Sailors assigned to Air Department aboard the world’s largest aircraft carrier, USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), guide an F/A-18E Super Hornet attached to Strike Fighter Squadron 213 on the ship’s flight deck, July 6, 2025.
07.06.2025
USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78)
By Robbin Laird
World leaders find themselves lurching from crisis to crisis with little time to catch their breath. This reactive scramble has become the defining characteristic of our era or what might be called the “anarchy of the moment.”
Unlike the grand ideological struggles or systematic breakdowns that marked previous periods of global disorder, today’s chaos feels fundamentally different. It’s not driven solely by competing visions of world order or the collapse of established systems, but rather by an endless succession of urgent, interconnected crises that demand immediate responses. Each moment brings its own emergency, its own imperative for action, leaving little room for the kind of strategic thinking that once shaped international relations.
The anarchy of the moment is born from velocity. Information travels instantly, markets react in milliseconds, and social movements can mobilize millions within hours. When a single tweet can trigger a diplomatic incident or a supply chain disruption in one region can cause shortages halfway around the world within days, the traditional tools of governance, deliberation, consultation, careful planning, begin to feel obsolete.
Consider how recent global events have unfolded. Conflicts that might once have simmered for months before drawing international attention now explode into global consciousness within hours, complete with real-time footage, competing narratives, and immediate demands for action from world leaders. Economic disruptions that previous generations might have had weeks to analyze and respond to now require emergency measures implemented over weekends.
This compression of time has fundamentally altered the nature of leadership and decision-making. Rather than chess masters contemplating long-term strategy, today’s leaders increasingly resemble emergency room doctors, triaging an endless stream of urgent cases while trying to keep the patient alive.
What makes this anarchy particularly disorienting is its ubiquitous character. In previous eras, global disorder often emanated from great powers or major institutions. Today’s chaos emerges from everywhere and anywhere, a single individual with a smartphone can trigger international incidents, small-scale cyber attacks can cascade into major disruptions, and local environmental disasters quickly become global concerns.
This ubiquitous of crisis means that traditional hierarchies and channels of influence are constantly being bypassed. A teenager’s climate activism can reshape international negotiations. A regional bank’s collapse can threaten global financial stability. A local conflict can draw in major powers through the magnetic pull of social media attention and public pressure.
The result is a world where the next major disruption is as likely to come from an unexpected corner as from the usual suspects, making prediction and preparation extraordinarily difficult.
Ironically, the very systems designed to bring order and efficiency to our interconnected world have amplified the anarchy of the moment. Global supply chains that optimize for efficiency prove brittle when disrupted. Financial systems that enable instant capital flows also enable instant contagion. Communication networks that allow unprecedented coordination also facilitate the rapid spread of misinformation and panic.
Our interconnectedness means that local disturbances rarely remain local, while our real-time awareness of these cascading effects creates a constant sense of crisis. We are simultaneously more informed about global events than any previous generation and less able to process that information in ways that lead to coherent action.
Perhaps most fundamentally, the anarchy of the moment reflects a collapse of temporal perspective. When every crisis is immediate and urgent, the distinction between important and unimportant, lasting and temporary, becomes difficult to maintain. Long-term challenges compete for attention with daily emergencies, often losing out to whatever is most visceral and immediate.
This creates a kind of political and social attention deficit disorder, where societies careen from one focus to another without ever developing the sustained attention necessary for addressing complex, systemic problems. The urgent consistently drives out the important.
Yet even within this apparent chaos, patterns persist. The anarchy of the moment may feel random and unpredictable, but it unfolds within existing structures of power, wealth, and influence. Some actors are better positioned to exploit the chaos than others. Some institutions prove more resilient than expected. Some problems, despite being urgent, never quite rise to the level of demanding immediate action.
Understanding these underlying currents or the persistent forces that shape how moments of anarchy unfold may be key to navigating this new reality. Rather than trying to eliminate the chaos or return to some imagined era of stability, perhaps the task is learning to operate effectively within it.
The challenge is in effect chaos management.
The anarchy of the moment may be the defining condition of our interconnected age. The question is not whether we can restore order in the traditional sense, but whether we can develop new forms of adaptability, resilience, and wisdom that allow us to thrive amid the constant churn of urgent demands and immediate crises.
In a world where the next moment might bring anything, the premium is no longer on predicting the future but on cultivating the capacity to respond thoughtfully when that unpredictable future arrives.
By some sort of cosmic accident, my dissertation at Columbia University was entitled: “On Historical Change: Order Within Chaos.”
