When Putin decided upon a “special operation” in Ukraine, his focus was on Europe and his way ahead in his effort to emulate Catherine the Great.

Only it has not turned out that way.

The conflict has enhanced pressure on the multipolar authoritarian world which had been making significant gains with a relatively quiet game of advancement.

But his invasion has led to his reawakening Europe to its defense future and has triggered actions which affect its partners in Asia, not positively.

An example of this are actions which Japan is taking triggered both by Chinese and Russian actions, and given the uncertain relationship between Russia and China over the future of Manchuria this has to be of concern to the Kremlin as well.

And the story of the coming together of Japan in support of Ukraine by providing satellite intelligence is part of the spin off created by Putin’s misguided and unacceptable actions.

The story goes something like this.

The secure conference room at Kyushu University’s Institute for Q-shu Pioneers of Space (iQPS) buzzed with nervous energy on a cold February morning in 2025.

Dr. Shunsuke Onishi, the CEO who had transformed a struggling academic spin-off into Japan’s most promising commercial satellite operator, sat across from Ukrainian intelligence officials whose nation had been at war for nearly three years.

What transpired in those discussions would mark a watershed moment but not just for Ukraine’s intelligence needs, but for Japan’s carefully constructed post-war identity as a pacifist nation that kept its advanced military technologies at arm’s length from foreign conflicts.

The catalyst for this unprecedented meeting had arrived just weeks earlier, when the United States temporarily suspended its intelligence sharing with Ukraine

Ukrainian officials, who had grown accustomed to the steady flow of American satellite imagery and signals intelligence, suddenly found themselves partially blind on the digital battlefield.

As Ukrainian officials reached out to allies across Europe, they discovered a harsh reality: no single European operator could match the quality and quantity of intelligence traditionally supplied by American satellites.

Germany’s SAR-Lupe and SARah systems, Finland’s ICEYE constellation, and Italy’s COSMO-SkyMed satellites were all providing imagery, but the coverage remained incomplete.

That’s where Japan’s iQPS satellites, each equipped with synthetic aperture radar (SAR) technology, offered something unique in the crowded satellite intelligence market.

Unlike optical satellites that required clear skies and daylight to function, SAR satellites could see through clouds, darkness, and even dense foliage by bouncing microwave pulses off the Earth’s surface.

For Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR), this capability was a game-changer. The ability to monitor Russian positions during the harsh Ukrainian winter, track supply convoys through forest cover, and assess bomb damage through smoke and debris could provide crucial advantages in a conflict where information superiority often determined success or failure,

But the technology came with a compelling economic argument as well. iQPS claimed its satellites cost just one-hundredth the price of traditional SAR platforms. This dramatic cost reduction had allowed the small Japanese company to deploy five operational satellites by April 2025, with plans for a seventh by late 2026 and a full constellation of 24 satellites by 2027.

The decision to share Japan’s most advanced surveillance technology with a foreign military represented a dramatic departure from decades of cautious policy.

Since World War II, Japan had maintained strict limitations on defense exports and intelligence sharing, preferring to keep its technological capabilities within carefully controlled boundaries.

The 2024 Noto Peninsula earthquake had provided a preview of iQPS’s capabilities when the satellites delivered high-resolution images that helped emergency responders track landslides and infrastructure damage.

But using the same technology to help Ukraine target Russian forces was an entirely different proposition.

The practical challenges of implementing the agreement were substantial. Ukrainian intelligence officers would need to adapt their systems to receive, process, and analyze SAR data from iQPS satellites This is a task that would stretch technical resources but promised significant battlefield advantages.

The integration process was expected to take two to three months, during which iQPS would install programming tools and image reception systems at Ukrainian intelligence facilities.

The goal was to create seamless data flows that would allow Ukrainian analysts to access near-real-time radar imagery alongside existing intelligence streams from European partners.

SAR technology’s unique capabilities made it particularly valuable for Ukraine’s military operations. The radar could reveal heat signatures from running engines, detect camouflaged vehicles, and map changes in terrain caused by artillery strikes.

In a 2024 report, Ukraine’s intelligence service noted that SAR satellites were being used to “directly prepare strikes on the enemy,” with nearly two-fifths of imagery from Finland’s ICEYE satellites contributing to attacks that caused billions of dollars in damage.

The agreement represented more than just technical cooperation for it signaled Japan’s willingness to take a more assertive role in international security affairs. As tensions continued to rise in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan’s participation in the Quad alliance with the United States, Australia, and India had already suggested a shift toward more active security cooperation.

