Australian Sovereignty and Maritime Security: RADM Goddard Discusses the Role of the Maritime Border Command

05/29/2019

By Robbin Laird

During my recent stay in Australia in April 2019, I had the chance to meet with RADM Lee Goddard, Commander of the Maritime Border Command.  His command oversees the operational side of ensuring maritime security for Australia.

Because Australia has no land borders, dealing with challenges like migration, drug smuggling and a variety of gray zone threats, the Maritime Border Command is a major player in operations to ensure Australian sovereignty on its borders.

It does so by a whole of government approach, which includes the ability to use defense assets as a key part of its operational approach. It really is designed to provide for integrated operations to try to optimize Australian security, in a very challenging environment.

The challenge simply starts with how extensive the sea borders are around Australia.  We focused in our meeting on the Northern waters and the challenges associated with those waters. But the broader picture is even more daunting in terms of surveillance and determining paths of action.

The reach North to New Guinea is where Australia almost reaches the land of a neighboring country. To the North is a key SLOC where significant trade comes into Australia, and to the West are the Malaccan straits.

We discussed challenges associated with the Lombok Strait, the strait connecting the Java Sea to the Indian Ocean, and is located between the islands of Bali and Lombok in Indonesia. The Gili Islands are on the Lombok side.

According to Wikipedia:

Its narrowest point is at its southern opening, with a width of about 20 km (12 miles) between the islands of Lombok and Nusa Penida, in the middle of the strait. At the northern opening, it is 40 km (25 miles) across. Its total length is about 60 km (37 miles). Because it is 250 m (820 feet) deep[1] — much deeper than the Strait of Malacca — ships that draw too much water to pass through Malacca (so-called “post Malaccamax” vessels) often use the Lombok Strait, instead.

The Lombok Strait is notable as one of the main passages for the Indonesian Throughflow that exchanges water between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.

The importance of this strait and the other straits coming into Australian waters is determined both the need to protect Australian territory and the security and safety of its maritime trade.

Graphic from 2016 Australian Defence White Paper

To provide for Australian maritime security, the focus has been upon three strategic directions.

First, the Australian government has a very clear set of regulations and laws governing immigration and approaches to dealing with security at sea.

As Rear Admiral Goddard put it: “I can act on suspicion; which allows us to be proactive in dealing with threats.”

Second, the force is organized as an integrated one, so that new capabilities coming into the ADF, like the P-8, Triton, Offshore Patrol Vessels and new frigates and other Australian Border Force assets can be leveraged as necessary for operations.

Operation Resolute is a combined force approach to providing for perimeter defense and security of Australia.

As it was put on the Royal Australian Navy website:

Operation RESOLUTE is the ADF’s contribution to the Whole-of-Government effort to protect Australia’s borders and offshore maritime interests.

It is the only ADF operation that currently defends the Australia homeland and its assets.

The Operation RESOLUTE Area of Operations covers approximately 10 per cent of the world’s surface and includes Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone which extends up to 200nm around the mainland. Christmas, Cocos, Keeling, Norfolk, Heard, Macquarie and Lord Howe Islands also fall within the Operation RESOLUTE boundaries.

Commander Maritime Border Command (MBC) is the overarching operational authority that coordinates and controls both Defence and Australian Border Force assets from his headquarters in Canberra.

Maritime Border Command is the multi-agency taskforce which utilises assets and personnel from both the Australian Border Force (ABF) and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to safeguard Australia’s maritime jurisdiction. Its maritime surveillance and response activities are commanded and controlled from the Australian Maritime Border Operations Centre in Canberra.

We discussed some of the new technologies which allow for greater SA over the maritime zones, but of course the challenge is to turn SA into ways to influence actors in the maritime zone.

“It does no good just to know something is happening; how do we observe but let the bad guys know we see them and can deal with them?”

Third, obviously IT and C2 are key elements of bringing the force to bear on the threats.

But doing so is a significant challenge, but one where new technologies and new capabilities to leverage those capabilities for decision making clearly are helping.

This is a work in progress where the Commander works with several government departments as well as industry to deliver more effective intelligence to determine where the key threats are to be found and being able to deploy assets to that threat.

Rear Admiral Goddard underscored that developments in the IT and decision tools area were already helping and would be of enhanced performance in the period ahead.

“With some of the new AI tools we will be able to process information more rapidly and turn SA into better decision making.”

Fourth, obviously this means working closely with partners in the region, such as Malaysian, Indonesia and the Philippines and shaping ways to operate more effectively with one another.

There are several examples of Australia expanding its working relationships with neighbors, which means as well finding ways to share information and to train together for common actions.

A challenge being posed by the Navies in the region is that they are clearly are generating what have been called gray zone threats.

This is why the Command is really part of more broadly understand security capability within an overall national crisis management effort.

And as the threats change or challenges change, the capabilities for the Command working with the ADF will need to change as well.

Editor’s Notes:

The description of the Command as provided on their web page is as follows:

Additional information was then provided as follows:

Deter, prevent, detect and respond to civil maritime security threats

Maritime Border Command uses an intelligence-led, risk-based approach to combat the civil maritime security threats within the Australia’s maritime domain.

Our dedicated Intelligence Centre collects, processes, integrates, evaluates, analyses and interprets information and intelligence to generate civil maritime domain awareness.

We use surveillance and identification systems such as the Australian Maritime Identification System to detect, risk assess and track vessels operating in or approaching our maritime zones.

We then tailor our operations to combat these threats with the support of surface and air assets. 

Contribute to Operation Sovereign Borders

 Operation Sovereign Borders is a military-led, multi-agency operation to secure Australia’s borders, combat maritime people smuggling and prevent deaths at sea.

We detect and intercept people-smuggling vessels that approach Australia, and carry out on-water operational responses including boat turn-backs where safe to do so.

Work with partner agencies and international counterparts

State, territory and Australian Government partner agencies guide our operations. Together, we work to provide a whole-of-government response to key civil maritime security threats.

We also collaborate with international intelligence and law enforcement authorities through information sharing, joint patrols and other cooperative arrangements.