But then again, I took a two-year course when an undergraduate on something called “symbolic logic” and no one including myself understood why I was doing so. I would like to say authoritatively that I was anticipating AI but of course that would be something only a politician could claim concerning personal foresight.
Note: After working on shaping a special report on Pasquale Preziosa’s recent articles, I began to work on this article.
The New Global Power Equation: A Special Report Based on the Work of Pasquale Preziosa
Germany has emerged as Ukraine’s most critical drone technology partner since February 2022, fundamentally transforming both nations’ defense capabilities through unprecedented industrial cooperation.
German companies have delivered over 900 advanced reconnaissance and strike drones to Ukraine while establishing full manufacturing facilities on Ukrainian soil – a level of wartime defense cooperation unmatched in modern history.
This partnership has not only supercharged Ukraine’s evolution into a drone warfare superpower but can impact on or empower Germany’s own military transformation, accelerating its shift from traditional defense procurement to an agile, innovation-focused approach emphasizing mass production and autonomous systems.
The strategic implications extend far beyond immediate military support.
Through supporting Ukraine’s drone operations, Germany has gained invaluable real-world battlefield data that is reshaping its own military doctrine, industrial policy, and defense investment priorities.
German defense officials now recognize that drones account for 60-70% of equipment destruction in modern warfare, validating their pivot toward distributed manufacturing, human-machine teaming, and precision mass production over traditional exquisite systems.
German companies have provided comprehensive drone capabilities across the entire spectrum of unmanned systems. Quantum-Systems has delivered nearly 500 Vector reconnaissance drones through German government funding, while simultaneously establishing a complete manufacturing ecosystem in Ukraine. Their Vector systems feature advanced AI-powered target detection, GPS-denied navigation capabilities, and specialized electronic warfare resistance – technologies proven essential in Ukraine’s intensive EW environment.
The company’s Ukrainian facility, inaugurated by German Economy Minister Robert Habeck, now employs 80 people expanding to 120, producing 1,000 units annually with fully localized fuselage production. This represents more than equipment delivery – it’s a complete technology transfer that has enhanced Ukrainian manufacturing capabilities while providing Germany with distributed production resilience.
Helsing has committed to delivering 10,000 AI-enabled strike drones, including 4,000 plywood-constructed HF-1 systems and 6,000 next-generation HX-2 drones with 100-kilometer range and swarm coordination capabilities. These systems incorporate breakthrough innovations like radar-transparent wooden construction combined with sophisticated AI guidance systems that enable autonomous mission completion even when communications are severed.
Rheinmetall has provided both offensive and defensive capabilities, delivering multiple SurveilSPIRE mobile reconnaissance systems and two Skynex air defense systems specifically designed to counter drone threats. The Skynex systems have proven particularly effective against Iranian Shahed drones, demonstrating the critical importance of layered air defense in modern warfare.
HENSOLDT’s contribution focuses on sensor technologies, providing 10 TRML-4D radars capable of tracking 1,500 targets simultaneously up to 250 kilometers range. These systems form the backbone of Ukraine’s air defense networks, specifically optimized for detecting small, fast-moving drones and cruise missiles.
The German-Ukrainian partnership has evolved from emergency aid to strategic industrial cooperation through comprehensive technology transfer programs. Quantum-Systems achieved 100% localization of Vector drone production in Ukraine by 2025 actually improving the design by reducing drone weight through superior Ukrainian materials. Their training programs have developed 200+ Ukrainian operators through a train-the-trainer model using 15 local instructors.
Helsing’s distributed manufacturing approach represents a paradigm shift toward resilient production networks. Their “Resilience Factories” across Europe, starting with the completed RF-1 facility in southern Germany, can produce over 1,000 drones monthly with capability to scale to tens of thousands during conflict escalation. This model provides both strategic autonomy for Germany and sustainable industrial capacity for Ukraine.
The battlefield feedback loop has proven crucial for rapid innovation. German systems undergo continuous improvement based on Ukrainian combat experience, with development cycles compressed from years to months. This has resulted in significant enhancements including frequency-hopping communications, improved battery life, enhanced stability systems, and specialized EW countermeasures.
Ukrainian forces first employed German drones during the Battle of Siverskyi Donets in May 2022, where Quantum Vector systems operated effectively through smoke and electronic warfare interference. Since then, German-supported drones have contributed to Ukraine’s most successful operations, including the devastating June 2025 “Operation Spider’s Web” that destroyed over 40 Russian aircraft across four airbases using strikes reaching 4,000+ kilometers into Russian territory.
