Gwadar: China’s Pivot into the Indian Ocean?

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
06/15/2015

2015-06-12  By Gulshan Luthra and Cmde Ranjit Rai (Retd)

Singapore. The sea is a dangerous place, getting miniaturized due to the ever-growing number of naval and merchant vessels, factors that mandate internationally cooperative efforts to maintain the peace and stability of the established Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) as well as neutrality of the waters.

This was an important observation made at seminars on the sidelines of naval exhibition IMDEX in May, particularly by Prof Geoffrey Till, a respected naval historian based here with the Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). He observed, quite emphatically, that China’s interest in the Indian Ocean along with the rapid expansion of its naval capabilities cannot be taken lightly.

Notably, there are strong military ties between Beijing and Islamabad, and China has provided and paid for the development of Gwadar port, next to the strategic Strait of Hormuz, and not far away from Indian shores.

China’s intent to claim much of the South China Sea by establishing artificial islands is already troubling this part of the Pacific. Further movement of its nuclear and non-nuclear vessels, including submarines, westwards into the Indian Ocean should be worrying not only for India but other countries as well.

Prof Till wasn’t the only one to express this concern. Everyone except the Chinese in fact said so. The Americans were emphatic, and top to bottom, officers simply said they didn’t care about China’s synthetic claims, echoing what Admiral Harry Harris Jr, Commander of the US Pacific Command, has often said (and declared repeatedly by successive US Secretaries of Defense, including the newly-appointed Ashton Carter).

Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Akitaka Saika has observed that China had violated Japanese waters more than 130 times, and Japan has warned them off “in Chinese” without trying to provoke hostilities.

Beijing’s apparent aim is to control virtually the entire South China Sea, a position not acceptable to any one.

Why does China create ripples with nearly all its neighbors?

Admiral Michelle Howard, US Navy’s first four-star distinguished lady officer, serving as Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO), categorically demanded: I think it is now time for China to talk about what the reclamation of land means. There is a purpose to it and I think in terms of helping everybody, who lives in this part of the world to understand the Why, it would be helpful for China to explain it.”

She discounted any chances of any conflict with Chinese forces though, saying there was an established mechanism to prevent a clash.

China has steadily warned US ships and aircraft to keep off its newly created-and-claimed areas while the US Navy continues to go where it wishes to “in the international waters.” In fact, soon after the Singapore show, the US Navy sent a P8-A Poseidon maritime surveillance and anti-submarine warfare aircraft over the area being reclaimed by China.

This “string of pearls” strategy of bases and diplomatic ties includes the Gwadar port in Pakistan, naval bases in Burma, electronic intelligence gathering facilities on islands in the Bay of Bengal, funding construction of a canal across the Kra Isthmus in Thailand, a military agreement with Cambodia and building up of forces in the South China Sea, Credit: Japan Focus
This “string of pearls” strategy of bases and diplomatic ties includes the Gwadar port in Pakistan, naval bases in Burma, electronic intelligence gathering facilities on islands in the Bay of Bengal, funding construction of a canal across the Kra Isthmus in Thailand, a military agreement with Cambodia and building up of forces in the South China Sea, Credit: Japan Focus

Nonetheless, China has declared that it would continue to build the islands as well as defensive and offensive air, naval and land capabilities.

It will also build lighthouses and defenses in the disputed Spratly islands, which are claimed also by Vietnam and the Philippines.

Singapore is a beautiful city, a good host, and many countries from the Pacific and elsewhere were invited to IMDEX, the region’s International Maritime Defence Exhibition. There were delegations from India, China, Vietnam, Australia, Thailand, Malaysia, Germany, France, Sweden, US, Italy, Bahrain, Oman, Spain, Israel and Pakistan. Many countries displayed their ships at the Changi Naval Base with India showcasing INS Satpura, a multirole stealth ship, and INS Kamorta, an anti-submarine corvette.

Rear Admiral Ajendra Bahadur Singh, Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet (FOCEF), was there to congratulate his hosts on the 50th Anniversary of Indo-Singapore diplomatic relations, and to coordinate the annual naval exercise with the Singapore Navy (Simbex – 15, or Singapore India Maritime Bilateral Exercise).

Additional Director General and Indian Coast Guard Commander (West) Surinder Pal Singh Basra was also invited by the Singapore Navy.

To recall, operational interaction between the Indian Navy and Royal Singapore Navy commenced with ASW training exercises in 1994, and formalized as an annual bilateral exercise in 1999.

Over 20 years, SIMBEX has grown in tactical and operational complexity, transcending from the traditional emphasis on ASW to more complex maritime exercises involving various facets of Naval operations such as Air Defence, Air and Surface Practice Firing, Maritime Security and Search and Rescue.

In 2014, Simbex-14 was conducted May 22-28 off Port Blair in which RSN ships Valour and Independence participated, while the Indian Navy was represented by Guided Missile Corvettes Karmuk, Kuthar and Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) Dornier.

This year, RSN ship Supreme and submarine Archer along with MPA and fighter aircraft took part, and the Indian Navy brought in its Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance Anti Submarine (LRMR-ASW) aircraft P 8I, which is now well integrated into its force structure.

The US displayed its latest Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Fort Worth with one manned and one unmanned helicopters , and significantly, for the first time in aviation history, the same pilot can fly either of the two aircraft, up in the air or from the control station on the ship. Appropriately, the squadron of these pilots is called Magicians. The machines on board were Sikorsky-Lockheed Martin MH 60R Seahawks and Northrop Grumman’s MQ 8 Fire Scout, both of which are on offer to India.

All the countries including Singapore, India, Malaysia, Australia, US and others allowed the media to visit their ships, some 20 of them all.

There was one exception, the Chinese ship, Jiangkai class frigate Yulin (569) with C 803 Missile and Harbin Z-9 helicopter (copy of French Dauphin) was kept away from the prying eyes of newsmen.

The event was apparently a show of capabilities, and as far as intent was concerned, China insisted the growth of its naval power was just for peace and stability.

img_3824

Rear Admiral Shen Jinlong, who exchanged courtesy visits onboard some of the participating ships, including INS Satpura, told India Strategic that China wanted good relations with everyone. He warned the US to keep out, and in reply to a question, said India had no locus standi in the region.

Addressing a seminar, he had claimed that China’s policy is “defensive in nature, actively developing friendly relations with the rest of the world.”

Admiral Jinlong, who is commander of the Chinese navy’s South China Fleet – that operates in the area where China is reclaiming 2000 acres of sea by artificially building islands – also said: A new security concept should be unfolded; keep yourself safe while making others safe and jointly build a harmonious and stable environment…. We should adhere to solve maritime disputes in a peaceful way, reduce suspicions, understand each other, control risks, avoid conflict and strive for win-win situations.”

He said that any dispute in the region should be left to the countries in the region to resolve, an argument not accepted by others as China is not talking about its established waters but outside them to claim what it shares with most of its neighbors, Japan, Thailand, Korea, Vietnam etc.

Prof Till said that China has to understand that the South China Sea does not belong to China just as the Indian Ocean does not belong to India. The established maritime boundaries must not be disturbed, and the freedom of navigation should continue to be there for all nations as has been historically so.

All the countries, from Australia to the US, are members of the international community, and should be free to operate in South China Sea or the Indian Ocean or the Pacific.

That should include both India and China.

But does China accept this?

Apparently NO.

It is the observation of these writers that China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean should be a big worry for India, particularly the creation of a Chinese naval base at Gwadar.

China and Pakistan are military allies, and Pakistan continues to needle India in every way, fair or foul, military or terrorism notwithstanding its own dissipation due to internal troubles.

It may be recalled that while India sought Soviet technical support in building the Visakhapatnam naval base, the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was firm in not accepting Soviet funds, for that would have made it difficult for her to say a NO to Moscow in permitting a Soviet naval base there.

Soviet technicians were allowed only to help maintain the submarines and vessels that India bought, and their mess deck – staying place at the base – was named Kremlin. That was all.

The Kremlin is still there, and interestingly, Mr. Carter, who is the first US Secretary of Defense to visit an Indian naval base on June 2, would have passed by it. It is not known if anybody drew his attention to this building, located very near the entry gate of the Eastern Naval Command.

Mr. Carter is continuing with US efforts to draw India into a rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific region, and cooperation against China is one of the items on his agenda. India may or may not get drawn into it, but a lot will depend upon what China does in the Indian Ocean.