Engage with industry

Maritime Border Command engages with industry by communicating with industry to advise of maritime actions that may impact on their businesses and advising of appropriate preventive security measures.

By complying with preventive security measures, the maritime industry also contributes to the ongoing safety of our maritime domain.

https://www.abf.gov.au/about-us/what-we-do/border-protection/maritime

The USCG Experience and Parallel

My own observations with regard to the challenges for the way ahead come from working with the USCG. 

As the gray zone challenges become more dominant in the maritime security environment, a key challenge is getting the military and civilian sides of how to deal with the challenge.

It becomes less a law enforcement function and more one that is a crisis management challenge where various types of authorities need to be exercised.

And this has certainly been a challenge for the US in which we can use military force or do law enforcement but we are not as good as we need to be in terms of being organized for what falls in between.

And that is precisely the area that is growing in strategic importance and significance

The structure which the Australians have built with the Maritime Border Command can provide a good focal point for sorting out good ways to shape 21stcentury crisis management capabilities; but it too will be a challenge for them as well.

An illustration of who the interagency process works in Australia to deliver maritime security was provided in this February 27, 2018 article on joint patrol operations off of the East Coast of Australia.

Commander MBC Rear Admiral Peter Laver said the patrol provided an opportunity to gather intelligence and work closely with our partners, stakeholders and the broader community to inform them about what suspicious activity to look out for and how to report it.

“Local knowledge is a great source and is perfectly placed to recognise signs of illegal fishing, prohibited imports and other criminal attempts to breach our borders,” Rear Admiral Laver said.

“Our officers spend weeks at a time at sea, quite often out of view of the general public, but patrols like this allow us to demonstrate that no matter where you are around the Australian coast, we are never far away.”

ADV Cape Fourcroy Commanding Officer Lieutenant Ken Brown said the multi-agency patrol was a great way to foster collaboration and his crew was ready to tackle any civil maritime security threat.

“The opportunity to share our intelligence and operational expertise is invaluable to our work and increases Australia’s capability to disrupt illegal activity in our waters, whether it be foreign fishing, drug smuggling or any other civil maritime security threat,” Lieutenant Brown said.

“This was a great chance to showcase what we do and assure the Australian people that we are out on the seas, patrolling and protecting our waters and securing Australia’s borders.”

AFMA’s General Manager of Fisheries Operations, Peter Venslovas, said that collaboration between Australian authorities is paramount to ensuring the future of Australia’s marine life.

“AFMA works closely with other government agencies including ABF and the ADF on activities like deploying fisheries officers on joint patrols to further our work in deterring and combatting illegal foreign fishing,” Mr Venslovas said.

“Protecting the marine environment from threats of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing activity is one of our main priorities.”

The vessel departed Cairns on 8 February 2018 and has visited ports including Bundaberg, Coffs Harbour, Sydney, and Brisbane.

https://www.afma.gov.au/joint-agency-patrol-targets-east-coast-maritime-threats

Editor’s Note: In an interview we did with Rear Admiral Day of the USCG in 2010, he laid out the nature of the situational awareness effort to shaping a successful engagement effort:

SLD: Could you provide us with an overview of C4ISR works in the USCG?

Admiral Day: Let’s talk about how C4ISR is used in support of Coast Guard missions.  And what changes have occurred—drastic changes—in the last 10 years and the drastic changes that are going to be needed even in the next five. These changes may or may not occur, because they may or may not make the funding threshold.  In most cases right now, they are not going to make the funding threshold.

SLD: C4ISR is essential for a modern Coast Guard to function.  Although ethereal to many, the glue, which holds the platforms together, is clearly C4ISR.  Could you provide a sense of the shift in performance enabled by the new C4ISR systems?

Admiral Day: Let’s talk about just the Eastern Pacific drug mission.  Let’s just use that as an example. In the old days, we literally went down there and bored holes in the water, and if we came across a drug vessel, it was by sheer luck.  It might be on a lookout list, and we might happen to see it.  Let’s fast-forward now to the 2000s and what we’ve started being able to do. 

By being able to fuse actionable intelligence, and not only that, but intelligence communicated at light speed.  So now, we’re to the point where we’re telling a Cutter to go point A, pick up smuggler B with load C.  And we’re doing that in real time with delivery of a common operational picture, which has been fused with intelligence.  That was unheard of 10 years ago.

SLD: So you’re contrasting on the one hand the hunt-and-peck method or the stumble across by chance method, versus having enough information to actually target a problem.

Admiral Day: And not only that, taking information from a wide range of intelligence sources and agencies that we can participate with and bringing it in and fusing it. And leveraging all those tools and being able to process that information to figure out anomalies and actually start doing these interdictions.

SLD: Could you contrast your experiences as a young sailor and a sailor doing the mission now? 

Admiral Day: Well, it’s a whole different framework.  The framework is shaped by most of the fusion of the information which is being done off the Cutter. The Cutter is merely a delivery mechanism for capability; the Cutter is now the point of the spear.  It has enabled the networks and all the systems back ashore at our Command Centers and our Intelligence Coordination Centers, whether it’d be from Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (JIATF) South or whether it’d be our own.

This ability to communicate that to them in real time allows to literally send them a common operational picture: the X is already on your radar screen, and you say go to that target.

SLD: So the difference here is that in the first case, you’re just throwing a spear out to the ocean.

Admiral Day: And hope you hit something.

SLD: And where you land, hopefully somebody’s near the spear. So the way you’re thinking is we have this grid over an area, and your platforms are the customers, so to speak, or the enforcers.

Admiral Day: Absolutely.  They’re the operational element that we are producing information for their mission execution.

SLD: The C4ISR systems are essential to changing the calculus of operations as well as enabling the USCG in its joint role as well?

Admiral Day: Yes.  For example, in the eastern Pacific, that’s done in JIATF South, which is an interagency task-force, they’re doing the lay-down based on the information that they’ve got.

They’re getting the intelligence feeds as well we’re getting intelligence feed and feeding into it.

Rear Admiral Lee Goddard

Rear Admiral Lee Goddard  was promoted to his current rank and became the Commander Maritime Border Command in February 2019.  Prior to this he was seconded as a Branch Head to the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.