The combat effectiveness data is striking. Helsing’s HF-1 drones have successfully engaged high-value Russian assets including Pantsir-S1 and Buk-M3 air defense systems at ranges of 45-50 kilometers behind enemy lines. Their radar-transparent construction and AI guidance systems provide remarkable survivability in contested environments.
Despite intensive Russian electronic warfare efforts, German systems maintain approximately 67% survival rates – losing roughly one-third of deployed systems while achieving mission objectives. This performance validates the technological approach emphasizing AI autonomy, EW resistance, and distributed operations rather than relying solely on communications links.
German counter-drone systems have proven equally effective. The Skynex air defense platforms successfully intercept Iranian-supplied Shahed drones, while mobile jamming systems disrupt Russian drone communications across multiple frequency bands.
The Ukrainian experience has fundamentally altered German military thinking, accelerating the transition from traditional procurement models to innovation-focused approaches. Germany has embraced Ukraine’s “precision mass” doctrine deploying large quantities of relatively inexpensive, AI-enabled systems rather than smaller numbers of sophisticated platforms.
German defense planners now acknowledge that modern battlefields offer “little to no place to hide,” fundamentally reshaping force deployment, dispersal, and operational concepts. This recognition has driven doctrinal shifts toward distributed operations, human-machine teaming, and network-centric warfare approaches.
The cost-exchange dynamics observed in Ukraine validate German investment priorities. Ukrainian drones costing thousands of euros routinely destroy Russian equipment worth millions, demonstrating superior cost-effectiveness compared to traditional expensive systems. This has influenced German procurement toward mass-producible autonomous systems rather than exquisite platforms.
Electronic warfare integration has become paramount in German military planning. The necessity of EW-resistant systems, demonstrated through Ukraine’s intensive jamming environment, has driven development of AI-native systems capable of autonomous operation when communications are denied.
Germany’s €100 billion Sondervermögen (Special Fund) established in February 2022 reflects the strategic urgency created by the Ukrainian conflict. Total German defense spending reached €78-85 billion in 2024, meeting NATO’s 2% GDP target for the first time since the 1990s, with significant allocations specifically for drone and autonomous systems capabilities.
Major procurement programs directly influenced by Ukrainian lessons include €1.3 billion for comprehensive counter-drone systems, hundreds of millions for reconnaissance and strike drones, and first-time acquisition of loitering munitions. The €200+ million LUNA NG contract for 13 reconnaissance systems exemplifies accelerated procurement timelines – reducing typical multi-year processes to months based on war urgency.
Germany has reversed its long-standing policy against weaponizing drones, deciding to arm its Heron systems based on Ukrainian battlefield validation. Parliamentary defense committee discussions emphasize NATO-wide adoption of Ukrainian-proven drone tactics, with Germany leading alliance drone capability coalitions.
Organizational changes include proposals for dedicated “drone branches” within German forces and integration of autonomous systems across all service domains. The Bundeswehr is adapting basic training to include drone handling and counter-drone skills at platoon level and above.
German defense investment has fundamentally reoriented toward rapid innovation and mass production capabilities. Helsing’s €770+ million funding and €5 billion valuation represents the success of Germany’s new approach, emphasizing AI-native defense companies over traditional contractors.
The company’s distributed manufacturing model demonstrates strategic resilience through geographic diversification. Multiple factories across Europe provide surge capacity while ensuring continued production despite potential supply chain disruptions.
European partnership programs reflect German priorities shaped by Ukrainian lessons. The Future Combat Air System (FCAS) with France and Spain now emphasizes “Remote Carrier” drones as loyal wingmen, while the Trinity House Agreement with the UK focuses on collaborative autonomous systems development.
Investment timelines have compressed dramatically. Traditional 5-10 year procurement cycles have accelerated to 2-3 years, with emphasis on rapid testing, iteration, and mass production rather than lengthy development phases. This reflects Germany’s adoption of Ukrainian-style continuous innovation cycles.
Germany has pioneered joint production models through its Ukrainian partnerships, including €5 billion in defense cooperation agreements and €400 million investment in Ukrainian long-range drone production. These represent more than commercial relationships – they’re strategic industrial partnerships that enhance both nations’ capabilities.
Export policy has evolved from restrictive to enabling approaches for drone technologies. Germany now supports the “Danish Model” of direct procurement from Ukrainian defense industry while integrating Ukrainian suppliers into German defense supply chains.
Technology transfer acceleration characterizes the new German approach. Helsing’s distributed manufacturing across Europe, MBDA Deutschland’s counter-UAS cooperation, and numerous joint ventures between German and Ukrainian companies demonstrate rapid adaptation compared to traditional defense procurement.