In other words, the spill over impact from the war in Ukraine to the Indo-Pacific is significant.

For Ukraine, the Japanese satellite partnership offered crucial redundancy in intelligence sources. Even after U.S. intelligence sharing resumed in mid-March, Ukrainian officials remained determined to diversify their capabilities. The experience of being temporarily cut off from American intelligence had underscored the risks of over-dependence on any single ally.

The timing also coincided with broader European efforts to support Ukraine’s intelligence needs.

France had confirmed on March 6, 2025, that it was providing military intelligence to Kyiv, while General Patrick de Rousiers, former President of the Military Committee of the European Union, advocated for forming an intelligence coalition among Ukraine’s allies.

The Japan-Ukraine satellite agreement emerged against a backdrop of shifting geopolitical dynamics. The temporary suspension of U.S. intelligence support had highlighted the fragility of Ukraine’s information lifelines, while also demonstrating the growing importance of commercial satellite operators in modern warfare.

The proliferation of SAR technology had democratized space-based intelligence gathering, allowing smaller nations and private companies to compete with traditional intelligence superpowers.

This technological leveling had created new opportunities for partnerships like the one between Japan and Ukraine, where advanced capabilities could be shared outside traditional alliance structures.

As the war in Ukraine continues to evolve, the Japanese satellite partnership represents a new model for international security cooperation that is one where technological innovation and private sector capabilities could reshape the balance of power in conflicts around the world.

The success of this unprecedented arrangement would likely influence future decisions about intelligence sharing, technology transfer, and the role of commercial space companies in national security.

For Japan, it marked a significant step away from its post-war constraints toward a more active role in global security affairs.

For Ukraine, the partnership offered not just enhanced intelligence capabilities, but also a demonstration that the international community remained committed to supporting its defense against Russian aggression, even as traditional partnerships faced new challenges.

Additional Note:

Japan’s iQPS satellites, equipped with advanced synthetic aperture radar (SAR) technology, have swiftly carved out a unique position in the rapidly expanding domain of space-based intelligence. Unlike traditional optical satellites, SAR satellites can peer through clouds and darkness, providing high-resolution images regardless of weather or time of day which is a vital capability in Asia’s often cloudy skies.

But iQPS offers more than just imaging power; it has delivered a compelling economic and technological breakthrough. Thanks to a patented foldable 3.6-meter antenna and local Kyushu manufacturing partnerships, iQPS satellites weigh ~100kg and cost just one-hundredth as much as conventional SAR platforms. This radical cost reduction enabled iQPS to deploy five operational satellites by early summer 2025, each with enhanced in-orbit image processing, inter-satellite links, and radar resolution as fine as 0.46 meters.

The pace of deployment has only accelerated. After the successful launch of QPS-SAR-9 “SUSANOO-I” in March, QPS-SAR-10 “WADATSUMI-I” in May, and QPS-SAR-11 “YAMATSUMI-I” by Rocket Lab in June, iQPS now operates five active satellites and are on track for nine in space by year’s end and a planned 36-satellite constellation by 2027. This will enable near real-time Earth observation, with global revisit intervals as short as ten minutes which offers strategic responsiveness unmatched in the Asian region.

What sets iQPS further apart is its integration of artificial intelligence. The company’s satellites now perform onboard data analysis, enabling continuous monitoring of moving targets, prompt detection of infrastructure changes, and economic forecasting. Japanese government agencies, as well as new private-sector clients, are leveraging this next-generation intelligence for disaster response, smart city development, and, increasingly, security missions.

This commercial-military synergy reflects a major shift in Japanese policy. The government has moved to integrate private space startups into national security planning. By purchasing commercial satellite data, the government is supporting dual-use development, and treating space as a strategic growth industry. In 2025, over ¥3.5 billion was allocated to space in Japan’s record ¥8.7 trillion (approx. $55 billion) defense budget, including a new multibillion-yen satellite constellation for real-time tracking and a next-generation secure communications satellite.

iQPS is not alone. The Japanese synthetic aperture radar sector is booming. Synspective, builder of the StriX SAR satellites, recently partnered with JAXA for access to L-band ALOS-4 data, offering broader spectrum coverage. Global players like ICEYE, in collaboration with IHI, are building a separate 24-satellite SAR constellation tailored for Japanese government and defense needs. These constellations, already signing data-sharing deals with domestic and international agencies, are ushering in a new competitive space intelligence ecosystem shaped by public–private cooperation.