In the case of Pakistan, China has paid for the development of the Gwadar port, and much more. It is logical that it will begin with commercial vessels and then gradually station and service its warship and submarines there. China is also giving Pakistan eight submarines, and Chinese maintenance personnel, engineers, and apparently others, will come there as part of the initial package. Islamabad will not hesitate in helping Beijing, particularly as China has now become the source of a substantial largesse – US$ 46 billion in addition to whatever is already given.

img_3824i

Pakistan has always depended on doles from the US, and even used terrorism to demand more. Post the 9/11 terror attacks on the US; equations between Washington and Islamabad are bound to wither over time. The entry of China as a one-way generous friend in terms of money, is a welcome opportunity for Pakistan.

With nearly 70 submarines, a few aircraft carriers in the making, large amphibious aircraft and other seaborne capabilities, the Chinese navy seems ready to venture out.

China will not explain to the Americans the Why of their build-up in the South China Sea, or their increasing naval forays into the Indian Ocean. But China is there in the Pakistan occupied Kashmir, it has systematically been creating surface links from there to Gwadar.

China has also been challenging India on its Himalayan border.

Or for that matter, challenging all its neighbors as well.

Watch out, Dear World, there is trouble ahead.

China has the will, money, capability, and intent to throw new challenges on the horizon.

Gwadar, built by it, paid for by it, and maintained by it, will be the pivot of its naval strategy in the Indian Ocean and beyond.

Reprinted with permission of our strategic partner, India Strategic:

http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories3824_Gwadar_China_Pivot_in_the_Indian_Ocean.htm

Also, see the following:

http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories3817_India_and_US_sign_2015_Defence_Framework_Agreement_for_10_years.htm

http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories3823_Framework_for_US_India_Defence_Relationship.htm

http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories3817_India_and_US_sign_2015_Defence_Framework_Agreement_for_10_years.htm

Editor’s Note: China and Russia both wish to make conflict in their key regions about conflict with the United States. 

The reality is very different.

It is about conflict with its neighbors within which the U.S. is an ally of those neighbors.

It is about self-defense coupled with what ever allies can bring to the defense of the country being pressured by either China or Russia.

For a Japanese and French joint perspective on the Chinese actions in the South China Sea. see the following:

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and French President Francois Hollande shared concern Sunday over China’s reclamation projects in disputed areas of the South China Sea also claimed by other countries, a Japanese official said.

On the fighting in Ukraine, Abe and Hollande agreed it is important for all countries concerned, including Russia, to implement a cease-fire agreement to halt fighting between government forces and pro-Russia rebels, according to the official.

The Japanese and French leaders met on the sidelines of the Group of Seven summit in Schloss Elmau, south of Munich.

The other G-7 members are Britain, Canada, Germany, Italy and the United States.

Abe told Hollande that China has been pushing ahead with reclamation “at a rapid pace” in the area, the official said.

China has built artificial islands and facilities on them in disputed parts of the sea, provoking other claimants including the Philippines and other Southeast Asian nations.

 

 

 

 

 

An International Task Force Looks at the Gaza Conflict in 2014: Israel Went the Extra Mile

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2015-06-15 Introduction by Ed Timperlake

There is a often used phrase in media-“If it Bleeds it Leads” sadly this can easily distort the real truth.

Fortunately one of the most distinguished group of experts ever assembled reviewed the combat engagements by Israel in defending all their citizens against an onslaught of munitions. The tragedy of the contemptuous distorted view was that the world wide media could focus on only what they could visually capture IDF munitions hitting ground targets.

The report tells all that the IDF responses were legally proportional defensive counter-attacks.

What was also not seen was the great success of the Iron Dome.

Comparing images of any destruction on the ground vice showing a successful intercept a couple of hundred meters above an Israeli school is a difficult visual to capture in a global Information War.

Fortunately, the Key Findings forevermore put the events in Gaza and Israel in appropriate context.

The report should have all in the Global Media, in order to be fair and balanced,  reported on  to bring understanding and context.

HIGH LEVEL INTERNATIONAL MILITARY GROUP
THE GAZA CONFLICT IN 2014

From 18th – 22nd May 2015, the High Level International Military Group, made up of 11 former chiefs of staff, generals, senior officers, political leaders and officials from the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Holland, Spain, Italy, Australia and Colombia visited Israel for a fact-finding mission on the 2014 Gaza conflict. We were led by General Klaus Naumann, former Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, the most senior officer in the Alliance, and Giulio Terzi, former Foreign Minister of Italy. Also in the group were Ambassador Pierre-Richard Prosper, formerly US State Department Ambassador at Large for war crimes issues; and Mr Rafael Bardaji, former National Security Adviser to the Government of Spain.

This was part of a longer term project by our group, whose principal concern is how civilian lives can be protected and military forces can fight effectively when operations must be conducted in a densely packed civilian area. We will be producing a full report this autumn.

Our mission to Israel was unprecedented. We were the first such multi-national group of senior officers to visit the country. We were granted a level of access to the Israeli government and Defence Force that has not been afforded to any other group, from the Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Minister of Defence, Moshe Ya’alon, right down to the field commanders responsible for fighting the battle on the ground.

We were well aware of the allegations made by some governments, the United Nations, human rights groups and the media, that Israel acted outside the laws of armed conflict in Gaza. Some have suggested that the IDF lacked restraint or even deliberately targeted innocent civilians.

Our findings lead us to the opposite conclusion. We examined the circumstances that led to the tragic conflict last summer and are in no doubt that this was not a war that Israel wanted. In reality Israel sought to avoid the conflict and exercised great restraint over a period of months before the war when its citizens were targeted by sporadic rocket attacks from Gaza. Once the war had begun, Israel made repeated efforts to terminate the fighting. The war that Israel was eventually compelled to fight against Hamas and other Gaza extremists was a legitimate war, necessary to defend its citizens and its territory against sustained attack from beyond its borders.

In the main Hamas’s rocket attacks deliberately and indiscriminately targeted Israeli civilian population centres in the south of the country.

We visited one, the kibbutz Nahal Oz, at which more than 150 Hamas rockets had been directed last summer, causing loss of life and large-scale destruction. Many attacks were also launched against major cities further north including Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Hamas deliberately fired missiles at Ben Gurion International Airport, disrupting and threatening international civil air traffic. There is no doubt that all of these attacks constitute war crimes.

An Israeli missile is launched from the Iron Dome defence missile system in the southern Israeli city of Ashdod in response to a rocket launched from the nearby Palestinian Gaza Strip on November 18, 2012.
An Israeli missile is launched from the Iron Dome defence missile system in the southern Israeli city of Ashdod in response to a rocket launched from the nearby Palestinian Gaza Strip on November 18, 2012.

Hamas also constructed an array of tunnels, using materials diverted from humanitarian supplies, which penetrated the border between Gaza and Israel, in many cases emerging close to civilian communities. We entered one such tunnel, which extended over two kilometres, terminating only a few hundred yards from a kibbutz and likely intended to eventually bore into the kibbutz itself. We can only conclude that these tunnels were designed, at least in part, to attack, kill and abduct Israeli civilians. This again constitutes a war crime.

Hamas launched attacks against Israel from the heart of its own civilian communities in Gaza and positioned its munitions and military forces there also, including in schools, hospitals and mosques. As well as carefully documented IDF evidence of this, we have viewed international media footage confirming several cases and are aware of senior Hamas officials’ own claims to have used human shields. A recent report by the UN Secretary General confirmed that in some cases Hamas even used UN facilities for storing munitions and launching attacks.

Again, these actions clearly amount to war crimes. The laws of armed conflict not only forbid the use of human shields but also demand that combatant forces ensure their civilians are physically evacuated from combat areas. Hamas made no effort to evacuate civilians; on the contrary, there are documented cases of them compelling civilians to remain in or return to places where they expected Israeli attacks to come.

The Israel Defence Force employed a series of precautionary measures to reduce civilian casualties. Each of our own armies is of course committed to protecting civilian life during combat. But none of us is aware of any army that takes such extensive measures as did the IDF last summer to protect the lives of the civilian population in such circumstances.

We were briefed on the IDF’s strict procedures and standards for confirming the validity of a military target and the presence or absence of civilians, and the stringent requirements for both military and legal authorisation to attack a target. We were briefed on some cases where the IDF declined to attack known military targets due to the presence of civilians, risking, and in some instances costing, Israeli lives.

Measures taken to warn civilians included phone calls, SMS messages, leaflet drops, radio broadcasts, communication via Gaza-based UN staff and the detonation of harmless warning explosive charges, known as “knock on the roof”. Where possible the IDF sought also to give guidance on safe areas and safe routes.