Lee Goddard joined the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) in 1987 from Melbourne through the Australian Defence Force Academy where he completed his degree studies graduating with a Bachelor of Science in 1989. In his final year he was appointed as the first Naval Academy Cadet Captain and was awarded the RSL Sword of Leadership on graduation. In the following year while completing Seaman Officer training at the RAN College (Jervis Bay) in 1990 he was appointed College Captain and awarded the Queen’s Medal.

Throughout his career he has served at sea in Australian, Canadian, Malaysian and US Navy warships, and on operations in the Middle East. He gained his Bridge Watch-keeping Certificate in early 1992 while serving on exchange with the Canadian Navy, in HMCS Yukon based in Victoria, British Colombia. Later in 1993-1995 he served as a Watch/Executive Officer onboard Australia’s national tall ship STS Young Endeavour and he has been posted overseas to Malaysia and Bahrain.

In 1996 he completed the RAN Principal Warfare Officer’s course where as dux he was awarded both the Sydney-Emden prize and the RAN Sword of Excellence.  He was a member of the commissioning crews of the ANZAC Class frigates HMAS Arunta (Warfare Officer) during 1997 – 1999 and HMAS Stuart (Executive Officer) during 2001 – 2003.  During 2006-2008 he commanded the ANZAC Class frigate, HMAS Parramatta, and the ship was awarded the Duke of  Gloucester Cup in late 2008.   Lee Goodard was awarded the Conspicuous Service Cross (CSC), on Australia Day 2007, for service as the commander operations in the maritime component of Joint Operations Command.  

Following on from his first sea command in 2008 he was appointed Commander Sea Training.In 2009 he was posted as an inaugural member of the ‘New Generation Navy’ Team, as the Deputy Director Transformation & Innovation working closely with the Nous Group that reported directly to the Chief of Navy.

He was then selected to attend the US Naval War College in Newport Rhode Island, where he joined the Naval Command College, graduating in June 2010 and was awarded the War College’s International Leadership Prize. He was subsequently asked to remain at the War College as an International Fellow, teaching within the Department of Strategy and Policy at the Masters level.

On his return to Australia in early 2011 he was appointed as the Director Military Strategic Commitments at the Australian Defence Headquarters, working within the strategic level of Defence and across Government. He returned to sea in late 2012 to assume command of the upgraded Anzac Class warship HMAS Perth. On promotion to commodore in late 2014 he assumed the role of Commander Surface Forces.

Rear Admiral Goddard was awarded a Master of Arts (International Relations) in 1996, is member of the Australian Naval Institute council and has previously served as councilor with the Australian Institute of International Affairs. He has contributed to a range of professional and academic journals focused on international affairs and security issues.

The featured photo shows then Commodore Surface Force, Commodore Lee Goddard, RAN, speaking with Leading Seaman Marine Technician Candice O’Keefe in the Central Control Station during his visit to HMAS Canberra, Jervis Bay.

HMAS Canberra is the first of two Landing Helicopter Docks (LHDs), the largest ships ever built for the Navy.

The ship’s company is made up of 400 personnel from Navy, Army and Air Force.

HMAS Canberra was commissioned into the Royal Australian Navy in Sydney on 28 November 2014.

India Adds a New Attack Submarine: The Vela

05/28/2019

By India Strategic

Vela, the fourth Scorpene class submarine being constructed by Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited for the Indian Navy, was launched 06 May 2019, by Mrs Veena Ajay Kumar, wife of Dr Ajay Kumar, IAS, Secretary Defence Production, who was the Chief Guest on the occasion.

VAdm AK Saxena, CWP&A was also present during the launching ceremony. This event reaffirms the steps taken by Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Ltd (MDL) in the ongoing ‘Make In India’ programme, which is being actively implemented by the Department of Defence Production (MoD).

The submarine was towed to Mumbai Port Trust, for separation from the pontoon, after which she will undergo rigorous trials and tests, both in harbour and at sea before delivery to the Indian Navy.

The contract for the construction and Transfer-of-Technology for six Scorpene class submarines in series, has M/s Naval Group (formerly DCNS) of France as ‘Collaborator’ and are being built by MDL.

Cmde Rakesh Anand, Chairman and Managing Director, MDL said on the occasion that with the launching of the P15 B Destroyer ‘Imphal’ on 20 April 2019 and the, launching of Vela on 06 May 2019, were indeed some of the major events for MDL so far this year.

Presently Eight Warships and five submarines are under construction at MDL. MDL is one of the India’s leading shipyards with a capacity to meet requirements of the Indian Navy.

The Scorpene class of submarines can undertake multifarious tasks typically undertaken by any modern submarine which include anti-surface as well as anti-submarine warfare.

The transfer of technology involves appropriate technical support by Naval Group to MDL in the field of construction, integration and tests of the submarines in India which is achieved through transfer of technical data package to MDL through information system as well as on job training to MDL’s personnel on critical technologies.

Leveraging the experience and the transfer-of-technology of the Scorpene project, with enhanced and upgraded infrastructure, MDL, is ready for undertaking construction of the future submarines.

This article was published by our partner India Strategic in May 2019.

Amphibiosity Evolves in the Australian Defence Force: The Case of Indo-Pacific Endeavour 2019

During Bold Alligator 2013, we interviewed an ADF officer about the coming of a new amphibious capability to the ADF.

Second Line of Defense learned more about the Aussie transition with an opportunity to discuss the effort with an Aussie Army officer involved in Bold Alligator 2013.  LtCol Bonavita is currently the Australian Army liaison officer with the USMC and is based at Quantico.  He is finishing the final year of his three-year tour of duty in the United States. He participated last year in Bold Alligator 2012 with two other Aussie officers and in this year’s exercise with one other officer.

Throughout his interview, he emphasized that the Aussies have been preparing for the introduction of their new ships, in part by working with the USMC.  LtCol Bonavita said “as far as we [Australia] are concerned, the Marines are the experts on amphibious operations.” Australia will look to share much information with the USMC as its Amphibious capability emerges. This is already occurring with a program of personnel exchanges and combined training.

