet appliances.
Further; that Infrastructure Owners be tasked to put in place protected SCADA Systems, under the watchful eye of the Department of Homeland Security, which again are frozen analog complex circuitry, again mimicking and replacing the currently installed Internet appliance.
Internet Service Providers, router designers, and server designers can provide needed support to the agencies and public corporations to alter our present course, and they should be doing it.
I would further implore Financial Institutions and Corporations to recognize that this must be done to protect themselves, and their customers from the current economic losses.
Why Insurance Companies are not demanding change is a mystery?
Society is not stuck, but thought leaders are, time for a change.
It is Time for Analog as the solution set to deal with the vulnerability challenges associated with software.
This is not only possible, but has been available for a few years–the path is novel, but not unknown.
Vulnerability on the Internet is actually a choice, not a given outcome.
Let’s get on with it!
Editor’s Note: In the following article, published earlier this year by David Sax in Bloomberg Business Week, the author suggested that in the Age of Cybercrime, The Best Insurance May be Analog.
The article is an interesting companion piece to Secretary Wynne’s very clear call for a new way ahead to deal with a strategic vulnerability affecting civil and military defense systems.
Last September, Darpa launched the $36 million Leveraging the Analog Domain for Security (LADS) program, which is attempting to create a set of electronic ears that can detect malicious activity by monitoring the unintentional analog emissions of digital hardware, such as heat, sound, and changed frequencies.
“The advantage of an analog approach is that there’s no way for the malware to directly reach through air and affect the monitoring device,” says Angelos Keromytis, who runs the program.
If you wish to comment on this article you can do so on the Second Line of Defense Forum.
2016-11-26 DTIII Testing for F-35B: October 31, 2016
The F-35B short takeoff/vertical landing (STOVL) variant is the world’s first supersonic STOVL stealth aircraft.
USS America, with VMX-1, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 211 (VMFA-211) and Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 23 (VX-23) embarked, are underway conducting operational testing and the third phase of developmental testing for the F-35B Lightning II aircraft, respectively.
The tests will evaluate the full spectrum of joint strike fighter measures of suitability and effectiveness in an at-sea environment and its support and enablement for the MAGTF.
The rumble of the MV-22B reverberated off the flight deck of the USS America (LHA-6).
The 12 F-35Bs onboard represented more F-35s than had ever gathered at sea.
The F-35B moving steadily towards deployment represents an unprecedented leap in capability, the future of formidable maritime power.
The gathering of assets was part of a joint US Navy (USN)/ US Marine Corps (USMC) “Proof of Concept” demonstration held off the coast of Southern California November 18-20.
PAO Capt. Sarah Burns indicated that the demonstration would explore the best way to integrate a large package of F-35Bs into the current USN/USMC structure to bring the most effective power projection from the sea.
Lt. General Jon M. Davis, Deputy Commandant for Aviation shared a core value of the Marine Corps demonstrated onboard, “No Marine Corps platform fights alone.”
The F-35B, MV-22B, AH-1Z and UH-1Y combined and integrated with the US Navy’s latest amphibious assault ship (USS America) complete a package that provides the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) with a broad spectrum of response options, and the most advanced mobile warfighting capability.
The MV-22B Ospreys speed and range have been a gamechanger for the USMC MAGTF, and now with the F-35B on hand the operational possibilities take yet another quantum leap.
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The sea based capability provides global mobility unrestrained by availability of land bases.
With a practical range of operations 450 miles from the ship, this integrated USN/USMC capability is ideal for the fight against terrorism, and/or the insertion of Marine infantryman or special forces deep in hostile territory.
The access is increased even more given the platforms ability to quickly relocate to austere forward operating bases.
Given the F-35Bs stealth, advanced sensors, situational awareness and weapons, it also provides the capability to operate in proximity of areas hosting Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) or Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) environments.
The demonstrated integration of the F-35 and the US Navy’s AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense System adds tremendous potency to an already capable system.
The F-35 can provide over the horizon targeting data to a readily available USN AEGIS platform that can quickly intercept ballistic missile, drone, or hostile aircraft with its SM-6 missile (widely believed to have a range beyond 200 mile).
This allows stealth detection of targets by the F-35, and a virtually unlimited (boatload) of missiles to utilize.
The F-35B replaces 3 Marine Corps aircraft, the F/A-18 Hornet, the EA-6B Prowler, and the AV-8B Harrier II.
Not only does it do the job of each aircraft better (Close Air Support (CAS), Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD/DEAD), Offensive/Defensive Counter Air (OCA/DCA), Electronic Warfare (EW)), it adds Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance (ISR) and Command & Control (C2) capability.
It adds this capability all while operating with the flexibility of a Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) platform.
The F-35B fulfills the USMC vision of “every Marine Corp aircraft a sensor, a shooter and a sharer.”