The transformation extends to dual-use technology integration. German companies are incorporating civilian AI advances, commercial manufacturing techniques, and startup innovation models into defense applications – a significant departure from traditional segregation between commercial and military sectors.
Germany’s Ukrainian drone partnership has positioned both nations at the forefront of next-generation warfare technology. The established production networks provide foundations for potential expansion across NATO allies, while the technological advances have broader applications for European defense requirements.
German defense spending is projected to increase to 3.5% of GDP (€140 billion annually) based on strategic reassessment following Ukrainian lessons. This includes requirements for 2,000+ long-range loitering munitions annually and expansion from 40,000 to 100,000+ additional troops.
Strategic autonomy considerations emphasize reducing dependence on U.S. and Chinese components through European production capacity. Germany’s distributed manufacturing model provides both sovereignty and resilience against supply chain disruption while creating sustainable industrial capacity.
Germany’s support for Ukraine’s drone revolution represents a paradigm shift in defense industrial cooperation, demonstrating how rapid battlefield innovation combined with scalable production models can transform military capabilities in real-time. This partnership has not only enhanced Ukraine’s defensive capabilities but has fundamentally reshaped German defense thinking, industrial policy, and military doctrine.
The Ukrainian experience validates that technological innovation, operational adaptability, and strategic resilience have become defining characteristics of military effectiveness in modern warfare.
Germany’s potential transformation from traditional procurement approaches to agile, innovation-focused models positions it as a leader in European defense modernization while providing crucial lessons for NATO allies facing similar strategic challenges.
The distributed production networks, AI-enabled autonomous systems, and rapid innovation cycles pioneered through this partnership will likely define the future of European defense capabilities.
The featured image was generated by an AI program.
See also the following:
From Plywood to Precision: How German Drones Are Changing Ukraine’s Battlefield Strategy
From Plywood to Precision: How German Drones Are Changing Ukraine’s Battlefield Strategy
The world’s power structures are undergoing their most profound transformation since the end of the Cold War. From the laboratories developing artificial intelligence to the missile ranges testing hypersonic weapons, a new kind of competition is emerging, one that threatens to make traditional notions of security, diplomacy, and national strength obsolete.
At the center of this transformation lies a stark reality: the old rules no longer apply. As European geo-political expert General Pasquale Preziosa warns, “Those who do not decide will be decided by others.” This isn’t merely a diplomatic platitude. It’s becoming the defining principle of 21st-century geopolitics.
The most immediate game-changer is the hypersonic missile. Traveling at five to eight times the speed of sound, roughly 12,000 kilometers per hour, these weapons fundamentally alter the nuclear balance that has kept the peace for decades. Unlike traditional ballistic missiles that follow predictable arcs, hypersonics can maneuver unpredictably at unprecedented speeds, rendering existing defense systems largely useless.
For Europe, this represents an existential challenge. With minimal anti-missile defenses, the continent finds itself particularly vulnerable to these weapons, especially when armed with nuclear warheads. Even the United States, long confident in its defensive capabilities, now finds itself playing catch-up in a race it once led.
The implications extend beyond military strategy. When decision-makers have mere minutes instead of hours to respond to incoming threats, the space for human judgment and human error shrinks dramatically. This compression of time may force nations to rely increasingly on automated systems, introducing new risks of technological failure or cyber manipulation at the most critical moments.
Modern conflict has expanded far beyond traditional land, sea, and air domains. Space itself has become an active theater of operations, where “atypical warfare” unfolds daily through signal jamming, cyber attacks on satellites, and covert missions by major powers. Control of space-based assets increasingly determines a nation’s ability to communicate, navigate, and gather intelligence.
Similarly, the cyber domain has evolved from a supporting capability to a primary vector of national power. Yet here, Europe finds itself in a particularly precarious position. Despite its regulatory leadership through frameworks like GDPR, the continent lacks major indigenous technology champions, leaving it dependent on American companies for critical digital infrastructure while being vulnerable to Chinese technological penetration.
Perhaps no competition better illustrates the new nature of power than the race for artificial intelligence supremacy. China’s 15th Five-Year Plan, covering 2026-2030, sets an audacious goal: global leadership in AI by 2030. This isn’t merely about economic growth—it represents a fundamental rewiring of national power around what Beijing calls “new quality productive forces.”
The Chinese approach treats every advanced semiconductor as a strategic asset, viewing technological dominance as the key to controlling future warfare, finance, medicine, and society itself. This perspective transforms global supply chains into instruments of geopolitical competition, where control over chip architectures becomes as important as control over traditional military assets.
