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2016-01-29 Recently, NATO released the 2015 annual report from the Secretary General.
It has been a busy year for NATO and the report highlights and summarizes many of those activities.
The executive summary to the report highlights developments during the year.
Safeguarding freedom and security has always been NATO’s aim.
As the security environment has evolved, NATO has adapted to ensure that it can deliver for the citizens it was created to defend.
The security environment in 2015 was one of complex challenges and unpredictable threats to the safety of citizens in the Euro-Atlantic area and around the world.
Violent extremism and instability in the Middle East and North Africa persisted, worsening the humanitarian crises in Syria and Iraq, and fuelling the largest flow of refugees in decades. Terrorists attacked in Ankara and Paris, Beirut and San Bernardino. They killed indiscriminately, bombing a plane of Russians on holiday in Egypt, shooting tourists in Tunisia and gunning down concert-goers and others out for an evening in France.
Through these acts, terrorists attempted to disrupt people’s everyday lives and fragment the rules-based societies and systems that are the foundation of stability and prosperity.
Russia continued to pursue a more assertive and unpredictable military posture in 2015. While persisting in illegally occupying parts of Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, and continuing to support separatists fighting in eastern Ukraine, Russia also began a military operation in Syria, not as part of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL but in support of the Assad regime.
The serious risks associated with ignoring or skirting agreed international rules and procedures were brought to light in 2015, when violations of Turkish airspace led to the downing of a Russian jet.
The hybrid nature of security challenges – combining military and non-military means of inflicting damage or creating instability – also continued to colour the security environment in 2015.
While the notion of hybrid warfare is not new, the scale, speed and intensity of the challenge demanded a new approach to preparing for, deterring, and defending against these threats.
While Russia’s actions have been unpredictable, NATO is committed to transparency and is working to update the mechanisms meant to ensure openness in relation to certain military activities and to restore predictability to the relationship with Russia.
At the same time, NATO is fully committed to the collective defence of all Allies and continues to bolster the readiness and responsiveness of its forces. Throughout 2015, NATO continued to implement the Readiness Action Plan that was agreed at the NATO Summit in Wales, providing assurance for Allies in the eastern part of the Alliance, supporting Turkey as it is faced with instability in the South, and adapting so that NATO is prepared for the challenges of today and tomorrow. These actions have contributed to the most significant reinforcement of NATO’s collective defence in decades.
NATO agreed a hybrid strategy to cope with the fast-moving challenges posed through a range of military and non-military means. The Alliance exercised its forces in a variety of scenarios throughout the year, including in its largest exercise in over a decade, which brought together more than 36,000 troops from over 30 countries.
In 2015, Allies invested in defense and security, developing and improving their capabilities, including ballistic missile defense, surveillance and reconnaissance, and cyber defense. Allies worked together and with partners on the operations and missions in which NATO is engaged, from training and advising in Afghanistan to maritime monitoring in the Mediterranean.
Terrorist attacks are meant to terrify, but NATO, along with the broader international community, has vowed to strengthen its resolve and continue to develop the ways and means of addressing the challenge. Every member of the Alliance is part of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, and NATO is working with its partners in the region to bolster their capacity to provide security and prevent further instability.
NATO deepened its cooperation with partners across a range of areas to build capacity, enhance interoperability and to generate a better understanding of and approach to a variety of shared challenges to security.
NATO provided essential training, assistance and support to Afghanistan through the Resolute Support Mission and agreed to sustain this presence and support during 2016. NATO also maintained its peace-support operation in Kosovo, contributing to the stability and security of the Western Balkans region.
The Alliance continued to stand by Ukraine in 2015, enhancing its support to Ukraine as it works to improve its governance and security structures, despite the ongoing conflict in the eastern part of the country.
In December, NATO invited Montenegro to start accession talks to join the Alliance, affirming the progress that country has made and demonstrating the Alliance’s commitment to its Open Door policy.
In order to pursue all three of the Alliance’s core tasks – collective Defence, crisis management and cooperative security – it is essential that NATO has not only the right policies, capabilities and relationships but that the structures supporting its work are fit for purpose.
To this end, NATO continued to adapt as an institution in 2015, implementing reforms to its civilian and military structures to ensure a modern, efficient, effective and accountable institution.
2016-01-28 The November 13th attacks on France reminded the world once again that the battle with ISIS and Islamic terrorism is at once a domestic and a foreign policy challenge.
As Murielle Delaporte wrote from Paris, shortly after the November 13th attacks:
A new reality is born from the bloodshed which occurred in the streets of Paris last Friday.
8 terrorists, 7 points of attacks, 30 minutes, close to 500 persons hit by Kalashnikovs or explosives, more than 2000 relatives mourning a loved one, 64 million people determined to win the war against barbarism.
The French are starting to put the dots between the war lead against Daesch by the Hollande government with the Chammal operation started a year ago and the growing domestic terrorist threat.
What makes the situation difficult to comprehend is the hybrid nature of the enemy: hybrid by the military means he uses, hybrid by its status.
As the French minister of the Interior Bernard Cazeneuve stressed in a televised interview, the enemy is a terrorist movement, but with the power of a state, since it can tap into the territory, the oil and banking reserves of the two countries it has started to take over.
The first debate therefore has been to answer the question: how do you fight a war against a non- state actor which has resources like a state?
Later in the year, she met with the well-known political analyst Michel Gurfinkiel and he gave us permission to republish his piece “No Surrender This Time,” which provides a clear insight into the challenges and the way ahead.
France has stepped its strikes against ISIS infrastructure in the Middle East, and has cracked down on internal threats simultaneously.
Some Mosques have been raided and shut down in part because lethal weaponry has been found in several of the raided mosques.
France has stepped up its role in air strikes in Iraq and Syria. Credit Photo: AP
The French government is operating under a clear assumption that free speech is protected, but that those who are preparing and inciting French citizens to kill their fellow citizens on religious grounds are not engaging in free speech.
One is reminded of the famous test which Justice Holmes suggested at the beginning of the 20th century concerning free speech.
The case in question involved a defendant’s speech in opposition to the draft during World War I and which Holmes felt was not protected free speech.
“The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”
Apparently, the Holland Administration agrees with Justice Holmes.
And the Hollande Administration is putting money into building up French domestic security capabilities as well after a period of decline generated by many factors, notably the budget deficit.
No Surrender this Time
France faces a future of ethnic civil war at worst, and periodic terrorist attacks and political tumult at minimum.
Yet its difficulties—both geopolitical and demographic—can be overcome with patience and determination.
The November 13 killing spree in Paris came as no surprise.
The Islamic State (ISIS) had threatened France explicitly and repeatedly for more than a year, and French government officials high and low issued warnings as well.
Most pointedly, Judge Marc Trevidic, who was in charge of antiterrorist investigations in France for ten years, disclosed in September that ISIS was planning “something big” against France.
He spoke of an “overbid logic” among competing jihadi groups:
“Each group is eager to strike further and in a heavier way than other groups. They all want to win the Pulitzer prize of terrorism–that is to say to do something as grand and as lethal as 9/11.”
Hence ISIS in Paris on November 13, and al-Qaeda in Bamako on November 20.
If the French were not surprised by the November 13 atrocities, they were nevertheless bewildered.