We were briefed on the IDF’s proportionality principles and calculations used in circumstances where an attack was likely to result in civilian deaths.

We believe that in general Israeli forces acted proportionately as required by the laws of armed conflict and often went beyond the required legal principles of proportionality, necessity and discrimination.

The Israeli military launches a missile Nov. 15 from the Iron Dome air defense system, designed to intercept and destroy incoming short-range rockets and artillery shells, in the southern city of Beer Sheva following the firing of rockets from the Gaza Strip. (Menahem Kahana / AFP)
The Israeli military launches a missile Nov. 15 from the Iron Dome air defense system, designed to intercept and destroy incoming short-range rockets and artillery shells, in the southern city of Beer Sheva following the firing of rockets from the Gaza Strip. (Menahem Kahana / AFP)

We were briefed in detail on Israel’s humanitarian efforts to reduce the suffering of the civilian population in Gaza. The measures taken were often far in excess of the requirements of the Geneva Conventions. They sometimes placed Israeli lives at risk. To an extent these steps also undermined the effectiveness of the IDF’s operations by pausing military action and thus allowing Hamas to re-group and replenish. Supplies provided to the civilian population by Israel were often commandeered by Hamas for military use.

We understand that over 2,000 people died in Gaza during the conflict. In a population of approximately 1.8 million, over a 50-day period many would have died of causes unrelated to the fighting. We also know that some died when Hamas’s attacks against Israel went wrong, and a recently published report by Amnesty International asserts that Hamas murdered at least twenty-three people in Gaza during this period, and tortured dozens more.

On the basis of close scrutiny of open source records as well as from secret intelligence, the IDF informed us that they assess that over half of those declared dead were combatants from Hamas and other groups that were engaged in the fighting – a figure higher than that commonly asserted by the UN, which takes its own assessment from Hamas sources. This nevertheless leaves a deeply concerning number of civilian deaths, perhaps around 1,000, many of whom were killed as a result of Israeli military action.

We recognise that some of these deaths were caused by error and misjudgement as we mention below.

But we also recognise that the majority of deaths were the tragic inevitability of defending against an enemy that deliberately carries out attacks from within the civilian population. We must therefore consider that Hamas and its terrorist associates, as the aggressors and the users of human shield, are responsible for the overwhelming majority of deaths in Gaza this summer.

In war, as in all facets of life, mistakes are made, including errors of judgement, confusion and technical failure.

Also individual soldiers sometimes act unlawfully, against military policy, rules of engagement and military law. All of this of course occurred among IDF forces in the Gaza conflict as it does in all military forces.

We were extensively briefed by the IDF’s Military Advocate General and by other military lawyers. We have been informed that where transgressions and errors are alleged these cases are subject to rigorous, transparent investigation and if necessary criminal proceedings and punishment. The Israeli military legal system includes a number of robust checks and balances, on which we were briefed; including oversight by the country’s widely respected supreme civil judiciary.

We agree with the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, who following the Pentagon’s fact-finding mission to Israel, went on record last November as saying that in the 2014 Gaza conflict, “Israel went to extraordinary lengths to limit collateral damage and civilian casualties”.

Our overall findings are that during Operation Protective Edge last summer, in the air, on the ground and at sea, Israel not only met a reasonable international standard of observance of the laws of armed conflict, but in many cases significantly exceeded that standard. We saw clear evidence of this from the upper to the lower levels of command.

A measure of the seriousness with which Israel took its moral duties and its responsibilities under the laws of armed conflict is that in some cases Israel’s scrupulous adherence to the laws of war cost Israeli soldiers’ and civilians’ lives.

Signed by the members of the High Level International Military Group that visited Israel 18th – 22nd May 2015,

Giulio Terzi – former Foreign Minister of Italy.

General Klaus Naumann – former Chief of Staff of the Bundeswehr and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee.

General Vincenzo Camporini – former Chief of the Defence Staff of Italy.

Admiral Jose Maria Teran – former Chief of the Joint Staff of Spain.

Ambassador Pierre-Richard Prosper – former US State Department Ambassador at Large for war crimes issues.

Mr Rafael Bardaji – former National Security Adviser for the Spanish government.

Lieutenant General David A Deptula – former Standing Joint Force Air Component Commander, United States Pacific Command.

Major General Jim Molan – former Chief of Operations, Headquarters Multi National Force, Iraq and Commander of the Australian Defence College.

Colonel Eduardo Ramirez – Member of Colombian Congress and former Chief of Security, Colombia.

Colonel Vincent Alcazar – former senior United States Air Force officer in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Colonel Richard Kemp – former Commander of British Forces in Afghanistan.

31 May 2015

The project was sponsored by the Friends of Israel Initiative.

http://blog.unwatch.org/index.php/2015/06/12/key-findings-of-the-high-level-international-military-group-on-the-gaza-conflict/

 

The Price of Success: Can the Osprey Be Effectively Globally Sustained?

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
06/14/2015

2015-06-14 By Robbin Laird

In September 2007, the Osprey was deployed for the first time to Iraq.

USMC Commandant Conway and Deputy Commandant of Aviation Castellaw announced and made the decision to deploy the Osprey into combat although virtually all public commentators thought this was too early for an “untested” airplane, as one critic put it.

https://sldinfo.com/osprey-at-the-five-year-mark-looking-forward-to-the-future/

Fast forward to 2015 – 8 years of operational engagements – it is hard to believe this is the same plane.

The Marines are now the only tiltrotar-enabled assault force in the world and are reworking their concepts of operations throughout based in large part on the Osprey and its ability to operate from multiple platforms and locations.

The demand for these unique assets is very high with the Marines operating globally in support of US military operations.

The early start in Iraq – with baby steps in operational terms — now sees the plane operating virtually everywhere in the world.

And the USAF with its CV-22s is doing much the same thing.

But the plane was never built as a global product, nor designed neither for global sourcing nor for wide-ranging, high demand global support.

The program has reached a critical turning point – can the Osprey be purchased by allies, supported by a global supply chain and effectively supported worldwide?

Can that allied opportunity be merged with an enhanced capacity to support forward deployed Ospreys, flown by the Marines, the Air Force and soon the Navy for its Carrier support operations?

Put bluntly, the current system of support is falling short of meeting such a growing demand signal.  In interviews I have done over the past few years with Osprey maintainers and operators, it is clear that there is a concern with supply shortfalls and uncertainties unduly affecting operational demands.  Again, because the demand signal is higher than DoD decision makers expected, the supply side has fallen short.

General Trautman in Iraq, USMC, November 2009. Credit, USMC
General Trautman in Iraq, USMC, November 2009. Credit, USMC

In the words of former USMC Deputy Commandant for Aviation, LtGen Trautman,

“As a growing number of unprecedented new missions and operating locations are added to the V-22 community’s repertoire and new international and domestic customers seek to obtain the Osprey, we must ensure the global supply chain evolves to keep pace with this incredible revolution in military technology.”

In an interview, which I did with Lt. Col. Boniface in early 2014 at New River, the Osprey commander underscored what he saw as a significant problem.

He focused on the critical need to have a responsive and effective parts availability pool to support the deployed but dispersed ARG-MEU.

This is an especially important challenge for the Osprey because of relatively limited locations within which parts are available to be flown or delivered to the ARG-MEU on deployment.

Put another way, the deployment of the ARG-MEU is not constrained by Osprey operations, but the effectiveness of the logistics or sustainment operations.

Lt. Col. Boniface during the SLD interview August, 22 2011 (Credit: SLD)
Lt. Col. Boniface during the SLD interview August, 22 2011 (Credit: SLD)

And the exit interview I did with Colonel Christopher ‘Mongo’ Seymour in the Summer of 2013 during the week prior to his retirement, the hard hitting and well-respected Marine Corps leader provided a look back and a way ahead with regard to sustainment of the Osprey.

QUESTION: A major challenge in fielding a new system is getting the supply chain up and working and getting the inevitably maintenance problems sorted out. How have you worked through these problems?

Col. Seymour: There are three separate streams of activity which need to align to really get the new system up and running and integrated into operations.

The first is getting the Marines committed to owning the system and learning how to fix “new” problems, which come up with a new system. The problems are different and have to be worked differently. You need to get the maintainers to change their culture.

Sorting out problems with the gearbox is a good example of what needed to be done. The gearbox on this airplane is very complex and central to its unique operational capabilities. The gearbox inside the nacelle turns a rotor, and they were chipping. This is high-end engineering.

But it was chipping and when it did so maintainers put it aside and waited for a new part. This meant the fleet was going to be degraded.