The contrast with Western approaches is stark. While American innovation remains largely decentralized and market-driven, China’s model emphasizes vertical control and national mobilization. This creates a systemic competition between different models of organizing technological development, one that will likely determine which approach proves more effective at harnessing AI’s transformative potential.
Compounding these technological shifts is what Paul Bracken has labelled the Second Nuclear Age. Unlike the bilateral competition of the Cold War, this new race involves multiple players with different doctrines, capabilities, and risk tolerances.
Russia under Vladimir Putin has departed dramatically from the cooperation that marked previous decades, investing heavily in modernizing its nuclear forces with advanced hypersonic missiles and new intercontinental ballistic systems. Most troubling is Moscow’s adoption of a “limited first use” nuclear doctrine, the dangerous belief that nuclear conflicts can be contained through the use of smaller, tactical weapons.
Meanwhile, China is rapidly building toward strategic parity with the United States, developing advanced ballistic missiles with multiple warheads and deepening military cooperation with Russia. For the first time since the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States faces the prospect of nuclear competition on two fronts simultaneously.
The American response, the “third strategic offset” launched in 2014, attempts to maintain technological superiority through AI, robotics, and hypersonic weapons. However, this strategy faces significant obstacles as rival powers make their own advances in precisely these areas, potentially rendering current defense systems obsolete.
Against this backdrop of global transformation, Europe faces perhaps its most consequential strategic choice since World War II. The continent can no longer rely on others to guarantee its security or define its role in the world order.
Three paths lie ahead. The first involves adaptation without fundamental change, maintaining current structures while accepting a secondary role in global affairs. This path risks leaving Europe burdened by internal divisions and unable to achieve genuine strategic autonomy.
The second option requires systematic revision of how European nations cooperate, prioritizing common defense and empowering EU institutions to act as a unified geopolitical player. This would represent a profound shift from the current system of national sovereignty to genuine European integration in security matters.
The most ambitious path envisions a radical transformation of the European project itself—evolution toward a true federation with centralized control over foreign policy, defense, and security. This “United States of Europe” would compete directly with America, China, and Russia as a global superpower.
The stakes of this choice extend beyond Europe itself. As General Preziosa emphasizes, “rearmament without a common political direction is not deterrence, it is dispersion.” Increased defense spending by individual European nations, without coordination, risks creating internal divisions rather than external strength.
These military and technological changes unfold against the backdrop of diplomacy’s apparent decline. The war in Ukraine represents not just a military conflict but the culmination of two decades of eroding multilateralism. Traditional quiet diplomacy has given way to unilateral decisions, media-driven foreign policy, and personalized leadership styles that prioritize publicity over patient negotiation.
This shift has profound implications for conflict resolution. War increasingly appears to function as a systemic instrument, a tool that justifies economic hardship and military spending in democracies while helping autocracies consolidate control at home. When conflict becomes structurally useful to political elites, the incentives for peaceful resolution diminish accordingly.
The transformation of global power dynamics creates opportunities and challenges far beyond the primary competitors. South Asia provides a compelling example of how these shifts play out regionally. American policy inconsistency has created space for other powers to assert influence. Russia re-engaging as India’s military partner, China leveraging water control through massive dam projects, and Turkey pursuing neo-Ottoman ambitions through ties with Pakistan.
These regional realignments illustrate a broader trend: the decline of American hegemony creates opportunities for middle powers to pursue more independent strategies but also increases the potential for miscalculation and conflict as traditional alliance structures weaken.
Perhaps the most unsettling aspect of these developments is how they compress human decision-making time while expanding the potential consequences of those decisions. When hypersonic weapons can reach their targets in minutes, when AI systems process information faster than human operators can comprehend, and when cyber attacks can unfold in milliseconds, the space for careful deliberation shrinks dramatically.
This acceleration of conflict timelines, combined with the integration of AI into military command systems, raises profound questions about maintaining human control over life-and-death decisions. Algorithms, however sophisticated, can misinterpret ambiguous situations and remain vulnerable to cyber manipulation, risks that multiply when reaction times are measured in minutes rather than hours.
The thread connecting all these developments is the fundamental importance of decisive action in the face of rapid change. Whether addressing hypersonic threats, AI competition, nuclear modernization, or regional realignments, the luxury of gradual adaptation no longer exists.
For Europe, this means confronting uncomfortable truths about dependence and vulnerability while making hard choices about integration and sovereignty. For other powers, it means navigating an increasingly complex landscape where traditional metrics of strength matter less than technological capabilities and adaptive capacity.