We thought we understood terrorism well, and we thought, especially after the January Charlie Hebdo attack, that we were mobilized and able in our own defense. We had activated a low-key state of emergency, Plan Vigipirate, following the 1995 bombings by Algerian Islamists in Paris, and maintained it constantly ever since.
After the Charlie Hebdo attack, Vigipirate was supplemented by another security program, Sentinelle.
However, November 13 was different: It was not merely terrorism, but war: not just in the sense that this enemy controls territory in the Middle East and is undertaking a state-building and governing process such as no previous terrorist enemy has ever done; but also in the sense that it trains military style units to operate among us, using complex and sophisticate plans, and ultimately to secure enclaves or bridgeheads on our soil.
Nonetheless, people here wonder why, if French officials knew so much and talked so much about the threat, they failed to neutralize it?
French security forces mobilized after the November attacks to prevent further attacks and to find the culprits. Credit: AP
And even deeper questions are still in the process of being formed and answered.
First, as has been widely remarked, to some extent the failure to prevent the attack came down to the failure of the state to keep up with the threat level.
Governments usually move much slower than non-state actors on the prowl. So the combination of the outflow of the Syrian civil war, the power vacuum in Libya, and the increasing pace of French engagement against terrorism (in Mali and in the Levant most prominently) combined to overwhelm the budgets of the security services. All true, but the problem goes beyond that.
The French people are slowly coming to appreciate that the state lacks the tools required for war, on either the domestic or the foreign front.
The deficit starts with numbers. According to Vincent Desportes, a former Army general who now teaches at Sciences Po in Paris and author of La Dernière Bataille de la France (France’s Last Battle), the French security apparatus has been overstretched since before the Syrian civil war.
Operational strength fell by 25 percent under the conservative Administration of Nicolas Sarkozy (2007–12), and by another 25 percent under the first three-and-a-half years of the socialist Hollande Administration.
These cuts together have shrunk the force from 200,000 combat-able personnel to just a bit more than 100,000 in a delayed French version of a “peace dividend”—but it has been a reduction in truth propelled more by recent anxieties about a growing national debt, a consequence of the very difficult math involved in reconciling a still-generous welfare state with a stultified economy.
On the other hand, France is still eager to be seen as a global military power, so much so that about a third of its remaining combat force—30,000 men and women—are dispatched to permanent or semi-permanent missions abroad, from the Sahel countries to the Middle East to Afghanistan.
A video purportedly released by the Islamic State in 2014 has reemerged online after the latest attacks on Paris.
To have nearly a third of the country’s active-duty military forces overseas in the absence of a major war is unprecedented, and it is both expensive and dangerous.
Beyond the armed forces proper, the French rely on the Gendarmerie, a semi-militarized police corps originally in charge of the rural areas but now active in urban areas as well, and the regular police, each over 100,000 strong in terms of operational personnel.
The operational defense and security apparatus as a whole can thus be estimated to be about 300,000 or so, which is barely enough, by any standard, for a population of 67 million (overseas territories included) in a state of multilateral war.
Security personnel, including army personnel, involved in the post-Charlie Hebdo Operation Sentinelle, the protection of places deemed “sensible” (sensitive, i.e. more likely to be attacked), have consistently complained of being overworked.
What about the much broader assignments they now face now under a heightened state of emergency?
True, the Hollande Administration decided in the wake of November 13 to reverse the previous trends and expand the security forces: some 8,000 troops are to be recruited to start with. Another project is the formation of a voluntary reserve force, already dubbed the National Guard.
Yet such things cannot be implemented overnight. New organizations must be adjusted to the larger defense and security structure, and of course all new personnel must be trained and equipped.
A second major difficulty arises from the ethnic and religious diversity of contemporary France, the discussion of which has taken on a different, and more frank, tone since November 13.
Whereas the November 13 terrorists in Paris were apparently Muslim French or Belgian citizens of North African descent, their victims were overwhelmingly ethnic French. Some media attempted to conceal these facts, if only by highlighting the presence at Bataclan and other places of some people of North African or African descent.
However, such intimations melted away before the fairer faces of the majority of victims and missing persons, seen across the web and on social networks. The unsettling sense that the terrorist attacks contained an element of minority-versus-majority genocidal intent has become very widespread, not so surprising really in what is, despite centuries of attempted transcendence, a country with a bloodline-based nationalism.
Also dawning is the uneasy realization that a war on terror might escalate into a kind of civil war between the ethnic French and the French Muslims, even if the security forces are thoroughly integrated and in fact list a high proportion members of the ethnic and religious minorities, including observant Muslims. Again, the numbers seem to matter.
Due to a combination of immigration and natural increase, the French Muslim community grew from about 5 percent of the total population of 60 million in 1997 to 9 percent of 67 million in 2014. Where in 1997 there were 3 million French Muslims there are now 6.5 million.
Moreover, some places—big cities as well are rural areas—now have Muslim majorities. And in younger cohorts, thanks to greater fertility or the inflow of immigrants, the proportion of Muslims is much higher than the national average: Fully a fifth of French citizens or residents under age 24 are Muslims.
Once one sees these demographic, geographical, and generational factors together, the likely consequences of an internecine conflict become clear.
For instance, in the département (county) of Seine Saint-Denis in the northern suburbs of Paris—of which Saint-Denis is the administrative center—around 30 percent of the population and about 50 percent of the youth are Muslim. Since war, including civil war, is fought by young persons (usually young men) in their late teens and early twenties, the Muslim/non-Muslim ratio there would not be 1 to 9, as the overall demographic data would suggest, but closer to 1 to 1.
Which raises a further question: How central is radical Islam to the lives of French Muslims, and, by implication, how “French” do they feel ? According to a comprehensive investigation published just one year ago by Fondapol (the French Foundation for Political Innovation), a political science think tank, French Muslims split into three group: “observants”, believers, and “French citizens of Muslim origin.”
A photograph of the theater hall reveals the bloody horror that unfolded when terrorists opened fire on a crowd of concertgoers at The Eagles of Death Metal rock concert on November 13. Credit: Daily Mail
The first group, which enforces strict religious practice among its members and is largely influenced by Wahhabism and other fundamentalist movements (more often than not, its mosques are funded by Saudi Arabia or Qatar), grew from 36 percent in 2001 to 42 percent in 2014.
It is much more likely than the two other groups to entertain negative views of non-Muslims.
The second group, whose members advocate a measure of compromise between traditional Islam and the French way of life, and entertains slightly less negative views against non-Muslims, fell from 42 percent in 2001 to 34 percent in 2014.
The third group, whose members clearly identify with French culture, human rights, and French democratic patriotism, and which tends to be more positive toward non-Muslims, including Jews, fell from 25 percent in 2007 to 21 percent in 2014. All in all, religious assertiveness is clearly growing among French Muslims and, in a political age, is bound to be politicized before long and at least to some extent.
These trends are leading to the increasing de facto segregation of Muslims from non-Muslims, a condition that Muslim communities increasingly seem to choose.
It is now frequently the case that neighborhoods with Muslim majorities are “no-go zones” where the even the police fear to tread. Christine Angot, a liberal-minded best-selling writer, participated this past summer in a television program at the working-class neighborhood in Chateauroux in central France, where she was brought up. She realized that the place had become such a Muslim “no-go zone.”