LtCol Bonavita believes his posting to Quantico has been at the perfect time, because “as the Marines are returning to their amphibious roots, we are rediscovering ours with the introduction of our large amphibious vessels.  Simultaneously, the Marines are establishing a presence in Darwin. These two issues have made for a busy assignment in the USA.”.

He also described how the working relationship with the USMC was an important part of the development of the Australian Army itself.  “We have done a lot of work with the Marines, including our officers attending USMC courses like the Expeditionary Warfare School, through to participating in exercises like Tailsman Saber, RIMPAC and Expeditionary Warrior, and exchanges with 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) in San Diego.” The relationships have been enduring. LTCOL Bonavita remarked that “When I was a platoon commander, a USMC company joined our battalion in Townsville as its MEU was deployed. In my current role I have found myself working with some of the very same officers from that Marine Company who are now USMC Colonels. It’s been very positive!”

LtCol Bonavita suggested that continual work with the Marines would help shape the Australian thinking about the new ships and its approach to amphibious operations. “We have a USMC Colonel attached to the Australian Army’s Deployable Joint Force Headquarters within the 1st Division, which is one of the organizations leading our amphibious capability development.”

He also felt that his time at the two Bold Alligator exercises, which he attended, were important in shaping his own understanding of the evolving amphibious operational capabilities.

He was asked about what he thought about the Osprey and he commented that his only negative comment about the aircraft was the limited space inside, but felt it was perfect for amphibious operations.“I was surprised by the ability of the wings to fold on deck allowing a greater number of these aircraft to deploy aboard the ship.  I was impressed with the redundancy of systems aboard the aircraft, which make it a very robust aircraft.  I was also impressed by its speed and range as well as its ability to land just about everywhere.  It really is a capable aircraft.”

He was asked about what he thought was the impact of the Marines exercising in the Northern Territory.

“The decision by the Australian government to invite the Marines to operate in the Northern Territory speaks volumes about the strength and good order of the relationship between Australia and the United States.”

That was 2019.

If you fast forward to 2019, the following article by Flight Lieutenant Bel Scott published by the ADF on May 23, 2019, highlights how far the ADF has come with its working of amphibiosity.

Three Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) personnel are controlling the airspace from a moving airstrip on board HMAS Canberra.

Squadron Leader Ross Madsen and Flight Lieutenants Hamish Upton and Paul Atteridge are deployed on Canberra – one of Australia’s two landing helicopter docks (LHDs) – for three months during Indo-Pacific Endeavour 2019 (IPE19).

A senior air traffic controller (ATC), Squadron Leader Madsen said providing an air traffic control service at sea was largely similar to on land.

“The biggest difference is the airfield moves and the runway points in a different direction, so we are constantly dealing with different airspaces,” Squadron Leader Madsen said.

The ATCs work within the Air Division, a tri-service division that integrates Army and Air Force personnel into the Navy team.

“Working on Canberra is a great example of joint operations, with RAAF controllers working alongside Navy on a Navy ship controlling the airspace for Army aircraft,” Squadron Leader Madsen said.

As well as helping the Australian Defence Force, the deployment benefits other nations involved.

“During IPE19, we’ve been working with other nations to enhance interoperability with different helicopters landing on Canberra’s deck and our MRH90s landing on their ships,” Squadron Leader Madsen said.

“We’ve also embarked four Army Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters, from the Australian Army’s 1st Aviation Regiment in Darwin, to train aircrew and ground staff for deck landing qualifications by day and night.”

Lieutenant Commander Tony Hammond, the officer in charge of flying operations in Canberra, said the ATCs brought experience managing many aircraft to enable safe and efficient flying operations.

“Additionally, having established points of contact at land bases, which control associated restricted airspace, has proven beneficial to successful completion of short-notice tasking,” Lieutenant Commander Hammond said.

“Having a joint environment on IPE19 demonstrates how the ADF works collaboratively to achieve the required capability of LHDs.”

Squadron Leader Madsen is enjoying being posted to a Navy ship, an uncommon experience for a RAAF officer.

“Certainly 35 years ago when I joined Air Force, I never expected to find myself sailing through the Bay of Bengal next to a Kilo-class submarine operated by the Indian Navy,” he said

 

 

Australians Incorporate Their Defense Industry into Indo-Pacific 2019

05/27/2019

By Flight Lieutenant Bel Scott

For the first time, Australia’s defence industry has been incorporated into Indo-Pacific Endeavour port visits.

The most recent engagement was on board HMAS Canberra at Changi Navy Base, Singapore, during Indo-Pacific Endeavour 2019 (IPE19).

Under the initiative, the Australian Defence Export Office (ADEO) together with the IPE19 Joint Task Force (JTF) showcases some of the prized outputs of Australian defence industry to host nations while industry representatives champion their products and services. Military members also provide their perspectives and practical operational experience in support of defence industry.

“I’ve really enjoyed discussing future capabilities and people power with our regional partners. Our relationships with our neighbours matters.”

JTF staff officer Squadron Leader Steven Rae has facilitated the exhibitions and said the collaboration involved a lot of planning.

“The goal of the Defence Export Expo is to achieve greater export successes, making Australia’s defence industry globally competitive, all in support of better capability for the Australian Defence Force. This aligns with the Defence Export Strategy,” Squadron Leader Rae said.

“From Canberra, I coordinate between the ADEO, various Defence attachés and other government agencies in each country we plan to visit, starting two or three months before we are due to arrive.

“Our team then briefs the executives of all the ships attached to the task group, and then, on arrival, assists in the execution of the plan for that port.”

“This is a great new initiative that illustrates the diversity of thinking that has gone into IPE19.”

He said Australian defence export capabilities and services were displayed during the official reception on board Canberra to maximise exposure and interest.

“For example, the owners of Wanachi, a mobile water purification system designed to withstand the harshest of conditions to produce fresh drinking water direct from source, were on display in Singapore,” he said..

“This innovative product can potentially save money and resources for Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel while on deployments, so naturally other defence organisations are interested.”

