U.S. Marines with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 268 (Reinforced), Marine Rotational Force – Darwin 24.3, drop cargo from an MV-22B Osprey at Mount Bundey Training Area, NT, Australia, July 9, 2024. Marines participated in the air delivery exercise in preparation for Predator’s Run Warfighting Exercise.
MOUNT BUNDEY TRAINING AREA, NORTHERN TERRITORY, AUSTRALIA
07.09.2024
Video by Cpl. Juan Torres
Marine Rotational Force – Darwin
On September 26, 2024, the most recent seminar of The Sir Richard Williams Foundation was held. It was entitled: “Enhancing and Accelerating the Integrated Force: An Operational Perspective.”
This seminar focused on how the force in being or the ready force was focused on improving its capability, its survivability and lethality for the fight tonight.
For such a focus, one needs a sense of urgency for how to improve the force in the short to mid-term, rather than over emphasizing the long term future and future force structure planning.
Here is a podcast generated by Google’s NotebookLM system which provides an AI summary of the 26 September 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation Report.
The September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation focused on accelerating the capabilities of the ready force.
Defence industry in Australia is obviously a key player in the ability for the government to find ways to enhance the ready force.
A panel of six industrial representatives discussed this challenge lead by Katherine Ziesing of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation as the facilitator.
The six panelists in order of providing presentations were as follows: Andrew Doyle, Director, Business Area Lead, Aeronautics from Lockheed Martin Aeronautics; Nick Leake, Head of Satellite and Space Systems, Optus; Derek Reinhardt, Director of Engineering and Operational Excellence, Northrop Grumman Australia; Dr. Brad Ferguson, Joint Battlespace Systems Technical Director, Raytheon Australia; Daniel Reinger, Engineering Manager MQ-28A Ghost Bat Combat Collaborative Aircraft (CCA), The Boeing Company; and Dr. Gary Eves, Principal Technology Officer of CAE Defense and Security.
The first speaker, Andrew Doyle, underscored how he viewed industry and its role in Australian defence resilience.
The critical enablers to growth in industry capacity–your experienced workforce, your facilities, and your capital equipment– have lead times of years to establish the scale that Australia will potentially need.
We’re already operating in a contested environment in terms of competing with other national priorities. With defence, where government is typically the owner, the operator and the regulator of defence systems, there’s definitely a role for government to play in fostering that ecosystem for defence industry to be able to grow the scale and depth that Australia needs to be calling upon in the future.
To do this requires a well-considered investment strategy and in my view, a partnership with industry whereby industry can make investments that lead to capacity for them and capability for the ADF. Any disruption in investment ensures that capability will not be there for the ADF.
Doyle put his assessment this way:
I will now talk about industry’s role in building a resilient and scalable national defence ecosystem which starts with the basics of depth of industry presence and a close degree of integration between industry and defense. Industry needs to have the appropriate degree of insight into defence plans and capability and preparedness requirements for defence to leverage the additional mass and scale that industry can bring.
The key to success is communication and close partnerships to ensure that we’re getting alignment of resources and actions to best affect where industry can contribute to the operational viability of the integrated force…
The second panelist was Nick Leake. He underscored that the ADF cannot operate effectively without secure C2 and ISR, and that in today’s world this means secure access to space and to satellites. He noted that Optus currently operates three geo satellites, one of which carries defence payloads.
Leake then highlighted the coming of the Optus 11 satellite which he indicated would be the first software-defined satellite in the region. He underscored: With these new spacecrafts you will have fundamental intelligence on board, and you will be able to configure that satellite in terms of its capacity and where you’re actually pointing that capacity.
Putting a chip on board the spacecraft obviously then opens up further issues with cyber security, because you’re putting intelligence in space, and you have to protect that asset the best you can.
He then highlighted Optus working on in orbit servicing which will allow the satellite service life to be extended as fuel tanks are replaced on the satellite in orbit.
He next discussed the LEO revolution which is obviously a significant transformer of the space satellite eco system but indicated that Optus worked with partners to leverage LEO constellations and to shape an adaptive network.