She described her experience in Le Monde on October 1:
When we arrived—all of us, the TV crew complete with their cameras and sound booms, and the writer who grew up there—we had to account for ourselves, to show our identity cards, to prove who we were, to state exactly where I had lived. . . .
And then, the director’s first name—David, his full name being David Teboul—supplied material for unsavory jokes. . . .
Some of the locals tried to intimidate us, saying that television was a cartel of the Jews. . . .
All this was uttered in a very menacing tone. . . .
We shot a few scenes under a running fire of jibes and jeering, and as we left we were told to pay our compliments to the Talmud. . . .
I swear we felt most uncomfortable.
The talk of a civil war may be somewhat paranoid, but the prediction that internal support for terrorism will grow has already been borne out by events.
Most observant and traditional Muslims are peaceful citizens, and understand well that Islam benefits from French-style democracy. They perceive a vested interest in keeping it functioning, but some still cannot help but entertain sympathies for radical groups outside of France.
According to an ICM Research poll released in 2014, 19 percent of French Muslims expressed “positive” or “very positive” views of the Islamic State. Among those under the age of 24, the figure was 27 percent. Evidently, this is the milieu that provides volunteers for ISIS training camps in Syria and Iraq.
Some experts think that the Islamic State’s ultimate goal in the current terror attacks actually is to arouse more suspicion and hostility among ethnic French about French Muslims, and as a consequence create a more polarized atmosphere that will drive more French Muslims to identify with ISIS—thus making the prospect of a ghastly civil war more likely.
The jihadi calculation, according to this thesis, is that France will not risk such an outcome and will instead surrender, by withdrawing its forces from Africa and the Middle East.
It could be, but France’s resilience may be stronger than its enemies think.
This is the photo which appears with the version of the article published on The American Interest and is credited to them.
The French are learning anew the importance of national sovereignty, identity, defense, and solidarity, and even the value of their Christian heritage as well. This may translate into a political upheaval: the rise of either the classic Right or the National Front, or of a new brand of liberal or leftwing patriotism.
Either way, the upheaval could translate into a simultaneous cultural revolution that could include the abandonment of multiculturalism, the return of Christian pride (Catholic churches are now packed on Sundays), and the rehabilitation of family values.
The very notion of surrender or appeasement of militant Islam is becoming so repugnant that the French are increasingly willing to bear very high costs to avoid it.
In recent years Jews have been a main target of jihadi violence in France, from the Jewish school massacre in Toulouse in 2012 to the HyperCasher massacre in 2015. It goes on: Four days after the November 13 attacks, a Jewish teacher was stabbed in Marseilles by three men wearing pro-ISIS t-shirts. u
While the government and the political class constantly expressed their concern, and the police have provided large-scale protection to synagogues and other Jewish public places under the Vigipirate and Sentinelle programs, many Jews wondered whether parts of the public are not in fact indifferent, ready to wave away Muslim anti-Semitism and terrorism, even in France, as an outcome of an alleged Israeli unwillingness to come to terms with the Palestinians.
The new patriotic mood that has been emerging since November 13 seems to have muted this “argument.” Since everybody feels threatened now and everybody demands protection, there is much greater understanding and sympathy for the special case of the Jews. Israel is no longer described in the media as a country engaged in a colonial war of sorts against the Palestinians, but rather as a victim, along with France, of jihadi terrorism—and even sometimes as a positive example of successful antiterrorist mobilization.
For all that, the long-term consequences may not be positive for Jews, and French-Jewish emigration, either to Israel or North America, will likely not subside. One reason is that greater ethnic and religious polarization means less toleration of all third parties.
Jews are seen as enemies, just as Christians are so seen, by radical Muslims—and the fact that Jews and Muslims have a lot in common religiously is irrelevant. Jules Renard, an early 20th-century writer, noted how difficult it was to teach cats to chase mice but leave canaries alone: “A subtle point, and even the smartest cats do not quite get it.” Alas, radical Muslims are rarely well educated in their own traditions; they are far from being the smartest cats.
The geopolitical consequences of November 13 might be problematic as well.
There is a near-consensus in France that ISIS must be punished and destroyed. There is also a temptation, due to the present eclipse of American power and influence in the Middle East, to enter into a broad anti-ISIS coalition with Russia, Iran, the Assad regime in Syria, and Hizballah in Lebanon.
This would be disastrous. Russia is everything but a reliable geopolitical partner for Western countries, and seems to be more interested in asserting itself or strengthening its vassals than in fighting the Islamic State.
As for Iran, the Assad regime, and Hizballah, they have been heavily involved for decades in religious and political radicalism and terrorism, not just in the Middle East, but in Western countries as well, from France to Argentina.
The French Parliament, November 17, 2015. Credit: Murielle Delaporte
As for Israel and Judaism, Russia’s present stand is outwardly not negative, but the three other partners in the Russian-led coalition are rabid enemies of the Jewish State and among the contemporary world’s main purveyors of anti-Semitism. To throw France’s lot in with such allies may be no improvement on surrendering to the jihadists.
France’s ideal allies in the fight against the Islamic State are the United States, because it is powerful and tends to see the problem in more or less the same way, and Turkey, because it is close by, locally potent, and has recently been savaged by ISIS attacks itself.
Alas, both the present American Administration and the present Turkish government have been wavering in their strategic priorities and neglecting their obvious national interests.
Moreover, the Russian-Iranian-Alawi axis complicates and deters the formation of an effective coalition more than it helps it. The complications could be overcome were strong U.S. leadership brought to bear, but that leadership apparently will not be forthcoming until at least January 2017.
The time between now and then will be difficult. France must therefore be patient as well as resolved.
Michel Gurfinkiel, a French journalist and public intellectual, served as editor-in-chief of Valeurs Actuelles from 1985 to 2006, and authored several books on geopolitics, international relations and culture. He is the Founder and President of the Jean-Jacques Rousseau Institute, a conservative think thank, and a Shillman/Ginsburg Fellow at Middle East Forum.
For a look at the intersection of domestic and foreign policies in shaping an approach to Islam within France and in the region, see the following article published in 1997 on France and Islam.
The article provides a look at the evolving French perspective long before 9/11 or the Gulf Wars.
During his three day visit to India, French President François Hollande had the honor of attending India’s Republic Day parade.
The military sent a contingent to participate in the parade and this was the first time a foreign military contingent has done so.
The French delegation engaged in wide-ranging discussions with the host country’s political and economic leaders during the visit which began January 24, 2016.
The two governments signed more than a dozen agreements on energy, economics, and counterterrorism.
Their joint statement spoke of their common values, French support for India’s entry into various nuclear export control bodies, and other cooperation.
Indians consider France a very reliable ally that stood by New Delhi against Pakistan even after its nuclear weapons tests and alignment with Moscow.[i]
The two militaries conduct frequent joint drills—most recently their 2014 Garuda air and 2015 Varuna naval exercises–and collaborate on regional security issues such as countering terrorism and maintaining security in the Indian Ocean region.[ii]
The French Navy agreed to participate in next month’s International Fleet Review at Visakhapatnam.
Hollande and Modi also extended the original ten-year bilateral Agreement on Defence Cooperation another decade.[iii]
However, the centerpiece of the trip was Hollande’s efforts to finalize the Indian purchase of the 36 made Dassault Rafale multi-role fighter planes that Modi agreed to purchase when he visited Paris last April.