Other equipment included the Hawkei and Bushmaster Protected Mobility Vehicles, an EF88 Advanced Steyr from Thales Australia, DroneShield’s drone gun, the Soldier Combat Ensemble from Australian Defence Apparel, and products from Aspen Medical, which delivers health services to the ADF.

“This is a great new initiative that illustrates the diversity of thinking that has gone into IPE19,” Squadron Leader Rae said.

“I’ve really enjoyed discussing future capabilities and people power with our regional partners. Our relationships with our neighbours matters.”

IPE19 is on the home stretch back to Australia after a successful three-month engagement with regional partners.

Published by the Australian Department of Defence on May 23, 2019.

The featured photo shows Squadron Leader Steven Rae with Andy and Zoe Cullen, the owners of Wananchi Mobile Water Purification, at the HMAS Canberra Defence Industry Expo in Singapore during Indo-Pacific Endeavour 2019. Photo: Corporal Kylie Gibson

 

Training for the Kill Web: The Gladiator Building Block

By Robbin Laird

There is a clear recognition that an ability to actually have a kill web force requires the training to actually do it.

In the live environment the focus will be upon working the physical pieces of operating air systems with distributed ground and naval capabilities.

The challenge will be to work distributed C2 at the tactical edge along with mission level command of the force as well.

And such training will require significant ops space, of the sort the US, Canada and Australia have available.

Butthe virtual environment is crucial in order to use a number of the fifth gen capabilities, associated with tron warfare and other cross leveraging means which one would not like the adversary to be able to see in the operational space.

This means then that the preparation for kill web ops requires combining live and virtual training either in the same physical training space or through visual engagement across training spaces.

What a kill web allows you to do is to operate a force appropriate to the full spectrum crisis management environment which the liberal democracies face.

Because the adversaries are building to mass and are emphasizing expansion of strike capabilities controlled by a very hierarchical command structure, the kind of force which will best fit Western interests and capabilities is clearly a. distributed one.

Fortunately, the technology is already here to build effectively down this path, a path which allows engagement at the low end and provides building blocks to higher end capabilities.

Recently, the UK MoD announced a new training effort which clearly provides a building block for shaping the way ahead along the lines described above.

According to a recent story published May 16, 2019 on the UK MoD website, the Gladiator program was announced and described.

Speaking on a visit to RAF Waddington today, the Minister announced a £36m contract for simulation technology which can replicate up to three real-life scenarios simultaneously and independently of each other, allowing US and UK aircrew to experience the same battle environment and threats.

The capability, known as ‘Gladiator’, will give the RAF unprecedented training flexibility, enabling pilots to exercise capabilities, tactics and procedures that would be impossible in the live environment due to airspace, aircraft availability, or security constraints.

Defence Minister Stuart Andrew said:

“This synthetic training technology offers the RAF a cost-effective, powerful and safe way to prepare our aircrew for the complex threats they will face on the battlefield.

“The UK-US defence partnership is already the deepest and most advanced of any two countries and now our pilots will be able to train for the frontline more closely than ever.”

The manufacture and design of the capability is expected to be completed within two years, with aircrew to start training on the equipment in autumn 2021.

Initially, Typhoon pilots will be able to fly virtual missions alongside their counterpart aircrews in America and interact with UK and US Joint Terminal Attack Controllers who direct combat aircraft from an advanced ground-based position. F-35 Lightning jets are expected to be added to the package by September 2021.

The RAF will also look to include Wedgetail early warning radar aircraft in the future, as well as upgrading the capability to enable the Royal Navy and the Army air assets to undertake collective training exercises.

The contract, signed with Boeing Defence UK, includes the design and manufacture of the simulation systems and software, and the first five years of support, sustaining up to 40 highly skilled UK jobs. The design and manufacture of the software will take place in Fleet in Hampshire and Bristol, and the equipment will be installed at RAF Waddington.

Flight Simulator and Synthetic Training Portfolio Team Leader, Russ Cole, said:

“The award of this contract heralds a 21st century capability that will transform the ability of the RAF to undertake collective operations, tactics and procedures training in the synthetic environment that cannot be performed in the live environment.

“We are looking forward to working with Boeing over the next few years to design, build, deliver and operate a state-of-the-art training hub at the centre of a collective training web capability.”

Air Commodore David Bradshaw, Senior Responsible Owner for the programme said:

“This contract award signals the go-ahead for the core element of the Royal Air Force’s future synthetic training capability. This new capability, known as Gladiator, will provide a step-change in the ability of our front-line Forces to train together in operationally realistic situations to meet an ever-increasing adversary threat.”

“Combined with other Programmes that are delivering new aircraft simulators to front-line Squadrons, Gladiator will allow aircrew to hone their skills, training with colleagues and allies. Our crews will be better prepared for a range of current and potential scenarios they may face. Gladiator is the pathfinder programme for similar synthetic training solutions planned across UK Defence.”

The featured photo shows Stuart Andrew MP, the Minister for Defence Procurement visiting RAF Waddington on May 16, 2019.

The reason for this visit is to provide the Minister of Defence Procurement with a comprehensive understand the industrial relationshups, transition plans for the various fleets and the international partnerships the ISTAR Force Elements foster.

 

 

Global Supply Chain Support: The Osprey Case Study

05/25/2019

Although the Osprey has become a globally deployed aircraft, the supply chain has not.

This is crucial as we move forward into an era of regionally specific crises involving peer competitors.

It will not just a race to get that Fed Ex delivery from the US through foreign customs, it will be about adversaries deliberately focusing on disrupting our supply chains.

And having the parts needed to maintain operational. aircraft through a crisis, will be a core requirement, not just a nice to have capability.

The recent interview with Major Paul M. Herrle,  head of MALS-26 which is part of MAG-26, argued that is increasingly crucial to have an integrated sustainment system and one, which could flow parts to a globally deployed force as well.

A recent masters thesis by Jacob P. Jones published in December 2018 and done within the Naval Postgraduate School program provided an overview on the challenges facing the Osprey supply chain system. He did so from the standpoint of taking modern notions of supply chain management and comparing the theory against the practice as seen from data which he analyzed with regard to Osprey deployments.