Leake highlighted the importance of Dr. Davis’s presentation on the need for enhanced sovereign space capability and indicated that Optus was a key part of any such effort.
The third presenter was Derek Reinhardt from Northrop Grumman Australia. His focus was on their work in enhancing the efficacy of sustainment in support of the ready force. NG is involved in the sustainment of the KC-30, the C-27J, the VIP fleet and the Triton.
About two years ago, we were trying to bring all of our programs together and have them work in a more consistent way. To do so, we set about building a sustainment delivery model which was really intended initially to align our programs, but it’s providing us interesting insights into the information that moves within a sustainment environment: the speed that that information needs to move, the decisions that hang off that information and how the enterprise combines to be able to do so.
He then when on to describe their creation in effect of a digital twin of the sustainment system. He went to argue that through this effort they have enhanced their ability to focus on the critical enablers for managing the information flows for decision making in the sustainment enterprise.
He noted: What we’ve really learned to be successful, the architecture, the cyber-worthiness, and the whole concept of the data fabric is absolutely vital.
When applied to the challenge of sustainment in a contested environment or contested logistics, this led him to the conclusion: How the data fabric is architected is crucial for it to continue to operate.
The fourth speaker was Dr. Brad Ferguson from Raytheon Australia. He certainly underscored the importance of enhancing the sense of urgency and speed to turn innovations into combat capabilities.
This is how he put it: We need to adapt our architectures to support plugins for new capabilities, new technologies to support the rapid growth and leverage those technologies, everything from AI to quantum to hypersonics to directed energy to autonomy, these things will shape the future battlefield.
He argued that the challenge and opportunity is to combine international cooperation with Australian delivery of capability. He then provided an example of this approach.
We started with the NASAMS system fielded in nine other countries, and then we built it from the ground up, integrating it with Australian innovation.
Working with over 30 companies across Australia, we integrated CEA radars, novel electrooptic infrared systems, new tactical data links to integrate with the Australian internet and military teams, integrating new missiles to leverage in service munitions, and ended up with the most capable short range ground-based air defence system in the world.
Some of those Australian innovations are now making their way back into the global community, supporting our allies and allowing for export opportunities.
The fifth speaker was Daniel Reinger of The Boeing Company.
His presentation was short and succinct and focused on a key area of developing and incorporating autonomous systems into the ADF.
This is what he highlighted:
What we need to focus on is building something that’s built to adapt. That’s in the wheelhouse of the collaborative combat aircraft, because if we don’t build something that’s adaptable, it will be obsolete before we even get it fielded.
How do we evolve our thinking, so we actually build something that’s adaptable?
The answer that we’re coming to is embracing open mission system standards and embracing not just open architectures, but government defined open architectures.
What does that do?
It opens up a best of industry ecosystem where everyone can come to the party. It lowers the barrier of entry. When we talk about CCAs, we talk about machine autonomy, we talk about flight autonomy, we talk about crewed and uncrewed teaming.
It’s simply too much for any one company to build the platform and then pull all of that together in a coherent manner.
By expanding the ecosystem and lowering the barrier to entry, you can get smaller and more companies that have niche skills into the effort.
The final presentation was by Dr. Gary Eves from CAE Defense and Security who highlighted the growing importance in training and innovations in training to enhance the operational capability of the ready force.
He started by talking about the challenge for today’s force in terms of training.
One of the things we need to understand is that the one size fits all approach just does not work for training. That requires a fundamental change in how we do things. What we are trying to do is evolve the capability of our young people to work with incredibly complex systems.
Now it’s not just a question of pure technical proficiency. They are decision makers. They’re operating in a highly complex environment that requires dynamic decision making en masse, in real time, maybe without support.
He highlighted the importance of training for effective operation by teams in performing key tasks and missions which not only lead to mission success but to more rewarding experiences which are important in being to retain the personnel which you want and need for the organization.
He also underscored the importance of shaping effective ways for training in a coalition environment. This especially challenging because of different historical, linguistic and cultural experiences.