The visit was seen by both sides as a means to accelerate progress on the issue despite bureaucratic delays.
The Indian air force desperately must renew its fleet since it is well below its authorized strength and faces a massive Chinese air force as well as a growing Pakistani fleet.
Its planned co-development of a 5th-generation stealth fighter with Russia remains well behind schedule.
The twin-engine Rafale can perform several roles well, including air defense, reconnaissance, electronic jamming, ground support, and deep strike missions.[iv]
The French Air Force and Navy have more than a decade of operational experience with the fighter and have clearly demonstrated its performance for the missions which India envisages for the plane.
In previous years, the Indian government had been conducting an extensive tender to purchase 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA). This tender, dubbed the combat aviation “deal of the century,” was supposed to have been one of the most lucrative aviation contracts in history.
In January 2012, the Indian government announced that Dassault Rafale had won the competition, but the negotiations to finalize the sale dragged on for years due to disputes over price, technology transfer, and other issues.[v]
Last year, the French and Indian governments decided to launch direct government-to-government talks to break the commercial logjam between Dassault and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL), which was to produce a growing share of the plane in India after an initial delivery of 18 planes.[vi]
Modi decided to purchase three dozen planes (for two 18-plane squadrons) “in flyaway condition”—as India did with the Mirage 2000 in the 1980s, which Dassault and Thales are upgrading under another contract–rather than await the transfer of assembly and production facilities to India.
Chandigarh: Prime Minister Narendra Modi with French President Francois Hollande at Government Museum & Art Gallery in Chandigarh on January 24. PTI Photo by Manvender Vashist
According to media reports, this week Modi and Holland signed a memorandum of understanding on the inter-governmental agreement on the technical aspects of the deal that will provide a modified version of the aircraft with indigenous systems and technology.
The French President said that the intergovernmental MOU represented “a decisive step,” and that the remaining financial issues “will be sorted out in a couple of days.”[vii]
But the weight of the Indian defense bureaucracy and political imperatives cannot be so easily overcome.
They both are pressing the Modi government to lower the planned purchase price of the planes – which cost more than the planes India has bought from Russia [viii]– and keep a hefty offset requirement to promote the national defense industry as part of Modi’s popular “make in India” program.
According to the terms, Dassault and its partners like Safran and Thales will share technology with India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation and Indian private companies.[ix]
However, Indian firms do not have the capabilities to produce many critical defense items at home, while the offset policy has proved ineffective at remedying this deficiency due to the limited absorption capacity of the Indian defense industry.[x]
The Indian government could better achieve its goal of reducing the costs of the planes if it were to lower these offset requirements and shape a more effective way forward.
Dassault issued a statement that it “supports the French authorities in finalising a full accord within four weeks,” but it could well take much longer to finalize the accord.[xi]
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Another unresolved issue is whether Dassault Aviation could accelerate the delivery of the planes, which are all supposed to be supplied within seven years of signing the deal.[xii]
The company has already committed to sell many planes this year to other foreign customers as well as the French military.[xiii]
The total number of planes India will buy also remains undecided; there has been speculation that India wants to order another 18 planes soon but there is no sign of this issue being discussed during Holland’s visit.[xiv]
Dassault is expected to try to leverage the deal to induce the Indian Navy to buy its planes rather than more MiG-29K for its future aircraft carriers.[xv]
India needs to be able to match a PLA Navy that is aiming to deploy its own carriers in the Indian Ocean
Further French sales are possible since India has become the largest arms importer in the world and the government has launched a $150 billion defense modernization program.[xvi]
The photos in the slideshow above show the French Air Force Rafales participating in the Trilateral Exercise at Langley AFB in December 2015. Credit Photos: USAF
2016-01-26 The Indians have developed and are building their own fighter aircraft in the form of the Tejas aircraft.
According to the Indian Aeronautical Development Agency:
India’s Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) together with its variants, is the smallest and lightest Multi-Role Supersonic Fighter Aircraft of its class.
This single engine, Compound-Delta-Wing, Tailless Aircraft is designed and developed by ADA with HAL as the principal partner along with DRDO, CSIR, BEL, DGAQA, IAF & IN to meet diverse needs of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and Indian Navy (IN).
The Indians have brought their aircraft to the Bahrain Air Show where it has flown outside of Indian air space for the first time.
According to an article in The Indian Express updated on January 22, 2016:
In a first, the government has decided to field indigenously developed combat aircraft Tejas for the fourth edition of Bahrain International Air Show (BIAS).
To be held from January 21-23, BIAS will also see participation of Pakistan’s JF-17 fighter produced with Chinese help. India will also send IAF Sarang helicopter display team that flies indigenous Dhruv helicopters and DRDO’s airborne early warning and control platform.
Defence ministry sources said the decision to send two Tejas aircraft to BIAS was “taken at the political level”.
“We were told to work on sending the Tejas,” an official said.
The team is to leave Bangalore on January 5 and halt at Jamnagar, followed by a stopover at Muscat for refuelling before arriving at Bahrain’s Sakhir Airbase.
The decision to field Tejas is being seen as a bold move as its performance would be analysed by aerospace professionals from across the world. Pakistan’s move to send JF-17 is likely to lead to a comparison between the two.
“We don’t want a scenario where Tejas is pitched against the JF-17. They are two different aircraft at different stages of development and cannot be compared,” a Tejas test pilot said. JF-17 Thunder was co-produced by Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, Kamra and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation.
It has been flown by Pakistan Air Force since 2010. Tejas has not been inducted into IAF so far. It has been developed by Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) with HAL and DRDO. After receiving Initial Operational Clearance in December 2013, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar handed over the aircraft to IAF last year.
ADA is hoping for a Final Operational Clearance (FOC) this year, which will lead to Tejas being operationalised in IAF. ADA sources said LSP-3 and LSP-4 of Tejas have been prepared for BIAS, one for flying duties and the other for static display. But test pilots flying Tejas are apprehensive.
“We have problems with the undercarriage. A short-term solution has been found for this trip but it’s not a permanent answer,” a test pilot said…..
The Economic Times set the stage for the air show appearance in an article published on January 1, 2016.
Besides the fighter and naval version of Tejas, India will also showcase state-of-the-art airborne platforms and associated sensors and communication systems designed and developed by DRDO.
During the Bahrain International Airshow, being held at Sakhir Airbase, Bahrain from January 21-23, DRDO along with some of its production partners is displaying India’s strength in advanced defence technology areas, with the aim of exploring the potential of exporting these advanced systems to friendly countries in the region, an official statement said.
The show will witness flying demonstration of the ‘Tejas’, the ‘Four plus’ generation and highly cost effective fighter aircraft, it added.
The Indian Air Force plans to acquire 120 Tejas aircraft, with 100 of them having major modifications to its strike, radar, and mid air refuelling capabilities.
Though the DRDO has developed a naval version of the Tejas, the Navy is seeking a much stronger engine beside ..
And finally, in an article by Craig Hoyle of Flight Global published on January 25, 2016, the way ahead for the aircraft is discussed.