Once onboard the USS America the rumbling of the Osprey was quickly replaced by the near continuous roar of F-35Bs launching and landing.
The tempo of operations demonstrated the F-35Bs readiness for deployment and combat activity.
That should come as no surprise given the “B” has over 22,000 combined flight hours.
The F-35B advanced flight systems reduce pilot workload and increase safety in all aspects of flight. USMC pilot Lt. Col. Rich “VC” Rusnok an experienced AV-8B Harrier II pilot and slated to become the Commanding Officer (CO) of VFMA-121 in 2017 noted that, “hovering in the Harrier was like sitting on a one legged bar stool.”
His comment was complemented by USMC pilot Lt. Col. John “Guts” Price (slated to become the CO of VFMA-122 in 2018).
Price noted that his first hover in a F-35B found him realize his learned instincts in the Harrier to provide inputs created problems in the hover, and it was better to ease off the controls and let the F-35B do as it wanted!
Perhaps nowhere is this ease of flying more evident than in the speed of pilots Carrier Qualifications (CQs); in the previous 4 years only 8 USMC F-35B pilots had CQ’d, in the past 3 weeks 19 pilots CQ’d!
The Marine Corps lead the way with the F-35 program.
The deployment of VMFA-121 the “Green Knights” to Japan is motion to take place in January 2017, with further deployments slated for 2018.
It all speaks to the ongoing progress and maturity of the F-35 program.
This “aerial amphibious assault force” represents a new era of flexibility and capability for the MAGTF, and I anticipate we’ll regularly see the USS America serving the nations interests in strategic locations around the globe.
The Second Line of Defense team wishes to thank Sylvia Pierson, and Brandi Schiff, JSF/JPO PA; Capt. Sarah Burns & 1st Lt. Maida Zheng, USMC PAOs; Captain Joseph R. Olson, Commanding Officer of the USS America and entire crew; Lt. General Jon M. Davis, USMC Deputy Commandant for Aviation; Supporting F-35B pilots of VMFA-211 & the F-35B and MV-22B pilots and personnel of VMX-1.
The US Air Force and Naval Aviation owe a generally unacknowledged debt of gratitude to Ivy League Colleges, and Harvard in particular, for their key role in the initial development of US military aviation and combat fighter pilots.
In the years leading up to 1903, Professor Samuel Langley of the Harvard College Observatory and later the US Naval Academy had failed to achieve powered flight; after thousands of glider flights, Otto Lillenthal was killed in the air; a Russian admiral also failed; and the possibly successful work of Gustave Whitehead (originally Weisskopf) was little known and doubted.
CAPT. Paul E. Mawn, USN (Ret.), a graduate of the Harvard College and an MBA from Rutgers University is Chairman of the Advocates for Harvard ROTC, an organization of more than 2,600 Harvard alumni of who most are veterans. He is also Senior Vice Commander of the Greater Boston Chapter of MOWW.
Then two unknown amateurs, brothers who owned a bicycle shop in Dayton, Ohio, electrified the world by demonstrating that powered, heavier-than-air flight from a level take-off was possible.
At once there was an almost magical attraction to this exciting, but extremely dangerous, adventure; and it especially appealed to many young men in the elite colleges during the first years of flight.
War Clouds on the Horizon.
We all know that the US Air Force evolved from the US Army Air Corps after World War II and that its creation was preceded by the aero squadrons of the US Army Signal Corps during World War I.
The initial combat foundation for Navy and Marine Corps “airdales” (i.e. aviators) was the Northern Bomber Group in World War I, initially based in the UK and later in France.
However, prior to these developments, it was the graduates of Ivy League Colleges – not West Point or Annapolis- who were the initial airborne pillars of US national security.
As World War I began in Europe, it was clear that aircraft would be involved in large numbers and in varied roles.
First, they were used for reconnaissance, observation of enemy movements, photography, then bombing, for ground attacks, and eventually aerial combat.
Following the start of World War I in August 1914, the war clouds on the European horizon motivated over 565 adventurous young men in the United States to volunteer to serve as military aviators for the British and French of which over 11% were Harvard alumni.
At that time there were several undergraduates and alumni from Harvard and a few other Ivy League colleges who wanted to fly military aeroplanes (as they were then called) among whom were several qualified pilots and members of the college aero clubs who had regular access to their own or club aircraft.
As a result, the US instantly had several squadrons of trained pilots with combat experience after entering the war in April 1917, of few were from the US Military Academy or the Naval Academy.
Prior to the US entry into World War I in April 1917, the surest way for current and prospective US aviators to join the fight was to cross the Atlantic Ocean by steamship to France and enlist into the French Foreign Legion.
As most of us know, federal law prohibits US citizens from joining foreign militaries and that may lead to the loss of their US citizenship.
However, service in French Foreign Legion by US citizens was specifically permitted by the US government.