CAE has worked and is working on a variety of approaches to succeed in the demanding training environments for the ready force operating in the new strategic environment.
There was a Q and A session after the panel presentations but the key focus was on the crucial need to reshape the partnership with government both for defence and commercial firms.
As one participant put it:
Don’t try to design something in five years, because by the time you get it in five years, it’s obsolete. We need an agile approach whereby we can build a capability, and then, over the years, we can add to that capability. Governments have to take some of the risk, and stop chucking the risk onto industry, because a lot of industries, particularly small business, will just walk away. If we have a shared risk and investment approach, we can have an agile model of delivering capability.
And the concept of “relational contracting” was introduced in a discussion of sustainment and support for the ready force, but perhaps has a wider application.
As one participant put it:
Relational contracting is an environment of defining how we work together, rather than defining specific technical requirements.
Our best performing sustainment programs are those where you create the right relationship, you create the right dialog.
A shared situational awareness is created and shared understanding of who makes the right decision at the right time and with the right information which builds the trust that’s needed for the desired outcome.
Some time ago – more than a decade – I worked with Alan Dupas, the noted French space expert, on a project for a European space company on the future of space in 2020. We focused on the key point that although a space company was most closely identified with launchers and satellites, the future was its engagement in the global information society.
Let me say that we were not greeted with cheers and love. Rather the major company we were dealing with shuddered at the thought that its “things” might be overshadowed by a product – data, communications and information. This of course puts a space company into competition with a range of providers of data, communications and information.
Space is enabler of much which goes on in earth providing the nodes and networks of an information society. But space is costly, complex and governments are loath to invest more than they have to in such “esoteric” technology whose investments might cut into social spending or green energy or whatever the priority is for a sitting government.
This is certainly the case for Australia. Dr. Malcolm Davis at the September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar provided a compelling case for Australian space investments and acceleration of engagement in the space sector.
This is how presented and discussed this important subject:
Space is contested and congested. When we’re talking about resilience, both being contested and congested are really becoming much more acute as a challenge.
Assuring space access for the ADF can be defined in different ways, but I would argue that it’s not just about being able to use a foreign provider. It is also about sovereign space capabilities.
Space domain awareness allows space control. If you look at the national defense strategy and integrated investment program, it highlighted space domain awareness. Then importantly made the point that space control is an important task for the ADF..
We can’t have assured access to space if we only rely on foreign launch providers to give us that capability. We need to prioritize our national space capabilities, including sovereign launch. We need to pursue space policy as a whole of nation endeavor.
We don’t currently have that.
It was started by the previous government. Those efforts were canceled by the current government. I would argue that we need to restore a whole of nation space strategy.
Space is an operational domain in its own right…
We’re seeing in the arsenals of our adversaries counter space capabilities. And these capabilities do not apply only in hot war scenarios. They could also be used in terms of gray zone operations as well…
We need to think in terms of how we defend against what the Chinese call system destruction warfare or how they can utilize counter space capabilities along with cyber attack, electromagnetic operations, and kinetic operations to take down critical Information Infrastructure as quickly as possible…
Part of resilience is managing space traffic and that requires a new approach to how we think about space domain awareness, how we manage the increasing amount of material that’s in orbit.
Space is increasingly competitive in the sense that it’s no longer just the sole domain of the major powers. It is also about the activity of small to medium powers, including Australia, as well as commercial actors.
And space has become democratized through a combination of falling costs that are driven by new technologies which allows more states to do things in space than previously was considered possible or financially viable.
That means there is a greater possibility that you could get either non state actors, commercial actors or hostile state actors essentially using space in a way that’s inimical to our interests.
But it also brings opportunities in the sense that more states like Australia can actually do things in space that previously were beyond our capabilities…
We’re starting to think about space 3.0. Space 1.0 was the Apollo era of big space agencies and the activities were the taxpayer funded and government led.