“The LCA has been [made ready for production], and this year we will see an additional number of aircraft entering into [Indian air force] service,” says HAL chief executive R Kaveri Renganathan. “We are currently ramping up production – any export order, we would be ready to dovetail,” he adds.
Production of the Tejas will rise to seven units this year and eight in 2017, before doubling to 16 the following year.
The latter advance will be made by building the Mk1A version of the fighter, which introduces numerous production and system enhancements over an initial batch of 20 jets. India plans to acquire 100 examples in the improved standard.
Also speaking at the show, Aeronautical Development Agency programme director C D Balaji notes more than 3,000 flights have been made by Tejas aircraft, and the air force has received its first production example.
“It is a parallel process between test and evaluation and production,” he says, while adding: “there is a significant amount of maturity.”
The engines for the Indian aircraft are being built by General Electric.
The latest engines for these aircraft will be the F-414 engine.
In an article published last year, Jane’s Defence Weekly discussed the new engines for the aircraft.
India’s Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) will receive the first of eight General Electric F414-GE-INS6 engines for the Mk 2 version of its Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) by the end of 2015, officials said.
The F414 engine, which generates 90-98 kN thrust, will replace the LCA Mk 1’s General Electric F404-GE-IN20 powerpack, which generates 80-85kN thrust.
The Indian Air Force (IAF), which has 40 single-engine LCA Mk 1s on order from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), maintains that the F404 engine constricts the fighter’s manoeuvrability, angle of attack, and weapons load.
The F414 engine was designed for the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, but has become the engine of choice for growth versions of the Swedish JAS 39 Gripen, and the Tejas.
Selected over the Eurojet EJ200 engine in 2010-11, it will eventually also power the navy’s LCA when it enters service in several years, programme director Commodore C D Balaji (retd) told IHS Jane’s on 8 July.
Until then the F404 engine will power LCA (N) prototypes and limited series production (LSP) platforms, he said.
In the video below, after the F-22 flight concludes, the Tejas takes to the air at the Bahrain Air Show, 2016.
2016-01-23 When the US Navy declared IOC on the Rolling Air Frame Missile Block 2 in 2014, you would barely know of its origins.
The Navy declared initial operational capability (IOC) on Raytheon’s Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Block 2, which brings greater accuracy and maneuverability to the self-defense system, the company announced.
Block 2 has an increased range due to a four-axis independent control actuator system and an increase in rocket motor capability, according to a June 1 statement. Its improved passive radio frequency seeker and upgrades to some components of the infrared seeker, along with advanced kinematics, help the newest block go after more complex maneuvering targets.
“RAM Block 2 provides the accuracy and lethality our sailors need to combat growing regional threats,” Capt. Craig Bowden, the Navy’s major program manager for Rolling Airframe Missile at the Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems, said in the statement. “IOC signals that the U.S. Navy is pacing the threat and ensuring the safety and security of our sailors and ships so they can operate wherever required.”
RAM Block 2, a cooperation between the United States and Germany, was designed to protect against the newest generation of anti-ship cruise missiles. It also defends against helicopter and airborne threats and hostile surface craft, and its dual-mode guidance design allows it to engage multiple threats simultaneously.
“RAM has been protecting naval ships for three decades, and the enhanced Block 2 variant enables vital defense of our warfighters far into the future,” said Rick Nelson, vice president of Naval Area and Mission Defense for Raytheon Missile Systems. “The U.S. Navy’s declaration of IOC is an important accomplishment that shows RAM Block 2 is ideally suited to protect against the full range of threats on a variety of platforms.”
Block 2 delivered to the Navy in July 2014 and has since undergone testing. In one test event, the system went two for two against a supersonic maneuvering raid, which Raytheon says is the first time a ship-based firing system has accomplished that.
Originally, the Rolling Air Frame Missile was a General Dynamics and then Hughes NATO program based on U.S. and German collaboration.
The RIM-116 was developed by General Dynamics Pomona and Valley Systems divisions under a July 1976 agreement with Denmark and West Germany(the General Dynamics missile business was later acquired by Hughes Aircraft and is today part of Raytheon).
Denmark dropped out of the program, but theUSN joined in as the major partner.
The Mk 49 launcher was evaluated on board the destroyer USS David R. Ray in the late 1980s.
The first 30 missiles were built in FY85 and they became operational on 14 November 1992, on board USS Peleliu.
Raytheon acquired Hughes in part because Hughes was much more involved in international efforts, than was Raytheon at the time.
The Rolling Airframe Missile Program Office (RAMPO) in Arlington, Virginia, has been operated as a common US German Office for more than 30 years now.
IT is led by a U.S.Navy Captain WHO is the Program Manager together with his German deputy. he German deputy closely cooperates with the national Project Manager in Germany and acts as German authorized representative for the RAM weapon system in the USA.
RAMPO is in charge of all activities related to the development, production and procurement of the guided Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) weapon system.
In the video above and the in the slideshow above, the amphibious transport dock ship USS New Orleans (LPD-18) fires RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missiles (RAM) from a launcher while off the coast of the Southern California during a live fire exercise.
New Orleans, part of the Boxer Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), is currently underway conducting routine training exercises and maintenance in preparation for its upcoming deployment.
2016-01-22 The Russians and the French started to use cruise missiles against ISIS fixed targets starting in December.
For the Russians, President Putin announced in December 2015, that Kalibr cruise missiles had been fired by the submered Rostov-on-Don submarine from the Mediterranean for the first time.
He said TU-22 bombers also took part in the latest raids and that “significant damage” had been done to a munitions depot, a factory manufacturing mortar rounds and oil facilities. Two major targets in Raqqa, the defacto capital of Isis, had been hit, said Mr Shoigu.
He said: “With regard to strikes from a submarine. We certainly need to analyse everything that is happening on the battlefield, how the weapons work. Both the [Kalibr] missiles and the Kh-101 rockets are generally showing very good results. We now see that these are new, modern and highly effective high-precision weapons that can be equipped either with conventional or special nuclear warheads.”
For the French, SCALP missiles or Storm Shadow, as they are known by the British, began to be used in December as well.
The French Air Force fired 12 Scalp cruise missiles during two recent airstrikes, a spokesman for the service said.
The first use of the long-range weapon was Dec. 15, a first since France launched the Chammal mission in September 2014 and the first since the Libyan air campaign in 2011. A second firing of Scalp came on Jan. 2.
France fired 15 Scalp missiles in the Libyan operation, with French media then reporting high unit cost of the weapons and a request for a more selective and restrained use.
With a recent government decision to reduce the stock of Scalp missiles to 100 units to lower costs, the service may have had reason to fire the weapons rather than reduce the inventory, an industry executive said.
France ordered 500 Scalp missiles, 450 for the Air Force and 50 for the Navy, with the latter flying the Rafale from the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier.
The initial French strike in December targeted Daesh headquarters, training center and a logistics depot, including some hardened buildings, in the region of al-Qaim, near the border separating Iraq from Syria.
Storm Shadow / SCALP is the air-launched long range, conventionally armed, deep strike weapon, designed to meet the demanding requirements of pre-planned attacks against high value fixed or stationary targets.
Able to be operated in extreme conditions, the weapon offers operators a highly flexible, deep-strike capability based around a sophisticated mission planning system.
After launch, the Storm Shadow / SCALP missile descends to a low cruising altitude powered by a turbojet engine.