The question facing leaders and citizens alike is whether humanity can develop institutions and norms capable of managing these new forms of power before they overwhelm existing systems of governance and security. The alternative, a world where speed trumps wisdom, where technological capability matters more than human judgment, and where the failure to decide quickly means having decisions imposed by others represents a future that serves no one’s long-term interests.
As we stand at this crossroads, the choices made in the coming years will likely determine whether the emerging global order enhances human security and prosperity or ushers in an era of unprecedented instability and conflict. The power to shape that future remains, for now, in human hands—but the window for exercising that power may be narrowing faster than we realize.
A video which explains the major concepts in the report can be seen below:
The report can be found here:
A podcast discussing the report can be found here:
A U.S. Air Force C-130J Super Hercules offloads cargo in support of exercise Resolute Force Pacific 2025 at Misawa Air Base, Japan, July 10, 2025.
By linking bases across the Indo-Pacific, the exercise validates expeditionary operations and the seamless movement of aircraft, cargo and personnel.
MISAWA AB, AOMORI, JAPAN
07.09.2025
35th Fighter Wing
By Robbin Laird
In 2021, my book entitled Training for the High-End Fight: The Strategic Shift of the 2020s was published.
I am starting a series of article re-engaging on this critical issue in the run up to my visit this Fall to the Italian International Flight Training School where there will be a great opportunity to look at one of the leading Western air forces addressing this challenge.
In this article, I want to revisit the argument presented in that book as my base line, so let me begin:
The fighter pilot climbing into an F-35C today faces a fundamentally different challenge than their predecessor from the Iraq War. Instead of operating as part of a traditional strike package with clearly defined roles, they must think and fight as a node in a vast, interconnected web of sensors, shooters, and decision-makers spanning multiple domains and services.
This shift from platform-centric warfare to network-enabled operations represents one of the most significant transformations in military thinking since the advent of combined arms warfare and it’s forcing a complete reimagining of how America trains its warriors.
The end of the “land wars” in Iraq and Afghanistan has coincided with the rise of peer competitors possessing sophisticated anti-access capabilities and advanced military technologies. This strategic shift demands “full spectrum crisis management” or the ability to seamlessly scale from peacetime presence operations to high-intensity conflict while maintaining precise control over escalation dynamics.
“We only win if we fight as an interoperable, networked, and distributed force,” explains Captain McCoy, Chief of Staff for the Navy Air Boss, reflecting on the challenge facing naval aviation. “We must embrace what is new and redefine what is basic warfighting capability.”
This transformation centers on the evolution from “kill chains” to “kill webs.” Traditional kill chains follow a linear progression: find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess.
But in contested environments against capable adversaries, this sequential approach proves too rigid and vulnerable. Kill webs, by contrast, create multiple pathways to achieve effects, with any sensor potentially informing any shooter across the joint force.
The introduction of fifth-generation fighters like the F-35 has accelerated this transformation. These aircraft aren’t just more capable platforms, they’re information nodes that fundamentally change how air power operates. As Rear Admiral Brophy of the Naval Air Warfare Development Center (NAWDC) notes, “A distributed fleet without integratability delivered by interactive kill webs would weaken the force.”
This reality is driving comprehensive changes to training syllabi across all services. At NAWDC, the traditional TOPGUN curriculum is being supplemented with new Maritime ISR (MISR) officer training, creating what some call “sixth generation officers” focused on the command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C2/ISR) capabilities that enable distributed operations.
“Training can no longer focus solely on platform capabilities,” emphasizes Captain McCoy. “Training has to develop young aviators who appreciate their role within a larger maneuver/combat element.” Fighter pilots must now understand how their F-35C complements fourth-generation aircraft within the carrier air wing and how that air wing integrates with distributed surface combatants across the entire carrier strike group.
Perhaps nowhere is this transformation more evident than in the renewed emphasis on what military professionals call “the left side of the kill chain” — the find, fix, and track functions that precede targeting and engagement.
“For the US Navy and the USAF, the weight of effort has been upon target and engage,” explains one senior officer. “But if you cannot find, fix or track something, you never get to target.” This shift requires training mission commanders to think through how various Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets could be used in complex strike packages, from P-8 maritime patrol aircraft sensors to satellite communications networks.
The challenge extends beyond simply accessing more information. In contested environments, operators must learn to synthesize data from multiple, often non-organic sources while making rapid decisions under pressure. This represents a fundamental cognitive shift from the deliberate targeting processes developed during the counterinsurgency era.