He highlighted the challenge as follows: “Due to the distributed nature of current naval forces, challenges supporting individual elements has increased. Logistics structures centered on supporting the carrier strike group are becoming antiquated as forces operate in a more dispersed fashion, growing the number of elements needing logistical support….”

After his analysis of data from a corps USMC Osprey squadron he reached the following conclusion:

Overwhelmingly, the supply chain did not behave as an agile network, adjusting and adapting to the needs of VMM-264.

After analyzing a 92-day period, the supply documents reported on the AMSRR conveyed a supply network that was reliant on supply nodes located within the continental United States.

Highlighting “BA” Not Mission Capable Supply (NMCS) parts the research showed that 71.3% of the requisitions were sourced from the continental United States, while DLA Europe Germersheim, Germany (SDQ), sourced only 0.19% of the requests.

Furthermore, those parts with higher quantities, between 5 and 22 items, were sourced from DLA Fort Belvoir, Virginia (SMS), NAS Oceana, Virginia (PNZ), and U.S. Navy Mayport, Florida (P29). “BA” Partial Mission Capable Supply (PMCS) displayed similar sourcing rates from the United States, accounting for 73.6% of the components.

None of the PMCS parts were sourced from DLA Europe or other European distribution centers. “AS” coded parts shared comparable results. “AS” NMCS and PMCS sourcing activities accounted for 83.4% and 72% of the components forwarded from the United States.

None of the parts initially given a status code of “AS” were sourced within the European theater of operation.

If this approach is taken with the F-35B or the new CH-53K, the inability to support the 21st century ACE will be enhanced.

It is time to deal with the global sourcing problem head on.

It is a basing, sourcing and structural issue; not an act of nature.

Rather than GAO writing continuous reports on parts shortages, it would be much more useful if the Department put together a structure that is congruent with how the 21st century force operates, rather than one that feeds the US based depots.

The featured photo shows a V-22 Osprey with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 268 refueling before departure from Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, Okinawa, on Japan, March 26, 2019.

VMM-268’s stop on the island was part of a 9,816-kilometer flight across the Pacific to train with U.S. allies in the region. (United States Marine Corps photo by Pfc. Ethan LeBlanc)

The thesis can be read below:

18Dec_Jones_Jacob

US Working With India on Enhanced ASW Capability

05/24/2019

Clearly, as the challenge from the Chinese Navy grows, the US needs to work with core allies and partners to shape more effective defenses in the years ahead.

India is clearly a partner in this effort.

According to an article published in April 2019by our partner India Strategic, the US State Department has approved sale of MH-60R ASW helicopters to India.

New Delhi. The US State Department has approved the sale of 24 Lockheed Martin MH-60R anti-submarine helicopters to India, paving the way for final negotiations to set the price and what onboard equipment and weapons will be required by the Indian Navy.

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) of the State Department announced approval on April 2, under the Foreign Military Sale (FMS) programme “for an estimated $2.6 billion” for the multi-mission helicopters. Procedurally, DSCA has to notify the US Congress, which it did, saying the proposed sale will strengthen the US-Indian strategic relationship and “improve the security of a major defensive partner which continues to be an important force for political stability, peace, and economic progress in the Indo-Pacific and South Asia region.”

This is the first time that the Indian Navy will get one of the most advanced Anti-submarine helicopters, equipped with Raytheon’s MK-54 torpedoes, Lockheed Martin’s Hellfire missiles, Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) and its Rockets, Night Fighting systems, sophisticated radars and secure communication devices. Just about the same that the US Navy uses.

The Indian Navy had decided about five years ago to go in for this helicopter, then Made and Sold by Sikorsky, and as usual there were procedural hiccups in India. Later, Lockheed Martin acquired Sikorsky, and the deal was closed.

Air Vice Marshal AJS Walia (Retd) and later Dr Vivek Lall, Lockheed Martin’s Vice President for Strategy and Business Development, coordinated the negotiations with Indian authorities. The Ministry of Defence will now set up a Price Negotiations Committee (PNC) to finalise the deal, and the supply of helicopters will commence around three years after the first payment is made.

Indian Navy sources said the helicopters are needed at the earliest possible, and the US company may be asked to expedite the delivery on As Soon As Possible basis.

As for the Weapons and Systems on board, DSCA said:

The Government of India has requested to buy twenty-four (24) MH-60R Multi-Mission helicopters, equipped with the following: 

Thirty (30) APS-153(V) Multi-Mode radars (24 installed, 6 spares); sixty (60) T700-GE-401C engines (48 installed and 12 spares); twenty-four (24) Airborne Low Frequency System (ALFS) (20 installed, 4 spares); thirty (30) AN/AAS-44C(V) Multi-Spectral Targeting System (24 installed, 6 spares); fifty-four (54) Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation Systems (EGI) with Selective Availability/Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) (48 installed, 6 spares); one thousand (1,000) AN/SSQ-36/53/62 sonobuoys; ten (10) AGM-114 Hellfire missiles; five (5) AGM-114 M36-E9 Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM); four (4) AGM-114Q Hellfire Training missiles; thirty-eight (38) Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System (APKWS) rockets; thirty (30) MK-54 torpedoes; twelve (12) M-240D Crew Served guns; twelve (12) GAU-21 Crew Served guns; two (2) Naval Strike Missile Emulators; four (4) Naval Strike Missile Captive Inert Training missiles; one (1) MH-60B/R Excess Defense Article (EDA) USN legacy aircraft. 

Also included are seventy (70) AN/AVS-9 Night Vision Devices; fifty-four (54) AN/ARC-210 RT-1990A(C) radios with COMSEC (48 installed, 6 spares); thirty (30) AN/ARC-220 High Frequency radios (24 installed, 6 spares); thirty (30) AN/APX-123 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponders (24 installed, 6 spares); spare engine containers; facilities study, design, and construction; spare and repair parts; support and test equipment; communication equipment; ferry support; publications and technical documentation; personnel training and training equipment; US Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistical and program support.

The total estimated cost is $2.6 billion.

Finland Works Its Fighter Replacement Program

At the beginning of the 1990s, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland established a stance of enhanced independence when it purchased Hornets from the United States and began a process of working with Western allied airpower.