Rafale armed with SCALP missile for mission. Credit: French Ministry of Defense
Guidance is based around a robust triple navigation system that uses Inertial Navigation, GPS (Global Positioning System) and Terrain Reference Navigatation, ensuring that the route selected by the mission planners can be achieved over land and water, even in the most severe counter measures environments.
This three-level system provides the weapon with a high degree of navigational precision. The missile is equipped with an imaging infrared seeker that is activated during the final target approach phase.
Automatic target recognition algorithms then compare the real scene with the target impact point designated during the mission planning phase, in order to hit the target exactly where required. Alternatively an Attack On Co-ordinate capability is available for more time constrained missions.
2016-01-19 By Robbin Laird, Ed Timperlake, and Murielle Delaporte
The U.S. Navy’s Military Sealift Command operates the logistical foundation for the U.S. sea services and provides key support to allies as well.
The fleet is being modernized but is facing the challenge of supporting the evolving concepts of operations of the US fleet as it moves toward distributed operations worldwide.
Greater distances mean more distributed logistical support; put in simply terms, more ships operating over greater distances.
And ships will need the speed to keep pace with strike forces operating not only in a distributed manner but also able to move to be more survivable against adversaries seeking to contain the U.S. combat fleet.
Another shift in naval capabilities has enhanced demand as well for the tankers. The continuous operation of missile defense ships in the Mediterranean requires significant and continuous tanker support, two tankers to be exact.
Civil service mariners operate MSC’s ships, and the overall decline of the US merchant marine and the imminent retirement of the post-war generation of civil service mariners poses a significant challenge as well.
The tanker is a key element of the fleet; with MSC operating largely single-hull tankers in a fleet of 15 tankers.
Single-hull tankers pose a challenge because, for environmental reasons, ports worldwide only want to host double-hull tankers.
According to the 2014 annual report for Military Sealift Command:
In FY 2014, MSC operated 15 fleet replenishment oilers. Seven Atlantic Ocean-based ships conducted operations in support of Commander, Task Force 20 , U.S. 4th Fleet, and in the Mediterranean Sea and Arabian Gulf. Eight Pacific Ocean-based ships supported surface units throughout the U.S. 3rd, 5th and 7th fleets and participated in several large naval exercises.
MSC fleet replenishment oilers provided a variety of fuels for ship propulsion, aircraft operations and power generation. Three of the newest fleet oilers are retrofitted with double hulls designed to meet Oil Protection Act of 1990 requirements: USNS Patuxent, USNS Laramie and USNS Rappahannock.
And the following graphic shows the disposition and volume of fuel delivered by the MSC fleet in 2014:
During a recent visit to Norfolk, Virginia to Military Sealift Command, we had a chance to visit the fleet replenishment oiler USNS Kanawha (T-AO 196) and talk with its skipper, a veteran of the sea and of many operations.
Master Mariner Jim Dolan has been in the service for 35 years with MSC by May 2016, the last 15 aboard tankers and notes that after retirement he will probably move to the mountains!
He has been a Master Mariner for around 25 years.
Question: How would you describe the evolving challenge for the tankers?
Dolan: The operational capabilities of the ship are stretched because there are only 15 oilers and we are spread out operating in the different AORs.
It’s a challenge to meet all the commitments.
And we are adding new hulls such as the Joint High Speed Vessel, which require different procedures from standard USN hulls. There is a learning curve with regard to this ship and some the other new hulls. These ships require specialized training by the crews to operate and to in turn be replenished.
Question: What is the basic capability for your ship to tank?
Dolan: We can tank around 180,000 barrels of oil; and the double-hull ships around 30,000 less.
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Question: It is not often realized outside of the Navy that the capital ships are looking to not go below 50% fuel. Can you talk about that?
Dolan: You are right. When the captains reach around 50% they are looking for the closest tanker. This is a challenge with the dispersed fleet staying on station but spread out.
Master Mariner Jim Dolan
Question: You just came back from the Mediterranean?
Dolan: We did.
We were the duty ship from August until recently.
From August until the beginning of December, we didn’t have more in a couple days in port other than on the weekends to go in and load, resupply and go back out.
Question: What seas have you operated in during your time at MSC?
Dolan: Pretty much all of them. I operated in the Arctic with the salvage ships and a tanker many other places. When we did the counter-piracy work involving Somalia we were running from Djibouti down to Mogadishu.
Question: How important are the NATO standards and facilities to your missions?
Dolan: They are important.
During the past decade, we’re always going into a NATO fuel terminal.
We do quite a bit of with the NATO.
We’d go to an exercise called Joint Warrior.
There are two of them every year up in Scotland and all the different NATO countries can interface together as a cohesive battle group.
Recently, we supported Canadian ships who no longer have a tanker to support the Canadian fleet.
Question: How do you do the resupply?
Dolan: If it is several ships, say 8-9, we do them in order over a 100-mile stretch of sea.
We do them one after the other.
Master Mariner Jim Dolan
Question: MSC is operated by commercial mariners; are you seeing problems with regard to the supply side in terms of the pool of qualified mariners?
Dolan: We are.
As the American commercial fleet declines, there’s going to be a shortage in the pool of skilled mariners.
No doubt about it.
And we’re starting to see that in MSC.
And my peer group, of 35 years of experience, is retiring, so you will see new Captains onboard the fleet.
Good captains but without our experience.
You can not put a price on experience.
Comment: There is a lot more focus of attention on what the sea services can do at the point of attack, than how they get there or how they are sustained. It is a challenge to get funding support to the logistics side of the business.
Dolan: Logistics is not a romantic item for navy planners.
And when it comes time to actually fund replacement logistics ships, the price of building these ships has gone up as well.
As the SLD team finished its day with MSC, it is clear that the shift to greater reliance on distributed operations and lethality provided by a widely distributed fleet will drive up demand on an already stretched MSC fleet.
And there is a clear need to fund fully the new class of Supply-class fast combat support ships.
The new T-AOE class has the speed to keep up with the carrier strike groups. She rapidly replenishes Naval task forces. She receives petroleum products, ammunition and stores from shuttle ships and redistributes these items simultaneously to carrier strike group ships.
This reduces the vulnerability of serviced ships by reducing alongside time.
There really is no alternative but to fund the logistics fleet more substantially, and to aid the civilian marine industry to generate the requisite pool of civilian mariner talent.
Without the logistics base necessary for globally distributed operations, it will be necessary simply to cut back the tasks and operational reach of the sea services.
The expenditure on the land wars has clearly challenged the future of the sea services, notably with regard to its logistical support structure.
Editors note: Unlike civilian “Super Tankers” that go 16 knots, Navy tankers can make 20 kts to more quickly service a wildly distributed fleet.
This enables global reach in an extended ocean battlespace.
The following story also highlights the various roles of a tanker on station.
U.S. 5th Fleet Public Affairs
MANAMA, Bahrain – French Ship Dupleix (D 641) and USNS Kanawha (T AO 196) responded to a distress call from a North Korean-flagged merchant vessel at approximately 6:26 pm local time in the Arabian Sea June 25.
The vessel reported that it was anchored with a weak mooring line, disabled diesel engine, no food or water, and was in danger of sinking. The sea conditions were unstable, with waves eight to 12 feet high.