Since Canada hardly had any Air Force in 1914, flying for Canada was not a viable option, and most Canadians who wished to fly operationally joined the Britain’s Royal Flying Corps or its Royal Naval Air Service (later consolidated in 1918 as the Royal Air Force).
By the end of the World War I, about 25% of the RAF pilots were Canadians.
By final tallies, the Brits eventually developed a formidable air force starting initially with only 36 aircraft to over 3,000 planes before the cessation of hostilities in 1918.
It was understood that Americans might join the RFC by going to Canada to enlist, but with the risk of the potential loss of their US citizenship.
It may be noted that this prohibition of foreign military service by US citizens has rarely been enforced except during World War II for those who joined the Axis Powers.
Scientific American, Cover Story of September 17, 1910: “The Harvard aviation meeting is the most important thus far held in the United States.”
A further limit on the opportunity of Americans to join British flying formations during World War I, was the fact that the RFC was able to draw the majority of its pilots from the United Kingdom and Commonwealth countries, especially Canada and Australia, and this pool of qualified personnel limited possibilities for Americans.
Having said this, some American pilots found their way into RFC service.
The other option was France, which had significantly more planes and aero squadrons at the start of and during World War 1 than the British, and the French organization therefore required many more foreign pilots than the RFC.
Thus, in spite of language issues, the French welcomed American volunteers with open arms since they lacked a substantial flow of colonial volunteers with aviation experience.
The French Connection
After successfully completing the French Foreign Legion boot camp in Marseilles, those adventurous Ivy League heroes could petition their French chain of command to send them to one of the flight schools of the French Air Service (i.e., Armée de l’Air), especially since many of them were already qualified pilots.
An interesting and little noted aspect of this effort, were the financial subsidies provided US volunteers who wished to fight for the French via the French Foreign Legion from US industrialists including William Vanderbilt, who was a Harvard alumnus and future Naval officer, and John Pierpont Morgan whose grandson was a Harvard graduate as well as a future aviator and Medal of Honor recipient.
Sous Lt. Norman Prince-Armée de l’Air: Among the first American pilots in the Armée de l’Air was Norman Prince who was from an old Yankee family on the Massachusetts North Shore and graduated from Harvard College in 1908 and Harvard Law School in 1911. While at HLS, he also took flight training under an alias and became the 55th American to be licensed to fly an aeroplane by the Aero Club of America. After practicing law for 3 years in Chicago, Prince crossed the Atlantic by ship and enlisted in French Foreign Legion.
After completing FFL boot camp in Marseille, he convinced the French to send him to flight school because he was a licensed pilot, fluent in French and for the additional reason that his family owned an estate in France. Prince served in 2 French aero squadrons (VB 108 & 113).
He then noticed that there were many Americans pilots serving in various French Squadrons. Using his lawyerly skills, he persuaded the French authorities of the many benefits of assigning all Americans in the same squadron.
This proposal was approved and resulted in the formation of the “American Escadrille” (i.e. French for squadron) which was later changed to the “Lafayette Escadrille” after pressure from Germany since the US was neutral at the time.
Prince was later promoted to the grade of sergeant and flew 122 aerial combat engagements. He was designated an “Ace” since he was officially credited with shooting down 5 enemy planes, and his record included 4 more unconfirmed kills.
On 12 October 1916 Prince flew as an escort for a bombing raid on the Mauser rifle works at Oberndorf, Germany, during which he shot down an enemy plane. Returning to base, his landing wheels hit telegraph cables near his air base and his plane flipped over and crashed. Prince was severely injured. He died three days later.
On his death bed he was promoted to sous lieutenant and awarded the Legion d’Honneur.
Previously, Prince had also been awarded the Médaille Militaire as well as the Croix de Guerre the French government.
The French Formations
Initially there were 38 pilots in the “Lafayette Escadrille” (also known as SP# 124) who, on average, had the following characteristics.
They were approximately 26 years old, 23 were from the eastern part of the United States, 30 were college graduates, 11 were the sons of millionaires, 9 had attended Harvard College, 9 had qualified as pilots before joining the French Foreign Legion, but none were graduates of the US Military or Naval Academy. The squadron pets were 2 young lions named “Whiskey and Soda”.
Prior to April of 1917 when the US declared war, the flow of US volunteers trained and qualified as pilots in the French Air Force exceeded the need of the “Lafayette Escadrille” and the surplus was sent to other French aero squadrons which along with “Lafayette Escadrille” became part of the “Lafayette Flying Corps”.
That formation included an additional 170 American aviators. In total, over 265 American served as a under the French Aéronautique Militaire, including 57 who were not in the “Lafayette Flying Corps”. With the US entry into the War and mounting British casualties, more Americans found their way into British formations.
Therefore, to the number who served with the French there must be added the approximately 300 Americans who ultimately served and were trained as pilots with the RFC.
Among the 28 American Aces of World War I, 22 flew with the RFC.