The flight line needed to take ownership of the problem because a lot of it was self-inflicted gunshot wounds. Maintainers would look to blame someone else when they had a proper gearbox go bad. As it turns out, the, the technology required was ti yse isotropic oil that actually absorbs moisture out of the air, so if you have a gearbox that’s not turning and boiling the oil out on a regular basis, it goes long term down. It’s sucking in the moisture of the North Carolina Coast into the oil.

And the maintainers would leave it out on the flight line all opened up just breathing the air, and then when they finally got a part or piece, they try to fire it up and another gearbox would chip or another problem would manifest itself someplace else. It was an endless loop.

We took some ownership here on flight line, and shaped better maintenance practices, and to help industry.

Once we got that proper gearbox moving back out of the red into the black, the internal culture of the community changed to become significantly more optimistic, you know.

The maintenance man-hours required to change a proper gearbox initially was estimated at 1800 maintenance man-hours.

We’re doing it now in about 380.

That’s how good we got at it.

QUESTION: The first challenge then was simply to get the maintainers familiar with the plane, adjusting their practices and communicating better with industry to solve the gearbox problem. What were the other challenges?

Col. Seymour: The second thread is industry.

The key challenge is to get industry working to solve the right problems, or the critical problems, which would make a difference.

But as we focus on solving a core problem, there is the challenge of dealing with simpler problems, which emerge, which then slip between the cracks.

Once industry is on a steady track, the PBL system incentivizes industry to drive down cost.

They will not do this if they have little capacity to know what our operational costs for a system and its component parts are.

We have to work with industry to get the reliability of key parts up and then the PBL system works quite well to shape an incentive system for industry to deliver parts on time and to improve costs.

The third thread is the government. In our case, the challenge is to get NAVAIR focused on solving the critical problems, and not just dealing with the low hanging fruit.

When we got NAVAIR focused on solving the gearbox problem as the key, industry kicked in and worked the problem as a priority.

The challenge is get those three strands to work together effectively – the USMC, industry and NAVAIR.

Seymour in the discussion in New River at the end of June 2013 provided a number of insights into what was necessary to succeed in shaping a new culture for maintenance.

“A key challenge is to let the maintainers are not stakeholders but Marines. For example, I had a gunny sergeant who said he preferred CH-46s to Ospreys.

“He said that I’m a 46 guy.” I looked him in the face and said, “Well, you’re in the wrong unit, gunny. There are no 46 that’s left here on the East Coast. You want me to get your orders to Okinawa, because, you know, that’s the only place for flying 46s.”

I told him that you don’t get a vote. This is not a democracy. Conway decided. McCorkle decided. Hagee decided. Amos decided, you know, we’re going to fly the Osprey. It is what it is, so either embrace it or leave.”

He then underscored where that Gunny is now in terms of working the Osprey.

“The same gunny now will brag about being, , the gunny who fixed problem X, Y, or Z in the maintenance department on a V-22. He owns it now. It’s like okay, you know, it worked, it’s normalized if you will, and that’s why you see this, this growing success. Success begets success internal to the Marine Corps culture.”

Seymour underscored the importance of industry and the SYSCOM listening to the Marines as they deployed the plane.

“We had another problem with the gearbox where it attaches inside in nacelle with a component called the drag pin that, that holds that, that gearbox in place.

There’s a fitting around that drag pin that with vibrational wear and would fall out.

And so you had to pull the whole gearbox out, replace this $25 bushing and put the whole gearbox back in at a cost of like 1800 maintenance man hours initially. So we did a lot of kicking and screaming at industry in and to the SYSCOM.

Are you guys, are you guys kidding us?

You know, you want us to pull this $1 million component out to replace a $25 bushing at the expense of 1800 man hours probably equates to a million dollars just in labor cost, right?

We don’t pay labor cost obviously, but it’s a good argument to make.

Marine labor is free, but it comes on the backs of marines and it’s demoralizing to the community.”

Seymour also underscored the challenges of getting NAVAIR focused on solving critical problems, rather than what was easiest to solve.

“NAVAIR has taken credit on briefing charts for dealing with low-hanging fruit. We have not fixed the gearbox but you got this. You know, what do you do? That’s not going to do anything for me. That gives me, you know, a 0.001 percent bump in readiness.

What’s going to get me a double-digit bump in readiness is having the proper gearbox.

We finally got the SYSCOM focused on the gearbox, which, which actually focused industry on fixing the gearbox. Industry invested a lot of their own money, upfront money when they had to, with the multi-year PBL.

They could not get this gearbox into the PBL because industry saw it as too risky. The costs were all over the chart. They would replace one gearbox or repair one gearbox for $800,000 and repair another one for $50,000. And of course, NAVAIR and NAVSUP wanted a flatline PBL and industry understandably wouldn’t take the risk.”

If you go for the low-hanging fruit, it might make you feel better for 30 seconds, but it’s not going to solve the problem.

Go after the hard, the big-bone items and that’s what this gearbox was.

It was a big-bone item.”

He revisited the PBL issue when asked what is the key item, which needs to be remedied currently.

“Blades, rotor blades, prop rotor blades. It drives me insane because in complexity, that proper gearbox is like splitting the atom and that blade sitting on top of it, it’s like a 2 x 4.

They focused all their energy on fixing the proper gearbox and they took their eye off the blades and, and now we got into this big bathtub on improper blades.

But it is absolutely solvable, and it’s a PBL item.

Industry is incentivized to improve reliability of the blade because every time they got to fix one, it costs them money. So they are going to work hard.

You’ll see probably in the next two or three years the blades won’t be a problem anymore.

But we’re going through this bathtub right now where they just weren’t incentivized to focus on it. They were making more money dealing with the blades when they came in for repairs, but now that it is part of the PBL they will solve it.”

What Seymour focused upon and dedicated many years of efforts to was to get the maintenance and sustainment system moving in the right direction for the USMC.

Now the scope of the challenge is widening: there is a need to embrace global support for global customers and to forward deployed US forces using the Osprey.

But to get a global system in place will not be easy, for the Osprey was not designed from the ground up to be a global system.

This will require shaping what one retired senior Marine Corps leader called a “normative performance based logistics systems.”

And what he means by this is more significant investment by industry and government in the parts sourcing, and better sharing of information and risk in getting a global system in place.

Clearly, a global sourcing system is possible, and Boeing might look no further than their very successful C-17 global sustainment program.

The C-17 has parts sharing and support by the company worldwide and only this sustainment program has allowed allies to buy the airplane and to work completely inter-actively with the US Air Force.

Parts Sharing Among Allies: The Case of the C-17 from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

As the former head of the RAAF Airlift Group put it in an interview:

The Boeing managed Global Sustainment Program is a C-17 support mechanism that was designed for the United States Air Force, so it can maneuver anywhere around the world.  And so, people who have received common training in different units could look after that aircraft as it deployed globally.

As international sales started with Britain and then with Australia with the C-17 in completely different hemispheres of the world, we felt that this agreement still was USAF centric.  So if a British C-17 was visiting Australia and had an engine malfunction or something go wrong with it, and needed technical support with more than a couple of technicians it was carrying, Australia could not do anything to it without Britain asking America’s permission to do that work.

That worked for about the first six weeks.

Then we realized that this was obviously a shortfall in our ability to conduct worldwide operations and support.

We now have a totally different approach. 

In the GSP we do not own the common spares; our common spares are part of a global C-17 inventory. Any of our air crew or technicians can walk up to any C-17 support area in the world, and actually submit an order form through which looks like a United States document.

And because the partner technicians have gone through the same training processes, they can help fix that malfunction that’s occurred.

This is the gold standard for working a multinational fleet and we see a similar process being established for the F-35 and we would certainly like to see that for the KC-30A as well. 

With aircraft that operate globally, you do not want to be limited by the logistics simply being supported by national parts, which may well not be located at the point of attack or in the area of interest.  This makes no sense with the multi-national and multi-mission aircraft becoming the norm for 21st century air forces.

Clearly, such an approach needs to be shaped to enable the global opportunity of the Osprey to unfold.

It would be a significant failure if this does not happen simply by failing to meet the strategic shift, which a new approach to Osprey sustainment requires.

The recently announced sale of Ospreys to Japan provides an opportunity to re-shape the approach and put in motion a more global approach.