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Unable to locate nearby assistance, Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 directed a rendezvous with the distressed vessel to take its crew of 13 Indians, two Burmese and one Sri Lankan on board.
The vessel reported it was unable to evacuate its crew with its own lifeboats, prompting Dupleix and Kanawha to use their rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIB).
At approximately 9:35 pm, Dupleix and Kanawha launched RHIBs and evacuated all 16 crew members safely. The crew members were transferred to authorities in Salalah, Oman.
“Considering the weather conditions in the area, Kanawha and Dupleix undertook a tough nighttime rescue operation, which tested the limits of the RHIB,” said Rene-Jean Crignola, Dupleix commanding officer. “The prompt assistance of Kanawha successfully allowed us to expedite the rescue and get all crew members transferred safely within 50 minutes.”
CTF 150, commanded by French Rear Adm. Alain Hinden, is responsible for maritime operations in the Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the North Arabian Sea and parts of the Indian Ocean.
And in a recent exercise in the Pacific, a commercial tanker refueled an MSC tanker.
In an article published October 28, 2015, the event was described.
In a rare occurrence, a Maersk tanker refueled a Military Sealift Command oiler while at sea during an exercise in international waters off the coast of Japan earlier this month, the U.S. Navy said Wednesday.
The exercise marks just the second time in the last 15 years that a U.S. Navy tanker conducted fueling operations with a commercial vessel at sea.
The operation, part of a four-day training event, took place off Sasebo, Japan on October 22nd and involved the USNS Tippecanoe (T-AOP-99) and the U.S.-flagged tanker Maersk Peary, which has been contracted to MSC.
“Typically MSC oilers like Tippecanoe are required to dock pier-side at one of the Navy’s Defense Fuel Support Points,” said Navy Captain Philippe Grandjean, assistant chief of staff for logistics for the COMLOG WESTPAC. “The capability exercised during this training evolution pushes the Navy’s ability to refuel at-sea via commercial tankers and furthers the vision of a distributed, agile logistics concept.”
The Navy explains that under certain circumstances, it wants to ensure that it has the flexibility to provide the best assets as possible – even if that means turning to commercial sector for fuel. After all the U.S. 7th fleet, which operates in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, covers an area of 48 million square miles – that’s almost 13 times the size of the continental United States.
“Our replenishment oiler crews must be proficient in receiving fuel from commercial tankers in case, for some reason – a natural disaster for example – a vital asset cannot make it into port to refuel,” explained Cmdr. Michael Wilson, deputy assistant chief of staff for logistics for COMLOG WESTPAC. “These operations provide MSC with flexibility in providing operational support to the 7th Fleet in any situation.”
Maersk Peary is under a long-term charter to MSC and is one of four MSC charters that have been specially outfitted to conduct consolidated cargo capability operations, including refueling, with fleet replenishment oilers.
Capt. Wilson added the end goal is to see this sort of training taking place throughout the fleet and on as many tankers as possible.
The process of replacing single hull with double hull tankers was begun in 2010 and the first ships of the new class are described in an article published in November 2010.
Military Sealift Command is reconfiguring the fleet of tankers it operates to meet fuel requirements in support of U.S. forces worldwide. This seagoing force of government-owned and U.S.-flagged chartered ships acquired a new chartered ship, MT Empire State, Oct. 7, after two government-owned ships completed their service to the command Oct. 1.
The newly built, U.S.-flagged Empire State is under charter to MSC for up to five years and will operate worldwide carrying refined petroleum products for DOD, primarily between commercial refineries and DOD storage and distribution facilities. Empire State is owned and operated by a private shipping company under contract to MSC.
Built at General Dynamics, NASSCO, in San Diego, the double-hulled Empire State is 600 feet long and has a cargo-carrying capacity of approximately 331,000 barrels. The ship’s construction was completed in July 2010, at which time Empire State went to work for MSC under a short-term contract.
A second State-class tanker is under construction at NASSCO and is expected to come under charter to MSC in early 2011.
Two of MSC’s four government-owned tankers transferred out of service Oct. 1. USNS Paul Buck and USNS Samuel L. Cobb began their service to MSC in the mid-1980s, along with three other new-construction T-5 tankers that came under long-term charter to the command in 1985 and 1986. In 2003, MSC purchased four of those ships – Buck, Cobb, USNS Lawrence H. Gianella and USNS Richard G. Matthiesen. Since then, these ships have served as the core of MSC’s tanker fleet along with an MSC-chartered shallow-draft tanker.
“Our T-5 tankers have served us well for the past 25 years, and as they approach the end of their service lives, the State-class ships will allow us to continue to fulfill our requirements to transport fuel for the Defense Logistics Agency – Energy,” said John Joerger, MSC’s tanker project officer. DLA Energy procures and manages fuel for all of DOD.
Upon deactivation from MSC service, Cobb and Buck transferred to the Maritime Administration’s National Defense Reserve Fleet, which comprises about 30 dry cargo ships and tankers kept in reserve for possible activation and use in support of national defense and national emergencies.
Gianella transferred to MSC’s Maritime Prepositioning Force in 2009, and Matthiesen will remain in service to MSC until early 2011, when the ship will join Cobb and Buck in the NDRF.
In fiscal year 2010, MSC carried 1.5 billion gallons of petroleum products in support of DOD operations worldwide, including delivering fuel to combat forces operating in Iraq to replenishing McMurdo Station, Antarctica, and Thule Air Force Base in Pituffik, Greenland.
The first slideshow consists of photos shot during the day of the visit and are credited to Second Line of Defense.
The second slideshow provides photos of the USNS Kanawha on deployment.
In the first photo, USNS Kanawha extends fuel lines to USS Kearsarge during a replenishment at sea. Kearsarge is the command ship of Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group, supporting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of responsibility.
In the second photo, USS Kearsarge, left, and USS Ponce, right, are alongside USNS Kanawha during a replenishment at sea. Kearsarge is the command ship of Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group, supporting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of responsibility.
In the third photo, U.S. sailors aboard the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) man a fueling station during a replenishment at sea with the fleet replenishment oiler USNS Kanawha (T-AO 196), not pictured, in the Atlantic Ocean on Jan. 26, 2013. The Harry S. Truman was underway in the U.S. 2nd Fleet area of responsibility participating in a composite training unit exercise in preparation for a scheduled deployment.
In the fourth photo, the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) approaches Military Sealift Command fleet replenishment oiler USNS Kanawha (T-AO 196) in preparation for a replenishment at sea. Dwight D. Eisenhower is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility conducting maritime security operations, theater security cooperation efforts and support missions as part of Operation Enduring Freedom.
In the fifth photo, a U.S. Navy SH-60F Seahawk helicopter assigned to Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron (HS) 11 retrieves cargo from the fleet replenishment oiler USNS Kanawha (T-AO 196) during a replenishment at sea with the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71), not pictured, in the Atlantic Ocean Jan. 30, 2014.
In the sixth photo, fleet replenishment oiler USNS Kanawha (T-AO 196) steams in the Atlantic Ocean during rough seas as the multipurpose amphibious assault ship USS Bataan (LHD 5) prepares to pull along side to conduct a replenishment-at-sea Feb. 11. The Bataan Amphibious Readiness Group is deployed supporting maritime security operations, providing crisis response capability, increasing theater security cooperation and a forward naval presence in the U.S. Navy’s 5th and 6th Fleet Area of Responsibility.