In an article published on February 16, 2018, we looked forward and backwards to the Finnish fighter capability.

The Finnish government is set to acquire 64 new fighter jets for its air force.

This is occurring as Nordic defense is being reworked, and the Northern European states are sorting out how to deal with what the Finnish Defense Minister Jussi Niinistö has referred to as the “new normal” in Russian behavior.

“It’s important that our armed forces have the equipment that they need to fulfill all of their fundamental roles,” said Niinistö.

Niinistö has described Russia’s more unpredictable behavior in the greater Baltic Sea region, particularly in the areas of political influencing methods and security policies, as the “new normal”.

“Changes in the security environment and the multi-purpose use or threat of power have become a new normal. Russia has shown in Ukraine and Syria that it possesses both the capacity and the will to use military power to push its goals,”

https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2017/01/26/global-vendors-size-up-finland-s-multibillion-dollar-defense-upgrades/

The new combat aircraft will be part of an integrated Finnish defense force in the evolving strategic environment of the 2020’s.

It is important to remember that the last major acquisition also occurred in a significant period of change for Finland in its strategic neighborhood.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the dynamics of change in the new Russian republic, Finland was able to negotiate its way out of the Cold War agreement with Russia in which Finland was committed to cooperate with Russia militarily in the case that an aggressor was threatening to use Finnish territory to attack the Soviet Union.

The agreement required mutual affirmation of the threat and the engagement but nonetheless was a major curb on Finnish military independence.

With the end of this agreement, and then the unification of Germany, and the opening of a new chapter in the development the European Union, Finland positioned itself for membership in the European Union in 1995.

The EU treaty contains a mutual security agreement for all of the members as well.

It was in this period of dynamic change, that Finland acquired new fighters for its air force, F-18 Hornet aircraft.

The fighter replacement program is being conducted under the auspices of the Strategic Projects Program.

According to the Finnish Ministry of Defence:

A sector called Strategic Projects Programme operates directly under the Director General of the Resource Policy Department. This programme is led by Project Coordinator Lauri Puranen.

Strategic projects include the replacement of the capabilities of the Hornet fleet (HX project) and the replacement of the Navy’s vessels which are scheduled to be decommissioned (Squadron 2020).

The Strategic Projects Programme is responsible for steering and coordinating strategic projects in the Ministry of Defence so that national defence policy objectives and timely replacement of ageing military capabilities are ensured while taking into account the security policy environment. 

The Strategic Projects Programme plans and manages external quality assurance, prepares funding models for projects and formulates the decision-making criteria for security and defence policy areas when procurement decisions are dealt with. The Programme is also responsible for a project-based coordination of cooperation, communications and travels to gather information. 

Furthermore, it maintains project-based situational awareness and prepares meetings as part of the steering process. The unit cooperates closely with other units in the Ministry of Defence as well as with organisations responsible for the Defence Forces’ strategic projects.

And earlier this month, Lauri Puranen provided an English translation of articles which he had published earlier in Finnish about the fighter replacement program.

Review of the blogs on the HX programme during the past 12 months

Lauri Puranen

I write a blog in Finnish about the background of and current matters related to the HX programme. If it was translated into other languages, my blog would probably have more readers; but so far it has been only in Finnish.

This rather long review published exceptionally in English is a compilation of the HX blog posts over the past year. My aim has been to put together the most relevant points about the background and developments of the programme.

In March 2018 I wrote this about the HX system and the goal of the HX fighter programme:

With the available resources, our task in the HX programme is to ensure that the best possible capability be procured for Finland’s defence system. Therefore, it is not a matter of a particular fighter plane’s features or its performance in air combat but what is desired for the Air Force’s entire combat capability in the future.

Its capabilities will be based on multi-role fighters: integrated sensors, aircraft self-protection systems, data exchange systems and other systems.  In addition to effective missiles, bombs and cannons, the capability of multi-role fighters to engage targets in the air, on land and at sea is based on electronic warfare systems, which all have been integrated into multi-role fighters and their systems.

The information from the aircraft’s own systems is not enough; the effectiveness of modern weapons and electronic systems requires also data acquired outside and input in advance about, for example, the location of targets and the parameters of systems used by the enemy. When all these elements work seamlessly together, the result is a combat-ready multi-role fighter.

A single multi-role fighter can be compared to a single ice-hockey player. More points will be scored only when the team consists of top-level individuals who play seamlessly together. In air warfare, a team corresponds to a section formed of four multi-role fighters and an air combat leader.

The effectiveness of this section is dependent on the capabilities of the fighters, the networking between fighters and the air combat leader and networking with other actors in the defence system. Here networking means immediate sharing of information on targets, target indication and aircraft position with the section’s other aircraft and air combat leader.

This is how all aircraft of the section can have a real time and comprehensive situation awareness that is notably more comprehensive than that of a single fighter.

Finland must be able to use the capabilities discussed above for thirty years. In April 2018, I wrote on the decision-making model of the HX fighter programme:

The procurement decision will have a substantial effect on the defence system’s capabilities and credibility. The Air Force’s high preparedness and high-performing multi-role fighter systems will play a significant role in securing a preventive threshold.

The replacement of the Hornet fleet will define the Air Force’s entire combat capability into the beginning of the 2060s. It is therefore vital that development prospects of each candidate aircraft will be critically evaluated for all areas of key importance when making a procurement decision. High performance, security of supply and appropriate operating costs are Finland’s key requirements for the coming decades.

Since the capabilities in Finland’s environment that challenge our defence evolve all the time, multi-role fighters must bring added value to the defence solution for their entire 30-year life cycle. It must be possible to develop the systems and features of the multi-role fighters over time, thus maintaining the defence capability also in the future. Avionics, radar, weapon and electronic warfare systems are software-defined but the “hardware”, computers and weapons, requires upgrading as well.

When considering the procurement decision, it is similarly essential to evaluate the candidates for the number of aircraft in use and the extent of the user community over the projected life cycle into the 2060s. Other user nations will share the costs with us.