Marines, U.S. Navy sailors and sailors with the Japanese Maritime Defense Forces gather for a group photo after successfully landing an MV-22B Osprey from Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 161 (VMM-161) onboard the JS Hyuga (DDG-181), during Dawn Blitz 2013 off the coast of Naval Base Coronado, June 14. Credit: 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade,
Marines, U.S. Navy sailors and sailors with the Japanese Maritime Defense Forces gather for a group photo after successfully landing an MV-22B Osprey from Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 161 (VMM-161) onboard the JS Hyuga (DDG-181), during Dawn Blitz 2013 off the coast of Naval Base Coronado, June 14. Credit: 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade.

Ospreys operating from Japan and by Japan will operate from a high demand and high stress-operating environment.

CV-22s, MV-22s and Japanese V-22s can all be sourced from a common warehouse with a higher than adequate supply part sourcing.

Because demand is flexible and the US Ospreys operate throughout the region, ramping up parts stores in a regional warehouse would make sense and start the process of globalization of the Osprey on a sound footing.

As Secretary Wynne, the former Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) put it with regard to a major barrier to proper global sourcing:

“It would be important for the Japanese to ensure that they have significant material on their side of the export request for their parts depot.

Marines can guide, but the investment in stock really pays off in terms of operational performance.”

The video at the top of the article shows a slice of the interview with Col. Seymour in the Summer of 2013.

Col Seymour, the CO of Marine Aircraft Group 26, discussed the introduction of the Osprey and the cultural challenges associated with the aircraft.

He discussed them from the standpoint of the challenge within the USMC and outside of the USMC.

The slideshow highlights the first landing of an Osprey on a South Korean ship.

A U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey prepares to land on the flight deck of the Republic of Korea ship Dokdo (LPH 6111), at sea, March 26, 2015.

This was the first time an Osprey has landed on a ROK amphibious assault ship.

The aircraft is with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 262 (Reinforced), 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit.

The Marines of the 31st MEU are embarked aboard the forward-deployed amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) and were participating in Korean Marine Exchange Program 15 during the MEU’s annual Spring Patrol of the Asia-Pacific region.

Such demonstrations will lead not only to sales opportunities but an upsurge in demand for parts and enhanced reliability of those parts.

This was to be the final piece in our Osprey series.

But two additional pieces are in the works.

For the first five pieces of the series see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/osprey-at-the-eight-year-mark-preparing-for-the-next-phase/

https://sldinfo.com/the-maturation-of-the-osprey-a-perspective-from-visiting-the-boeing-plant-near-philadelphia/

https://sldinfo.com/the-next-phase-for-the-v-22-multi-missionization/

https://sldinfo.com/navigating-the-future-for-the-v-22-kristin-robertson-discusses-the-way-ahead/

https://sldinfo.com/sustaining-the-next-phase-of-the-osprey-nation-getting-the-global-supply-chain-right/

The visit to the Boeing facility was done by Robbin Laird and Murielle Delaporte, with Delaporte’s pieces to appear in the French press later this summer.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Arctic Challenge 2015: Fighter Jets at EFRO

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
06/13/2015

2015-06-13 RVNspotting has an interesting video showing some NATO jets taking off from EFRO.

Rovaniemi Airport (Finnish: Rovaniemen lentoasema) (IATA: RVN, ICAO: EFRO) is the fifth biggest airport in Finland by annual number of passengers (in 2012), located in Rovaniemi, Finland, about 10 kilometres (6 mi) north of Rovaniemi city centre.

The Arctic Circle crosses the runway closer to its northern end.

According to the posting:

One of Europe’s largest fighter jet exercises is underway in the Northern sky with more than 100 aircraft and 4000 people participating.

The ACE 2015 is organized by Norway, Finland and Sweden with participating forces from France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, USA and NATO.

The air exercise takes place in the High North, with the activity being divided between Bodø in Norway, Rovaniemi in Finland, and Kallax in Sweden.

The Coming of the F-35: A Special Report on the Introduction of the New Air System

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
06/12/2015

2015-06-04 By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

In a meeting last year in the United Kingdom with one of the RAF officers responsible for the introduction of the F-35 into the UK forces, Group Captain Paul Godfrey highlighted the behind the scenes work to roll out an F-35 fleet, an effort largely ignored by the analytical press.

“There are 115 F-35s flying now. We are focused on how we are going to use the capability, not whether it will exist. There is a huge gap between the users of the aircraft and the broader puzzlement over the future outside of the warrior community; we are just getting on with it.

We just need to encourage thinking that isn’t tied to whatever we’ve done in the past. The F-35 fleet is different and can be used for force transformation; unless you don’t.”

Group Captain Paul Godfrey addressing the Copenhagen Airpower Symposium, April 17, 2015. Credit: SLD
Group Captain Paul Godfrey addressing the Copenhagen Airpower Symposium, April 17, 2015. Credit: SLD

While more direct than most, Godfrey’s comment reflects the reality as seen by those in the U.S. services and in US allied partners involved in bringing the F-35 fleet to life.

The number of airplanes flying is now 140, rather than 115 but the perceived reality among the growing F-35 community is that the future is now.

It starts this year with the USMC and will accelerate through the next three years.

While the Chinese and Russians introduce their “fifth generation” aircraft, the U.S. and its allies are preparing to launch a global fleet.

The Chinese and Russians have client states; the U.S. has allies and what is unique about the F-35 is it is jointly funded and jointly operated by a global coalition.

This simple fact seems to be missed by many.

When 60 minutes did a program on the F-35, not once was it mentioned that this is a global aircraft, not simply an American export. 

Recently, the Norwegian Defence Minister opened an F-35 partners meeting held in Norway by this comment with regard to the arrival of the F-35 for the US and the partners: “We’re turning the future into the present.”[1]

Our new Special Report looks at the services and the allies as they prepare to introduce the F-35 into service and look to transform their airpower capabilities appropriate to dealing with 21st century threats. 

The report is based on dozens of interviews with the services and partners, ranging from Italy, to the UK, to Australia and from Eglin, to Yuma, to Fallon.

21st century warfare technologies concepts of operations, technology, tactics and training are in evolution and revolution.

5

However, there is always the reactive enemy who gets a vote in combat.

Consequently the roll out of new approaches to execute a successful combat campaign being shaped by the impact of the F-35 is critical to understand.

The F-35 is at the heart of change for a very simple reason – it is a revolutionary platform, and when considered in terms of its fleet impact even more so.

The F-35, Lightning II, has a revolutionary sensor fusion cockpit that makes it effective in AA, AG and EW. Allied and U.S. combat pilots will evolve and share new tactics and training, and over time this will drive changes that leaders must make for effective command and control to fight future battles.

An issue has been that the F-35 has been labeled a “fifth generation” aircraft, a sensible demarcation when the F-22 was being introduced.

But the evolution of the combat systems on the aircraft, the role of the fusion engine, and the impact of a fleet of integrated F-35s operating as a foundational element will make the current term “5th Gen” obsolete.

The global fleet of F-35s will be the first generation for building a foundation for a fundamental change in the way air power operates in overall combat concepts of operations.  It is not in and of itself a single aircraft platform; it is about what an integrated fleet of F-35s can deliver to TRANSFORM everything.

The decade ahead will be very innovative if what the fleet brings to the fight is learned and applied.

Combat warriors, at all ranks, can leverage what they learn and then apply those lessons to reshaping the force over and over.

The F-35 is entering service at an interesting time in the evolution of digital warfare.   

The US and Allied fleet of F-35s will also add an “electronic” or “tron” warfare component to the fight, an “E” for electronic.

It is not necessary to designate the F-35 as the F/A/E-35 but that would be more accurate.

3

Because of the growing role of shared situational awareness and shaping of what some are calling the “combat cloud”, tron warfare is part and parcel of the transition in air warfare. Tron warfare is about protecting your ability to operate in shared communication space and to deny your adversary the ability to do so.

To put it another way, the F-35 fleet allows the air services to shape a new foundation for engaging in active and passive Tron Warfare, but because “no platform” fights alone can be a foundation from which other elements of the airpower and combat capabilities are woven in for 21st century operations.

In other words, the IOC of the F-35 is not simply about the introduction of a replacement aircraft but the next phase in the revolution of airpower and inextricably intertwined with doing air combat differently.

In discussions with the pilots, maintainers and industrialists involved in the launch of the F-35, there is clear awareness that the F-35 is not simply about business as usual.  There is a clear sense of excitement seen by the F-35 launch cadre, which is missed by those not part of the process.

And each service or partner has a particular launch point with regard to transformation, which the F-35 enables or facilitates.

This is not a replacement aircraft in and of itself, but rather it is the driving technology catalyst for a transformation of combat air power in this next phase of military aviation history.