Perhaps the most dramatic changes have been in policy. After decades of self-imposed restrictions, Japan began reforming its defense export laws in 2025, lifting prohibitions on dual-use (commercial and defense) satellite technology. This opens the door for iQPS and its peers to expand globally and for Japan to deepen strategic intelligence-sharing with allies, from the US to Southeast Asia.

Meanwhile, the government is expected to amend the Space Activities Act and establish a “Space Operations Unit” within the Air Self-Defense Force. These steps mark a clear transition: from seeing space as a scientific frontier to treating it as a critical strategic high ground, where commercial ingenuity and national security now converge.

Driven by the tectonic events of recent years, Japan has moved decisively to close its space intelligence gap. The iQPS satellite constellation is on course to reshape not only Japan’s surveillance power but also its role in a rapidly transforming global security landscape. What was once a cautious, insular approach to space is now a leap forward—built on innovation, collaboration, and a new resolve to play a leading role in the world’s emerging space domain.

Among the sources consulted in writing this story were the following: 

Japan’s secret satellite weapon now in Ukraine’s ‘war hands’

Japan’s iQPS to provide Ukraine with satellite intel amid US support uncertainty

Japan to Share SAR Satellite-Based Data With Ukraine for the First Time

Satellite Warfare: Japan’s iQPS SAR Satellites Set to Strengthen Ukraine’s Intelligence Arsenal

Ukrainian intelligence will receive satellite imagery from Japan

In the complex chess game of global geopolitics, few developments have been as paradoxical as the way two of Xi Jinping’s most challenging counterparts may have inadvertently strengthened China’s strategic position. While facing significant domestic economic headwinds, President Xi has found unexpected opportunities in the disruptions caused by Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine and Donald Trump’s aggressive trade policies.

By 2022, Xi Jinping confronted a daunting economic landscape. China’s growth model, built on manufacturing exports and massive infrastructure investment, was showing signs of strain. The property sector was in crisis, demographic trends pointed toward a shrinking workforce, and the COVID-19 pandemic had disrupted global supply chains that Chinese manufacturers depended upon. Perhaps most challenging of all, Western companies were increasingly “friend-shoring” or “near-shoring” their production, moving operations from China to India, Mexico, or back to domestic facilities.

Xi’s response focused on building domestic demand to reduce dependence on exports, but this transition came with its own contradictions. The Chinese government’s emphasis on maintaining political control over the economy from tech crackdowns to regulatory interventions often worked against the market dynamism needed to drive consumption and innovation. This tension between political imperatives and economic efficiency represented a fundamental challenge to China’s development model.

The Russian Opportunity

Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 unexpectedly provided Xi with a pathway through some of these challenges. While Western sanctions isolated Russia economically, China positioned itself as Moscow’s most important economic lifeline. Chinese imports of Russian energy soared, often at heavily discounted prices, providing Beijing with crucial raw materials at favorable terms during a period of global inflation.

More strategically significant, however, was how the war accelerated Russia’s economic decline and weakened Moscow’s influence over its traditional sphere of influence. In Central Asia, countries that had long balanced between Russian and Chinese influence found themselves dealing with an increasingly weakened northern neighbor. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and other Central Asian states began tilting more decisively toward Chinese investment and trade partnerships.

This shift allowed China to expand its Belt and Road Initiative influence in a region rich with energy resources and strategically positioned between China and European markets. What emerged was not just economic opportunity, but a fundamental reshaping of Eurasian geopolitics in China’s favor. This was an outcome that might have taken decades to achieve through purely economic competition with a stronger Russia.

Trump’s Trade War Paradox

Donald Trump’s return to aggressive trade policies, particularly his expansion of tariffs on Chinese goods, presented Xi with another unexpected strategic opening. While these tariffs certainly imposed costs on Chinese exporters, they also created an opportunity for China to position itself as the champion of free trade and multilateralism which is a remarkable role reversal from the traditional post-war order.

As the United States pursued increasingly unilateral trade policies, China strengthened its relationships with traditional American partners. Brazilian soybean exports to China increased dramatically as Trump’s trade policies made American agricultural products less competitive. Australian mining companies, despite political tensions with Beijing, continued to benefit from Chinese demand for iron ore and other commodities.

Perhaps more importantly, Trump’s approach pushed many countries to diversify their economic relationships away from over-dependence on the United States. This “de-risking” from American economic dominance created openings for China to expand trade relationships across Southeast Asia, Latin America, and even parts of Europe.