In the seventh photo, as the guided missile destroyer USS Cole (DDG-67) refuels with the underway replenishment ship USNS Kanawha (T-AO-196) on its starboard side, the guided missile destroyer USS Mahan (DDG-72) refuels with the Kanawha on its port side in the Atlantic Ocean, Feb. 17, 2014. The bridge watch standers, refueling team, and the line handlers are ready to commence their refueling.
In the final photo, (July 19, 2012) The fleet replenishment oiler USNS Kanawha (T-AO 196) transfers fuel to the amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) during a replenishment-at-sea (RAS).
Credit Photos: US Navy
The third slideshow shows the USS Ross being refueled at sea by the USNS Leroy GrummanSailors aboard USS Ross (DDG 71) conduct a replenishment at sea with the Military Sealift Command fleet replenishment oiler USNS Leroy Grumman (T-AO 195) in the Mediterranean Sea Jan. 5, 2016.
Ross, an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, forward deployed to Rota, Spain, is conducting a routine patrol in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations in support of U.S. national security interests in Europe..
This is the second of three pieces on the Military Sealift Command based on our visit to Norfolk on December 14, 2015.
A Very Capable Multi-Mission Support Ship in the MSC Fleet: Demand Drives Operational Diversity for the T-AKE Ship
01/19/2016 – The USNS William McLean is one of the 14 T-AKE supply ships operating in the Military Sealift Command.
Given the shortage of ships for the USCG and the US Navy, the ship has been tasked to do a diversity of missions far beyond simple fleet replenishment.
As both Captain Phillips and the crew of a sinking sailboat off of the East Coast of the United States were to discover. …
On January 15, the IAEA confirmed that Iran had met all its obligations for the JCOPA to take effect, an assessment the other governments accepted the following day.
In accord with its terms, Iran has reduced its capacity to enrich uranium by two thirds, exported almost its entire stockpile of low-enriched uranium, converted its Fordow enrichment plant into a research center, reconfigured its plutonium reactor at Arak and not produce weapons-grade plutonium, accepted extensive international monitoring of the entire range of its nuclear activities.
The formal declaration of Implementation Day this past weekend means that countries will end their nuclear-related economic sanctions on Iran.
The country’s large size, extensive nuclear activities, and proven skill at sophisticated concealment and sanctions circumvention will present a major challenge for monitoring its nuclear program despite Iran’s provisional adoption of the Additional Protocol and pledge to allow IAEA monitoring of its entire nuclear supply chain—from mining and milling, to conversion and enrichment, to nuclear reactor operations and spent fuel storage.
n this Sept. 26, 2015 file photo, Secretary of State John Kerry meets with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif at United Nations headquarters. As Iran races to satisfy the terms of last summer’s nuclear deal and the U.S. prepares to suspend sanctions on Tehran as early as Friday, Kerry is talking to Zarif more than any other foreign leader, including an emergency call Tuesday to secure the release of 10 U.S. sailors after they were detained by Iran in the Persian Gulf. CRAIG RUTTLE/AP PHOTO, FILE
The Iranian government has agreed to allow the IAEA to conduct comprehensive monitoring of the sites where nuclear activities are occurring that Iran has declared to the nuclear agency.
But we need access to Iran’s military and other undeclared possible sites since that is where Iran would attempt to develop nuclear weapons.
Just last month, the IAEA confirmed that Iran had a structured military program (not just blackboard research by scientists but a multilayered effort to design a nuclear warhead and a re-entry vehicle and probably with a test of a conventional trigger for a nuclear weapon, though that is hard to prove) to design a bomb until 2003.
The IAEA has said it found some evidence that the program continued as late as 2009.
The Agency found no evidence of such an Iranian military nuclear program after that date, which is not quite the same as saying that they can confirm there was no program.
After all, the Iranian government has thwarted repeated IAEA efforts to gain access to Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons sites like Parchin or to Iranian scientists who might have involved in a program, which does not bode well for how responsive Tehran will be for future disputes regarding the IAEA.
In monitoring the agreement, the IAEA will have at its disposal a wide array of advanced detection technologies such as new environmental sampling techniques to ensure that Iran does not breach the terms of the JCPOA, but it is impossible to tell at this point how well these measures will perform.
In many cases, the IAEA inspectors will have to learn as they go.
The United States will need many partners to prevent Iranian cheating or backsliding.
All countries must coordinate how they relax international sanctions on Iran to avoid rewarding Tehran too much or too soon and thereby reducing Iran’s incentive to uphold the deal—and encourage other nuclear aspirants to anticipate similar benefits.
Potential pitfalls include Russia’s eagerness to sell weapons and civilian nuclear technologies to Iran, China’s desire for Iranian oil, and both countries’ incentive to defect from any agreement to gain leverage with Washington and its allies.
We also need deeper thinking how to keep Iran from becoming a real, as opposed to a virtual, nuclear weapons state after the constraints in the JCPOA expire.
Whatever the goals of the current leadership in Tehran, we need to consider how Iranian intentions might change a decade from now when Iran has greater latent nuclear weapons potential.
An interesting wildcard is how the deal will affect Iran’s internal evolution.
Some scholars sometimes argue that over time Iranians’ perceptions of having a less threatening environment will lead not only to a less aggressive Iranian foreign policy but also to a less repressive regime.
President Obama seems to have anticipated in his timelines that Iranian Revolution would experience its Thermidor in the next decade. -Post-Revolutionary states tend to moderate, but it is not clear if 15 years is enough.
So far the Iranian reactionaries have reacted with alarm to the deal’s possible effects and done what they can to limit U.S.-Iranian ties as well as reinforce their grip on Iranian civil society.
Meanwhile, supporters of the Iran deal hope that it will encourage and even provide a pathway for North Korea and other countries to constrain their own nuclear weapons potential without the use of force or crippling sanctions.
But while Iran marked its Implementation Day on January 16, North Korea had its own “Detonation Day” on January 6.
Unfortunately, North Korea’s nuclear program is more advanced than that of Iran.
In addition, whereas the Iranian leadership appears more divided about whether Iran needs an active nuclear arsenal at present, North Korean leades have made clear that they are determined to have nuclear weapons for defensive purposes but also for tools of extortion, influence, and prestige.
The international community has more economic leverage on Iran, which needs access to world markets, that North Korea, which is autarkic in many respects and can rely on China and illicit trafficking for others.
The United States also has better military options in the case of Iran than with North Korea.
We have better intelligence on Iran, have a more defined set of targets to bomb, and Iran has a more limited means of retaliation.
North Korea is a black box and can easily retaliate against South Korea and Japan
It is true that widespread adoption of the JCPOA-style intrusive inspections, with continuous surveillance and complete access throughout the production chain, and mandatory application of the IAEA Additional Protocol, would help counter illicit nuclear programs..
But if we are not careful, the JCPOA could set a bad precedent by making it easier for states to pursue enrichment and reprocessing and other sensitive nuclear technologies.
A better standard for nuclear technology transfers is that of the 123 Agreement for Peaceful Civilian Nuclear Energy Cooperation between the United Arab Emirates and the United States in which the UAE voluntarily agreed not to possess ENR technologies