The transformation is perhaps most dramatic within the U.S. Marine Corps, which is undergoing its most significant reorganization since World War II. The service is shifting from an amphibious assault force designed for major combat operations to a distributed maritime force focused on sea control and sea denial in the Indo-Pacific.
Colonel Gillette, commanding officer of the Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1 (MAWTS-1), frames the challenge: “How do you bring forces afloat inside the red rings in a responsible way so that you can bring those pieces to the chess board or have them contribute to the overall crisis management objectives?”
This shift requires Marines to master entirely new skill sets. Fire support Marines, traditionally trained in deliberate targeting for ground operations, must now learn dynamic targeting for maritime battles. The service is experimenting with blended training environments that combine live flying events with sophisticated simulators to create contested environments impossible to replicate safely in the real world.
Live Virtual Constructive (LVC) training is emerging as a critical enabler of this transformation. By blending real platforms with synthetic threats and environments, LVC allows training for scenarios that would be prohibitively expensive or dangerous to execute with live forces alone.
“We will shape a blended training environment,” explains Colonel Gillette, “which, from the operator’s perspective, will be no different than a completely live environment.” This technology enables realistic training against peer-level threats while allowing for repeated iterations that would be impossible with purely live exercises.
The integration extends beyond individual services. The U.S. Air Force is working closely with naval forces to develop truly joint training scenarios. As one Air Force leader notes, “There is a clear recognition that the maritime forces and USAF integratability is the key to unlock the U.S. capabilities in the Pacific and the North Atlantic to prevail in the high end fight.”
The transformation isn’t limited to U.S. forces. Key allies are simultaneously restructuring their own forces and training approaches. Australia is developing a fifth-generation enabled fleet focused on the Indo-Pacific, while Britain is implementing its Integrated Operating Concept. The challenge lies in ensuring these parallel transformations remain interoperable.
“Doing so in interaction with allies and partners is a key part of the training environment,” notes one senior officer. “If in combat such sharing will be more widespread than allowed in most training environments, the joint enterprise will suffer significantly from combat preparation.”
This points to one of the most complex aspects of the transformation: balancing operational security requirements with the need for realistic training. Information sharing protocols that work during peacetime exercises may prove inadequate for the rapid decision-making required in actual crises.
The transformation of military training for great power competition is still in its early stages, but the direction is clear. Success will require abandoning comfortable assumptions about how military forces organize, train, and fight. Platform-centric thinking must give way to network-enabled operations. Sequential kill chains must evolve into adaptive kill webs. Most importantly, individual expertise must be balanced with collaborative capability across services, domains, and allies.
As Admiral Nimitz observed in the Pacific War, “Having confronted the Imperial Japanese Navy’s skill, energy, persistence, and courage, Nimitz identified the key to victory: ‘training, TRAINING and M-O-R-E T-R-A-I-N-I-N-G.'” The same principle applies today, but the training itself must be fundamentally reimagined for the challenges of 21st century warfare.
The stakes couldn’t be higher.
As I concluded my book, “These systems will have the proper effect only in the hands of skilled warriors, who, today, have to face a radical disjuncture from traditional training approaches and thinking in order to address these new types of threats.”
For a podcast which discuses this article, go to the following:
For a short briefing overview on the strategic shift, see the following
A U.S. Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey with Marine Helicopter Squadron 1 prepares to land during landing drills aboard the Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7), during 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) Composite Training Unit Exercise while underway in the Atlantic Ocean, June 28, 2025.
During COMPTUEX, the IWO ARG and 22nd MEU(SOC), refine tactics, techniques, and procedures to execute warfighting functions that enhance operational readiness and lethality as a unified IWOARG/22 MEU(SOC) team.
06.28.2025
22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit
Australia’s ambitious leap into nuclear submarine warfare through the AUKUS partnership represents one of the most significant strategic pivots in the nation’s defense history.
But a seemingly unrelated infrastructure project in Western Australia may be inadvertently creating a massive security vulnerability at the very heart of this cornerstone defense initiative.
In September 2021, Australia announced its historic commitment to the AUKUS deal. This is a landmark collaboration with the United Kingdom and United States that would see Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines. The decision marked a dramatic strategic shift, requiring billions in investment and decades of planning to build the infrastructure needed for these cutting-edge vessels.
Simultaneously, the Western Australian government has been pursuing its own ambitious project: Westport, a $7.2 billion initiative to relocate container operations from Fremantle to a new facility in Kwinana. While economically beneficial for the state, this development has created an unexpected and potentially catastrophic security challenge.
The problem lies in geography. Kwinana sits just 20 kilometers from HMAS Stirling on Garden Island which is the Royal Australian Navy’s largest base and the planned home for Australia’s future nuclear submarine fleet, as well as rotational visits from US and UK nuclear submarines.