Space 2.0 was the establishment and the emergence of commercial space activities which really transformed the space environment and global space activity,
Space 3.0 is that next step that beckons in the future. It’s that opportunity to do space-based industry and a manufacturing capability, a space based economy that exploits space resources and new environments such as lunar space.
We have to challenge the orthodox mindsets that I think currently exist within government which primarily thinks about space in terms of satellites and rockets and start thinking about how we can utilize space in radically new and different ways that generate prosperity and growth.
He then went on to discuss how adversarial actions in space (war in space) can bring down or dismantle space infrastructure and that this infrastructure is a key part of a functioning information system for Australia.
This meant that the Australian government needed to get out of any stoved-piped look at space and take a broader view which would include space policy in the whole of nation concept of defence.
He then added:
The democratization of space technology means that space is no longer dominated purely by the major actors, so it’s far more unpredictable as an operating environment. Increasingly, counter space technologies are moving in radically different ways and posing direct threats to space assets.
For example, If you think back to the Cold War, there was no such thing as cyber warfare. Now we have the potential opportunity for cyber-attacks on satellites that can create scalable or reversible effects to disable or deny. And so suddenly, space weapons or space warfare or counter space capabilities become far more usable because it’s in the interests of our adversaries to use them.
And I think that our adversaries recognize that space warfare and counter space capabilities can generate decisive strategic effect.
Space is critical for maintaining how we fight wars and how we undertake joint and integrated operations across multiple domains, but it’s also vital for sustaining our information-based economies and societies…
Modern information-based societies depend on space capabilities to function, in particular through satellite communications, but also positioning, navigation and timing services. Everything that we do in a modern society from using information on our mobile phones, to our computers, to stock markets, logistics systems, all of that depends on the space capabilities.
That dependency will grow in the future, particularly as we get more and more reliant on processes of change associated with the Internet of Things and pursue the fourth industrial revolution. Such transitions demand that we have continued access to space
Dr. Davis then went on the identify the various means of space attack and degradation which adversaries have already demonstrated.
And his point was clear – If Australia wants to protect its free and open society, if it wants to support a “rules-based” order which in my view is shrinking globally, how can you do so without an effective space engagement policy?
Featured Photo: Dr. Davis speaking too the September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation.
U.S. Marines with Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS) 12 build guided bombs for an F-35B Lightning II aircraft at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam.
05.29.2024
Video by Travis Minyon
F-35 Joint Program Office
By Robbin Laird
The strategic environment has clearly changed and the level of real world conflict has escalated, whether in terms of major hot wars – in the Middle East and in Europe – or in terms of active gray zone conflicts.
The ready force needs to deal with this real world rather than than just preparing for a future war. The DSR has outlined the future force for the future war; the current ADF needs to deal with the world we have.
The prospect of armed conflict in the first island chain, already underway in the gray zone between China and the Philippines, and the prospect of PRC actions against a sovereign free nation in Taiwan has been constantly threatened by the current leader of China.
How do you respond to the here and now but do so in a way that puts you on the trajectory which the DSR has mandated?
Some answers to this question were provided by three of the speakers at the September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation.
Their answers were in the form of identifying capabilities crucial to the ADF now which needed to be underscored and enhanced in the years to come.
The first speaker was Lt General Susan Coyle, Chief of Joint Capabilities. The Joint Capabilities Group is defined by the Australian government as follows:
Joint Capabilities Group (JCG) is headed by the Chief of Joint Capabilities (CJC), who is responsible to the Chief of Defence Force for the provision of Joint Health, Logistics, Education and Training, Information Warfare and Joint Military Police. CJC will also manage agreed Joint projects, and their sustainment, to support joint capability requirements.
Concomitant with her broad remit, Coyle discussed a range of efforts within the JCG. But the most important for this discussion was what she identified as the “high ground.”
Cyber power is a vital element of national military power. We need to coordinate electronic warfare and cyber information operations in order to gain asymmetric advantage and paralyze our adversary’s decision making. We must be able to continue to defend and exploit capabilities within the electromagnetic spectrum.