Of all the Aces, 13(or 46%) were Harvard alumni.
Harvard ROTC
Besides Sous Lt. Prince, other notable Harvard members of the “Lafayette Escadrille” included a significant number of aviators who are indicated in the graphic at the end of this article.
A mere glance at this list will suffice to indicate the importance of the contribution to World War I military aviation – and the scope of the sacrifices of Harvard alumni and their families.
As a Harvard alumnus, I have been concerned that the military and patriotic history of this great institution of learning should not be completely lost or fade into the unread footnotes of its history.
It is not generally known that 18 Harvard alumni have been awarded the Medal of Honor, including one aviator who served in both World Wars.
Only West Point and the Naval Academy alumni have received a higher total of this highest award for valor.
In a work of progress, at least 127 alumni of Harvard are known to have been awarded the 2nd highest valor award (i.e. the Distinguished Service Cross, Navy Cross or Air Force Cross) for extreme gallantry of which 49 were aviators.
The highest award for valor conferred by France is the Legion d’Honneur which was established by Napoleon and has been awarded to at least 21 Harvard alumni, including 5 aviators. Over 98 Silver Star Medals have been awarded to Harvard alumni, including 49 aviators, for extraordinary heroism in military operations against an enemy of the US.
In addition during World War I, 13 Harvard alumni were Aces which are often considered to have merited the Silver Star had it had existed at that time. From World War I through the Vietnam War, a total of 1,352 Harvard alumni of all military branches and designations made the supreme sacrifice in the military service of our country.
As noted on the walls of Memorial Church in the Harvard Yard, “While a bright future beckoned, they freely gave their lives and fondest hopes for us and our allies that we might learn from them courage in peace to spend our lives making a better world for others.”
Capt. James N. Hall USA (H-11) – Distinguished Service Cross, Legion d’Honneur, POW twice & 3 kills;
1st Lt. Walter Lovell USA (H-05) – Croix de Guerre;Sergeant Harold Willis Armée de l’Air (H-08) Shot down & POW but escaped in 6 months – Croix de Guerre; Sergeant Victor Chapman Armée de l’Air (H-13) – Killed in action; Lt. Charles Bassett USN (H-17) later attached to RAF – Navy Cross; Major Charles Bassett Jr. USAAC (H-17) – Navy Cross, USN in WWI & USAAC in WWII;1st Lt. Hugh Bridgman USA (H-19) – later to 49th Aero Squadron & 1 confirmed kill;1st Lt. David Putnam USA (H-20) – Distinguished Service Cross, “Ace of Aces” (20 kills -14 confirmed) – killed in action;Colonel Raynal Bolling US A (H-00) – Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit & Legion d’Honneur – killed in action; Captain Leonard Hammond USA (H-01) 91st Aero Squad.– Distinguished Service Cross & Ace with 6 kills;Major Stephen Noyes USA (H-03) 1st Aero Squadron – Distinguished Service Cross;Lt. (j.g.) Ralph Loomis USN (H-08) Lafayette Flying Corps & Northern Bombing Group) – Navy Cross;Captain Charles Biddle USA (H-14) Lafayette Flying Corps & 103rd Aero Squad.–Distinguished Service Cross & Ace with 8 kills;1st Lt. Charles Plummer USA (H-14) Lafayette Flying Corps & 88thAero Squad.–Distinguished Service Cross – killed in action;Major Lloyd Hamilton USA (H-16) 17thAero Squad.–Distinguished Service Cross & Ace with 8 kills – killed in action; Lt. (j.g.) David Judd USN (H-16) Lafayette Flying Corps & Northern Bombing Group – Navy Cross; Captain Ralph Bagby USA (H-16) 88th Aero Squadron – Distinguished Service Cross; Lt. Charles Gray Little USN (H-16) Naval Dirigible Squadron – Navy Cross; Lt. David Morgan US Navy (H-16) Northern Bombing Group – Navy Cross;1st Lt. Thomas Abemethy USA (H-17) 147th Aero Squadron – Distinguished Service Cross;1st Lt. Arthur Alexander USA (H-17) 96th Aero Squadron & 1st Day Bombardment –Distinguished Service Cross;1st Lt. Walter Avery USA (H-17) 95th Aero Squadron – Distinguished Service Cross;Captain John Mitchell USA (H-17) 95th Aero Squadron – Distinguished Service Cross;Captain Doug Campbell USA (H-17) 94th Aero Squadron – 5 Distinguished Service Crosses & Ace with 6 kills;Lt. (j.g.) George Roe USN (H-17) (attached to: Royal Naval Air Service) – Navy Cross & POW for 7 months;1st Lt. William Taylor USA (H-17) 6th Balloon Company – Distinguished Service Cross;Lt. (j.g.) Alfred Gardner (H-18 ) USN (attached to: Royal Naval Air Service) – Navy Cross;Captain James Knowles Jr. (H-18 ) USA 95th Aero Squadron – Distinguished Service Cross & Ace with 5 kills;Captain John Lambert USA (H-18) 91st Aero Squadron – Distinguished Service Cross;1st Lt. Chester Wright (H-18) USA 93rd Aero Squadron – Distinguished Service Cross & Ace with 8 kills;Lt. (j.g.) Addison Center