Selecting a multi-role fighter is based on five decision making areas: the multi-role fighter’s military capability, security of supply, industrial cooperation, procurement and life cycle costs, and security and defence policy implications. (Editorial remark: Military capability is the only decision-making area where the candidates will be compared. The other areas are assessed as pass or fail. Defence and security policy will be assessed separately).

Since the procurement will have an impact on the Defence Forces’ operational capability and define the Air Force’s entire combat capability into the 2060s, a system with the greatest capabilities, including supporting elements, should be selected.

The quotations will be placed in an order of priority, based solely on military capabilities; as to the other decision making areas, the quotation shall meet the strict requirements laid down in the Request for Quotation.

Towards the end of 2018, public discussion on the number of aircraft became more heated.  I took up the needs of and justifications for defence:

As to the number of fighters, claims have been made that full capabilities could be achieved with fewer, more effective modern fighters.  Some comments have even proposed reducing capabilities.

Since full replacement of capabilities requires a procurement of the same size as that of the Hornet fleet, Finland invited tenders for 64 multi-role fighters. There are three key factors that impact this number: Finland’s military operating environment, tasks set for the Defence Forces and resources allocated to defence.

Changes in the security environment

Since the 1992 decision to procure Hornets, Finland’s security environment has changed and has become more challenging. The situation in Europe is also more strained. These changes do not support the idea to decrease the number of fighters, quite the contrary. Although the significance of the procurement contract extends beyond the current security political situation and defence planning cannot depend on the political climate, the impact of the HX Fighter Programme is monumental in creating a credible defence capability.

Tasks of the Defence Forces

The Defence Forces have clearly set tasks to maintain a credible and preventive defence capability and the capacity for defending Finland’s entire territory. These tasks have not changed since the procurement of the Hornet fleet.  Finland as a militarily non-allied country is responsible for its own defence, despite the increased international cooperation.

The foundation of the Defence Forces’ deterrence capacity is a proven, flexible and proactive preparedness control, with a credible capacity for repelling an attack, based on a sufficient amount of equipment fit for combat, competent personnel and the will to defend the country.

Defending Finland’s airspace and supporting the other services engaged in combat require that a sufficient number of fighters must be available in all situations; only fighters in the air increase the defence capability.  The operational range of a fighter is about 500 km, which means that in Finland it is necessary to be able to operate simultaneously in two directions. In one operational direction, several four-fighter sections are needed, and when necessary, they will have to be fuelled and armed on the ground. Some of the fleet are always out of use because of servicing.

Undisputedly the new fighters will be more effective than the Hornet fleet, but so are the adversaries in the air who also employ new aircraft; military technology evolves everywhere. It is a fact that the new multi-role fighters have capabilities not exceeding those of the Hornets’ with similar operating speed, radius and time. Moreover, the arming and fuelling time on the ground for a new sortie needs to be roughly the same.

In view of the Defence Forces’ tasks, the full replacement of the Hornet fleet requires that the current number of fighters will be kept.

Allocated defence resources

Resources in the defence system consist of funding, defence materiel, personnel, competences and infrastructure. These must be able to produce the Defence Forces’ peacetime activities and results. Simply put, we currently have resources for just over 60 fighters to be maintained and operated by the Air Force. The existing infrastructure, personnel, training system, flight hour adjustment, and the command and control system can be exploited when new multi-role fighters are introduced.

It has been stated that while the new multi-role fighters will be financed from outside the regular defence budget, their operating and maintenance will have to be financed from the regular defence budget.

Even if it was to some extent justified to procure more fighters than what the current number is, the size and resources of the Air Force influence what can be done. In this respect, sixty-four is the right number of new multi-role fighters for our defence system.

In January 2019, before tenders were received, I published a blog where I reflected on coming events in 2019:

The received tenders will be analysed during this spring and, based on them, negotiations will be conducted with the tenderers. As to reaching a procurement decision, 2019 is too early for drawing conclusions. Instead of making comparisons, the aim this spring is to analyse and fully understand the concept and the whole package offered by the tenderers, and to continue the negotiations to reach the best possible solution for Finland. After the spring negotiations and possible steering by the new government, a more specified Request for Quotation (RfQ) will be issued. The goal is to send the RfQ in early autumn 2019.

To evaluate the tenders, an HX Evaluation Handbook was written to ensure an accurate implementation of the evaluation.  By means of the Handbook it is possible to ensure impartiality and to enable making comparisons in all areas of the decision model.

The responses to the preliminary RFQ build around the package of 64 aircraft. It is assumed that the system packages of the five tenderers are very different from one another because of different sensors, weapons, data, and training and servicing solutions. Each tenderer has, of course, a different flying platform.  All tenders are very likely to fall within the price range of EUR 7 to 10 billion as defined in the government’s Defence Policy Report.

Tough competition is in the buyer’s advantage. Keeping in mind the requirements for full replacement of capabilities, the aim is to procure best possible capability for Finland and as advantageously as possible. The final procurement costs will become more accurate after analysing the tenders, based on the new government’s steering.  Preventive and defence capabilities as part of the defence system are to be the key criterion for the system to be procured.

The ultimate capabilities and components, including the number of fighters, will become clear in the course of the tendering process and evaluations.

All tenders are confidential and their contents cannot be published as they contain both secret information on required capabilities and commercially confidential information.  The defence administration will inform of the progress and stages of the project.

To conclude, here is a blog I published some weeks ago on the start of the negotiations:

Negotiations started in March and they are being conducted in Finland, with a similar time frame reserved for each candidate. All areas of the decision model will be addressed: evaluation of capabilities, security of supply, contract terms, cost information and industrial cooperation.

The first round of negotiations will be concluded in May. The second round will be conducted in the course of summer, with the aim to discuss complementary information requested and received from tenderers, and to address any other business that may rise. The third round of negotiations will be conducted in early autumn, preparing the candidates for receiving a more specific RfQ

After the first stage or the three rounds of negotiations, a more specific RfQ will be sent in autumn 2019.

The second stage will start after answers have been received.

The final tenders will be requested in 2020 and the procurement decision will be made in 2021.

Lauri Puranen

Program Director, MoD

Major General, ret.