And I’ve heard this referred to recently as the next high ground. Doing so will slow adversaries kill chains and increase confusion and degrade their precision. The layering of electronic warfare, cyber and kinetic attacks is similarly vital for us to assuring our own strike capability.
We must protect radios and microwaves that are used for communications and radars, as well as infrared spectrum for our weapons guidance, jamming aircraft, blinding air defence, radars, suppressing military missile systems. All of this is absolutely real and at the forefront of our mind, and so we’re focused on delivering capability that will protect our ability to operate across the electronic magnetic spectrum.
Lt General Coyle put it bluntly:
If we lose the war in the electromagnetic spectrum, we lose the war across all domains.
Hence enabling the force in being to fight, survive and prevail in the current context is crucial and in so doing carves a path to shaping future options as well.
The second speaker weighed in on Coyle’s comments.
The speaker was Phil Winzenberg, the Deputy Director General-Signals Intelligence and Effects from the Australian Signals Directorate. He reinforced Coyle’s emphasis on the role of effective operations in the electromagnetic spectrum and signals intelligence as enablers for an integrated force..
In his presentation he underscored that the integrated force was more than the ADF and its operations.
This what he argued about the ASD and its current relationship with the ADF in creating a more integrated force:
That brings us to the present, where the demands from the ADF have increased ever further. Instead of just the land domain, which was the focus of previous conflicts, we will support the ADF in all domains. We won’t just provide intelligence on adversary capabilities, but also timely indicators and warnings of adversary intent towards the integrated force and also our nation’s critical infrastructure.
We won’t just provide situational awareness of the disposition of adversary platforms and forces, but we’ll do that also to establish and hold custody of them so that they can be used effectively by CJOC, at his or her discretion, and on a scale and with a complexity never encountered before by ASD or indeed the ADF.
He then highlighted REDSPICE
This programmatic effort is described by the ASD as follows:
REDSPICE is the most significant single investment in the Australian Signals Directorate’s 75 years. It responds to the deteriorating strategic circumstances in our region, characterised by rapid military expansion, growing coercive behaviour and increased cyber attacks.
Through REDSPICE, ASD will deliver forward-looking capabilities essential to maintaining Australia’s strategic advantage and capability edge over the coming decade and beyond.
If you’re the type of person who is curious, motivated by finding a purpose and loves problem-solving, then you’re the type of person we’re looking for.
The REDSPICE Blueprint (PDF) offers some further insights into what REDSPICE will deliver, and a vision of what ASD will look like in the future.
Through REDSPICE, we will expand the range and sophistication of our intelligence, offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, and build on our already-strong enabling foundations.
Winzenberg went on to underscore the following:
I can assure everyone here that delivering REDSPICE is an ASD top priority, and we’re doing all that we can to hold up our end of the bargain in supporting the future integrated force.
REDSPICE is supporting current and future operations from the strategic to the tactical. There is no defensive cyber activity that the integrated force plans or executes that doesn’t draw its threat intelligence or employ tools developed by REDSPICE. There is no information and cyber effects that the integrated force plans or executes that doesn’t happen without REDSPICE targeting intelligence and tools, and there’s no technical intelligence on weapon systems and other capabilities that allow us to develop countermeasures and build electronic attack algorithms that isn’t enhanced by REDSPICE.
He then underscored that the ADF-ASD partnership was enhanced by the Five Eyes alliance.
I’ll finish by reflecting on the power that comes from ASDs membership of the five eyes. The Five Eyes alliance is the greatest intelligence partnership the world has ever known…
The trust and depth of this partnership is the key differentiator between us and others in the region. The breadth and depth of what we do together is truly staggering.
If we set about trying to achieve that today from the standing start, it would be inconceivable that we would get to where we are now. We have good, good friends everywhere who willingly work with us. They work with us to build our capabilities. They work with us to secure our interests. They work with us to share intelligence so that we can understand the challenges of the world together and in similar ways.
He then concluded with this statement:
So to close, I’m going to leave you with three fun facts.