Burnham Jr. (H-19) USN Naval Dirigible Squadron – Navy Cross;Capt. Hamilton Coolidge USA (H-19) 94th Aero Squad. – Distinguished Service Cross & Ace with 8 kills – killed in action; Lt. (j.g.) William Gaston USN (H-19) Northern Bombing Squadron – Navy Cross; Lt. (j.g.) Charles Edward Hodges Jr. USN (H-19) 5th Squadron USMC – Navy Cross;Major General Pierpont M. Hamilton (H-20) USAF (WW1& WWII – AAC & then USAF) – Medal of Honor; Capt. Sumner Sewall USA (H-20) 95th Aero Squad. –2 Distinguished Service Crosses & Ace with 8 kills; Major Charles Biddle USA (HLS-14) “LFC”& 13th Aero Squad. – Distinguished Service Cross & Ace with 8 kills; Major Benjamin Harwood USA (HLS-17) 12th Aero Squadron – Distinguished Service Cross; Ensign Albert Dillon Sturtevant USN (HLS-17) (attached to: Royal Naval Air Service) – Navy Cross – killed in action;1st Lt. Donald G. Graham USA (HLS-17) Air HQ – AEF – Distinguished Service Cross (WW1 & WWII service); 1st Lt. Howard Knotts USA (HLS-21) 17th Pursuit Squadron – Distinguished Service Cross;Rear Admiral David S. Ingalls USN Northern Bombing Group–Distinguished Service Medal (WW1 & WWII service); 1st Lt. Lloyd Andrews Hamilton USA “RFC” & 17th Aero Squadron – Distinguished Service Cross – killed in action. Many detailed biographies and pictures of these aviation pioneers and heroes may be found in the article Crimson Aviators at www.advocatesforharvardrotc.org/Harvard.
For one of the best explanations of the development of military aviation during the first world war, see the video below:
During the election campaign, some of Donald Trump’s advisers criticized the Obama administration and its predecessors for adopting policies that alienated Russia and helped drive Moscow toward Beijing, to China’s benefit.
They indicated that one reason they wanted to reconcile with Russia was to break this Sino-Russian alignment.
For example, George Papadopoulos, told the Russian media a couple weeks before the U.S. presidential elections that the U.S. sanctions imposed on Moscow for its annexation of Crimea and actions in eastern Ukraine ”have done little more than to turn Russia towards China as a primary market for Russian goods, services and energy.
It is not in the interest of the West to align China and Russia in a geopolitical alliance that can have unpredictable consequences for U.S. interests in the South China Sea, Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. I believe both the U.S. and Russia should consider China as an emerging superpower threat that will have to be dealt with over the next fifty years.”
The Trump Administration will decide whether to remove sanctions on Russia, but they might well consider imposing new ones on China, to force Beijing to revise its foreign economic policies, coerce Pyongyang into ending its nuclear weapons program, and otherwise address ways to alter Chinese behavior.
Pursuing this strategy, though difficult to fully execute, would represent a long-due recognition in U.S. policy that a strong Sino-Russian partnership is not in the U.S. national interest and that Washington policy makers need to consider how U.S. policies shape Sino-Russian ties.
Since the end of the Cold War, “triangular diplomacy” has been out of fashion in the West.
Most U.S. policy analysts today rarely use the term today, while U.S. government initiatives normally address one or the other country—or try to envelop both countries in larger global order initiatives.
Neither seems to consider how U.S. approaches towards Moscow or Beijing will affect the Sino-Russia relationship let alone what tactics Washington could use to shape it.
At Valdai, Putin denied that Russia’s outreach to Asia was due to Moscow’s tensions with the West, insisting that they were a logical reflection of Russia’s location—much of the country’s land is in Asia—as well as the economic opportunities and strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific region.
In public, Chinese officials also profess not to see their relations with either Russia or the United States as directed at the other, and Beijing has distanced itself from Russian policies aimed overtly at confronting Washington.
Sheng Shiliang, a research fellow the Global Issues Research Center, a think tank of the Chinese state-run Xinhua News Agency, said that Putin had “many fans in China among almost all groups of the population” due to the fact that he “did a lot to increase Russia’s power and to improve China-Russia relations.”
In both cases, there is a gap between rhetoric and reality. Russian analysts often use the triangular framework in their analysis. Important Russian policies toward China are driven by tensions with the West and aim to influence the U.S. approach toward Moscow in ways that benefit Russia.
China and Russia have a long and complicated relationship of allies, competitors, rivals and friends.