The roll out of the F-35 global fleet through the iterative IOC process lays a foundation for crafting 21st century joint and coalition approaches to air and combat power.

Built into the IOC of the F-35 roll out is a nascent global fleet.  Again it is not about the IOCs of a single platform for a single service, it’s the concurrent roll out of U.S. and allied F-35s.

And this roll out is supported and facilitated by a collaborative cadre of pilots, maintainers, and industrialists worldwide.

For the US services, this means being joined at the hip about the way ahead for the F-35 community.

Squadron Leader Nichol at Beaufort MCAS standing in front of an RAF F-35 jet which is part of the training effort. Credit: Second Line of Defense
Squadron Leader Nichol at Beaufort MCAS standing in front of an RAF F-35 jet which is part of the training effort. Credit: Second Line of Defense 

For the allies, this means engagement with the U.S. service’s “F-35 cadre” as they roll out their capability as well.

Indeed, there are two key lines of collaboration shaping the roll out. 

The first is the training cadre based at Eglin, Luke and Beaufort where pilots are trained to fly either the F-35A, or B or C.

Luke will become the center for excellence for the roll out of US and allied F-35As; with Beaufort becoming the initial training base for the roll out of US and allied F-35Bs. The Navy is currently training at Eglin, with its first squadron of F-35Cs, the Grim Reapers.

The second key collaborative effort is shaped by the warfighting centers of excellence at Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma, Nellis AFB, and Fallon Naval Air Station.

The F-35 community at all three warfighting centers is working together to think through how to use the F-35 as it comes into the fleet.

F-35 partners are visiting the centers as well, such as a recent visit of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force officers to Fallon.

It is this community of warriors, which is shaping the roll out of the F-35 global fleet.

The commander designate of VMFAT-501 at Beaufort, Lt. Col. Summa, described the process, which as Executive Officer of Marine Corps Squadron VMF-121, he was experiencing:

“We are working with the USAF at the 422 Test and Evaluation squadron at Nellis. We tend to busy here, so we send operators from the training department or former patch wearers (MAWTS-1 and TOPGUN) to work with SMEs from the Navy and USAF at conferences or simulator events.

Major Summa in front of the Squadron building. Credit: SLD
Major Summa in front of the Squadron building. Credit: SLD 

The young senior company grade who are coming off of a tour with a Hornet or a Harrier and now wearing a Green Knights patch go into the room with the aviators at Nellis with F-16 and F-15 pilots and work through the process.

In effect, an F-35 enterprise is emerging built around a group of individuals in the profession of arms who want to make this airplane as lethal as possible.

People come in from different backgrounds – Raptor, Eagle, Viper, Hornet or Harrier – and are focusing on the common airplane and ways to make it work more effectively in a tactical setting. And talking to the experience of a common plane is a crucial piece of the effort.

When an F-35 pilot sits down regardless of what service he is in, he’s talking with an individual from another service on the same data point….If we differ in training, it doesn’t have to do with hardware, it doesn’t have to do with software; it has to do with service approaches or carry-over from previous doctrinal employment.

When an F-35A pilot talks with an F-35B pilot and they discuss what they would to see with the evolution of the aircraft they are discussing essentially the same airplane and its evolution.

It is two operators of the same airplane focused on what they want to see evolve even though they are in different services. And the commonality point is really lost in the broader discussion of the F-35. And when it comes to strategic impact it is the commonality associated with logistics, which will have a really significant operational impact.

The interoperability at the supply level, the logistics level, the procurement level or the maintenance or training level is a key foundation for joint and coalition airpower going forward leveraging the F-35”

It is inevitable that the joint services and the coalition partners are clearly going to find significant commonalities and ways to work together going forward from the process of figuring out how collectively to use their F-35s within their service or partner operational cultures.

And this is facilitated by the common cockpit information systems within the fleet. One little noted commonality is the common symbiology in the cockpit.

All pilots will have uniformly understandable symbols and cockpit display icons that are not language specific.

The common icons and graphics can be understood correlated with evolving combat experience, in the fighter, attack and electronic warfare mode.

This represents a dramatic shift from the past.

For the first time in history, individual F-35 pilots –A, B or C – will have the best database of real time knowledge in the history of combat aviation.

And all of this is internal to their cockpit and enabled by advances in computer processing and sensor information fusing.

The USMC and the smaller partner air forces due to their size will find very innovative ways to leverage their F-35s within their operational situations. 

The USAF as the largest user of the F-35 will find unique ways to combine F-35s with their other assets in shaping a more effective air dominance enterprise.

And the USN will focus on how the F-35C enables a more effective integrated fire controls integration effort and to empower the evolving integrated air wing and Navy surface warfare ships and their submarines.

Each service and partner will provide ways to think about how the F-35 transforms their approaches; and the sharing of these ways to think will empower the overall joint and coalition combat capabilities for US and allied joint and coalition forces as well.

In other words, rather than thinking of an IOC it is better to focus on rolling out of a global fleet which will help re-shape collaboration and innovation in 21st century air operations.

[1] http://breakingdefense.com/2015/05/fundamental-change-in-direction-for-f-35-kendall-floats-plan-to-buy-450-planes/

To download the Special Report, go to the following:

https://sldinfo.com/the-coming-of-the-f-35-the-services-and-partners-get-ready/

Taking NATO’s Collective Approach To Maritime Logistics To The Next Level: Building A Joint Logistics C2

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2015-06-12 by Murielle Delaporte

Interview with Rear Admiral Juan A. Cornago, Spanish Navy, MARCOM DCOS Support

Rear Admiral Juan Cornago joined the Spanish Navy College in 1979 and served in the amphibious ship Aragon and in the Navy Air Wing as a Harrier pilot.

He then commanded several ships, including the amphibious ship Galicia in 2010 during the Atalanta operation.

He is now Deputy Chief of Staff Support at Northwood headquarters where he had already served as N7 training branch head between 2002 and 2005.

Rear Admiral Cornago arrived at MARCOM (Allied Maritime Command) in his current position, as the NATO Command Structure Reform launched at the Lisbon Summit in 2010 was being implemented with the merger of Maritime Command Naples and Maritime Command Northwood, with the latter becoming the headquarters for all NATO Standing Maritime Groups, i.e. two Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMG 1 and 2) and two Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups (SNMCMG 1 and 2).

In the interview below, he describes his mission as head of logistics for MARCOM, the specificities of maritime logistics in general and within NATO.

He is tasked as well with navigating the way ahead towards a better coordination and integration of NATO members’ naval assets within the Alliance overall strategy and the Readiness Action Plan set during the last Summit in Wales in 2014.

Ensuring life support

As DCOS Support, my responsibility is to deliver life support for the operational forces.

Logistics is about planning and providing the right sustainment and replenishment to the naval forces in order to maintain capabilities in the theaters, whether it involves personnel, fuel, ammunition and so on.

My role at the strategic level is to provide the advice and expertise when it is required, in particular through various working groups.

At the operational level, my main role here in Northwood is to participate in the planning of exercises and operations.

And at the tactical level, we are, as a maritime training command, also responsible for the assigned forces on a permanent basis.

We therefore have different levels of responsibilities, which is not a small task and we have to be careful to keep the right balance between the operational and the tactical levels.

My directorate runs the logistics, but we had to change our mindset as MARCOM used to be a tactical command: we shall reached our operational capability this summer, although we do not forget that we still have a tactical role in support of the Standing Naval Forces under our command.

Deployable by nature

In the maritime domain, ships can store, so sailors tend to encounter less issues than troops on land.

We have no problem to maintain sustainment to the forces at sea, as long – however – as the sea lines of communication (SLOC) are maintained open.

If the deployability of NATO forces as a whole involves many logistics aspects, in the naval field, we are deployable per se.

The way we do logistics is to send out as much supply as possible to a place within the theater where the threat is not as important: we forward deploy a logistics base from which we go back and forth to resupply the forces.

We use ships and tankers, which are always in the theater, to transfer storages to other naval forces.

So we are not so much worried about prepositioning.

Navies reason more in terms of pre-deployment than prepositioning, while some nations like the United States are in the process of developing floating sea bases.

Fostering a collective approach to maritime logistics among NATO allies

In NATO, the nations have the responsibility to support the forces they provide and our effort is to coordinate those efforts.

During the planning of operations, we put in place the right structure to be able to do so in coordination with a representative of each nation.

We interact with other NATO agencies in order to get the right expertise as far as host nation support or contracting are concerned.

Navies have been used to work together for a long time, especially since the NATO Standing Maritime Groups have been in place for decades.