Number one, ASD is at its core a support to military organizations. We’re now driven to deliver REDSPICE to best support government and defence in our complex strategic environment.
Number two, partnerships are key to the integrated force, and the ADF has no better partner than ASD and our five eyes buddies as we all rise to the shared challenge.
And number three, last but not least, when it comes to actionable intelligence at the speed of relevance in a modern battle space, you only have two options, SIGINT or everything else, much, much, much too late.
The third speaker was the Chief of the RAAF, AIRMSHL Stephen Chappell. He focused on the importance of taking advantage of the geographical situation in which Australia finds itself.
In effect, by shaping the RAAF and the integrated force as a maneuver force, the ADF is able to use geographical depth to defend itself and at the same time able to deploy from various locations on its own continent to gain strategic and tactical advantage.
This is how he concluded his presentation:
We can create the tempo, confuse and complicate adversary targeting and project depth well beyond their shores by working together as a joint and integrated force working closely with interagency, industry partners, allies and partners. We can position and posture to deter and be prepared to respond.
What he was articulating was defence by maneuver in terms of geographical and operational (meaning an ability to leverage space and extended range ISR and C2 systems) depth.
He highlighted this approach as follows:
Going back to how to generate our depth. We’ve experimented using space and cyber in generating effects to gain advantage. We’ve integrated with the U.S. and Australian fleets and land forces across the primary area of military interest for us to execute multi domain strikes at range in defense of our territory and coalition forces.
Our war games show us how in the Indo Pacific we can effectively integrate capabilities and forces across domains and nationalities, operationally and strategically. They also show us that there is much more to be done, and therefore our services will have to continue to evolve to meet the requirements of multi-domain operations.
He provided further details in a earlier presentation as well. In the 27 September 2023 Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar, he made the following comment:
AVM Stephen Chappell, Head of Military Strategic Commitments, focused on the symbiotic relationship between offense and defense with regard to multi-domain strike.
“Integrated air and missile defense and multi-domain strike are two sides of the same coin. By having an ability to protect our strike enterprises we enhance their credibility to strike back which ensures as well our enhanced deterrent capability.”
He underscored: “Passive defense is just as important not only for defending critical assets, but preserving our multi-domain strike capabilities in order to execute those left jabs and those right hooks necessary. The next layer of defense we’re thinking about is counter force. This in effect is multi-domain strike, the ability to reach out and defeat a threat to our homeland or to our forces. Deterrence by denial includes that defensive protection of the chin as we deliver effective left jabs and right hooks.”
It is fine to have long-range force structure planning, but what happens when the operational environment is rapidly changing for your operational force? How to adapt the ready force effectively and adeptly in a timely manner? And what consequences does that have for one’s long-range force structure design?
The presentation by Jennifer Parker, Expert Associate National Security College of the Australian National University, focused on a key challenge which raises such questions. Her presentation was entitled: “The Contested Maritime Domain: Challenges for an Integrated Force?”
What she focused on was the changing nature of littoral maritime operations, the emergence of new technologies and concepts of operations by various actors notably in the Black and Red Seas, and how those shifts in approach affected maritime operations.
The bottom line of her analysis was that the new technologies and approaches had a clear impact on capital naval vessels, and with relevant defence measures, technologies and relevant training, capital ships could still operate effectively in the littorals. But the point can be put bluntly: you need to adapt your ready force to deal with new technologies, new con-ops and technologies.
And a point outside of her presentation was inherent within it: what is the future of capital ships integrating maritime autonomous systems? For defence? For offense?
Or as I would put it, it is not a question of crewed versus uncrewed vessels. It is about how crewed vessels could leverage offboard assets like maritime autonomous systems or air systems for the projection of effect or defence in depth.
Her first case study was of the Black Sea and contested littoral operations there.
She argued that: The range of the littoral is increasing. Ukraine has effectively used uncrewed surface vessels, cruise missiles and UAVs to target ships at greater ranges.
Now we don’t know the exact ranges of some of the uncrewed surface vessels that Ukraine has operated, but certainly they managed to hit the Kursk bridge at about 300 nautical miles from Ukrainian controlled territory.