The Limits of Opportunism

However, this narrative of Chinese strategic gains should be tempered with recognition of its limitations. China’s closer relationship with Russia, while economically beneficial in the short term, carries significant risks. Secondary sanctions remain a constant threat, and the association with an increasingly isolated regime complicates China’s relationships with European and other Western partners.

Similarly, while Trump’s trade policies may have pushed some countries toward China, they also accelerated a broader trend of technological decoupling. American restrictions on semiconductor technology, artificial intelligence, and other advanced technologies have created genuine challenges for Chinese technological development. The cost of reduced access to Western technology and investment may outweigh the benefits of expanded trade relationships elsewhere.

Moreover, many of China’s strategic moves from the Belt and Road Initiative to efforts at domestic consumption growth preceded both the Ukraine war and Trump’s return to protectionist policies. This suggests that Chinese strategy has been more proactive than simply reactive to external opportunities.

The Chinese experience since 2022 illustrates a broader principle in international relations: how skilled powers can transform external disruptions into strategic advantages. Xi Jinping’s government has demonstrated considerable agility in adapting to changing global circumstances, turning potential isolation into opportunities for expanded influence.

For policymakers in Washington and Moscow, this dynamic offers important lessons. Unilateral actions, whether military interventions or trade wars, can create unintended consequences that benefit strategic competitors. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has not only failed to achieve its stated objectives but has also accelerated the decline of Russian influence in favor of Chinese expansion. Similarly, American trade policies aimed at constraining China may be pushing other countries toward exactly the kind of China-centric economic relationships that Washington seeks to prevent.

The irony of contemporary geopolitics is that Xi Jinping may owe some of his strategic successes to the very leaders who pose the greatest challenges to Chinese interests. Putin’s military adventurism has weakened Russia’s position in ways that benefit Chinese expansion, while Trump’s trade nationalism has created openings for China to position itself as a more reliable economic partner.

This dynamic suggests that in an interconnected world, the consequences of major power actions extend far beyond their intended targets. As global competition intensifies, the ability to transform challenges into opportunities as China has done since 2022 may prove as important as raw economic or military power in determining which nations emerge stronger from periods of global upheaval.

The question moving forward is whether this pattern will continue, and whether other powers will learn to anticipate and counter such strategic adaptation. In the great game of 21st-century geopolitics, the most successful players may be those who can best turn their opponents’ moves to their own advantage.

The AI-generated image of how President Xi looks at the global chessboard.

By Robbin Laird

The 2019 International Fighter Conference in Berlin brought together military leaders and industry representatives from nations living in the shadow of authoritarian powers. Their presentations, focused on airpower strategies for self-defense against existential threats from Russia and China, now read like a prophetic warning of conflicts to come. What seemed like contingency planning in 2019 became brutal reality just three years later.

Ukraine: From Deterrence to Actual War

Lieutenant General Vasyl Chernenko’s 2019 presentation on “Peculiarities of Employment Fighter Aviation” described Ukraine’s experience with Russian hybrid warfare following the 2014 seizure of Crimea. He spoke of the “sabotage-terrorist nature of the enemy’s actions” and the need for Ukrainian fighter aircraft to confront Russian air defense systems moved forward into contested areas.

His analysis proved devastatingly prescient. When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine faced exactly the scenarios Chernenko had outlined but magnified exponentially. The limited pilot training and “very limited” readiness of Ukraine’s legacy MiG-29s and Su-27s that he described became critical vulnerabilities when facing the full weight of Russian airpower.

The general’s emphasis on the need for Western counter-insurgency capabilities and airpower support foreshadowed the massive international military aid effort that would emerge. His warning that any Western assistance would trigger Russian “fake news” campaigns proved accurate, as Moscow’s disinformation apparatus worked overtime to frame NATO support as escalatory aggression.

Most remarkably, Chernenko’s focus on Ukraine’s need to “buy time for partners and allies to plug into one’s defensive system” became the fundamental strategy that allowed Ukraine to survive the initial assault and mount an effective resistance.

Lithuania: The Information Warfare Frontline

Colonel Dainius Guzas’s presentation on “Developing Capability Against a Peer Opponent” highlighted Lithuania’s dual challenge: direct Russian threats and sophisticated political warfare designed to undermine NATO cohesion. His documentation of Russian airspace violations and “fake news” campaigns targeting Lithuanian confidence in NATO allies provided an early warning of hybrid warfare tactics that would intensify dramatically.