At Valdai, John Mearsheimer, a well-known realist scholar in the United States, depicted Russia as a critical swing state in the growing Sino-U.S. competition for global preeminence. He faulted past U.S. policies for “violating Geopolitics 101” by challenging both countries concurrently, in the realm of both interests and ideology, thus driving them closer, instead of allowing Russia to pursue the logical course of aligning with the United States to balance Beijing’s growing power.
In their Foreign Affairs article this summer, Mearsheimer and co-author Steven Walt advocated reducing the U.S. military role in Europe, where they saw the remaining countries as able to balance Russia, and concentrating U.S. military strength in Asia, where they perceived even China’s most powerful countries as too weak and divided to balance Beijing’s growing power.
More recently, Mearsheimer argued that, since the United States is the more powerful than Russia, Washington rather than Moscow is the driving agent in the Sino-Russian partnership:
“The Americans pushed the Russians into the arms of the Chinese. I believe if Washington had a more positive attitude towards Moscow, then the end result would be that we had good relations between the U.S. and Russia and eventually the Russians would be part of the balancing coalition against China. It’s important to understand that over time, if China continues to rise, the U.S. is going to be deeply committed to containing China and it’s going to need all the help that it can get and it’s going to need the Russians.”
That both Russia and China have had strained relations with the United States has likely contributed to their having closer ties, but this improvement might have occurred, in some geographic and functional areas, in any case due to their ongoing ideological and geopolitical harmonization.
Both regimes are skilled at using nationalism and anti-Americanism to rally domestic support behind their policies. Russian and Chinese leaders both describe their countries as under threat of encirclement by the United States and its allies.
They are also both led by strong leaders who can control their countries’ foreign policies seem to get along with each other better than their predecessors did with each other. Xi Jinping is supposed to remain in his position until 2022, while Vladimir Putin’s presidency could continue until 2024 or beyond depending on how many times he is reelected.
For both Moscow and Beijing, their policies toward Central Asia are partly a projection of their domestic policies. Defensively, they both fear the spillover of transnational security threats from the region. They also seek to position their national companies to benefit from the economic opportunities in the region.
Moscow wants Chinese support to manage Eurasian security challenges and to secure a stable eastern frontier as Russia engages militarily in Europe and the Middle East. PRC leaders value not having to worry about Russia (or Central Asia, which is under Moscow’s security oversight) as they confront security challenges with the United States, Japan, India, and other countries in Asia.
The Ukraine crisis has catalyzed many recent trilateral developments.
First, it has severely degraded relations between Russia and the West.
Second, the crisis has placed China in a more advantageous relationship with Moscow, whose leaders felt they needed better ties with Beijing in the face of the collapse of their relations with the West.
Third, it also helped China strategically by reducing the intensity of the U.S. rebalancing toward Asia, as Washington grappled with the Ukraine crisis, and by enhancing Beijing’s leverage vis-à-vis Washington.
Fourth, the collapse of the Russian economy, partly due to the post-Ukraine sanctions but amplified by the fall of world oil and gas prices and the collapse of the Russian ruble, has resulted in Russia’s gross domestic product becoming ten times smaller than that of China.
The growing Sino-Russian power gap could complicate their future relationship by amplifying Russian anxieties about “China passing”–Russia’s becoming a junior partner to Beijing in a primarily Sino-American world.
To address this challenge, both Russian and Chinese leaders have shared an interest in concealing Moscow’s weakening influence and status vis-à-vis Beijing.
Both Russia and China want to have their own spheres of influence where they can enforce their own rules and norms of international behavior, primarily through regional initiatives under their control—the Eurasian Economic Union, SCO, new Silk Road Economic belt– rather than more overt economic and military pressure.
They also aspire to enjoy the geopolitical freedom of action enjoyed by the United States—able to employ military and other tools of power to advance its narrow self-interest.
Yet, Moscow’s turn toward Beijing may limit its freedom of action in Central Asia, where Moscow has had to accept growing Chinese economic dominance, and East Asia, with Russia finding it ever more difficult to challenge Chinese objections to Russian arms sales and other ties with India, Vietnam, and possibly other states.
U.S. policies designed to improve relations with Russia—such as the possible repeal of some sanctions or other measures which might be considered by the Trump Administration–could delay Moscow’s continued economic and military decline, which would decrease possible Russian anxiety about falling behind China. But it could also serve to balance the rise of China’s power in Europe, Eurasia, the Arctic, and the Middle East.
In the Arctic, Russia has relaxed its objections to China’s claims to influence in the region—such as its membership in the Arctic Council—and has offered PRC companies’ energy access opportunities in order to obtain financial capital.
Although Russia’s Middle East presence is more visible, China is in a better long-term position since it has been better able to maintain strong ties with Arab countries like Saudi Arabia.
Whereas Moscow has had to accept the loss of influence in the Arab world due to its close ties with Tehran and Damascus.