That is a dramatic change in terms of the range of the littoral. Ukraine has managed to destroy about 30% of Russia’s Black Sea fleet, and certainly pushed them back from Ukraine and territorial seas and from Crimea, and that’s no mean feat when you look at the USV engagements,
But what must considered is how the Russian ships have defended themselves. They have no countermeasures whatsoever. They’re barely maneuvering or defending themselves…As offensive capability evolves, we need to be working hard on what the defensive capability is and integrating it into our platforms.
She noted as well that USVs can certainly attack ports and port infrastructure. This means that there need to be countermeasures for this new threat as well.
The key takeaways from her analysis were the following:
Her second case study was of the Red Sea and the approach of the Houthis to disruption in the littorals.
She argued that: The Houthis have been successful in changing the direction of maritime trade. There have been over 100 attacks now on merchant shipping, and 30 of these attacks have managed to sink a couple of ships. This shows the vulnerability of choke points using the kind of systems and technology available to the Houthis. They have attacked but not damaged surface combatants.
She underscored that prepared surface vessels have successfully defended themselves but two problems have been underscored for the ready force. First, the fleet needs to find ways to be rearmed with missiles while at sea. Second, the fleet needs to find much cheaper ways to defeat the unmanned strike force directed against the fleet.
She argued that it was necessary for the ready force to be “stressed tested” by engaging in such deployments to evolve its combat edge.
The key takeaways from her analysis were the following:
Her third case study was of the PRC actions against the Philippines.
The key takeaways from her analysis were the following:
And finally she addressed the active threats to sea laid cables which are critical to the information flows globally. Here she asked the poignant question: “Whose responsibility for such defense is this in Australia? And what are we doing about it?”
This challenge is a key one, which parts of NATO are finally addressing in Europe. For example, in the recent NORDIC WARDEN Exercise, the UK and Northern European nations exercised their forces to shape a con-ops to deal with this, although the exercise indicated important technology and force structure gaps to deal with the challenge.
With regard to operations in the Red Sea, she noted:
A number of the European navies who have gone through their workups and gone through their test and evaluation have sent ships to the Red Sea and learned very quickly that their combat systems and their missile systems were not up for the fight and had to withdraw them.
That is something that we want to learn before we are getting multiple missiles shot at us in the event of a more significant conflict.
Parker underscored the really crucial point that when it comes to naval operations, the military and the civilian aspects are intertwined. Australia depends on maritime trade, which will need to continue in times of conflict, and to do so, the military and civilian parts of the equation need to be clearly working together.
She noted: We’ve learned that defence and maritime industry need to coordinate now. That’s something that we consistently relearn, and that has been a key point of the defence of merchant shipping in the Red Sea, and something that Australia needs to think about as we try and grow our maritime industry with strategic fleet…
Maritime trade does not stop in the event of conflict, so the view that we don’t need to worry about it or that we just need to worry about protecting Australia has not borne itself out in our previous world wars and it is not bearing itself out in the Black Sea or the Red Sea.
And what is happening in the west Philippine Sea is a clear blurring of civil maritime security threats. This is something that we need to pay attention to. We currently have a civil maritime strategy. We have a military maritime strategy, and the two don’t connect. It’s not too far to think that an adversary could try to overwhelm Australia’s maritime domain through using what we would continue consider civil maritime threats.
And to Parker’s point about “Ship preparedness / posture is key”:
F-35B Lightning II aircraft, assigned to the VMFA-121, conduct flight operations at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam.
The F-35 Joint Program Office is the Department of Defense’s focal point for the 5th generation strike aircraft for the Navy, Air Force, Marines, and our allies. The F-35 is the premier multi-mission, 5th generation weapon system. Its ability to collect, analyze and share data is a force multiplier that enhances all assets in the battle-space: with stealth technology, advanced sensors, weapons capacity, and range.
06.07.2024
Video by Travis Minyon
F-35 Joint Program Office