A5327, Brillant Mariner 2013, F219, F576, ITA Helicopter, Photo onboard ITS CAVOUR, SNMG2, STROMBOLI, Ship
A5327, Brillant Mariner 2013, F219, F576, ITA Helicopter, Photo onboard ITS CAVOUR, SNMG2, STROMBOLI, Ship

This common history has led us to a standardization process, regarding not only in procedures, but also in the adoption of standards in systems among different Navies.

We have therefore been able to reach a good interoperability level.

In refueling for instance, we all use the same fuel and equipment, so any ship can be refueled at sea.

Another example relates to the standing procedure set up among naval allied powers to share spare parts: when a ship has a specific need, the crew will, before asking its own national authorities, inquire within the Task Force via an EMREC (Emergency Requirement).

Thanks to NATO’s standardization number, it is often possible to find the missing spare part within NATO forces on short notice, which saves a lot of time and resources.

The same goes with the use of helicopters within a Standing Maritime Group (SNMCMGs do not have a dedicated helicopter): the Commander of the Group will look after making the best use of the pool available for the common good.

These are examples of what a future collective approach to logistics could further develop.

If we are a long way to some kind of burdensharing among nations as far as logistics capabilities are concerned, since nations are independent and have national interests outside the Alliance, the latter does create an environment favorable to foster pooling and sharing.

There exists as a matter of fact many bilateral agreements (e.g. common maintenance of the Seafox fleet between the Netherlands and Belgium; common brigade for amphibious operations between Spain and Italy; etc), which NATO is very happy with and encourages, but does not lead.

Recent operations have only reinforced the value of a collective approach to logistics, which the nations have increasingly gained appreciation of.

Ocean shield as NATO’s naval landmark

Because of this long history of NATO Navies working together for decades, manœuvering together requires more fine-tuning than resetting. However we always apply lessons learned in order to better prepare for the future.

In that sense, the same way Afghanistan has redefined in many regards air and land coalition warfare, Ocean Shield has been a challenge for NATO naval forces at the beginning of the operation, in particular in terms of refueling.

The Indian Ocean is a huge area with very little ports available, so we had to rely more on support at sea as well as host nation support.

Because some of the coalition forces already operate in that part of the world, we were able to fill the gaps. But it has definitely been a major mindset shift in the way NATO had been operating till then.

One of the issues we encountered during Ocean Shield concerns Medevacs, since we did not have a Role 2 at sea.

Usually we operate close to the shores of a member-nation of the Group, which provides a helicopter for a medical emergency.

TS MIMBELLI after her contribution with Operation Ocean Shield (OOS)
TS MIMBELLI after her contribution with Operation Ocean Shield (OOS)

So it is just a problem of coordination.

In this case, the distance had a true operational impact and we had to mitigate by embarking a forward surgical medical team onboard to ease problems.

Some of the ships are able to provide a Role 2, such as big amphibious ships, tankers, LPDs (landing platform/dock), but not all.

Frigates for instance cannot and that is why we now include a forward surgical team in the crew.

We are hence pursuing within NATO such a collective approach, so even though all nations do not have the same capabilities and do not necessarily have tankers or hospital ships or supply ships, they can still operate within a Naval Group.

When we prepare to go into an operation, we ask for the combined operational requirements which nations can fill.

The harmonization of already standardized NATO procedures provides the necessary commonality.

The Way Ahead: joint logistics C2 as the foundation

NATO’s logistics vision has set four lines of efforts:

  1. Enhancing deployability;
  2. Reinforcing sustainability;
  3. Building more capable and interoperable systems;
  4. Creating a solid logistics C2 capability.

These are the guidelines for the future. In the maritime domain, we do not have to work so much on deployability and sustainability, as these requirements are inherent to us and have been worked out.

Autonomy at sea ranges between one to two week for SNMCMGs to twenty to twenty-five days for SNMGs.

Brillant Mariner 2013, ITS CAVOUR, Photo onboard ITS CAVOUR, SNMG2, SPA Helicopter
Brillant Mariner 2013, ITS CAVOUR, Photo onboard ITS CAVOUR, SNMG2, SPA Helicopter 

A frigate will hold that much supply on board, but through tankers and supply ships we can keep it going, again, as long as sea lines of communication are open.

There is of course however a human limit, since crews usually need to rest after six months of deployment.

What is new is the objective we have regarding logistics Command and Control.

As we interact more at the joint level and work closer together at the planning level to prepare the exercises, we have to coordinate and integrate the traditional modus operandi of maritime logistics with new ways of operating on the basis of a solid C2 in logistics on the theater, in the commanding structure as well as at the joint units’ level.

We indeed need to integrate the maritime domain with the Joint Logistics Support Group concept[ref] According to NATO’s 2009 document entitled “Allied Joint Doctrine For Logistics AJP – 4(B)”, « the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF) led to the development of a conceptual framework for logistic support to NRF operations; “MC 526, Logistics Support Concept for NRF Operation”. Since NATO logistic support options (including their command and control (C2) relationship) were lacking in their ability to effectively support a NRF Operation, new logistic principles have been introduced in the NRF Logistic Support Concept » (source: http://hogskolene.forsvaret.no/english/Documents/AJP-4%28B%29%20Logistics%20doctrine%202009.pdf)[/ref]

We are doing a lot of work in that direction, especially as far as logistics Command and control are concerned.

The processes are there, as JLSG has been exercised before, but it is the first time MARCOM will join.

This does require more coordination and we have been planning two exercises, which will test this ability.

Trident Jewel 2015 is a small exercise, but it has been a challenge, as it is the first time we operate at a joint level from a logistics point of view. We are in the process of learning how to tackle the land and air logistics as well.

The second exercise is Trident Juncture 2015 to occur in the Fall.

We shall be in charge of the maritime planning of what will be the largest Livex [Live exercise] of NATO in fifteen years.

But no matter how much one plans, the level of required supply can vary: it is in that regard the same at land or at sea.

Editor’s Note: Murielle Delaporte went to sea with the NATO counter-mine task force and was onboard the German Marine Tender Donau earlier this year.

She is the co-founder of Second Line of Defense and the editor of Operationnels where a complete dossier on the NATO approach to mine warfare is discussed from the standpoint of her time in the Baltic sea operation.

Moscow and the INF Violations: How to Respond?

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
At present, most Russians still probably want the regime-led reform rather than regime change. (Credit Image: Bigstock)

2015-06-10 By Richard Weitz

Reversing Russia’s INF violations may take years.

It took Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush seven years to convince the Soviet Union to destroy a radar system that violated the since abandoned 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

Russia ceased complying with the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in 2007 and has yet to end its violations.

Originally most NATO governments seemed to treat the Russian violation issue as a question that Washington and Moscow needed to resolve directly.

Now the violation has become linked with renewed NATO concerns about how the Russian government has been directing nuclear threats and deployments against the alliance.

As with the U.S. drone campaigns and renewed U.S. military operations in Iraq, the administration is finding it difficult to balance the president’s rhetorical support for disarmament and arms control with its projects to counter Russian aggression.

Obama administration officials openly acknowledge that, given the poor security relationship between Russia and the United States, they will not be able to negotiate another major bilateral arms control treaty with Putin before leaving office in January 2017.

The administration is no longer actively seeking Russia’s acceptance of U.S. or NATO missile defense plans and has lost hope of negotiating major reductions in Russia’s large tactical nuclear weapons stockpile.

U.S. officials also believe that chances of securing Senate support for ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty have declined due to decreased congressional support for (or confidence in) the Obama administration’s national security policies.

Indeed, members of Congress are also demanding strong action to counter Russia’s treaty violations and discourage Iran and other countries from also violating arms control treaties.

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY16 adopted by the House of Representatives last month, if enacted in the final legislation, would require the White House to notify Congress within 30 days if Russia flight-tests or deploys an INF-prohibited missile and the Intelligence Community and the Defense Department to notify Congress of what they have told NATO about Russia’s violation.

In addition, if Moscow continues its non-compliance with the INF Treaty, the bill would require United States to develop counterforce and countervailing capabilities against Russia; suspend bilateral military-to-military contacts or cooperation; stop funding implementation of the New START accord; and provide the Aegis Ashore BMD sites in Poland and Romania with defenses against cruise missiles.

The Obama administration still hopes that threatening concrete retaliatory measures, along with continued diplomatic efforts and public shaming of Moscow, will induce Russia to come back into compliance with the INF Treaty. However, the administration has recently been publicly considering more assertive responses to Russia’s INF violation but has yet to commit to any specific countermeasure.