The Westport project will funnel both high-value nuclear submarine traffic and a rapidly expanding volume of commercial shipping through the same narrow channel in Cockburn Sound. Once fully operational, shipping movements through this critical waterway are expected to more than double, with some commercial docks positioned as close as six kilometers from the naval base.
According to a comprehensive report from the Institute for Integrated Economic Research Australia, co-authored by distinguished military figures Air Vice Marshal John Blackburn and Commodore Vince DiPietro, this configuration creates multiple layers of security risk that appear to have been inadequately addressed.
The security concerns extend far beyond simple traffic congestion. In an era of asymmetric warfare, seemingly benign commercial vessels can become sophisticated weapon platforms. The report points to recent conflicts in Ukraine and Israel, where weapons were successfully deployed from shipping containers.
Ukraine’s “Operation Spider Web” exemplifies this new reality. Drones were smuggled into Russia inside standard shipping containers to attack military airfields. Such tactics transform ordinary commercial vessels into potential covert launch platforms, particularly dangerous when positioned near critical military assets like nuclear submarine bases.
The statistics are sobering: Australia currently operates only 15 commercial vessels over 2,000 tons flying its own flag. This means virtually all increased shipping traffic through Cockburn Sound would involve foreign vessels with varying levels of oversight and scrutiny. This creates what the report describes as a significant “blind spot” in national security.
Beyond direct attacks, the concentration of traffic creates another critical vulnerability: the risk of channel blockage. A single maritime incident, whether accidental or deliberate, could create cascading crises affecting both military operations and civilian infrastructure.
The report cites the 2011 MV Rena incident off New Zealand, where a grounded container ship required six to seven weeks just to remove cargo, with environmental recovery extending for months afterward. A similar blockage in Cockburn Sound wouldn’t merely trap submarines; it would halt all refined fuel deliveries to Perth, which is 100% dependent on fuel imports through the sound.
Such a scenario could cripple everything from military readiness to essential civilian services, ambulances, food transport, and power generation, creating a strategic chokepoint with devastating potential.
Perhaps most troubling is the apparent disconnect between levels of government on these security concerns. Local Western Australian MP Mr. McGinn felt compelled to bypass normal channels and directly brief Washington DC officials about the risks, supported by documentation from the Maritime Union of Australia.
Meanwhile, WA Premier Roger Cook has categorically dismissed these concerns as “wrong.” The report’s authors characterize this response as “opportunistic ignorance.”
Or a tendency to prioritize economically beneficial projects while hoping security concerns simply fade away, rather than conducting comprehensive threat assessments.
The Institute for Integrated Economic Research Australia report poses more than a dozen critical questions that apparently remain unanswered at the highest levels of government:
The failure to systematically address these fundamental security questions represents what the authors term a significant gap in strategic foresight.
This situation appears symptomatic of a broader challenge facing modern nations: the failure to integrate national security considerations into infrastructure planning from the outset. The report suggests similar vulnerabilities likely exist at other Australian ports near major defense installations, including Darwin, Newcastle, and Sydney.
Australia’s AUKUS commitment represents a multi-billion dollar, multi-decade strategic investment positioned as the cornerstone of the nation’s future defense capabilities. Yet this grand strategic vision risks being undermined by what appears to be inadequate coordination between state economic development goals and federal defense requirements.
The implications extend beyond Australia’s borders. AUKUS is fundamentally about strengthening allied capabilities and regional stability in the Indo-Pacific. Security vulnerabilities that compromise the program could affect allied confidence and regional deterrence strategies.
The situation in Western Australia serves as a stark reminder that national security in the 21st century requires unprecedented integration across all levels of government and infrastructure planning. Traditional threats are evolving rapidly, with asymmetric capabilities emerging that can turn civilian infrastructure into strategic vulnerabilities.
As one of the report’s authors noted, this raises fundamental questions about how nations ensure their grand strategic visions aren’t accidentally undermined by failures to “connect the dots” between seemingly local decisions and overarching national security postures.
For Australia, addressing these concerns may require difficult conversations about balancing economic development with security imperatives and ensuring that the nation’s most significant defense investment in generations isn’t compromised by avoidable vulnerabilities created in its own backyard.
The question remains: in our complex, interconnected world, how many other nations are facing similar blind spots where strategic ambitions could be subtly or not so subtly undermined by a failure to connect these critical dots?
For a podcast discussing this report, see the following:
https://defense.info/podcast/how-australias-port-development-threatens-its-nuclear-submarine-future/