Editor’s Note: On his farewell tour, President Obama warned his successor against pursuing “realpolitik.”
But it is clear, that with the rejection of TPP and a wish by Trump to get away from mushy multilateralism, accountability is a key objective.
This can be achieved much more effectively in a bilateral approach than a multi-lateral one with very weak or virtually non-existant enforcement mechanisms.
Americans have a long history of not seeing the trees for the forest when it comes to East Asia.
During the Korean war, UN forces were amazed by the human wave assaults by Chinese troops and implicitly presumed that the PRC had endless reserves of manpower based on its population even as General Ridgeway’s strategy of using massed firepower dulled the offensives and ultimately, enabled UN forces to pursue peace talks based on status quo ante bellum.
Little noticed was that human wave attacks by Chinese troops were mostly former soldiers for the KMT regime that the CCP regarded as disloyal and security risks. Incoming dynasties customarily disposed of troops loyal to former regimes by making them front line troops. The CCP tasked them to invade Taiwan, be PVA in Korea, or otherwise deployed on frontier adventures.
When that supply ran low and the CCP began to have to use the much smaller cadres of trusted communist PLA troops, CCP enthusiasm for the war dwindled very quickly.
Incidents that devastated the morale of Mao Tse-Tung and members of the ruling circle escaped notice in the west. For example, Mao Anying, the elder surviving (and only fit) son of Mao Tse-tung who was killed in Korea on November 25, 1950 by an UN Airstrike in a supposedly safe rear area was not well recognized and exploited.
Had PVA command and control nodes that are staffed by loyal CCP cadres with ties to high ranking officials been specifically targeted, it would disproportionately impacted regime behavior.
The weakness of detailed local knowledge has hindered US policy toward China in general, resulting missed opportunities.
Detailed knowledge of familial, clan, provincial, ethnic, linguistic and other ties is what is needed to understand Chinese signals and meanings and to dissect local from so called national interests.
Pleading for cooperation as opposed to conflict between the between United States and the People’s Republic of China; or, Preserving a monopoly by Beijing on relations with the United States.
Celebrating the good old days. U.S. President Barack Obama, left, walks past Chinese President Xi Jinping during a welcome ceremony for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit at the International Convention Center in Yanqi Lake, Beijing, China Tuesday, Nov. 11, 2014. (AP Photo/Ng Han Guan) .
It follows from this that President Xi is pleading for is for the Trump Administration to not bypass Beijing on key issues and to endorse the CCP/PRC monopoly of power that, de facto, it may or may not have.
In Western diplomacy, acceptance of a recognized regime’s monopoly on legitimate power is explicit and recognized regimes are rarely bypassed even when facts on the ground clearly dictate otherwise, like the interregnum between the proclamation of the PRC in 1949 and de-recognition of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1978.
With a limited agenda between the US and PRC well into the early 1980s, beginning with Kissinger’s initiatives and Nixon’s visit in 1972 it was readily managed and tightly controlled by the Priesthood of Western “China scholars”.
This arrangement worked well before the “opening” of China by Deng Xiaoping that unleashed a China that much more closely resemble China historically, where local authorities are subservient to the Emperor in name, and are free to do much as they pleased as long as the Emperor received their taxes and the visible manifestations of obedience to Beijing were adhered to.
Chinese civilization of the 21st Century, however, found the priesthood of Western China Experts that focused on Beijing increasingly out of touch with the widening and divergent interests of different parts of China.
Beijing centric interpretations of policies have faced challenges in explaining the lack of consistency in regime behavior across regions:
For example, the declaration of an ADIZ in East China Sea was not matched by similar moves in South China Sea. Nor are the island building ventures in South China Sea replicated elsewhere.
Divergences like this raise questions as to what are the local dynamics that are driving Chinese policies, rather than Beijing’s official policies .
China experts, because of their predominant training in one dialect and their preponderance in a few major Chinese cities, are an obstacle for a more nuanced understanding and foreign policy under the Trump Administration toward the many Chinese “local” authorities.
Crafting a nuanced set of foreign policies toward the different parts of China that simultaneously recognizes the limitations of Beijing’s power and influence, and the diversity of interests, behavior and concerns that make up the vast Chinese civilization require an expansion of capacity and broadening of expertise that will take time.
Meanwhile, acceding to Xi’s demand for a monopoly plays right into Beijing’s hands as it enable the regime to play off issues like the North Korean Nuclear Threat, South China Sea Grab, Trade, Currency, Climate Change and many other issues all at once with a Washington Foreign Policy priesthood eager for diplomatic “solutions”.
In Western diplomacy, the dominant paradigm is to compartmentalize differences and disputes to within a particular policy area, and to limit / prevent its bleed / spread to other issues. If there is a trade dispute that is not settled amicably through legitimate mechanisms, sanctions by one party are limited to that trade area.