The defense Department has developed response options.

During his Senate confirmation hearings in early February 2015, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter indicated that he was inclined to recommend retaliating if Russia failed to convince Washington that it had come back into compliance with the INF treaty.

In his written responses to the questions posed by the Senate Armed Services Committee, Carter said that, “Russia’s continued disregard for its international obligations and lack of meaningful engagement on this particular issue require the United States to take actions to protect its interests and security as well as those of its allies and partners.”

In general, Carter added the U.S. response “should continue to remind Russia why the U.S. and Russia signed this treaty in the first place and be designed to bring Russia back into verified compliance with its obligations….[and] must make clear to Russia that if it does not return to compliance our responses will make them less secure than they are today… [as well as] negating any advantage Russia might gain from deploying an INF-prohibited system.”

If Russia does not return to compliance, the United States has several options.

According to Carter, the three main ones are: deploying “active defenses to counter intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles; counterforce capabilities to prevent intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missile attacks; and countervailing strike capabilities to enhance U.S. or allied forces.”

The least confrontational option, which would more likely to win NATO backing and thwart any Russian effort to use the issue to stir up tensions between the United States and European countries, is to enhance alliance defenses against Russian cruise missiles.

However, this could present challenges due to the potential difficulty of detecting and intercepting Russian cruise missiles that can reach nearby NATO countries in only a few minutes.

The United States could alternatively deploy its own ground-based cruise or ballistic missiles in Europe to threaten Russian military forces, either any INF-banned missiles Moscow deploys or even other Russian military assets, with an equivalent U.S. system.

The move to generate new “counterforce” capabilities would aim to induce Moscow either to negotiate a compromise or to deny—by being able to destroy the Russian missiles before they could be launched—Moscow any military advantages from violating the treaty.

NATO pursued such a successful “dual-track” policy in the 1980s when the alliance deployed U.S. intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles in several West European countries to induce Moscow to accept a “zero-option” INF Treaty for both U.S. and Russian nuclear systems in Europe.

However, it is unclear which countries would host such weapons.

Those NATO members most inclined to welcome them would be those located closest to Russia, but deploying these land-based systems in proximity to Russian territory would also make them more vulnerable to Russian preemption.

In addition, the administration would prefer to avoid violating the INF Treaty, which bans such ground-launched intermediate-range missiles.

The administration is also considering a “countervailing strategy” designed to increase NATO’s strike capabilities in general in a way that, without matching any new Russian ground-based systems, would negate any adverse effects that might result from Russia’s violating the INF Treaty.

The Treaty permits sea- and air-launched intermediate-range systems even while banning them on the land.

Putting U.S. non-strategic systems aimed at Russia on highly mobile warplanes and warships (such as F-35s, which NATO countries will need in any case to employ US tactical nuclear bombs in the future) would make them less vulnerable and would be seen as less provocative than stationing ground-launched missiles near Russia, where both sides would have incentives to use these missiles first against the other’s strike forces.

Looking ahead, this experience underscores the importance of the “trust but verify” maxim that has always guided U.S. arms control policies.

Also see the following:

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/moscow-and-inf-why-is-russia-cheating/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/remembering-the-inf-treaty-the-euromissile-battle-was-about-the-future-of-europe/

 

 

Moscow and INF: Why Is Russia Cheating?

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
06/09/2015

2015-06-09 By Richard Weitz

In its just released report on foreign governments’ Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Non-proliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, the U.S. State Department highlighted that the Russians are violating the INF treaty.

“The United States determined the cruise missile developed by the Russian Federation meets the INF Treaty definition of a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, and as such, all missiles of that type, and all launchers of the type used to launch such a missile, are prohibited under the provisions of the INF Treaty.

The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty prohibits Russia and the United States from developing, manufacturing, or deploying ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500-5,500 kilometers.

The Treaty permits both sides to possess sea- or air-launched cruise missiles within the ranges banned by the Treaty, but the parties may not test them from mobile ground-based launchers or deploy them on land.

The Russian response has always been to deny that they have tested any missile in violation of the treaty.

According to one participant in the Russian-U.S. exchanges on the issue, “so far, our discussion has been roughly like this. Hi, we have a concern, you violated the treaty.

They say, no, we haven’t. But no, you really have, and let us share some information with you about… no, you have to give us more information. We don’t know anything about it.”

Russian officials and media have been describing the U.S. INF allegations as, in the words of Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov on the state-owned RT television channel, “part of the anti-Russian campaign unleashed by Washington in connection with the Ukraine crisis.

And the US is ready to exploit any means to discredit Russia.”

A Russian GLCM is launched from an Iskander-K launcher at Kapustin Yar in 2007.
A Russian GLCM is launched from an Iskander-K launcher at Kapustin Yar in 2007.

Why is Russia violating the INF Treaty? There are several possible reasons.

Russian officials may be maneuvering to induce the United States into withdrawing from the INF Treaty, which they have long disliked.

From Moscow’s perspective, it would be better for Washington to bear the onus of formal withdrawal from the treaty so that other countries in general, and NATO allies in particular, would resist strong measures against Russia.

By pursuing this “soft exit” strategy from the INF and other arms control agreements, Russia can violate an agreement while placing on others the burden of either withdrawing from it, responding with counter-measures, or remaining compliant and constrained by an accord that Moscow is violating.

Prominent Russian national security officials, including President Putin, believe that the INF Treaty—along with NATO membership enlargement, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty—represents one of those unequal agreements that the collapsing Soviet Union and then the prostrate Russian Federation was compelled to accept.

The Russian Foreign Ministry has extended this complaint to cover more recent years.

Denying U.S. allegations of Russian treaty violations and accusing the U.S. government of lying and hypocrisy, the Ministry in 2014 charged that:

“Washington is systematically carrying out a plan to dismantle the global strategic stability system…The Americans started this process in 2001, by unilaterally withdrawing from the ABM treaty.

Now it is aggravated by a rapid and unlimited build-up of the US global missile defense system, an unwillingness to clean up the territory of other states from the US tactical nuclear arsenal deployed there, elaboration of a provocative strategy of Prompt Global Strike, and an excessive build-up of conventional weapons, including their offensive components.”

Of course, this victimization perspective makes Russian officials more comfortable violating these treaties.

In addition, Russia might want INF-range systems to attack the ballistic missile defense systems and conventional forces that NATO is deploying around Russia’s periphery.

Russia could use intermediate-range systems to deter and defeat potential threats from surrounding countries and counterbalance U.S. superiority in conventional forces and missile defenses.

Russian officials have long argued that, whereas the United States does not need such missiles to deter attacks from its neighbors Mexico and Canada, Russia is surrounded by countries–including India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, North Korea, and China—that are acquiring large numbers of short- and intermediate-range missiles—states that have, or could soon have, nuclear weapons.

They also note that Russia is vulnerable from air strikes launched from these neighboring states.

The United States and Russia joined in a limited effort to induce other countries to adhere to the INF Treaty, but this campaign has so far involved little more than issuing an appeal at the U.N. General Assembly.

No other country has joined the Treaty beyond the United States and the Russian Federation (though some provisions apply to the other former Soviet republics).

It is possible that Russian leaders might have hoped that the United States would not soon discover the violation, especially if the plan was to develop the new system but not soon deploy it.

U.S. officials engaged in talks with the Russian officials and experts believe that only a small number of Russians originally knew about the program.

If Moscow had successfully concealed the violation, that would have decreased the prospects of a U.S. response.

Various U.S. experts believe that the Russian government may be violating other arms control agreements, such as the Biological Weapons Convention, the Vienna Document, and the Open Skies Agreement.

In addition, Russia has long been pursuing a variety of tactics to intimidate neighboring countries and undermine NATO’s cohesion.

In pursuit of these goals, Russian leaders have been threatening to attack countries that align themselves with NATO policies and have tried to win over West European leaders through sweetheart energy deals and other inducements.

Whatever the original reason for the deployment, Moscow may now hope that NATO governments will divide over how to respond to a new missile that only threatens the eastern members of the alliance.

While Poland and the Baltic states likely will favor a vigorous response, NATO members beyond the range of the new weapon might oppose a strong reaction.

Finally, Russian actions regarding INF, nuclear threats, and other issues suggest that they are pursuing a nuclear doctrine and modernization plan that differs from their published military doctrine, which continues to describe nuclear weapons as a weapon of last resort.

This experience underscores the importance of the “trust but verify” maxim that has always guided good U.S. arms control policies.

Credit Photo: https://fas.org/blogs/security/2014/07/russia-inf/