The Baltic Air Policing mission that Guzas described as Lithuania’s window into NATO interoperability became a crucial proving ground. When tensions escalated following Russia’s 2022 invasion, the experience gained through hosting diverse NATO air forces proved invaluable for rapid coalition operations.

Guzas’s emphasis on the political dimension of airpower or how Russian disinformation sought to weaponize every NATO flight over Baltic airspace presaged the information warfare that would accompany kinetic operations in Ukraine. His insights into how authoritarian powers use political warfare to complement military pressure became a template for understanding broader Russian strategy.

Taiwan: The Growing Shadow

The presentations from Colonel Li-Chiang Yuan and Dr. Yu-Jiu Wang on Taiwan’s defense challenges have only grown more relevant. Yuan’s description of the People’s Republic of China’s “encirclement challenge” through South China Sea militarization has accelerated dramatically since 2019.

His concept of “multiple deterrence” which is the need for integrating active defense, air defense, and resilient ground forces anticipated the “porcupine strategy” that has become central to Taiwan’s defense planning. The emphasis on operating aircraft from highways and dispersed locations, inspired by Finnish models, reflected an understanding that traditional airfields would be primary targets in any conflict.

Dr. Wang’s focus on AESA radar technologies and C2/ISR integration proved remarkably forward-looking. The technological capabilities he projected have become essential elements of the “deterrence in depth” strategy that Taiwan and its allies continue to develop as Chinese military pressure intensifies.

Malaysia: The Connectivity Imperative

Major General Dato’ Muhamad Norazilan Bin Aris’s emphasis on “Striking the Balance Between Affordability and Capability” highlighted challenges that have only grown more acute. His focus on Link 16 capabilities for better integration with partner air forces, particularly Australia, anticipated the growing importance of coalition interoperability in contested regions.

Malaysia’s two-theater defense requirements and emphasis on maritime domain awareness presaged the multi-domain challenges that have become central to Indo-Pacific strategy. The Royal Malaysian Air Force’s focus on light attack aircraft for multiple roles reflected budget constraints that many nations now face as defense spending struggles to keep pace with growing threats.

Lessons Validated by History

Several key insights from the 2019 conference have proven remarkably prescient:

• Self-Reliance as Foundation: Every presenter emphasized that nations in authoritarian neighborhoods must first be capable of self-defense to “buy time” for allied support. Ukraine’s initial resistance validated this principle entirely.
• Dispersal and Resilience: The emphasis on operating from multiple locations, dispersed basing, and highway operations proved essential when traditional infrastructure became primary targets.
• Political Warfare Integration: The recognition that military threats come wrapped in sophisticated information campaigns anticipated the hybrid nature of modern conflict.
• Coalition Connectivity: The focus on interoperability and Link 16 capabilities reflected an understanding that no nation could stand alone against peer adversaries.
• Technology as Equalizer: The emphasis on advanced radar systems, C2 integration, and networked operations presaged how smaller nations could leverage technology to offset numerical disadvantages.

The Prescient Warning

Perhaps most striking was the shared recognition among 2019 presenters that their nations faced “existential threats” requiring immediate attention, not distant contingency planning. While many in Western capitals still viewed major power competition as a manageable challenge, military leaders from frontline states understood the urgency of their situation.

Their focus on defensive capabilities that could deter aggression without threatening authoritarian homelands proved particularly insightful. This distinction between defensive deterrence and offensive threat has become central to alliance strategies aimed at avoiding escalation while maintaining credible defense.

Looking Forward

The 2019 International Fighter Conference presentations now read as a strategic warning that was largely unheeded until events forced recognition of their accuracy. The military leaders who spoke in Berlin understood their operational environment with a clarity that broader policy communities would only achieve through bitter experience.

As we face continued challenges from authoritarian powers, the insights shared in 2019 remain relevant. The emphasis on self-reliance, coalition interoperability, dispersed operations, and integrated deterrence strategies continues to guide defense planning for nations on freedom’s frontlines.

The tragedy is not that these military professionals lacked foresight — their analysis was remarkably accurate. The tragedy is that it took actual war to validate warnings that were clearly articulated years before the shooting started.

The featured photo shows President Tsai Ing-wen and senior Taiwanese military staff during an exercise in southern county Changhua, not far from one of the island’s main airbases at Taichung. Photo: Facebook

Airpower When Directly Faced with the Authoritarian Powers: The International Fighter Conference 2019

The Emergence of the Multi-Polar Authoritarian World: Looking Back from 2024