Example: France once restricted customs clearance of Japanese VCRs to one small custom post, causing month’s long tie-ups. Japan retaliated by issuing a “health” regulation that Perrier water had to be boiled.
Notably, at the height of US-Japan trade disputes in the 1980s, the military-strategic relation was never impaired or disrupted. China, and particularly the Beijing regime, however, do not follow this protocol.
Astute observers will notice that there is a noticeable correlation between the diminishing of US and Allied pressure on China in key areas like trade, currency manipulation, intellectual property theft, state-sponsored hacking, human rights, and the flaring up of strategic issues like North Korea, South China Sea, confrontations with Japan, etc.
Every one of these “crisis” have been used by the Beijing regime to make themselves indispensable, knowing that the priesthood of “China experts” in the US and allied regimes will back China up and cause the US to back down or sideline lower priority issues.
The priesthood of China experts has nowhere to go except Beijing, and cannot afford to appear to have no influence.
Beijing is happy (after intense negotiation and hard bargaining) strike deals that appear to meet key US and allied demands for the priesthood of China experts to deliver to Washington.
Beijing, in turn, can rely on the lack of consequences from the US when they fail to deliver on their commitments, or to only deliver for a brief period (to make it look good), and then renege, confident that Washington will have lost interest or focus on the issue.
With rapid turnover of Administration staff and the revolving door to and from K-Street lobbying firms, Beijing can count on whoever playing “hardball” with them on one issue to be needing to be on Beijing’s payroll, either directly or indirectly for US firms that have interest in China in due course.
At the same time, Beijing can by diktat, in the short and medium run, threaten US economic interests with highly visible moves that impact iPhone sales, Boeing, American automakers, agricultural imports, or the old trick of limiting or encouraging mass diversions of Chinese tourists and students studying abroad. Indeed, this explicit threat was made along with President Xi’s call to President Elect Trump.
Xi’s Beijing regime wants “free trade” where OECD nations that have a bona fide, legitimate monopoly of power to open their markets to Chinese products under the existing regime.
However, there can be no expectation of reciprocity or expectations of fair dealing by the local Chinese authorities to foreigners whose governments negotiated the deal with Beijing.
Post “deal”, the regime in Beijing that have little interest, let alone power to enforce terms Beijing agreed to, and is happy to use the traditional tactics of bureaucratic delay, obfuscation, and use of formal dispute settlement mechanisms to stall as long as possible — while other pressing issues move up the agenda.
Demands on Beijing to honor deals can be frustrated in any number of ways, ranging from “the next strategic crisis”, to the facility with which Beijing can carry out “barbarian management” operations.
Chinese diplomats are competent at calculating the impact of their actions on particular constituencies; estimate their impact on particular legislators in Congress or Administration officials, as any lobbyists.
They have watched how their counterparts from Taiwan played Congress and the Executive Branch, and lobby State Governors and state houses over the decades, and have adopted the same tactics.
While there are extensive efforts to coordinate foreign policy between US and Allies, there is far less coordination in economic policy beyond macro issues (e.g. currency valuations, trade balances, etc.) toward China.
This opening is exploited by Chinese by salami slicing.
Slicing and dicing US and allied interests has been effective because the US and the closest allies do not speak with one voice.
There is no economic and trade equivalent to NATO, and in particularly no equivalent to Article 5 in dealing with Beijing when the regime target a particular OECD nation.
China routinely successfully mount retaliatory moves against key US allies. For example, punishing the UK by diverting business to EU for meeting with the Dailai Lama knowing that no EU member or the US backed UK on a minor issue by standing united. Or disrupting Japanese interests by singling them out for persecution.
Similarly, when US firms are targeted for a shakedown like Qualcomm for “anti-competitive” practices, there was no action of consequence from the Obama Administration beyond verbally raising the issue, let alone efforts to form a united front of western interests and tit-for-tat retaliation.
President Xi goal toward the Trump Administration is status quo ante.
Xi knows how to exploit the present system that makes US and allied foreign policy ineffective except for the biggest issues between Beijing and Washington such as preventing all-out Nuclear War, or enabling perfunctory access to the Chinese market for western interests.
In order to be effective in reform, President Trump will have to secure a consensus within OECD to develop a common policy toward the tactics routinely used by Beijing and be willing to use the leverage.
Beyond that, China must face immediate, measurable, quantifiable consequences for their behavior targeted at not just Beijing, but the local Chinese interests most concerned with the issue and most able to influence behavior.
This is not statecraft in the western sense. But it is statecraft nevertheless.
Danny Lam is an independent analyst based in Calgary.
Editor’s Note: Danny Lam is one of the VERY few foreigners who called the Trump election months before it happened.
Indeed, three weeks before the election, he sent a forecast to us with regard to the electorcal colleage vote for Trump, which was, it would turn out to be, exactly right.
